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HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAM AND IDENTITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND CHINA

ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT

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Editorial

In this issue, we move away from our customary focus on the Muslim Middle East and Muslims in the West and turn toward Southeast Asia and China. Here, we find Muslim communities that seem not to be so entranced by what we in the West consider to be the most pressing issues: the Muslim world vs. the West and/or modernity, the Abrahamic faiths trialogue, political and economic reform, the suitability of western-style democracy in Muslim countries, and the rise of Islamic "fundamentalism," "terrorism," "extremism," or whatever similar term the media throws at us.

Excluding Indonesia and Malaysia, the overriding concerns of these Muslims appear to be different, for they are often viewed as unwanted or ignored minority communities. For example, Muslims living in Xinjiang, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines are confronted daily by hostile or indifferent regimes that want their natural resources and land. Thus, their main concerns are actual (as opposed to theoretical) justice, being allowed to remain "different" instead of being forced to assimilate, and passing on their religious and cultural identities in a hostile environment.

In interfaith terms, their intellectuals are involved in other discourses: Islam and Buddhism, Confucianism, communism, folk religion, cultural chauvinism, and others. To cite an example, one of my Cham Muslim friends from Vietnam translated the Qur'an into Vietnamese several years ago. According to him, the hardest part was translating such monotheistic concepts as God, sin, final judgment, good, and evil into a non-monotheistic language that has no words for such concepts. One of our articles (Peterson) deals with how Chinese Muslim scholars of the pre-modern era tried to solve this problem.

Several of our articles deal with China, whose rite of passage into modernity might have killed a lesser nation. Within the space of 100 years, it was ruled by a highly traditional empire engulfed in its own hubris, a nationalist republican regime beset by a virulent communist insurgency and Japanese invasion, and an extremely radical revolutionary communist regime. And now it is an economic dynamo, due to its "capitalism with Chinese characteristics." But what do we know of its Muslims, other than that the Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang continue to be restive and that the Bush administration has accepted Beijing's claim that several of Xinjiang's secessionist groups have links with the Taliban and al-Qaeda?

We lead off with Philipp Bruckmayr's "The Cham Muslims of Cambodia: From Forgotten Minority to Focal Point of Islamic Internationalism." He introduces us to this resilient community, descendants of the Hinduized (and much later partially Islamized) kingdom of Champa, the former ruler of much of present-day Vietnam's central region. He looks at them before and after the holocaust that engulfed them, their origin, what was important to them, and why the Khmer Rouge unleashed their wrath against them. Going one step further, he explains how this community is now rejoining the larger Islamic world that had forgotten about it centuries ago. Based on his fieldwork during the summer of 2005, Burckmayr also informs us of the new challenges facing the Cham: the influx of alien interpretations of Islam, conflicts between rural and urban Muslims, the close relationship of the community's leaders with the ruling Cambodian People's Party, and Cambodia's new role in the "war on terror."

In our "Forum" section, Ba Trung Phu introduces us to the Cham Bani of Vietnam, who live in the traditional Cham heartland and follow the traditional ways. Having grown up in this culture, he offers an insider's view of their version of "pure" Islam. As honored guests of the community's leader, my friend (who grew up there) and I attended their *tarāwīḥ* prayers during Ramadan 1993. This was the first time they had allowed the "other" into their mosque since the village-wide split that had occurred after orthodox Sunni Islam arrived in the 1960s. I watched two imams, dressed in white and wearing solar-orb-type hats, recite the *adhān*, which seemed to take several minutes and contained few recognizably Arabic words. I saw the women, none of whom wore the hijab, and some of the men perform the full-body prostration that I have seen in Hindu and Buddhist temples. After they joined the other imams in the front to pray on the community's behalf in front of tall grayish-colored candles, we sat and talked with the betel-nut-chewing leader and slowly acquired an audience eager to learn about us.

Next, we present three articles on the complicated land of China. First is Kristian Petersen's "Reconstructing Islam: Muslim Education and Literature in Ming-Qing China." In his fascinating article, he traces the Muslim scholars' long-term (and largely one-sided) scholarly process to convince their non-Muslim colleagues to accept Islamic knowledge as a legitimate and recognized part of classical Chinese civilization. Their claim was based on two major assertions: Muhammad enjoyed the same stature as China's revered ancient sages, and Islam was the equivalent of their *dao* (path). Generations of Muslim scholars devoted themselves to this, fearing that Islam might one day vanish due to the Muslims' growing inability to read the original Arabic-

and Persian-language texts and because many children were being lost to the surrounding Chinese civilization. To solve this problem, they developed the *Han Kitab*, a corpus of indigenous Islamic literature written in Chinese during 1600-1750. Petersen details this process for us, as well as its ultimate fate.

Haiyun Ma's "Patriotic and Pious Muslim Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century China: The Case of Ma Jian" follows the career of a Chinese Muslim intellectual who sought to secure a respected place for Muslims and Islamic knowledge under the Republicans (1911-49) and the Communists (1949-). After a brief account of Ma Jian's early years, he analyzes this scholar's attempts to convince both regimes that allowing Muslim children to acquire Islamic knowledge in the state-controlled education system would benefit the people and the nation. Although unsuccessful in this and in his quest to reform the existing mosque-centered education system that isolated the Muslims from the surrounding Chinese society, Ma Jian left behind a valuable legacy of translations from Arabic (including the Qur'an), made Arabic and Islamic sciences for the first time a respectable part of Beijing University's curricula, and trained a new generation of Muslim and non-Muslim scholars to carry on his vision of solidifying China's ties with the Muslim world.

Our final article, Ross Cuthbert's "Beijing Rides the Bandwagon: A Critical Analysis of Islam and Separatism in Xinjiang," examines how Beijing, in the aftermath of 9/11, persuaded the Bush administration that indigenous Uygur Muslim opposition to repressive official policies was due to the restive indigenous population's supposed "Islamist" orientation and "links" with the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Cuthbert does all of us a service by discrediting Beijing's foundational document for this claim: "East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity." He informs us of why Beijing holds on to this restive province, how it views the many separatist groups, the problems associated with translating Chinese into English, and the context in which the report was released. The article ends with an assessment of Uygur-Han relationships and existing realities on the ground in Xinjiang.

This ties in well with Rebiya Kadeer's "Forum" article on living as an economically successful and outspoken Uyghur woman in Xinjiang. Once considered one of China's ten richest people, everything changed when she began to speak about her people's plight at the national level. Unfortunately, this brave woman cannot match the "superstar" status of neighboring Tibet's Dalai Lama; nor does "Xinjiang" conjure up Tibet's long-standing romanticized "mystical" and "exotic" image. As a result, it will be an uphill battle to raise the concern of western politicians and the general public.

Our other "Forum" article deals with the need for a Muslim-Buddhist interfaith dialogue. Chaiwat Satha-Anand's "A Rumor of Anger: Understand-

ing Muslims' Voices in the context of 'Pure War'" discusses how southern Thailand's Muslim community views its place within the surrounding sea of Buddhist Thailand as well as its relationship with a not-always-sympathetic government located in far-away Bangkok. The author pays special attention to the issues of cultural insensitivity and rumor in maintaining the Muslims' sense of alienation. Given the increased level of violence and tension during the last several years, this article is an eye-opener.

While this issue was being put together, an important event took place: On 15 April 2006, North American Muslim leaders finally met with the Dalai Lama, who had requested such a meeting ten years ago. "What was so unusual about that?" it might be asked. Well, most Muslims do not consider Buddhism to be a valid religion, for Buddhists have no concept of God, sin, or the Day of Judgment; believe in reincarnation, the value of monks and monasteries, and "worship" statues; and, perhaps most importantly, claim that since God (in the monotheistic understanding of the term) does not exist, each person must find his/her own way to enlightenment by choosing a suitable path, as opposed to listening to the religious community's leaders.

The fact that they had to ask the fourteenth incarnation of Avalokiteśvara (The Buddha of Compassion) for advice on how to improve Islam's image in the West proves that their strategies have reached a dead end and that new insight – and perhaps new blood – is badly needed. Maybe by taking this step they have finally realized that there is more to a genuine interfaith dialogue and an exchange of worldviews than just talking with fellow monotheists. In fact, there is a whole world of atheists, communists, secular humanists, Hindus, Buddhists, Confucianists, Shintoists, and followers of traditional indigenous religions with whom Muslims should be talking. Let's include them in our discussions of how to remain spiritual beings in this increasingly materialistic and consumer-driven culture that leaves many of us so frustrated at the end of the day.

We have put a lot of effort into this issue in the hope of broadening our readers' horizons. It is our desire that Muslims in the West leave their comfortable cocoon of fellow monotheists and ethnic cliques and venture forth into what is "uncharted territory" for so many of us. If we do not expose ourselves to new ideas and new possibilities, we will stagnate and, maybe one day, disappear. The meeting with the Dalai Lama is a step in the right direction. May there be many more – and soon!

Jay Willoughby
Special Issue Guest Editor

The Cham Muslims of Cambodia: From Forgotten Minority to Focal Point of Islamic Internationalism

Philipp Bruckmayr

Abstract

The Cham Muslims of Cambodia are descendents of Champa, a once-powerful Hindu-Buddhist kingdom located in modern-day central and southern Vietnam. Champa existed from the second century CE until its complete annexation by its long-time rival, the Dai Viet, in 1832.[1] Its gradual loss of territory caused several waves of immigration to Cambodia between the crucial dates of 1471 and 1835 (the start of violent repression against the Cham in their last, and finally also annexed, principality: Panduranga).[2] It seems that the first wave allied itself with Cambodia's Malay community, with whom the Cham share ethno-linguistic (as both groups are speakers of Austronesian languages) and cultural (e.g., matrilinear customs) heritage, as well as their status as foreign immigrants. Through this contact, they were Islamized.

This article presents an overview of the religious and political development of Cambodia's Cham Muslims, most of whom are Sunnis, from the days of French colonialism up to the present, and shows how this formerly neglected minority became a showcase of Islamic internationalism. Contact persons or interviewees were recommended to me by Dr. Sos Mousine (CMDF, CAMSA, and the Ministry of Agriculture), Set Muhammadsis (CAMSA, CMDF) or Dato Hajji Alwi Muhammad (MAI Terengganu), or were sought out by myself. As I was mainly interested in religious change and the rebuilding of religious infrastructure, I visited many mosques and schools for interviews, which were conducted in English, Arabic, or with a Khmer or Cham translator.

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Islam in Cambodia

Before Democratic Kampuchea

There is hardly any information concerning Islamic practices in Cambodia before the French protectorate. European visitors and the *Royal Chronicles* note only the existence of mosques or the political and economic role of the Cham and Malays. While the Cham Bani in Vietnam remained attached to their distinctive religion, coupling rudimentary Islamic beliefs with traces of Brahmanism, the Cham in Cambodia supposedly became orthodox Shafi`is due to Malay influence. Indeed, in eighteenth-century Cham manuscripts, we learn of Malay efforts to lead the Cham of Panduranga (now in Vietnam) to orthodox Islam.[3] Furthermore, we know of the *katip* (*khaṭīb* [preacher]) Sumat, who returned to Cambodia in 1833 after studying in Makkah and subsequently conducted a preaching mission in Panduranga, where he led an anti-Vietnamese revolt.[4] It is reasonable to assume that it was mainly his Muslim followers who fled to Cambodia after its suppression.

As the existence of thirty-five Cham Jahed villages proves, not all Cham in Cambodia experienced the same degree of Malay influence. The Jahed, who are not Sunnis, pray only on Friday and are considered the preservers of Cham culture, as only they can still read and write in the classical Sanskrit-derived Cham script.[5] The other Cambodian Cham use an adapted form of the Arabic-derived Jawi script used by the Malays before British colonialism.

The *Royal Chronicles'* reports of King Ramadhipati/Ibrahim's conversion in the 1640s provide a small piece of data: One described ritual closely resembles the practices of a Malay traditional healer (*bomoh*).[6] Although it is doubtful that the king actually participated, the description might have been inspired by actual rituals. Furthermore, it states that the king's officials who converted were actually circumcised,[7] as are the Sunni Cham. Thus, we can infer that although they were already Islamized to a certain degree, traditional folk beliefs were still prevalent in the Cham-Malay community.

For higher-level Islamic education, the community looked toward Patani (now in southern Thailand) and Kota Bharu (in Kelantan, Malaysia). The latter was already a center of religious education for students from all over Southeast Asia in the second half of the eighteenth century. It must have had an intellectual impact on Islamic education in Cambodia, as it is still the most important destination of Cham students seeking advanced religious education. In fact, they call it "little Makkah."[8]

During the first half of the twentieth century, by which time the majority of Cham had become Shafi`is and followers of the Malay understanding of Islam, they naturally were affected by the fierce conflicts raging between

the *kaum muda* (young group) reformists and the *kaum tua* (old group) traditionalists in the Malay-Indonesian world. Indeed, the Malay brand of Islam, which eventually prevailed over the distinctive, somewhat superficial, Cham brand (as preserved by the Jahed), was perceived as modern in the Cambodian context, despite its stagnation for almost 150 years. For example, since the first half of the seventeenth century, local Qur'anic commentary was based almost exclusively on Abd al-Rauf Singkeli's (d. ca. 1700) *Tarjumān al-Mustafīd*, which draws on the *Tafsīr al-Jalālayn* of al-Suyuti (d. 1505) and his teacher al-Mahalli. Until recently, this was the only tafsir of the entire Qur'an in the Malay language.[9]

Islamic modernism, as preached by Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935), took hold in Southeast Asia through the *kaum muda*, who attacked the religious establishment for its backwardness and called for fresh *ijtihād* (independent judgment in juridical matters) and the purification of doctrine and practices (e.g., making pilgrimages to the graves of Islamic holy men; belief in magic; and, of great importance in Cambodia, specific burial, marriage, and birth rituals lacking Islamic justification). Another significant dispute centered on the *uṣallī* (*nīyah*, stating one's intention as start of the prayer). The stagnation in the field of literature and the inability to adapt to the modern world's challenges were blamed on strict *taqlīd* (imitation) and the traditional form of teaching in study groups (*ḥalaqah*), where students of different ages sat around the teacher and learned by rote. The modernists introduced a classroom system far less based on plain memorization, encouraged education for boys and girls, and often included secular subjects in the curriculum.[10]

The *kaum muda* rose to prominence at an early date in the Dutch East Indies (the founding of the now multi-million strong modernist mass organization Muhammdiya in 1912 can be seen as a hallmark in this context) and in the Malaysian Straits Settlements. However, it had a lesser impact on the rest of British Malaya, including Kota Bahru/Kelantan. Yet in the latter area, Islamic education was pushed forward by compiling dictionaries and tables of Arabic verb forms for Malay students by Muhammad Yusuf To' Kenali (d. 1933) after his return from twenty years of study in the Middle East.[11]

Although the *kaum muda* must have made its first inroads into Cambodia at least two decades earlier (in the 1930s Phum Trea had two famous schools, one with a modern mixed curriculum[12]), serious conflict broke out only in the 1950s via Imam Ali Musa's zealous propagation of its ideas upon his return to Kampong Cham province after long years of study in Kelantan. Bitter disputes mostly revolved around the correct burial ritual. The more modern educated *kaum muda* also claimed superiority because of their

expertise in Arabic, whereas the *kaum tua*, graduates of the old *ḥalaqah* system, still relied almost exclusively on old Malay literature.

Ali Musa was subsequently joined by Imam Ahmad, who had returned after studying in India (presumably influenced by an Indian reformist movement, most likely the Deobandis or the Nadwat al-Ulama[13]). As in other parts of Southeast Asia and even in India, the resulting conflicts divided families and villages and even caused violent clashes. In 1960, the Cambodian government temporarily exiled the two imams to Thailand. Over the following years, the situation calmed down and a coexistence between the two parties ensued.[14]

In the 1970s, the Cham were caught in a downward spiral through civil war and the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime led by the Khmer Rouge. Whereas the Lon Nol regime used the Cham to pursue its own goals, the DK sought to destroy them as a distinct group.

Under the Khmer Rouge (1975-79)

Discussions about the fate of the Cham under the Khmer Rouge revolve around certain important questions. First, did they suffer disproportionally or not vis-à-vis the majority of Cambodians? While Michael Vickery denies that they suffered more than the average Khmer, Ben Kiernan and Cham researcher Ysa Osman see them as victims of specific genocidal policies.[15] Kiernan bases his suggestion on a presumed proportionally higher death toll among the Cham and estimates that approximately one-third of the estimated more than 250,000 Cham living in 1975 died under the DK regime.[16] According to Vickery, the 1975 Cham population was less than Kiernan's 250,000 and, therefore, suggests a much lower death toll.[17] However, Osman and Cham officials like current Grand Mufti Sos Kamry (Kamaruddin Yusuf) claim that there were approximately 700,000 Cham, thus implying the horrible death toll of 400,000-500,000.[18] Both Kiernan and Osman regard the 1979 Cham population to have numbered around 200,000.

All of these 1975 figures are largely guesses, since the last census including the Cham before this date took place in 1936 and gave a Cham population of 73,000. Even if we assume this figure as being much too low, due to the limited possibilities of conducting a thorough census in rural Cambodia at that time, an increase of up to 700,000 in four decades would imply an incredible growth rate. Yet evidence suggests that Kiernan's estimate was actually too low. A Khmer Rouge telegram from 1975 implies that more than 150,000 Cham were living in the Eastern Zone (consisting of the eastern part of Kampong Cham province and parts of three other provinces)

alone before the deportations began.[19] Kampong Cham province was – and still is – where the majority of Cham lived, and its largest community was in DK Region 21, which formed part of the Eastern Zone. Still, the high number of 150,000 Cham in this zone alone might hint at a higher number of Cham than Kiernan had expected. Although still far below the 700,000 figure, it is another argument in Kiernan's and Osman's claim to a disproportionally high death rate among the Cham.

Second, were they targeted because of their race, ethnicity, or religion, or simply because they were considered enemies of the regime? The idea of persecution because of their race *per se* has to be dismissed, for the Chinese minority suffered (according to Kiernan) an even higher death rate (about 50 percent). In fact, the DK regime had friendly relations with Beijing, which had sent a huge contingent of advisors to Cambodia. The persecution of the Chinese minority merely occurred because the Chinese were mostly city dwellers and thus labeled as class enemies for their social origin.[20] It seems that the Cham were not the victims of racism, but rather became collectively labeled as regime enemies because some of them refused to comply with certain policies, such as the attempted eradication of religion through the destruction of the religious elite, places of worship, and religious literature, all of which affected all religions in the same way. Furthermore, certain discriminatory measures were applied to the Cham and other minorities (e.g., banning the Cham language and breaking up most of their villages).

Many Cham initially supported the revolution because they were mostly part of the rural population, of which a high proportion joined the revolution (here, the heavy bombing and shelling of the countryside by the American airforce and the Lon Nol troops played an important part.[21]). Second, the Eastern Zone's revolutionary organization had its own Islamic movement led by Sos Man (see below, p. 6), and the majority of this zone's revolutionaries were communist but still pro-Sihanouk and pro-Vietnamese (Khmer Rumdos [Khmer Liberation], as opposed to Khmer Krahom [Red Khmer]). During the war against Lon Nol, intra-revolutionary fighting occurred between these two groups and another dissident communist faction, the Khmer Saor (White Khmer), whose leaders were mostly Cham.[22]

Nevertheless, some of them rebelled when the bans on religion and the Cham language were introduced. Cham Khmer Rouge cadres led a rebellion in Krauchhmar district (Kampong Cham province) in late 1975.[23] A *toun* (religious teacher) in Sihanoukville province incited dissatisfied people to run off into the forest in early 1976.[24] Such counterrevolutionary behavior stigmatized the Cham. In both instances deportations ensued, apart from violent repression (the village of Koh Phal was razed after a rebellion) and execu-

tions. Village and religious leaders, as well as religious teachers, were targeted for execution, as were those associated with the Lon Nol regime, the Cham battalion, or FULRO.[25] Still, some Cham occupied various positions under the DK: Mat Ly was a member of the party's Thbaung Khmum district committee and the People's Assembly,[26] Tumad Afan served in the Ministry of Education, and one Cham even worked as an interrogator at the interrogation (and torture and execution) center Tuol Sleng (S-21).[27]

The treatment of the Cham varied from zone to zone and even from district to district. Without going into detail, I provide some general observations on variations in their status and treatment. The Khmer Rouge divided people into base people (revolutionary supporters in rural areas) and new people (generally deportees, city dwellers). Only the former were granted a full-rights status. Throughout Cambodia, the Cham were labeled *a priori* as new people, except in the Eastern Zone,[28] where the revolutionary Cham Sos Man (Mat Ly's father) was initially allowed to form a Islamic Cham Movement (disbanded in 1974). Although at first enjoying a superior status compared to the Cham of other zones, in 1978 the Eastern Zone Cham were severely persecuted due to rebellions and the CPK center's special treatment of the zone. Moreover, there is no evidence that Cham suffered more than Khmers in various districts in the North, Northwestern, and Western zones, while, at the same time, forty entire families were killed in Kampong Tralach district (Kampong Chhnang province, also in the Western Zone).[29]

At least by 1977, the Khmer Rouge's policy to break up the Cham, as they were collectively suspected of being traitors, was clear. Through deportations, Cham villages were divided into small groups and forced to live among Khmers and killings became more widespread. But the collective persecution of whole groups of alleged regime enemies was not confined to the Cham. In fact, the CPK center eventually considered the whole Eastern Zone, including most of its revolutionary leadership, untrustworthy. In May 1978, it began a large-scale program to disperse and eliminate Eastern Zone cadres and populations, collectively labeled as "Khmer bodies with Vietnamese minds." This constituted the worst atrocity of the DK period: Over 100,000 people died during the next six months.[30] One-third or even more of the zone's population was subsequently evacuated to other zones, where their numbers rapidly decreased due to selective killing and starvation.[31] These measures affected Khmers and Cham just the same. People from the Eastern Zone expelled to the Northwestern Zone had to wear blue and white checkered scarves so that they could be readily identified as deportees.[32]

Surprisingly, the number of Cham imprisoned at S-21 (Tuol Sleng) was rather small. Out of 14,000 people held there, only forty-two were Cham,

alongside forty foreign Muslims.[33] The Cham detainees were not only questioned about alleged rebel contacts, but also about the political stances of Islamic leaders.[34] This is another testimony of the regime's fear of religious leaders as anti-regime mobilizers.

In conclusion, the Cham were not marked for extermination from the beginning, but came to be regarded collectively as enemies, as were the Eastern Zoners. Nevertheless, the rural Khmer population was not dispersed to the same extent as were the Cham and, of course, did not have its language banned. Furthermore, numerous reports have surfaced of Cham being forced to eat pork by DK cadres. However, it should be kept in mind that this kind of humiliation could not have been used systematically, as DK refugees generally complain that there was too little meat of any kind. I also doubt Osman's allegation that the Cham of Kampot and Sihanoukville provinces and Kampong Luong (Kendal province) today do not speak their native language because of the DK ban.[35] In fact, Ner has written that the Cham of Kampong Luong mostly spoke Khmer and that half of the Cham of Kampot province (then including the Sihanoukville province of today) had already given up their native language (referring to his visits of the areas in 1937).[36]

When the DK regime was finally deposed in January 1979 by a Vietnamese military intervention and the efforts of the Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea, founded by DK Eastern Zone defectors (including Mat Ly), the long process of rebuilding the Cham community had to begin.

Picking Up the Pieces

The new People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) immediately allowed the reestablishment of Buddhism and Islam. The Cham became strong supporters of the new regime and, with several Cham members in the National Assembly, were more represented in the government and its institutions than ever before.[37] Some Cham refugees returned from Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia.[38] The highest-ranking Cham in the country was again Mat Ly, now a member of the ruling party's (the precursor of the CPP[39]) Political Bureau. Furthermore, he was the prosecutor in a tribunal that tried Pol Pot and Ieng Sary *in absentia* in 1979 and served as deputy minister of agriculture in the early 1980s.[40] He also turned out to be the instrumental figure in the Cham's quest to get desperately needed help from the international Islamic community, as almost all mosques and religious books had been destroyed.

Yet neither the West nor the Islamic world seemed to be concerned about the Cambodian tragedy. In 1979, 1980, and 1981, the United Nations (UN)

decided that the ousted DK regime was still Cambodia's legitimate representative. No western nation opposed the DK's claim; in fact, most voted for it (the PRK was seen as a tainted, Vietnamese-backed regime). Among the Muslim-majority countries, only Afghanistan, Algeria, South Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Chad opposed this. More strikingly, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, all of which would later become the Cham's largest benefactors, voted in favor of the DK.[41] The DK regime occupied Cambodia's UN seat until 1990.[42]

Already in 1979, Mat Ly established an organization to help the Cham attract foreign donors. In April 1980, a Cambodian delegation visited the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Jeddah to request moral and material support. Perhaps because of their distrust of the PRK regime, the first efforts of these organizations were undertaken to help Cham refugees in Thailand and Malaysia. The IDB finally provided a subsidy of $500,000 for the Malaysian government to facilitate the entry of Cham refugees.[43] Needless to say, this aid could have been used to rebuild Cham communities inside Cambodia. This incident sheds light on the doubtful conditions under which international aid was used not to assist the slowly recovering Cambodian state and its population, but rather the refugees, most of whom had fled after January 1979 and thus were not fleeing political oppression (in the Thai refugee camps near the Cambodian border, the population had increased from 35,000 in January 1979 to over 200,000 in mid-1980).[44]

Seddik Taouti, who visited Cambodia as the IDB's representative in 1981 and 1982, testified to the Khmer Rouge's full-scale destruction of the Qur'an and other religious books. For example, the Nur al-Ihsan mosque of Chrang Chamres, one of the few remaining mosques (according to conflicting reports either five or twenty out of 113[45]), had only one copy of the Qur'an. The situation in various localities in Kampong Cham province was similar. Eventually, the IDB became the first large donor: $1 million was given to reconstruct mosques with annexed classrooms and to acquire school materials, including scientific and religious books in Arabic and Malay.[46]

Apart from rebuilding their mosques, the Cham first had to construct a new religious leadership by selecting a grand mufti, *ḥākims*, imams, and other officials. As the vast majority of them, as well as the religious teachers, had been wiped out – only 20 of the 113 *ḥākims*, 25 of the 226 deputy *ḥākims*, and 38 of the approximately 300 *toun* survived[47] – it was inevitable that a whole new generation would take over these functions. Grand Mufti Res Lah, the two deputy muftis, and most other officials appointed by the Lon Nol regime were either executed or died during the DK regime.

The beginning of the PRK era marked the end of Cham persecution, for the new government was rather sympathetic toward them, facilitated cooperation with the IDB, and in a few cases even made donations for mosque repairs and construction.[48] However, rebuilding the Cham community and Cambodia in general was hampered by international opposition to the Vietnamese-backed regime and the ongoing military struggle against the remnants of the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Serei, both of which were operating in the border regions close to Thailand. International Muslim interest in the Cham was also very limited until the end of the 1980s.

In 1988, Mat Ly and his Cambodian Islamic Association won the support of two businessmen from Dubai, Hisham ibn Nasir and Mahmud Abdallah Qasim, who not only financed a yearly Cambodian hajj contingent, but, more importantly, in the 1990s contributed financially to the construction of 20 mosques throughout Cambodia. These are easily identifiable because they bear the name Dubai (e.g., the International Dubai Mosque of Phnom Penh at Boeung Kak lake).[49] This mosque, built in 1994 mainly for the foreign Muslims residing in the capital, is only frequented for the Friday prayer (the *khuṭbah* is held in Arabic and Khmer), which is attended, apart from a limited number of Cham, by Muslims from Arab countries, South Asia (mainly Pakistan and Bangladesh), Thailand, Malaysia, and even Burundi. The imam spent a few years at al-Azhar, and his salary is paid by the financers from Dubai. Even though this mosque is located far from traditional Cham enclaves, an unidentified number of rural Cham families now live adjacent to it in an illegal settlement, where they have established a few *ḥalāl* food stands and hope to be allowed to stay permanently.[50]

Malaysian interest in the Cham first became evident in 1988, with a museum exhibition in Kuala Lumpur entitled "Malay-Champa Civilisation." This rediscovered feeling of kinship with the Cham (Malaysian officials even called Champa "the first Malay kingdom in Indochina") and the Cham's traditional turn toward Malaysia for higher Islamic education facilitated Malaysia's rise to prominence in providing development aid.[51] In addition, such aid is rather safe in the ASEAN context, for aiding the Muslim minorities in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines could easily provoke Bangkok and Manila, both of which are confronting long-term local Muslim irredentist movements.[52]

Still, it was not until after the UN-brokered elections in 1993 that Islamic internationalism, as well as the increased efforts of exiled Cham in the West and of Cambodia's political sphere, began to play a major role in the Cham's understanding of Islam.

Islam in Cambodia after 1993

After the 1993 elections, things changed quickly. Several international Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from Arab countries and Malaysia appeared; cooperation with Malaysia at the state and national levels grew; numerous Cambodian Islamic NGOs sprang up and became more involved in party politics in order to channel foreign aid and coordinate community upliftment efforts; and the emergence of new religious ideas and movements from the Gulf, India, and Malaysia led to the emergence of diverse new currents of Islam in Cambodia.

At the beginning of all this was the (until then) largest peace-keeping mission in UN history: the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which consisted of stationing 15,900 soldiers from several countries in Cambodia to uphold order for eighteen months until August 1993.[53] Their presence had a profound impact upon the Cham. Cambodia was basically divided into ten sectors, five of which were monitored by Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Malaysian, Indonesian, and Tunisian troops. Some cooperation was inevitable. For example, each of the 600 Bangladeshi soldiers at Siam Reap donated $1 every month to maintain and expand the mosque in Stung Thmey village (Siam Reap), and Indonesian troops stationed near Prek Ta Peou (Ta Khmou district, Kendal province), a village renowned for its fishing nets, raised $7,000 to build a mosque.[54]

The peace process and the elections also caused many Cambodian refugees to return. The Cham remained active in politics, some of them even serving as secretaries and deputy secretaries of state in various ministries. In addition, they could be found in the National Assembly, especially in Parliament, as members of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and of the royalist FUNCINPEC. It was mainly the politically active Cham who formed Islamic associations to benefit the community.

Cambodian and International NGOs

Shortly after the elections, Ahmad Yahya, a returned refugee (he had spent several years in the United States) serving at that time as a FUNCINPEC member of the National Assembly and presently as a member of Parliament representing Kampong Cham province for the Sam Rainsy Party, founded the Cambodian Islamic Development Association. This NGO takes a special interest in elevating the Cham's level of education, and thus, apart from supporting religious endeavors, sponsors students at the private Norton University of Phnom Penh or to study abroad (mostly in Malaysia, where they study general, as opposed to religious, subjects).[55]

In 1997, Cambodian Grand Mufti Kamaruddin Yusof (Sos Kamry), acting as patron and advisor; Othsman Hassan (secretary of state, ministry of labor and vocational training); and Zakariya Adam (secretay of state, ministry of cults and religion), acting as president and vice-president, respectively, established the Cambodian Muslim Development Foundation (CMDF) to provide *dakwah* (*da`wah*), education, knowledge, and welfare for the community.[56] It consists of three committees: one each for *dakwah*, welfare, and education, each of which has its own subunits. One subunit bears the name of "international aid." Of course, the CMDF relies largely on cooperation with the Islamic world and foreign aid. Interestingly, although the CMDF denies involvement in any political party as part of its mission, in fact its founders, as well as committee heads and at least certain subunit heads, are all members of Prime Minister Hun Sen's CPP.[57]

The education unit, which has a language (Arabic, Malay, and English) and computer training institute, has established a network of over fifteen secondary Islamic schools for girls and boys in eight provinces. Known as Madrasah an-Nikmah, they essentially use the same (mixed) syllabus as similar schools in Malaysia. Generally, Malaysia's efforts in education are viewed as an example to follow. Contrary to other Islamic village schools, Malaysian universities accept these schools' graduation certificates, as does al-Azhar.

The *dakwah* unit mainly searches for and manages donations. The closest cooperation seems to exist with Malaysia, as the organization coordinates activities with and gets support from various Malaysian NGOs, state institutions (e.g., Terengganu state's Council of Islamic Affairs),[58] and universities (e.g., Kolej Universiti Islam Malaysia-KUIM in Negeri Sembilan state). Donations also come from Australia, Indonesia, Brunei, the United States, Singapore, and various Arab states. When a new mosque is formally opened, CMDF President Othsman Hassan usually cuts the ribbon. However, sometimes this honor is reserved for Prime Minister Hun Sen or the former party secretary Heng Samrin,[59] thus testifying to the intertwining of the CMDF and the CPP. These acts should be seen not only as strategies to advertise the CPP as the Cham's party, but also as efforts to strengthen the Cham's attachment to Cambodia. Therefore, the Cambodian national anthem is always part of the ceremony.

The efforts of the welfare unit include a *korban* (*qurbān*) and *`aqīqah* program (donations of sheep or cows for sacrifice on the seventh day after a child's birth); aid for flood victims; sending books, prayer mats, and mopeds; and Saudi eye doctors to perform eye surgery – all for free. Through Sos Mousine (deputy secretary of state, Ministry of Rural Development), who

heads the health unit, the CMDF is connected with two other associations: the Cambodian Muslim Students Association (CAMSA, founded in 1994 with the help of Mon Kriya) and the Islamic Medical Association (IMAC, founded in 2001). The IMAC provides free mobile clinic services in rural areas and started to build a polyclinic in March 2005. Sos Mousine presides over both organizations and is cooperating with the IDB.

Several Arab NGOs operate directly in Cambodia.[60] Shortly after the 1993 elections, donators from Kuwait arrived, and in 1996 the Revival of the Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) officially began working in Cambodia. This organization is prominent for its orphanages (including schools and mosques), of which the whole country, not just the Cham, has a great need. The largest of its eight orphanages is located a few kilometers outside Phnom Penh and is home to approximately 300 boys. The organization also supplies the teachers' salaries and students' grants for the school annexed to the Nur al-Ihsan mosque of Chrang Chamres, which serves as a boarding school to prepare future Islamic teachers.[61]

Since the end of the 1990s, at least four Saudi organizations have been active in Cambodia. The first to arrive was the Umm al-Qura International Organization, which, together with the al-Basar International Foundation, sent eye doctors to Cambodia.[62] Umm al-Qura also established a large school complex at Chroy Metrei village (Kendal province), which became rather controversial in 2003 (see below, pp. 17-18). The other Saudi organizations are the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), and the al-Haramayn Foundation.

Contacts between the Cham and Malaysia have been renewed and steadily expanded. The CMDF regards Malaysia as a model, and its numerous language training efforts in Malay show the Cham's and Malaysia's desire to strengthen these cordial relations. Of course, this has both inherent religious and economic implications. The modern-oriented Cham leaders recognize the importance of education, which most rural Cham lack. In addition, they view Malaysia as a symbol of rapid economic growth and successful educational reform policies. Furthermore, Malaysia has been involved in the international promotion and institutionalization of Islam since the early 1970s,[63] and thus has gained recognition throughout the Muslim world. This is exactly what the long forgotten Muslims of Cambodia are after.

Whereas modern Arabic-Islamic thought reached the Cham through the Malays, now Middle Eastern Islamic thought and practice (including Salafi and Wahhabi teachings) have found direct inroads through the Islamic charities operating in the country. It goes without saying that these developments

have prompted important changes among the Cham. But before discussing this, I turn to another recent and important outside influence: the emergence and rapid rise to prominence of the Tablighi Jama`at.

The Way of Dakwah

The Tablighi Jama`at (TJ) began to spread across Cambodia in the early 1990s because of Sulaiman Ibrahim, the former imam of Phum Tria who had lived in Vietnam, Thailand, the United States, Egypt, and Malaysia from 1970-89. He came into contact with the TJ[64] in Malaysia, where it had been active since the 1970s. I was told that Pakistani and Indian TJ members first visited the mosque of Prek Prah (Phnom Penh) in 1987-88.[65] But it was only after Sulaiman Ibrahim's return to Cambodia in 1989 and his subsequent *dakwah* efforts that the TJ took hold among the Cham. Malays from southern Thailand also played an important part: Yusuf Khan, the organization's leader in Southeast Asia, lived there and had numerous followers. Yusuf Khan also came to Prek Pra, and Malays from southern Thailand and Malaysia now come to Cambodia regularly on their *khurūj* (obligatory preaching mission).[66] Sulaiman Ibrahim first preached in Chumnik (Kampong Cham province) and then moved to Phum Tria, where he built a madrasa in 1992 with the help of Malaysian TJ sympathizers and Cham living in the West.[67]

The movement quickly attracted vast numbers of followers and has become a major force. Its main centers are Phum Tria, Prek Pra, and Daun Loy/Au Chreou (Sihanoukville province), and it now has twenty provincial units (the Cham live in twenty-two provinces).[68] The movement's canon, Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi's *Fada'il-e `Amal* can be found in many mosques in Malay, English, and even the Urdu original. Furthermore, parts have been translated into Khmer by Abdul Coyoume, an old companion of Mat Ly.[69] Every Thursday evening, a large gathering consisting of locals, as well as people from distant villages in the area, is held at the movement's centers. After the sunset prayer, visiting preachers from other parts of Cambodia, Southeast Asia, or even South Asia address the audience, which spends the night at the mosque and eats together.

Due to its location in Cambodia's capital, Prek Pra is basically referred to as the movement's central node. However, the obvious spiritual center is the comparably difficult-to-reach Phum Tria. This is not surprising, as the TJ's strongholds are in rural Cambodia; however, its influence in Phnom Penh's Chrang Chamres and Chroy Changvar is steadily increasing. Sulaiman Ibrahim not only lives at Phum Tria, but his boarding school and Cam-

bodia's largest mosque, the construction of which was started in 2000 (still uncompleted in August 2005, as I saw piles of tiles lying inside during my visit) are located there as well. The school's *ustad* (professor) was educated in Thailand at Yala city's Madrasa Markaz Tabligh, and several other teachers studied in Thailand.[70]

One reason for Thailand's importance among JT supporters are the difficulties the movement has encountered in Malaysia. For instance, Sabah state banned the movement (1985) and Malacca state followed suit (1992).[71] The Malaysian *dakwah* movement Darul Arqam, said to be active in Cambodia, was banned in 1994 for being a deviant sect. The Dakwah Tabligh is under constant surveillance in Malaysia, whereas both groups were treated with relative indifference by the Thai authorities in the past.[72]

On the other side of Cambodia, close to the Gulf of Thailand, one also finds a recently (2000) constructed *tablighi* boarding school and mosque, the Dar al-Muhajirun in Au Chreou (Sihanoukville province), which attracts students from all over the country. Just a few kilometers away is the austere al-Azhar mosque (built in 1964 and damaged – but not destroyed – in DK times) in Daun Loy, the *markaz* of the area.[73]

In Phum Tria and other zones of JT influence, its members' ostentatious manner of imitating the Prophet's example is demonstrated in their clothing. For example, the traditional sarong and *kopiah* (skull cap) have been traded for the traditional Arab robe and turban. In Phum Trea, I witnessed numerous students brushing their teeth with a *miswāk* (a tree twig) instead of a toothbrush.

New Challenges

Since the early 1990s, the appearance of Islam in Cambodia has once more been altered. The Cham's desire to strengthen their bond with the international Islamic community has brought about a new level in their constant quest for identity reinvention. During their long sojourn in Cambodia, their traditional pagoda-style of mosques almost died out. Now, even those that survived are being razed and replaced with those that look more "Islamic." Cham women are wearing the Islamic headscarf (*jilbāb*, *tudung*), which is encouraged by the *tablighis*, Arab charities, and Malays, instead of the *krama* (the checkered "national" scarf widely used by all Khmer) or a distinctive woolen hat still found in Kampong Cham province. In the mid-1990s, the body-enclosing (except the eyes) black *purdah* appeared and can now be found in certain regions.[74] This is causing unease among the Cham and the Khmer majority. More problems occur because rural Cham girls, of whom

very few even complete primary school as they are needed at home or in the field, are forced to drop out of school because most secondary schools ban the wearing of headscarves.[75]

The different currents of external Islamic influence also lead to conflict within the community. In this context, we might recall the quarrels between traditionalists and modernists in the first half of the twentieth century and later between the *kaum muda* and the *kaum tua*. Now the new ideas arriving in Cambodia are causing similar dissensions.[76] Islamic charities (notably Umm al-Qura) have pressured the Jahed community to give up its distinctive religious practices in favor of standard Sunni ones. Their refusal to do so has cut them off from international Islamic aid.[77] Nevertheless, the state regards them as a distinct and respected religious community. Its leader Kai Tam, who lives in O Russei (Kampong Chhnang), is recognized as equivalent to the grand mufti of the orthodox Cham and was bestowed with the title *ouknha* (excellency) just like the latter.

Furthermore, Arab charities and the Tablighi Jama`at/Dakwah Tabligh movement view each other with suspicion. Muslim opponents of the TJ have always argued that the *Fada'il-e `Amal* draws mostly on weak hadith and that its adherents value it as much as they do the Qur'an. Other doctrinal criticisms are that the *tablighis* are not thorough enough in their efforts to root out local un-Islamic practices and that their *khurūj* (obligatory preaching mission) is *bid`ah* (an innovation). Apart from the religious implications, the practice of frequently leaving one's family to engage in *dakwah* is considered unacceptable. While the *tablighis* accuse Arab charities of proselytizing via financial aid, they are themselves criticized for only preparing the Cham for the afterlife instead of helping them raise their standard of living. In fact, the *tablighis* have a bad reputation among modern-oriented Muslims because they are said to advocate only primary education for Cham children and then purely religious studies. In contrast, schools established by Arab charities and the CMDF teach secular subjects as well. The more extreme partisans of the Dakwah Tabligh even insult western-style dressed Cham for wearing *kāfir* (unbeliever) clothes.[78]

Also, differences between rural and urban Cambodia seem to play a role in this dispute. Especially in rural Daun Loy, I heard that this area's Cham are barred from the large influx of Islamic aid pouring into Phnom Penh. Although the *tablighi* madrasa of Au Chreou was built with Malaysian support (which continues with a modest monthly subsidy of $100), just like the mosque of nearby Boeng Ta Prom village, where the donor organization's check is presented inside the mosque, it is clear that Arab charities often neglect such remote areas.[79] But other Cham are generally skeptical of such aid,

for they have heard of or might have experienced cases in which donations were coupled with an attempt to popularize alien religious doctrines (e.g., Wahhabism).[80]

These conflicts have once again resulted in divided communities. For example, in Chumnik (Kampong Cham province) one finds a *markaz* of the *dakwah tabligh* as well as a mosque of the Kuwaiti RIHS, each of which is frequented by segregated groups of residents.[81] In Phum Tria, Sulaiman Ibrahim's plan to consolidate the area's worship in the new huge mosque was opposed by the neighboring villages, whose people (allegedly against the *dakwah* leader's will) searched for aid to build their own small mosques because they disliked his claim to leadership and *tablighi* dominance.[82] Near Phum Tria, I saw one small mosque (built with Malaysian support) and two more under construction (one of them with RIHS support).

Another fault line is the attitudes toward the community's official leadership. Grand Mufti Sos Kamry, like most of the imams and village *hakems*, belongs to the CPP (this also goes for the Jahed), which often makes any distinction between the local CPP and the religious hierarchy difficult.[83] Naturally this is problematic, as certain currents in the Cham community hold that politics and religion generally do not mix; others, affiliated with other parties, view these circumstances as just another proof of democracy's limited scope under long-time Prime Minister Hun Sen. Still, the new puritan factions on the fringes of Cambodian Islam criticize the grand mufti and the Ministry of Cults and Religion, along with its secretaries Zakarya Adam (CPP) and Sith Ibrahim (FUNCINPEC), as being religiously lax.

However, it is important to note that most Cham generally agree that Sos Kamry (appointed to his position for life) is the best man for the job and that it is merely the CPP domination down to the village level that causes concern.[84] Furthermore, I want to point out that the Cham supported this CPP domination in the 2003 election. Although intimidation and even killings (according to Amnesty International, seventeen candidates of FUNCINPEC and Sam Rainsy Party were killed in the run-up for the elections[85]) still play a part in elections, the CPP's consolidation of power on the local level cannot be attributed to such practices alone. As for FUNCINPEC, it should be remembered that with the death of Tol Lah (2003), former secretary of state in the Ministry of Education and afterwards deputy prime minister and party secretary-general, the party lost its most eminent Cham politician.

In general the Cham have lost influence in Parliament, compared to the elections in 1998 (which were controlled by the CPP[86]), with the number of Cham members decreasing from ten (five CPP, four FUNCINPEC, one SRP)

to three (two CPP, one SRP), while the number of senators has remained stable: one from FUNCINPEC and one from the CPP.[87] Furthermore, three Cham are now serving as secretaries of state and four are serving as undersecretaries of state (all CPP, apart from Sith Ibrahim). In addition, Ismail Osman (FUNCINPEC, and allegedly a supporter of the Dakwah Tabligh[88]) is president of the National Assembly. With Sem Soprey and Saleh Sen (both CPP), Kampong Cham (where 40 percent of the Cham live) and Kampong Chhnang both have Cham vice governors.

Finally, the Cham community has been affected by militant Islam and the war on terror. Several Arab NGOs operating in the country figure prominently on the Bush administration's list of organizations that allegedly support international terrorism: IIRO and WAMY, which for years were led by bin Laden's son-in-law Muhammad Khalifa, and the al-Haramayn Islamic Foundation. But it was Umm al-Qura's school at Chroy Metrei village (Kendal province) that the Cambodian authorities closed down, due to American intelligence reports. In May 2003, its Egyptian director and two Thai teachers were arrested for suspected links to the terror organization Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). All twenty-eight foreign teachers (from Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen) and their families were deported. In June, Sman Ismael, a Cham from Kampot and a former student of an Islamic school in Patani (southern Thailand), was arrested for alleged complicity with the former.

The absolute majority of Cham viewed this incident as politically motivated (e.g., to serve American interests) and the charges as unsubstantiated. The school, now known as the "Cambodia Islamic Center," was reopened in September 2004 under the auspices of Grand Mufti Sos Kamry and the Ministry of Cults and Religion. Such well-known Cham CPP members Sos Kamry, Othsman Hassan, Zakaryya Adam, and Sos Mousine were appointed to its leading positions, and current staff-members are all Cambodian Cham.[89]

Whereas those Cham more sympathetic to the prime minister argued that the suspects were innocent, others, like the opposition politician Ahmad Yahya (SRP), were furious and claimed that they were only guilty of arousing the CPP's envy for running an influential organization.[90] The whole case became even more doubtful, as it took the authorities until 29 December 2004 to convict the suspects, who had already spent one year longer than allowed by the law in preventive detention.[91] Nevertheless, a connection between Cambodia and the JI was eventually proven: Hambali, the alleged JI head, had lived from September 2002 to March 2003 in a Phnom Penh

guesthouse in the backpacker area of Boeung Kak, located near the International Dubai Mosque.

One of my informants in Kampong Cham province further argued that other foreign-run institutions were in danger of being shut down or taken over by the authorities not because of links to international terror, but for a lack of diplomacy in dealing with the government. The informant's brother was a former teacher at the RIHS-run orphanage in Phnom Penh and allegedly quit his position after disputes, the source of which was the teacher's attendance at a government seminar about AIDS prevention – his superiors had not approved of his attendance.[92] Another interesting story, related by the same informant and other people I talked to in Kampong Cham province, concerns the financing of Phum Tria's huge mosque. According to rumors, the mosque was at least partly built with aid from Pakistan, and in the months after 9/11 a short financial crisis occurred. When asked about this, the *ustad* declared that the mosque was financed solely by Cham living in Cambodia and abroad. However, he also claimed not to be well-informed on the subject, as he had come only to teach in Phum Tria two years ago.[93]

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the pace at which the Cham community has developed over the last two decades, especially after 1993, is astonishing. I regard the introduced changes as by no means extraordinary, given the development of the rest of Muslim Southeast Asia. All of these countries (just like the whole Islamic world) were subject to an Islamic resurgence during this time. Part of Southeast Asia's Islamic resurgence consisted of movements that, at the same time, were not anti-modern in a general sense, but still strongly emphasized purifying religion and applying it to daily life. Another important part in this resurgence, especially in Malaysia, was played by the Dakwah Tabligh and other *dakwah* groups, which gained enough importance to be labeled a threat to Muslim unity and thus, in the case of Malaysia, even to national unity.

Other features of this resurgence were direct Arab influence (e.g., visible in Indonesia if one looks at the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, which is closely associated with the Muslim World League) and also the emergence of militant Islamic movements at the fringes of Muslim society. But compared with its Southeast Asian Muslim neighbors, whose resurgence took time to grow, things were accelerated considerably after Cambodia's sorely tried Muslims were discovered by Islamic internationalism. The very intensity of this international Islamic effort is another peculiarity of the Cham's case. Clearly, the Arab oil-backed organizations have the largest scope and

are able to penetrate into Islamic communities in all corners of the world. The Tablighi Jama`at and the various Malaysian *dakwah* groups also spread throughout the world rather quickly.[94] But the historical and ethnic ties between the Malays and the Cham made the latter a preferred recipient of federal (UMNO approved) as well as regional (from the PAS-controlled states of Kelantan and Terengganu) and private Islamic aid.

Of course, what is striking about the Cambodian Cham is their status as a minority of immigrant descent and their opting to reinvent their identity on the basis of Islam and relegating ethnic identity to a secondary position. But this process is nothing new, for their ancestors did it immediately after their arrival in Cambodia. This was a gradual, though at times somehow slow, process for hundreds of years. But in the era of globalization and fueled by international efforts, it was transformed into a very fast one. A majority of Cambodia's Cham population has, even though living in a Buddhist country, felt the urge to belong to the wider Islamic world ever since. Finally, the wider Islamic world has come to them.

Endnotes

1. Po Dharma, "Etat des dernieres recherches sur la date de l'absorption du Campa par le Vietnam," in *Actes du Séminaire sur le Campa organisé à l'Université de Copenhague, le 23 mai 1987* (Paris: Centre d'histoire et civilisations de la péninsule indochinoise 1988), 62.
2. Agnès De Féo, *Les Chams, l'islam et la revendication identitaire* (Mémoire de DEA, 2004), 17.
3. Ibid., 50-51.
4. William Collins, *The Chams of Cambodia* (Center for Advanced Studies, 1996. Online at www.cascambodia.org/chams.htm), 23. (The page numbers of the printed version do not correspond to those given in the table of contents therein. To simplify things, I cite the printed version's actual page numbers.)
5. De Feo, *Les Chams*, 61-74; or, by the same author, "Les Chams sot, dissidence de l'islam cambodgien," *Les Cahiers de l'Orient*, no. 78 (2005): 115-24.
6. Carool Kersten, "Cambodia's Muslim King: Khmer and Dutch Sources on the Conversion of Reameathipadai I, 1642-1658," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (JSEAS) 37, no. 1 (February 2006): 12.
7. Mak Phoeun, *Chroniques Royales du Cambodge (de 1594 à 1677)* (Paris: PEFEO, 1981), 190.
8. De Feo, *Les Chams*, 37.
9. R. Michael Feener, "Notes towards the History of Qur'anic Exegesis in South East Asia," *Studia Islamika* 5, no. 3 (1998): 54-55.
10. Eliraz Giora, *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), 1-8.

11. Feener, "Notes," 57.
12. Marcel Ner, "Les musulmans de l'Indochine Française," *BEFEO* 41 (1941): 177-78.
13. See Barbara Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).
14. Collins, *The Chams of Cambodia*, 63-64.
15. Michael Vickery, *Cambodia 1975-1982* (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999), 194-95. (This is a republication of the original [Boston: South End Press, 1984]) and *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Francis Pinter, 1986), 2; Ben Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide: The Cham Muslims of Kampuchea under Pol Pot," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (BCAS) 20, no. 4 (October-December 1988), 11-33, and *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79* (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999), 461-63. (Again, a republication of the original [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996]); Ysa Osman, *Oukoubah: Justice for the Cham Muslims under the Democratic Kampuchea Regime* (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2002), 1-9.
16. Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide," 30.
17. Michael Vickery, "Comments on Cham Population Figures," *BCAS* 22, no. 1 (January-March 1989): 31-33. Also see Kiernan's defense of his figures in "The Genocide in Cambodia, 1975-79," *BCAS* 22, no. 1 (April-June 1990): 35-40.
18. Osman, *Oukoubah*, 2.
19. Ibid., 3.
20. Kiernan, "Genocide in Cambodia," 39.
21. Ror a personal account, see Osman, *Okubah*, 57.
22. See Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 64-68.
23. Osman, *Oukoubah*, 4.
24. Ibid., 69-75.
25. The Cham battalion (the Fifth Brigade) gained notoriety for its systematic destruction and extermination of Khmer Rouge villages. Les Kosem, a Cambodian Cham and military officer, played a major part in establishing links between nationalist Cham and highland groups in Cambodia and Vietnam. Eventually in August 1964, his Front for the Liberation of the Champa and the Bajaraka movement, a group representing various (Cham-related) Austronesian-speaking hill tribes and also Austroasiatic (Mon-Khmer)-speaking tribes, merged to form FULRO (Front Unifié de Lutte de la Races Opprimés). Subsequently, FULRO was patronized by the up-coming general Lon Nol. Collins, *The Chams of Cambodia*, 31.
26. Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide," 10.
27. Osman, *Oukoubah*, 30, 58-59.
28. Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 275.
29. Vickery, "Cambodia 1975-1982," 138, 194; Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 286-88; Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide," 27-30.

30. Ben Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens, and Cormorants: The Eastern Zone under Pol Pot," *Revolution and its Aftermath in Kampuchea*, eds. David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Council, 1983), 138.
31. Ibid., 197.
32. Ben Kiernan, "Kampuchean Muslims: An Uncertain Future," *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* (JIMMA) 10, no. 1 (January 1989): 30.
33. Osman, *Oukoubah*, 7, 9, 126.
34. Ibid., 27.
35. Ibid., 5.
36. Ner, "Les musulmans," 169, 175.
37. Kiernan, "Kampuchean Muslims," 34.
38. Shanti Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 176. Here Nair gives the untenable number of 100,000 Cham Muslim refugees resettling in Malaysia in 1978; this at a time when it was obviously hard enough for Cham living in the border regions to escape to Vietnam, let alone Malaysia. A refugee camp in Tay Ninh province (Vietnam) held 600 Cham refugees in 1978 (Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide," 15.).
39. On the CPP, see Michael Vickery, "The Cambodian People's Party: Where Has It Come From, Where Is It Going?" *Southeast Asian Affairs* (1994): 102-17.
40. Collins, *The Chams of Cambodia*, 39, 42.
41. Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide," 32-33. Interestingly, I came across a reference to a 1975 article in the Saudi *Akhbār al-`Ālam al-Islāmī*, hijacking the struggle of the Cambodian Muslims for blatant propaganda; Reinhard Schulze, *Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert* (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 414.
42. Evan Gottesmann, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 342-43.
43. Seddik Taouti, "The Forgotten Muslims of Kampuchea and Viet Nam," in *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, Ahmad Ibrahim et al., (Singapore: ISEAS, 1986), 199.
44. Michael Vickery, "Refugee Politics: The Khmer Camp System in Thailand," in *The Cambodian Agony*, eds. David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1988), 293-326. (Figures obtained from pp. 295, 298.)
45. The higher figure is obtained from Taouti, "The Forgotten Muslims," 194; the lower one from Osman, *Oukoubah*, 119.
46. Taouti, "The Forgotten Muslims," 196.
47. Osman, *Oukoubah*, 119.
48. For example, I have been told of government aid for the old mosque of Phum Roka (Kompong Cham province), which had survived the DK era roofless, in 1985. Interview with Imam Yunus (Phum Roka) 19 July 2005.
49. De Feo, *Les Chams*, 90.
50. Interviews conducted with various persons (including the imam) at the Dubai mosque on 29 July 2005, 1 August 2005, and 2 August 2005.

51. Collins, *The Chams of Cambodia*, 63.
52. Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy*, 171-93.
53. Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Gottesmann, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 342-52. For a contemporary journalistic approach, see Michael Schaper, "Die Friedensstifter: UN-Blauhelme in Kambodscha" *Geo*, no. 2 (Februar 1993): 36-56.
54. Interviews with the province imam of Siam Reap, Musa Soleh, in Stung Thmey (15-16 July 2005), and *toun* Muhammad bin Abdulwani in Prek Ta Peou (2 August 2005).
55. Collins, *The Chams of Cambodia*, 61; De Feo, *Les Chams*, 90.
56. Information on the CMDF, unless otherwise indicated, was obtained from the document *CMDF Serves the Muslim's* [sic] *Community* (Phnom Penh: CMDF, 2004); and interviews with Sos Mousine and CAMSA under secretary general Set Muhammadsis in Phnom Penh (13-14 July 2005).
57. *CMDF Serves*, 3; Farina So, "The Study of the Qur-An vs. Modern Education for Islamic Women in Cambodia," www.dccam.org, 8-10.
58. Personal conversation with Dato' Haji Alwi Muhammad, CEO of the Majlis Agama Islam of Terengganu, in Istanbul, Turkey (7 June 2005).
59. Heng Samrin was party secretary of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (PKR) from 1981 until it became the Cambodian People's Party in 1991. Therefore, western observers came to refer to the PRK regime as the "Heng Samrin regime."
60. De Feo, *Les Chams*, 91-92.
61. Interview with Imam Ali ibn Musa at the Nur al-Ihsan mosque, Chrang Chamres, Phnom Penh (14 July 2005).
62. CMDF, 44.
63. Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy*, 60.
64. On the Tablighi Jama`at, see Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed., *Travellers in Faith: Studies on the Tablighi Jama`at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); and Yoginder Sikand, *The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama`at (1920-2000): A Cross-country Comparative Study* (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2002).
65. Interview with senior *tablighi* Haji Faisal at the mosque of Prek Pra (21 July 2005).
66. The movement's members are obliged to engage in *da`wah* three days every month and forty days every year; senior members have to conduct three months of *khurūj*.
67. Collins, *The Chams of Cambodia*, 65.
68. Interview with Haji Faisal. (See endnote 65.)
69. De Feo, *Les Chams*, 95. Mat Ly, during his last years still a member of the National Assembly and also supreme personal advisor to the king, died in 2004. His modest grave is located on the premises of the Prek Pra mosque.

70. Interview with an unnamed *ustad* at Phum Tria (31 July 2005).
71. Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy*, 185; and De Feo, *Les Chams*, 94.
72. On the Darul Arqam movement, see Johan Hendrik Meuleman, "Reactions and Attitudes towards the Darul Arqam Movement in Southeast Asia," *Studia Islamika* 3, no. 1 (1996): 50-78.
73. Interviews with Zayn al-`Abidin, director of Dar al-Muhajirun in Au Chreou (27 July 2005) and Ga`far bin Abdallah, the province imam of Sihanoukville province, in Daun Loy (28 July 2005).
74. I only witnessed this kind of dress worn by a small group of women in Phum Tria. Another example given by Farina So, "The Study of the Qur-An," 7, is the conservative village of O-Kcheay, Battambang province.
75. Ibid., 6.
76. De Feo, *Les Chams*, 101-04.
77. Ibid., 62.
78. Interviews with Sli Man in Kampong Cham city (19-31 July 2005).
79. Interviews with Zayn al-`Abidin and Ga`far bin Abdallah and interview with Imam Ahmad Ali b. Ansri at Boeng Ta Prom, Sihanoukville province, 27 July 2005.
80. Interviews with Ismir Ramli and an elderly villager in Koh Sautin, Kampong Cham province (18 July 2005).
81. De Feo, *Les Chams*, 101.
82. Inteview with Sli Man.
83. Bjorn Blengsli, "Trends in the Islamic Community," *Phnom Penh Post*, Issue 12/12 (6-9 June 2003).
84. Interview with Cham historian Ysa Osman at the Documentation Center of Cambodia in Phnom Penh (2 August 2005).
85. http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/khm-summary-eng.
86. Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge,* 354-55.
87. The 1998 figures are obtained from Omar Farouk Bajunid, "Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia: A Review," in *Islam in Civil Society in Southeast Asia,* Mitsuo Nakamura et al. eds. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001). The 2003 figures from Farina So, "The Study of the Qur-An," 8-10.
88. De Feo, *Les Chams*, 94.
89. Interviews with Sos Mousine and Musa Soleh. The latter's father is now teaching at the facility.
90. Noy Thrupkaew, "Follow the (Saudi) Money," *American Prospect Online*, 8 January 2004.
91. Information obtained from the U.S. State Department, online at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ irf/ 2005/51507.htm.
92. Interviews with Sli Man.
93. Interview with an unnamed *ustad.*
94. Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy*, 200.

Reconstructing Islam: Muslim Education and Literature in Ming-Qing China

Kristian Petersen

Abstract

During the sixteenth century when Islam was already established in China, Chinese Muslims began to critically examine their understanding of Islamic knowledge and how to transmit it to future generations. Traditional tutelage based on purely Arabic and Persian sources generally evaded a Muslim population that, for the most part, could no longer read the available rare Islamic texts. The subsequent reconstruction of Islamic knowledge and education emphasized the intersections between the Chinese and the Muslim communities' cultural and religious heritages. The new specialized educational system, "scripture hall education" (*jingtang jiaoyu*), utilized Chinese as the language of instruction and incorporated aspects of traditional Chinese literati education in collaboration with newly retrieved Islamic sources from the Muslim heartland.

The ensuing standardization and organization of curriculum and pedagogical techniques enabled peripatetic students to replicate this system throughout China. It also allowed the religious community's leaders to direct the discourse concerning Islam and disseminate a specific interpretation of religious knowledge. This is most clearly displayed through the *Han Kitab*, the canonized corpus of Chinese Islamic texts written, approximately, during

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1600-1750. This literature articulated Islamic principles through the lexicon of literary Chinese and replicated the ideology highlighted by the educational network. This paper analyzes why Islamic knowledge was lost and traces how the new educational system transformed the indigenous Islamic discourse, articulated through the Han Kitab literature, to reflect a distinctive *Chinese Muslim* interpretation of the faith.

Introduction

During the middle of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and into the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), Muslims in China were beginning to embrace their heritage's Chinese characteristics. Following centuries of cultural and physical division between local inhabitants and Muslim settlers, Arabs, Persians, and Central Asians were slowly being assimilated. After generations of living in China and intermarrying with the native people, many of the original distinctions, such as language, had begun to wane. Due to their isolation from the Islamic heartland and the need to educate their fellow Chinese Muslims (hereinafter "Muslims") in Islamic doctrine, several Muslims began to incorporate tenets from traditional Chinese education into their promotion of Islamic knowledge.[1] As a result, some Muslim literati established the "scripture hall education" (*jingtang jiaoyu*) system, which featured an Islamic canon made up of Arabic, Persian, and Chinese works.[2] The *Han Kitab*, the collective name of this corpus of Chinese Islamic texts that is unique in the history of Islamic literature,[3] was produced by a group of self-identified Confucian Muslim scholars (*Huiru*).[4]

This is the first instance of Muslims writing major expositions in the language of a predominantly non-Muslim society.[5] The Chinese had already developed an illustrious philosophical and religious lexicon, and this influenced the character of these Islamic treatises. This collection of Islamic works allowed educated and intellectually oriented Muslims to grasp "the principles of the religion" (*uṣūl al-dīn*) and the Islamic nature of God, the universe, and the soul.[6] These works are the first self-expression of how the Muslim literati understood themselves as *Muslims* and as *Chinese* in premodern China. Their linguistic skills allowed them to transform the traditional understanding of Islam into a compatible Chinese vision of morality, self-cultivation, and livelihood. While using the language of China's rich literary and philosophical traditions, they composed a profile of how to understand being Muslim and to realize this conception in all aspects of one's life.[7]

In devising a spiritual map, the *Han Kitab* authors (hereinafter "authors") were in dialogue with the literary traditions of both Islam and China. The Muslim community's religious leaders were navigating the rhetoric of Islamic and Chinese sources and reconstructing their meaning into a coherent and comprehensible *Chinese Muslim* interpretation. In other words, they were revealing how educated Muslims involved with the educational network discussed their perspective on, and relationship to, the cosmos. They showed Islam's compatibility with Chinese conceptions of morality; but, at the same time, asserted Islam's superiority over these philosophies. By traversing cultural and literary fissures, they began to negotiate this community's unique Chinese Muslim identity, which was at the interstitial space between two strong cultural influences.[8]

From the *Han Kitab* literature, one can determine this distinct Muslim community's character. This self-description was a mutual assertion of their Chinese and Islamic personalities. The Islamic educational network and the *Han Kitab* texts served as the community's vehicles to fashion its distinctive identity. These pedagogical techniques allowed its religious leaders to disseminate a specific interpretation of knowledge that connected all adherents and perpetuated their dual personality. The reciprocal relationship between the discourse (as fixed by canonizing the *Han Kitab*) and the method (developing an educational system) led to the creation of this community's simultaneous *Chinese* and *Islamic* identity.

This article outlines why Islamic knowledge was lost and traces how creating a new religious educational system enabled Islamic discourse to reflect a distinct Chinese Muslim interpretation of Islam and express the community's dual identity. It will also discuss how the authors described Islamic thought through a terminology heavily laden with previous meaning and interpretations. Examining the Islamic and Chinese concepts emphasized in their writings reveals how they saw themselves as both Chinese and Muslim and how they understood the roots and branches of their knowledge. Their use of a specific neo-Confucian lexicon to articulate Islamic teachings reveals their construction of a new Muslim discourse that reflected an identity of simultaneity.[9]

I employ Zvi Ben-Dor Benite's *The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Chinese Muslims in Late Imperial China* to outline the community's social history and then attempt to further his work by addressing the content of this *dao* (path or way) and how it took shape. The themes dealt with in the *Han Kitab* literature reveal this community's values and are key to understanding how its members understood themselves. Ultimately, I will show the dialectical relationship of this community's identity and how its leaders nav-

igated the precarious seam between their dual heritages, as shown through the works of the *Han Kitab* canon.

The Historical Legacy of Muslims in China

The factors leading to the loss of Islamic knowledge and its reconstruction are directly related to the community's long-standing social, political, and cultural circumstances. To understand why Chinese became the language of instruction and why this engendered the scripture hall education system, it is necessary to outline the Muslims' history in China,[10] for this legacy has left indelible marks and has shaped the character of Muslim identity up until the present.[11] Further, our understanding of the Muslim-Chinese relationship throughout history will show why the contributions of the Muslim educational network and the *Han Kitab* literature are so unique and worthy of note.

The Muslim and Chinese cultural spheres remained largely separate until the middle of the Ming dynasty. Their relationship was not always amicable and was often marked by disengagement; later, it would be stained with the blood of continuous turmoil.[12] Two results of this passive relationship were the late translation and interpretation of Islamic texts in Chinese and the development of an official system to spread this knowledge. During the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, the Muslim elite evaded the social isolation of past generations and managed to combine these two cultural traditions and express both their Islamic and Chinese heritages equally.

The Tang Dynasty

Arab and Persian traders had been traveling to China long before the advent of Islam.[13] Although Hui legends assert that the first Muslims were summoned to China to save the empire by Taizong (626-49), the second Tang (618-907) emperor,[14] the earliest historical records provide evidence of a Muslim presence in China only in the eighth century.[15] They came mainly as traders, officials, or soldiers, and were first found in the port cities of China's southeast coast and later along the Silk Road.[16] These first Muslim visitors probably began arriving within the first generation of Muhammad's (d. 632) disciples.[17] They remained segregated from their Chinese neighbors and generally preserved their own languages, customs, religion, and ethnic identity:

> Muslims remained sojourners, obvious and clearly designated by state and society; they were granted a measure of legal and administrative autonomy within their carefully delineated settlements, but they were not supposed to mix with the local population.[18]

The Tang government prohibited foreigners from wearing Chinese clothing and marrying Chinese women. Initially, neither the Chinese nor the Muslims wanted to have much interaction with each other, and only collaborated for business or other official reasons. These Muslims were unmistakably *other* to the Chinese and were referred to as "foreign guests" (*fanke*).[19]

The Song Dynasty

During the Song dynasty (960-1278), Arab and Persian travelers began to settle in China and built permanent homes. Some married Chinese women and adopted Chinese dress, traditions, and language. However, most of them still lived in their "foreigners' quarters" (*fanfang*) and were generally not incorporated into the mainstream.[20] The Muslim community, which was small and concentrated in large commercial cities, followed the Shari`ah. The Chinese government also recognized it. Proselytization was minimal, and few Chinese converted.[21]

By the close of the Southern Song dynasty, Muslims had become a common feature of the social landscape in international port cities. But before the Mongols took control of China, few Muslims had become Chinese subjects and it seems that neither community wanted the Muslims to assimilate.[22] In fact, those Muslims who learned Chinese and stayed on in China were still regarded as foreigners.[23]

The Yuan Dynasty

The Mongol occupation of China (1278-1368) brought a vast number of Central Asian, Persian, and Arab Muslims to serve in the court and other official positions.[24] The Mongol conquest of Eurasia united various ethnic, religious, and cultural civilizations under a single administration. The Yuan administrative system, which ruled most of China, adopted a caste system and discriminated against the subordinate orders accordingly. In order, these consisted of the upper echelon (the Mongol oligarchy); Central Asian or non-Chinese people (predominantly Muslims); the northern Chinese, who had been under foreign control before; and the southern Chinese, who had never been ruled by an alien government.

This segregation enabled groups to retain their own culture, language, and religion. The new Muslim inhabitants refused to assimilate and learn Chinese. Yuan institutions, such as the National College for the Study of Muslim Languages, facilitated this disconnection and reinforced Muslim feelings of superiority under the Mongols.[25] The Chinese resented such attitudes, which created an intolerant atmosphere vis-à-vis cultural or religious

exchange. This inhibited each community's understanding of the other's traditional values.[26]

The Ming Dynasty

By the time of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), Muslims had become a ubiquitous feature of the Chinese cultural landscape. However, they were often seen as the purveyors of Mongol oppression. During the dynasty's early years, there was a resurgence of Han pride and a restoration of Chinese culture. Ming rulers sponsored major foreign explorations and trade, but only allowed travel through official venues. Trading activities were limited, and all endeavors had to be conducted through the legitimate tributary system.[27] The Ming government also tried to eliminate all foreigners by decreeing assimilation. Muslims were required to assume Chinese names, but retained their original names within their own communities.[28]

The *Statutes of the Imperial Ming* reflect this policy: "Mongols and Central Asians may marry Chinese. They are not allowed to marry their own race."[29] The bitterness toward outsiders was expressed through these official attempts to show Chinese superiority over their "barbarian" (*yi*) neighbors.[30] As a result, numerous individuals of foreign descent began to assimilate. At this time, Muslim acculturation was predominantly focused on material culture and language. This process was hastened by Ming policies of isolating minority populations from their native lands. In southeast China in particular, Muslim communities found themselves increasingly isolated because of Ming policies and their Chinese neighbors' xenophobia.[31]

Ming repression motivated more Muslims to marry Chinese women. Their local-born Muslim children adopted Chinese names, became articulate in Chinese, and appeared outwardly indistinguishable from the Han residents.[32] After several generations, Islamic knowledge began to diminish, many religious leaders could no longer provide profound interpretations of the holy books, and individuals could not perform hajj or study abroad. Many Muslims felt that the elements of their distinct Islamic identity were beginning to deteriorate.[33] Although ritual practice was maintained through generational transmission, a true understanding of Islamic teaching was lacking even among educated Muslims, because most Muslim families were being assimilated and educated in a traditional Chinese manner. These individuals became well versed in the Chinese classics, but could not read Islamic texts in Arabic or Persian.

These "native-born foreign" children played an important role in amalgamating the Islamic and Chinese cultures. While most foreign Muslims at the beginning of the Ming dynasty tried to preserve their Islamic character-

istics, their children began to take on many Chinese qualities. Muslims who had held prominent social and political status under the Yuan now had to adjust to the new Confucian system of the Ming. In addition, Islam's social influence was now restricted to the local level. This led the Muslim elite to raise their children in a traditional Islamic setting but also incorporate a traditional Chinese education so that they could attain noteworthy positions in the Ming administration.

After several generations, Islamic learning in Arabic and Persian was overshadowed by the Confucian education of the Chinese literati. By the middle of the Ming dynasty, apprehension began to grow over Islam's very survival in China. This led some members of the Muslim elite to search for a way to reverse this process. The new scripture hall educational system enabled this elite to adjust to its circumstances and preserve both Islamic knowledge and the community's Muslim identity.

Islamic Education in China

This new educational system allowed the Muslim elite to counter the harmful effects of acculturation and preserve aspects of their foreign heritage. On their own, Muslims used this educational system to create a distinctive identity that transcended the biased depictions of official Chinese narratives, enabled them to protect the boundaries of their community's identity, and helped them overcome the influences of external forces in forming their character. Establishing a system that disseminated a specific version of how Chinese Muslims should think and act allowed them to move beyond negative historical depictions and establish aspects of their character that they felt encompassed their distinct identity. This pedagogical method established the community's philosophical discourse and produced its members' dual self-understanding.

The *Han Kitab* literature is a direct result of the scripture hall education system and owes its genesis to the community's religious leaders. The religious mentality fostered in this system, which would eventually influence Muslim authors, embraced aspects of both heritages.

Hu Dengzhou and Scripture Hall Education

The life experiences of its founder, Hu Dengzhou (ca. 1522-97), reveal why he felt that China needed this "scripture hall education" system and why it acquired its dual personality.[34] Hu hailed from the city of Wei in Xianyang county, Shaanxi province. Early in his life, he studied the Confucian classics and dynastic histories but decided not to pursue a career as an exam-

ination candidate. He also received a traditional Islamic education in a local mosque, but became frustrated with his inability to penetrate the meaning of the Islamic classics. His elderly teacher's dialogical method lacked precision in grasping the difficult content of many texts, and this caused Hu to seek an education in the Muslim world. Traveling through Central Asia for several years, he eventually reached Makkah and stayed there for many years. He returned to China with a new understanding of Islam and, more importantly, books that authenticated this knowledge.[35] Prior to his return, "there was a shortage of books [and] learned men were few and far between and the transmission and interpretation [of the texts] were not clear."[36] Hu's homecoming occasioned a decisive shift in Islamic education in China.

Hu's pedagogical method introduced a new curriculum, a financial support system for schools (including room, board, and study materials), and the use of Chinese as a language of instruction.[37] This system was similar to madrassahs (religious schools) throughout Muslim communities, but deviated drastically from traditional Islamic schools, for "in addition to books in Arabic and Persian, Chinese Muslims made use of books written in Chinese (both Islamic and non-Islamic, including the Chinese classics and official histories). This trend grew more pronounced with time."[38] Hu's school also employed a Qur'anic primer (*haiting*, Arabic *khatm*) that contained two dozen or so passages, and an elementary Islamic textbook (*zaxue*, *Diverse Studies*) of prayers and Arabic and Persian passages on ablutions, faith, worship, fasting, marriage, funerals, and festivals. These teaching tools were rather basic, due to most of the students' limited command of Islamic languages, and often featured a Chinese phonetic transliteration system to represent the original orthography.[39]

Scripture Hall Curriculum

The curriculum for more advanced students also included Islamic law (*fiqh*), theology (*kalām*), and Sufi philosophy (*taṣawwuf*).[40] The Islamic texts available to the Muslim intelligentsia were mainly by Persian authors. While Arabic was the language of the Qur'an and the majority of the Islamic classics, Persian was the primary vehicle for Islamic instruction from Persia eastward.[41] The available Arabic and Persian texts are recorded in the prefaces to two of Liu Zhi's major works from 1704 and 1710. The two lists contain sixty-six to sixty-eight distinct records, providing the title of each work (but not the original titles) in Chinese transliteration and translation.[42] Thus, it is difficult to identify the original texts. Many of the more prominent works were translated into Chinese. In order to acquire a wider audience and

greater prestige, authors would often claim that their original compositions stemmed from an Arabic or Persian original:

> Sometimes such originals are imaginary; but even when these actually exist ... the alleged translation implies a total rewriting and remodeling in order to translate the philosophical notions and concepts of Sufism into an acceptable Chinese mode of thought. From this, an original literature has resulted, one unknown to Islamic specialists for want of being studied by Sinologists.[43]

Four texts have been identified as genuine translations of an original Islamic text. All four were written by Persian Sufis and have been held in high regard throughout the Muslim world. The first was *Mirṣād al-`Ibād min al-Mabdā' ilā al-Ma`ād* (The Path of God's Bondsmen from Origin to Return), written by Kubrawi master Najm al-Din Razi (d. 654/1256).[44] This text clearly, systematically, and eloquently explains the nature of human beings, the journey to God, and the various stations and states one will experience while progressing toward perfection.[45] It avoids highly technical language and clarifies its message via the imagery of everyday language, and thus is exceedingly popular in the eastern Islamic lands.

The second one, *Maqṣad-i Aqṣā* (The Furthest Goal) by Kubrawi master `Aziz al-Din Nasafi (d. ca 700/1300),[46] provides a shorter, drier, and more systematic explanation of the relationship between God, the cosmos, and the perfect human being (*al-insān al-kāmil*).[47] The final two texts, *Ashi``at al-Lama`āt* (The Rays of the Flashes) and *Lawā'ih* (Gleams), were written by the famous Naqshbandi scholar `Abd al-Rahman Jami (1414-92).[48] The first one is a commentary on the Persian classic *Lama`āt* (Flashes) by Fakhr al-Din Iraqi, a thirteenth-century Sufi of Ibn al-Arabi's school.[49] Jami's text includes Fakhr al-Din Iraqi's original work and explicates the metaphysics of divine love behind his mixed prose and poetry, often word by word.[50]

Many early authors relied heavily on these works when writing their interpretations of terminology and concepts. Among the advanced textbooks used, three were classified as part of the discipline of "learning to know God" (*ren zhu xue*), which covered *`aqīdah* (declaration of faith), *uṣūl al-dīn* (the principles of religion), and *uṣūl al-tawḥīd* (the principles of God's unity). Two of these were Sufi classics, the *Ashi``at al-Lamā`āt* and the *Mirṣād*, which were regarded as the foundation of *ren zhu xue*. The third work, Abu Hafs `Umar Najm al-Din al-Nasafi's (d. 537/1142)[51] *`Aqā'id* (Beliefs), was a concise and systematic summarization of the Islamic creed, the distillation of a hundred years of previous development.[52]

Zhao Can, who wrote *Genealogy of the Transmission and Lineage of Classical Learning,* labels Najm al-Din Razi's *Mirṣād,* Jami's *Ashi``at al-Lamā`āt,* and `Aziz al-Din Nasafi's *Maqṣad* as the three classics of "the principle learning of human nature and mandate."[53] Their widespread use by advanced students led to a certain interpretation of Islam that emphasized issues of belief, the nature of human existence, and knowledge of God.

Hu's new methods primarily sought to preserve this retrieved Islamic knowledge. To achieve this goal, he condoned the use of a non-Islamic language: "His most significant move was to emphasize the transmission and development of knowledge and learning, and not only the training of imams."[54] Prior to this educational system, imams (*ahongs*) were generally of Arab, Persian, or Central Asian decent. Transmitting Islamic knowledge through Chinese allowed the community to produce its own scholars and pass on the resulting knowledge.[55]

Hu's systematic program of study became the standard of Islamic education by the seventeenth century. The standardization and organization of the curriculum and teaching techniques made his system extremely successful and easy to replicate throughout China. In addition, its linguistic flexibility allowed many Muslims to help preserve Islamic knowledge, which resulted in an entirely new discourse and understanding of the faith.

Hu's career indicates that the Muslims' concerns were tangible and realistic. Muslims lived throughout China, but Islamic knowledge was missing. Hu's system incorporated aspects of traditional Chinese education along with his newly retrieved Islamic sources. The recovery of traditional Islamic knowledge (by acquiring texts) combined with the school's accessibility (using Chinese to teach) started a revival of Islamic learning. His disciples traveled from all over China to study in his school and then returned home to open their own schools. The web of connections within China began to grow, and Islamic education became a prestigious endeavor:

> The existence of an extensive, interregional, semi-formalized, and institutionally complex Chinese Muslim educational network demonstrates that Islam not only survived on Chinese soil but developed its own – distinctively Chinese Muslim – institutions, values, and ideals.[56]

Upon their return home, students would implement Chinese-language instruction, systematic methods, and uniform textual resources. These new methods accentuated the community's dual character, and systematizing the educational system and using the same texts established the criteria for Islamic education. As this network spread, it retained the features that had

made Hu's school successful. But as it moved eastward, it eventually began to acquire more innovations that emphasized its members' Chinese heritage. This transformation would reach full development far from Hu's original school and would establish the system's defining characteristics.

Creating an Educational Network

The scripture hall educational system was inaugurated in northwestern China, where Muslims lived in large communities and were often in contact with their Central Asian coreligionists. This environment made the reality of their declining understanding of Islamic knowledge extremely clear. Their regular interaction with other Muslims also led them to express the non-Chinese aspects of their character.

Although the educational network arose in this atmosphere, it was in the large cities of eastern China that it blossomed in numbers of teachers and students, as well as in the production of texts, and assumed its distinctive final character.[57] The urban context of the cosmopolitan cities of the Yangzi delta (Jiangnan) produced the scholars who would compose Islamic works with Chinese characteristics. These cities, Quanzhou, Hangzhou, Yangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, and Nanjing, were large commercial and intellectual centers with a history of book collecting and printing, many high-ranking degree holders, and numerous affluent and educated Muslim residents.[58] Their Muslim communities blended into the surrounding urban fabric and utilized the educational network to unite their dispersed members.[59]

This education system relied on familial, political, philanthropic, and other types of relationships to unite those involved in their mission to preserve and spread Islamic knowledge. This objective was not sponsored by all Chinese Muslims; however, it was embraced by a variety of individuals, including some Han Chinese, all of whom contributed funds for producing Muslim scholarship:

> The Chinese Muslim educational network's constituency was tied together by various ties, including shared intellectual outlook, kinship, friendship, patronage and clientelism, geography, pedagogy, master-disciple relations, and collegiality.[60]

Nanjing, eventually one of the most eminent centers for Islamic education, housed Wang Daiyu (the first *Han Kitab* author) as well as Liu Zhi (its most prolific author). Here, alongside Islamic education, many teachers and students studied the Confucian classics and often received official titles.[61] The rich cultural life and scholarly community that existed in the large

cities of the Jiangnan region allowed this network to blossom; however, it also propelled its members to incorporate their own Chinese self-perception into their self-expression.[62] The promotion of education and scholarly production provided this community with a way to understand its status as Muslim and Chinese. These Muslims shaped their identity as a Chinese elite via scholarship, through "the foundation and dissemination of a specifically Chinese form of Islamic knowledge, one that claimed to be compatible with – indeed, a subset of – Confucian knowledge and learning."[63] Since they used traditional Chinese structures, education, and scholarship for maintaining literati status, these Muslims understood themselves as participating in a larger intellectual project and being fully part of Chinese elite culture.

As the educational network grew and developed, Muslim identity gradually began to crystallize. As the system gained prominence, Muslims began to view it as the authoritative possessor of Islamic knowledge. And, as time progressed, this system produced more religious scholars and professionals who then launched their own schools. As an authoritative source of Islamic doctrine, the networks' leaders shaped the community's character through their interpretation of Islam.

Forming a self-manifested subject begins with a dialogue about the self between an individual and professionals. In this case, students would decipher the nature of the world from a *Chinese Muslim* viewpoint, in collaboration with the educational system's religious scholars, and internalize their teachers' stylized and distinct discourse to understand the cosmos. The identity of educated Muslims took on a dual character because the system's elite highlighted the similarities between Islam and traditional Chinese values, and the students duplicated this interpretation and upheld this dual identity. The teachers' interpretation of what it meant to be an educated Muslim reconstructed how the students understood themselves. The instructors, thereby, controlled the Muslims by enumerating the principles that made one a member of this community. Ultimately:

> Because Chinese Islam developed scholarly institutions and a literary tradition, it was able to fuel a social-intellectual-cultural movement among the more Sinicized Muslims of eastern and central China. This movement, in turn, was capable of producing outstanding individuals who could promote their accommodative vision of Islam with ever-increasing sophistication, systematization and eloquence.[64]

The *Han Kitab* authors were the most visible of these exceptional figures. Their work was the direct expression of this educational system and

represented the Muslim elite's collective identity by enunciating the discourse of Chinese Islam.

The *Han Kitab* Literature

The most effective technique for establishing and disseminating this dual identity was also its most memorable. The *Han Kitab* literature of the late Ming and early Qing dynasties embraced the Muslim educational system's ideology and proclaimed its distinctive explanation of Islamic doctrine via the language of classical Chinese literature. During this period (c. 1630-1750), a canon of literature emerged. Over a hundred works were published, and many went through several editions and reprintings.[65] These works were written independently and later grouped together conceptually by scholars in the educational network. However, all of them had a direct association with the scripture hall educational system and its teachers.

Among the greatest scholars who were repeatedly referred to in later works were Wang Daiyu (c. 1590-1658), Ma Zhu (c. 1640-1709), and Liu Zhi (c. 1670-1724): "These key scholars and their works symbolize renaissance periods for Chinese Islam."[66] They wrote in Chinese about concepts from Arabic and Persian sources to expound the core of Islamic knowledge to a Chinese audience. Using mainly neo-Confucian (but also Buddhist and Daoist) terminology, they attempted to transmit traditional interpretations of the Islamic faith and its compatibility with Chinese principles while simultaneously asserting Islam's superiority. This literary innovation could only occur "where Chinese learning among Muslims had progressed to the point that literati who knew both Arabic and Chinese could contemplate translating texts and ideas from one idiom into the other."[67]

The *Han Kitab's* content is diverse: translations of Arabic and Persian works, dictionaries, grammatical works, commentaries on Islamic texts, and original philosophical works.[68] Contrary to some commentators' claims, most of these texts were not apologetic treatises addressed toward the non-Muslim literati.[69] Neither were they basic expositions on Islam's tenets for the general Muslim audience. Rather, they were written in the sophisticated language of the Chinese literary tradition for the educational system's intellectually advanced Muslim adepts. Several texts also sought to inform the Han elite about Islam. But this was a secondary aspect of their function.

Additionally, this body of Sino-Islamic texts was "not a work of proselytism, but was primarily aimed at educating in their own religion the Muslim community which already existed."[70] Written mainly to explain how to understand Islamic teachings, they did not focus on how to put these into practice:

> Their primary concern is not to explain Shari`ah or jurisprudence, nor the contents of the Koran and the Hadith in any direct way. Rather, the writings elaborate on the nature of the Islamic perception of God, the universe, and the soul.[71]

For a community that was largely unable to read and interpret its basic religious texts, the *Han Kitab* enabled its members to become familiar with their faith: "In short, the early Chinese texts were written to explain to Muslims why their tradition looks at the world the way it does."[72] But implied by the genre's half-Chinese, half-Arabic name (*Han Kitab*), the contents articulate their Islamic faith through the lexicon of classical Chinese literature, thus underlining its authors' dual Chinese and Muslim identities.

The Authors

The *Han Kitab* authors all belonged to the *Gedimu* school of Islam,[73] the oldest and most orthodox form of Islam in China. Its members are usually understood as upholding the early Muslim settlers' original traditions (*Gedimu* is derived from the Arabic word *al-qadīm* [the ancient].). Although they practice traditional Sunni, Hanafi Islam,[74] Aubin notes that "this theology nevertheless evolves from one author to another over the course of two succeeding centuries whilst remaining, so far as it seems, not rooted in any particular time and with no sectarian links."[75]

Most of the network's participants were descendants of Muslim immigrants from Arabia, Persia and Central Asia who had come to China during the Mongols' rule. Over the generations, they attained enough wealth and social position to allow their descendents' children to concentrate on education, both in Chinese academies and local mosques. As the newly trained scholar-teachers moved east and set up schools, the Muslim elite incorporated the dual aspects of its identity and embraced the Chinese means to express its community's Muslim character:

> The gentry setting of the east provided what was lacking in the west: a readymade, highly educated Muslim constituency that has kept its Muslim identity but needed a new content for it. This content was to be produced in the form of Chinese texts, written and taught in a framework that valued scholarship and learning.[76]

This body of literature grew out of this setting. Even though the authors were scattered in various centers of Islamic learning, they were in continuous dialogue with one another. These texts were produced by a conscious intellectual collaboration between several scholars and their students within the

scripture hall educational network. Authors knew each other and were colleagues, related, or had a master-disciple relationship. Therefore, no author's work was the product of isolated innovation: "Just like other Chinese intellectuals, *Han Kitab* authors spoke not as individuals but as members of an established and recognizable intellectual community."[77]

Each author would circulate his work to other scholars for comments or critique and usually received a short preface applauding the volume in return. Sometimes they would even obtain forwards from officials to whom their work had been presented. The texts also arose out of a community that valued Islamic knowledge and supported its preservation. The *Han Kitab* authors "remained close – literally and intellectually – to one another and worked in concert. They were, however, also supported by and in contact with many other individuals – publishers, financial backers, philanthropists, editors, students, and countless others."[78] This larger community, both Muslim and non-Muslim, was directly responsible for enabling these authors to distribute their writings within the community. This creative reciprocal relationship between writer and audience, as well as its creation of texts, would not have been possible without a group of affluent and interested supporters who encouraged and assisted these authors financially.

The Role

The educational system was the immediate stimulus for the *Han Kitab*, and the resulting mutual relationship was a reciprocal reaffirmation of the importance of both aspects of the Muslim self-identity. The educational system was the driving force behind the Chinese Islamic canon, which was the direct product of the pedagogical techniques utilized by Hu Dengzhou and his disciples. Employing classical Chinese texts and Chinese as the language of instruction reminded the students of their Chinese heritage, whereas the use of Arab and Persian sources as the basis of knowledge emphasized the community's Islamic roots. In the *Han Kitab* texts, the Muslim literati clearly defined their dual identity by explaining why their tradition looks at the world the way it does via the Chinese language and symbolism. In their attempt to delineate the Islamic worldview, the authors illustrated how *Chinese Muslims* thought about the world.

As the educational network developed, these texts became an integral part of the curriculum and inspired others to employ traditional Chinese understandings of the cosmos to explain Islam. A specifically Muslim literati identity was being fashioned within scripture hall education, for "the curriculum in the various schools of the network was fairly uniform, and its

members, however separated in distance, were interconnected in myriad ways and were in constant intellectual dialogue with one another."[79] The consistency of materials used contributed to crystallizing the discourse on self-understanding.

The Muslim literati's correlation between method, educational network, and discourse (i.e., the *Han Kitab*) enabled Muslims to understand themselves and their place in the world. This discourse's construction, internalization, and reiteration also allowed them to represent their own community in their own terms. Its deliberate formation and dissemination established an effective methodology by which Muslims directed and articulated their religious and cultural identities. The authors were simultaneously following the model of a learned Muslim scholar set forth by the scripture hall education system and innovatively developing a distinct Muslim literati identity by creating Sino-Islamic treatises.

Religious beliefs direct and standardize the self, but in this case, cultural influences also directed how the community wanted to be perceived. Its elite members were part of late imperial China's larger elite culture and expressed this to the larger community with which they interacted: "The network consisted of teachers, translators, authors, grammarians, and students; its clientele included publishers, editors, patrons, and benefactors."[80] All of these individuals, and the rest of Chinese society, perceived this Muslim community through its writings and conduct. The Muslim literati, who viewed themselves as equally Chinese and Muslim, also represented their tradition, composed of the *Han Kitab* canon, as congruent with Chinese culture. They did this not to substantiate their beliefs apologetically for the greater Chinese society, but because they understood themselves as embodying elements of China's cultural legacy. This canon, a skillful blending of Islamic doctrine with traditional Chinese conceptions of morality expressed in neo-Confucian terminology and concepts, instilled, in cooperation with the educational system, this sense of a dual identity and developed the discourse to express this identity.

Neo-Confucianism and Islam

The authors employed obvious neo-Confucian terms and themes to explain Islam, convey the two systems' mutual compatibility, and produce a vision of their faith comprehensible to their Muslim and non-Muslim fellow literati. The use of neo-Confucian ideas grew more pronounced over time and was a distinctive feature of Liu Zhi, the foremost *Han Kitab* author. Leslie notes: "Almost all of the Islamic writings in Chinese are imbued with

Confucianism, quoting the Sage rulers Yao and Shun, Confucius and Mencius."[81] The explicit reference to Confucian ideas was a deliberate attempt to bridge the perceived gap between the two traditions and make a place for the Muslims' tradition in the Chinese philosophical landscape. Painting Islam as the principal *dao* (path) among many helped to situate Islam within a Chinese perspective without forfeiting any of its essential principles. To do this, the authors endorsed

> ... a literary corpus that defied conventions by merging Islamic beliefs with Confucian concepts and terminology. Yet they nevertheless made explicit and frequent reference to the fact that they were transmitters of a Teaching (Jiao) and a Way (Dao) as ancient as humankind itself.[82]

The authority of Islam, despite its ancient foreign roots, was corroborated for the Muslims by the barbarian origins of the sage ruler Shun.[83] In their view, one's sagacity did not depend upon family background or locality, and depicting Muhammad as a sage was central to the casting of Islam's Chinese characteristics.

Whether in Makkah or Nanjing, Muslims need to follow the model of righteous exemplars to reach their goal. Remarkably, Islam accepts that past individuals from various traditions and geographical areas might express its central message and doctrine: "We have sent no messenger save with the tongue of his people" (Qur'an 14:4). These authors saw that such Chinese representatives of virtue as Confucius did not contradict the Islamic view of God or morality, and so promoted to their Chinese adherents the "Islamic" actions of such men. In their conception, China's sages were the prophetic archetypes for their people. By using the Chinese philosophers' concepts and imagery to express Islam, the *Han Kitab* authors successfully coupled the familiar Chinese systems of thought with the obligatory spiritual path of Islam by portraying Muhammad as a sage and Islam as his *dao*.

Both traditions manifest a shared appreciation of the sages' importance and the necessity of following their example by cultivating the self. Living harmoniously with the world is impossible without the guidance of those who have traveled the path correctly. From an Islamic perspective, this deals with the second principle of faith: prophecy. God's message was revealed to Muhammad, who abided by His principles to exemplify human perfection: "Muhammad is His messenger." In China, the character of the ancient sages and worthies, as well as Buddhas and bodhisattvas, embodies the nature of the perfect human being:

> In the Chinese Islamic texts, it is completely clear that the ulama saw "learning how to be a human" as the fundamental purpose of all Islamic teachings. When the Prophet said, "Seek knowledge, even unto China," he meant knowledge of how to be human, of how to live up to the models established by the perfect human beings of the past.[84]

Without such examples, human perfection would be beyond reach.

Associating Muhammad with the ancient Chinese sages was one of the authors' most important techniques to articulate their self-understanding as Muslims and represent their community within the literati culture of late imperial China. Uniting their scholarly pursuits with the greater literati tradition allowed them to validate the foundation of their knowledge and make it comprehensible to educated Muslims: "Specifically, Islam becomes a part of the distinct portion of Chinese thought produced, preserved, and disseminated by Chinese Muslim scholars – the Dao of Islam – a constituent of the greater dao comprising all scholarly knowledge."[85] Their work delineated how Muhammad was understood as a sage by portraying him as a divulger of knowledge and a model of righteous conduct. This interpretation "made Muhammad a part of Chinese tradition and rendered him a culturally intelligible figure in the interpretive categories of Han society."[86]

The significance of sages as models of upright conduct was a fundamental characteristic of the Confucian worldview. In China, the character of the ancient sages and worthies embodied the ideal of the perfect human being and thus was an appropriate topic of investigation.[87] Additionally,

> ... the depiction of Muhammad as a sage or righteous ruler rendered him not merely an acceptable object of study but a necessary one. Islam thus became the study of the "Dao of Muhammad," one component of the Dao with which all Chinese scholars were concerned and hence a legitimate component of late imperial Chinese intellectual discourse.[88]

Following Muhammad's example was akin to following the conduct of the ancient sage kings Yao and Shun, whose behavior and conduct became a standard for following generations.[89]

Muhammad upheld the traditional Chinese sages' values and principles, but was viewed by the Muslim literati as superior to Confucian sages due to his knowledge, which was derived from God. His conduct was based on his divine knowledge and, therefore, produced the correct path (*dao*) for the Muslim community to emulate. Understanding the "*dao* of Muhammad" as the most accurate among many paths situated the Muslims' worldview between their Islamic belief system and the Chinese literati tradition: "Islam,

then, was viewed not as a foreign knowledge 'compatible with' Chinese knowledge but as part of knowledge itself."[90]

The scholarly attempt to understand the way of the utmost sage, the "*dao* of Muhammad," meant asserting Islam's Chinese characteristics. Painting Muhammad as a sage and Islam's teachings as his *dao* were critical to negotiating the fissures between Islam and Chinese philosophical systems: "Through these two parallel themes, Chinese Muslim scholars made room for Muhammad and for their body of knowledge within Chinese literati culture."[91] Recognizing and articulating these features allowed the Muslim literati to determine their identity and establish the attributes constituting their conception of the Chinese Muslim self.

While these authors found neo-Confucian moral teachings compatible with Islamic piety, they felt that these same teachings were lacking in their conception of a supreme being. Thus, they made God's nature and manifestation explicit and detailed in order to convey the necessary relationship between God and His creatures. They often equated God with terminology from various Chinese schools and delineated His eminence in comparison to them. Their descriptions and explanations were always in dialogue with Chinese traditions, for these indigenous ideas are what shaped the Chinese-educated Muslims' minds. The implicit conversation was between the *Han Kitab* authors and the Confucian intellectual society within which they chose to locate themselves.[92] Explicating Islam through a Chinese idiom enabled the authors to reach their Chinese-speaking Muslim audience and convey Islam's underlying messages in a coherent scheme, which underlined this community's dual identity.

Creating a Discourse

The *Han Kitab* literature's structure, content, and goals created a distinct discourse that expressed the views of the scholarly Muslims involved in the scripture hall education network. This new discourse brought together aspects of this community's Chinese and Islamic qualities, for these authors' ultimate goal was "to make Islam comprehensible, moral, and effective within a Chinese political, intellectual, and cultural world without compromising its core principles."[93] This task was accomplished by utilizing neo-Confucian reference points to express Islam's theological complexity and moral piety to the Muslim audience.

The Muslim literati first created and then internalized and utilized this discourse to regulate individual and community identities within Chinese society and the systems with which they had to interact. This new identity, which challenged preconceived ideas about what it meant to be *Chinese* and

Muslim, enabled the community to shape its own identity, because identities are shifting constructions communicated to others through interaction. Muslims stressed their identity's Chinese aspects by using Chinese structures and language to communicate their community's character to the larger Chinese society. In addition, their character's Islamic qualities were accentuated by highlighting the preservation of their ancient traditions and the foreign source of ultimate knowledge. Together, these features allowed the Muslim literati to locate the community within both groups and view it as participating in both the Chinese literati community and that of previous educated Muslims. The Muslim discourse employed in the *Han Kitab* literature reflects this conversation with the literary traditions of both China and Islam.

The direct correlation between this new means, the educational network, and the discourse expressed through the *Han Kitab* allowed the Muslim literati to construct a new dual identity by challenging existing religious paradigms and enabling the community to regenerate its identity. Establishing the educational network and creating the *Han Kitab* literature contested conventional understandings of knowledge, authority, and identity. Their work is extremely valuable,

> ... for it provides an extraordinary view into the minds of Muslim intellectuals self-consciously explaining their faith in the idiom of Classical Chinese, and thus a subtle description of the relationship between the two parts of Sino-Muslim identity as these particular men experienced and explained it.[94]

The innovative teaching technique, which generated and circulated this discourse, allowed the Muslim elite to disseminate specific knowledge that united their adherents and perpetuated the dual Chinese Muslim identity.

Language

Due to the limitations of the Chinese language, Muslim authors had to make creative use of the lexicon of other traditions to express Islam's superiority. This has been understood as the Muslims' total incorporation into Chinese society, because the use of Chinese reflects their failure to retain their Muslim ancestry and assert their Islamic identity.[95] However, since they had little choice but to utilize neo-Confucian terminology to convey their messages, this perceived assimilation may have been unintentional.[96]

These texts could also be understood as a retrogressive interpretation of Islam's fundamental stance. According to this view, the authors tried to assert their Muslim-ness but could not maintain an orthodox interpretation of Islam. However, Aubin argues: "Their literature proves that this is not the case: the

use of a terminology and a juggling with images borrowed from Chinese culture has not resulted in a degenerate syncreticism. The message, the Sufi one in particular, has remained distinctively Muslim."[97] When the Muslim elite felt its identity was being compromised by the lack of Islamic knowledge in China, they began to create an indigenous body of literature to uphold their foreign-born ancestors' prominent Islamic intellectual tradition.

The language utilized in the Chinese texts was selectively chosen and versatile in meaning. An initial reading of the *Han Kitab* reveals a clear and accessible writing style and language that would be intelligible to Confucian-trained literati. Contained within this basic meaning was a text linked to an Islamic worldview, which only an initiated student would understand. The alternate meanings of terminology reflected the general Chinese understanding of terms and also the reinvented Islamic sense. Many of these Islamic texts also appear to have a profound Sufi meaning.[98] By recognizing these texts' Islamic and Chinese origins, one can verify the importance of these two systems in the development of Chinese Islamic thought.

Syncretism or Simultaneity

Much of western scholarship on Islam in China has depicted Muslim identity as accommodative or conciliatory. A common assumption is that Muslims cannot adhere to the Chinese order due to their religious beliefs.[99] When they somehow manage to do so, it is because they have abandoned their Muslim roots and assimilated. According to this view, Chinese Islam is a syncretic (viz., the merging of two or more individual substances to create a new distinct object) combination of Chinese customs and Muslim religious practices. This term is usually applied to a religious praxis in which there is a union of diverse tenets or rituals. But at this level, it more accurately resembles a historical interrelationship.

To retain any utility, syncretism must also incorporate the reconciliation of divergent truth claims.[100] The authors should not be placed into this categorization, for they firmly asserted both their Islamic and Chinese characteristics simultaneously without compromising the ultimate reality of either. In the end, they perceived the inherent supremacy of Islam's doctrinal assertions. As Lipman points out, "the writers of the Han Kitab – and their readers – were and are serious Muslims, not assimilated half-breeds or betrayers of the faith."[101]

The religious dialogue initiated by these authors expressed their self-identity in mutually recognized categories of association. This self-designed identity was dialogically constructed and situated in an imagined space that encompassed both China and Islam. This group of scholarly Muslim literati

understood themselves as being simultaneously *Chinese* and *Muslim*.[102] This simultaneity of identity was supported by myths explaining Chinese Muslim origins that emphasized their significance in maintaining Chinese society and their direct descent from the Prophet's closest Companions.[103] It was also reinforced through a discourse that incorporated the lexicon of the predominant Chinese philosophies of the day. To understand the authors' multifaceted identity, their dual characteristics must be considered equally, because they uniformly presented these features.

This elite's participation in the larger Chinese scholarly endeavor was viewed differently by the Chinese literati and the Muslim community. It is difficult to articulate the former's viewpoint, because Confucian-trained literati largely ignored the *Han Kitab* literature. From the Ming Dynasty on, official Chinese records and personal accounts increasingly mentioned Muslims, but there was little direct recognition of these works or the scripture hall education system. What was mentioned was often stated in prefaces to particular works or inscriptions at mosques.

In fact, not until the events of 1782 did Chinese society validate this body of literature in an authoritative manner. After the arrest and interrogation of a peripatetic Muslim who possessed several *Han Kitab* texts, a copy of Liu Zhi's *Veritable Records of the Most Sagely of Islam* (*Tianfang zhisheng shilu*) was presented to the Qianlong emperor (1711-99) for his inspection. After looking it over, he stamped it with his "read by the emperor" seal (*yulan*) and wrote an approving commentary on it. Upon the emperor's visit to Nanjing in 1784, a new edition of Liu Zhi's book was presented to him with the imperial seal and his review of the text on its first page.[104] This official recognition marked the authors' success as a whole and demonstrated that Chinese society accepted the value of the neo-Confucian Islamic dialogue.

Prior to this imperial confirmation, the Muslim scholarly community understood their members as being engaged in a meaningful process of combining their two cultural heritages. As Muslim Confucians (*Huiru*), they held that their tradition was expanding on truths found within Confucianism and was an essential aspect of the scholarly pursuit. As Benite points out, "[w]riting, study, and scholarship were the activities through which learned Chinese Muslims found a place for themselves within literary Chinese culture."[105] Preserving Islamic knowledge was supported by involvement in scholarly production and participation in the educational network. Muslim authors believed they were included in the larger Chinese literati endeavor because of their involvement in education and literary output as scholars (*shi*). From the Muslim literatis' viewpoint, their *dao* (viz., Islam) was just as legitimate and enlightened as that of the Confucian sages.[106] Through con-

stant implicit dialogues with other Chinese elites, the authors carved out a dual self-identity that incorporated both their local culture and their foreign source of knowledge.

Conclusion

The quest for the *Chinese Muslim* identity was preceded by an inquiry into the meaning of being both *Chinese* and *Muslim*. The *Han Kitab* authors perceived the flexibility of these cultural categories and envisioned themselves as the quintessence of both. Members of the Muslim literati were forced to understand themselves within imperial China's societal circumstances and established notions of Muslim identity. These, in turn, ultimately shaped their conception of Chinese Muslims and their role within larger Chinese society.

The Muslims' stylization of self was a product of their scholarly elite's reinvention of their identity, which was shaped by the determining influence of power relations within imperial China. The internal developments of the Muslim literati community and the external powers of Chinese society were forces of subjectivization that constructed the Muslim self. As Benite notes: "To be Chinese Muslim in late imperial China was to be connected, in one way or another, to this [scholarly Chinese Muslim] constituency. Thus Chinese Muslim identity was, like other Chinese identities, institutionally shaped."[107]

Islam's historical legacy within China also affected the perception of Muslims within the broader Chinese society and among individual Muslims. By creating an original discourse and disseminating it through innovative pedagogical techniques, the *Han Kitab* authors and the scripture hall education system's leaders reconstructed Muslim identity. The performative aspect of illustrating the Muslim character by adopting new descriptions and perceptions engendered a new self-fashioned dual identity that was maintained and developed through scholarship and literary production. It understood Islam as compatible, integral, and supplementary to neo-Confucianism, and was both encompassed by and encompassing of that Chinese tradition.[108] The *Han Kitab* authors located their Islamic message in a language accessible to contemporary acculturated Muslims and made their foreign religion familiar to the Chinese. From their work, one can discover how individuals who were simultaneously Muslim and Chinese understood themselves and their world.

Endnotes

1. Chinese Muslims of the scripture hall educational system and the *Han Kitab* authors were more concerned with orthodoxy than orthopraxy. This led them to emphasize the nature of reality and then illuminate how this related to Muslim life and practice. Thus, Islamic knowledge refers to the Islamic intellectual tradition that addresses the Islamic viewpoints' theological roots. Overall, this is how it has been understood by theosophical authorities. In addition, it is not limited to the Shari`ah-oriented science of *fiqh* (jurisprudence) or the philosophy of *kalām* (rational theology).
2. This Muslim community's limited language skills posed a serious problem for understanding Islam. Arabic is essential for the basic exegesis of the Qur'an, and, by the time of the Ming Dynasty, Persian rivaled Arabic as the language of eastern Muslims and was the language of those Sufis who spread Islam throughout Asia. William C. Chittick, *Sufism: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oneworld Press, 2000), ix; and John Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
3. The understanding of this body of literature by contemporary Chinese Muslims is varied. *Han Kitab* is used by those living in the northwest, transliterated as *Han Ketabu*. However, the genre is typically called *Zhongwen Yisilanjiao yizhu* (Chinese-language Islamic translations and commentaries) by intellectuals in other parts of China. Jonathan Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 74, note 38.
4. This identification first appears in 1680 in a preface in Ma Zhu's *Compass of Islam* (*Qingzhen zhinan*), in which eleven scholars are labeled *Huiru*. Later authors continued to use this term. Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Chinese Muslims in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 143, 160.
5. Similar movements were occurring in parts of Africa and South Asia during this period, but emerged from predominantly Islamic societies. Many of these treatises were also written in Arabic or Persian. For Tamil literature, see Asim Roy, *The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983) and Vasudha Narayanan, "Religious Vocabulary and Regional Identity: A Study of the Tamil Cirappuranam," in *Beyond Turk and Hindu: Rethinking Religious Identities in Islamicate South Asia*, eds. David Gilmartin and Bruce B. Lawrence (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 74-97.
6. Sachiko Murata, *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light: Wang Tai-yu's Great Learning of the Pure and Real and Liu Chih's Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 4.
7. The *Han Kitab texts* writings are markedly "neo-Confucian" in style, but I employ "Chinese literary and philosophical traditions" here to also encompass

the terminology utilized in Buddhist and Daoist discourse, which is also often drawn upon and cited throughout their works.

8. Research on minority identities within China has been plagued by a "sinicization" theory, which suggests that "China" is a hegemonic society dominated by a "Confucian" moral and social order that forces minorities to assimilate into "Chinese" society. This theory ignores the ethnic diversity and cultures that existed in pre-modern China. The sinicization debate has dominated the work of historians of the Manchurian-ruled Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), especially that of Pamela K. Crossley, Mark C. Elliot, and Evelyn S. Rawski. This theory has also been addressed by scholars of Chinese Islam, ardently supported by Raphael Israeli and challenged by Zvi Ben-Dor Benite. See my sections "Language" and "Syncretism or Simultaneity."
9. I purposely use *simultaneity* to describe this community's dual identity, which is not accommodating, conciliatory, or syncretic. Benite has shown that this term is most appropriate for illustrating their dialogically self-produced identity, because these scholars understood themselves as simultaneously Chinese and Muslim. Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad*, esp. 12-18.
10. Lipman reminds us that in order to overcome the inherent problems of recalling a hegemonic Sino-centric history of China, the deconstruction process must provide alternative narratives that acknowledge the ambiguity and multiplicity of human existence. Therefore, this introduction only attempts to present the major trends that have been documented regarding the Muslim settlers in various locations throughout China and not the history of the Muslims in China. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, xxxiii-xxxv.
11. See Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, "From 'Literati' to '`Ulama': The Origins of Chinese Muslim Nationalist Historiography," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 9, no. 4 (2003): 83-109.
12. There were numerous "Muslim" rebellions throughout northwest and southwest China during the latter years of the Qing dynasty. These conflicts, which included Han, Muslim, and other minority peoples, were often between differing Muslim factions or a unified Han/Muslim/Other geographical community against Qing suppression. Muslims certainly fought on both sides of every confrontation. See, for example, Joseph Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China," *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, ed. Beatrice Manz (London: Variorum, 1995), 1-46; David G. Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); and Bai Shouyi, ed., *Huimin qiyi* (Righteous Uprisings of the Hui People) (Shanghai: Shenzhou guoguang, 1953).
13. Arabs and Persians were called *dashi* and *bosi*, respectively. The former term later became the most common one for Muslims in official Chinese sources until the Yuan Dynasty. Since identifying names for Muslims and their homelands changed throughout history, it is not always clear exactly what these

terms designated. Donald Daniel Leslie, *Islam in Traditional China* (Canberra: Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1986), 195-96.

14. The most famous elements of the mythical literature describing the Muslims' arrival in China is recounted in the *Huihui Yuanlai* (Origins of the Huihui). This story narrates the emperor's dream of a forthcoming disaster, which led him to request a delegation from "the great king" Muhammad. The resulting delegation was led by the Prophet's maternal uncle Sayyid ibn Abi Waqqas (Sahaba Saade Wan Gesi), who, according to Hui tradition, established China's first mosque. English translations can be found in Li Shujiang and Karl W. Luckert, *Mythology and Folklore of the Hui, A Muslim Chinese People* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 237-38 and Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 204-09.
15. Chinese sources place Arab soldiers in China by 760, many possibly Muslims. Arabic sources clearly discuss an Islamic settlement in Canton by 851. Leslie, *Islam in Traditional China*, 35-37.
16. Canton certainly had a considerable Muslim population with extraterritorial rights and its own Muslim judges (*qāḍī*) by the middle of the ninth century, and most likely earlier. Chang'an probably had a small but significant Muslim population after Arab troops arrived there to aid the An Lushan rebellion in 756. Arab embassies began traveling to Chang'an in 651, and later delegations included Muslims who may have set up mosques. Ibid., 42-55.
17. One Chinese source states that the king of the *dashi* sent a pearl as a gift for the Tang emperor in 627. This is probably due to a mistaken character, making the date 785, but could actually refer to an embassy sent by the Prophet himself. Ibid., 36.
18. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 26.
19. Even the children of Muslims who married Chinese were seen as outsiders, identified as "native-born foreigners" (*tusheng fanke*). Ibid., 195.
20. Rich merchants often bypassed laws prohibiting foreigners from buying houses inside city walls. Ibid., 68.
21. Many of the new Chinese believers were children who had been adopted and raised by Muslim merchants.
22. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 28-30.
23. For the most complete English-language history of Muslims prior to the Yuan dynasty, see Leslie, *Islam in Traditional China*, chapters 4-7.
24. James A. Millward and Peter Purdue, "Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 44.
25. Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 194.
26. Lee Cheuk Yin, "Islamic Values in Confucian Terms: Wang Daiyu (a. 1580-1658) and his Zhengjiao Zhenquan (Genuine Annotation of the Orthodox Teachings)," in *Islam and Confucianism: A Civilizational Dialogue*, eds.

Osman Bakar and Cheng Gek Nai (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1998), 76-77.

27. Joseph Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368-1884," in *Chinese World Order*, John Fairbank ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 207-08.
28. Tsai Yuan-Lin, "Sufism in Wang Daiyu's San Yi (The Threefold of Oneness) Theory: The Advent of a Creative Dialogue between Islam and Confucianism" (paper presented at the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, San Antonio, Texas, 20-23 November 2004).
29. Quoted in Lee, "Islamic Values in Confucian Terms," 77.
30. Commonly seen by the Chinese as strangers living among them, hence, Lipman's apt title *Familiar Strangers*.
31. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 46.
32. Lee, "Islamic Values in Confucian Terms," 78.
33. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 73.
34. He also appears in some sources by his style name (*zi*) Hu Puzhao or his Arabic name Muhammad Ibrahim Ilias.
35. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 39-42.
36. Zhao Can, *Jingxue xi chuan pu* (Genealogy of the Transmission and Lineage of Classical Learning), quoted in Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 41. This pandect, written circa 1677, reflects the success of the scripture hall education system and outlines its scholastic history, including teachers, students, curriculum, literary output, and the establishment of mosque schools.
37. Some even lived with Hu in his home on a work-study program. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 50.
38. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 75.
39. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 50
40. Yuan-Lin Tsai, "Confucian Orthodoxy vs. Muslim Resistance in Late Imperial China: The Ideological Origin and the Development of the Hui Rebellion in Yunnan under the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)," Ph.D. Dissertation, Temple University (Ann Arbor: UMI - Dissertations Publishing, 1997), 102.
41. Murata, *Chinese Gleams*, 13-14.
42. Donald Daniel Leslie and M. Wassel, "Arabic and Persian Sources Used by Liu Chih," *Central Asiatic Journal* 26 (1982): 78-104.
43. Francoise Aubin, "Tasawwuf 8. In Chinese Islam," *The Encyclopedia of Islam* CD-Rom Edition v.1.1 (Leiden: Brill, 2001).
44. This was translated as *The Essentials of the Return to Truth* (*Guizhen yaodao yiyi*) by Wu Zixian in 1651. This text was so popular that several people created their own translations, under other titles, to use in the scripture hall. All references in later Chinese Islamic texts employ Wu's title *Guizhen yaodao* to designate this book. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 127 note 20.
45. For an English translation and an explanation of this text's importance throughout the Islamic world, see Hamid Algar, *The Path of God's Bondsmen from Origin to Return* (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1982).

46. There are two translations of this text, which could be written by the same author. The first, *The Scripture of Studying the Truth* (*Yan Zhen Jing*) was translated by She Yunshan in 1679. The second is an undated copy attributed to Po Nachi (possibly She Yunshan's pen-name): *The Outline of the Way Returning to the Truth* (Gui Zhen Biyao).
47. For an English translation, see Lloyd Ridgeon, *Persian Metaphysics and Mysticism: Selected Treatises of `Aziz Nasafi* (Richmond: Curzon), 2002.
48. The former was translated as *The Mysterious Secret of the Original Display* (*Zhao yuan mi jue*) by Po Nachi, but was not published until 1927. The latter was translated as *Secret Method for Illuminating the Origin* (*Zhenjing Zhaowei*) by the great Liu Zhi circa 1751. For an English translation of this latter book, see Murata, *Chinese Gleams*, 113-210.
49. For an English translation of this text, see William C. Chittick and Peter L. Wilson, *Fakhruddin `Iraqi: Divine Flashes* (New York: Paulist Press, 1982).
50. Murata, *Chinese Gleams*, 33.
51. Abu Hafs `Umar Najm al-Din al-Nasafi, one of the greatest Sunni and Hanafi jurists and theologians, belonged to al-Maturidi's (d. 333/944) school. For a discussion of this text, see Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, *The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript: A 16th Century Malay Translation of the `Aqā'id of Al-Nasafi* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 1988).
52. A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development* (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1979), 249-76.
53. Zhao Can, *Genealogy of the Transmission*, 19 and 90. Quoted in Tsai, "Sufism in Wang Daiyu's San Yi."
54. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 42.
55. Muhammad Usiar Huaizhong Yang, "The Four Upsurgences of Islamic Culture in Chinese History," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 16, no. 1 (1996): 15.
56. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 37.
57. Ibid., 21.
58. Ibid., 21-22.
59. These Muslims were strewn throughout the cities and tightly incorporated into Chinese society where, unlike the Muslim communities of northwest and southwest China, they often lived in large isolated rural communities. See Lipman, "Patchwork Society, Network Society: A Study of Sino-Muslim Communities," in *Islam in Asia* vol. 2, ed. Raphael Israeli (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
60. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 30.
61. The title *mingjing* is used several times in *Genealogy of the Transmission*. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 54-57.
62. The authors of the *Han Kitab* literature and the scholar-teachers of the scripture hall educational system deliberately employed such terms as classical teacher (*jingshi*), scholar (*xuezhe*), upright literati (*duanshi*), or simply literati (*shi*) to refer to members of its own community, rather than such terms as imam (*ahong*), which have been used by contemporary scholars and Chinese Muslims. See Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 36, 100-06; and Jin Jitang, "Wang

Daiyu Aheng zhuan" (A Biography of Imam Wang Daiyu), in *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaoshi cankao ziliao xuanbian, 1911-1949* (Selection of Reference Materials on the History of Chinese Islam), eds. Li Xinghua and Feng Jinyuan (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubansh, 1985).

63. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 6.
64. James D. Frankel, "Liu Zhi's Journey Through Ritual Law to Allah's Chinese Name: Conceptual Antecedents and Theological Obstacles to the Confucian-Islamic Harmonization of the Tianfang Dianli," Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University (Ann Arbor: UMI - Dissertations Publishing, 2005), 12-13.
65. Leslie discusses fifty-nine of these works at length in his *Islamic Literature in Chinese*, 1-59.
66. Ibid., 4.
67. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 73.
68. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 119.
69. "To preserve their culture in the face of Chinese ridiculing and negative stereotyping, the Muslims engaged in literary apologetics that pathetically attempted to show that Islam was not incompatible with the prevailing Confucian system." Raphael Israeli, *Islam in China: Religion, Ethnicity, Culture, and Politics* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 61.
70. Joseph Ford, "Some Chinese Muslims of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *Asian Affairs* 61 (1974): 147.
71. Murata, *Chinese Gleams*, 4.
72. Ibid., 4.
73. Michael Dillon, *China's Muslim Hui Community: Migration, Settlement, and Sects* (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1999), 96.
74. Dru Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991), 37-41 (distributed by Harvard University Press); and Dillon, *China's Muslim Hui Community*, 95-100.
75. Aubin, "Tasawwuf."
76. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 68-69.
77. Ibid., 121.
78. Ibid., 29.
79. Ibid., 37-38.
80. Ibid., 38.
81. Leslie, *Islam in Traditional China*, 119.
82. Frankel, "Liu Zhi's Journey," 70.
83. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 230.
84. Murata, *Chinese Gleams*, 10.
85. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 179.
86. Ibid., 171.
87. Murata, *Chinese Gleams*, 9-10.
88. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 171.

89. Ibid., 172.
90. Ibid., 171.
91. Ibid., 181.
92. Ibid., 229.
93. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 211.
94. Ibid., 74, note 38.
95. This position is epitomized by Raphael Israeli's work.
96. Lee, "Islamic Values in Confucian Terms," 91.
97. Aubin, "Tasawwuf."
98. Dillon, *China's Muslim Hui Community*, 97.
99. Raphael Israeli, "Muslims in China: Islam's Incompatibility with the Chinese Order," in *Islam in Asia*, eds. Raphael Israeli and Anthony D. Homes (Jerusalem: Magness Press, 1984), 275-304.
100. Rodney Leon Taylor, *The Religious Dimensions of Confucianism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 71-73.
101. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 226.
102. Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 13.
103. See the *Han Kitab* text, the *Huihui Yuanlai*; Benite, *Dao of Muhammad*, 232.
104. Ibid., 215-31.
105. Ibid., 232.
106. Ibid., 230.
107. Ibid., 62.
108. Ibid., 232.

Patriotic and Pious Muslim Intellectuals in Modern China: The Case of Ma Jian

Haiyun Ma

Abstract

The fall of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and the founding of the modern Chinese nation-state brought both opportunities and challenges to Chinese Muslims. No longer having to deal with emperorship and its foundational ideology, Confucianism, they were soon confronted with new state ideological impositions, namely, Han nationalism and socialism, imposed by the Republican and Communist regimes. These new challenges were both threatening and promising, for although the new ideologies were fundamentally antithetic to Islam, the new regimes promised an equal status to Chinese Muslims and saw how they could aid national diplomacy and international relations with Muslim countries.

Within this context, China's Muslim intellectuals tried to reorient and reposition Muslims and Islam by minimizing differences and maximizing commonalities during both the Republican and the Communist regimes. By studying Ma Jian (1906-78), one of modern China's most influential and representative Muslim intellectuals, as well as his juxtaposition of Islam and China, I look at the way of being a modern Chinese Muslim intellectual in China's post-1949 internal and international contexts. The Turkic Muslim communities in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China are excluded from this study.

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Introduction

Having lived for nearly fourteen centuries in China, Muslims have become culturally Chinese but have kept their Islamic religion. This juxtaposition of "Chinese" and "Muslim," as Jonathan Lipman aptly points out, has made them "familiar strangers" on Chinese soil.[1] Their dual status as cultural-social familiar strangers and as a minority group within Han-majority society makes any inquiry into Chinese Muslim intellectuals difficult, given their wide physical distribution and relatively small population vis-à-vis the majority non-Muslim Chinese population. At the same time, however, this attempted inquiry is meaningful, for it reveals much about Muslim intellectuals on the periphery not only of the Middle East and North Africa, but also of such Muslim-dominated societies as Malaysia.

From a global perspective, studying Chinese Muslim intellectuals also enriches discourses on Muslim intellectuals by adding Islam-Confucianism or even Islam-Communism to the monopolized discourses on Islam and the West in contemporary western scholarship.[2] Recent scholarship on Confucian Muslims, known in Chinese as *Huiru,* has greatly promoted our understanding of Confucian Muslim intellectuals and of the Islam-Confucian discourse in imperial China, while studies on contemporary Chinese Muslim intellectuals remain little researched in English scholarship.[3] In addition, such research becomes more practical and important as the encounter between Islam and Confucianism increases, along with the growing economic prosperity of Muslims and Chinese, as the Malaysian case suggests.

Modern Chinese history begins in 1911, when the Republicans overthrew the Manchu dynasty and promised to erect a nation-state comprising five major groups (Manchurians, Mongolians, Tibetans, Han, and Hui [Muslims]). This promise appealed to many Chinese-speaking Muslims,[4] who subsequently participated in the regime's political, social, and cultural movements. Under this short-lived regime (the KMT, or Guomingdang, 1911-49), Muslim participation burgeoned and blossomed in the Chinese government as well as in the military, religious, journalistic, education, academic, and other sectors.[5] The most noticeable stratum turned out to be intellectual. It is this early Republican-era ferment of political, social, and cultural consciousness and concerns of Chinese Muslim intellectuals that gave birth to several famous Muslim intellectuals in Communist China, among them the al-Azhar graduate Ma Jian.

As a Chinese Muslim, Ma Jian's influences were simultaneously religious and secular, as well as internal and international, as seen in the following observations. Ma Jian is widely considered to be modern China's first

nationwide Muslim scholar and influential diplomacy consultant. At both the national and religious levels, he is known to ordinary Chinese Muslims primarily through his scholarship on Islam. His name is very meaningful to Chinese Muslims. For example, a contemporary Muslim stated that when he found two pictures of Ma Jian in Shanghai, they "were carved in my heart when I began to read the Qur'an [in Chinese] at the age of eleven years old."[6]

Ma Jian's secular and international reputation as a Muslim was solidly based upon his activities in Communist China's second-track diplomacy with the Muslim world. As Clyde-Ahmad Winters noted, "the CIA (Chinese Islamic Association) and CII (Chinese Islamic Institute) have been instrumental in laying the groundwork for CCP [Chinese Communist Party] advances in Africa and the Middle East along with Ma Chien [Ma Jian]."[7] Ma Jian's prominence in Islamic scholarship and in China's informal diplomacy is enough to make him a representative modern Chinese Muslim intellectual. Thus, this article focuses on him as a Muslim intellectual, discusses his discourses and activities on behalf of Chinese Muslims and Islam in China, and examines the meaning of being a Chinese Muslim intellectual in the contemporary Chinese context.

A Concise Biography

Born in 1906, Ma Jian came from Shadian, a famous village in Yunnan province known for its rich production of past Muslim scholars. Ma Jian seems to have continued the village tradition of learning during a chaotic time. After completing his middle school education in 1925, he taught at a Chinese Muslim primary school (Zhong A Xuexiao) in his hometown and then headed to Gansu (northwestern China) in 1928 to study Islam with the famous reformist and modernist *ahong* (imam) Hu Songshan (1880-1955).

In the same year, Chinese Muslim activists headed by Da Pusheng (1874-1965), Ha Decheng (1888-1943), Wu Tegong (1886-1961), and Sha Shanyu (1879-1968) founded the private Shanghai Islamic Normal School (Shanghai Yisilan Shifan Xuexiao, 1928-38) as an attachment to the earlier formed Academic Association of Chinese Islam (Zhongguo Huijiao Xuehui, 1925), which purported to promote Islamic research in China by training Muslim students in Chinese culture at home and in Islamic sciences abroad. Ma Jian's immersion in both Chinese and Islamic cultures qualified him for entrance into this school and, in 1929, he enrolled in it to begin his formal training. His record of academic excellence earned him a place among the first Chinese Muslim student group sent by the Academic Association of Chinese Islam to Egypt in 1931 for professional training in Arabic and

Islam. The underlying goal of this program was to produce a comprehensive Muslim translation of the Qur'an in modern vernacular Chinese.[8]

For the next eight years, Ma Jian studied a broad range of Islamic knowledge, including the Arabic language, literature, religion, philosophy, history, and education at al-Azhar and Dar al-`Ulum.[9] In 1939, he returned to China and began translating the Qur'an in Shanghai, as the Academic Association of Chinese Islam directed. The outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 endangered the Chinese Muslims' activities in Shanghai, and so he went to his hometown and continued translating. In addition, he taught Muslim education and Islamic studies, both of which he had excelled at in Egypt, part-time at various Muslim schools and at Yunnan University.

Due to the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the end of the Second World War, the Chinese government realized the importance of Arabic in its diplomacy with the Middle East. As a result, it set up Arabic language programs in Chinese universities. Beijing University adopted this mission and, in 1946, created the first Arabic language major in its Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures (Dongfang yuyan wenxuexi). Ma Jian's mastery of both Chinese and Arabic, as well as his professional training in Cairo and his ability to translate Arabic texts, made him the ideal candidate for this newly created position. Therefore, he began a new career as a professor of Arabic language and Islamic studies. This event also represented a milestone for Arabic education, for this was the first time that Arabic and Islamic culture had ever been included in China's system of higher education.

He also was asked to participate in new China's political life. As a result, he was elected as a member of China's Political Consultative Committee in 1949, a member of the Asia and Africa Association, and a standing member of the Chinese Islamic Association. From then on, Ma Jian was an influential figure in China's internal political consultancy and external diplomatic politics directed toward Islam and Muslims. His articles defending Islam and promoting understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims in China frequently appeared in such leading newspapers as *The People's Daily* (*Renmin Ribao*).

According to his wife, Ma Jian served as the official Arabic translator for China's national leaders, among them Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.[10] Thus, he became a national symbol of Communist China's freedom of religion and Muslim participation in the nation's political life. He translated the Chinese constitution into Arabic and the Egyptian constitution into Chinese during the 1950s to strengthen the relationship between socialist China and nationalist Egypt. He also translated and broadcast China's official declaration of support for the Egyptian and Lebanese anti-imperialism struggles in 1956 and in

1958, respectively.[11] Ma Jian even joined the official Chinese delegation that attended the Asia-Africa Conference in 1959, held in Egypt.

After experiencing the bitter period of the Cultural Revolution, Ma Jian continued to work on his translation of the Qur'an until his death in 1978. In 1987, the Religious Department of Saudi Arabia accepted his translation, known as the *Jian Ma Yi Ben* (Ma Jian translation), as the standard Chinese translation for distribution to Chinese-speaking Muslims. These accomplishments project Ma Jian as a famous activist Muslim intellectual, though still Chinese, who served his motherland as a teacher, researcher, translator, writer, political consultant, and social activist in its political center: Beijing.

Ma Jian and China's Islamic and Middle East Studies

There seems to be a trend among Chinese Muslim intellectuals, regardless of when they live, to associate the fate of Islam with thinking about the condition of Muslim education in China. Ma Jian was no exception in that he made, with some sadness, the following observation concerning the history of Muslim education in China: "Although the history of Islam in China is over one thousand years old, a history of Muslim education does not exist due to the lack of records."[12] This situation was, in his opinion, largely the result of China's traditional mosque-centered education (this system is common throughout the Muslim world).[13] Ma Jian commented and critiqued this time-honored system by saying that Muslim students in such schools "only study Arabic and Persian, but not Chinese ... thus they know little about their rights and duties of being citizens of China and cannot express in Chinese what they achieve in understanding Islam."[14]

Ma Jian argues that not every Chinese Muslim youth needs to become a religious master: "[T]he need for religious masters is limited," but "Muslim parents force their children to go to religious school despite their poor potentiality in this field."[15] In his eyes, this practice only fulfilled the parents' wishes instead of encouraging the children to pursue modern knowledge. The result, he concluded, was that young Muslims either dropped out and learned nothing useful, or somehow made Islam a way to earn a livelihood. Muslim societies, he argued, "do not need only religious masters; they also need teachers, doctors, judges, lawyers, tailors, carpenters, and so on."[16]

At the same time, he critiqued the Republican government's complete imposition of "scientific" and nationalistic new-style modern school upon Chinese Muslims, a system that excluded any type of Islamic religious education:

> The new school does not offer general courses on Islam, nor does it pay attention to religious cultivation. Muslim students who graduate from these schools know little about the basic teachings of Islam and disobey the Islamic Law. They smoke, drink, gamble, and engage in other immoral activities. These results have disappointed their parents and provided conservative Muslims with excuses against the new-style education. The opinion of these conservative Muslims that studying Chinese would become Han Chi-nese is not necessarily unreasonable.[17]

In Ma Jian's eyes, the traditional Muslim education system and the new-style public education system were either too rigid or irrelevant to Islam, and therefore did not meet the community's needs. The ideal system, he thought, would teach Muslim students both Chinese and Islamic subjects, because these two areas of knowledge studies are inseparable and indispensable for being both good Muslims and modern Chinese. Ma Jian insisted that Chinese Muslims must create their own special education system in order to serve their community and their nation.

To make such an education possible, he proposed that religious courses be added to the state-controlled public school curriculum in line with the special education policy granted to non-Han minority peoples.[18] He detailed this proposal by suggesting that two or three Qur'anic classes be provided to Muslim public school students each week so that they would learn how to fulfill such religious duties as prayer and fasting and so that such basic Islamic virtues as obedience, time-keeping, and persistence would not be corrupted by the social environment.[19] Thus, Ma Jian did not view teaching Islam to Muslim students merely as a way to fulfill one's religious duties, but also as a way to become a modern Chinese citizen. However, the Republican government rejected his reasoning, although such courses would not affect the students' major study, for, in Ma Jian's words:

> The education department of the reactionary nationalist regime thought that this would prevent their aim of assimilating minority peoples, and therefore was opposed to incorporating these special courses into the curriculum for Chinese Muslim students, under the excuse that this would violate public education policies.[20]

Years later, as a member of the Political Consultative Conference, established after the founding of the People's Republic of China, Ma Jian asked the new communinst leaders to consider the special needs of Chinese Muslims, such as the Hui minority nationality:

> The school courses for Hui students at different levels should meet the Hui people's special needs and actual situation. In addition to the general courses, special courses on the Hui people's culture should be added.[21]

The Communist party's response was no better than that of the Republicans. Clearly, an atheistic communist ideology leaves no space for religious "penetration" into the education arena, even for those minority peoples who have a different faith and culture. It seems that Ma Jian discerned the fate of this appeal under both regimes. Accompanying his early appeal for adding religious education to the minority students' curriculum during the Republican period, he suggested an alternative means of promoting Muslim education by establishing a scholarship institution to encourage Muslim students:

> We can use the money for building [Muslim] schools to grant scholarships to Muslim students who have a good school record and a good personality. Would this not be a better way? We can send our youths into the public or private schools and reward them with the funding that we gather from Muslims for their good performance at schools. During vacations, we can provide education in Islam.[22]

It seems that this alternative suggestion for a scholarship system governed by Muslim communities, as an indirect intervention into Muslim education, would facilitate Muslim education in a mixed-population society. As his case shows, Ma Jian himself is a good example of the success of such a scholarship system, for he was funded by his Muslim community, a situation that linked him, as a student, to his Muslim community by sharing with it his progress and achievements of his studies in Islam and Arabic.[23]

Ma Jian could not conduct a top-down reform of education for Chinese Muslims in this new era of Chinese society due to the state's dominance of power and discourse on the majority's behalf. However, his recognition of education's importance, as well as of the means needed to achieve it, were valuable to Chinese Muslims during a time when China was transforming itself from a dynastic empire into a modern nation-state. According to his wife Ma Cunzhen, Ma Jian first became aware of the importance of a formal Arabic and Islamic education after he had taught in his hometown for two years, and his studies in Egypt convinced him that traditional methods for teaching Arabic and Islamic subjects in China had to be reformed.[24]

After accepting the position of professor at Beijing University in 1946, Ma Jian was able to fulfill his two hopes: teaching Arabic and translating Islamic texts. This suggests that Chinese Muslim intellectuals must actively participate in China's institutionalized education system for the sake of legit-

imacy and so that they can serve Islam by serving the country. In this sense, his translations of the Qur'an and other Islamic texts not only symbolized a great practice of state-encouraged *ijtihād* (independent judgment in juridical matters) among modern Chinese Muslims so that Islamic texts could be understood in the Chinese Muslims' native language, but also marked a clear transformation of the Muslims' status from "subjects" of various dynasties to "citizens" of the Chinese nation-state. In other words, unassimilated Muslim "strangers" in the Chinese nation-state have to become familiar with all of the nation's aspects, including the Chinese language. Education, armed by the state, began to function as a means of making citizen-believers.

As chairman of Beijing University's Arabic program, Ma Jian focused on developing Arabic and Islamic studies and training high-level experts of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies in Chinese universities. His hope to find a solution to the need for Muslim education in modern China led him to pay special attention to the history of early Arab Muslim education. This affiliation generated a rich scholarship on Islam, Muslims, and the Middle East. While working at this university, his prolonged project of translating the Qur'an into Chinese, initiated in 1939, was finally finished and printed in 1981 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.[25] Bai Shouyi, a contemporary Hui intellectual and historian, stated that Ma Jian's translation surpassed all existing versions.[26] It is not surprising that it became the most popular Chinese-language Qur'an among Chinese-speakers. Moreover, its accuracy and elegance gained it the approval of the Islamic Center of the Middle East, which caused the Religious Department of Saudi Arabia to accept it as the standard Chinese translation for circulation among Chinese-speaking Muslims in 1987.[27]

In addition to this translation, known as *Gulanjing*, Ma Jian also translated, among many other publications, Hussein al-Jisr's *Ḥaqīqah al-Diyānah al-Islāmīyah* (*Huijiao Zhenxiang*),[28] T. J. de Boer's *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam* (*Huijiao Zhexue*),[29] Khalil Adbullah Totah's *Contribution of the Arabs to Education* (*Huijiao Jiaoyushi*),[30] and Philip Hitti's *History of the Arabs* (*Alabo Tongshi*).[31] His extensive translations and writings on Islam and Arab Muslims laid a solid foundation for Islamic and Middle Eastern studies in China's academia.

In his capacity as a well-known university professor, Ma Jian also personally taught and trained many Muslim and non-Muslim Arabic and Islamic experts. All of his students became the first generation of China's experts on the Arabic language and Middle Eastern studies. Many of them went on to dominate Arabic teaching and research at Beijing University, the Beijing Foreign Languages University, and other Chinese universities. Some

contemporary influential Muslim scholars, among them Lin Song, were students of Ma Jian. Therefore, it is fair to say that Ma Jian is the founder of modern Islamic and Middle Eastern studies in China.

The significance of Ma Jian's contribution to Arabic language education and Islamic studies in China can be fully understood and appreciated from two historical angles. The first one is from that of Muslim education. As mentioned above, the traditional mosque-centered education system (*Jingtang Jiaoyu*) managed to produce enough imams and mullahs to sustain Islam in pre-modern Chinese society. However, it has encountered many difficulties and challenges from modern secular education because it cannot offer the necessary natural and social sciences and must compete with the state-enforced atheistic education for the souls of Muslim students. Bringing Islam and Arabic into the nation's universities provides a platform to deepen Islamic studies and research and to combine them with mainstream education. Furthermore, since such courses are centered on Arabic and Islam, other Muslim sciences dealing with history, culture, education, and geography have greatly expanded the knowledge of Islam in China. In this sense, Ma Jian's efforts have succeeded and surpassed those of the Confucian Muslims to make Islam known to Muslim and non-Muslim audiences in China.

The second angle is that of the state. Chinese history shows that it is almost impossible to insert Islam into any Chinese educational institution. Although Islamic sciences, especially astronomy and medicine, had been used by Chinese scholars for centuries, subjects on Arabic and Islam had never been presented in state-sponsored non-Muslim schools and scholarship. The Qing dynasty's inclusion of Liu Zhi's *Tianfang Dianli* (*The Rites of Arabia*) in the catalog of the imperial libraries (*Siku quanshu*) in 1782, despite being full of derogatory commentary, is probably the first time that this non-Muslim state showed an initial – but limited – interest in Islam and Muslim writings.[32] Ma Jian's conversion of interest in Islamic religious, cultural, and historical texts and research into state-recognized and legitimate scientific disciplines of academic inquiries, under official sponsorship and supervision, built a bridge between the indigenous Muslim community and the Chinese nation-state.

Ma Jian's Religious Patriotism

Ma Jian's love of Arabic and Islam was accompanied by his patriotism, which originated from his great love of Chinese culture. As hinted at above, among his virtues were his mastery of Chinese culture, his insistence that Chinese Muslims study Chinese culture, and his effort to introduce Chinese

texts to the Arab world during his student days in Egypt. As a student, Ma Jian began to translate Chinese classics and other texts dealing with Chinese history, culture, and mythology into Arabic. A few of these are *Analects* (*Lun Yu*), *The Tea God* (*Cha Shen*), *The Story of Hebo's Marriage* (*He Bo Qu Qi*), and *Chinese Idioms and Axioms* (*Zhongguo Geyan Yanyu*).

Ma Jian's love of Chinese culture developed into political patriotism during China's resistance to the Japanese invasion of the 1930s and 1940s. Even while he was studying at al-Azhar, he actively spread China's policy of forming a United Front for Anti-Fascism (*Fan Faxisi Tongyi Zhanxian*) and uncovered Japan's plot to divide-and-rule China by offering superficial support to establishing a separate Hui-Muslim nation (*Huihui Guo*) in northwestern China.[33] He even carried his patriotism to Makkah, where, during the 1939 pilgrimage season, he spoke out against the politically motivated, Japanese-sponsored Chinese Muslim delegation.

Ma Jian's early record of patriotism was paid back politically after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949: He was invited to participate in new China's Political Consultative Conference (Zhongguo Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi) in 1949, made a key member of the Asia and Africa Association (Yafei Youxie), and a standing member of the Chinese Islamic Association (Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Xiehui). All of these memberships were designed to develop diplomacy and friendship with Muslim nations at a time when communist China was facing the West's (American-led) policies of isolation and sanction.

Although the degree of his involvement in and influence on China's diplomacy with Muslim countries is hard to measure, his visibility in the second-track diplomacy conducted between the 1950s and the 1970s, as Winters has observed, was tremendous. Ma Jian undertook political translations that strengthened the relationship between China and the Arab world. For example, he translated such political texts as the Chinese constitution into Arabic in 1954 and the Egyptian constitution into Chinese during the 1950s.

Ma Jian also became an essential interpreter for the growing friendship between China and various Muslim states. Through his efforts, together with those of his other Muslim comrades, China established foreign relations with many Islamic countries in Asia and Africa. Ma Jian personally served Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai as their Arabic translator when Arab leaders visited China.[34] During the special time of Chinese political support for Arab countries, Ma Jian translated and broadcast Beijing's declarations of support for Egypt's anti-imperialism war in 1956 and for those of Lebanon and Jordan in 1958.[35] In 1959, he joined a high-ranking Chinese delegation to the Asia-Africa Conference in Egypt, where, after twenty years, he met his old

friends, teachers, brothers, and now comrades. Hence, as a Chinese Muslim intellectual, he played a dual role of engendering political solidarity and nation-to-nation friendship between the peoples of his motherland (China) and of his "brother lands" (Egypt and other Islamic countries).

Ma Jian's enthusiasm and devotion to Sino-Arab diplomacy was not merely the result of his early language and cultural training in the Middle East. A close reading of his mind reveals that as a Chinese Muslim, he hoped to use his community to build up solidarity between China and the Muslim world against their common enemy: American imperialism. Ma Jian's combination of piety and patriotism became particularly evident after the Korean war broke out: He published a famous article in *The People's Daily* (*Renmin Ribao*), in which he argued that American imperialism was Islam's deadly enemy ("*Meidiguozhuyi Shi Yisilanjiao de Sidi.*").[36] To defend Islam and China, Ma Jian detailed the American conspiracy against the Islamic world and proposed a united front between China and the Muslim countries:

> They [the American imperialists] deploy various conspiracies against Muslim countries and treat and cheat Muslims as naïve children by establishing hospitals and schools. The most condemned [act] is that they insult our Prophet Muhammad by propagandizing that he holds the Koran with his left hand and a sword in his right hand, implying that he converted people into Islam by force. This poisonous propaganda was even found in textbooks during nationalist rule to cheat the Chinese people.
>
> If we can cooperate with this great bloc [the Muslim world] through diplomatic means via the Hui people, we can beat and break the conspiracy of the imperialist war of America. Thus, we can gain a strong shield for the peace of the world.[37]

To unravel the imperialists' degradation of the Prophet, Ma Jian wrote a book on Muhammad's sword to refute the West's propaganda against Islam.[38] As a Chinese Muslim intellectual at that particular time, defending Islam and protecting China converged with the political movement of anti-imperialism. In this sense, his political writings served to demonstrate to the internal public the religious freedom and political rights enjoyed by Muslims in socialist China (in contrast to the imperialist countries) and, on the international stage, to consolidate relationships of friendship between China and its Third World Muslim allies. By transcending his local Muslim community and moving to the center of Islamic learning in Egypt, and from being born a member of his nation's Muslim minority community and rising to become an influential diplomatic consultant, Ma Jian fulfilled his mission as a twentieth-century Chinese Muslim intellectual.

Conclusion: Muslim Intellectuals in Modern China

Ma Jian's case outlines an aspect of the Muslim intellectual that is different from those of Muslim intellectuals living in Muslim-dominated societies. His career as a scholar and a political consultant poses the question of how we define a Muslim intellectual in contemporary China. Chinese Muslim intellectuals differ from their counterparts in Muslim-dominant societies in terms of their activities and discourses. While the latter mainly focus on the "Islamic" economic, cultural, and political issues faced by their societies, the former have to consider the concerns and priorities of the majority non-Muslim population of the society and nation-state in which they function.[39]

Another major difference is the civilizations to which they react and respond. Many discourses of Arab, Persian, or even Malay Muslim intellectuals focus on Islam and the West and so develop a Muslim-Christian reaction model that mainly focuses on their similarities and differences and how they interact with each other. In contrast, the discourses of Chinese Muslim intellectuals have to be framed in the Chinese context, and therefore concentrate on showing conformity between Islam and the dominant state ideologies, ranging from Confucianism to communism.[40]

From a historical perspective, the nature of Muslim intellectual discourses and activities in China is predicated on the attempt to assure the non-Muslim regime of the Muslims' political loyalty. The early generation of Muslim intellectuals of imperial China, namely, the *Han Kitab* (Chinese book) scholars, worked through the existing cultural and social institutions to show that the "*dao* (path) of Muhammad" conformed to that of Confucianism and that the various schools of Muslim scholarship agreed with those of the Han Chinese.[41]

Both the Republican and the Communist regimes transformed the previous emperor-subject relations, which characterized Muslims and the empire in pre-modern China, into Chinese-nation and Muslim-citizen relations. As Ma Jian's case shows, he located his activities to save/protect the Islamic religion (*Jiujiao/Baojiao*) under the Republican regime, albeit in a very complex manner, within the various political and social movements of saving/protecting the Chinese nation (*Jiuguo/Baoguo*). After the Communist regime consolidated its power, the relationship between the state and Islam had to be reformulated in the guise of an updated patriotism that juxtaposed one's love of country with one's love of religion (*Aiguo Aijiao*). All of this now informs the dualistic nature of Chinese Muslim intellectuals.[42]

This definition of an intellectual differs markedly from that provided by Edward Said, whose definition, although favorable to such minority peoples

as Chinese Muslims, cannot be applied to the Chinese Muslim case. The Muslim representatives appointed by the state at either the village or the provincial level favor the government's interest over that of the Muslims. Thus, the vocation of intellectuals to "represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug" in an the unrepresentative tradition (such as China's) cannot be fully fulfilled.[43]

So, the discourse of Chinese Muslim intellectuals on Islam in the twentieth century is, to some degree, a byproduct of the discourse on the nation from the perspective of China's Muslim citizens. Believing in Islam and living in a Confucian society, as well as under Republican and Communist regimes, Chinese Muslim intellectuals have become accustomed to speaking in dualistic discourses (to majoritarian regimes and minority Muslims) either simultaneously or otherwise. This dualistic discourse, while mixed with Islam and nation and deliberately designed and prepared by Muslim intellectuals, is always harmonius on the surface but conflicting in nature.

As we can see, Ma Jian's transition from Islamic and Arabic studies in non-official schools in China and at "religious" schools in Egypt to working at a legitimate official institution – Beijing University – reveals a serious dilemma that Chinese Muslims have to face in the nation-making context: Muslims either enter the Chinese education system to receive a completely secular education to "make" them Chinese, or continue their *private* or even *illegal* religious studies at local schools to "make" themselves Muslim. As Ma Jian's case shows, modern Chinese Muslim intellectuals have attempted to nationalize and "scientificize" Arabic and Islam in national universities and make Islam relevant to the Chinese nation, and vice versa, in order to acheive both: piety and patriotism.

According to Benite, the *Han Kitab* ultimately made up the basic curriculum of Chinese Muslim education in late imperial China. However, neither republican Nanjing or communist Beijing allowed this curriculum to be taught in public education institutions for Muslim students. Ma Jian's efforts to insert Islamic "language and religious studies" into the curriculum at universities shows both his identity as a Chinese (citizen) and reflects his concern with the difficulty and problematic of being a Chinese citizen because of his Muslim religious and ethnic background. This uncovers the discrepancy in the discourse of dualism. At this point in time, being Chinese does not mean merely being members of a "civilization" as opposed to a backward "minority," as was the case in the past. Rather, it has now become an apparatus that interferes with such relatively independent domains of "backward" peoples as education.

In this sense, Ma Jian's case suggests a new stage of China's old assimilation pattern. If the sophisticated writings of "Confucian" Muslim intellectuals of the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, who focused on the philosophies of Islam and Confucianism, were not written for the "common man" but for Muslims who had been integrated to some degree into the educated Chinese elite, to use Sachiko Murata's words, then Ma Jian's translations of Arabic Islamic texts into modern Chinese, as well as his writings on Islam and nationalism for the Chinese Muslim community, obviously served the "common man" of the Chinese nation, whether this "common man" was a Muslim or a non-Muslim.[44] This implies that this nationalization of Islam is the latest stage of assimilation, the stage that pushes Chinese Muslims to be acculturated by the "national" (Han) culture through a public education system in the name of state-required compulsory education.

The problems that Ma Jian identified for Chinese Muslim education in both traditional Muslim education systems and in modern public education reflect the tension between the Muslim minority and the Han majority, rather than the new tension raised between the Islamic tradition and "western" modernity. What Ma Jian's proposal and efforts suggest is not the issue of accepting Chinese-language education or modern education, but the issue of de-Islamization at "public" schools – in other words, deconstructing Muslims in the public sphere. It reveals that Muslims, to use Lipman's words, must be persuaded or educated into conformity with the dominant cultural norm: the Han Minzu [Han Chinese].[45]

At the same time, Ma Jian's case shows that when Chinese Muslim intellectuals for the first time began to speak of Islam through the voice of their nation in the twentieth century, though not through Confucianism, by adding new such terminology as "citizenship," "patriotism," and "imperialism," they showed themselves to be highly political on both the national and the international level. As Ma Jian's case indicates, modern Chinese Muslim intellectuals have attempted to fit Arabic and Islam into the modern Chinese nation-state. These Islamic and nationalistic activities outline the new form of the modern Chinese Muslim intellectual's dualistic identity: that of continuing to justify Islam's legitimate existence within China and also of directing their diplomatic speeches and activities toward Islam and Muslims within the context of the Chinese nation.

This dualism transcends the traditional Islam-Confucianism discourse, for it exposes a complicated phenomenon of juxtaposing assimilation by means of nationalization and consciousness of the collective Muslim community within the context of nation-state. This juxtaposition can be seen in

two ways. On the one hand, the Chinese authorities expect it to quicken the transformation of Chinese Muslims into "full" or "real" Chinese "citizens." On the other hand, Muslims view it as a legitimate expansion and strengthening of their communal identity from Muslim intellectual identity to Muslim ethnic identity in the name of citizenship. After all, a national minority gains much of the legitimacy it needs by revising the *raison d'être* for its continued existence within a new context. In this sense, as Chinese Muslims struggle to justify Islam's legitimate existence and prove that they are as much citizens of China as they are followers of Islam, Chinese Muslim intellectuals represent the vanguard members of society who are actively transforming traditional Muslim communities into a Muslim ethnicity.

Endnotes

1. For a study on Chinese Muslims as "familiar strangers" in China, see Jonathan Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).
2. For a study on contemporary Muslim intellectuals in Muslim societies and countries, see John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
3. For a study on Muslim intellectuals in imperial China from the Ming to Qing dynasties, see Donald Daniel Leslie, *Islamic Literature in Chinese, Late Ming and Early Ch'ing: Books, Authors, and Associates* (Belconnen: Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1981); Sachiko Murata, *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light: Wang Tai-Yu's Great Learning of the Pure and Real and Liu Chih's Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm* (with a new translation of Jami's *Lawaih* from the Persian by William C. Chittick), tr. William C. Chittick (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000); Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Imperial China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005). For a gleam of Muslim nationalism in modern China, see Ya'qub Wang Jingzhai, "Imperative for Encouraging Islamic Culture," in *Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook*, ed. Charles Kurzman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 368-75.
4. It should be noted that the term *Hui* (Muslims), which is used for one of the five peoples of the Republic of China (ROC), is highly ambiguous in that, on the one hand, it refers to Turkic-speaking Muslims (Uyghurs) of Xinjiang, while on the other hand, it often indicates inclusion of Chinese-speaking Muslims (*Hui*). This ambiguity, however, reflects the legacy of the Qing dynasty's cultural-religious labeling of all Muslims. I use "Chinese-speaking Muslims" in this article to refer to the Hui nationality minority of present-day China (*Huizu*), which is ethnically different from Turkic-speaking Muslims and other Muslim ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China. For a short

discussion of the "Hui," see Dru Gladney, *Muslim Chinese, Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991) and Lipman, *Familiar Strangers.*

5. That the contour of the Chinese Muslims intellectuals becomes clear does not mean that there were no Muslim intellectuals before this time. Rather, it emphasizes the degree of connective participation in the social, cultural, and political movements of modern China. Although collective Muslim cultural activities have existed among Chinese Muslim scholars since the seventeenth century, as Benite's study suggests, it cannot compare with modern Chinese Muslim activities in terms of political and social influence. For a study of Chinese Muslim cultural activities and networking, see Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad.* For a study on Chinese Muslim social and cultural moment, see Zhang Juling, *Liiyuan Gouchen* (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2002).
6. Sun Yuqing, "*Aiguo Aijao de Guanghui Bangyang*" ("A Brilliant Model of Patriotism and Muslims"). Online at www.guicheng.com/nn/info/info2.asp?w=130.
7. Clyde-Ahmad Winters, *Mao or Muhammad: Islam in the People's Republic of China* (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1979), 49.
8. The non-Muslim translations of the Qur'an were by Tie Zheng (Beijing: 1927) and Ji Juemi (Shanghai: 1931). Chinese Muslims at the time were not satisfied with the translations by their non-Muslim contemporaries. Muslim translations of the Qur'an before the publication of Ma Jian's version include Wang Wenqing's *Gulanjing Yijie* (Beijing: 1932), Liu Jinbiao's *Kelanjing Hanyifuzhuan* (Beijing: 1943), Wang Jingzhai's *Gulanjing Yijie* (Shanghai: 1946), and Yang Zhongming's *Gulanjing Dayi* (Beijing: 1947).
9. Ma Cunzhen, "Majian Qinfeng de yisheng," *Yilanyuan* (*Yunnan Kaiyuan Azhuan*) vol. 13-15, nos. 1-2, (2001).
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ma Jian, tr. *Huijiao Jiaoyushi* (Changsha: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1941), "*Yizhexu*" ("Preface of the Translator"), 3.
13. For a study of Muslim mosque education in China, see Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad.*
14. Ma Jian, tr., *Huijiao Jiaoyushi*, "*Yizhexu*" ("Preface of the Translator"), 1.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 3.
17. Ibid., 5
18. Ibid., 7
19. Ibid.
20. Ma Jian, "*Di Sanshici Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Ti'an*" ("The 30th Proposal for the Political Consultative Committee Conference"), in Li Zhenzhong, *Xuezhe De Zhuiqiu: Ma Jian Zhuan* (*A Scholar's Pursuit: A Biography of Ma Jian*) (Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), 177-78.
21. Ibid.

22. Ma Jian, tr., *Huijiao Jiaoyushi, "Yizhexu"* ("Preface of the Translator"), 7.
23. Two wealthy Muslims should be mentioned for their general funding for Ma Jian's study: Ma Jinqing and Bai Liangcheng.
24. Ma Chunzhen, "*Majian Qinfeng de yisheng*," *Yilanyuan* (Yunnan Kaiyuan Azhuan Xuebao), vols. 13-15, nos. 1-2 (2001).
25. Ma Jian, tr., *Gulanjing* (The Qur'an) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe, 1981).
26. Bai Shouyi, "Preface," in *Gulanjing,* 4.
27. Ma Cunzhen, "*Majian Qinfeng de yisheng*," *Yilanyuan* (Yunnan Kaiyuan Azhuan Xuebao), vols. 13-15, nos. 1-2 (2001).
28. Ma Jian, tr., *Huijiao Zhenxiang* (Shanghai: Shangwu Chubanshe, 1951).
29. Ma Jian, tr., *Huijiao Zhexue* (Shanghai: Shangwu Chubanshe, 1946).
30. Ma Jian, tr., *Huijiao Jiaoyushi* (Changsha: Shangwu Chubanshe, 1941).
31. Ma Jian, tr., *Alabo Tongshi* (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1979).
32. For a bibliographic introduction of *Tianfang Dianli*, see Leslie, *Islamic Literature in Chinese.*
33. Ma Chunzhen, "*Ma Jian de yisheng*," 2.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ma Jian, "*Meidiguozhuyi shi Yisilanjiao de sidi,*" *Renmin Ribao*, 26 November 1950.
37. Ma Jian, "Muhanmode De Baojian" ("Muhammad's Sword"), *Renmin Ribao* (*The People's Daily*), 20 January 1952; also in *Guangming Ribao* (*Guangming Daily*), 19 January 1951.
38. Ma Jian, Muhanmode de Baojian (Tianjin: Jinbu Ribaoshe, 1951).
39. For the relationship between Muslim minorities and the historical Chinese regimes, see Yu Zhengui, *Yisilanjiao Yu Zhongguo Lidai Zhengquan* (*Islam and Regimes in China*) (Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 1996).
40. Although Chinese Muslims had felt the challenges imposed by the West and Christianity at the turn of twentieth century, the dominant discourse of Chinese Muslims has continued to focus on the Islam-Confucian relation.
41. For a study on elite Chinese Muslim identity in imperial China, see Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad.*
42. This dualism might be helpful in understanding Muslim ethnicity in China.
43. Edward W. Said, *Representations of the Intellectual* (New York: Pantheon Press, 1994), 11.
44. Murata, *Chinese Gleams*, "Introduction," 5.
45. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, xxxiii.

Beijing Rides the Bandwagon: A Critical Analysis of Islam and Separatism in Xinjiang

Ross Cuthbert

Abstract

This paper offers a critical assessment of the Chinese Communist Party's post-9/11 efforts to build international support for its security activities in its Xinjiang province. Xinjiang has traditionally presented the party with a particular challenge. It is remote and relatively underdeveloped, has borders with seven countries,[1] and, most importantly, is inhabited by a large, concentrated, and restive Islamic minority known as the Uygurs. The party is very concerned about the presence of separatist elements among the Uygur population. Beijing's activities to control such elements have traditionally been quite secretive. However, after 9/11, a Beijing-released report claimed that Xinjiang's separatist activity is Islamist in nature and that groups operating within the region have ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. I argue that inconsistencies surrounding this report tend to undermine the party's position. Furthermore, given the nature of Islamic practice in Xinjiang and the historical development of Uygur-Han relations in the region, it is more likely that the primary motivations for separatism are rooted in ethno-nationalist, rather than religious, considerations.

Introduction

Representing the world's most visible vestige of authoritarianism and imperialism has often left the People's Republic of China (PRC) at odds with the

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norms of the greater international community. There is irony to be found, then, in Beijing's recent efforts to involve the international community in its ongoing struggle with Uygur separatist elements in Xinjiang. While the proportional mix of genuine apprehension to opportunistic justification remains unclear, it is quite apparent that Beijing is riding the American-led anti-Islamist propaganda wave to gain international acquiescence to its continued human rights offenses in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR – henceforth "Xinjiang").

That separatist elements, some of them with Islamist agendas, exist in Xinjiang is not at issue here. Rather, this paper argues that Beijing's concern over Islamist separatism in Xinjiang (be it sincere or contrived) is overstated. Indeed, Beijing's own reporting on the extent and cohesion of violence there has often been exaggerated and contradictory, especially the tenuous claims that regional elements have connections to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Beyond such inconsistencies, the nature of Uygur discontent tends to suggest that the primary motivations for separatism are rooted in ethno-nationalist, rather than religious, considerations. Furthermore, it is likely that the imbalanced and generally repressive nature of Han-Chinese rule in the region[2] has prompted much of the current separatist sentiment. Prior to threshing out this paper's key arguments, however, it is perhaps prudent to consider why China is so keen on keeping Xinjiang and, moreover, why it might feel the need to gain international acquiescence to its security activities in the region.

Beijing on Xinjiang

While it is beyond the scope of this work to detail in full the Chinese Communist party's (CCP) interest in holding on to Xinjiang, it is important here to briefly discuss a few of the more relevant points. First, Xinjiang is about half the size of India and lies between central China and Central Asia. This makes it strategically important, both as a trade route and as a buffer zone. The Manchus and the Romanovs fought for control of it, as did the Nationalists (KMT) during their brief tenure. The CCP, then, is unlikely to hand it over to the Uygurs. Second, the region holds vast reserves of coal, oil, and natural gas, for which the pubescent Chinese economy hungers.[3] Third, and perhaps most important, the CCP has much at stake in the way of legitimacy when it comes to maintaining the empire.

Not so long ago, the Chinese coast was carved up by the Europeans and later by the Japanese. Remedying the "century of shame" has been an important element of the CCP's claim to leadership since the PRC's inception, making any separatist movement anathema. The recent showcasing of Bei-

jing's planned Taiwan anti-secession bill[4] is clear evidence of this.[5] Also, the days of big-poster charisma are long gone, for while ideology cannot buy the regime support, a strong economy and coercion can. The Chinese economy is doing very well, but pockets of political resistance are ever-present and accommodating them shows a lack of control and weakness. As such, the CCP exercises widespread moderate repression, complemented by incidental heavy repression, so that no significant dissent or non-state organization (e.g., the Falun Gong), can exist. Indeed, it appears to adhere well to the old Chinese adage "Kill a chicken to warn all the monkeys."[6] The methods used to consolidate its hold over Xinjiang are no exception to the rule, and human rights abuses in the region abound.

While it is impossible to discuss all of these abuses, an attempt will be made to give an overview. Xinjiang remains one of the few provinces where the execution of political prisoners is common: Between January 1997 and April 1999, Amnesty International documented 210 death sentences and 190 executions.[7] To put this in nationwide perspective, Uygurs account for only 0.7 percent of the Chinese population but, in 1999, accounted for 4.43 percent of China's total executions that year.[8] Rights of due process are not generally afforded, confessions are often extracted by torture, and arrests are often arbitrary because China does not distinguish between criminal and political disobedience.[9] As in the rest of the country, the CCP allows very little freedom of religion in Xinjiang. A 1998 law passed by the Xinjiang Communist Party Committee and the XUAR government states that religious leaders are expected to "stand on the side of the government firmly and express their viewpoints unambiguously," and attend "patriotic education courses." In May 2001, seven imams were arrested for organizing "underground mosques"; however, the charges were not made public.[10]

This law also restricts freedom of association and expression. Registered social groups have been subject to "rectification drives," with 131 being closed down between 1996 and 1999. Cases like that of Osman Yimit, sentenced to seven years in prison for "engaging in separatist activities" for running an unregistered aid fund for poor families, are common. In January 2001, Xinjiang Party Committee Secretary Wang Lequan warned journalists that "our media absolutely does not allow any noise that counteracts the party's voice" and that "journalists should remember the principle of news reports serving the party and socialism."[11] Finally, any significant rallies or protests are generally put down swiftly and severely. For example, after the arrest of a third consecutive imam from the Baytulla mosque in Khotan in 1995, a crowd converged on the local party and government compound to demand information on his whereabouts. The government responded by

calling in "large numbers of riot police who trapped the demonstrators in the compound, deployed tear gas, and arrested and beat many of them."[12] None of Beijing's policies in Xinjiang have been good for the international image of an increasingly integrated Chinese economy. Fortunately for Beijing, however, a modicum of absolution has recently become available.

The PRC-SCIO Document

On 21 January 2002, the PRC's State Council Information Office (PRC-SCIO) released "East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get away with Impunity," a document cataloging violent acts that Beijing alleges have been committed by separatist groups in Xinjiang.[13] Representing Beijing's first public acknowledgement of the extent of anti-state activity in Xinjiang, it attempts to draw links between heightened disorder there and international militant Islamist organizations. Central to the document is the claim that Osama "bin Laden has schemed with the heads of Central and West Asian terrorist organizations many times to help the East Turkestan forces in Xinjiang launch a holy war with the aim of setting up a theocratic Islamic state in Xinjiang."[14] The Taliban are also implicated as collaborators with and suppliers of separatist elements. Beyond these dubious claims of al-Qaeda and Taliban involvement with Uygur separatists (discussed in the next section), there are several reasons to be suspicious of this document.

The first major problem is related to how the document categorizes the various separatist groups. Available data on them is limited, but the following list provides an idea of the breadth of alleged organizations within the separatist movement[15]: the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan Party, the Uygur Liberation Organization (ULO), the Xinjiang Liberation Organization, the United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkistan, the Organization for the Liberation of Uygurstan, the Wolves of Lop Nor, the Home of East Turkistan Youth, the Free Turkistan Movement, the Party of Allah, the World Uygur Youth Congress (WUYC), the Uygurstan People's Party, and the Islamic Uygur Party.[16]

These groups represent a diversity of religious and secular orientations and tend to gravitate toward two poles. One is in the region's western part, near the Kazakhstan border, around Yining and the Yili Valley. The other is in the south, around Kashgar and Hetian. The more religiously oriented groups tend to gather around the second pole. Despite their loose convergence, however, "Groups like the 'Party of Allah' or 'Islamic Uigher Party' keep appearing and disappearing, but seem loosely connected and small in

membership. They advocate the establishment of an Islamic state and reject Chinese domination, but none of them has claimed to be part of a pan-Islamic network."[17] Moreover, even among the more permanent and organized groups, there seems to be a lack of incentive to cooperate. The ETIM and the ETLO, for example, display differences in "ideology, strategy and practice."[18] Thus, the separatist "movement" in Xinjiang materializes as highly fractionalized. But this is not the image Beijing has attempted to convey.

The PRC-SCIO document's treatment of Xinjiang's separatist organizations is more manipulative than it is systematic. It makes use of arbitrary and often confusing terms that rather abstract the situation:

> [T]he document in both its Chinese and English versions relies frequently on such vague generic terms as "the 'East Turkistan' terrorist organization," which it intersperses confusedly with references to specific groups, many of which also have "East Turkistan" in their names. Because in Chinese the compound "Dongtu" (East Turkistan) is used both in a generic sense, for all "East Turkistan" groups, and as a specific abbreviation for any name beginning with "East Turkistan," the result is ambiguity over whether a given act was committed by a specific group known to espouse a separatist line (such as the East Turkistan Liberation Organization, or ETLO) or by unknown perpetrators whom the authors of the document claim, without providing evidence, to be East Turkistan separatists. Moreover, the English version of the document uses the singular form ("the 'East Turkistan' terrorist organization") for terms that in Chinese (which lacks a definite article) are generic and possibly either singular or plural. The document thus implies that there is a unified East Turkistan terrorist organization of considerable strength. From all other indications, however, this is not the case.[19]

What is more striking than the document's inconsistency with current reality, however, is the lack of consistency it shares with Beijing's pre-9/11 position on Xinjiang. Herein lies the second major problem.

In a piece on Uygur separatist sentiments published just prior to the release of the PRC-SCIO's Xinjiang document,[20] Gardner Bovingdon gives the following description of the CCP's domestic line on Xinjiang: "It paints the opposition as vanishingly small in number, extreme and completely misguided in outlook, socially isolated, and doomed to fail in the immoral attempt to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat."[21] Such a depiction of anti-state elements has been typical of CCP propaganda since 1949 to present an image of complete party control over the Chinese state. But in reality, Beijing has been showing signs of growing concern over the Xinjiang separatist issue ever since Russia began retreating from the Central Asian

Republics (CARs) in the late 1980s. For example, China initiated the creation of the Shanghai Five in 1996 and has emphasized the need to prevent cross-border insurgency activities at every meeting held thereafter.[22] When Uzbekistan was added in June 2001 and the Five became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Beijing supported the creation of an anti-terrorist center in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.[23]

Granted, increasing diplomatic relations with the CARs is partially a result of Beijing's efforts to fill part of the political vacuum left after the Soviet Union's collapse. However, reports of escalating violence from top Xinjiang officials in the late 1990s indicate that Beijing's efforts were also intended to recruit support in containing the Uygur. For example, in March 1999, XUAR Governor Abdulahat Abdurixit claimed that during the 1990s, explosions, assassinations, and other violent incidents in Xinjiang numbered in the thousands. He further claimed that some 480 people had died from serious incidents in 1998 and 1999 alone. Available data tends to suggest that there was actually a significant decline in violence after 1997. Even the PRC-SCIO document acknowledges less violence, claiming only 162 deaths and 440 injuries as a result of terrorist acts for the entire decade.[24] Thus, it is likely that the governor's account was somewhat exaggerated.

Interestingly, it appears that prior to 2001, Chinese officials would also soften the official line on Xinjiang when it was in their interest to do so:

> Concerned perhaps about the region's image and negative impacts on potential foreign investment, officials moderated their statements in the early 2000s. In welcoming Chinese and international trade partners to the Urmuqi trade fair on September 2, 2001, Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan together with Abdulahat Abdurishit proclaimed that the situation in Xinjiang was "better than ever in history." While mentioning separatism, they stressed that "society is stable and people are living and working in peace and contentment."[25]

Such reassurances of stability, issued less than five months before the PRC-SCIO document, underscores the fact that Beijing's telling of the story in Xinjiang has, to date, been replete with inconsistencies. Most notably, while the extent of violence prior to the 2002 report may have been exaggerated or softened by Beijing to conform to changing political priorities, there was never any serious effort made to blame Xinjiang violence on an omnipresent unified Islamist movement before 9/11.

The second major problem relates to what the document does not report. The most violent event of the 1990s occurred in Baren, a small southern town near Kashgar. The facts are not entirely clear, but the following infor-

mation provided by the East Turkmenistan Information Center of Munich has been given precedence by Amnesty International over PRC claims. An armed uprising of some 3,000 Uygurs took control of the town, including the police station, on 5 April 1990. Their stated goal was to create an independent East Turkestan Republic. Twenty-four hours later, nine other local towns had joined the movement. The Chinese government sent in the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA), including 200,000 anti-riot troops, from Landzuo. Using tanks and fighter jets, the PLA bombed nine townships, killing, according to unofficial reports, 1,000 Uygurs and 600 police/soldiers. The movement did not appear to have used Islam as a rallying cry or motive. Amnesty International has classified Baren as a massacre.[26]

The description of the Baren incident in the PRC-SCIO document is limited to the following paragraph:

> On April 5, 1990, a group of terrorists, aided and abetted by the 'East Turkestan Islamic Party,' created a grave terrorist incident in Barin Township, Atko County, Xinjiang. They brazenly preached a 'holy war,' the 'elimination of pagans' and the setting up of an 'East Turkestan Republic.' The terrorists tried to put pressure on the government by taking ten persons hostage, demolished two cars at a traffic junction and killed six policemen. They shot at the besieged government functionaries with submachine guns and pistols, and threw explosives and hand-grenades at them.[27]

Such a subdued assessment is hardly surprising. First, the PLA did most of the killing. Second, the idea that violence in Xinjiang has somehow become a more pressing issue after 9/11 is not well supported by the fact that the region's most violent episode occurred in 1990 by non-Islamists.

The third major problem is the timing of the report's release, coupled with its content, which suggests that it was likely designed to realize two related goals. First, stressing a common interest in combating terrorism allowed Beijing to put its diplomatic relationship with Washington on a better footing. Prior to 9/11, the Bush regime had earmarked China as a "strategic competitor." Relations between the two were beset by an array of controversial issues, including national missile defense, American weapons sales to Taiwan, the EP-3 spy plane collision, China's missile exports to Pakistan, and, underlying it all, continued criticism regarding China's violations of human rights and religious freedom. By pushing the anti-terrorism angle, Beijing managed to partially redirect China's position from "strategic competitor" to "partner in anti-terrorism," thus guiding Sino-American relations in a new direction.[28]

The second goal was to attract international (particularly American) sympathy for Beijing's policies toward Xinjiang and the Uygurs. Beijing has been at least partially successful in achieving this goal. In late 2002, the United States extended its endorsement of PRC claims by placing one of Xinjiang's separatist movements – the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) – on its list of international terrorist organizations.[29] Since that time, around twenty-five Uygurs suspected of terrorist activities have been detained at the United States' irregular prison camp in Guantanamo.[30] Recently, the Pentagon cleared fifteen of them of "enemy combatant' status. However, due to fears of persecution and possible execution if they are returned to China, the United States has refused Beijing's demand that the men be returned to China. In consideration of public opinion and not wanting to further upset diplomatic relations with China, the United States has refused to provide refuge for the men. As of 5 May 2006, after being rejected by over 100 other countries, five of the detained Uygurs have been granted temporary asylum in Albania. Lawyers and amnesty workers close to the case have suggested that the five, and others still being held at Guantanamo, could eventually end up in Canada.[31]

The United States has further collaborated with China to pressure Central Asian states to cooperate with the repatriation of Chinese Uygurs. In Paki-stan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, this has often involved weeding a few Uygurs from the ranks of hundreds of Taliban detainees.[32] Granted, at the Shanghai APEC summit in October 2001, President Bush made it clear that the United States did not approve of China's using the war on terrorism as an "excuse to persecute minorities."[33] Nevertheless, with the American military supporting bases in the CARs and the situation in neighboring Afghanistan precarious, the Uygur-Islam connection has been receiving unprecedented attention in universities, think tanks, and the international media.[34]

Worse yet, its decision to designate the ETIM as a terrorist organization has amplified the abstractions present in the PRC-SCIO document. For example, when the American embassy in Beijing announced the designation on 22 August 2002, it adopted much of the language used by the SCIO, accusing the ETIM of some 200 acts of terrorism resulting in 162 deaths and 440 injuries. The problem here is that the PRC-SCIO document says that these same figure represent the deaths and injuries cased by all acts of terrorism in Xinjiang during the 1990s.

Thus, Washington has, in effect, accepted Beijing's position that the ETIM is solely responsible for all violent acts during the 1990s, many of which the PRC itself ambiguously acknowledges were the work of the ETLO

or of groups left unnamed. This PRC has exploited this error further by proclaiming that the United States has designated the "East Turkistan movement" (which technically includes all groups espousing independence, Islamist or not, violent or not) as terrorist in nature. A disturbing side effect of such murky rhetoric is that the conventional wisdom emerging from press releases and think tanks is that the ETIM, a unified, Islamist, anti-American, and anti-Chinese organization, is directing the violence in Xinjiang.[35]

Finally, even if the PRC-SCIO document's figures of 162 deaths and 440 injuries are accepted as true, they pale in comparison with the violence that has resulted from other protracted insurgencies in neighboring countries. For example, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka have been responsible for an estimated average of 1,500 deaths *per annum* in a civil war that has lasted for twenty years. Maoist insurgents in Nepal are believed to have caused some 600 fatalities in 2001 and 2002 alone.[36] Regardless of motivation, then, Uygur insurgents have been responsible for contained and isolated violence, rather than the kind of indiscriminate mass killings generally associated with a large organized terrorist movement. But what of the document's claim that separatist elements in Xinjiang have connections to Osama bin Laden? Would not the existence of such a connection heighten the chances of escalating violence in the future?

The Bin Laden Connection?

The evidence that can be used to connect separatists in Xinjiang to Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, or the Taliban is tenuous at best. Beijing has claimed that the ETIM has had contact with both al-Qaeda and the Taliban, including a meeting with Bin Laden, receipt of al-Qaeda funds, and training of Uygurs in Taliban and al-Qaeda camps.[37] As for links with al-Qaeda, ETIM leader Hasan Mahsum "strongly denied any connection with or financial help from al-Qaeda."[38] Of course, perhaps Mahsum, not wanting to encourage warmer Sino-American relations, may have lied. Indeed, Islamabad announced in December 2003 that Pakistani forces had killed Mahsum that October during a raid on an al-Qaeda hideout in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. However, according to Kakharman Khozhamberdi, head of the Uygurstan People's Party, there is suspicion in Xinjiang that Mahsum might in fact be a Chinese agent.[39] It is clear, then, that contradictory evidence on this matter abounds. Moreover, none of these accounts, to the best of my knowledge, have been effectively substantiated.

Also unsubstantiated are claims that the Taliban have provided aid to Uygur separatist groups. The short Sino-Afghan border at the Wakhan cor-

ridor mountain pass is controlled by the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, so there is little likelihood of contact being made there. Also, the Uygurs are ethnically akin to the Uzbeks and, as such, most have a greater affinity with the ethnic Uzbeks living in Afghanistan than with the Pashtuns, who make up the bulk of the Taliban. As for the few Uygurs involved with the Taliban: "Interviews conducted with Uighurs enrolled in the Taliban forces and captured by the Northern Alliance (published in *Le Monde* on September 30, 2001) indicated that they came on an individual basis to participate in the pro-Taliban jihad after a stay in Pakistan's Islamic schools. There was no suggestion that they sought to establish international networks."[40]

Beyond the lack of any clear collaboration, there is little reason to believe that the greater Uygur population in the region would have any motivation to attach itself to a unifying fundamentalist variant of Islam. To begin with, they are divided in their Islamic affiliations into competing Sufi and non-Sufi factions.[41] The Sufis themselves are predominantly Naqshbandiya, but are subdivided into the Jahriyya (meaning those who recite the *dhikr* [remembrance of Allah] loudly) and the Khufya (those who recite the *dhikr* quietly). Historically, these two branches have been bitter rivals.[42] To complicate this mix of religious divisions further, there are territorial loyalties, linguistic discrepancies, commoner-elite alienation, and competing political factions. This evidence of Uygur disunity can be seen in the May 1996 attack on the imam of Kashgar's Idgah mosque by rival Uygurs and the assassination of six Uygur officials in September 2002.[43]

Moreover, apart from violent fringe groups, the majority of Uygurs embrace a moderate popular Islamic culture. This is partially because Beijing controls the training and selection of Islamic leaders in China. Moreover, the Uygur middle class is, for the most part, professionally oriented and secular, and enjoys its adherence to Islamic beliefs and practices in a private manner that tends not to have overt political significance. Finally, as the CCP thoroughly monitors education in China, there has been little opportunity to develop religious schools that might incorporate the fundamentalist teachings of the Afghani or Pakistani *madarsi*.[44] All of this indicates that such fundamentalist groups as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, both of which are often glossed as "Wahhabiyya" in the region, would have limited appeal to the Uygurs.[45] Furthermore, it serves to undermine Beijing's claims that a sustained Islamist independence movement exists. What does exist "is a deep sense of alienation and extensive criticism by Uygurs of official Chinese policy towards Xinjiang on political, economic, social and cultural matters."[46]

Uygur Separatism: An Ethno-nationalist Response to Han-Chinese Domination

Interestingly, although the Uygurs share a general historic experience as Turkic-speaking people dwelling around the oases of what is now present-day Xinjiang, they did not begin to think of themselves as a single national identity until Moscow and Beijing identified them as such during the early part of the twentieth century.[47] While the infant Chinese Republic may have held legal title to the region after 1911, the continuous struggle between the KMT the CCP and various warlords allowed the Uygur a kind of default independence until mid-century. In fact, a formally proclaimed East Turkestan Republic existed in the region between 1944-49, and was then crushed by the newly formed PRC.[48] At first, living under the PRC was not so bad. PLA cadres were ordered to respect the Uygurs to distinguish themselves from the KMT. As such, an effort made to honor their customs and religious beliefs, learn their language, and acknowledge them as equals. However, respect for minority people and customs diminished rapidly as leftist political initiatives from the center gave way to the violence of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s-70s.[49] Furthermore, with Russia retreating from the CARs in the late 1980s, the Uygurs faced an enviable example in their Turkic cousins "who had not only gained independence but, in an astonishing feat of bureaucratic *legerdemain*, had become a part of Europe – as members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation."[50]

When the Uygurs became citizens of China, they also became officially recognized by the PRC as an ethnic minority of China (*zhonghua minzu*), one of fifty-six. This classification comes as part of a CCP nationalist propaganda policy, within which "the various *minzu* were all born into China's 'great family of *minzu*' and therefore fulfill their destinies by living within it."[51] The CCP has successfully nationalized many of the country's minority groups, particularly those who share strong cultural affinities with the majority Han.[52] However, as the Uygurs are ethnically, linguistically, religiously, culturally, and historically distinct, attempts to incorporate them into a greater Chinese identity have failed. Similarly, designating Xinjiang an "autonomous region" does little to placate the Uygur, since Han Chinese hold almost all significant political positions in the region. Furthermore, due to the CCP's Han resettlement policy, the region's Han population rose from roughly 200,000 in the mid-1940s to some 6.5 million in 1995 – a number that represents around 40 percent of the region's total population.[53]

The Uygurs have come to see themselves as one nation dominated by another. Their homeland is run and increasingly populated by Han Chinese,

who tend to enjoy better jobs and benefit from a contrived cultural dominance. In such an environment, calls for independence arise for various reasons, including those related to religion. However, the strongest and most widespread roots of separatist sentiment are related to the "rejection of the assimilationist formula of the *zhonghua minzu*, repudiation of the CCP's claims that all *minzu* enjoy political and economic equality, and critiques of the system of autonomy in Xinjiang."[54]

As far as *minzu* unity is concerned, the reality is that deep-rooted prejudices and uncomfortable inter-relations exist between the Uygurs and the Han. For example, in a 2000 survey conducted in both Han and Uygur households on ethnic relations in Xinjiang, Yee and associates found that 36.4% of Uygurs and 28% of Han feel their ethnic group to be "cleverer" than the other. Similarly, 43.6% of Uygur respondents and 31.7% of Han respondents believe their people to be more hygienic. Finally, when asked about the relative welfare of Uygur-Han relations, 42.5% of Uygur and 66.9% of Han felt them to be only fair or poor.[55] Social interaction between the two groups is generally restricted to the work place, and intermarriage is rare.[56]

These numbers would likely be augmented had a majority of interviewees felt comfortable, or even safe, responding to such sensitive questions in the presence of near-strangers. As one Uygur student said to Bovingdon during the latter's research in Xinjiang between 1994-97:

> If you announce you want to do research, they'd send people to follow you everywhere. And after you'd visited people, if you wrote things down, they'd find them, and they'd interrogate people. If it turned out they had said anything wrong, they could end up in jail. One word can get you three years in jail – did you know that?[57]

As such, Yee suspects that "Given the sensitivity of the question and the inclination to give desirable answers ... ethnic prejudices between the Uygurs and Hans are more serious than our data suggest."[58]

When, in moments of emotion or recklessness, Uygurs do express their sentiments about *minzu* unity and separatism in public, the results can be highly revealing. Bovingdon witnessed a rare incident involving a Uygur woman (Rehile) and a Han woman (Wang), in which a debate over China's ownership of Xinjiang arose. The discussion is too lengthy to transcribe in full here, but a few experts give the general idea:

> Rehile had warmed to her theme, addressing me in Uygur. "Xinjiang was ours to begin with ... my father and others his age were very hospitable. They welcomed people, though to tell you the truth, they looked down on

> Hans." She then repeated this phrase in Chinese, for Wang's benefit, and continued in that tongue: "Originally, it was ours. Then you people came and stole our place." ... Wang leaned over to me and asked, "Have you heard of Wang Zhen and his pacification of Xinjiang? ... If he hadn't brought it under control, people would have dared do any old thing. It would still be feudal, right? If he hadn't controlled it, then China wouldn't be unified, right?" These questions seemed to provoke Rehile all the more. She shot back, "Xinjiang is our place. It's not yours ... Look at the Qazaqs and the Tajiks. After the Soviet Union split up, each group had its own country. If [China] splits up, Xinjiang will be an independent country." She said she had learned that very day that a gang of Han toughs had raped a young Uygur woman. Why, she wanted to know, couldn't Han men rape their own kind? Wang again sought common ground: "Hans and Uygurs are all one family." Rehile, indignant, contradicted her: "No, they're not. Hans are Hans. Uygurs are Uygurs. ... Originally I didn't hate any *minzu* ... But after seeing that girl ... I began to hate. Now I hate them."[59]

Although this conversation represents only one person's direct opinion, that opinion can be extended in degrees to the Uygur population at large. The Uygur do not see themselves as being part of China or as akin to the Han. As the proprietor of the Verdant Camelthorn restaurant once expressed, much to the amusement of his clientele, "The camelthorn (a desert plant) is the Uygurs ... and the desert is the Hans."[60]

Regarding economic considerations, it should be noted that the CCP's presence has not been without benefit for the Uygurs. The Great Western Development Strategy, which involves transfer payments to underdeveloped inland provinces from the booming coast, has been kind to Xinjiang. Between 1978-2002, the annual per capita income was multiplied by 15.68 in rural areas and by 23.37 in urban areas.[61] However, studies conducted by Bovingdon, Mackerras, and Yee all indicate that Uygurs do not feel that they are receiving their fair share of modernization's benefits.[62] One area where Han-Uygur differentials are the strongest felt is in cotton, a crop that is traditional to both Uygur and Han societies.

Uygurs see the cotton industry as a mechanism for Han immigration, giving advantage to the Han and the state over the Uygurs. As one cotton-grower told Mackerras:

> He was expecting to make nearly 40,000 yuan in 2003 for his cotton, or over twenty times the average 2002 rural income. Although he expressed satisfaction at his income, he also said that the cotton industry was bad for Han-Uygur relations, because the Han had better access to the investment and land necessary for cotton growing.[63]

Yee's 2000 survey shows similar results, with some 38 percent of Uygur respondents (as opposed to only 12.5 percent of Han respondents) saying they felt Uygur standards of living were rising slower than Han standards.[64] The nationalist sentiment that has developed among the Uygur is poignantly put by one of their best-known intellectuals, Abduqadir Jalalidin, who wrote: "If I construct a hell of my own devising, no matter how terrifying the flames, I will call it heaven. But a heaven built by others will cause my trees to wither."[65]

Finally, Han-Uygur political equality and Uygur autonomy are practically non-existent. To be fair, the Uygur are well represented in local government, the Xinjiang People's Congress having a minority base of 65.5 percent in 1998.[66] However, local People's Congresses in China have relatively little power compared to the various provincial bodies of the CCP, and here the Uygurs are greatly underrepresented. Virtually every party organ in the region from the county level up is headed by a Han, and at every level the party head outranks the corresponding government official.[67] Much of the problem here is that CCP members are expected to abandon their religious beliefs in favor of Marxist-Leninism, which poses a significant problem for many Uygurs. Those who do join are often branded as traitors by the rest of the Uygur community. However, even those Uygurs who do join do not tend to be promoted to significant positions. Many of the Uygur cadres interviewed by Yee in his 2000 survey were dissatisfied with the system to the point of seeking early retirement.[68] This problem has worsened due to the fact that a significant minority of the Uygurs, some 40 percent, do not view Han cadres as honest, industrious, or capable.[69]

Conclusion

The Uygurs are a predominantly Islamic people living in a sea of atheists with a strong taste for pork. The CCP does not currently allow them any freedom of religion or expression that conflicts with the party line, a fact of life that is not likely to change in the near future. Nor is it likely that that Xinjiang will become independent any time soon. Such conditions have led segments of the Uygur population to develop violent Islamist agendas. However, Beijing's calls to the international community for support in its fight with Islamist terrorism in Xinjiang should be taken with a fist of salt. There is little unity in Xinjiang's separatist movement, let alone unity under a brand of Islam that is alien to the region. Beijing's attempts to establish a connection between the Uygurs and al-Qaeda and the Taliban is based on precious little. And what purpose does making such a connection have when the worst vio-

lence in the region occurred over a decade ago? Washington has allowed Beijing to play its hand on Xinjiang, and this is very unfortunate for the Uygur people.

Xinjiang will not be a Tibet or an East Timor. It is not populated by friendly Buddhists suffering under a repressive foreign regime. It is populated by radical Islamists ... at least that is the current history being written by Beijing and, to a lesser extent, Washington. History has played a trick on the Uygurs. If they had suffered Stalin instead of Mao, it is possible that they would be independent today. And, independence would take the form of a nation of ethnic Turkic people in a land they view as theirs. Although likely a factor, religion does not appear to be a major motivation for separation. Rather, most Uygurs want back what has been taken from them: their home and their equality.

Endnotes

1. These are Mongolia, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
2. Note that *region* in this work is specific to the XUAR, and not ito any region adjacent to China (i.e., Central Asia).
3. World Tibet Network News, "China: Where Beijing Fears Kosovo," *World Tibet Network News*, 6 September 2000. Online at www.tibet.ca/en/wtn-archive/2000/9/6_1.html.
4. E. Labott, S. Grant, and T. Duffy, "US Urges China to Rethink Taiwan Law," CNN.com International, 9 March 2005. Online at http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/03/07/china.npc.law/.
5. Explaining Xinjiang's incorporation is, unfortunately, beyond the purview of this work. An extensive discussion can be found in Jonathan N. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: The Story of Muslims in Northwest China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). For a more parsimonious discussion, see Charles Horner, "The Other Orientalism: China's Islamist Problem," *The National Interest* (spring 2002): 37-45.
6. James D. Seymour, "Human Rights, Repression, and 'Stability,'" *Current History* (September 1999): 285.
7. World Tibet Network News, "China," 2.
8. Marika Vicziany, "State Responses to Islamic Terrorism in Western China and Their Impact on South Asia," *Contemporary South Asia* 12, no. 2 (June 2003): 247.
9. Human Rights Watch, "China: Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang: A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder." Online at www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/China-bck1017.pdf.
10. Ibid., 6.

11. Ibid., 7.
12. James Millward, "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment," East-West Policy Studies, no. 6 (2004): 15. Online at www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/PS006.pdf.
13. Ibid., 11.
14. Quoted in the *South China Morning Post*, 22 January 2002. Borrowed from Horner, "The Other Orientalism, 45.
15. Note here that this list is in no particular order of size or relevance.
16. Human Rights Watch, "China: Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang," 2; Dewardric L. McNeal, "China's Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism," Congressional Research Report for Congress, 8-9. Online at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7945.pdf.; Millward, "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang," 13-14; Vicziany, "State Responses to Islamic Terrorism," 255.
17. Human Rights Watch, "China: Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang," 2.
18. Vicziany, "State Responses to Islamic Terrorism," 255.
19. Millward, "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang," 13.
20. And, therefore, most likely completed prior to 9/11.
21. Gardner Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uygur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang," *Modern China* 28, no. 1 (January 2002): 47.
22. The Shanghai Five was an informal association of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia.
23. Human Rights Watch, "China: Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang," 1.
24. Millward, "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang," 12.
25. Ibid., 11.
26. Viczianzy, "State Responses to Islamic Terrorism," 249.
27. State Council, "East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get away with Impunity" (Beijing: Information Office, State Council, 2002). Borrowed from ibid., 248-49.
28. McNeal, "China's Relations with Central Asian States," 4. Online at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7945.pdf.
29. Vicziany, "State Responses to Islamic Terrorism," 244.
30. Millward, "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang," 1.
31. See Glen McGregor, "Canada May Welcome Detainees." NationalPost.com, 14 June 2006. Online at www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=871c1410-b839-4dff-ae9a-d30f99095876&k=83624; Bruce Konviser, "A Strange Kind of Freedom." TheStar.com, 13 June 2006. Online at www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1150149009716&call_pageid=968332188854&col=968350060724; Robin Wright, "Chinese Detainees are Men Without a Country." WashingtonPost.com, 24 August 2005. Online at www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1150149009716&call_pageid=968332188854&col=968350060724.

32. Dru C. Gladney, "Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism," *The China Quarterly* 174 (June 2003): 457.
33. Mike Allen and Philip P. Pan, "China Vows To Help in Terror Fight," *The Washington Post*, 19 October 2001. Borrowed from McNeal, "China's Relations with Central Asian States," 5.
34. Millward, "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang," 10.
35. Ibid., 11-14.
36. Vicziany, "State Responses to Islamic Terrorism," 244-45.
37. Millward, "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang," 23.
38. Colin Mackerras, "Ethnicity in China: The Case of Xinjiang," *Harvard Asia Quarterly* (winter 2004): 14. Online at www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200401/0401a001.html.
39. Millward, "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang," 24.
40. Human Rights Watch, "China: Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang," 3.
41. Gladney, "Islam in China," 6.
42. R. Israeli and A. Gardner-Rush, "Sectarian Islam and Sino-Muslim Identity in China," *The Muslim World* 90, no. 3 (fall 2000): 436.
43. Gladney, "Islam in China," 6.
44. Vicziany, "State Responses to Islamic Terrorism," 253.
45. Gladney, "Islam in China," 457.
46. Vicziany, "State Responses to Islamic Terrorism," 253.
47. Indeed, "Foreigner travel accounts of Xinjiang from the mid-16th century to the early 20th century contain no references to any collective group referred to as Uygur, but instead found people identifying themselves as *Turki* (from their language family), *Sart* (meaning "caravaneer" in old Persian), and such oasis-based ethnonyms as *Kashgarlik*, *Turpanlik*, and *Kotanlik*. (Dru C. Gladney, "Constructing a Contemporary Uighur National Identity: Transnationalism, Islamization, and State Representation," 1. Online at www.ceni-sciences-po.org/public/cemoti/texts13/gladney.pdf.)
48. Horner, "The Other Orientalism," 42.
49. Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority," 45.
50. Horner, "The Other Orientalism," 43.
51. Ibid., 41.
52. For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon, see Jonathan Unger, "Not Quite Han: The Ethnic Minorities of China's Southwest." Online at www.rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/ccc/JU-not-quite.Han.pdf. For an interesting discussion more specific to the creation of Muslim minority nationality in China, see Dru C. Gladney, *Ethnic Identity in China: The Making of a Muslim Minority Nationalism* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998).
53. Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority," 45.
54. Ibid., 46.
55. Herbert S. Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uygur-Han Relations in Urmuqi," *Journal of Contemporary China* 12, no. 26 (August 2003) 439-42.

56. Ibid., 449.
57. Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority," 48.
58. Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang," 440.
59. Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority," 50-51.
60. Ibid., 52.
61. Mackerras, "Ethnicity in China," 5.
62. Mackerras, "Ethnicity in China," 2004; Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang"; Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority."
63. Mackerras, "Ethnicity in China," 6.
64. Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang," 443.
65. Abduqadir Jalalidin, "An Artistic Rendering of Historical Perception," *Sinjang Madaniyiti* 224 (1997): 49. Borrowed from: Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority," 55.
66. Mackerras, "Ethnicity in China," 8.
67. Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority," 57.
68. Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang," 449.
69. Ibid., 441.

Review Essays

Books Reviewed: Sachiko Murata, *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light: Wang Tai-yu's "Great Learning of the Pure and Real" and Liu Chih's "Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm."* Albany: SUNY Press, 2000; Maria Jaschok and Shui Jingjun, *The History of Women's Mosques in Chinese Islam: A Mosque of Their Own.* Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 2000; Jean A. Berlie, *Islam in China: Hui and Uyghurs between Modernization and Sinicization.* Bangkok: White Lotus, 2004; Sheila Hollihan-Elliot, *Muslims in China.* Philadelphia: Mason Crest Publishers, 2006.

With a population conservatively estimated at 20 million (and, according to some sources, as high as 50 million), the Muslims of China remain one of the least studied and most misunderstood Muslim communities in the world. After decades of relative neglect, however, over the past few years several books have been published that seek to shed light on different aspects of the historic, religious, and contemporary lives of China's Muslims. This review essay will survey four recent works written by a wide range of scholars.

Research on Islam in China has been hindered by many factors, including the difficulty of gaining expertise in both Chinese studies and Islamic studies, learning both modern and classical Chinese and Arabic, the long-standing prejudices of Han Chinese scholars regarding the country's minority peoples, together with the similarly long-standing prejudices of many western scholars regarding Islam. The earliest major work on the Muslim communities of China was published in 1910, by Marshall Broomhall of the China Inland Mission. Titled *Islam in China: A Neglected Problem*, its main purpose was to educate Christian missionaries in China about the location, customs, and history of the indigenous Muslims in order to facilitate proselytization activities among them.

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Although the field has developed significantly since then, it is still hindered by the fact that most scholars writing on Islam in China are scholars of China and not of Islam. This lack of expertise on Islam (which is, unfortunately, not uncommon among scholars writing on Muslim peoples around the world) has perpetuated a wide range of misinterpretations and misunderstandings involving the community's beliefs and practices.

Of China's fifty-five officially recognized minority groups, ten are primarily Muslim. The two largest groups are the Hui, who are spread throughout China, and the Uighur, who are concentrated in the northwestern province of Xinjiang. Most of these works focus on the Hui, the group that has assimilated the most into the dominant Chinese culture; however, several also include the Uighur (also commonly spelled "Uyghur").

Much of the recent scholarship continues to be hindered by the assumption of many western scholars that Muslims in China have always lived in a state of constant tension about their Islamic and Chinese identities. In more than twenty years of research in the field of Islam in China, as well as in more than seven years of living in China, I have yet to encounter any Muslims who have expressed any doubt as to their identity as both Chinese and as Muslim. And yet the belief that these two identities are somehow mutually antagonistic, if not mutually exclusive, continues to be commonly held by many western scholars.

Perhaps the most important work that addresses this misunderstanding is Sachiko Murata's *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light.* By documenting the earliest tradition of Chinese Islamic scholars writing about Islam in Chinese, she reveals the extent to which these Muslims had adapted Chinese intellectual traditions to their understanding of Islam and how Islamic intellectual trends in China were influenced by trends in the rest of the Islamic world. Her work is primarily an annotated translation of the writings of Wang Daiyu (ca. 1584-1670) and Liu Zhi (ca. 1655-1745), two of the earliest-known Chinese Muslim scholars who wrote about Islam in Chinese. Unlike most other scholars in the West writing in this field, Murata brings with her an extraordinarily broad and sophisticated understanding of Islamic traditions and languages, and thus a new perspective on the role of Islam within Chinese intellectual and cultural history. By identifying the Neo-Confucian and Sufi influences in these two texts, Murata shows the importance of these two philosophical traditions in the development of Chinese Islamic thought.

These two works are major components of a body of texts that became known as the *Han Kitab* (or "Chinese books," a phrase that includes both Chinese and Arabic terms), which would subsequently serve as the basic curriculum for the study of Islam in China. Through a close textual analysis

of the Chinese terms used to describe Islamic principles, Murata shows how Chinese Muslim scholars were able to create ways of expressing basic Islamic principles fluently – and often strikingly – in the Chinese language. Although some scholars have assumed that these works were part of an apologist literature written for a non-Muslim Chinese audience, according to Murata they were written because

> ... [t]he Islamic community had reached a point where the ulama perceived the danger that Muslims would no longer be able to understand the principles of their own faith and the rationale for their own practices ... Their primary concern is not to explain the Shariah or jurisprudence, or the contents of the Koran and Hadith in any direct way. Rather, the writings elaborate on the nature of the Islamic perception of God, the universe, and the soul, that is, the domain that is traditionally called "the principles of the religion" (*uṣūl al-dīn*). (p. 4)

For those interested in the historical development of a scholarly Islamic tradition in China, this book is the ideal start. In addition, the "Foreword" by noted Confucian scholar Tu Wei-ming sheds light on the place of this Chinese Muslim intellectual project within the context of the Neo-Confucian intellectual developments of that time.

The History of Women's Mosques in Chinese Islam is an especially important contribution to the field, because it focuses on both Chinese Muslim women and the rare practice of separate mosques for women. Written as a joint project between a western non-Muslim woman (Jaschok), a Chinese Muslim woman (Shui), and two Han Chinese researchers, it analyzes Muslim communities in central China's Henan province. According to the authors, their work focuses on the following:

> We ask how unique and controversial innovations in organized Islam in China led to the historical emergence of *qingzhen nusi* (women's mosques) and the institution of *nu ahong* (female religious leader); we ask about initiators, initiatives, place and time of innovations, the structural and historical factors of its evolution. But also we ask what happened when Muslim women took over space situated outside their designated feminine sphere which was intended for their education and which became in the course of time a site of religious and social activities over which women had, and have, various degrees of control and influence, various degrees of dependence on, an independence from, men's mosques. (p. 4)

In addition to the above, the authors also address theoretical issues related to the role of gender within both the Chinese and the Islamic cultural traditions.

My favorite section is chapter 12, which is a collection of biographies and autobiographies of Chinese Muslim women who played an active role in religious affairs. By focusing on the individual lives lived, decisions made, and influences, one can more easily imagine the dynamic nature of Islam in China. Perhaps most interestingly, the traditions of women's mosques and women religious leaders have been spreading across China in recent years. This is due to two factors: women from central China establishing girls' schools and mosques in other regions, and women from other regions attending Islamic studies schools in areas where female mosques are popular and then introducing the custom upon their return to their home regions.

Those interested specifically in Muslim women in China should consult, in addition to the four related articles in the first volume of the *Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures*, "Narratives Engendering Survival: How the Muslims of Southwest China Remember the Massacres of 1873," *Traces: An International Journal of Comparative Cultural Theory* 1, no. 2 (2001).

Jean Berlie's *Islam in China: Hui and Uyghurs between Modernization and Sinicization* is an ambitious work that attempts to incorporate information gathered through extensive travel in China's Muslim regions, as well as visits to Chinese Muslim communities in northern Thailand and Burma/Myanmar. An honorary research fellow at the University of Hong Kong's Centre of Asian Studies, Berlie is not an Islamic studies scholar. However, he clearly has long-standing research interests related to China in general and to Islam in China in particular. The book focuses on the Hui communities in Yunnan (southwestern China), Thailand, and Burma/Myanmar, as well as the Uyghur community in Xinjiang, and is based on fieldwork carried out during numerous trips to China between 1986 and 2004. According to the author, "[t]his study attempts to explain the role of Sinicization or cultural change as a result of direct interethnic contact between the Han and Muslims in China" (p. ix).

Although ostensibly divided into seven distinct chapters ("The Setting," "Islam's Ubiquity in China," "Hui Identity and Modernity," "Hui in Yunnan," "The Hui in Northern Thailand and Burma and Burmese Muslims in Yunnan," "Uyghurs in Xinjiang," and "Perspectives on Islam's Future in China"), each chapter is, in fact, a veritable jumble of anecdotes (some more directly relevant than others). While interesting, the all-too-often uncited references to secondary historical sources, platitudes regarding both Islam and Chinese culture, and non-sequiturs are serious defects. Useful information is frequently followed by information that is flat-out wrong, such as "The character for 'religion' does not exist in Chinese" (p. xi), or by such stereotypes as "there is a basic incompatibility between modernity and Islam" (p. 143),

that hinder any degree of understanding Islam's role in China today. At the same time, a wealth of interesting information is intermixed throughout the book. Unfortunately, the lack of organization, combined with the lack of footnotes or citations, makes it extremely difficult for a non-specialist to sift through the chaff to find the worthwhile grains.

The final book to be considered here is perhaps the least ambitious but the most useful. Written as part of the series "The Growth and Influence of Islam in the Nations of Asia and Central Asia" and sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (a conservative think tank based in Philadelphia), it is geared toward secondary school students and teachers. Despite its sponsorship, it is an excellent overview of the history and present-day conditions of China's main Muslim groups. Beginning with background information on both traditional Islamic and Chinese civilizations, the author makes a point of noting several of the similarities between the two cultural traditions, including their focus on education and the pursuit of knowledge in general, calligraphy as a primary art form, and the importance of the role of religious rituals in daily life.

The overview is followed by chapters on "Islam Comes to the Middle Kingdom," "The Influence of Islam on China," "Muslim Ethnic Minorities in China," "Muslims in Modern China," and "Muslims in Reforming China." The early history of Islam in China and the expansion of both the Chinese and the Islamic empires across Asia, until they met due to both trade networks along the Silk Road and then military conflict, are well covered. There is also a section on the importance of the Mongol's rule of China (the Yuan dynasty, 1271-1368), which was characterized by the large-scale settlement of Central Asian Muslims in China.

In addition to recruiting Muslim administrators to serve as officials throughout the Chinese empire, the Mongols also used Muslim architects in building their new capital: present-day Beijing. Muslim contributions to other aspects of Chinese culture are noted, including paper-making, cloisonné, porcelain production, music, and cuisine. The accomplishments of Zheng He, the Chinese Muslim maritime explorer who led several massive trade expeditions throughout Southeast Asia and as far west as the Red Sea and the east coast of Africa, are also recounted.

Another strength is its descriptions of several smaller and lesser known Muslim minority groups, including the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tatars, Dongxiang, Salar, and Bonan. The history of each group is described, as are their unique characteristics and present-day conditions in China.

The concluding chapter, "The Uyghur Separatist Movement," focuses on the most recent events affecting Muslims in China: the aftermath of Septem-

ber 11, China's participation in the American-led "war on terror," and the Bush administration's subsequent decision to bow to Chinese pressure by labeling an obscure Uyghur separatist group a "terrorist organization." As the author notes, many experts have speculated that this decision was based on a desire to secure Beijing's support at the United Nations for the United States' military action in Iraq. However, regardless of why this decision was made, "the official designation gives the Chinese government a pretext to quash dissent among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang; all dissenters can now be lumped together as 'terrorists' and persecuted by the state" (pp. 103-04).

Despite the high-quality images included and the overall excellent design, the text is marred by several striking spelling errors: the Qur'an is repeatedly spelled Qu'ran, the author's name is misspelled on the cover, and Genghis Khan is renamed Genghis Kahn. But these are minor errors. In essence, the book is refreshing in its lack of essentialized views of Islam or Muslims and its concise and accurate overview of the history and present-day conditions of Islam in China.

Books Reviewed: Jack Weatherford, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World.* New York: Crown Publishers, 2004; Thomas T. Allsen, *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia.* UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Justin Marozzi, *Tamerlane: Sword of Islam, Conqueror of the World.* London: HarperCollins, 2004.

What these books have in common is their attempt to recast our perceptions of the Mongols' impact upon the Islamic world. Given the lore of gore thrown up by the intervening centuries, the authors clearly had their work cut out for them. Over the course of those centuries, hardly a schoolchild or even an illiterate villager anywhere in the Islamic world, and certainly in Muslim Central Asia, was not taught to dread and despise the very mention of the Mongols – and especially their two most infamous and notorious leaders, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. To a great degree, the same holds true for children in other parts of the world, especially in Europe, where the works of Chaucer, Marlowe, and others contributed greatly to the vilification of these two Mongols.

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After reading the three books under review, there is no option for the careful reader but to reassess his/her own understanding of the Mongol centuries (the thirteenth and fourteenth CE) and, indeed, of how history may rightly or wrongly be represented and perceived. Much of the information presented in these books is truly eye-opening. There is probably just as much that is ultimately material for continued scholarly consideration and interpretation. However, it is at the human level that any such reading must begin.

If history is really a matter of perspective, let me begin by quoting from Justin Marozzi's work:

> Such cultural benefits to Persia of Mongol rule were all very well. But, as David Morgan concluded in a recent study of medieval Persia: "We may justly have our doubts over how impressed the Persian peasants, as they did their best to avoid the Mongol tax-collectors, would have been by developments in miniature painting. For Persia, the Mongol period was a disaster on a grand and unparalled scale."

It is difficult to disagree.

Thus, while Jack Weatherford points out that the scale of the carnage attributed to Genghis Khan is in no way consistent with the reality of what occurred, especially in view of the forensic evidence, there can be no doubt that the Mongols, from Genghis Khan to Amir Timur, wreaked a degree of havoc upon the civilized (Muslim) world that is unprecedented in the annals of history. And while it is certainly gratifying to read Allsen's account of the benefits derived from the cross-cultural exchange facilitated by the Mongols between eastern and western Asia, it is also quite clear that the lives of ordinary people in those times counted for very little. Indeed, hell on earth would probably be an apt description of what millions of souls were subjected to during those bloody centuries of conquest, rebellion, and reconquest.

But, then, these are things that we knew about. What is it about these three books that brings us to a new understanding? Let's start with Weatherford's *Genghis Khan*. For eight hundred years, the secret burial ground of the Great Khan was protected by his family and tribe, right until the time of the great totalitarian communist regimes of the last century. One would assume that those regimes, given their animosity to anything as seditious as religion or culture, would have done their best to uproot any and every thing even remotely associated with a cult of nationalistic ancestor worship. Instead, the Soviets completely sealed off the area, designating it a "Highly Restricted Area," thereby effectively preserving everything within its confines. Thus, when the USSR collapsed, the Mongols discovered that their heritage had

survived. More incredibly, the *Secret History of the Mongols*, known for centuries only as a rumor, a fabled text, was found and deciphered.

In the 1990s, Weatherford was part of a team of western and Mongol archaeologists and anthropologists who conducted serious on-site studies of the *Secret History's* meanings and mysteries. By means of these studies, much has been gathered about the carefully guarded record of Genghis Khan and his life. There is much here that will enthrall readers with its novelty. But the most important part of Weatherford's work is his examination of what he terms the "global awakening" occasioned by the Mongol conquests, an awakening that is on a scale with the Renaissance in Europe in terms of its significance for world politics and economics. The book's accounts of the capital city of Karakorum and how it was populated with scholars and scribes from all over the world came as a personal revelation, as did the fact that nearly one-third of the Mongols in Genghis Khan's homeland were Muslim and that the armies that rode with him were composed of an equal percentage of Muslim soldiers.

The work of Thomas Allsen, *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia*, is equally as captivating in terms of its scholarship. In it, one finds a great deal about the Mongol style of administration, Mongol religion and culture, and how these factors contributed to cultural and other exchanges between the peoples living at the far-flung corners of the new empire. To quote from Allsen's introduction: "In this monograph I will speak primarily to the question of the nature and conditions of the transmission of cultural wares between China and Iran."

Perhaps most significantly, Allsen does so by looking more "deeply at the nomads' political culture and social norms which functioned as initial filters in the complex process of sorting and selecting the goods and ideas that passed between East and West." Thus, his first chapters are quite informative and insightful. I found one of the themes of particular interest: that of specialization, apparently a clearly established formula for success in the Mongol world, which openly acknowledged its need for assistance from the sedentary world in matters related to the customs and laws of cities. Allsen's later chapters on developments in agriculture, printing, cuisine, astronomy, medicine, and historiography are likewise well-researched and revealing.

The third book, Justin Marozzi's *Tamerlane*, takes the reader a century or two past the initial Mongol conquests to a repopulated and reconfigured world of Islam that witnessed the consequences of decades of infighting between the scattered factions of Mongols descended from Genghis Khan. Marozzi sees the swath of destruction cut by the conqueror and describes it

in all of its horror. At the same time, however, he is careful to distinguish Tamerlane (also known as Timur the Lame) from his notorious Mongol predecessor. Both men wreaked havoc across half the known world, putting millions to the sword and razing those cities standing in their path. But only Tamerlane saw fit to rebuild, for he was as much a creator as he was a destroyer. This marked him out as a different breed of conqueror altogether. Much of his life was spent honoring the ancient traditions established by his Mongol predecessor; but by the time he died, Tamerlane was his own emperor and in thrall to no other man.

Marozzi's observations as a traveler to the lands of which he writes come as an added attraction and provide a further layer of significance to Tamer-lane's accomplishments. For indeed, his accomplishments were many – and many of them were truly grand. For instance, the fact that he attracted such scholars as al-Jazari, al-Taftazani, al-Jurjani, al-Razi, and even Ibn Khaldun to his court is remarkable. One can understand, surely, why poets would have flocked to his court. But the Sufis and the scholars who sought him out were of another caliber entirely.

Finally, each of these books possesses merits of one sort or another. More importantly, however, when taken collectively they open a window on an age that was just as terrible for many of those innocents who lived and died in it as it is fascinating for those of us fortunate enough to be able to look at it through the eyes of modern scholarship. The Golden Age of Islam was brought to a close by the Mongols, or so goes the popular conception. But after reading these works, one is tempted to reconsider much of that. Without the Mongols, one must ask, where would Islam be today?

Perfection Makes Practice: Learning, Emotion, and the Recited Qur'an in Indonesia

Anna M. Gade
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004. 348 pages.

Studies of Islam in Southeast Asia have sought to better understand its multifaceted and complex dimensions, although one may make a generalized categorization of Muslim beliefs and practices based on a fundamental difference in ideologies and strategies, such as cultural and political Islam. Anna M. Gade's *Perfection Makes Practice* stresses the cultural aspect of Indonesian Muslim practices by analyzing the practices of reciting and memorizing the Qur'an, as well as the annual competition.

Muslim engagement with the Qur'an has tended to emphasize the cognitive over the psychological dimension. *Perfection Makes Practice* analyzes the role of emotion in these undertakings through a combination of approaches, particularly the history of religions, ethnography, psychology, and anthropology. By investigating Qur'anic practitioners in Makassar, South Sulawesi, during the 1990s, Gade argues that the perfection of the Qur'an as a perceived, learned, and performed text has made and remade the practitioners, as well as other members of the Muslim community, to renew or increase their engagement with the holy text. In this process, she suggests, moods and motivation are crucial to preserving the recited Qur'an and revitalizing the Muslim community.

In chapter 1, Gade begins with a theoretical consideration for her case study. Drawing from concepts that emphasize the importance of feeling and emotion in ritual and religious experience, she develops a conceptualization of this engagement. In chapter 2, Gade explains memorization within the context of the self and social relations. She argues that Qur'anic memorizers have a special relationship with its style and structure, as well as with the social milieu. Although Qur'anic memorization is a normal practice for most Muslims, its practitioners have learned how to memorize and recite beautifully some or all of the Qur'an's verses, a process that requires emotion

management and obedience to ethnic norms (*adab*). According to Gade, being a memorizer (*ḥāfiẓ*) is a dynamic process that brings social expectations together with the realities of daily and disciplined practice in managing one's affective attention. The task of memorizing is personal, while the contextual role and practice are social. Thus, memorizing the Qur'an is both a private and a public act.

Chapter 3 discusses how the Qur'an is recited with or without understanding within educational and social environments. Gade found two kinds of recitation pedagogies: traditional (the Baghdadi method) and modern (the Iqra method). The former is slower but deeper, whereas the latter is faster but more superficial. What is more crucial for Gade, however, are the affective associations, ambivalences, and emotional textures that enveloped experiences of Qur'anic education. The content of Arabic-language education is less important than the affective dimensions involved in learning to recite. This sentimental identity of learning, she argues, emerged both about and within the systems of ritual practice.

Chapter 4 describes how Indonesian Muslims are to obey an orthopraxy – the right way to recite and to meet such expectations. Aesthetic, melodic recitation, with a musical form of vocalization derived especially from Egypt, has become a condition by which advanced practitioners reach the ideal standard. However, as the author emphasizes, orthopraxy does not mean closing new horizons and changes in experience over time. Perceptions of how things ought to be may be a perception of practice that emerges from within the practice itself, but is not necessarily derived entirely from the representation of an external other. Moreover, Gade contends, changing social and emotional systems that developed recitation styles to the level of orthopraxy (with formalized pedagogies being involved) interacted with structures of religious piety. As she puts it, "emotional systems of pedagogy and performance forged for many Indonesians a subjectivity of Qur'anic practice that took the form of expanding evaluation of potential and escalating expression of pious possibilities" (p. 215).

In the last chapter, she focuses on the annual competition. Gade maintains that several motivations are involved here: having fun, glorifying Islam, participating, winning, and contributing to the national development. However, these dominant discourses did not determine the motivations; rather, it was the effect of a sort of sociological invisible hand (p. 226). For example, it was hoped that the 1997 national competition would increase the community's belief and piety as a resource for the New Order's national development. Although some Muslim groups opposed such competitions on the grounds that they are wasteful and ceremonial in the face of more significant

work (e.g., implementing Qur'anic teachings) or that a woman's voice in public is indecent (*`awrāt*), these and other objections seemed to decrease by the mid-1990s when more justifications were offered, such as countering perceived and real westernization and glorifying Islam through *da`wah*.

The author concludes that an energetic movement in Qur'anic practices in South Sulawesi motivated the self and others to follow suit: "... the Indonesian movement of Qur'anic revitalization in the 1990s provides material for reconsidering the idea that dynamism of religious systems may be generated by 'feeling'" (p. 273), although the power of an "envy of goodness" should be equally recognized.

This fine work reasserts the superiority of memorized knowledge and the fixed character of religious knowledge among Muslims. The author might need to look at how Qur'anic practitioners have to solve a possible internal tension between merely memorizing or reciting the Qur'an beautifully and internalizing and implementing its teachings in daily life. The focus on emotion without cognition might obscure the more complete picture of Qur'anic recitation. It might also be helpful to put this tradition within the longer historical period of time, by considering, for example, how today's Qur'anic memorization and recitation may have taken on a pedagogic system and culture different from that of the past. One may wonder if memorizing and reciting the Qur'an in public have changed over time.

Perfection Makes Practice is suggestive in its interdisciplinary approach and argument for the role of emotion and social context in religious practice. For scholars and students of the history of religions, Islamic studies, anthropology, psychology, and education, this is crucial reading.

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Jihad in Paradise: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia

Mike Millard
New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004. 155 pages.

Jihad in Paradise explores cultural and religious interaction in Singapore and compares this with the intolerant radical Islamism threatening the country and Southeast Asia in general. Millard, a senior journalist who first worked on East Asia and then Southeast Asia, artfully conveys his descriptive yet analytical narrative of how Southeast Asia underwent radical change due, in

large part, to the influence of global and regional terrorism. Meanwhile, Singapore has yet to move forward by allowing greater political freedom and developing mutual dialogue and cooperation between its different religious communities. The Malay minority must also adjust itself to such pragmatic economic and political climates. Singapore's future depends on how well it manages multicultural diversity and balances its economic progress and political democracy.

The book is divided into six chapters. In his introduction, Millard observes how Singapore and Southeast Asia were generally prosperous and peaceful until the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, 9/11, and the 2002 Bali bombings. He realizes that his book is not an "inside story," for he regards himself as only journalist who is deeply interested in human realities and their regional and global dimensions.

In chapter 1, "Arrival and Discovery," Millard makes a sharp contrast between capitalist Chinese-plus-Indian Singaporeans and culturally backward and economically poor Malaysians and Indonesians partly due to their emphasis on cultural and religious values rather than on capitalist material pursuits and competition. By asking one Singaporean scholar why Singapore could be so well developed, he is told that it was due to good leadership and luck. The Afghanistan crisis has had its ramifications in Singapore and Southeast Asia, for "Singapore remains part of ground zero of a global jihad, coveted as part of a Southeast Asian Islamist state" (p. 17).

The next chapter, "Sources of Jihad," makes ideological linkages from "Islamist extremists" in Afghanistan and Pakistan back to their origins in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as well as from Kashmir, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Through his readings and interviews, Millard finds out how Osama bin Laden was ideologically influenced by his teacher, Dr. Abdullah Azam, and the larger movement of Wahhabism, whose main ideologue was Sayyid Qutb. After 9/11 and the American toppling of the Taliban, Singapore's intelligence agency faced – and thwarted – an anticipated threat.

Chapter 3 tells the story of terror in Singapore and how, in early 2002, the Internal Security Department, supported by most local Muslim leaders, arrested the terrorists, many of whom had trained in Afghanistan. He agrees with the assertion that such spiritual leaders as Ibrahim Maidin and Abu Bakar Baashir disseminated radical ideology and explains the terrorist goal of creating a regional Islamic state, such as the caliphate, that would impose the Shari`ah. He argues that Singaporeans should be tough in containing radicalism while building more tolerance and interfaith dialogues, and develop critical thinking while maintaining economic advancement. He warns against

forging Singapore's Muslims into a separate psychological and political in-group and into an internationally oriented Islamic community.

Chapter 4 explains how things changed after the Bali bombings. For example, Singapore sought to deal with it by furthering integration programs, avoiding ghettos, making different ethnic groups mix with each other, and curbing Islamic radicalism. Millard tells of his conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's senior minister, who believes that the terrorist actions had nothing to do with local conditions and that Malay Muslims should be more rational in their political orientation in order to prevent external ideological influences. The white paper "The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism" says that those arrested are secularly well educated but had also received ideological indoctrination from spiritual leaders and visited Afghanistan. American support for Israel, oppressive regimes in the Middle East, and Saudi influence have also contributed to the rise of radical Islamism.

The story then moves on to Malaysia at a time when the United States had begun its latest invasion of Iraq. Millard interviewed Nik Aziz, leader of Parti Islam seMalaysia (PAS), which controlled the states of Kelantan and Trengganu. Nik Aziz offers a conservative worldview, as opposed to the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO), for he sees Islam as the solution to all problems. However, he says that he would understand if non-Muslims chose civil law instead of Islamic law. Nik Aziz criticizes capitalism because of its emphasis on profit at the expense of other cultural, moral things. He also says that democracy is not at odds with Islam, which recognizes consultation (*shūrā*), but that an Islamic democracy cannot tolerate certain things (e.g., gay marriage and immoral tourism). After the conversation, Millard thought that Aziz, a pious man, could be "arbitrary and even tyrannical," arguing that "the moral dictums of a religion are not an appropriate substitute for [the] laws of a multicultural state, and Islam offered no exception to this" (p. 117).

Chapter 6 discusses how Singapore may look forward amidst the changing local and global contexts by eliminating censorship, developing a civil society to counter a hegemonic government, and allowing political education. Agreeing with Kirpal Singh, a Singaporean Sikh writer, Millard writes that creativity is needed. More importantly, Singapore should rethink the whole country to ensure greater freedom of the press and thinking and allow Malay Muslims to participate more actively in building the nation. While Islamism is a "spiritual disease" (p. 142) that should be dealt with, Muslim societies should make a positive, rather than a destructive, contribution to the world: "If a healthy pluralistic society can be created and maintained in Singapore, there is no reason why it cannot be so elsewhere or even everywhere (p. 140)."

Millard's lack of knowledge about Islamic history and teachings has trapped him in some fallacies. For example, he equates Islamism and violence (see p. xix). *Islamism* refers to Muslim groups who use Islam as their political ideology, even though they may be non-violent. His understanding of jihad is limited, for he presents it only as holy war and terrorism. Lastly, his depiction of Indonesia suffers from unnecessary over-generalization when he writes that "Indonesia, and the Philippines ... were more receptive to the message of Islamic militancy" (p. xviii), thus ignoring the fact that Indonesia is generally moderate and peaceful, despite the terrors in Bali and Jakarta. He also portrays Indonesian Muslims as mostly "poor with little education" (p. xix) and "corrupt" (p. 10). Millard should have included moderate and even liberal voices, such as those of the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama, and should have said something about the country's much-improved state of education and prosperity, all of which would have provided a more nuanced analysis of Muslims, Indonesians, and Southeast Asians in general.

Most of what Millard says about Islam, jihad, madrassahs, Islamism, Wahhabism, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia is too general. For example, regarding the Malay people, Winstedt's book *The Malays: A Cultural History* (1947) is largely outdated when it comes to contemporary Malays. With regard to Islam and the West, Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis (1996) and Bernard Lewis' *What Went Wrong* (2002) have also been criticized by many. Despite these shortcomings, *Jihad in Paradise* is a useful reading for students and general readers interested in the relationship between Islam and politics in Southeast Asia.

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Oukoubah: Justice for the Cham Muslims under the Democratic Kampuchea Regime

Ysa Osman
Cambodia: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2002. 154 pages.

Imagine that a struggling revolutionary movement is promising paradise after your defenseless country is unwillingly sucked into the maelstrom of total war; that the revolutionary leaders are highly respected men and women, many of whom were educated in the former colonial master's homeland; and that the ruler, who is credited with single-handedly achieving your nation's independence and enjoys near-divine status among the

masses, joins the revolutionaries after being overthrown and calls upon you to do likewise. And then, full of post-victory idealism, imagine that you live for three years, eight months, and twenty days in the horror that introduced a new word into the English language: *auto-genocide*. Welcome to Democratic Kampuchea, whose ruling elite, the Khmer Rouge, targeted the author's people, the Cham Muslims, for extermination: "The enemies of Angkar [the "Organization"] come in many categories, but the biggest enemies are the Cham. The plan is to destroy them all before 1980" (p. 6).

This book is divided into five parts: "Introduction," "S-21 Prisoner Cases," "Analysis," "References," and "Appendix." The "Introduction" deals with the controversial questions of how many Cham died under the Khmer Rouge (from 77,000 to 400,000-500,000) and how many lived in Cambodia before the Khmer Rouge took over (from about 250,000 to 700,000, the latter number being accepted by the Cham). Osman then moves on to how the Khmer Rouge sought to destroy community solidarity: turning Cham against Cham and children against parents, forbidding Islamic and Cham customs *in toto*, destroying the Qur'an and the *keitab* (a book explaining the Qur'an), making local leaders "disappear," splitting up families during forced evacuations, and resettling the Cham among ethnic Khmer and Chinese. He also explains why he chose the thirteen case studies that make up the next part: "...there is sufficient documentation for study and research" (p. 8).

"S-21 Prisoner Cases" presents information about thirteen Cham prisoners who died in S-21, the code name for Tuol Sleng, part of a former high school complex that became the "crown jewel" of a nation-wide system of concentration camps and torture centers. Each case is based on "confessions" extracted under extreme torture ("[T]orture is used to get their answers, not for entertainment. So make them hurt so they will answer quickly." p. 59, n. 225) and then cross-checked with survivors who had had some contact with the deceased both before and during the Khmer Rouge period, as well as with surviving family members or relatives. Each prisoner is identified by name, date and place of birth, parents and siblings, profession, and a brief life sketch until he ended up in the Khmer Rouge army (through forced conscription), in S-21, and, finally, in a mass grave.

"Analysis" details the plan to turn Cambodia into "... a society of happiness, equality, justice and true democracy, with no rich, no poor, no class oppressors and no class oppressed, a society in which the people live together happily in great national unity ..." (p. 77). The method chosen was, to say the least, unique: initiating forced population transfers from urban to rural areas right after their 17 April 1975 victory; creating new social classes: "old (base) people" who had lived under the Khmer Rouge before April 17 and

"new (April 17) people" who had been evacuated, and their various subcategories; prohibiting private property, currency, markets, exchanges, and bartering; and limiting (in practice, outlawing) traditional rights and freedoms (e.g., observance of ethnic customs and religious practices, speech, travel, personal relationships, and protest). Smaller sections are devoted to who bears responsibility for the prisoners' deaths, the rules they had to obey, why and how they were arrested (usually implicated by someone being tortured or through trickery), and similar matters. The final two sections deal with the Khmer Rouge's attempted elimination of Islam and ideological training for the youth, who were regarded as "'pure,' having never been affected by the reactionary influence of earlier societies" (p. 98) – and upon whom the regime depended.

The "References" document the tertiary sources, the DC-Cam (Documentation Center of Cambodia) sources, the author's interviews, and interviews by DC-Cam researchers and others. The "Appendix" gives information about the number of Cham killed, who and how many of the Cham intelligentsia were murdered, and other data.

The book has a few shortcomings. First, it seems to have been written for those who are familiar with recent Cambodian history; there is no map, no discussion of Cham history, how and why the Khmer Rouge came to power, the sources of its murderous ideology, its leaders and what happened to them, how Prince Sihanouk helped them to power, and why Washington supported the Khmer Rouge for twelve years after Vietnam drove them from power on 7 January 1979. Second, no "confessions" by female Cham prisoners are included. While the full list of Cham prisoners is provided, due to the Cham penchant for truncating Muslim names and then spelling them phonetically, the reader cannot even ascertain if there were any female Cham prisoners at S-21.

Osman acknowledges the third problem: "Given the experience levels of DC-Cam researchers, we do not strictly apply the standard social research hypothetical-deductive methodology. ... Cambodian schools as yet do not inculcate a culture of learning that respects individual critical thinking and writing. Aspiring Cambodian scholars also face a severe lack of library resources, both in quantity and quality" (p. 149). Since the Khmer and the Cham intelligentsia were largely "disappeared" and Cambodia remains one of the world's poorest countries, this situation is hardly surprising.

All of that aside, however, this is a valuable book simply because it lets the Cham speak for themselves. Thus, it does not become lost in theorizing and speculation. Osman and his informants know what they are talking about, because they lived – and survived – a holocaust that will always remain

largely incomprehensible to an outsider. One hopes that more such Cham narratives and analyses will follow, and that their quality will improve.

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The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Late Imperial China

Zvi Ben-Dor Benite
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. 280 pages.

Zvi Ben-Dor Benite has contributed an important piece to the history of Muslims in imperial China, centered on a seventeenth-century Muslim genealogy known as the *Jing Xue Xi Chuan Pu* (hereinafter *Genealogy*), which has been recently discovered, punctuated, and printed as the *Jing Xue Xi Chuan Pu* (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1989). His book follows Sachiko Murata's study of Confucian Muslim texts and teachers (namely, *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light: Wang Tai-Yu's Great Learning of Pure and Real and Liu Chih's Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm* [Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2000]) and illuminates many aspects of the Muslims' cultural life in imperial China.

The book consists of an introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion with tables and illustrations. The first chapter decodes the *Genealogy* and outlines the trajectory of the Chinese Muslims' educational network in central and coastal China. The second chapter explores the "social logic" behind the practices of the Muslim literati (p. 74) – that is, how they envisioned and understood the educational system, their roles, and Islam in reference to imperial China's existing sociocultural categories. This chapter reveals how Muslim educational institutions enabled and empowered Muslim intellectuals to convert "Islam" and "Muslim" into valid social categories of school (*xuepai*) and to envision themselves as "literati" (*shi*) that were as much Chinese as Muslim.

The third chapter analyzes the transformation of Islamic knowledge from "orality" to "texuality" (p. 158) and the formation of the Chinese Islamic school, which was patterned on contemporary Chinese schools of scholarship. The fourth chapter explains how Confucian Muslims interpreted Islam, Prophet Muhammad, and Islamic canons as equivalents and counterparts of Confucianism (enumerated in the *Han Kitab* as "Dao," "Sage," and "Classic"), and how the Muslim literati embraced Confucianism. In the conclud-

ing section, through the so-called "Muslim literature inquisition" (the Hai Furun case), the author demonstrates how the Islamic Dao, Sage, and Classic were "encompassed" by the dominant Chinese thought and philosophy of (neo-)Confucianism.

The book is clearly written and analyzes the Muslim educational networking presented in the *Genealogy* from multiple angles, from historical development to geographical distribution. More importantly, this book provides an insider's view of the close ties in this elite circle and its members' consciousness, which was brought and bound by the learning network. At the same time, the author interprets the *Genealogy* contextually in reference to imperial China, where learning and the learned are socially appreciated. This insider and outsider understanding of the Muslims' perception of their religion (as "Dao"), activities (as "learning"), and status (as "literati") leads the author to refute the dichotomist understanding of Chinese Muslims as either Muslim or Chinese and to conclude that these learned Muslims were as much Chinese as they were Muslim. In addition to the unique way of textually and contextually interpreting the Muslim literati, another strength of the book is the author's linguistic ability to read these complicated philosophical and religious texts in Chinese, Arabic, and Persian.

This book, however, in many ways recalls and reflects legacies of sinological and Islamic studies that continue discourses that, on the one hand, distinguish between *civilized* and *barbarian* (*hua* and *yi*) in Confucian societies and, on the other hand, the difference between Islamic and un-Islamic domains (*dār al-Islām* and *dār al-ḥarb*) in Muslim societies that existed in Qing China. The result of the millennium-long inquiry into the two cultural identities unavoidably results in studying Chinese Muslim "identity," enticed by such recent studies on Manchu "ethnicity" as Pamela Crossley's *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) and Mark Elliott's *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

Unfortunately, studying "Chinese Muslim" identity causes one to fall into a subtle trap. The Manchu identity, either prescribed by imperial edicts in Crossley's study or subscribed to under the banner institution in Elliott's research, is actually identification. The internal Muslim educational system, however, did not generate enough force to impose such an identity, nor did the external forces of "valid" social categories (be it "Dao," "Learning," "School," and "Literati"). It is hardly convincing that "Chinese Muslim" cultural identity was, like other Chinese identities, institutionally shaped during the Qing era (p. 62), and it is even difficult for this reviewer to find a proper

translation for "Chinese Muslim" in the Qing context. The urge to make a resemblance between the Muslim educational system and the dominant Chinese learning system even leads the author, following Evelyn S. Rawski's definition in her *Education and Popular Literary in Ch'ing China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979, 38-40), to translate religious professionals (*zhangjiao*) and their certificate (*zhangjiaodie*) as "school master" of "low-ranking local schools" and "school master's certificate with belt and caps" (p. 101, fn. 57; p. 102).

This reviewer asks why Muslims had to act in the "Chinese" way under the Manchu rule, given that the Manchus built close relations with Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang and that Han Muslims of the interior regions were included in the large category of the *min* (commoner) population. The ultimate reason, as this reviewer argues, lies in the cultural scholars' misinterpretation of the legal concept and category of *min* during the Qing period, which the author mistakenly translates as "people" (p. 198). It is this reviewer's opinion that Chinese Muslims well understood the legitimacy of this legal (not cultural) category, and that it is by and to this legal reference that Chinese Muslims engaged in a discussion on Islam and Confucianism.

In addition to second-hand citations of many Qing memorials and edicts of the 1780s, often twisted if not distorted, included in the *Han Kitab* (esp. *Zhi Sheng Shi Lu*, p. 215), other minor mistakes include misinterpretations (e.g., "Turbaned-man," p. 42, fn. 60), faulty translations (e.g., p. 225, "*huo su qie qie*" as "burn urgently"), chronological confusion (p. 185, "*zhenquan,* 785-805" should be "*zhenguan,* 627-650"), geographic misidentifications (e.g., p. 154, "Yangzhou" should be "Liuzhou"), Chinese character mistakes (e.g., pp. 27, 85, and 127) and the misidentification of official titles (e.g., Zhu Chun was not "governor-general" of Guangdong and Guangxi, but "governor" of Guangxi; Jueluo Bayansan was "governor-general" of Guangdong and Guangxi at the time of the Hai Furun case, p. 215). These mistakes are joined by editorial errors as well as misspellings in the text and the bibliography (e.g., p. 2. "Lin Yansheng"; p. 57, "*Jingxue Xi Chaun Pu*"; and p. 205, "*Saahde*").

Despite all of these questions and minor mistakes, however, the book is a great piece and this reviewer recommends it for students of historical, religious, and identity studies on Islam and China. It is of particular interest and importance to studies of Islamic thought and theology, both of which are often centered on major Islamicates of the Middle East, for it enables readers to look at another way of being "Muslim" and practicing "Islam." The same is true of scholars of Confucianism (especially neo-Confucianism) who

seek to understand the Muslim perception of and contribution to "Confucianism" that has long been abscribed to the "Chinese."

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The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873

David G. Atwill
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. 264 pages.

David G. Atwill's recent historical work joins in the anthropological stream of studying the ethnic groups of China's Yunnan province. This book presents a history of the violence in nineteenth-century Yunnan, to which ethnicity, economics, culture, environment, and politics all contributed. It consists of ten chapters, the first of which discusses the bloody history of the Hui (Muslim) genocide by the Han (Chinese). In this chapter, Atwill identifies why the Han resent the Hui and refutes conventional assumptions about the Panthay rebellion (1856-72). The second chapter situates nineteenth-century Yunnan in mosaic landscapes of region, commerce, ethnicity, and geography and provides the context for understanding the ensuing violence. The third chapter presents the history, communities, and networks of Muslims in multiethnic Yunnan, and the fourth chapter discusses Han trouble-makers (*Hanjianism*) in Yunnan's borderlands and presents a history of non-Han resistance to Han expansion.

The fifth and sixth chapters concentrate on Han hostility toward the Hui and documents in detail the massacre of Muslims by Han officials and militia as well as major Hui resistance campaigns: rebellions in Yunnan's eastern, southern, and western regions. The seventh chapter discusses divisions among Yunnan's Hui, which were largely due to differences in region, religion, and personal ambitions, along with the Qing policy of using some Hui to control other Hui. The eighth chapter focuses on the Dali regime (1856-72), which Atwill surprisingly labels as "Sultanate," and discusses its multiethnic character. The ninth chapter presents the back-and-forth battles between the Dali Sultanate and the Qing, and the fall of the Dali regime. The tenth chapter, as an epilogue, critiques the existing scholarship, which fails to note the facts of the Han massacre of the Hui and the multiethnic backing of the Dali regime. It also restates that the Panthay rebellion was primarily a Hui-led indigenous multiethnic resistance to the Han immigrants' hunger

for food, land, women, money, and power in a nineteenth-century Qing frontier area at a time when the central government was dysfunctional.

This book is superb in explaining the Panthay rebellion. Atwill positions the violence in its ethnically, religiously, geographically, commercially, and politically interwoven local context and thus avoids the reductionist and intuitional discourses often used to address violence in ethnic and cultural terms alone. He captures the tension between large-scale invading Han immigrants and local indigenous groups by tracing its trajectory and presenting patterns of historical violence between local ethnic groups and immigrant Hans. The Panthay rebellion represents the zenith of this kind of violence, and Atwill identifies the social and materialistic roots for the Hans' hatred and attempt to exterminate the Hui. Another virtue of this book is Atwill's juxtaposition of identity and violence, such as linking the Panthay rebellion to Muslim ethnic and religious identities during a time of crisis (pp. 155-60).

The only question I have is, in addition to known Manchu-Han official prejudice toward the Hui in nineteenth-century Yunnan, what was the state's degree of political complicity? Had the author focused more on the patterns and histories of administrations (e.g., the standard province-county style of interior regions, subprefecture [*ting*] mixed with administrations and regulations, and indigenous local autonomies), why the state categorized Yunnan's subject populations of Yunnan into three (Han, Hui, and Yi), and why it tolerated the massacres, the Han policy of slaughtering the Hui would have been more comprehensible. I believe that categorizing Yunnan's populations seems to be related to these administrative trivia and the need to standardize those differences that allowed the state to tolerate such events.

Administrative differences make sense to both Hui identity debates and Han identity. Atwill carefully categorizes *Huimin* and *Mumin*, respectively, as "ethnic" (Hui) and "religious" (Muslim) identities (p. 157). There is no problem with translating the latter as religious identity, for it is probably derived from the Arabic term *mu'min* (believer). However, his treatment and reading of *huimin* as ethnic identity is problematic. Ma Rulong's justification for surrendering, that "the state had treated its people (*min*) benevolently" (p. 156), seems to suggest that *Huimin* (Hui commoner) primarily expressed the person's legal status as *min* (commoner), despite the cultural-ethnic modification (Hui). Interestingly enough, in contrast to Ma Rulong's identification of the root of the Hui genocide with the Yunnan Han, Du Wenxiu attributed it to the alien Manchu ruler who refused to be a [Hui] *min* subject of the Qing and tried to establish a new regime for people of different cultures (*jiaomin*), among whom were the *Mumin* (Muslims).

Administrative differentiations in Yunnan's populations equally make sense to the self-perceived Han identity. Since the Han, new or old, belonged to the standard administration of interior regions and were the largest group of *min* subject populations, it is not surprising that they equated themselves with the whole loyal commoner population. Thanks to Yunnan's multi-ethnic setting, the state also overlapped the Han with the commoner so that, as Atwill discusses in the fourth chapter, it expressed its early concern over trouble-maker commoners via an ethnic term: *Han-jian* (Han traitor). Later on, along with the accelerated violence directed against the minority populations, the Han opportunistically identified themselves as good commoners and allied themselves with the state.

Attacking and eliminating non-Han groups thus served the interests of both the Qing, who desired to standardize the local administrations, and the Han, who desired to rob the indigenous peoples. Simultaneously, by equating themselves with commoners, the ethnic Han alienated and excluded the Hui, many – if not all – of whom were actually commoner subjects under standard administrations, from [equal] commoner status. The Qing pacification of the Panthay rebellion, as this reviewer argues, and the subsequent administrative reform was, in this sense, a great victory for the state at the political level and for Yunnan's Han population at the local ethnic level.

The book is of great help in understanding ethnic and religious revolts and violence in concrete terms in imperial as well as modern China, and for the crimes committed by the immigrant Han in China's frontier and ethnic regions in the name of state. It also reveals long-term challenges for non-Han peoples to be considered as equal subjects in a Han-dominated polity. This book deserves serious attention from students of imperial Chinese history, ethnic studies, and frontier studies, as well as policymakers.

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The History of Women's Mosques in Chinese Islam: A Mosque of Their Own

Maria Jaschok and Shui Jingjun
London: Routledge & Curzon Press, 2000. 361 pages.

This remarkable collaboration of primarily Maria Jaschok and Shui Jingjun (with contributions from nine other mostly Muslim Chinese women who are duly acknowledged) contains a wealth of information on a subject that most

scholars of Muslim communities have never considered or perhaps even imagined: the existence of *bona fide* women's mosques in China. Through painstaking historical, archival, interview, and field research, the authors lay out a convincing argument that such mosques have existed in China and continue to experience a "rapid increase" (p. 15), at least since the late Ming dynasty (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries), proliferating in northern China's central plains region (mainly Henan, Hebei, Shandong, and Anhui) during the Qing emperor Jiaqing's reign (1796-1820) (pp. 67-69).

This work sheds light on "how women [in China] engendered and sustained faith, aspiration and loyalties under often challenging conditions" (p. 5) – which is putting it mildly. Strenuously caught between Confucian, Islamic, and patrimonial requirements, they developed an institution of learning and cultural transmission perhaps unique to the Muslim world. While the authors never fully address why "women's mosques" and madrassahs developed so fully in China (and almost nowhere else), they do richly demonstrate the extraordinarily important role these religious and educational centers have played in preserving and promoting Islamic understanding among China's Muslims, known as the Hui national minority (with a year 2000 population of approximately 9.8 million, out of a total 20.3 million Muslims in China, according to the especially accurate PRC state census).

While the authors claim these women's "prayer halls" (the Chinese term is ambiguous) and the women who lead them are fully-fledged *ahongs* or imams (again, the Chinese term, like the Arabic and Persian equivalents, is not clear about the teacher's actual status), the issue here is whether they have any authority over men. Since they clearly do not, *ahong* should be taken in its more general sense of "one possessing advanced Islamic knowledge" or training, and does not imply institutionalized authority beyond the sphere of women (and children, which in most instances includes boys). Nevertheless, it is significant that they have such organized authority, training, and separate prayer halls or mosques among themselves.

The issue of whether a prayer hall (*libai tang* or *qingzhen nusi*) exclusively reserved for women is actually a "woman's mosque" (*nu si*) is really a matter of semantics, since mosques in China are often referred to as "prayer temples" (*libai si*). The real issue is whether the women are organized separately from the men and if their mosque is considered independent. Usually, women's prayer halls are adjacent to the main mosque, as the authors illustrate (and thus, unfortunately, the maps only give a general indication of the mosque locations since they are subsumed under the men's), or women are given a curtained section or outlying room of the main prayer hall in which to pray. But the authors also discuss several totally independent women's

mosques that are nowhere near a larger mosque that includes men. In any case, the work clearly shows that these mosques serve as important social nodes that do much to galvanize nationwide Muslim women organizations in China and thereby contribute to increased Muslim women activism, either in social welfare programs, education, or even new mosque building.

The existence of extensive women's Islamic educational training and active women's organizations in the mosques of Yunnan and Henan suggests that such bodies have a long history in China. In the more conservative Muslim areas of the northwest (Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang), women are more restricted from public participation in ritual and leadership, and thus there are fewer examples of such mosques. We also do not find them among the other Muslim nationalities (Uyghur, Kazakh, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik, Baonan, Uzbek, or Tatar, in order of higher population numbers), who, being concentrated in the northwest, are perhaps unaccustomed to this practice.

Once again, this raises the question of why in China, and more specifically, why in north central China among the Hui Muslim Chinese, did this institution emerge and endure? This fascinating work provides many clues to this enigmatic puzzle, but, unfortunately, no satisfactory answers. In the "Epilogue," the authors suggest that the "peripheral minority" status of Muslim women in a secularizing state (Confucian and Communist!) is a critical factor; yet we have not seen the rise of similar institutions among Muslim minority women in Europe, the Americas, or Asia. The multiple challenges Muslim women in China must negotiate between family, home, mosque, work, public sphere, and the state is best understood by letting China's Muslim women speak for themselves, which this book, through extensive quotations, inclusive authorship, and several appendices and glossary, splendidly accomplishes, as the following quote by a Ms. Yang Yinliang Ahong from the northeastern city of Harbin so vividly demonstrates:

> Since I was appointed *nu ahong* [female imam or teacher], I have never wavered from the principle of loving the motherland and our religion. Carefully observing my responsibilities, I have dedicated all my efforts, however insignificant, to the service of the party, the country and to religion with the help of the limited knowledge I have acquired, thus gaining trust, respect, and admiration from our Muslim brothers and sisters (p. 287, and repeated at the end of the Epilogue, p. 306).

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Lost Voices: Central Asian Women Confronting Transition

Yvonne Corcoran-Nantes
London and New York: Zed Books, 2005. 208 pages.

Yvonne Corcoran-Nantes' *Lost Voices: Central Asian Women Confronting Transition* examines how the Soviets empowered and disempowered Central Asian women before, during, and after the communist regime. To date, this book is the most in-depth study of the revolutionary transformations experienced by these women during the twentieth century. Combining her western academic background and sensitivity for the local context, she reaches beyond the mainstream conceptualization of gender issues vis-à-vis the Soviet regime to examine Central Asian and western literature on gender thematics across disciplines, from anthropology to political science.

The book opens with a sophisticated analysis of the relation between western feminist paradigms and the Soviet policy of gender equality. Both existed in parallel, yet were interactive. Although western feminist ideas impacted women from the Soviet space, they represented rather marginal views among Soviet feminists. Corcoran-Nantes explains that while the Soviet regime was empowering Central Asian women by liberating them from traditional religious values and setting quotas in public structures, these radical shifts in daily life inevitably complicated their identities in various social situations. The Soviet model provided some institutional framework for the independence period, yet was largely inadequate in the new free market system. As a result, Central Asian women faced greater problems in shaping their feminist agendas when compared to Russian women.

Chapter 2 discusses why this forceful emancipation, which involved *khujun* (unveiling), replacing Islamic law with Soviet legislation, and establishing *zhensovets* (women councils) in the 1920-30s, was controversial. She argues that women were expected to follow the changes, yet still had to play important social roles in their families. In addition, this empowerment provoked domestic and social violence against women. Such phenomena as *khujun* also engendered intra-personal conflict and hesitation among the first generation of Soviet-ruled Central Asian women. Corcoran-Nantes states that the "emancipation of Central Asian women had far more to do with the implementation of the Soviet political and economic project than constituting an act of altruism" (p. 38).

Chapter 3 argues that this emancipation did not lead to women having a choice in their public and private lives (p. 63). While the first generation of

female doctors, lawyers, and scientists was already appearing in the late 1930s, women were banned from higher-paying positions. They were also exposed – often without their knowledge – to dangerous working conditions. Moreover, their employment in agriculture and factories considerably undermined fertility rates. However, despite its flaws, this policy of emancipation was unprecedented in the Islamic world and its legacy continues.

The book's second part analyzes the effects on women's health. The Soviet economy, which became heavily dependent on female workers, provided an array of subsidized social services for women and children, liberal abortion laws, and family planning programs to raise a "healthy generation." Chapter 5 focuses on the reemergence of Islamic traditions in the post-independence period. Corcoran-Nantes observes that "the nexus between Islam and national identity remained unbroken throughout seventy years of Soviet rule" (p. 137). Women's status in families and local communities began to shift in the early 1990s. Family and community values reemerged along with traditional marriage practices banned by the Soviet regime (e.g., *kalym* [bride price], arranged marriages, bride kidnapping, and polygamy). In fact, the Soviet regime strengthened traditional sentiments by constructing administrative units based on pre-Soviet cultural divisions. Islam's reemergence and increased poverty due to the economic crisis disempowered women: domestic violence is on the rise, while women's social status has declined rapidly.

The final chapter analyzes the post-independence pro-western "democratic" presence that preserved the "zero tolerance ... of the better aspects of the Soviet system" (p. 160). Women were pushed out of the political process after the Soviet government and parliament quota system for gender representation was cancelled. There was, however, a trend to voice their concerns by founding women NGOs (WNGOs). Although western-funded WNGOs were important in this process, foreign involvement also provoked controversy as WNGOs began to compete for donor attention by aligning their agendas with externally imposed guidelines. Thus, are today's WNGOs genuinely independent?

Her conclusion that the Soviet framework for female emancipation and international funds became the key elements in Central Asian women's ability to retain power in society, politics, and economy in the post-independence period is thought-provoking. However, although she offers a comprehensive analysis of the pre-Soviet and the Soviet periods, she makes too many generalizations about developments in the post-Soviet era.

In addition, this book contains several weaknesses. First, as regards its empirical content, the author displays a perpetual difficulty when making

inter-state and inter-cultural comparisons between Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek women. She elaborates the general trends, and yet overlooks the various paths they have undertaken in the post-Soviet context. This leads to some factual misinterpretations. For example, the author generalizes that *mahallas* (a cultural division among sedentary societies) were important in the post-independence period throughout the region. Similarly, she largely ignores such intra-groups differences as urban/rural divisions, sedentary/nomadic cultures, and wealthy/poor households.

Second, she underestimates the salient differences in the states' post-independence political systems. More than a decade after independence, the difference between the agenda-setting processes by Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz WNGOs are striking. While Uzbekistan's WNGOs are still struggling to establish contacts with the western community, their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are promoting such liberal values as the rights of sexual minorities and paid sex workers.

Finally, the author overlooks the role of women in times of conflict. Although Central Asia arguably remained relatively calm after the Soviet collapse, the region saw some new phenomena, such as female suicide bombers in Uzbekistan and the manipulation of women's organizations by opposition and government forces.

On the example of Soviet emancipation policies, Corcoran-Nantes manages to trace the formation of Soviet institutes in general by explaining their rationale and effects on Islamic society. In essence, her portrayal of the transformation of Central Asian women provides an analysis of the USSR's establishment, continuity, and decline. Her language is rich, expressive, and harmonious. The book is a valuable contribution to Central Asian and post-Soviet studies, as well as to theories of feminism vis-à-vis Islam.

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Aversion and Desire: Negotiating Muslim Female Identity in the Diaspora

Shanaz Khan
United Kingdom: Women's Press, Ltd., 2002. 152 pages.

In this interesting book, *Aversion and Desire: Negotiating Muslim Female Identity in the Diaspora*, Shanaz Khan challenges us to rethink static and fixed conceptions of Muslim women. She also points out that because

minority identities are fixed, women who happen to be Muslim are often forced to enter social and political spaces as Muslim women. Such restraints make it almost impossible to create a place for progressive politics, change, and fluid identities. As an anthropologist and observer, Khan pinpoints and focuses our attention on the situation currently facing Muslim women in the West, particularly in Canada. As a Muslim and a woman, she has located a space in which progressive politics and change may take place.

Borrowing mainly from the work of Homi Bhabha, Khan calls for moving from fixed and static notions of Muslim women into what Bhabha refers to as the "third space," from which hybrid identities can be constructed. The author argues that both Islam and Orientalism, the two dominant discourses from which ideas about Muslim women have been and are still articulated, have led to essentializing and idealizing our images of the Muslim woman. This is also true of feminism, which sees specific aspects of Islamic practice as oppressive to women and, therefore, the target of change; of colonialism and postcolonialism, which reinforce those stereotypes influenced by unequal power relationships between Euro-American and Muslim societies and that have an imperial history currently embedded in the neocolonial forms of control of other societies; and multiculturalism, which views the cultures and religions of nonwhite people as homogenous, unchanging, and unconnected to any social, political, and historical reality. All of these lenses through which the "others" are viewed contribute to this essentialization.

Moving beyond an extremely useful theoretical discussion structured by the concept of hybridized identities in the third space, Khan then incorporates a series of case studies that are categorized in a manner designed to showcase a variety of Muslim women's attempts to construct an identity, live life, and challenge the norms of both the wider society and of the Muslim communities in which they live. This is done from a third space, one that they themselves might not even realize that they are occupying.

In the first set of cases we encounter women who, although they self-identify as Muslim, have largely disavowed Islam. However, they are still forced to negotiate their identity as "Muslim." As a result, they are at odds with their families and communities, as well as with a wider society that forces them into a category with which they may not wish to be identified. In the second set, we meet women who have managed to construct hybrid identities and negotiate their lives in such hybrid spaces. At the same time, however, they accept the authority of monolithic notions of Islamic views regarding what the Muslim woman is supposed to be.

Finally, the third set of women accept their identities as Muslim and strive to conduct their lives within what their communities consider to be

Islamically appropriate behavior. However, they also recognize that, in practice, many aspects of Muslim behavior are sexist and unjust. Thus, these women choose to focus on the more spiritual and internal side of Islamic practice. In rejecting all manifestations of unjust treatment by others while still trying to perfect an ideal kind of Islamic spiritual practice, they have been able to negotiate and establish their own Muslim identities.

This book makes a strong contribution to an ongoing discussion of Islam's encounter with the West. However, it moves away from the Islam vs. the West dichotomy by locating several layers, both in the western perceptions of Muslim women and from within the Muslim community itself, that have been sites from which particular images of Muslim women have been constructed over time. This book makes an interesting theoretical argument and provides an important discussion of how Orientalism and Islam occupy opposite sides of the same coin by serving to create a very similar image of Muslim women.

Moreover, the case studies introduce us to specific examples of women constructing their own third spaces from which they are challenging notions of what it means to be a Muslim woman in Canada. With the growing interest in Muslim minorities in the West, a study located in Canada is an important contribution that allows us to move away from a focus on western Europe and the United States.

One area that Khan could develop further is her data (gathered during 1991-1992). Even though much remains the same in terms of how host countries position their Muslim immigrant communities, so much has changed as we have moved into the early twenty-first century. Her theoretical focus is still relevant, but updated data would greatly improve the discussion.

Khan is an expert at applying theory to case studies. Through this book, she makes an important contribution to studies of transnational religion, Muslim minority communities, gender, and post-colonialism. For anyone interested in these areas, this book is very useful.

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The Private World of Ottoman Women

Godfrey Goodwin
London: Saqi Books, 2006. 261 pages.

The publication of *The Private World of Ottoman Women* is an important landmark in both social and gender history. Until this point, accounts of the

seemingly mundane activities of Ottoman women were limited to travelers' accounts, gossip, and information that could be discerned through the latticework guarding the imperial harem. Godfrey Goodwin's groundbreaking work, however, introduces the reader to a society with women who were, in many areas, their husbands' peers and, although restrained by certain gendered restrictions, had a remarkable level of mobility. His book not only removes the popular notion that "Ottoman woman" is synonymous with "harem girl," but shows that there was an extensive network of politics, intrigue, and socio-religious change and adaptation outside of the urban elite. It also presents the reader with an understanding, although not overemphasized, that these were women who lived within the parameters of Islam as both Christian and Muslim women, and who distinctly embodied the ideals of the feminine in Islam.

The book is cleverly organized to reflect both the chronology of the empire's development and its class hierarchy. The majority of the first two chapters, "The Coming of the Nomads" and "The Wanderers," discuss in-depth the empire's early formation and the pre-Islamic period of tribal nomadism, and essentially illustrate the empire's boundaries and seeds of social activity. Thus they are not terribly informative about Ottoman women. But this is in no way the fault of the author, who does provide some interesting tidbits where information could be gleaned and placed into the context of the thesis.

Only in the third chapter does more information become available. Here, Goodwin relies upon both primary research and a variety of travelogues by European men and women. In addition, he now begins to weave anecdotal tales of women into his narrative, which alleviates some of the historical drudgery that comes with the text. In particular, the story of Kira Hatun (Rumi's wife) remains in the reader's memory: She intercedes at the gates of Paradise on behalf of a couple killed for committing adultery so that they may also enter heaven (p. 76). Such moments soften the text's content and add to the Ottoman woman's multidimensional image.

The book's major strength lies in the author's discussion of the harem and the network of women inside Topkapısary. In particular, one discovers that not only was the harem *not* a center of lasciviousness, but was, in reality, an intimate area in which women were educated and groomed for a life outside the harem if they could not bear the sultan any children (p. 127). In effect, then, the imperial family viewed this institution as a kind of finishing school that one entered through abduction and slavery, as opposed to social class. The women's sexuality was closely guarded: lesbianism was forbidden and, rather amusingly, so were such "phallic" vegetables as carrots –

apparently, there was a fear that these bored young women might use them as masturbatory devices and thereby ruin themselves (p. 131).

In addition, Goodwin makes an important contribution to "traditional" discussions of the harem by debunking the myths and stereotypes of harem life on the grounds that much of what has been said is just hearsay, gossip, and fantasy. It is also noted that much of what is said about the women themselves must be carefully weighed as gossip, which, after the art of seduction, was the most important political tool for women in the imperial harem.

Goodwin's discussion of the imperial family at Topkapısary is particularly interesting, as he weaves tales of women together and, despite linking them by the sultans that they bore, gives them their rightful place in history. A reader interested in the so-called "First Ottoman Queen," Hasseki Hürrem (born Alexandra), will find a marvelous set of anecdotes and information about her philanthropies, politics, and devotion to her husband Sulayman.

Overall, this book's importance lies not so much in the so-called "private lives" of Ottoman women, but in how they functioned within the empire's changing landscape, from its foundations until its collapse after the First World War. At times, they seem to be secondary to the text, which is limited to available accounts left behind by a largely illiterate and secluded female population. Nonetheless, the author paints an exquisite portrait of these women, returns to them some of the dignity lost through a largely phallocentric writing of history, and extracts them from the mythology of the exotic. Goodwin's work frees the peasant woman and the odalisque from their cages and returns them to the social pedestal that they enjoyed as savvy, Muslim citizen-women of their empire.

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Pilgrims of Love: The Anthropology of a Global Sufi Cult

Pnina Werbner
London: Hurst & Co., 2003. 348 pages.

Pnina Werbner's *Pilgrims of Love*, a truly exceptional book in several important ways, is the result of some eleven years of fieldwork in Britain and Pakistan. While the topic, understanding a transnational Sufi cult, is quite conventional within the discipline of anthropology, the time span in which the research was conceived and conducted is perhaps one wherein anthropology

began to question seriously even its most taken-for-granted truths. This makes the final product anything but conventional.

The author makes very clear her position as an anthropologist and the difficulties she experienced as a western Jewish female academic writing about a Pakistani, or second-generation Pakistani, predominantly Muslim male practitioner's perspective. Her honesty about the nature of her field experience, the classic nature of the research itself within the canon of anthropological literature, and her assessment of what she calls "the limits of postmodern anthropology" (pp. 14-15, 291-302) add a certain depth of substance to the discipline's ongoing discussion of the subject-object relationship. This text is an important contribution to the body of literature within the anthropology of religion and Islam, comparative studies of Islamic movements, transnationalism, and, in general, to students and scholars of Pakistan and South Asia.

This work focuses on the life of a living saint, Zindapir, and his lodge in Pakistan, Ghamkol Sharif, and how globalization and postcolonial conditions have influenced the spread of his influence in Pakistan and Britain. Whereas most similar studies are either about a living or a legendary saint, this text is both; in that sense, it is quite unique. One of the book's more surprising aspects is that it takes on a very contemporary topic with a very classical theoretical approach. While Werbner does seek to dialogue with such scholars as Edward Said and Michel Foucault, her project is more closely aligned with the classical theoretical approaches of Max Weber, Claude Levi-Strauss, and Victor Turner. One wonders how the text might have developed differently if Werbner had chosen to situate her work squarely within the current literature on globalization and transnationalism. Nevertheless, the text is interesting from the point of view that she demonstrates how classical anthropological theory can evoke salient themes even in today's globalized world.

One of the book's more intriguing themes is the socially cooperative efforts that go into the making of sacred space. Werbner approaches this by describing the general landscape of the lodge in Pakistan, as well as the mosque and community-building activities in Britain, in terms of a group inserting itself into a larger foreign and mostly non-Muslim public space. The book's central section focuses specifically on the various public celebrations that occur in both countries. While the commentary on these celebrations in Pakistan evokes familiar themes about the events' function as a large-scale redistribution of resources and the saint's miraculous role in feeding the poor, these events take on a significantly different meaning in Britain, where a Muslim minority population organizes public processions.

Werbner explains how her informants viewed "western" public space and what motivated them to organize public processions. She comments that the areas of the non-Muslim world, in this case Britain, where no established branches of Zindapir's order had been set up, were seen as blank spaces on a map. Public processions then served to inscribe not only the identity of Pakistani migrants into the British landscape, but also to inscribe the saint's influence into a new sphere where adherents might attract new followers. New centers served as sites where Zindapir's *khulafā'* ("emissaries of the saint beyond the central lodge," p. 157) emulated both him and his lodge in Pakistan (pp. 157-82).

Werbner describes sacred spaces in the minutest detail, down to how Zindapir himself carefully constructed spaces for interacting appropriately with visitors, how the lodge was continually built and rebuilt through volunteer labor, and how the saint's cave was opened and framed in a narrative about him as a living saint after his physical death. More than simply describing these spaces, Werbner analyzes how people interact with the saint through space. For example, she includes interesting excerpts from her fieldwork on the building of his gravesite and relates various individuals' attestation that the saint's power has increased exponentially by virtue of him being outside, out of his contemplative cave, and available at any time for any person.

Further, she describes how Zindapir's tomb is decorated with flowers and different *chaddars* (a "very large scarf, usually white, that covers the head and upper part of the body; sheet") from various regions and different groups of people as they arrive at his tomb in waves. Thus, his tomb can be read in terms of its constant transformation, thereby representing the many roles he filled while serving his many adherents.

The book also takes up the subject of knowledge, who is deemed to have it, and how it was acquired. This point comes to a head in the final chapter, when Werbner describes the various expectations she encountered when telling people that her research would lead to a "book." She met with a positive response from Zindapir's followers in Britain; however, the saint himself, influenced by others near him in Pakistan, ordered that an explanatory English-language pamphlet she had helped write about the order be burned. This experience was halting, but finally opened a productive field of inquiry into the validity of anthropological knowledge and writing, as well as knowledge as it is understood in other contexts.

This fascinating conclusion, far from being conclusive in any respect, might actually have been framed more productively as a starting point for the book, rather than added at the end in a sort of confessional manner. This single section is enough to make the entire book worthwhile reading for any-

one interested in how knowledge is constructed and how current anthropological work deals with dialogism and reflexivity.

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Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel

James Ron
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. 208 pages.

Scholars of state violence, among them sociologists and legal scholars, have insisted upon the existence of certain distinctions that separate those police methods deemed acceptable to the international human rights community from those methods of state brutality considered worthy of condemnation. Interestingly, most of the cases that cause confusion over what can be considered a legitimate use of state violence and what is condemned emanate from the same places: Serbia and Israel. James Ron's impressive study of state violence under these two modern regimes offers an important genealogical and comparative analysis of these blurred moral, ethical, and analytical lines.

Ron's work in *Frontiers and Ghettos* highlights, in particular, patterns of state violence in territories that are under varying degrees of direct state control. These patterns both challenge assumptions about Israeli and Serbian history and serve as a corrective to much of the theoretical literature on state violence. Ron clearly argues that it is the nature of the state's formal relationship with its territories that ultimately determines the level of state violence in both the Balkans and Palestine. His insight into these patterns is, perhaps, especially persuasive because they are fruitfully compared over distinct periods of both regions' history.

At the heart of this provocative study is a bravely argued claim that patterns of state violence vary because of international borders and how states operate within and beyond them. Ron suggests that geographical and administrative borders enforce a certain relational order between mechanisms of coercion and the extent to which the international community will tolerate state brutality. To make his argument, he carefully outlines how Serbian and Israeli repertoires of coercion dramatically changed depending upon the nature of each state's direct relationship with the territories in which they operated. In the cases of Serbia's activities in the former Yugoslavia and Israel's actions in Palestine and southern Lebanon, he sees a pattern of

engagement that highlights a distinction made by state authorities depending upon existing "institutional settings."

For areas that the state identifies as its own, methods of coercion are often brutal but not so excessive that mass expulsion or murder take place. In the case of Israel's evolving relationship with the West Bank and southern Lebanon, for instance, areas deemed beyond Tel Aviv's sovereign control prior to 1967, those two areas were considered "frontiers." As such, the Israeli military was not formally restrained from using deadly force against Palestinian and Lebanese targets. After 1967, however, the West Bank and Gaza became areas of direct Israeli administration. In Ron's terms, these two regions (the "Occupied Territories") became a "ghetto" within which Israeli power could be used far more selectively. Ostensibly, due to the fact that Israel had incorporated the Occupied Territories into its state in important formal ways, the Palestinians living there no longer had to be treated in military terms, but could – and were – policed in ways that emphasized coercion and punishment rather than murder and deportation.

Similarly, Ron suggests that Serbia modified its policies toward Muslims and Catholics in the 1990s. He believes that he has discovered patterns in how, as with Israel's direct annexation of the West Bank, Serbia's formal administrative claim to areas of the former Yugoslavia determined the kind of force used to suppress opposition. In the largely Muslim-populated enclave of Sandjak, which formally remains part of Serbia, the police did not employ anything near the kind of brutal tactics exhibited in Bosnia or Kosovo, both of which were, at different times, formally removed from direct Serbian control. It needs to be recalled that the international community declared both Bosnia and Kosovo to be external to direct Serbian administrative control. This, according to Ron, encouraged Belgrade to unleash an entirely different strategy, one consisting of the mass murder and forced expulsion of the unwanted Muslim and Catholic communities.

As can be imagined, such claims are littered with exceptions, and both Palestinians and Albanians would question Ron's grasp of history. Indeed, it is the author's inability to explore Serbia's long-term relationship with Kosovo that subjects his analysis to question. For decades, while squarely within Serbian/Yugoslav territorial control, Kosovo experienced such forms of state violence as the forced expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanians in the interwar and post-World War II periods. In much the same way, the nature of Israel's violent past in the Occupied Territories hardly fits well with the modification depicted in strategies of coercion after 1967. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians live in permanent exile in Lebanon, Jordan, and

throughout the Middle East as a direct result of Israeli colonialism in the West Bank after 1967. This situation is a far cry from the author's suggestion that Israel somehow modified its use of violence once it directly took over administrative responsibility for the Occupied Territories.

But such concerns about history do not dilute this book's importance. It is reasonable to believe that this important study may contribute to a deeper appreciation for what are clear and distinctive patterns of state violence. That international borders matter in determining the extent to which states are willing to use violence with varying levels of intensity is both reasonable and an excellent working model for a comparative analysis. In addition to exposing the extent to which violence has been used against civilians by both countries over the last thirty years, Ron introduces a tone that carefully avoids the oversimplifications often found in scholarship on the Middle East and/or the Balkans. Rather than reducing the actors to primordial enemies playing out an inevitable struggle for power, he reinforces the notion that individual decisions contributed to the escalation and reduction of direct state violence on civilians and armed opponents alike.

Ultimately, what accounts for Ron's innovative and provocative conclusions is of central importance to how social scientists and historians will interpret and analyze events in a wide range of similar cases. This book, therefore, should be seen as the perfect study to introduce such an analysis as an instructional tool for policymakers as well as convincing scholarship that has important contributions to make to several disciplines.

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The Cham Bani of Vietnam

Ba Trung Phu

Introduction

Based on 1989 statistics, approximately 131,282 Cham live in Vietnam. They are the descendents of Champa, an Indian-Hindu kingdom that, centuries later, was heavily influenced by Arabic-Islamic culture. Buddhism also made its way into Champa, but was confined to the royal circle during the reign of King Indravarman II (c. 896-905). Historically, the Cham were divided along religious lines: Hindu and Muslim. The Muslim population is subdivided further between the Cham Banis and the mainstream (Sunni) Cham Islam. The Cham population is concentrated mainly in the lower-middle and southern parts of Vietnam. In the middle part, they live scattered in the Phan Rang and Phan Ri regions. In the southern and southwestern parts, they live in Tay Ninh, Chau Doc, An Giang, Ho Chi Minh City, Long Khanh, and Binh Phuoc cities. The Cham Banis and Cham Hindus only reside in Phan Rang and Phan Ri. There, the Cham Banis make up about one-half of the Cham population, while the remaining half is Cham Hindu. However, in the south and southwest, all of them follow mainstream Islam.

Islam Appears in Champa

According to Ed Huber, Islam entered Champa during the tenth century. He based this on a Chinese record: "There were many water-buffalos that lived on the mountain (in Yin Li). They (the buffalos) were not used to cultivate the land but as sacrificed objects to the gods. When the water-buffalo was killed, they invoked the name 'Allahu Akhar.'"[1]

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Aymonier found this paragraph in the record left by an anonymous historian of Champa:

> In the year of the mice, a man who attributed himself to Po Auloah (Allah) worked for betterment and perfection of Champa. But the people became upset. He then submitted himself wholly to God, migrated to live in the holy land of Mecca. Later, he returned to the kingdom in the reign of the king whose name is Ouloah (Allah) that ruled the land from 1000 to 1036.[2]

This paragraph was carved, along with its Sanskrit translation, on two stones found by an archaeologist working along the coast of middle Vietnam. One stone was dated 1039, and the other between 1025-35. The writings on both stones mentioned Muslims, but indicated that they were foreigners who stayed along the coast in the middle of present-day Vietnam. Most of them were traders and builders who formed their own communities with a spiritual leader and a man who led the prayers, whom they called *emüm* (imam). Based on archaeological artifacts and historical data, some historians have concluded that Islam entered Champa perhaps as early as the tenth century.

The Cham Bani

Those Cham who follow mainstream Islam are concentrated in south and southwestern Vietnam form their own *palei* (villages), each of which must have at least a *sang mügik* (mosque), where all activities, whether social or political, are conducted. Actually, the term *sang mügik* is used by both the Cham Bani and the Cham Islam for their place of worship. The life and daily activities of the Cham Islam are guided by the *Qur'ün* (Qur'an) and its teachings. Other decisions in daily life are made by the *ong kaem* (*ḥākim*), a local spiritual leader who chairs every meeting in the *sang mügik* or resolves disputes between Muslims in the village. On the other hand, all laypeople who belong to the Cham Bani communities live freely outside the realm of orthodox Islam, for all religious responsibility rests squarely upon the *acars* (priests), who are responsible for safeguarding the religion from corruption and praying on the community's behalf.

Religious Creeds

God, known among them as *Po Auloah*, is considered to be the One God (Allah) of the Muslims. They believe in the angels, the Qur'an, the saints (viz., the Forty Imams), and the deities (*yang*). Their version of the Qur'an is incomplete, for it does not contain all 114 surahs; rather, it is a collection of different surahs. No one knows what happened to the rest of them, but his-

tory shows that the Cham have survived many centuries of war and have had virtually no contact with the outside world, especially the Muslim world, since the late fifteenth century. The Bani priests relied on their memory to write down the surahs, after their final defeat by the Vietnamese, with instructions in the Cham Sanskrit-based script on how to use them.

The Bani *Qur'ün* consists of the short surahs (surahs 96-114) handwritten in the Kufic style; other surahs are either fragmented or non-existent. So when the *acars* spend time mastering the *Qur'ün,* they try to understand how each surah or verse is applied to a particular occasion, such as performing the religious duties associated with burials, weddings, prayer, and sermons, or to master such secular knowledge as the calendar or the lunar cycle in order to determine the beginning and end of Ramadan.

Prophet Muhammad, whom the Bani call *Mbi Muhammad* (Nabi Muhammad), is a rather vague figure. They do not know what country he came from or to which race he belonged. All they know is that he is the man whom *Po Auloah* sent. Also interesting is that they call Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, *Mbi Ali*, meaning that Prophet Muhammad and Ali are on the same level. The Bani sermons, handed down for many generations, mention Fatimah next to Ali, but they do not know who she is.

Religious Hierarchy

The religious life of the Bani communities rests upon the circle of male *acars,* who are responsible for performing all religious duties on the community's behalf. Their structure consists of several layers, from the lowest to the highest rank, as follows: *acar*, *madin* or *madintan*, *tip* or *ktip* (one who gives the *khuṭbah*), *emüm* or *emümtan*, and *po gru* (honorable guru). Before entering into this circle, each family's maternal line[3] chooses one, two, or maybe more individuals (this depends upon the family's size).

Before a candidate can become an *acar*, he must take a ritual bath (*ghusl*), shave his head and wear a white cloak, and spend several months memorizing the *Qur'ün* passed down through the generations in order to learn the necessary religious rituals. The *Qur'ün* was handcopied word-for-word by their forefathers and recited; however, due to their living in isolation for so many generations, the *acars* do not understand what the scriptures say. Nevertheless, they consider it a holy book that cannot be abused or disrespected in any way. The *acars* are bound by the hierarchy of the priesthood order. Any *acar* who violates the religious creeds is asked to make atonement (*ngap bah* [*tawbah*]) for them in front of *Po Auloah*). These are the general rules and characteristics of the Bani's priesthood circle.

Each layer of the hierarchy has a different set of rituals to perform. The *acars*, the first tier, divide the laypeople from the priesthood. Once they enter this layer, they are assigned to perform *jamak* (*jum`ah*) and *talavi* (*tarāwīḥ*). *Talavi* is performed only during Ramadan. When an *acar* becomes a *madin*, he is called a *madintan*. Those who belong to this tier are responsible for organizing and orchestrating all rituals in the *sang mügik* and for teaching the *Qur'ün* to the children. Each order has only one *tip*, and there is only one order per village. This official also gives the Friday *khuṭbah*, for it is not allowed to be given at home.

The *acars* have to spend from ten to fifteen years studying and mastering the *Qur'ün* and many rituals in order to become an *emüm*. When a *tip* becomes an *emüm*, he is called *emümtan*. An *emüm* is considered a master. Some of them are elevated to the status of an *emüm pak pluh* (the Forty Imams) who not only master many disciplines but are also considered outstanding people and, therefore, earn the people's trust in their fields. Once selected to become an *emüm pak pluh*, many *po grus* and *emüms* from different villages are invited, before a special ceremony, to present this candidate to the Forty Imams, who are part of the Bani's legendary history. No one knows who they are any more. Since this event does not occur very often, the Cham Bani regard it as a very special event that every low and high *acar* from near and far-away villages comes to attend.

Each village can have one or two *po grus*, depending upon the population, and they are nominated and selected by the *acars* and the villagers. He runs the *sang mügik*, decides important dates (e.g., when Ramadan and the Eids start), and settles disputes in religious or personal matters as well as between families.

Advancing between Tiers

The *acars* advance to the next tier through a specific procedure. Looking at the *acar* order carefully, one notices that there are two stations that have only one priest: the *gru* and the *tip* offices. Only one individual can hold this office at a given time. So, the priests can only advance when either of these two offices becomes vacant. For example, an *emüm* can become a *gru* only when the *po gru* passes away. In this case, the most senior *emüm* will hold the office. Likewise, a *madin* can become a *tip* only when the latter is promoted to an *emüm*. Here, the interesting point is that when the *tip* is advanced, it ripples through the two lower tiers, meaning that one of the *madins* will move up to take the *tip's* office and one of the *acars* will advance to the *madin's* office. The *tip* is promoted on Eid al-Fitr, the last

day of Ramadan. When this happens, a ceremony is held at the *sang mügik* both for the candidates and with the spouses of the *tip*, the *madin*, and the *acar*. In normal operation mode, each *sang mügik* nominates three different groups (viz., the *emüm din* [assistant imam]), the *tip* [*khaṭīb*], and the *emüm* [imam] for a three-year period of service to the community. This period also serves as a trial period for those who desire to be promoted to a higher rank.

The Cham Bani are not bound by orthodox Islam's religious creeds as are the Cham Islam, who are mainstream Sunni Muslims. The Cham Islam believe in Allah and that Muhammad is His messenger, pray five times a day, attend the Friday prayer at the mosque, pay zakat, and perform hajj at least once in a lifetime. Making the pilgrimage to Makkah is a must for those who have the means. In the Southeast Asian tradition, those who came back from the hajj are called *ḥājji*, which signifies that they have fulfilled this pillar.

The Cham Bani laypeople, on the other hand, perform none of these rituals because they believe that their representative *acar* in the religious order has already fulfilled them for the community. Moreover, a long-standing tradition handed down through the generations mandates that each family's maternal line dedicate their own man in the line of religion to perform all religious duties and to intercede for them with *Po Auloah*. As a result, the Cham Bani laypeople are not bound by the five pillars of Islam. The priests do not have to make the pilgrimage to Makkah, and instead of paying zakat in the form of distributing money to the poor, the Cham Bani community contributes rice, a very common commodity in Vietnam, to the *acars* in their own family line.

For the Cham Islam, the mosque is also a place for socializing, settling disputes, performing such religious ceremonies as weddings, and praying for blessing. On the contrary, the Cham Bani *sang mügik* is open only during Ramadan and for such important events as Friday prayers.

The Ramadan Fast

For mainstream Muslims, the Ramadan fast is one of Islam's five pillars and is compulsory for each Muslim who can fast. Every year, Ramadan provides a boost in spiritual renewal. In southern and southwestern Vietnam, the Cham Islam begin and end their fast based on a calendar created by Haji Isahat.[4] This calendar shows all of the important religious events with cross-references to the lunar and solar cycles to make it easy to follow.

When Ramadan comes, Muslims celebrate two occasions: one before and another one after Ramadan (Eid al-Fitr). Ramadan has a special mean-

ing in their lives. Interestingly, for both the Cham Muslims and the Muslims in Southeast Asia in general, during this month daily activities almost come to a stop during the day but come alive during the night.

The Cham Bani call Ramadan *Ramüvan.* Considering it more like a month of worshiping *Po Auloah,* they dedicate their sincerity to the Forty Imams rather than to fasting. During this month, every *acar* must be present in the *sang mügik.* Normally, devout orthodox Muslims stay in the mosque for the last ten days (*i`tikāf*); however, the *acars* must stay inside the whole month. Before *Ramüvan* starts, the Bani priests in every tier must perform the *ngap bah* (*tawbah*) ceremony, and every house in the village must perform the cleansing ceremony. Each ceremony has its own merits and procedures, which are, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this article. The *acar* must perform his own *ngap bah* ceremony and then go from house to house to perform the cleansing ritual for the layman families. After that, they stay in the *sang mügik.* Every afternoon during this month, the *acar's* family brings food for them to break their fast. Other family members contribute rice to support the *acar's* family while he remains inside.

Cham Bani tradition holds four days during *Ramüvan* in high esteem: the first, the fifteenth (full moon), the twentieth, and the thirtieth (the last day). On these four occasions, every family in the village brings rice and sweets to the *sang mügik* for the *acars* and worships there to get a blessing for their family. Unlike the Cham Islam, who go home after *tarāwīḥ*, the Cham Bani remain in the *sang mügik* during the night because it houses all the village's *acars.* They also visit it wearing white garments to invoke blessings from *Po Auloah.*

During this month, the Cham Hindu priests, called *ong sak* and *ong seh* (high priests), also visit the Cham Bani *acars.* This tradition is observed by both groups of Cham to maintain harmony within Champa. The Cham Hindu priests confess that *Po Auloah* is the Supreme Being and pray to Him for His blessing. On special nights called *ong troon muk troon* (Ramadan 27), some Cham Hindus bring fruits and sweets to the *sang mügik* to offer to *Po Auloah* and pray along with Cham Bani *acars.* Perhaps such a mixture of two very different religions coming together in the house of God only exists in the Cham Bani community.

Building the Sang Mügik

Oral transmissions from many village elders say that prior to the twentieth century, all *sang mügiks* were built with unique specifications: the roof had to be made of fine long grass from the mountain, the walls with fine bamboo,

and the floor with plain dirt. These items may have had symbolic meanings, but no one knows them any more. In front of the entrance, there were seven plain rocks and a container for the water used by the *acars* to make ablution (*wuḍū'*).

These days, however, all of these structures are built and fortified with a cement floor, a brick wall, and a tile roof. They do not have a dome or a dome-like shape like mosques throughout the world. However, they are all oriented toward Makkah so that the *acars* can face the holy city during their prayers. At the end of western wall, there is a canopy supported by four posts. This is the place where the *tip* stands up to give the Friday sermon. They call this place the *mimbar*, just as the orthodox Muslims do. The main activities carried out in the *sang mügik* occur during Ramadan and on some special Fridays called *sut yeng* (rotated Friday) or *zam-at* (*jum`at*).[5] The celebration of *wa-ha* (Eid al-Adha) has its own special place among the Cham Bani, not like the Muslims. For this event, the *acars* fast on the first day of Dhū al-Ḥijjah at home. On the tenth day, all *acars* pray at the *sang mügik*, just like the Muslims. The Cham Bani do not perform *qurbān* (the sacrifice) on Eid al-Adha, but every family prepares sweet dishes and takes them to the *sang mügik* for the *acars* to enjoy.

Conclusion

The Cham Bani have preserved their traditional Islamic faith and mixed it with local customs and traditions, thereby creating a unique variety of Islamic beliefs and rituals. The facts that they still pray facing Makkah, profess *Po Auloah* (Allah), and observe many Islamic events prove that Islam entered Champa but gradually changed to adapt to the surrounding environment and culture. Islam became a mix of traditional beliefs associated with the region's pre-Islamic Hindu deities and saints. Aa a result, Islam among the Cham Bani of Vietnam has become a unique religion, one very unlike the mainstream Sunni Islam that we see in Southeast Asia and the larger Islamic world.

Endnotes

1. E. Huber, "Note sur un témoignage de l'islamisation du Campa," *Annales des Song* (1903).
2. Aymonier, *Le Cambodge* (Paris: 1904), T.11, page 153
3. Cham society is matrilinear.
4. Haji Isahat is from Chau Doc, the Cham religious center, and might have graduated from the local university of religious education. He traveled to Malaysia

Sut yeng (rotated Friday) is done once every three years in a Cham Bani community. When the cycle comes, the *acars* in every village gather on Friday at one village and then rotate to another until all villages have been covered. Since the Cham Banis in the Phan Rang area are divided into seven villages, there are seven rotations. This is a fun event, because every village has a chance to host *acars* from other villages. The purposes of *sut yeng* are to promote harmony among the Cham Bani, deal with new issues that arose during the last three years, and plan for the next three years. There is an open discussion among the *acars* as well as the *ong sak* and the *ong sek* from the Cham Hindu communities [translator's note].

Cham Bani of Phuoc Nhung village, Ninh Thuan province, Vietnam, performing *talavi tarāwīḥ* prayer) during Ramadan 1993. (Photo: Courtesy of Jay Willoughby)

A Rumor of Anger: Understanding Muslims' Voices in the Context of "Pure War"

Chaiwat Satha-Anand

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to understand "Muslims' voices" at the advent of the twenty-first century, especially the angry tone within. I would argue that such anger could be construed by situating the voices in the context of "pure war" constituted by terrorism used by different groups in the name of Islam, as well as state violence used in the name of security and order at the expense of rights and democracy. When the state exercises more control over its population through modern technology, which renders private space almost obsolete, rumors are used to offset its powerful gaze. Rumors about violence in the context of pure war, in turn, engender among Muslims some kinds of negative group cohesion that is fertile ground for anger directed against "the others," as evidenced in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

Introduction

Before Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis, with Islam playing the pivotal role, captured the global imagination of academics and policymakers in 1993, there was Bernard Lewis' seminal essay on "The Roots of Muslim Rage," in *The Atlantic Monthly* (September 1990). In his later work (an expansion of the essay), he pointed out that things had indeed gone badly wrong in the lands of Islam. Muslims have become poor, weak, and ignorant. And in his analysis, it was how the questions are raised about these "wrongs" that would, by and large, determine the Muslim world's future: "Who did this to us?" and "What did we do wrong?"

It is interesting to note, however, that these two questions are not mutually exclusive. In fact, both questions will lead us through the complex road

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of the politics of Muslims' identity, where the notions of "self" and "others" will need to be underscored. Then, the path already taken will have to be reexamined to find out what went wrong. For some, it will lead to a choice between a return to "authentic Islam" or a move toward "secular society."[1] While searching for the "roots" of a public sentiment as well as the idea of "Muslim" as a monolithic entity are highly problematic, Lewis did address a most important political element: rage.

There are many ways to discuss the issues of Muslims' voices in today's world. I choose anger for two reasons. First, though often described merely as a wild emotion that disrupts social order as well as political dialogue, anger, as a political emotion, is indispensable because it could serve as the voice of the powerless questioning the dominant order. Order itself, some would argue, is rooted in the anger of middle-class professionals, whose claim to social status and power depends on their moralistic enforcement of the rule of technique justified by technical rationality.[2] Second, anger that exists in a context heightened by deadly conflicts could strongly reflect the relationship between self and others. Although each case differs, there have been signs in the past two years from Spain to England and from France to the Philippines, as well as in southern Thailand, that deadly conflicts involving Muslims have become more visible. In such contexts, anger proliferates.

In this paper, I argue that Muslims' anger, understood as voices influencing the future course of the world, could be better construed by raising three related questions: In what way is the present global context conducive to the rise of anger among Muslims? How does anger spread in such a context? And, finally, what does anger do to Muslim societies?

"The New Pure War" as an Anger-Producing Context

There have been 228 armed conflicts since World War II ended, and 118 since the cold war ended. Most of these have been fought within states. In 2004, in twenty-two locations around the world, there were thirty ongoing armed conflicts, defined as contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths per year and at least one party is the national government.[3]

But at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the face of war and violence has become more complicated. The context of global violence characterized by global terrorism, in itself perhaps a response to conditions of glaring injustice, and the state's violent responses have produced some unusual realities in political societies. First, since terrorism can attack anyone

at any time or place, it successfully robs a society of that precious sense of certainty that allows its members to continue their lives in a condition of normality. In this sense, both the present terror and the continuing war against it undermine the basic foundation of any political society, namely, a sense of certainty guaranteed by the state's normal functioning, the minimum of which is to protect its citizens' lives. Second, in the absence of normality fueled by fear and anger, the society that mourns the tragic fate of its victims is transformed into a society of victimizers.[4] The present violent conditions, I would argue, have turned the world into a state of pure war.

Two decades ago, theorist Paul Virilo suggested that the modern text of international danger is scripted by logistical experts in "the age of logistics," where all seemingly non-military social processes are "vectorized" in preparation for war.[5] Such logistical thinking preoccupies itself with avoiding full-scale global nuclear catastrophe, which allows other armed hostilities to continue as "interstate delinquencies" or "state terrorism." Thus, he argues that the modern politics of preoccupation with nuclear extermination amounts to a depoliticization of all other violent confrontations.[6]

But the present pure war, based on the threats of terrorism and counter-threats of state terrorism, is somewhat different. It is pure war in the sense that the whole society is mobilized militarily at all times in the name of fear. In the United States right now, there is a daily television notification of different-colored terrorist threat levels – not unlike weather announcements. Yet the continuing violence, such as the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or violence in southern Thailand, as well as the cultural violence that appears in the form of profiling a group of people as potential terrorists, as seen in the media, is not hidden. Instead, every armed hostility as well as all conflicts between governments and those who oppose them can be conveniently seen as figments in the war against terror imagination.

Depoliticization in this new pure war takes place not because conflicts and violent confrontations have been eclipsed by any grand catastrophe, but because they have been militarized and their discourse heavily securitized. Under such circumstances, political solutions are undermined (if not altogether absent), ordinary citizens' rights are sacrificed, and civil society groups that oppose the state are punished or silenced – at times summarily. The time when a political society has to live under the shadow of such pure war is the moment when anger can be produced quite easily.

Imagine the following scenario:

- Video cameras mounted on street corners and covert photography conducted from behind special slits cut into delivery vans or from the roofs

of buildings, or from helicopters in the sky covering political demonstrations and funerals.

- The visual appearance and dress of many residents in communities are registered and cross-referenced in extensive computer files accessed by police, army patrols, and their respective roadblocks.
- An informant (male, 32) who lived under the gaze of army video camera declared: "They know the patterns of your wallpaper and the color of your underwear!"
- Young males fourteen and older, the group most frequently stopped and searched on the street, have been known to return home and shower after being body-frisked in public by the security forces.

These scenarios could very well occur in Mindanao, southern Philippines. Those whose attire were profiled and bodies frisked by the soldiers could be young Muslims in southern Thailand. But actually, they were from Northern Ireland's County Tyrone (1978-80) and Belfast (1984-87; 1990-92). The appearance and attire of the residents in question were Catholic working class, as were the young Catholic males who felt so dirty that they had to return home to shower after being frisked by the soldiers.[7]

In the context of the new pure war, state authorities can ignore civil rights and cultural sensitivities in the name of preserving national security. At times, such activities are legitimized by specific laws designed to authorize the exercise of special power. Encountering Malay Muslims in southern Thailand, Thai soldiers, who are sent in from other regions and are rarely Muslim, often do not understand just how important cleanliness is to the poor villagers. For example, before 4 January 2004, the day when militants attacked the military camp in Narathiwat and stole more than 400 weapons, soldiers came to search Bagong Pitaya School in Nong Chik Pattani, southern Thailand, for weapons. From 9:00 am to 11:00 am, they used police dogs to search for suspects and illegal objects in the school. These dogs, wet with water, went everywhere. Baba Sa, the school's leader, said later:

> We lost our hearts. How could they do such a thing? Why did they trample on our dignity as Muslims? We were sad and angry. We thought, "They didn't trust us at all?" I tried my very best to be patient, but I couldn't help thinking this way. It has never happened. We don't despise the dogs, but we have to do what we were taught.[8]

In this case, everyone in the school had to clean the whole place seven times, including once using rare earth mixed with water, as required by the

Islamic injunction of cleaning after being contaminated by some kinds of *najis* (unclean things), such as dogs' saliva.

When the soldiers enter Malay Muslims' houses with their shoes on, which has happened time and again, anger rises because their houses are not merely a place to stay but also a sacred space for prayers. Therefore, they have to be sufficiently clean for just such a purpose. The soldiers not only step on the sacred space secured for daily praying, but also on the inhabitants' identity by showing no regard for their dignity as Muslims.[9] This is, perhaps, how anger could be produced in the context of the new pure war. How, then, could such anger be vented among Muslims facing this situation?

Rumors as Muslims' Evading Instruments

As is now common knowledge, violence in southern Thailand has intensified over the past two years, beginning with the 4 January 2004 attack on a military camp in Narathiwat, where four Thai Buddhist soldiers were killed and more than 400 firearms were stolen. For the past two years, from 4 January 2004 to 4 January 2006, there have been 2,676 casualties among civilians, government officials, and militants from violence in southern Thailand. Among these, 1,076 lost their lives.[10]

The government has tried different means to control this violence. In the opinion of some high-ranking military officers, this violence points to the weakening, if not the absence, of state power. Therefore, the military has to reestablish state power in this area and try to make its presence felt. One way of doing this is to strengthen its gazing power over the population. Songkhla's governor reported that the province has just received a special budget for 900 closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV) to record people's movement in public space to monitor potential acts of terror by phantom militants.[11]

Again, this is quite common in the context of the new pure war. For example, after two deadly Irish Republican Army bombings in London at the turn of the last decade, the British government set up so many CCTVs that an average Briton is scrutinized by some 300 cameras every day. Almost everyone is being observed in his/her daily life from getting on a bus to lining up at the bank and even driving around in London. While human rights advocates decry such a phenomenon, which has turned Britain into "the surveillance capital possibly of the world, certainly of Europe," not unlike the Orwellian Big Brother, others hail these cameras in the sky as "a kindly and watchful uncle or aunt."[12]

Within a circuit of "visual prosthetics" composed of surveillance cameras, helicopters flying over villages at night, the panoptic architecture of the inter-

rogation room at police stations, prisons in army camps, and aimed guns, political subjects are formed. These instruments of fatal vision can be divided into hardware and software technologies. The human gaze, subject to a high degree of spatial and temporal extension and electronic supplementation, must be placed among the latter. Due to its potential for violence, visual appropriation has become "a metonym for the dominance over others," for "power lies in the totalizing, engorged gaze over the politically prone body, and subjugation is encoded as exposure to this penetration."[13] How, then, can those subjugated by these "visual prosthetics" voice their resentment?

In late 2004, I was traveling alone in the three southern provinces speaking with local Muslims and Buddhists to get a feeling of how they lived under the recent violence. While having tea with some locals in a teashop in downtown Pattani one early afternoon, a man rushed inside and screamed in Malay. After listening carefully, it turned out that he was sharing a story of what had just happened "on the other side of town" when a young man was stopped by two local policemen: Failing to answer the policemen's questions satisfactorily, the youth was hit and his motorcycle was pushed down. The man's story immediately induced agreement from the audience. The fact that no one seemed to question its truth needs to be construed. Clearly, they must have heard something like this before, and so this only provided further evidence of how the authorities have always abused the locals.

Perhaps rumors, like the historical narratives outlined in Hayden White's *Tropics of Discourse* and *The Content of the Form*, or Roland Barthes' *Historical Discourse*, do have plots. These plots are not there to be discovered, but are for the participants who share the rumors to invent them. Rumors, therefore, are equally a fiction with imagined words and contents on the one hand, and events that are discovered on the other. A successful rumor is a story told in such a way that it fits a certain plot. Moreover, participants in a rumor – even listeners – are involved in the process of *emplotment* (White's term) when they impose a certain kind of order on seemingly confused or unrelated phenomena. *Emplotment* gives meaning to a set of events that take place chronologically and turns them into a related whole, at times with enough power to engender political change.[14] Once it assumes the character of a story, the rumor is ready to be told and retold.

Analyzing why rumors have become prevalent in the context of violence in Northern Ireland, Allen Feldman suggests that it is a form of resistance used by the locals to confront the cohabitation of the state and private life. There is a frisson here between the precision of the state's optics – the rationalization of political subjects by visual grids and archives – and rumor's imprecise, out-of-focus, and floating quality. Rumor, therefore, becomes a

vehicle for evading the rationalization of existence under state surveillance: "It is the very imprecision of rumor that drives it as a counternarrative against the electronic grid of the state's gaze."[15]

With imprecision as its major characteristic, rumor opens up possibilities for anyone involved, such that new episodes can be added and a modified story can instantly become another rumor and then travel with the speed of sound to all corners of the land. Once there, they can perform almost the exact function of replenishing the plot of how the Thai authorities have brutalized local Muslims. The question, then, is what does the spread of anger through rumors do to the Muslim societies of southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, or elsewhere in Europe in the context of pure war?

Anger and *Hyper-`aṣabīyah* in Muslim Societies

It is important to point out that anger, as a human emotion, is highly problematic and is regarded differently in different societies. For example, the Utku Eskimos of northern Canada consider anger as always inappropriate, since it is a sign of immaturity that makes its possessor appear infantile. On the other hand, Seneca's *On Anger* is full of stories of trivial provocations that arouse murderous responses. For the Romans, a truly manly man is extremely attached to his honor and therefore eager to get angry at any slight or damage. For both the Greeks and the Romans, anger is considered a pleasant emotion directed at the future, because of the pleasure of contemplating revenge.[16] But for the Muslims, anger is discouraged and those who restrain it are those who do good and therefore are loved by God:

> Hurry toward your Lord's forgiveness and a Garden as wide as the heavens and Earth prepared for the righteous, who give, both in prosperity and adversity, who restrain their anger and pardon people – God loves those who do good... (Qur'an, 3:133-34)[17]

But in the context of pure war and the ensuing rumors discussed above, one can argue that anger is prevalent among Muslims. Some would say that anger is needed to generate group feelings against objects of anger. Yet there are grounds for concern that anger might adversely affect Muslim societies.

In 1377, Ibn Khaldun wrote *Al-Muqaddimah*, his classic study on the general problems encountered in the philosophy of history and sociology. He pointed out that conditions affecting the nature of civilizations include savagery, sociability, and how one group achieves superiority over another and constructs group feelings.[18] This "group feeling" (*`aṣabīyah*) is at the core of

his understanding of society. For him, "only tribes held together by group feeling can live in the desert," because:

> [T]heir defence and protection are successful only if they are a closely knit group of common descent ... since everybody's affection for his family and his group is more important (than anything else). Compassion and affection for one's blood relations and relatives exist in human nature as something God put into the hearts of men.[19]

Using Ibn Khaldun's *`aṣabīyah* as the cornerstone of his analysis, Akbar S. Ahmad argues that during the twentieth century, the Muslim world suffered a breakdown of *`aṣabīyah* as a direct result of dramatic change. Two sets of conditions gave rise to this development: massive urbanization and demographic change due to a population explosion, as well as migration to the West, the increasing gap between rich and poor, widespread corruption, the low premium given to education, the identity crisis, and new seductive ideas that challenge traditional values. These conditions occured on a ground pregnant with past violence that has killed and displaced millions, split communities, and shattered families: the creation of Pakistan, the fight for/against Palestine/Israel, the revolution in Iran, civil wars in Algeria, and wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Central Asia. Sociopolitical decay that grows on the soil of cruel pasts and violent presents gives rise to a dangerous form of *`aṣabīyah*: *hyper-`aṣabīyah*. Ahmad concludes:

> With the collapse of *asabiyya* and the creation of *hyper-asabiyya*, neither *adl* (justice) nor *ihsan* (righteousness) is easy to attain, while society finds its expression through *fitna* (chaos) and *shar* (conflict).[20]

In other words, Muslims in societies facing these problems are angry, and it seems that Lewis might be right if the question often raised is "Who did this to us?" With an exaggerated feeling of group cohesion fostered by the present decay and past violence, anger is turned outward and group feeling is heightened. At a meeting of people seeking peaceful ways to end violence in southern Thailand, no local Muslim leaders appeared with their non-Muslim colleagues at a press conference to condemn the killing of an elderly Buddhist monk and two young temple boys inside a Buddhist temple in Pattani on 16 October 2005. When asked why they felt too uncomfortable to do so, they replied that there was not enough information about who was guilty. When I suggested that the condemnation was against the act itself, since it is wrong from a common ethical position and Islamic belief, I was met with silence, unlike what happens when the victims are Muslim. This is, perhaps,

a clear symptom of the rise of Ahmed's *hyper-`aṣabīyah*, which makes Muslims see primarily the sufferings of their own kind.

Conclusion: A Rumor of Anger as Reclaiming Compassion

In his *A Rumor of Angels*, Peter Berger points out that angels, those beings of light who witness the fullness of divine glory and appear as "signalizing" God's transcendence as well as His presence in the world, have become "rumors" and that we live in a situation where transcendence has been reduced to "rumors."[21] In this sense, rumor appears as a sign that the story shared as rumor has all but faded into oblivion. However, as discussed above, rumor could also be understood as a form of potent resistance against the increasing penetration of state power into private spheres. On the one hand, rumor signifies weakness waiting to disappear; on the other, it is a sign of strength when it becomes a weapon of choice for those who see the power of storytelling. Perhaps this is not the case of a rumor of anger as either a faint sign or a powerful expression. It could be both.

It is also important to point out that anger is an emotion. But it need not be construed merely as senseless. Martha Nussbaum, for example, maintains that emotions in general could be understood as judgments of value.[22] In such a case, anger involves judgments about important things at a moment when incompleteness is acknowledged before parts of the world beyond one's control. Taken together, a rumor of Muslims' anger could be seen as a way in which voices of resistance as a potent power, crucial for moral judgments, are expressed. To strengthen the moral quality of anger among Muslims is to underscore the need to voice anger when non-Muslims become victims of violence and injustice, realizing that it is in line with the inclusivistic Islamic message that Islam, as stated in Qur'an 3:96, exists to benefit humanity.

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Fighting for Uyghur Rights

Rebiya Kadeer

I begin my brief story in the 1960s, when many Uyghur (also spelled "Uygur" and "Uighur") people, including myself, struggled against starvation. The already difficult lives of Uyghurs living in East Turkestan[1] (also known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region [XUAR]) under Chinese government rule became much worse during the Cultural Revolution. Everything was rationed and controlled by the government and food was in very short supply. There was no private enterprise. Trying to find any way I could to alleviate the poverty we were suffering, I started to make and sell children's clothes. I also took in laundry to earn some money. From there, I began to travel to different cities (first within East Turkestan and later throughout China) buying fabrics and garments and selling them on the street. Of course, this was not allowed under the communist system, and many times the Chinese police confiscated all of my goods and charged me with "taking the road of the capitalists." Nor was it usual for a woman to travel in the region. I endured many hardships and indignities, but I was determined to care for my children and improve my life.

During the 1980s, as China began its economic reforms, I was able to set up a small store to do business in Urumchi, the capital of East Turkestan, and gradually started to prosper. I always tried to encourage the other Uyghur street sellers and merchants as well. In March 1987, I established the "Eighth of March" market (named in honor of International Women's Day), a covered marketplace that housed ninety-three stores and stands. In 1989, I built a seven-story apartment building, and a few years later I built the Rebiya Kadeer Department Store in downtown Urumchi. The Uyghur street vendors could come and sell their goods in my store. At some point in my struggle for economic independence, I became one of the ten richest people in China, for my business eventually grew into a multi-million dollar trading company.

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During the 1990s, as Uyghur cities were growing, our region became the home of thousands of Han Chinese brought in by the government to settle in the XUAR. But the Uyghurs were not prospering, and I was especially concerned about the situation of Uyghur women. I traveled constantly for my business and observed everywhere how poor my people were, as well as the general lack of education and opportunities to improve their lives. Women were the hardest hit. I asked the National Women's Association for help to improve Uyghur women's lives, for my economic success gave me access to Chinese governmental bodies. But I got nowhere. I always helped out single families or donated money for schools, but it was not enough.

So, on 15 December 1997, along with thirty-five other Uyghur women, I established the "Thousand Mothers Movement." My goal was to promote women's education and increase their economic activities, thereby promoting and enabling their active involvement in civil society. Once women became successful, I thought, they could, in turn, help other women.

At the first public meeting, I was hoping that at least fifty women would show up. Instead, 2,000 women came! I told the women that day that we owed it to our children, we owed it to our land, and we owed it to ourselves, each one of us, to take on the task of empowering women. More than 1,000 women ultimately invested their money in the organization. We obtained official registration papers and a business license. For the inauguration day, the government sent its most prominent woman to cut the ribbon – Ms. Maynur Kasim, head of the XUAR Women's Association, director of the Regional Congress, and vice chairwoman of the National Women's Association.

Inexplicably, a mere two months later, Beijing shut down the movement and froze our bank account. We had no idea what kind of mistake we had made, but it was clear that Beijing did not approve of what we were doing: taking our own initiative to empower ourselves. There was nothing to do but for me to use my own money to pay back the women who had invested their funds in the project and the dream.

About the time that I was launching the Thousand Mothers Movement, others were looking for ways to resolve the moral crisis that the Uyghurs were facing throughout East Turkestan. In Ili region, people revived a Uyghur cultural event called *mashrap,* during which the actors/presenters preached to the people to quit drinking and taking drugs, and go to the mosques and help others. They attempted to revive the moral values through religion. But in early 1997, Beijing charged the organizers with conducting illegal religious activities and began to arrest both the organizers and the attendees. This led to the now infamous (for Uyghurs) "Ghulja massacre."

On 5 February 1997, in Ghulja city in Ili, Uygurs held a peaceful demonstration to demand the release of those who had been detained for their involvement in the *mashraps* and to call for human rights, democracy, and religious freedom. In response, fully armed paramilitaries (*wuzhuan jincha*) were dispatched to crush the protest. They opened fire on the crowd, killed several hundred Uyghurs, and then arrested all of the protesters. The authorities claimed that no one had been killed.

After the Ghulja massacre, Beijing strictly monitored and controlled the activities of mosques and clergy all over East Turkestan. The most popular clergy were removed or arrested, and then replaced with others, who had been indoctrinated by the government. Minors were openly forbidden to go to mosques, and Uyghur high school and college students were suspended if they were caught observing their religion (praying). Those Uyghurs who organized underground religious schools were arrested. In 1998, for example, the government shut down sixty-five religious schools in the Hotan region and sixty-three in the Aksu region, all of which had been operating since 1990. The organizers were arrested. As a result of China's strict religious control and the destruction of their moral values, many Uyghurs fell into drug use and other destructive behavior. In Ili, more than 80 percent of those with HIV/AIDs are Uyghurs.

Normally, religion plays an important role in eradicating people's moral crises by helping them live in harmony with themselves and with each other. In short, religion teaches people the best way of life and offers moral support when they are depressed or unhappy. Without it, the young people could not find a way out of their problems. I felt that I had to speak out for the demoralized Uyghur people.

As stated earlier, my economic success had earned me access to certain government offices. Between 1987 and 1996, I received eighteen awards for paying my taxes on time and was a member of the XUAR Peoples Congress (1987-1992). Later on, I was made a member of China's Political Consultative Conference, a high honor for an ethnic minority. But in 1997, at the annual session of the National People's Congress, I spoke out about the Uyghurs' economic, educational, and cultural rights. Although I had raised these issues before, this was the first time I had done so nationally. I was rewarded by being stripped of all my official titles and medals, and forbidden to travel abroad. I then decided to raise the issue internationally.

On 11 August 1999, I decided to meet members of an American congressional delegation to explain my people's situation. But I was arrested on my way to the hotel. I was carrying a letter in which I made ten demands of Washington. For this act, I was sentenced to eight years in prison for reveal-

ing so-called "state secrets." I spent six years of my sentence in prison. Beijing harassed my businesses after my arrest by suddenly cutting off the power, shutting down the water, adding taxes, and disrupting the normal business of the restaurants I owned as well as my relations with other business partners and banks. My business suffered huge economic losses.

Thanks to sustained international pressure, especially from human rights groups and the American government, Beijing released me for "medical reasons" and allowed me to come to this country. I arrived in Washington, DC, on 17 March 2005, and since then have been breathing the air of freedom. Just before my release, a Chinese foreign ministry official warned me: "If you engage in any activity that makes China look bad, and if you associate with Uyghur political activists, your children and your business will be finished in an unimaginable way." But from the day I landed in this democratic country, I have not stopped campaigning for the rights of the long-suffering Uyghur people. If it makes China look bad, I cannot help it.

The Chinese did not take long to make good on their threat. Just days after I testified before Congress for the first time and after giving an interview to a Norwegian media conference, 300 armed police raided my company in Urumchi. They confiscated every single official document, including contracts, tax papers, and other documents. The material filled fifteen bags. They arrested the director and secretary of the company a few days later, and my children were put under house arrest for two weeks.

In August 2005, the XUAR's party secretary held a press conference in Beijing in which he accused me of colluding with foreign terrorist forces to plan a terrorist attack on China's National Day (October 1st). The XUAR public security bureau then established Unit No. 307 to monitor my family members and my trading company's staff and activities. Since then, my sons have frequently been called into the office for questioning.

Last fall, I visited nine European countries and met with high-level officials to brief them on the human rights violations against my people. I have testified for six congressional hearings and have founded my own organization, the International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation, to carry on my work. In May 2006, I was elected president of the Uyghur-American Association.

On 29 May 2006, when another American delegation visited Urumchi, the Chinese police detained three of my eleven children: Alim (31), Ablikim (33), and Roshangul (38). My son Kahar (38) was brought from Aksu city to Urumchi two weeks later. All three of my sons were formally charged, and my daughter Roshangul and brother Mahmet were put under house arrest.

They charged my son Kahar with tax evasion, Ablikim with subversion, and Alim with tax evasion and trying to "split the motherland." My business and property have been confiscated. In other words, the government has kept its promise of finishing my business and children.

Before I came to the government's attention, Beijing had categorized my husband, Sidiq Rouzi, as a dissident, since he was – and remains – a Uyghur intellectual who continues to criticize Chinese policies toward Xinjiang in his many writings. After spending ten years in jail, he came to the United States in 1996. Five of my younger children were able to join him two years later. After he criticized China's treatment of our people on Radio Free Asia, the government pressured me to divorce him. I refused to do so.

I love all of my children. I know they are suffering greatly in prison. I want them to be happy and live a normal life. But at the same time, I cannot stand to see the suffering of my people any longer, because they all deserve human rights, religious freedom, and democracy. Moreover, they deserve to live without fear.

Struggling for the human rights of the Uyghur people is not a crime. I will continue to raise these issues with governments, international bodies, and human rights organizations. And I know that all freedom-loving people will support me and the cause of the Uyghurs, so that they may gain their freedom and their human rights.

Endnote

1. "East Turkestan" is the term used by Uyghurs to denote the geographical region where the majority of them live. Its current political designation is the "Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region" (XUAR) or just "Xinjiang."

Terrorism, Geopolitics, and Multinational Security Cooperation in Central Asia

On 22-24 February 2006, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) held this conference on the complex security environment of Central Asia as the region continues to struggle with the phenomena of terrorism and religious extremism, poverty and corruption, political instability and authoritarian governance, as well as great power (China, Russia, and the United States) suspicion and rivalry. These challenges are not uniquely Central Asian, but the region seems to be particularly vulnerable to them as its young nations are undergoing a significant political, social, and economic transformation. How the region copes with these issues will extend important lessons to the world as a whole.

This forum examined the trilemma posed for Central Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region. First, for the war on terror in the region to be successful, it must evolve into well-implemented stabilization and reconstruction efforts as well as dramatic improvements in governance and human rights. Second, no country on its own can alter the situation in Central Asia, for such an effort requires cooperation between all of the major powers and stakeholders in the region (India, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey). The magnitude of the problem of terrorism, which affects most if not all countries in the region, should preclude another variation of the Great Game. Finally, while the number of regional organizations and security forums in Central Asia has been growing, the low degree of coordination among them triggers counterproductive rivalries and plays into the hands of extremist elements. Since terror knows no borders, what happens in Central Asia significantly impacts developments elsewhere.

Although the counterterrorist effort in Central Asia has successfully marginalized the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the localization of the terrorist threat means that new autonomous extremist cells continue to emerge in Central Asia. The sources of proliferation of radical Islam can be found in socio-economic deprivation, widespread corruption, and political authoritarian-

ism. The only efficient way to successfully eliminate the extremist threat in Central Asia is through a combination of dramatic political, economic, and social change. As for the struggle's military component, enhancing Central Asia's counterterrorism capacity should be the priority.

All Central Asian states are experiencing an Islamization of their societies and political activities. After decades of forced Soviet-style secularization, desecularization and a subsequent Islamization are seen by the populace as a progressive, democratic, and inevitable process. Ruling elites sense and acknowledge this trend; but instead of channeling it into a broader democratic process, they are attempting to manipulate and tightly control the Islamic clergy. Suppression tactics work in the short-term, as evidenced by the decline of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's activities. Much more problematic, however, is the long-term containment of an organization such as the non-violent Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which is also aspiring to create an Islamic state in Central Asia. Hizb-ut-Tahrir's growing popularity all over Central Asia is, in many ways, an expression of popular protest against corrupt governments.

While there is no way to be certain whether Islamization will become more balanced or increasingly radical in Central Asia, it is important not to overreact to the rise of Islam and ignore the role of culture, ethnicity, and nationalism. The reality of power, assuming that Islamic parties do gain power in more of the Central Asian states, has the potential to change radicals as they become preoccupied with the socioeconomic issues that predominate in the actual politics of ruling. Additionally, Islamic radicalism is less interesting to national majorities, who are concerned with establishing the state's identity, than to national minorities, who are drawn to the social justice platform. Helping and facilitating the progressive and inclusive formation of the region's nation states seems to be a reliable way of minimizing the political effects of Islam's rise.

There was a consensus among the presenters that the great powers' growing presence in Central Asia should not lead to a new version of the Great Game. This task remains complicated, however, not only because the great powers continue to treat each other with suspicion, but also because the Central Asian states are, at times, willing to manipulate the great powers against each other. Excessive geopolitics was defined as damaging to long-term developments in Central Asia. Therefore, the great powers need to accommodate each other in the region rather than focus on zero-sum tactics.

The complementarity of the great powers' role should be emphasized and better promoted. Russia's historical ties to the region connect it with the

European tradition and also serve as a conduit for much of the region's energy. China's economic influence contributes to development and modernization as well as to closer relations with the Asia-Pacific. India offers an Asian example of combining the democratic tradition, religious freedom, and economic dynamism. The American presence helps strengthen the sovereignty of those Central Asian republics that remain wary of powerful neighbors and makes them more visible in the international arena. Its democratization effort is welcome, but it must proceed incrementally and be tuned to domestic realities within each country. At the same time, American support for human rights needs to be more consistent to avoid setbacks, like in Uzbekistan. In principle, Central Asian states recognize the need for multinational cooperation but remain somewhat uncomfortable about rapid movement in that direction.

Presenters at the conference were Baktybek Abdrisaev (Utah Valley University), Ehsan Ahrari (Strategic Paradigms, Washington, DC), Rouben Azizian (APCSS), Sanjay Chaturvedi (Panjab University), Jon Chicky (U.S. Department of Defense), Elizabeth Van Wie Davis (APCSS), Jim DeHart (U.S. Department of State), Feng Shaolei (East China Normal University), Fu Jen-Kun (Ching Yun University), Roger Kangas (Marshall Center, Germany), Alisher Khamidov (The Johns Hopkins University), Fatima Kukeyeva (Al-Farabi Kazakh National University), Alexey Malashenko (Carnegie Moscow Center), Robert T. Moeller (U.S. Central Command), Yury Morozov (Center for Military-Strategic Studies, Moscow), Askar Nursha (Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies), Thomas W. Simons, Jr. (Harvard University), Nadia Usaeva (Radio Free Asia), Shi Ze (China Institute of International Studies) Sohail Zaidi (Command & Staff College, Quetta), and Irina Zvyagelskaya (Center for Strategic and Political Studies, Moscow).

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Islam and Bioethics: Concerns, Challenges, and Responses

On 27-28 March 2006, Pennsylvania State University hosted an international conference on "Islam and Bioethics: Concerns, Challenges, and Responses." Cosponsored by several academic units in the College of Liberal Arts, the conference brought in historians, health care professionals, theologians, and

social scientists from ten different countries. Twenty-four papers were presented, along with Maren Grainger-Monsen's documentary about an Afghani immigrant seeking cancer treatment in California.

After opening remarks by Susan Welch (dean, College of Liberal Arts) and Nancy Tuana (director, Rock Ethics Institute), panelists analyzed "Critical Perspectives on Islamic Medical Ethics." Hamada Hamid's (New York University Medical School) "Negotiating Autonomy and Religion in the Clinical Setting: Case Studies of American Muslim Doctors and Patients," showed that few doctors explore the role of religion in a patient's decision-making process. She suggested that they rethink this practice.

Hassan Bella (College of Medicine, King Faisal University, Dammam) spoke on "Islamic Medical Ethics: What and How to Teach." His survey, conducted in Saudi Arabia among medical practitioners, revealed that most practitioners approved of courses on Islamic ethics but did not know if such courses would improve the doctor-patient relationship. Sherine Hamdy's (Brown University) "Bodies That Belong to God: Organ Transplants and Muslim Ethics in Egypt" maintained that one cannot easily classify transplant patients' arguments as "religious" or "secular," for religious values are fused together with a patient's social, political, and/or economic concerns.

The second panel, "Ethical Decision-Making in Local and International Contexts," provoked a great deal of discussion. Susi Krehbiel (Brown University) led off with "'Women Do What They Want': Islam and Family Planning in Tanzania." This ethnographic study was followed by Abul Fadl Mohsin Ebrahim's (KwaZulu University, Durban) "Human Rights and Rights of the Unborn." Although Islamic law is commonly perceived as antagonistic to the UN's charter on human rights, Ebrahim argues that both may be used to protect those who can and cannot fight for their right to dignity, including the foetus. Thomas Eich (Bochum University) asserted in "The Process of Decision Making among Contemporary Muslim Religious Scholars in the Case of 'Surplus' Embryos" that decisions reached by international Muslim councils were heavily influenced by local politics and contentious decisions in such countries as Germany and Australia.

The afternoon panel, "The Fetus and the Value of Fetal Life," focused on specific issues raised by artificial reproductive technologies (ARTs). Vardit Rispler-Chaim (Haifa University) presented "Contemporary Muftis between Bioethics and Social Reality: Pre-Selection of the Sex of a Fetus as Paradigm." After summarizing social customs and religious literature from around the world, she claimed that muftis generally favor pre-selection techniques and suggested that their reasoning is guided by a general social pref-

erence in the absence of clear religious indications. Hamza Eskandarani's (King Faisal University, Dammam) "Ethical and Legal Implications in ARTs: Perspective Analysis of the GCC Countries" examined the effectiveness of government legislation in establishing guidelines for ARTs in the region. He proposed implementing clearer and more structured guidelines (following Islamic principles), thereby creating more uniform legislation.

The day's final panel, "Comparative Perspectives on the Nature of Islamic Ethics," featured Martin Goetz (Basel University) and Manfred Sing (Freiburg University), both of whom spoke on "The Structural Similarity of Islamic and Western Bioethical Discourses." They examined Islamic and western bioethical discourses, focusing on how each one defines and understands dilemmas, reaches consensus, and proposes legitimate solutions. While Islamic and western discourses differ in their language, use of authority, and political and juridical framework, they nevertheless share a common process of identifying legitimizing authority and building bridges between authorities and ethical problems.

The next two papers looked at end-of-life issues. Shabbir Alibhai (University of Toronto) and Michael Gordon (University of Toronto) presented "A Comparative Analysis of Islamic and Jewish End-of-life Ethics: A Case-Based Approach." They discovered many similarities on questions concerning illness and the end of life, including seeing the believer as a "responsible steward" of his/her body and upholding people's responsibility to reduce an individual's suffering. Stef van den Branden (Interdisciplinary Centre for Religious Studies, Leuven) discussed "Medication and God at Interplay: End of Life Decision Making in Moroccan Migrants Living in Antwerp, Flanders, Belgium," based on his interviews with thirty elderly Moroccan men living in Antwerp.

The next day began with a fascinating panel on "Ethical Decisions in Historical Context." Samar Farage's (Pennsylvania State University) "Medical Ethics and the Pulse in the Galenic-Islamic Medieval Tradition" asserted that modern scientific medicine has so distanced itself from the Galenic-Islamic tradition of an elaborate and intimate doctor-patient relationship that today's norm is one of minimal contact and almost nonexistent personal trust. Justin Stearns (Middlebury College) presented "Enduring the Plague: Ethical Behaviour in the Fatwas of an 8th/14th-Century Mufti and Theologian," in which he compared Ibn al-Khatib's and Ibn Lubb's commentaries on Islamic ethics during a widespread outbreak of the bubonic plague.

The next two panels analyzed clinical issues. First, Hassan Shanawani (University of Michigan) and Mohammed Hassan Khalil (University of

Michigan) examined "Reporting on 'Islamic Bioethics' in the Medical Literature: Where Are the Experts?" Their survey of articles available on MEDLINE revealed that scholars usually look for one monolithic view to represent Islam, thereby ignoring the complex debate within the Islamic tradition itself and the varying (at times contentious) viewpoints of Islamic legal scholars. Tahareh Mosavi's (Concordia University, Montréal) "Disability and Bioethics in Iran: The Religious Beliefs of the Parents and Their Decision To Continue or Stop Treatment of the Children with Cerebral Palsy" presented the results of her research in Iran. Abd al-Hakim Bishawi (Harvard Medical School, Dubai) spoke on "Medical Ethics: Health Science Librarians Are Involved as Well," arguing that while new communication technologies allow communities access to a plethora of information, they can also potentially restrict our access to the same.

After lunch, the panel continued with Imran Rafi Ahmed Punekar's (Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, UAE University) "The Necessity and Obligations of Cultural Competency in the Physician's Relationship with the Muslim Patient: Effects on Quality of Health Care, and Methods of Implementation." He said that doctors must be culturally competent when providing patient care. Faiz Khan (Pennsylvania State College of Medicine) analyzed "Faith and Care of the Patient: An Islamic Perspective on Critical Illness and Death," opining that focusing only on a patient's physical well being is driven by the modern perspective of "patient-centered practice," which imposes boundaries between care givers and receivers. He suggested that doctors be trained to accommodate a patient's spiritual and religious needs. Shabbir Alibhai closed the session with "Artificial Nutrition and Hydration in Advanced Dementia: Scientific Challenges and a Proposed Islamic Ethical Response." In such cases, he said that the tube must be used even if it does not change the patient's status, since feeding another person is an Islamic duty. It should be withheld only if it would harm the patient or cause the disease to worsen.

The conference's final panel, "Muslim Body, Muslim Person," engaged controversial topics. Omar Sultan Haque (Harvard Medical School) spoke on "The End of Life and the Problem of 'Brain Death' in Islamic Bioethics: Implications and Redefinitions of Muslim Personhood." Stating that science has shown the body/soul duality to be untenable, he explored the implications of a materialist conception of personhood for Islamic medical ethics. Iqbal Jaffer (University of Queensland) and Shabbir Alibhai spoke on "A Discussion on the Permissibility of Organ Donation, Palliative Care, and Autopsy: Comparing Orthodox Judaism and Shi'ah Islam." They noted that

Shi`i imams seem to be more supportive of organ donation programs than Sunni scholars, which brings them closer to the opinions of Orthodox Judaism.

The final paper, Debra Budiani's (University of Pennsylvania) and Othman Shibly's (University of Buffalo) "Islam, Organ Transplants, and Organ Trafficking in the Islamic World," said that the Shari`ah forbids transplants from corpses. This has caused ethical dilemmas for both parties in the Muslim community, as illustrated in the case of an Egyptian donor and recipient who chose this route to help overcome economic difficulties.

Farhat Moazam (Centre of Biomedical Ethics and Culture, Karachi) opened the final plenary session by asserting that the event's key contribution lay in its ability to amalgamate the varying perspectives of ethicists, academics, medical practitioners, and philosophers and to allow for ideological exchange. Further, it revealed the complex and decidedly non-monolithic ideological perspectives within Islam itself. Most papers, she said, referred in detail to arguments based on the Qur'an and the hadiths, but only a few examined how Muslims actually practice their faiths and live these philosophies on a daily basis. In the future, researchers might want to examine how Muslims actually practice their faith and negotiate these philosophies.

Frederick Denny's (University of Colorado) remarks focused more on assimilating Islamic perspectives into the bioethical discourse. He observed that the West's current discourse on bioethics virtually excludes the Islamic perspective, although practitioners are aware that religion and culture play an integral role in doctor-patient relationships. He challenged those present to integrate Islamic views into this discourse and place Muslims and Muslim views in the vanguard of solving bioethical dilemmas.

Most of the papers are being prepared for publication. The entire proceedings are online at http://rockethics.psu.edu/islam_bioethics/.

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From Orientalsim to Postcoloniality

Orientalsim and postcoloniality are synonymous with contemporary culture and literature. As much as the younger generations of formally colonized nations and communities would like to argue, the truth of the matter is that

on some level, their colonial times have made an everlasting impression on their own identity and culture. This was one of the many themes that the conference, held at the Södertörns Högskola University College in Stockholm, Sweden, focused on during its congested four-day program.

This was one of the largest gatherings to deal with issues of ethnic identity and diversity, as well as the non-proverbial influences of colonialism in the reshaping of new communities and their modernized cultures. Papers presented ranged from diversity and nationalism in the postcolonial context, postcolonialsim and religious studies, African-American writing and social activism, colonial romanticism and white supremacy, and postcolonial literature and film in English, among other topics.

This may have been the first postcolonial conference of this size and scope in Sweden. In her welcome speech, conference organizer Kerstin Shands (professor, Department of English) mentioned that participants had come from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Malawi, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, India, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the United States, Japan, Croatia, Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Britain, and that the organizers had been surprised by the amount of interest elicited. Clearly, this interest testifies to the topic's importance.

Postcolonial critics need to deal with occidentalist or anti-western perspectives, along with a renewed attention to the "otherness" of the "other." Also on the agenda were concerns about religion and the sacred, as well as the natural environment. Postcolonialism may finally be in the process of desecularizing itself. The papers presented were thought-provoking, to say the least.

In the first "Black American Writing and Social Activism" workshop, Fredrik Sunnermark (senior lecturer, Cultural Studies, University West, Trollhättan, Sweden) presented "Sameness and Difference: The Paradoxical Meaning of the 'Negro' in the Rhetoric of Martin Luther King, Jr." Mariangela Palladion (Ph.D. candidate, University of Stratchclyde, Glasgow, UK) spoke on "History, Postcolonialism, and Postmodernism in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*," which *The New York Times* recently named the best work of American fiction in the last 25 years. She provided an analytical look into this book by drawing religious allegories from within the context of the characters and their stories. At the end of the workshop, author, poet, artist, and lecturer Shay Youngblood (Jamaica Plain, MA) tackled the topic of "Transforming the Personal into the Proverbial: Subversive Fictions in Print and on Canvas." He focused on the significance of art and literature (and combining them into one art form), maintaining that they can be applied in such a way as to address issues that reflect a postcolonial world.

On the second day, I attended the workshop "Windows of Change: Decolonisation or Re-colonisation?" chaired by Donald Christian (instructor, Södertörn University College) and John Forward (instructor, Department of English, Södertörn University College). This session featured an intriguing look back into the history and process of de-colonization in the Middle and Far East by Major Simon Williams (retired, Sweden), who had served as a British army officer in the Persian Gulf and focused on the significance and impact of this process on the local communities. John Forward's paper on "Harold McMillan: A Metaphor?" delved into the characterizations and principals of the man, as well as his accomplishments, and touched upon his relationship with assassinated American president John F. Kennedy. This topic was also addressed by Ian Bald (American Embassy, Sweden) in his "The Life and Times of John F. Kennedy." The discussions veered into the imperialistic domination of powerful states throughout history and compared the British Empire and its colonization policy with today's empire, the United States, and its international policy.

In the first session of the "Postcolonial Literature and Film in English" workshop, Amit Ray (lecturer, Department of Language and Literature, Rochester Institute of Technology, USA) presented "Of Booker and Spice and Everything Nice: Indian-ness Literary Prizes and Cosmopolitan Culture." His absorbing analysis questioned the reasons behind the dominance of postcolonial literature on the literary prize scene, highlighting in particular the various winning titles of the Man Booker Prize coming out of India. Rose Bloem (Skovde University, Sweden) addressed "The Spectre of the 'Other,'" giving examples in Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre*, Jean Rhys' *Wide Sargasso Sea*, and Nadine Gordimer's *A Sport of Nature*. The session ended with an animated presentation by Osita Ezeliora (instructor, School of Literature and Language Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa) on the "Subject of the Other: Location of the Self in Zoë Wicomb's Post-Apartheid Post-colony." She argued that Wicomb's literature is a raw and accurate account of life in postcolonial Africa and dismissed the myths and tainted images produced by other literatures.

The conference also featured a short documentary film, "Models of Success," which featured a group of Arab Muslim women from the Persian Gulf region and highlighted their role in supporting and developing their communities through their active involvement in various training and education programs for youths. The women featured all come from humble backgrounds and have broken new ground by achieving remarkable feats in otherwise male-dominant Arab societies. The film, in English, was written,

directed, and produced by Art L. Jones (English instructor, University of Bahrain) and coproduced by Ali Al Saeed (writer/author, Baharin), who attended the conference.

Among the various keynote lectures was one on "Said and the Critics: The Historical and Orientalist Response," presented by Nigel Wood (professor, Department of English, University of Loughborough, UK), who shed light on Edward Said's relationship with literary and social criticism and his critique of it from both a historical and an orientalist perspective, and the impact that such views have had on modern thinking.

The first day featured three keynote lectures: Anthony Grooms (writer and professor of creative writing, Kennesaw State University, Georgia, USA) on "Civil Rights Movement Narrative and the American Civic Place," Inga Brandell (associate professor, Department of Political Science, Södertörn University) on "Revisiting Ibn Khaldun: Contemporary Use and Misuse of Classical Arab Science," and Irina Sandomirskaja (professor of culture studies, The Baltic and East European Graduate School, Södertörn University) on "One-sixth of the World: Avantgrade Film, Revolutionary Language and the Colonization of the Periphery in the USSR during the 1920s."

The Literary Salon, convened on the conference's final day, featured readings and recitals by writers and authors Shay Youngblood (*Big Mamma Stories, Soul Kiss,* and *Black Girl in Paris*), Anthony Grooms (*Bombingham*), Dilruba Ara (*A List of Offences*), and Marisa Villagra.

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Abstracts

The Media in Democratic Transitions: Institutionalizing Uncertainty in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Mohamed Suharto). McCoy, Mary Elizabeth, Ph.D. *Northwestern University, 2005.* 592 pages. Adviser: Ettema, James. Publication Number: AAT 3177770.

With Suharto's resignation in May 1998, Indonesia entered a precarious transition from the entrenched authoritarianism of his New Order regime. In examining the press's role in the events that followed, this study finds that what is critical in the success of a democratic transition is not how free a country's media are but what individual news outlets do with this freedom. The key function news outlets play in using their new freedom, this study argues, is to foster what Adam Przeworski calls the institutionalization of uncertainty – a process essential to, if not also synonymous with, democratization.

Yet this study also expands on Przeworski's model to argue that in emerging democracies, such as Indonesia, where other institutions remain compromised by the certainty of fixed outcomes, the news media serve as the principal arena for both generating and institutionalizing the uncertainty necessary to democratization. Ironically, in this process, some of the same media tendencies faulted for degrading debate in advanced democracies – horserace coverage, focus on conflict, and scandal-mongering – can serve an emergent function in political transitions, warding off democratic reversal even after other institutions fail. More specifically, these tendencies, above all the relentless pursuit of political scandal, make the news media a primary vehicle for intra-elite contestation and the circulation of leadership – the very dynamics that drive democratization in developing nations and, arguably, prevent democracy's decline in modern societies. Finally, these findings on the press in Indonesia's transition may illuminate the dynamics of democratization and reversal in other societies undergoing similar transitions, notably Russia and the Philippines.

Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: A Case for Empirical Study of Counterinsurgency (Philippines). Felter, Joseph H., III, Ph.D. *Stanford University, 2005.* 219 pages. Advisers: Laitin, David D.; Fearon, James D. Publication Number: AAT 3171683.

The qualities and structures of a state's internal security forces have a significant impact on reducing the risks and overall casualties from insurgent violence in civil war. To test this argument, I introduce a new micro-conflict dataset on counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines between 2001 and 2004 and measure the relationship between conflict deaths and the capacities of small military units tasked with suppressing rebel threats at local levels. My empirical tests isolate qualities of security forces not directly tied to aggregate state resources. I find that small units possessing superior leadership, training, and access to local information are more likely to conduct effective and discriminate counterinsurgency. Deploying locally recruited soldiers with specially trained elite forces as cadres is particularly effective at achieving this potent combination of capabilities.

I also find empirical evidence that government forces that initiate operations at a higher rate relative to their opponents suffer fewer of their own soldiers killed in action, inflict more rebel casualties, and reduce the number of civilian fatalities as a result of conflict. These findings demonstrate that variation in the qualities of the military forces tasked with combating insurgent threats affect important conflict outcomes. Significantly, they indicate this variation is not fully determined by factors such as state wealth and level of development and that there is thus a major role for professional training of militaries in reducing the damage from, and possible prospects for, civil war.

Liu Zhi's Journey through Ritual Law to Allah s Chinese Name: Conceptual Antecedents and Theological Obstacles to the Confucian-Islamic Harmonization of the Tianfang Dianli. Frankel, James D. Ph.D. *Columbia University, 2005.* 460 pages. Adviser: Awn, Peter J. Publication Number: AAT 3174789.

This dissertation places the Chinese Muslim literatus Liu Zhi (1660?-1730?) and his writings in their historical, cultural, social and religio-philosophical context. Liu Zhi was affiliated with a burgeoning network of Sinicized Muslim scholars of the late Ming-early Qing period, who wrote about Islam in classical Chinese to form a body of literature known as the *Han Kitab*. At a time of transition for Chinese society, the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1911), particularly under the aegis of the Kangxi emperor (1662-1722), attempted to establish hegemony over China and project an image of legitimate sovereignty, despite foreign origins, over an ethnically diverse empire. This situation opened a window of opportunity for various communities, including Chinese Muslims, to express their beliefs and collective identity as being not only unthreatening to Chinese culture and society, but, moreover, completely consonant with the values and doctrines of the dominant Confucian ideology.

Liu Zhi, the consummate product of the Chinese Muslim educational system and scholarly network, embodied this ethic. His work represents the most systematic and sophisticated attempt within the *Han Kitab* corpus to harmonize Islam with

Chinese thought. In particular, in his *Tianfang Dianli*, Liu Zhi explored the theme of Ritual, applying this quintessential Chinese concept to Islamic religious practice. He also provided a theoretical, metaphysical foundation for his discussion of orthopraxy, presenting an introduction to Islamic theology in classical Chinese.

The challenge of expressing these concepts in a context devoid of any clear monotheistic principle tested the limits of his scholarship and linguistic finesse. Liu Zhi's theological discussion in the *Tianfang Dianli* engages not only the ancient Confucian tradition, but also Daoism, Buddhism, and even non-Chinese traditions. His methodology reveals him as an erudite and cosmopolitan scholar, who synthesized diverse influences, from Sufism to Neo-Confucianism, and possibly even Jesuit and Jewish sources, into a body of work that was both steeped in tradition and, yet, exceedingly original, epitomizing the phenomenon of Chinese Muslim simultaneity.

Nowhere beyond Good and Evil: Muslim Activism in China as Ethical Critique, 1929 to 2001. Henning, Stefan, Ph.D. *University of Michigan, 2005.* Adviser: Messick, Brinkley M.; Mueggler, Erik A. Publication Number: Not Available through PQDD.

Nowhere Beyond Good and Evil is an ethnography and history of Chinese-speaking Muslims and their efforts to situate Muslim communities within Chinese society. I conducted archival research and fieldwork from 1999 to 2001 in Beijing and in Lanzhou, a provincial capital on the upper reaches of the Yellow River. I also visited activists' projects in Henan, Shaanxi, and Qinghai Provinces. The dissertation focuses on activism in the three domains of education reform, translation, and the publication of periodicals, while also touching on entrepreneurs who finance activism. For the Republic, I show how activists went against the secularizing trends of the time by trying to make an Islamic way of life meaningful in China. For the era of Reform and Opening, I describe how activists were able to challenge the authoritarian rule of the state while many urban Chinese tended to acquiesce, in particular after 1989. I also show how activists have successfully resisted the trends toward an apolitical life mired in commercialization and consumption by finding collective meaning in religious faith. Describing activism as a "politics of conscience," this dissertation is my attempt at writing about morality and ethics at the intersection of emotion and politics. I have looked to Talal Asad, Max Weber, and Friedrich Nietzsche for help in envisioning a "politics of conscience."

Collapsed and Prebendal States in Post-Soviet Eurasia: Cross-regional Determinants of State Formation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Markowitz, Lawrence P., Ph.D. *The University of Wisconsin - Madison,* 2005. 307 pages. Adviser: Beissinger, Mark R. Publication Number: AAT 3186216.

Why did Tajikistan's state collapse into a five year civil war while state power in Uzbekistan became mired in prebendal politics? Theories drawn from the comparative study of the state, which have tended to concentrate sources of varying state development in the hands of rulers, do not fully account for the different state forms in these two countries. Through the examples of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan this dis-

sertation examines how economic resources concentrated under local strongmen and patronage relations that link political elites in one province to elites in another provide conditions that can facilitate the spread of particular state capacity outcomes. It utilizes process tracing through case studies of seven provinces in both countries – Kuliab and Kurgan-Teppe in Tajikistan and Ferghana, Kashkadarya, Namangan, Navoii, and Samarkand in Uzbekistan – to infer the causal paths along which some state capacity outcomes spread and others do not.

The study finds that patterns of prebendal versus collapsed states emerged at the national level as a result of the varied ways that provincial political elites, who served as the critical link between local strongmen and the state, negotiated shifting access to state resources. In provinces where elites could access resources from the center through trans-regional patronage ties their continued dependence on those ties imported state capture. In provinces where state resources were constricted, provincial elites' disaffection from the center enabled the proliferation of state failure. In addition to elucidating social processes through which institutional breakdown spreads within weak states, this dissertation identifies the Soviet origins of certain characteristics of state weakness that are shared by other Eurasian countries and offers new insight into the causes of Tajikistan's civil war.

Perspectives on Self-immolation Experiences among Uzbek Women, Campbell, Elizabeth A., Ph.D. *The University of Tennessee, 2005.* Adviser: Gorski, June. Publication Number: AAT 3197600.

The purpose of this study was to examine the motivation of Uzbek women who committed acts of self-immolation and survived. The study examined the role of the religion and culture of Islam, whether the act of self-immolation was a suicide attempt or an act of protest, and whether the use of fire had some symbolic significance.

Self-immolation, or deliberate self-burning, is increasingly becoming a cause of death and disability among young Muslim women in the Middle East and Central Asia. However, little is known about this phenomenon. This was a qualitative, bounded case study, which used a blended model of case study that combined elements of Yin and Stake. The setting was the Umid Center, a rehabilitation center and shelter for victims of self-immolation and domestic abuse located in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The sample for this study included nine residents and former residents of the Umid Center who had survived acts of self-immolation. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the assistance of a translator. These interviews were audiotaped and the English responses were transcribed. The data were analyzed both manually and using the qualitative data analysis software program QDAMiner, for thematic categories and code words.

The results suggest that all women interviewed were attempting suicide when they set themselves on fire and that the use of fire had no symbolic significance, but was a method of convenience. The findings also suggest that the religion and culture of Islam cannot be assumed to be contributing factors to female self-immolation. Domestic abuse and harsh lifestyles of the rural village (*kishlocks*) culture were the main motivating factors in self-immolation among the women interviewed.

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Islam: Tradition and Modernity

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

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