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TOWARD ISLAMIZATION OF DISCIPLINES

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الحمد لله رب العالمين
والصلاة والسلام على خاتم الأنبياء والمرسلين

وقال رب زدني علما

*In the Name of Allah,
the Compassionate, the Merciful,
Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Universe,
and Peace and Prayers be upon
His Final Prophet and Messenger.*

*"... and say: My Lord!
Cause Me to Grow in Knowledge."*

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

أَقْرَأَ بِأَسْمِ رَبِّكَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ ﴿١﴾ خَلَقَ الْإِنْسَانَ مِنْ عَلَقٍ ﴿٢﴾
أَقْرَأُ وَرَبُّكَ الْأَكْرَمُ ﴿٣﴾ الَّذِي عَلَّمَ بِالْقَلَمِ ﴿٤﴾ عَلَّمَ الْإِنْسَانَ
مَا لَمْ يَعْلَمْ ﴿٥﴾

(العلق: ١ - ٥)

Read in the name of your Sustainer. Who has Created man out of a germ cell. Read – for your Sustainer is the Most bountiful One. Who has taught (man) the use of the pen. Taught Man what he did not know. (Qur'an 96:1-5)

وَاللَّهُ أَخْرَجَكُم مِّن بُطُونِ أُمَّهَاتِكُمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَ شَيْئًا
وَجَعَلَ لَكُمُ السَّمْعَ وَالْأَبْصَارَ وَالْأَفْئِدَةَ
لَعَلَّكُمْ تَشْكُرُونَ ﴿٧٨﴾

(التحل: ٧٨)

And Allah has brought you forth from your mother's womb knowing nothing – but He has endowed you with hearing, and sight, and minds, so that you might have cause to be grateful.

(Qur'an 16:78)

Chawkat Ara

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INTRODUCTION

Toward The Third International Conference on Islamic Thought

The Second International Conference on *Islamization of knowledge* was held in Islamabad, Pakistan (*Rabi' al Awwal* 1402 / Jan 1982). The contributors presented their ideas on the whither, why and whence of Islamization and subjected those ideas to scholarly critique. The unedited proceedings of that conference were published in 1982 by the University of Islamabad under the title *Knowledge for What?* Selected research papers presented in that conference are now being published by the International Institute of Islamic Thought under the title, *ISLAM: Source and Purpose of Knowledge*.

Conference participants at Islamabad agreed in their diagnosis of the world *ummah's* malaise, as well as on their prognosis of the remedy. They felt that the general principles governing the needed reform were firmly in their grasp and that the main features of the projected workplan to bring about the desirable change had become readily apparent.

Rather than dwell on the breakthrough achieved in Islamabad, the International Institute of Islamic Thought looked toward awakening the Islamic minds already cognizant of the general principles of Islamization to the applications of such principles for the arts and sciences. Hence, the Institute published *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Workplan*, which was distributed to thousands of thinkers and scholars around the world. They were invited to the arduous task of undertaking the reform and starting to develop Islamic thought and methodology, the contents of the Islamic vision, and the goals, values and the basic principles of Islamization. The implications of ideas, values and principles for each discipline had to be brought out for experts to use in the reconstruction of their disciplines.

In the two years that followed, the Institutes's appeal to scholars, institutions, and leaders to undertake the tasks already proclaimed contributed significantly to the surging movement for Islamization. Under the auspices of the Institute, Islamization of education went far beyond a mere gesture for reform voiced in many Muslim quarters. It achieved specificity, becoming the call for reform of Islamic thought, for Islamization of the modern

disciplines, and for the production of appropriate textbooks for use in Islamic colleges and universities.

Prominent among the voices heard and measures taken, in which the International Institute of Islamic Thought was directly involved, were lectures on the Islamization of elementary and secondary school curricula, as well as of colleges and universities. Throughout the Muslim world, university students, faculty and administrators began to voice the same demands and give expression to the same needs. The call for Islamization of legal texts, of the humanities, the social sciences and the sciences of nature was on nearly every lip, from Lagos to Jakarta, Khartoum to Dhaka, Cairo to Delhi, Rabat to Istanbul. In response to this great upsurge, the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports of Malaysia, in co-operation with the National Museum of Malaysia, and *Berita Harian*, one of the major dailies of Malaysia, held an international symposium on Islamic civilization. The symposium called on the country, as a whole, to rise to the challenge of Islamization. Chinese, Hindu, and Muslim scholars and leaders participated for the first time in the symposium. The symposium presented to the world a magnificent array of the great works of Islamic civilization in the arts, sciences, and industries, both in the world at large and in the world of Southeast Asia. Similarly, Islamic forces were at work in the universities to awaken them to the need to involve students and to mobilize the faculty to produce the requisite textbooks and reading material.

It may be justly said that Islamization has become a world movement. While everybody has heard of and debated its desirability and urgency, many scholars and thinkers have given it concrete consideration. Journals involved with Islamization, like *Al Muslim al Mu'āsir*, *Al 'Ummah*, and the *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, have published several articles directly concerned with the subject and the problems it engenders. Many scholars have sent their critical questions and comments directly to the Institute. Others with clearer perception began to write further elaborations of the general principles of Islamization especially concerning their own areas of specialization.

Planning for the Conference

In response to these developments, the International Institute of Islamic Thought, in its working paper on the various problems of Islamic thought and Islamization of contemporary knowledge, announced a call for another international conference on Islamic thought. The Institute invited Muslim scholars and thinkers to prepare essays on various aspects of Islamic thought and Islamization of knowledge.

The response to these calls and invitations justified the Third Interna-

tional Conference on Islamic Thought, whose proceedings appear in this volume. The conference took place in Kuala Lumpur in *Shawwal* 1404 / July 1984, and was attended by the presidents, deans and faculties of Malaysian and other Muslim universities. Several Malaysian political leaders were also involved in the sessions. The conference was inaugurated by Dr. Mahathir Muhammad, prime minister of Malaysia. This showed that Islamization was no longer confined to the world of academia, but as in the case of Pakistan, had become the concern of whole peoples, institutions, and governments. For the first time in many decades, governments and people expressed the same spiritual longings and demanded their implementation in earnest. Echoing the stance of the early Muslim call for Islamization fourteen centuries earlier, Dr. Mahathir for the new forces stirring within the Islamic soul. In his inaugural address, he said:

We should reorganize our political, social and economic life in a way that fully incorporates the injunctions of Islam to ensure that a socially healthy, politically coherent, and economically efficient and vigorous *ummah* will emerge. . . . To understand the underlying dynamic relevance of these injunctions in contemporary society, and to work out the process of their implications in practice, is an acute spiritual need of the Muslim *ummah* . . .

The plan for critical examination of the modern disciplines in light of the vision of Islam is an ambitious one, but it is essential for the future of the *ummah*. Fundamental questions need to be asked . . . [and] every young Muslim intellectual—trapped within the conceptual constraints of secular paradigms and secular academic disciplines—needs textbooks in each discipline that allow him to question present approaches . . . and relate the teachings of Islam to modern problems.

Indeed, since the *‘Abbāsī Khulafā’* charged the scholars of their day with the task of Islamization of Greek, Persian and Indian knowledge, the same demand has not been repeated with such clear vision in a millenium of Muslim history. Muslim scholars were clearly asked to shoulder the burden of Islamizing of their discipline. The modern Muslim scholar must Islamize the international legacy of modern knowledge to reform its methodologies and establish systematic and scientific approaches in all fields of social and human sciences and other fields of studies from an Islamic point of view. The world *ummah* of Islam must master and transcend that legacy if it is to reconstruct itself and build a world order fulfilling the Divine norms pattern.

Between the early Muslim’s vision and the modern Muslim’s vision,

however, there are significant differences. The early Muslim's vision was far easier to realize for two reasons, one pertaining to modern knowledge and the other pertaining to the quality of our Islamic commitment. First, being the greatest power on earth and having achieved victory over both the Persian and Byzantine Empires, the Muslims were far better prepared than the weak and backward Muslims who constitute the overwhelming majority of today's *ummah*. Moreover, the quality and intensity of *imān*, the commitment to the vision of Islam prevalent in the early Muslim people, far surpassed ours today. Second, whereas the legacies of the ancients were rich, they do not compare with the legacy of modern knowledge in depth, breadth, and variety. The volume alone of modern knowledge, with its explosive nature, strikes panic in the student who sets out to master it. Furthermore, the depth of knowledge so far achieved in each branch is colossal, and it reveals far more complexity in the nature of things than ancient man ever imagined. It takes far more effort to achieve the requisite mastery.

All this notwithstanding, today's Islamically committed scholar is not cowed by the challenge, but stimulated. His enthusiasm for undertaking the task is in direct proportion to its difficulty. Whereas the security and glory of the *ummah* made the scholar of the early centuries relaxed, tolerant, and sometimes compromising, the danger to which the *ummah* is exposed in modern times makes the *engage* scholar more tense and alert and ready for battle. Over his predecessors, he has the advantage of wider experience and longer history. Already, he has courted all sorts of other ideas, tried all sorts of ideologies and presuppositions. All too often he has lived the *ummah's* malaise in his own person, much to his agony as well as credit. True, the early Muslims commanded the wealthiest treasury and exchanged bags of gold and jewels for manuscripts. They commissioned the best minds to produce the desired works, regardless of the cost in wealth or time. No institution in the Muslim world today stands as well endowed or patronized as institutions like *Dār al Hikmah* in the Bagdad of the past. True as all this may be, it does not lessen the pride of the Islamic scholar committed to the Islamization of knowledge, nor does it reduce his enthusiasm.

Highlights of the Conference

An important highlight of the Third International Conference on Islamic Thought was Dr. Mahathir Muhammad's participation. His inaugural address was a real contribution to the implementation of Islamization. He declared that the goals of the International Institute of Islamic Thought were intrinsically desirable for the *ummah*, and he expressed his commitment to these goals. In fact, as a responsible Muslim leader, he showed his appreciation of the task and precise knowledge of the problems.

Another highlight of the conference was the contribution of Dr. Akbar Ahmad of Pakistan. Dr. Ahmad produced what may well be the first significant critique of Western anthropology from the standpoint of Islam. His purpose is to rebuild the discipline of anthropology on a different foundation, avoiding uncritical ideological presuppositions and replacing them with principles that are both critical as well as consistent with Islam. There are three methodological assumptions in Western anthropology that must be removed, according to Dr. Ahmad.

First, he states most anthropologists are ethnocentrists. They define the human person or society in terms of the natural, physical and psychic characteristics of the ethnic group to which the object of study belongs. They do not see the human person as a universal phenomenon transcending space, time and ethnicity, though standing within them. In their view, man is not the vicegerent of Allah (SWT) the cosmic agent who is capable of manifesting the absolute on earth.

Second, most anthropologists regard Muslim societies as fossils drawn from a past age, not as living contemporaries with as much or greater claim to the present and the future of this globe. Their judgement is vitiated by this prejudice which causes them to identify with the present and worthiness with their own ideology and civilization, he contends.

Third, Dr. Ahmad states that most anthropologists perceive man as the necessary consequence of the interplay of geographic, historical and social forces to which he adjusts by reaction to their pressure or influence. They assume that an understanding of this “natural” process of human development is a necessary and exhaustive understanding of human nature. For them, only what is observable, measureable, and materially sensible is “natural”. In their study, man seems to be made—as well as dwarfed—by the circumstances of his existence. he is always the product of historical and natural factors, never the master to whom the angels were ordered to prostrate themselves. Dr. Akbar’s paper has been included in chapter 6 of this volume.

Another great highlight of the conference was the contribution of Dr. Roger Garaudy, the former professor of philosophy, former proponent of European Marxism and chief ideologue of the French Communist Party, whom Allah (SWT) guided to Islam. The Institute had previously commissioned Dr. Garaudy to write a critical essay on contemporary Western philosophy. This admirable work already available in French, will soon be published in English by the IIIT. It is a scathing critique of contemporary Western philosophy, particularly in France and Western Europe. It exposes the tragic failure of Western civilization to bring genuine felicity to humanity despite the West’s hegemony over the world in the last three centuries.

In his work, Dr. Garaudy traces the development of Western thought from Hegel to the present, passing through existentialism, “scientific” Marxism,

positivism, empiricism, pragmatism, and semanticism. Dr. Garaudy rightly perceives this development as one for the worse, a development that culminated in the philosopher's becoming a sophist. It led to the contemporary denial of the very essence of philosophy as the loving quest of truth. Before the Second World War, the *Wienerkreis* (School of Vienna) taught rebellion against all idealism and advocated logical positivism. After the Second World War, the earlier calls were outgrown by the School of Frankfurt, which called for rebellion against philosophy itself. Dr. Garaudy lived through this philosophical degeneration as a Marxist, but he was one who never lost sight of man's need for the absolute—the Transcendent. His Marxist commitment could not deny the need for God, the Ultimate Reality, to which his sensitive conscience sought to anchor the vision of reality. For decades he struggled to raise the meaning of life above the banality of ethical empiricism and beyond the dry vacuity of Marxist determinism. In his youthful enthusiasm, he tried to give Marxism a humanist dimension by attributing to it the dignity of a Kantian critique of the history of the nations. Reading into Marxism a sort of Christian hope and Kierkegaardian utopianism, he even attempted to reconcile it with mainstream Catholicism. But it was his attempt to universalize Marxism as a self-critique of all history that led him to the histories of other cultures. There he discovered legacies in non-Western humanistic ideas that overwhelmed his faith in the Western tradition. Earlier, in his student life, he made the acquaintance of Islam. Now, after the long journey in the history of the Western mind, his mature reading of the legacy of Islam led him to accept it as the truest affirmation of absolute, unique, and transcendent reality. Recognition of the Islamic ethic as the embodiment of the best of humanism and of the Islamic social order as the most ecumenical and worthy world order quickly followed. Thus Dr. Garaudy rightly perceived that the solution of the West's debacle is the spirituality of Islam, which satisfies the requirements of this world and the next in complete harmony. He presented to the Conference at Kuala Lumpur a precis of his study, from which we quote the following statement:

Surrender to the logical implications of Western culture, or to its peculiar brand of growth and development after five centuries of Western hegemony, does lead and has led the entire planet earth to suicide.

. . . In fact, Islam is the only message capable of effectively countering the fatal implications of Western domination. Against positivism, it gives us transcendence; against individuals, it gives us the *Ummah*. . . .

As far as the natural sciences are concerned, . . . it is . . . crucial

to avoid two errors at once: blind copying of the West, and outright rejection of everything Western. We should acquire Western science and technology selectively, creatively and critically as well . . . As far as philosophy is concerned, the Muslim thinker today needs to learn from Western philosophy nothing but its critical methodology, which is really its essential core from Socrates to Galileo, Kant and Husserl . . . [We also need] to prove ourselves capable of solving the problems that the West is incapable of solving. These are, notably, to discover new forms of growth, development and culture that do not lead to human destruction, but to the flowering. . . .

We must read the Qur'ān with our eyes fixed on the solution to our problems, with minds and wills determined to discharge our responsibility as the vicegerents of Allah (SWT) on earth. We must, in short, find answers to our own problems in light of the eternal message of the Qur'ān. To be faithful to our ancestors is not to preserve the ashes of their fire but to transmit its flame.

Certainly, Dr. Garaudy's book is "must" reading for the present generation of secularized Muslim intellectuals who have been dazzled by Western intellectuality despite its bankruptcy. Our hope is that they will find in his work the remedy for their confusion and the impetus to return to the transcendence affirmation, humanism, and universalism of Islam. A condensation of his book appears in chapter 10 of this book.

No doubt the critique of the traditional Muslim methodology and the new concepts and terms introduced by Dr. 'AbdulḤamīd Abūsulaymān's paper are a very important contribution toward reforming Muslim thought. The paper points out successfully some of the basic drawbacks of traditional Muslim methodology and the need for a new approach and methodology for the study and investigation of the nature and the reality of social phenomena and relations as an integral part of Muslim thought. His paper and approach will usher in a new era in Muslim social sciences and in the study of Muslim law and life. It will make a departure from the traditional, accidental, Muslim social studies and insights. The English translation of this paper appears in chapter 2 of this publication.

These contributions, however, are not alone. As the reader will discover in the pages that follow, the conference generated numerous important essays which constitute genuine breakthroughs in the reform of Islamic thought and in the internal reconstruction of academic disciplines. The conference did address the holistic re-categorization of thought into purely Islamic disciplines. The topical grouping of the essays is designed to enable the reader to grasp their cumulative contribution to the discipline in question. The purpose of

these essays is essentially the same as that of the conference as a whole, namely, to discover the relevance of the Islamic vision of the general principles of Islamization to the methodology peculiar to each discipline; to show how that methodology—once reformed by these principles—may affect the conduct of the discipline. Our conviction is that once the discipline is given a new constitution and content compatible with Islam, the disciplinarian will undertake any investigation with the certainty that the results will be acceptable and Islamically justifiable. Islam is not a factitive ideology—like national socialism or communism—which substitutes its own “truths” for the findings of scientific analysis. Rather, its target is the methodology through which those “truths” are reached or established. And it is in the realm of methodology, including the development of new Islamic disciplines, that Islam raises its most significant questions. The principles it advocates on this level constitute its capital contribution to the human pursuit of truth, goodness, and beauty.

This hoped-for Islamic contribution to the discipline is not meant to add discoveries or new data or new insights to the cumulative knowledge of the generations. That is the goal and duty of the individual disciplinarian facing the given area of investigation. Islam is interested in reforming the disciplinarian’s mind, widening his horizons, and setting his vision upon the plenum of values constitutive of the divine will, in order to expand and apply the human resource of divinely guided wisdom. Naturally, this requires methodological changes. Once these are in place, the disciplinarian may roam as far as he pleases and pile up discoveries in any realm. His venture will remain Islamic and, together with the work of creative persons in other disciplines who have adopted the same orientation, will contribute to the future Islamic school of thought both within each discipline and transcending them all.

The operational objective of the Third International Conference on Islamic Thought was thus: 1.) A new school of thought in each of the disciplines. 2.) A school of thought whose ultimate principles stem from the values of Islam and lead to them and 3.) A school of thought worthy of the greatest empiricism precisely because its methodology uniquely guarantees the inclusion of both material and axiological reality.

Surely, we may claim with the greatest emphasis that the creation of such a school of thought is the Institute’s objective. Although none may claim that we have reached it, none may deny that we are on the way toward that great objective. Our duty—like that of all scholars committed to Islam—is to start on the road and to exert the maximum effort of which we are capable. Success and *tawfiq* are the property of Allah to grant, as He alone (SWT) disposes.

II

FRAMEWORK FOR THE ISLAMIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE

**Orientation Guidelines for the
International Conference on Islamization
of Knowledge**

'AbdulḤamīd A. AbūSulaymān

Orientation Guidelines for the International Conference on Islamization of Knowledge

ʿAbdulḤamīd A. AbūSulaymān

In modern times, the *ummah* has suffered from numerous crises which have adversely affected nearly all aspects of its life. These crises have been so persistent and so exacerbating that no serious Muslim may any longer escape the duty to investigate their causes and apply himself to the tasks of saving the *ummah* from their suffocating clutch.

Any careful look into the recent efforts of Muslim intellectuals to explain the *ummah's* unfortunate debacles, or to justify the solutions offered for its salvation, betrays the lack of insight, the superficiality, and futility of those efforts. Indeed, such examination leads inevitably to the conclusion that the cause of all of these crises is that of the Muslim intellectuals themselves. It consists in their failure to apply their minds to the problems of their *ummah* and candidly to seek efficient solutions without compromise; in short, the *ummah's* failure is really their own failure. It was with this awareness that a few Islamic scholars held a number of conferences to look into the state of contemporary Islamic thought. Their purpose was to make the Muslim thinker aware of his responsibility for the malaise of the *ummah* in modern times.

The first of these conferences was held in 1397/1977 in Switzerland. The net result was to make us aware that the first step toward a genuine solution of the crisis of Islamic thought is the *Islamization of knowledge*; i.e., the critical examination of modern disciplines in light of the vision of Islam and the recasting of them under categories consistent with that vision. A careful probing of this "first step" quickly revealed two other steps that it presupposed and that are still far from accomplished, namely, the mastery of the modern disciplines and of the Islamic legacy of thought. Whereas the modern disciplines were at least accessible to the contemporary researcher, the latter was not; thus a number of measures would have to be taken to make it so. The conference therefore resolved that an international institution of Islamic thought

be formed for the purpose of realizing these preliminary objectives. It was thought that the time had come for a real translation of our occasional insights, into a program of sustained effort and problem-solving action on the level of ideas. Thus, the International Institute of Islamic Thought was born in 1401/1981.

A second international conference was held in Islamabad in cooperation with the Islamic University in 1402/1982. Its theme was the Islamization of knowledge. Its purpose was to reach a working consensus among scholars on the general principles of Islamization and to map out a work plan for Islamizing the disciplines. Eventual production of a textbook, in each discipline in the humanities and the social sciences, which incorporates modern knowledge while giving it an Islamic mode, was to be the ultimate end of current effort.

This work is presently under way. In order to promote it, to examine its product, and generally to move it toward realization, it was decided to hold a third international conference on 25 *Shawwal* 1404/July 24 1984 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It was hoped that the third conference would fulfill the following objectives:

1. Lay out concrete plans for reforming and moving Islamic thought forward in specific areas and define a scale of priorities for these plans.
2. Examine the Institute's works so far accomplished, or in progress by the participants in the conference, and evaluate the plan drawn for Islamization of the modern disciplines.
3. Draw a plan of activities for the Institute for the coming five years.

Toward Reform of Islamic Thought

Papers therefore were invited that contributed to the movement of Islamic thought on these fronts. In particular, they were to raise and seek answers to the following issues:

1. Is contemporary Muslim awareness of the crisis adequate?
2. Is the contemporary Muslim understanding of Islamic values, of their nature, their relations, and the order of rank the Qur'an has assigned to them, correct?
3. Is the methodology of presenting Islamic values available to us adequate for the reconstruction process desired? for actualization of the "ought-to-be" of Islamic values and principles?
4. Are our applications of Islamic values true to them?
5. Is our understanding of Islamic history, with all its lessons and landmarks of positive achievement or failure, correct?

6. What are the historical roots of our failure? the contemporary causes of our shortcomings? How can they be altered or surmounted? What is both needed and possible in this regard?

7. Is the failure of Muslim analysis in the various fields of human endeavor responsible for the *ummah's* failure in its application of the precepts of Islam?

Were true and adequate answers to these inquires readily available to us, the *ummah* would have the necessary foundations for genuine self-reconstruction, for achievement of the level of civilizational development worthy of the *ummah* of Islam. Certainly, the *ummah* would not be languishing in its present crisis if we had the right answers today!

From such self-questioning, it is hoped that the Muslim mind will reconsider the patterns under which it has so far labored. Certainly, our axioms and presuppositions must be subject to a new scrutiny if future failure is to be avoided and the true mission of Islam reestablished.

Research in the Islamization of Knowledge

The proposed conventional disciplines for the July 1984 conference were (1) economics, (2) sociology, (3) psychology, (4) international relations, (5) anthropology, (6) political science and (7) philosophy.

Papers were invited in each of these disciplines to treat the following questions:

1. How are the general principles of Islamization developed in the Institute's publication, *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan*,¹ to be applied to your discipline?

2. What would their application entail for the methodology and theory of the discipline?

3. What does their application promise by way of limitation expansion of knowledge?

4. What can it contribute to the integration of human knowledge?

5. What fruits may be expected of such an epistemological revolution in the given discipline?

6. What concrete plans (in a five or ten year period) do you envisage that could move the discipline toward Islamization?

Because of its strategic importance to Islamization of knowledge in general, the 1984 conference considered papers on the following additional themes:

1. What has been the contribution of Islamic thought in your specific discipline during the last 100 years? Needed to answer this question is a com-

¹Al fārūqī (ed.), *Islamization of Knowledge* (Herndon Va.) International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1402/1982), 23-38.

plete bibliography of works (articles, monographs, books), a topical classification of them, and a critical evaluation of their content or contributions leading to a statement on the “state of the art” of that discipline in the Muslim world.

2. What has been the contribution of the legacy of Islamic thought to that section of human knowledge or concern that your modern discipline seeks to cover? Granted that the Islamic legacy is inexhaustible, can you identify some of its greatest chapters that may be regarded as crucial to that specific discipline? Can you classify, analyze and evaluate their contents critically?

3. Assuming that works on *fiqh*, *uṣūl al fiqh* and *Shari’ah* are the greatest expression of Islamic spirit, it is absolutely necessary to make their contents readily available to the research scholar in each of the specific disciplines of modern times. The expected illumination of those disciplines cannot proceed without reckoning with the Islamic legacy, of which the works on *fiqh*, *uṣūl al fiqh* and *Shari’ah* are the quintessence. What system of classification, indexing or computer programming would make the contents of these works instantly retrievable? Has any system been devised or followed? With what results?

Islamization of Knowledge and the Future of the Ummah

Mahathir Muhammad

Islamization of Knowledge and the Future of the Ummah

Mahathir Muhammad

The last four centuries have done us, the Muslim *ummah*, little credit. We have not reflected the essence of Islam which was once the pacesetter of humanity. Our future must reflect a new approach; we must have clearly crystalized ideas and well-articulated goals. We can carry out orderly and constructive work only when the planning is thorough and we labor toward recognized and acceptable goals. Unfortunately, the vast majority of Muslims, including intellectuals and those involved in the Islamic movements, have overlooked what to most builders is obvious. They know they must go somewhere but they do not know exactly where to go. We must therefore plan for the future and this means we need to analyze the past and take stock of the present.

It is clear that man's survival is dependent on new patterns of mutual partnership and cooperation, interdependence and symbiosis. This will not be possible without long-term planning for the next twenty to forty years. We also need to understand Islam within the context of the contemporary world, with the changed conditions of life. We cannot recreate the world of the early years of Islam. The changes that have occurred in recent decades are fundamentally the biggest changes human society has ever experienced, but in practical and intellectual terms, we Muslims have not been able even to conceive of how to reorganize our political, social and economic lives to take in the changes that have taken place. We should reorganize our political, social and economic lives in a way that fully incorporates the injunctions of Islam to ensure that a socially healthy, politically coherent, and economically efficient and vigorous *ummah* will emerge, able to face all challenges.

Consider, for example, the concept of *shūrā* as applied to economics and politics. These values laid down by the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* tell us how the Prophet formulated them, and how early Muslim society institutionalized them. The question is, how can we realize them in our lives in the new

fifteenth century [A.H.]. What pattern of human relationships would best realize the values of cooperation and lead to the most efficient system of economy? What institutional arrangements would secure a distribution of wealth and income, both during and after its production, consistent with the value of "cooperation for the good"? Obviously it is not enough to ask the Muslims to co-operate. This request has repeatedly been made, and the end product is in front of us. Islamic injunctions must be given practical content and their implications explained in concrete terms before they can become operational in the economic organization of Muslim or any other countries. The large numbers of those involved in the process of production, the many dimensions in which co-operation must be conceived, the complex technicalities involved in production, relevant knowledge of the actual needs of consumers, the priorities of government, the intention as well as the circumstances of the other producers, the circumstances of the workers, and their entrepreneurial participation in the firm or farm where they work, all these factors have turned the simple question of how to co-operate into a highly complex one. What is required now, if anything, is a gigantic intellectual and imaginative effort involving deep insight into the objectives and scope of these injunctions. It is only by solving the problems mentioned above that we can know what co-operation is and how it can be adopted as a way of economic life in the contemporary situation. Then and then only can Islam be said to be a way of life. To retreat and withdraw from modern society is to deny that Islam is for all times.

Examination of other injunctions of Islam convinces us of the same conclusions. One may ask, what significance does all this have? If we are unable to understand these injunctions of Islam with reference to contemporary reality, we have failed to understand Islam itself; we fail to understand the social conduct desired of us by Allah (SWT) if we fail to operationalize the injunctions with reference to contemporary reality, and we will not be able to plan effectively for the future.

This is a painful admission. And this is the root cause of the present predicament of Muslims. Not only have we failed to live up to Islam, but we have also, to a large extent, failed to appreciate its universality. It follows therefore that to understand the underlying dynamic relevance of the injunctions of Islam in contemporary society and to work out the process of their implication in practice is an acute spiritual need of the Muslim *ummah*.

An Islamic Future

Our understanding of Islam will not increase overnight with the beginning of the fifteenth century of the Hijrah. A better future for the Muslim *ummah*

requires much more effort and strength. The Qur'an promises the eternal survival of Islam but this promise does not extend to Muslims automatically. Allah (SWT) does not change the fate of a society unless they make an effort to change it themselves. History offers no support for the idea that simply by the passage of time Muslims will suddenly undergo a miraculous revival. We, the Muslim *ummah*, have to make a conscious decision whether to remain in a constant state of tension, between living in the past and only superficially coming to terms with the contemporary world, or to opt for an Islamic future, thereby redirecting ourselves to the original path of Islam. Remember always that when Islam came, it was a modernizing force that brought greatness to the early followers of faith; greatness in the fields of economy, industry, the sciences, the arts and military prowess.

For Muslim civilization to achieve its destiny and experience a second upturn, a balanced approach to Islam and a certain amount of self-criticism is prerequisite. We Muslims must learn to be honest with ourselves. We need to apply this balanced approach to this world and to the hereafter. The concept of the hereafter was given to man to broaden his outlook and not to make him blind to his immediate environment. We must seek good, both in this world and the next. Modern scholars must therefore be neither too preoccupied with this world nor exclusively entranced by the next. Both must influence their scholarly efforts and exhortations.

It would appear to me that many Muslims have accepted and to some extent have taken pride in their ignorance with unbelievable satisfaction. We are in acute social, economic and political agony, yet many Muslims have adopted a strangely false sense of security: reading the Qur'an will bring them *thawāb* or blessings even if they do not understand or practice it; going out on *tabligh* or propagation will secure a piece of paradise; writing pamphlets and propaganda sheets will win support for Islam. But this preoccupation with gaining merit for self is too narrow. Muslims must establish a thriving and dynamic society because there can only be a hereafter for us if we survive as Muslims.

If we really want to establish Islam, we must look for the leading issues of our time and let people know what rights Allah has given them for which they must fight, what security Allah offers them for which they must look, and what promise Allah has for them for which they must work. We must ensure that Islam is responsive to the immediate requirements and concerns of modern man. If we ask people to accept a whole set of beliefs and practices, they may run away because they may not understand what Islam really is. This is perhaps the main problem. Understanding Islam does not mean only the ability to explain a *hadīth*, or outline the mechanics of certain rituals or recite verses of the Qur'an. Understanding Islam also means the capacity to explain and put into practice its dynamic and vibrant concepts in contem-

porary society.

At this point in time, disaster is threatening us, the very future of mankind is at risk, and the existence of the Muslims as a viable force in the world is in the balance. The problems we face are complex and varying. They are not getting any simpler. The two great challenges facing Muslims are to recreate a living civilization of Islam which was once dynamic and thriving, and to make a positive contribution to the predicament facing mankind. In fact, these two tasks are the same, because Muslim civilization is the only civilization that still preserves in tact its basic teaching and has the potential to provide an alternative to what is called the 'modern' world. It is also the only civilization that can provide the much-needed value structure and spiritual needs that can lead mankind to happiness on this earth. But before Muslims can do this, there is much work to be done.

The first thing Muslims have to do is to plan the kind of future they envisage for themselves. They can have an aimless future or a planned future. Current trends show that Muslim society is heading toward an aimless future. Unless something is done now, this trend is likely to continue, putting the Muslims in grave danger of being separated from their faith.

The Muslim *ummah* cannot continue lying inactive like a stagnant lake—full of potential resources yet polluted. The *ummah* must think about and plan for its future. Muslims have longed for freedom since they were invaded by the colonial powers and lost their independence. In some regions the struggle still continues. Although the Muslims finally achieved victory over their foreign enemies, their neglect of planning for the post-victory period robbed them of the fruits of their struggles. They sacrificed their lives for the sake of Islam, but their sacrifice was made almost in vain because the Islamic order they envisaged did not emerge. This is due to neglect by those who failed to plan for the implementation of Islamic systems. The Muslims have spent much of their time after independence pursuing the various "isms" left behind by the colonialists.

Planning for the Future

There is no escape from planning for the future. If Muslims really want an Islamic social order, then they must examine every aspect of modern life from the perspective of Islam and make necessary corrections. The comprehensive relevance of Islam to everything has to be established on a concrete level and many questions must be researched and examined. A practical blueprint for the implementation of Islamic systems needs to be worked out taking into account the practical realities of today's world.

Planning in the Muslim countries, however, must be more than a projec-

tion into the future of today's dominant trends. It is by no means enough just to produce five-year development plans, as generally these plans are responses to current situations; they remain dominated by current events. This is why most developmental planning in the Muslim countries has not been very successful. Although our real problems exist on the macro level, we have concentrated our efforts on cosmetic changes for the sake of appearance. Therefore we need to make a careful cross-impact analysis among various priorities, policies and planning and various parameters of Muslim thoughts and criteria. Possible greatness in the years ahead will depend on the greatness of our vision of the future. While we may fall short of our goals, we must not allow any deficiency in the clarity and articulation of our vision.

Ibn Khaldun uses the word *umrān* for a dynamic, thriving, operational civilization. The Muslim world today needs such a viable plan as an alternative and to present to the Muslim *ummah* convincing visions of the Muslim civilization of the future.

This Third International Conference on Islamic Thought, should plan for reforming and moving Islamic thought forward in specific areas with a proper scale of priorities as a step toward achieving this planned future. The work plan of the International Institute of Islamic Thought in making critical examination of the modern disciplines in the light of the vision of Islam is an ambitious one, but is essential for the future of the *ummah*. It is indeed true to say, as does the book *Islamization of Knowledge* published by the Institute, that today non-Muslims are the undisputed masters of all the disciplines. Muslim academicians should master all the modern disciplines, understand them completely and achieve an absolute command of all that they have to offer. This is, however, only the first prerequisite. Then they should integrate the new knowledge into the corpus of the Islamic legacy by eliminating, amending, reinterpreting and adapting its components according to the world view of Islam and its values. The exact relevance of Islam to the philosophy of the disciplines should be determined. A new way in which the reformed disciplines can serve the ideas of Islam should be adopted. Finally, by their example as pioneers, they should teach the new generation of Muslims and non-Muslims how to follow in their footsteps, push the frontiers of human knowledge even further forward, discover new layers of the patterns created by Allah and a new ordering of thought in Islamic disciplines deriving from *tawhīd*, and establish new paths for making His will and commandments realized in history.

In developing such a fresh understanding of Islam, in adjusting to change, we need a number of intellectual tools. We need to develop a tradition of Muslim scholarship that incorporates modern methods of study and research into the best techniques of traditional scholarship. We need to analyze what changes are desirable in Muslim society. The confusion of some Muslim in-

tellectuals is understandable. They have not seen the injunctions of Islam in an operational form and hence they become confused when translating these injunctions to meet the demands of modern society. Furthermore, they are trapped in the conceptual framework of the West. Fundamental questions need to be asked, but unless the young Muslim intellectual is provided with a university textbook in each discipline that allows him to question present approaches, he will not be able to ask these questions. The aim of the Institute to produce textbooks in all the disciplines should be supported.

We must aim to develop an awareness of the future and an Islamic perception that can relate the teachings of Islam to current problems and meet the coming challenges of the future. Once we have become sensitized to this perception, we are equipped to analyze modern problems in the light of the Qur'ān and *Sunnah*. What is important is the problems we face and how to formulate practical Islamic solutions to these problems. The policies needed to solve these problems require Muslims to go against contemporary fashions to a great extent, as well as to reexamine some traditions that are seen as Islamic but are not really so. They also require a bold effort to make an Islamic stand, as well as intellectual courage and a firm understanding of Muslim societies and the true culture of Islam. The future of Muslim societies is with Islam, for without Islam, they have no future.

III

METHODOLOGY

***Mafāhīm fī I'ādat Binā' Manḥajīyat
al Fikr al Islāmī al Mu'āşir***

**(Concepts of Reconstruction-Methodology
in Contemporary Muslim Thought)**

'AbdulḤamīd A. AbūSulaymān

مفاهيم
في إعادة منهجية الفكر الإسلامي المعاصر

عبد الحميد أبو سليمان

”مفاهيم في إعادة بناء منهجية الفكر الإسلامي المعاصر“

توافق الوحي والعقل في الفكر الإسلامي:

سبق لي في الندوة العالمية الثانية لإسلامية المعرفة التي كان قد عقدها المعهد العالمي للفكر الإسلامي في ضيافة الجامعة الإسلامية بـلاهور في باكستان منذ عامين، أن قدمت ورقة حول أزمة الوجود الإسلامي الحضارية في العصر الحاضر، وجذورها في قصور الفكر الإسلامي المعاصر، الذي أدى إلى ضباب رؤية الأمة، ووهن عزمها، وتخلّف ممارساتها ومؤسساتها الاجتماعية، ووقوعها فريسة سهلة للاستعمار بكل ألوانه بلا حق ولا كرامة.

وأوضحت في ذلك البحث العلاقة بين أزمة الأمة الحضارية وبين الفكر، وأنه هو أساس الأزمة الحضارية، واصلاحه شرط أساسي مسبق لتوضيح الرؤية ومنطلقات العمل الجاد الناجح.

كما أوضحت جذور الأزمة الفكرية في فصام الشخصية الإسلامية، بانفصام القيادة السياسية عن القيادة الفكرية، الذي نبتت جذوره الأولى من بذور تسلل أعراب القبائل العربية البدائية إلى الجيش الإسلامي حركة الفتح الإسلامي — لمواجهة خطر امبراطوريات الرومان والفرس المجاورة والمهددة للكيان الإسلامي — دون أن يكتمل إعدادهم إسلامياً بالقدر المطلوب، مما ساهم في سقوط الخلافة الراشدة وفكرها وهدمها، وأقامة دولة ملك بني أمية.

وبينت أن تلك الأحداث والأوضاع أدت إلى انحراف المؤسسات والممارسات الاجتماعية التي كانت قائمة على الصدر الأول وانتهت الأوضاع الجديدة الى جهالة وغشم القيادة السياسية، كما أدت إلى عزلة القيادة الفكرية الإسلامية وضمور الفكر الإسلامي. ولاحظنا كيف أن الإسلام، الذي جاء ليفتح آفاقاً جديدة للعقل والحضارة الانسانية، أصبح وكأنه في معركة مع العقل ويمثل حجراً أو قيداً على العقل الإنساني، لاهدياً وسراجاً منيراً.

ومن الواضح أن هذه صورة زائفة لعلاقة الإسلام بالعقل وإنما هو في الحقيقة موقف ناشئ لأسباب مصطنعة، تكمن وراءها أسباب الصراع والانفصال بين القيادة السياسية في البلاد الإسلامية والقيادة الفكرية الإسلامية من جهة، والمأخذ الخاطيء والحلط وعدم تبيين طبيعة الفكر والشخصية الإسلامية حين انفتح المسلمون بانهار على تراث الأمم والحضارات المحيطة بهم من هندية وفارسية ويونانية ورومانية وسواها ، وما حمله رعايا الدولة الإسلامية

من أتباع وسلالات تلك الأمم من فكر معهم من جهة أخرى.

وكان الخوض في الإلهيات بغيبيات وتهويمات وفلسفات تلك الأمم والحضارات البائدة والمنهارة، وبالترجمة الخاطئة عنها، مما جبر الأمة الإسلامية والصكر الاسلامي إلى خوض معركة وهمية بين العقل والوحي، مما أضعف جهود الأمة في قضايا لاضابط لها، ولا فائدة من ورائها للمسلمين وأطار العقيدة والفكر الإسلامي بشأن الإلهيات وما وراء المادة له طبيعته الخاصة المحددة التي تتلخص في ان البحث إسلامياً في ذات الله عقلي، ومنطقي في شأن أمر وجوده ولا مجال ولا علاقة ولا معنى ولا فائدة للعقل الاسلامي في بحث كنه وجوده، لأنه ليس كمثل شئ، ولم يلد ولم يولد، ولم يكن له كفواً أحد. وكنه الذات الالهية والعالم الآخر في العقيدة الإسلامية مما ينحصر أصلاً في دائرة ما لاعين رأت ولا أذن سمعت ولا خطر على قلب بشر، لكن الغاية الانسانية الاجتماعية منه في كل الحالات والوجوه، هو الأمر في هذه الدنيا ، بالعدل والاحسان، وبذل الخير والكف عن الأذى، والبعد عن ممارسة الفساد والفحش والمنكر.

وكانت تجربة الترجمات من الحضارات الأجنبية وممارسات الفلاسفة المسلمين وكتاباتهم ومن تبعهم من الفرق والجماعات كاخوان الصفا والمعتزلة من الخوض بغير علم الهي يقيني في كليات الإلهيات والوجود مما أشاع الفوضى في ساحة الفكر الاسلامي، وخلق معركة صراع وهمية بين الدين والعقل.

وليس عجباً أن يقف القادة السياسيون خلف هذه الممارك الوهمية ويدعون اليها ويأججون أتونها ويأخذون جانباً أو آخر فيها، يروجون به لهذه القضايا، ويذكون به النار، ويقودون الأمة والفكر الى متهات وقضايا زائفة جانبية تستنفذ طاقة الأمة ، وتبخر جهودها وتنهك مسيرتها، في لهو عن القيادات السياسية وممارساتها المنحرفة، وغاياتها الذاتية الفاسدة.

آثار التجربة المعتزلية على مسيرة الفكر الاسلامي:

ومعركة المعتزلة والسلفيين وأصحاب السنة، مما يعتبر من معالم هذه الممارك الزائفة والمسيرة الفكرية الضالة.

ونجد في كتابات علماء ومفكرين أمثال أبي حامد الغزالي في "تهافت الفلاسفة" نظرات نافذة، وانذارات مبكرة، عن زيف القضايا المثارة ذاتها، ومضارها، وما تؤدي اليه من ضلال وضياح، حيث أوضح بدراسة نافذة وعميقة، أن أصل قضية الفلاسفة والناقلين عن الأمم والحضارات الأجنبية في البحث في الإلهيات إنما هو ظنون وتخريف لاجدوى للمسلمين والعقل الإسلامي من ورائه وغريب على عقيدة الإسلام وشخصية المسلم، وغاياته وحركة حياته، وأوصى بمقاومة المزاوالات الفاسدة في المجدالات والمناظرات الكلامية والفقهية التي روج لها حتى في مناسبات لا تمت إلى كنهها بصلة، كالولائم والأفراح، فيلهو بها الناس ويخرّب بها الفكر ، وتضيق من ورائها الرؤية والعزم.

لقد تركت تلك الممارسات الفكرية الفاسدة والتجارب الفكرية الخاطئة المُرّة آثارها وبصماتها على مسيرة الفكر الإسلامي اللاحقة، منها ذلك الموقف الموروث في مسيرة الأمة الثقافية الإسلامية والذي يتسم بالحدز والتوجس والشك تجاه العقل، وتركيز الجهد بقصد كبحه، والحد من دوره في دائرة التنظيم الاجتماعي، وقد يحلو للبعض في العصور المتأخرة من هذا الباب افتعال التناقض بين الوحي والعقل وتهويل توهمات وذلك بالتركيز على التفاوتات الثانوية التي قامت وتقوم بسبب القصور الانساني من وقت لآخر، بين نص أو آخر، وبين مقولة علمية أو أخرى، في قضايا مثل لعاب الكلب، وجناح الذبابة، وكروية الأرض ودورانها، والوصول الى القمر، وخلق آدم، وكان من الواضح أمام المتأمل أن التفاوتات إنما ترجع الى قصور في الإدراك الانساني، أما في فهم النص أو تأصيل القضية العلمية، وكثيراً ما ينسون أن مضي الوقت ونمو الإدراك العقلي قد جلى هذه القضايا بتحقيق مزيد من النمو والثروة الثقافية والعلمية في جوانب العلم والدين، ويظل المزيد من تحرير مثل هذه القضايا مصدراً من مصادر التنمية العلمية والفكرية الإسلامية.

وبالتطبع لا مجال للمقارنة في المسيرة الإسلامية الحضارية بين معركة العقل والنقل والفكر الإسلامي، وبين معركة العقل والخرافة والكهانة والجهل في المسيرة الأوروبية الوسيطة.

لهذا يجب التنبيه على الدارسين عدم التسرع والثوب الى مثل هذه القضايا بجهل او غرض، وسحب موقف على آخر، لمجرد تشابه في بعض معالم أو ألفاظ ومصطلحات وعناوين. فمعركة العقل والوحي في تاريخ الحضارة الإسلامية، لا علاقة لها بعلاقة العقل والكهانة الدينية المسيحية في أوروبا في العصور الوسيطة، وطبيعتها وتفاعلاتها ونتائجها تختلف كل الاختلاف.

ولطبيعة ووضوح القضية الأوروبية في الصراع الذي قام بين الدين والعقل. أمكن حسمها والانتصار للعقل ضد الكهانة والخرافة والفساد.

أما القضية الإسلامية فإنه لم يمكن حلها أو الحسم فيها رغم مضي العقود والقرون واستمرار المعارك العلمية حولها، فالقضية الإسلامية ليست قضية صواب وخطأ وحق وباطل وعقل وكهانة حتى يمكن الحسم فيها. أن خطورة القضية الإسلامية هو أن جذورها ترجع إلى الخلط الفكري، مما أدى إلى استمرار المعركة وتماديها دون القدرة على الحسم فيها إلى جانب العقل أو إلى جانب النقل، أو الوصول الى أي حل آخر فيها، رغم الخمائر الحضارية والإنسانية التي عانت وما تزال تعاني منها الأمة الإسلامية بسببها، وبسبب ما ينجم عنها من ضعف وتخلف وتمزق.

من أسباب الحيرة:

فالأمة خلال هذه المعركة، يشدها أمران، لا نجد بينهما مخرجاً الا بالتفلسف والتجاهل

باحساس العجز من ناحية ، و باحساس التردد من ناحية، وبأمل ان تحل المشكلة نفسها من خلال الزمن والحركة العشوائية، فلعل الزمن والحركة والممارسات المختلفة أن تنتج طريقاً او تعطي حلاً. وهذه الممارسات العشوائية المبنية على التعامي والتجاهل، لم تحل المشكلة، بل أورتت التسبب وضعف النظام والتنظيم والادارة في الحياة الاسلامية المعاصرة.

أحجار رحي الأزمة:

والأمة في معركة الوحي والعقل التاريخية، التي اصبحت المعركة بين الثقافة والالتزام الاسلامي، وبين العلمانية وعلوم وامكانات الحضارة الغربية المعاصرة، يطحنها أمران لاتجد منها فكاًكاً.

الأمر الأول: هو ما يقوم عليه كيانها وتبنى عليه شخصيتها ودوافعها، وهو كليات الاسلام وقيمه الكبرى الأساسية في الايمان بالله الحق الخالق الذي يأمر بالعدل والاحسان وينهي عن الفحشاء والمنكر، الذي خلق الموت والحياة ليلو الناس أيهم أحسن عملاً، ومصيرهم اليه، فإن قدموا في حياتهم خيراً كان مآلهم إلى الخير، وأن قدموا شراً كان مآلهم الى شر. وكليات الإسلام وقيمه وغاياته الكبرى مما لا يقارن بالتهويمات والتناقضات المسيحية، ولا بالعنصرية اليهودية، ولا الوثنيات التنسكية الغالية الآسيوية ولا بالمادية الملحدة المتبوتة الماركسية والعلمانية.

فإسلام المسلم في قيمه وكلياته واضح مشرق فطري متوازن، فهو في إطار سلام الايمان بالله، لا ينكر الرغبات والشهوات ولكنه لا يقتصر عليها كما تقتصر عليها المادية الفردية التحررية العلمانية الغربية، ولا ينكر الحاجة الحياتية الاقتصادية ولكنه لا يقتصر عليها كما تفعل المادية الجماعية الشمولية الماركسية، ولا ينكر الروحانيات وفضرة الانسان وحاجته اليها، ولكنه لا يفصلها عن حاجته وأدائه الحياتي، ولا يعارض بها أو يلغي حقيقة الوجود الإنساني الحياتية استجابة لغاية روحية وهيمية، بل الروحانيات في عقيدة الإسلام، هي الوجه الآخر للوجود والفعل الانساني الحياتي. تتمثل في البعد والغاية الكلية السامية للوجود والفعل الإنساني، فهي النية والتوجه والإرادة الانسانية، في كل فعل وحركة من أفعال الوجود الإنساني وحركته، لا عزلة ولا عبثاً و لا غلواً وانحرافاً ورشقا بالغيب وما وراء الحياة من ملكوت الأبدية، قبل أن تبلغ الساعة ويحين الحين وتنفذ النفس وينفذ البصر حديداً إلى لقاء الله في ملكوت الأبدية، ولا غرابة فحتى في شؤون الذكر الإسلامي يلمس الإنسان فائدة في حياته، فالوضوء نظافة والزكاة والصلاة تنبهاً وتذكراً وتنظيماً.

الأمر الثاني: وفي تعامل سمو وكال الكليات الإسلامية يقوم الواقع الاجتماعي والنظم والممارسات الاجتماعية سياسياً واقتصادياً وحضارياً في العالم الإسلامي والذي يتسم بالتخلف والفساد والضعف والتدهور مقارناً بالواقع والنظم الاجتماعية والحضارية التي تحيط به، وتعصف بوجوده وتحدهاه في العالم المتقدم غير الإسلامي.

وفي هذه الصورة وهذا الواقع، أصبحت الأمة، وأصبح الضمير المسلم بين شقي الرحي.

فهو لا يمكنه أن يتخلى عن اسلامه في كلياته وقيمه وعقائده، ولا يمكن أن يجد فيما لدى المجتمعات والعقائد الأجنبية بديلاً ولا نداءً لما لديه، وما قامت عليه حنايا نفسه وجذوره شخصيته.

وفي الوقت نفسه لا يقدر الضمير المسلم ولا يطبق ولا يقبل بالواقع الاجتماعي والحضاري الذي يعيشه ويمثله ويعاني منه، وهو يتطلع إلى مثل ما لدى الآخرين من انجاز وقدرة وممارسات حضارية واجتماعية، والمسلم بهذا يعيش في كابوس دائم وفي حيرة لا تنتهي يظل معها ممزقاً بين روحه وضميره، وبين واقعه وممارساته وتنظيمه.

ويهرع المسلم طلباً للحل الى التقليد، ولكن يخيب فأله، فليس له أن يمارس اجتماعياً الا بما لهذه الممارسات من قيم وغايات وكليات، على شاكلة من قلدته وحذا حذوهم، نقيض إسلامه عقيدته.

فلا هو بخير إن قلد من هم أقدر منه وأقوى من غير المسلمين الذين يسحقون وجوده ويتحدونه، ولا هو بخير لم يقلدهم، ويبقى المسلم في هذه المتاهة مضيقاً فاطر العزم، ممزق الشخصية، يسرق من يسرق ويطلب الستر، ويرتشى ويطلب المغفرة.

وهذا التناقض والتمزق هو ما يفسر الفشل المستمر في المحاولات المتتالية للعلمانية والتغريب الاجتماعي والثقافي، وما يفسر التمزقات الشبابية بين مختلف الاتجاهات، لا يقر لها مع اتجاه قرار، ورود فعلها العنيفة تجاه التوجهات والممارسات الاجتماعية السائدة في مجتمعاتها، كما يفسر التعلق المحتال للإسلام، ميراثاً وتاريخاً ومظهراً، من دعاة التحول والتغريب.

والنتائج على كل الأحوال — مقصودة وغير مقصودة — ، ليس التقدم وتملك ناصية إنجازات العصر، على حسب دعوى دعاة التحول والتغريب، ولكنها مزيد من التفسخ والتمزق والتدهور الاجتماعي والحضاري، وقد الإرادة والعزيمة والقدرة.

وتظل رحي الأزمة تدور، تطحن ضمير الأمة وإمكاناتها بين حرصها على قناعتها وعلى شخصيتها وكلياتها وعقائدها، وبين واقعه الاجتماعي الحضاري المتردي ومحاولاتها الفاشلة للتجدد على غير أسس الإسلام وغاياته وعقائده، بعزم فاطر وإرادة مسلوبة.

الواقع ومصداقية النموذج الصحيح:

وللرحى بين الشباب وجه آخر، أشد إيلاماً ووخزاً من مجرد احساسهم بالقهر والعسف، وجه يمس أسس كياناتهم وقواعده ، ويدفع بهم من طرف قصي الى طرف قصي من العنف والتطرف واللاعقلانية.

فالشباب الإسلامي له قناعته الراسخة بان الإسلام يقدم النموذج الحياتي الصحيح الذي

يمثل طريق الوجود الصحيح، فهو النموذج الأقدر الأفضل، ولا بد له من مواجهة التحديات واحتواء العقبات وانصواء كافة التماذج الأدنى تحت لوائه وقيادته.

ولكن الواقع الحضاري الانساني يجري على غير قناعتهم دون مواربة، وبلغة صارمة كاسحة، فهم الأدنى، ونموذجهم هو الأضعف، ينضوي في ظلال التخلف والتدهور الداكنة، كلياتهم ونموذجهم وواقعهم الحضاري والإجتماعي والتاريخي على غير ما تقضي به قناعتهم ومقولتهم فهو وجود غير مُرض ولا مقنع ولا مقبول.

ويأتي الجواب من القيادات اللاهثة المحاصرة: الخلل في عدم التمسك بالإسلام، مزيد من المعاناة ، مزيد من التسليم، مزيد من التقليد... ويردد الشباب المتلهف ولكن لماذا لا يلتزم الناس؟ لما لا يتبع الناس على مر الأيام والآلام؟

ويردد الشباب ماذا ايضاً عمن التزم وكثير قد التزم؟ أفواج أثر أفواج عبر السنين المتتابعة، في صدق وتضحية وإخلاص. هل حقيقة أن الأمر في الناس وحدهم؟ أو أن الأمر في بعض جوانبه يرجع إلى ما يقدم للناس؟ أو في أسلوب ما يقدم للناس؟

ماهو المصير؟ ومتى المخرج؟ ولماذا؟ وكأن الأمر الى مزيد من التدهور ، تدهور لا ينقطع ولا يتناقص، أين الحلقة المفقودة؟ أين الخلل؟

وتتابع أفواج ، وتقلب أفواج، وتضيع أفواج، والرحى تدور، وتدور الأيام، ويدور الشباب، وتدور رؤوس الشباب، ويظل السؤال: أين الخلل؟

حبل الخلاص: الرؤية والمنهج

إذا كانت القضية قضية القهر الحضاري والغياب الحضاري وضياح مصادقية النموذج الإسلامي والأداء الاسلامي.

وإذا كانت العقيدة والرؤية راسخة فإن هذا الاضطراب والتردي الحضاري ليس حقيقة معدنتنا، فأين الخلل؟

إذا سلمنا بأن الإنحراف بدأ في جذوره البعيدة بهجمة الاعراب على جيش الفتح والخلافة، وتغير القاعدة السياسية، وما استتبعها من حتمية تغير القيادة السياسية، إلى ما تمثله القاعدة من قيم وتوجهات ومفاهيم خليط من قلبية جاهلية وإسلام، وإذا سلمنا بأن ذلك أدى إلى فصام الشخصية المسلمة وانفصال القيادة السياسية عن القيادة الفكرية، وأدى ذلك إلى غشيم وجهالة القيادة السياسية، وعزلة وضمور فكر القيادة الفكرية، وعجز الفكر ، وضياح دوافعه في النمو والبلورة المستمرة في ضوء المعطيات والحاجات المتجددة، كل ذلك أدى إلى تدهور المجتمع وفكره ومؤسسته وعلاقاته وتنظيماته، كما أدى وتأثير الانفتاح والانهيار بالتراث الفكري والفلسفي والديني والحضاري غير الإسلامي للأمم المنضوية تحت لواء الدولة الإسلامية أو المتصلة بها، إلى ضباب في الرؤية، وخلط في المفاهيم والمناهج، وتداخل في الصور

والمجالات، وأصبح الفكر جديلاً ومناجزة، دون ضوابط أو حدود من إطار ورؤية وغاية واضحة، وأصبح فكر الأمة وثقافتها ليس له صاحب، يختلط فيه الخابل بالنابل، والصالح بالطالح، والسوي بالشقي، والخالص بالزائف في مزایدات وعروض لا ضابط لها ولا مرشد ولا دليل.

وهنا يكمن أصل الأزمة ومنطلقها الفكري، الذي عاث وما زال يعيث في فكر الأمة خراباً، وذلك هو الخلط المنهجي في دور العقل ودور الوحي في الفكر والمجتمع الإسلامي، وقامت القضية الزائفة في قضية مواجهة العقل والوحي، وتعارض العقل والوحي، ونصبت متاريس المواجهة والترصد والشك والحذر، وتصيد الهفوات والزلات وسوء فهم التفاوتات الطارئة في مجالات البحث والانجاز العلمي والعقلي والفكري والتشريعي والفقهية والدينية، ولما كان قد تم تجاهل تفاوتات العلم الواحد، أو ما بين العلوم العقلية في أي نقطة من الزمان والمكان، فان تهويل التفاوتات بين العلوم العقلية والدينية الفقهية كان هو المدخل لكل صاحب غرض.

وكان لهذا الخلط المنهجي من جهة، وهجمات اصحاب الأغراض من جهة ثانية، ولتداخلات الغايات السياسية من جهة اخرى آثارها من ردود الفعل في الذاكرة التاريخية، والمواقف النفسية للقيادة والفكر والثقافة الاسلامية.

فإذا أضفنا الى هذا كله هجمة الغرب عسكرياً وحضارياً على الأمة الاسلامية، وقهرها وتمزيقها واستغلالها واستعمارها، ومن خلفه ومن بين يديه، انجاز وتراث عقلي وحضاري هائل، لايملك المسلمون له ولا لأدواته مثيلاً، أمكن ان نفهم موقف المقاومة الفكرية الصلب والمتصلب من قبل القيادات الفكرية والتقليدية الاسلامية خلال مرحلة الاستعمار المباشر، دفاعاً وحفاظاً على الأمة، كي لا ينفذ اليها المستعمر، ولا تستكين ولا يفتقر عزمها في مقاومته، كذلك أمكن فهم هذا التعطش التقليد من قبل القيادات السياسية الشابة في مرحلة ما بعد الاستقلال او الاستعمار المباشر، لحاجتهم وحاجة شعوبهم الى الفعل والأداء والعمل والتنظيم الاجتماعي.

وبتحقيق الاستقلال السياسي في ظل المهجمة والغزو الثقافي الأجنبي وتوجهات التبعية والتقليد في الدوائر السياسية والثقافية في العالم الإسلامي عاد الصراع مجدداً بأشد مما كان بين القيادة السياسية والقيادة الفكرية الاسلامية، وتجمدت المعركة في مواجهة أوضح وأشمل على ساحة العقل والوحي، وعلاقة العقل والوحي، وظلت هذه القضية هي قضية الأصل المنهجي الفكري الذي تنطلق منه الخلافات واليه تعود.

فالقيادات السياسية والاجتماعية العلمانية، لاترى لغير العقل مجالاً في رسم وتخطيط مؤسسات النظام والعلاقات الاجتماعية الانسانية، وتشير الى جمود القيادات الفكرية الاسلامية التقليدية وسفسطها وعجزها عن تفهم الواقع الاجتماعي والحضاري المعاصر وتحدياته وعجزها عن تقديم حلول وبدائل علمية امام هذه التحديات، وهي لاترى تحت وطأة مسؤولياتها وتأثير انبهارها بالنماذج الأجنبية وسيطرة تلك القوى الأجنبية على مقدراتها ان تقدر مكانة الوحي

والدين والشريعة من كيان الأمة ومقوماتها وشخصيتها ودوافع حركتها ووجودها. والقيادات الفكرية الإسلامية من جانبها لا ترى في القيادات السياسية الا موقفها المتعنت الجاهل الجاحد للوحي مصدرراً للتنظيم والتوجيه والتشريع الاجتماعي، دون ان ترى لعزلتها او تراثها التاريخي من واقع التحدي وموقع المسؤولية الذي تقع القيادة السياسية في مواجهته، وبين شراكه، على ما تعاني منه القيادة السياسية الرسمية من محدودية قدرتها اصلاً في اتخاذ القرار المستقل امام القوى العالمية المعادية المتحكمة في مصادرها.

ومن الواضح أن كلا الجانبين في جناحي القيادة في الأمة الاسلامية يقف في موقف مغاير ، وينظر من زاوية مختلفة، وتحيط به ظروف ومعطيات مختلفة، ويعاني تجربة تاريخية، مختلفة ولا يتمتع بالشمولية والعمق اللازمين لمعرفة أسباب الخلل وسد الثغرة.

أولاً: في المنهجية الفكرية — علم الفطرة الاجتماعية وعلم الشريعة

من البديهي قبل البدء في أي عمل جاد مثمر ان يكون هناك منهج وان يكون منهجاً سليماً مناسباً لحاجات الفرد والمجتمع وما يواجهانه من تحديات والا كان التخبط وكان الجهد هباء، واذا كنا نشكو من تدهور المجتمع الاسلامي الحضاري ومن جهود الفكر الاسلامي وقصوره، فلا يمكن مواصلة السير دون اصلاح الخلل إصلاحاً جذرياً بدءاً بالمنهج والمنطلقات التي ينبثق عنها هذا التدهور والخلل والجمود.

وإذا كان هناك صراع ومعركة حول علاقة العقل بالوحي في ميراث الفكر والمعركة الاسلامية، فعلينا أن نتعرف بموضوعية وتجرد ماهية قضية المعركة والمواجهة. واذا كان هناك تفاوت في بعض قضايا العقل والنقل، فعلينا ان نعرف مصدر هذه التفاوتات وما هي — في مجملها — وجوهها الايجابية والسلبية، وما دلالة كل ذلك على أصل هذه القضية ومنطلقاتها المنهجية.

لابد من الوقوف عند هذه القضايا وعند أصولها المنهجية قبل كل شيء، فالمنهجية هي التي تحدد طبيعة مسيرة الفكر والمعرفة الإسلامية، في أساسها، وفي أساس مصادرها قبل الأخذ وعند الأخذ بآي جوانب وأسباب أخرى مما يبني عليها وعلى فعل العقل والفكر الإسلامي في الأصل.

من الواضح أن القضية الحقيقية هو انه لا يمكن ان يكون في أصل المعرفة الإسلامية تعارض حقيقي بين العقل والوحي، أو تناقض حقيقي بين العقل والوحي، فمن الحقائق التاريخية البديهية ان الاسلام قد جاء ليفتح للعقل — الذي خلقه الله — الأبواب ويسخره لما خلقه الله من أجله في خدمة الانسان والحياة والبناء والاصلاح، ولم يكن ليأتي الوحي الذي أنزله الله هداية ورحمة للناس أبداً عدواً له، ولا قيلاً وحجراً على طاقاته وقدراته التي أبدعها الخالق فيه.

ومن الواضح ان هذه القضية البديهية قد ضيعت في غمرة الصراع والتجربة التاريخية

الخاطئة التي عانى منها المسلمون في القرون الأولى في غيبة الرؤية الإسلامية الكاملة الواضحة وتوجيه الفكر الإسلامي الصحيح بعد سقوط الخلافة الراشدة والقيادة الإسلامية الحاكمة الملتزمة . إذا أدركنا ذلك ادركنا ان القضية ليست قضية التعارض أو التناقض بين الوحي والعقل ولكنها مأساة الخلط بين مجال العقل ومجال الوحي والتداخل الخاطيء بين مجالاتها على غير إطار الإسلام وتصوراته ورؤيته ومنطلقاته. أصل القضية أنه لم يأصل تاريخياً مجال كل من العقل ومن الوحي، وعلاقة كل منهما بشكل صريح وواضح متبلور في المنهجية الإسلامية المدرسية ولا في بؤرة الوعي الفكري الحضاري الإسلامي حتى اليوم.

فرغم ان الازهاصات والتوجهات الكامنة في المنهجية الإسلامية المدرسية (اصول الفقه) وفي الفكر والثقافة والحضارة الإسلامية تدعو الى العقل، وعلوم العقل وطلب ثمار العقل، إلى جانب الأصل الالهي الشرعي وتوجيهه وفي حماه ، الا انه بسبب عدم الوضوح كان تاريخياً هذا المفهوم يتأرجح عشوائياً ويكاد ينحصر في مجال العلوم الفيزيائية والتطبيقية، وما يأتي على غير ذلك الوجه يأتي عرضاً ومن خلال استطرادات في شروح النصوص والعروض الشرعية، على نحو ما نشهد من التأملات الفكرية الاجتماعية والانسانية في الكتابات والتفاسير الموسوعية في التراث الإسلامي وفي كتابات ومؤلفات الأفاضل من الأئمة والعلماء كالأئمة الأربعة ومن جاء في أثرهم من المجتهدين كالغزالي وابن حزم وابن تيمية.

تأصيل الرؤية المنهجية الفكرية الإسلامية:

من المهم لتنمية المنهجية الفكرية والقضاء على مصادر الخلط في عروض المنهجية الإسلامية المدرسية ان نطرح في وعي ووضوح اصول المعرفة والمنهجية الإسلامية وان نتبين علاقاتها ومجالاتها الأساسية التي على ضوئها ومن خلالها يتم النظر الإسلامي وتنطلق قدراته في التوجيه البناء. واول هذه القضايا التي تحتاج الى وضوح التأصيل، وبلغة وعرض وتركيب يدرك معناه ودلالته العلماء والمفكرون والمثقفون والقيادات الاجتماعية الإسلامية ويستجيب لاحتياجاتهم، هي قضية مصادر المعرفة الإسلامية وما تتميز به ومجالات هذه المصادر وطبيعة العلاقة فيما بينها.

وعلى هذا الأساس نستطيع ان نقول ان أصول المعرفة الإسلامية ومصادرها هما في الحقيقة مصدران ومجالان أساسيان يتفاوتان ويتكاملان ولا يتعارضان ولا يتواجهان ولا يحل أحدهما محل الآخر ولا غنى للمعرفة والفكر الإسلامي عنهما بديلاً.

وهذان المصدران هما الوحي والعقل وهذان المجالان هما العلم القطري وعلم الانسان.

ورغم ان هذه الحقيقة بديهية الا اننا حين نقرب ونحقق في تفاصيل القضية سنجد — بسبب عدم بلورة هذه القضية وتأصيلها في المنهجية المدرسية الإسلامية — إن الأمر ليس كذلك، وان هناك خلطاً خطيراً في فهم هذه القضية وعرضها وبلورة علاقاتها وتطبيقاتها في

مسيرة عطاء الفكر الإسلامي وتفاعلاته في العصور المتأخرة مع متغيرات الإمكانيات والتطلعات والتفاعلات والعلاقات الحضارية والانسانية المتداققة.

فحين يكون الأمر يتصل بعلاقة العقل والشرع في مجال العلم الفطري الفيزيائي ومجالاته التطبيقية والتقنية، لانبثوق هناك صعوبة واضحة في تقبل دور العقل في هذه المجالات، فالعلماء والباحثون الاسلاميون لا يجيدون غضاضة في عمل العقل والبحث العقلي في هذا المجال، بل انهم يعتبرونه من فروض الكفاية التي يتوجب على بعض ابناء الأمة الاسلامية القيام به، استجابة لحاجات الأمة والناس ومطالبهم المادية الحياتية. اما حين يمتد البحث الى القضية الاجتماعية فلا يجد الباحثون من خلال العقل، والباحثون من خلال النص، مفهوماً منهجياً واضحاً بأصل العلاقة بينهما وينظّمها ويسهل المهمة، ويقوم أواصر التعاون بينهما مما يؤدي في معظم الأحيان إلى أن ما ينصرف الفريقان عن العمل العلمي إلى أمر المناجزة في حق كل منهما، وموقع كل منهما، وسلامة قضية أو أخرى من نتائج أعمالهما لكسب الشرعية أو سلبها من طرف أو آخر. وخطورة عدم وضوح الرؤية المنهجية لم يجعل حتى مجال الفطرة الفيزيائية خالياً من الصعوبات التي ترجع إلى بعض التفاوتات العابرة والمؤقتة والثانوية مثل قضية كروية الأرض وبلوغ الكواكب وخلق الانسان والتي لا يخلو من مثلها مجال من مجالات المعرفة بسبب تفاوت المجالات وتفاوت المحصلات وتفاوت قدرات الباحثين ومناهجهم، وبسبب الترسبات وعدم وضوح الرؤية لم يعرف الفرقاء المختلفون مكانة الحجم المحدود لهذه التفاوتات — الطبيعية العابرة الملائمة لكل عمل في كل مجال على مدى الزمان والمكان، مما جعل التفاوتات تأخذ أبعاداً خطيرة في تمزيق اطار الفكر الاسلامي والمعرفة الاسلامية وتجنيد طاقات كل مصدر من مصادر المعرفة الاسلامية كيما يحطم المصدر الآخر ويقضي على دوره ويسحب عنه غطاء المشروعية.

وقد يكون من المفيد ان نضرب بعلم التداوي مثلاً على ما يمكن أن يصل إليه تأثير الخلط وعدم وضوح الرؤية المنهجية من مدى يذهب بعيداً عن كل قصور معقول او مقبول للإطار الاسلامي المعرفي ولعلاقة مصادر المعرفة الاسلامية وعطائها في مجالات التوجيه والعلم والمعرفة والحضارة الانسانية، فمن الواضح ان علم الأدوية والتطبيق في جوهره مجال من مجالات العقل الانساني لدراسة المواد وخواصها وطرق تعاطيها واستخدامها وتأثيرها على الجهد الانساني وتفاعلها معه طلباً للصحة والوقاية والعلاج.

وكذلك من الواضح أن علم الشريعة والنصوص المأثورة من كتاب وسنة فيما يتصل بعلم التداوي تتناول في جوهرها جوانب التوجيه العام التي تتصل بالآثار الاجتماعية والاخلاقية وما يتعلق باستعمالها من أمر حلّ وحرمة وطهارة ونجاسة لمادة أو أخرى كالمخدرات والمسكرات والنجاسات، وهذه التوجيهات قد تتضمن علماً هياً لحماية الانسان من الآثار المادية لبعض المواد والممارسات والتي لا ينبغي للانسان الوقوع فيها إلى حين اكتشاف العقل لآثارها كالمسكرات والنفايات والفضلات ولعاب الكلب، كما قد يرد في توجيهات الوحي الإشارة العابرة إلى فوائد بعض المواد، كالعسل (فيه شفاء) أو بعض النصائح أو التوجيهات النبوية

في حياة الرسول ﷺ قولاً أو فعلاً مما فيه فائدة إذا أخذت كل حالة بفهم علمي لمعانها الدقيق وظروفها ودلالاتها الموضوعية الزمانية والمكانية، فإن ذلك كان مما يعتبر إطاراً للتداوي المسلم وعلم التداوي الاسلامي وامتصاً له، ولكن الأمر يمثل خلطاً منهجياً حين يلجأ البعض إلى اطراح الدراسات العلمية العقلية في مجال علم التداوي ودراسة خواص المواد والأجساد ومختلف الإمكانات والأساليب التي تهدي إليها الدراسة والبحث والنظر والتجريب ويقصرون الأمر على هذه الجوانب الشرعية فيما يسمونه "الطب النبوي"، ويأخذونه ويأخذهم معهم بعض الناس والعامّة على أنه بديل لعلم التداوي وما يستتبعها من النظر والمعرفة والفائدة العقلية في تلك العلوم وليقوم مقامها ويكفي دونها.

لاشك ان مثل هذا الفهم والتصرف خلط غير مقبول يجب ان يكون أمره — منهجياً — واضحاً لا يقبل المساومة ولا مكان فيه للسفسطة والمماراة والجدل.

فالتداوي في بدايات الاطار الاسلامي له شقان، شق العلم الفطري، والتعرف عليه، واستخراج معارفه بواسطة العقل، من ملاحظة وتجربة وخبرة وتحليل علمي، وشق العلم الشرعي، الذي يتناول الغاية والتوجيهات والرعاية الالهية الشرعية في مجالاته. وهذان الشقان لاغنى عنهما يتعاونان ويتكاملان ليس أحدهما بديلاً للآخر او معارضاً له.

أما ماقد يثور فيما وراء ذلك من حين لآخر من تفاوتات — بسبب اختلاف المواقع — حول قضية بعينها أو مادة بعينها، فمثل هذا كما سبق ان ذكرنا أصلاً هو "الاستثناء" كما برهن على ذلك واقع سجل التاريخ الثقافي والحضاري والاسلامي، فقياساً الى ما لا يعد من القضايا التي عاجلها وانتجها الفكر الاسلامي والانساني لم يثر جدل المفارقات والتفاوتات الا في قضايا تكاد تعد على أصابع اليد الواحدة.

ولم يكن على مر التاريخ الحضاري الاسلامي لهذه التفاوتات على الحقيقة الا فائدة النمو العلمي لتحقيق مزيد من النظر العلمي في كل من الشق الفطري والشق الشرعي لتحرير القضايا وحسن ادراكها مما يزيل التفاوت ويعطي رؤية أكمل وأوضح وأنضج.

ومثل هذا يمكن ان يقال عن علوم الأغذية والعمارة والجغرافيا وطبقات الأرض والفلك والفضاء وسواها من علوم الفطرة الفيزيائية والتطبيقية، فكل علم من هذه العلوم له شقان، شق فطري وشق شرعي، يتكاملان ويتعاونان لاعطاء الانسان المسلم العلم والمعرفة الانسانية النافعة الأخلاقية في غاياتها واستعمالاتها.

ورغم كون هذا الجانب من علاقة العلم الفطري بالعلم الشرعي واضحاً بديبياً الا أنه لم يسلم هنا وهناك من ضباب و خلط كما سبق ان أوضحنا ، خاصة عند بعض من يتعرض لما يسمى بالجوانب العلمية في القرآن والسنة النبوية الشريفة، فان هناك جانباً آخر للعلم والمعرفة الفطرية هو المقصود بالتأصيل المنهجي ووضوح الرؤية المنهجية. وضباب الرؤية المنهجية في هذا الجانب والخلط في قضاياها ومفاهيمه ومنطلقاته ومجالاته كان من أهم أسباب قصور النمو وضعف طاقة التجدد في الفكر الاسلامي المعاصر وفي مواجهة التحديات الحضارية المعاصرة.

هذا الجانب الهام والخطير هو موقع علم الفطرة الاجتماعية من الفكر الاسلامي والمعرفة وعلاقته من علم الشريعة وتأصيله وتأصيل موضع العقل والاستقراء في مجاله.

فعلم الفطرة الاجتماعية في مفهوم المنهجية الاسلامية المدرسية علم ومجال غير واضح وغير متبلور، ونتيجة لعدم وضوح هذا العلم ومجاله ووجوه الحاجة اليه لم يقم له في علوم الفكر الاسلامي قائمة ولم يتبلور له منهج ولا خطة دراسة علمية موضوعية، وكل ما أنتجه الأفاضل من العلماء المسلمين في مجالاته انما هو مجموعة من التأملات لم يكن فيها العناء لدراسات وأبحاث علمية منضبطة نامية تمد المجتمع بانظمة وبدائل تنظيمية اجتماعية، ولذلك ليس عجباً في هذه الحالة انه لم يتطور هذا المجال ليصبح علماً معترفاً به في مجالات الفكر الاسلامي، بل ظل يمثل عجزاً خطيراً تلمسه في الجمود وضعف القدرة التحليلية وضآلة المشاركة التطبيقية والتنظيمية الاجتماعية والاقتصار في الجوهر على الدراسات اللغوية والحواشي الاستطرادية والتعرض المقولب التاريخي للجوانب القانونية والوعظية.

لاشك ان هناك حاجة منهجية وعلمية وفكرية واجتماعية وحضارية ماسة لتبيين الفطرة الاجتماعية لدى الأفراد والجماعات الانسانية وتفاعلاتها، وتبين مدى الحاجة الى دراسة ذلك المجال ومعرفته ومعرفة سبل التعامل معه، وكذلك لتبين موضع كل من الوحي والعقل من هذه الدراسة وحدود كل واحد منهما في خطة هذه الدراسة، وسبل تكاملهما وتعاونهما في جلاء، وادراك كنه هذه الفطرة الاجتماعية التي تتكون منها النفوس والجماعات على ما أودعها الله من مكونات وسنن وأسرار.

وانطلاقاً من هذا المفهوم العام ومن هذه المطلقات المنهجية فان المسلم يعلم ان الله — سبحانه وتعالى — قد خلق الكون ومنه الانسان واودعه الفطرة التي قدرها له، وجزء من تلك الفطرة فطرة الانسان في بنائه جسداً ونفساً وروحاً وفي حاجاته ودوافعه ورغباته فرداً كان أو جماعة.

كذلك يعلم المسلم ان الوحي والعلم الشرعي يتعرض للانسان ككيان قائم متكامل فرداً كان أو جماعة، بالتوجيه والترشيد، له ولفطرته، نحو الخير والعدل لا نحو الظلم والشر.

فعلم الفطرة الاجتماعية هو علم دراسة الانسان وتكوينه النفسي والاجتماعي في مختلف جوانبه ودوافعه وغرائزه وحاجاته السياسية والاقتصادية والاخلاقية والتربوية كفرد وجماعة وما يؤثر فيه وكيف يؤثر فيه وكيف يستجيب له ولماذا يستجيب له، وكيف يمكن توفير حاجاته وتسخير طاقاته ومواجهة تحدياته وبناء أنظمتهم ومؤسساتهم وتطويرها وحفظها وصيانتها.

اما العلم الاهلي الشرعي في أصله فهو علم غاية الاجتماع البشري وضوابطه وتوجيهات سلوكه باتجاه العدل والخير ودفعه عن الظلم والشر، ويشتمل على غايات سامية وقيم خيرة وأوامر ونواهي نافعة القصد منها خير الانسان وصلاحه، وهي تتفاوت مقداراً وتفصيلاً حسب الحاجة من جانب اجتماعي الى جانب آخر، وفق ما قدرته الحكمة الالهية من حاجة الانسان ليحقق الغاية من وجوده وليحى الحياة الصحيحة الخيرة القويمية في هذه الدنيا ويوم يقوم الناس

لرب العالمين.

والعلمان والمعرفتان (علم الفطرة وعلم الشريعة) هما شقان ضروريان كلاهما لازمان لتحقيق المعرفة الاسلامية الاجتماعية، ليس فقط بمعرفة التوجهات الاسلامية ولكن ايضاً بمعرفة موضوع التوجهات الاسلامية وهو معرفة الفطرة الانسانية، وحتى يمكن ان يتم البناء الاجتماعي ويمكن تسخير الفطرة الاجتماعية الانسانية لتحقيق الحياة الاسلامية الصالحة.

انه لا يكفي معرفة الغاية وحدها في كثير من الأمور لانفاذ المطلوب فيها بل لابد من معرفة طبيعة كل موضوع ومعرفة موضع الحل والحيلة من خلال الفهم والدرس حتى يمكن تحقيق الغاية وبلوغ المقصود.

فلا يكفي — على سبيل المثال — معرفة التوجيه بالأمر بالصلاة أو أي عادة من عادات القدرة والخير، للنجاح في بذر العادة المنتظمة المتقنة، فحسن فهم نفسية الطفل، وحسن التعامل مع الطفل، والفرق ما بين طفل وطفل، وظروف طفل وطفل، هي الفصل في نجاح أب ومرب، وفشل أب ومرب، وليس مجرد العلم بالأمر والتوجيه والغاية من الأمر والتوجيه، وهذا الفرق هو جوهر الفرق بين مرب وآخر، قائد وآخر وموجه وآخر، فليس الفرق بين واحد من هذه الفئات وآخر في الأصل تفاوت القصد أو العلم بالغاية ولكنة في أغلب الأحوال هو التفاوت في العلم والدراية بطبيعة الموضوع المقصود انجازة والدراية به وبكيفية واسرار تكوينه ووجوه الحيلة والإمكان في مكوناته وتركيباته.

والمتلوق القرآني والسنة النبوية الشريفة تقرر وجود هذه الفطرة التي جاء الوحي بتحديد غاياتها وتوجيه طاقاتها وترشيد نوازعها. يقول الله سبحانه وتعالى: ﴿وَنَفْسٍ وَمَا سَوَّاهَا، فَأَلْهَمَهَا فُجُورَهَا وَتَقْوَاهَا، قَدْ أَفْلَحَ مَن زَكَّاهَا، وَقَدْ خَابَ مَن دَسَّاهَا﴾، ٩١:٧-١٠. فهذه النفس الانسانية سوى فطرتها بما تشتمل عليه من طاقات الخير والشر والفجور والتقوى ولا يكون فلاحها وتركيبها لا بطاعة الله وما أنزل من التوجيه والوحي.

ويقول الرسول الهادي عليه أفضل الصلاة والسلام: ”يولد المولود على الفطرة، فابواه يهودانه او ينصرانه“. ويوجه الخليفة الراشد عمر بن الخطاب السؤال الى من جاء مزكياً في مجلس قضاء الراشد عمر بن الخطاب السؤال الى من جاء مزكياً في مجلس قضاء فيقول له: ”هل جاورت الرجل؟ هل عاملته؟ فيقول: لا فيقول: لعلك رأيت ذاهباً الى المسجد أياًباً منه؟ فيقول: نعم، فيقول: اذهب ما عرفت الرجل.

وهذا الخليفة عمر رضي الله عنه وقد ووجه بمشكلة جنود الفتح يغتربون آماداً طويلة عن أزواجهم وأهلهم وأحس ما لهذا الوضع من مخاطر على سلامة الأسرة وقيمها وعلاقتها الاسلامية فتوجه بالسؤال الى بعض أمهات المؤمنين عن الفترة التي لا يكون معها خطر وضرورة على الزوجة وحاجاتها الروحية والجنسية، وما تحصل عليه من معلومات في حاجة النساء من النساء احتاط لما يمكن ان نسميه اليوم محدودية العينة التي توفرت له كأساس للقرار فأمر ان يعود الجند الى أهلهم في مدة أقل من المدة التي ذكرت له.

هذا المثال يخصص قراراً تشريعياً تنفيذياً في قضية لها جوانبها النفسية والاجتماعية فسمى المسؤول بأسلوب بسيط تلقائي بحسب ما توفر له الى دراسة الموضوع وما يتعلق به من شؤون الفطرة الاجتماعية والذي ولده روح الاسلام ومنهجه الشامل في نفوس رجال الصدر الأول وذلك قبل ان يأخذ فيه قراراً توجيهياً تشريعياً بل انه وبنفس اسلوب البساطة والتلقائية التي سمحت بها إمكانات العصر اتخذ احتياطه بسبب ما يمكن ان نسميه اليوم محدودية العينة التي استخدمهما للحصول على المعرفة والمعلومات الخاصة بموضوع الدراسة والقرار لذلك أمر ان يعود جنود الفتح من الجبهة الى أهاليهم في أمد أقصر مما ذكر كحد أقصى قبل ان يترك الاغتراب وغيبة الزوج عن زوجه آثاراً ضارة بها وبأسرتها.

من المهم ان نستطرد الى قضية هامة يوضحها المثال السابق بشأن قرار الخليفة الراشد عمر بن الخطاب عن المدة التي يتغيبها جنود الفتح عن زوجاتهم وأهليهم وهذه القضية الهامة ان البساطة والتلقائية في منهج النظر في سنن الفطرة الاجتماعية كانت أيضاً هي سمة النظر في أصول التنزيل وتوجيه الاسلام، فالمنهج المدرسي في الأصول لم يعرف على ذلك العهد، وانما نمى وتطور مع نمو وتطور الإمكانيات والحاجات والظروف الى ان صدر أول عمل مدرسي مكتوب على يد الامام الشافعي في كتابه "الرسالة" وللأسف فان التطور الابحاثي في تأصيل منهج دراسة التنزيل وتفصيله قابله تطور عكسي بشأن منهج دراسة الفطرة وسننها وتأصيله وتفصيله، فلا بد من تحديد النظر في القضيتين وفي تأصيلهما وتفصيلهما بما يحقق حاجات الحياة الاسلامية وروح الاسلام وغايات الاسلام ومنهج الاسلام. ولا بد للحكم والمعرفة من دراية وخبرة بعدها يكون الحكم ويكون الرأي والافتاء. وان منطلقاً ومفهوماً ونظرة مقررة في اصل المنهج وفي ممارسات الصدر الأول لم تحظ بالبلورة والتنمية والتأصيل المنهجي المدرسي والممارسة العلمية التي كان المسلمون أولى بها في سواهم.

انه لا بد لنا اليوم من تصحيح منهجي وبلورة واضحة في البؤرة العلمية الاسلامية لاصلاح وتحديد المعرفة الاسلامية، ولتعطي علم الفطرة الاجتماعية ودراستها مكانها وكيانها وآفاقها ومنهجها العلمية في خدمة المعرفة الاسلامية في تكامل وتكاتف مع العلم والمعرفة الشرعية يداً بيد وجنباً الى جنب في تكوين العقلية والمعرفة والفصول والمناهج الدراسية الاسلامية.

اذا نظرنا اليوم الى أمم الأرض المتمكنة رغم قصور توجهاتها أو فسادها، لانجد لها من سبب من أسباب القوة في تنظيماتها وإنجازاتها ومستوياتها الحضارية وتطبيقاتها وعلاقاتها الاجتماعية وقدراتها المادية، الا سبباً واحداً أساسياً، أخذوا به وتمكنوا منه، واهملناه ولم نجعل له في اطار نظرنا ولا مناهج فكرنا وتربيتنا موضعاً، وهو الدراسة المنهجية والمعرفة العلمية لسير كنه الفطرة الاجتماعية ، وتسخيرها لغاياتهم وتوجهاتهم على ما بينها من اختلاف وما بها من قصور، فكان لفكرهم وتوجهاتهم على علاقتها فاعلية ولتطلعاتهم وقيمهم وعقائدهم رونقاً وتنظيمات ووسائل، تنجز لهم المطلوب وتقرب منهم البعيد، فكان فكراً الى قول الى فعل وتنظيم وثمر.

أما نحن بالتركيز على علوم الغايات والمقاصد وإهمال علوم الفطرة والوسائل فقد غرقنا وذهلت قدراتنا وطاقاتنا في خدر أحلامنا وهويماتنا وذكريات سامي مقاصدنا دون قدرة ودون عزم، وكان حالنا قول من لا يجبر وعزم من لا يقدر وبيع من لا يملك، وكأن أمرنا الى جهل الى قول الى جهل الى عجز، وكان حالنا أحلاماً ورجبات وغضباً وهدماً وبكاء ومباهاة وتحسراً وترانا في نهاية المطاف فرقاً وقطعاناً ومزقاً تتصارع جموعها لا تقدر ولا تفعل، ولا تضر بجهلها وعجزها وتمزقها الا نفسها، ولا تنفع بجهلها وقصورها وتمزقها الا عدوها، آفتها العجز عن الادراك والتنظيم والتنفيذ، رغم وفرة الإمكانيات والقيم والغايات والتطلعات.

لا عجز عن النداء ولكن عجز عن تلبية النداء بكل ما يتطلبه النجاح من علم ودراسة بالواقع والسنن والطبائع بكل ألوانها وادراك سبل تسخيرها وتطويرها وتسييرها نحو الغاية المرجوة منها.

لو اننا واجهنا انفسنا بصراحة لأدركنا ان تصورنا عن أعدائنا ومناجزنا الذين تمكنوا منا وتفوقوا علينا ليس بمجرد تفوقهم وتمكنهم من علوم الفطرة الفيزيائية، فقد هتتنا خلف هذا وحصلنا منه الكثير الذي يظل يتفلسف منا ولا نعرف كيف نحفظه ونحافظ عليه، مهما ارسلنا من بعثات وأقمنا من معاهد ومؤسسات علمية وجامعات حيث ليس لنا ما لهم من ادراك وعلم بالفطرة الاجتماعية، سخروها لخدمة قيمهم وغاياتهم — على ما بها من انحراف وقصور — وبناء مؤسساتهم ومجتمعاتهم وتنظيمها واستقرارها ولتتأسك وتسعى باستمرار لمواجهة العقبان والأزمات والتحديات في انجاز حضاري متصاعد.

وحتى حين بدأنا نأخذ بما لديهم من تراث وتنظيم اجتماعي، أخذنا بجهالة لا نفرق بين ماهو علم فطرة، وماهو تنظيم اجتماعي مركب من غاية ووسيلة، بخدم غاية من صنعه وركبه، فكأن اساتذتنا وقادتنا وخبرائنا المثقفين أشبه ما يكونون بالجهلة المسنين الذين يركنون الى خيرتهم القاصرة في علاج الأمراض، فالدواء المعهود لكل مريض موعود اذا تشابهت عليهم الأورام والأعراض، تنال بالأذى والردى القريب والصديق.

وكا أن الداء والدواء لا يكونان الا بدراية منضبطة محددة لكل حالة بما يناسبها، فكذلك النظم والتنظيمات الاجتماعية، بغض النظر بما خلفها من مصادر المعرفة الفطرية وغير الفطرية، فانها تمثل وتخدم توجهات وعقائد وقيم وغايات بعينها وفق ظروف وإمكانيات بعينها، لا يمكن سحبها من أمة الى أمة ومن بلد الى بلد ومن زمن الى زمن، دون دراية وعلم بمكوناتها وتوجهاتها، فما لغير المسلم لا يصلح اعتباطاً للمسلم، وما كان لقوم أو أرض أو زمن لا يصلح لقوم وأرض وزمن آخرين دون علم ودراية بأحوال ومكونات هؤلاء الآخرين.

لذلك فإن دراسات ابناء المسلمين للعلوم الاجتماعية في البلاد الأجنبية، دون دليل ولا مرشد، ولا وعي على النهج والغاية والكليات، ودون قاعدة فكرية علمية منهجية اسلامية، تستقبل ما درسوا وما حصلوا الى بوتقة ثقافتها وحضارتها ومحصلة معارفها، كان طبيعياً أن تصبح دراسات عقيمة سقيمة خاوية لاتنمو ولا تتجدد، ولا تسمن ولا تنفع، ولكن تخلق بهلوانات علمية وثقافية، لها من العلم والخبرة والنفع مظهره، ولكنها في نهاية المطاف لاتعود

الثياب والمراكب الفارحة البراقة والألفاظ المستغربة العجماء التي يتسترون بها على خوائهم وعجزهم عن تحقيق الآمال المعقودة على علمهم وقيادتهم.

ليس المطلوب تلقينا وحفظاً ومحاكاة للقديم أو للغريب بل المطلوب اسلام وإحسان ووعي وتأصيل ومنهج، نسير على هداة وعلى أساسه نعمل ونبني وتمثل، لنعيش وقوة وقدرة وحضارة.

مطلوب معرفة وقدرة اسلامية متأصلة منهجية، في كل جوانب الوجود والحياة، روحية ومعنوية ومادية، اجتماعية وسياسية واقتصادية وتقنية وتربوية وجمالية، على أساس من منهج الفهم والادراك الصحيح، والتعامل العلمي الواعي القادر المتمكن المتجاوب مع الوحي الالهي والفترة الالهية في الانسان والوجود، لاتعامل الجاهل المتجاهل لها المعارض بقصد ودون قصد لمكوناتها وتركيبتها وعلاقتها ونواميسها.

ومن نافلة القول ان ادراك الفترة الاجتماعية للانسان ونواميسها وتداخلاتها وتنظيم ادائها والتعامل معها أصعب وأعقد من كثير من ألوان الفترة الفيزيائية للكون والوجود.

أمثلة توضيحية في مجال الدراسات السياسية:

فلو أخذنا حالة الدراسات السياسية الاسلامية بشكل عام كنموذج لحال المعرفة الاسلامية والفكر الاسلامي بشكل عام لأمكن أن نفهم معنى هذا القصور في المنهج.

فالكتابات السياسية كانت ولا تزال في جوهرها كتابات شكلية وصفية تتركز على منصب الخليفة واختصاصاته ومؤهلته الشخصية وعلى شكلية البيعة وولاية العهد والغايات الاسلامية الكبرى من الحكم وما يتعلق بها من نص الأوامر والنواهي لما يستحب وما لا يستحب وما يجب وما لا يجب.

والكتابات الاسلامية المعاصرة لم تخرج من ذلك النطاق الا الى نطاق الشكليات الدستورية الغربية في مبادئ الحكم في الحرية والعدل والمساواة والديمقراطية والسيادة ومركز رئيس الدولة وطبيعة سلطاته الدستورية.

ومن الواضح ان خلفية هذه الدراسات الاسلامية الحديثة هي فقط مرويات السنة ووصف المؤسسات الرسمية للخلافة الراشدة، وفي الوقت نفسه لا تتمتع بأي دراسة علمية سياسية بشكل فني عام ومن باب أولى الا تتمتع بأي معرفة سياسية بشكل فني خاص يتعلق بمعرفة حقيقة حقبة عمر الخلافة الراشدة ولا مبررات تنظيماتها وأسباب اتباعها والأخذ بها في البيعة الزمانية والمكانية الانسانية والمادية والحضارية لعصر الخلافة، وفي ظل الغايات والتوجهات الاسلامية. وهذا القصور في المعرفة الفنية السياسية يجعل كثيراً مما تقول به هذه الدراسات مخطيء الدلالة عقيم المعنى، يخلط فيه الأمر بالأمر، والغاية بالوسيلة. ونضرب على سبيل المثال أحداث الردة والمرتدين من الأعراب والآثار والأحاديث النبوية التي تعلقت بها وتحدثت عنها وأشارت إليها وذلك في نهاية عهد النبوة قبيل وفاة الرسول ﷺ. وقد أخذت

بعض القبائل العربية التي كانت في كثير من الحالات في حالة من الجهالة والتوحش وضعف التربية والتهديب الاجتماعي والحضاري. ولم تألف بعد الخضوع للحكومة وتنظيم سياسي عام، وأخذت تظهر التمرد وتعلن العصيان على دولة الاسلام.

ومن الواضح ان تلك الآثار وتلك الأحاديث انما تعالج قضية التمرد والعصيان السياسي داخل الدولة وحق الدولة في قمع التمرد والعصيان السياسي، وان تحمي الحقوق الانسانية الأساسية، وان تحافظ على كيان الدولة والمجتمع من التمزق نتيجة الجهالة وضعف التربية الاجتماعية.

هذه الآثار والأحاديث تصبح عند الكتاب والباحثين غير أصحاب الاختصاص والخبرة بالسياسة والأنظمة السياسية نصوص تخدم أغراض المركزية الاستبدادية والسلطة السياسية المطلقة وفرض أغراض الصراعات الشعبية والقبلية والأسرية ضمن ما يعرف في المعالجات التقليدية «بوحدة الخلافة».

وهكذا يفرغ الفكر والبحث من الحاجة الى المعرفة والخبرة والدراية ويفرغ من البحث والدراسة والتحليل الموضوعي للنصوص وللموضوع والقضية التي تعلقت بها النصوص وظروفها وملابساتها الظاهرة وغير الظاهرة، والخاصة والعامّة وعلاقة كل ذلك بسياسة الأمة وبناء أنظمتها السياسية في الأزمان والمواقع والإمكانات المختلفة المتباينة اللاحقة.

وبذلك ينزوي الفكر السياسي الاسلامي كما أنزوي سواه من الوان الفكر ليصبح دراسة تاريخية وفكرًا شكليًا ثانويًا في قضايا وحدة الخلافة ومركزية السلطة ومواصفات شخص الخليفة ونسبه وبيعه وولاية عهده يستخرجها أصحاب الأغراض لخدمة أغراضهم لا ليكون فكرًا قائمًا موجهًا يحرك الطاقات وينمي الساحات ويعد العدة لمواجهة التحديات.

الدراسة السياسية الاسلامية دراسة علمية ناقدة:

وليست الدراسة الناقدة هي التي فقط تدل على المحاسن وتبرز الانجازات، وهي ليست الدراسة التي تكفي بالحديث عن وجوه العجز والقصور، ان الدراسة العلمية الناقدة هي دراسة موضوعية تحليلية شاملة تعنى بفهم القيم والغايات والوسائل والمسببات والظروف والإمكانات وتشيد بالنجاحات وتلفت النظر الى وجوه الفشل والقصور وتستمد من كل ذلك المعرفة وتستفيد العظات والعبر.

ولعل من أهم ما يمكن ان يستفاد من دراسة دولة الخلافة ونظمها فهم اختيارات الخلافة الراشدة، وظروف هذه الخيارات ومبرراتها، والأسباب الجوهرية والموضوعية والتنظيمية التي أدت الى انجازات الخلافة وكذلك فهم الأسباب التي أدت الى سقوط الخلافة الراشدة وانهيارها، وهذا اللون من الدراسة هو الدراسة المفيدة المطلوبة التي تعين القيادات والأمة على إعادة بناء كيانها وأنظمتها وتقضي على وجوه التمزق والاستبداد والطغيان التي تعاني منها أنظمة البلاد الاسلامية السياسية وممارساتها الفكرية والاجتماعية.

المعرفة السياسية الإسلامية أكبر بكثير من مجرد تلقين النصوص والأوصاف المأثورة في الحكم والخلافة في الصدر الأول، فهذه النصوص والأوصاف هي بعد الفهم والادراك الكلي الشامل تمثل جانب التوجه والغاية، والإسلامية، كما تمثل السياسات النبوية وسياسات الخلفاء الراشدين في ظروف الصدر الأول وإمكاناته المادية والاجتماعية والدولية والتي تستمد منها العظات والعبر ولا يقصد بها التكرار واقتفاء الأثر. أما دراسة الفطرة السياسية للإنسان (علم السياسة) فهو الشق الآخر الذي لا بد منه لبناء مناهج متكاملة سليمة وكوادر وأنظمة قادرة وتخطيط ودراية وفعل مرسوم معلوم، فالإنسان كان ولا يزال في ظل الغاية الإسلامية وفي غير ظل الغاية الإسلامية وقبل الإسلام وبعد الإسلام سياسياً بالطبع كما عرفه قدماء علماء السياسة والدارسون لها، ولا تكون لنا معرفة بالسياسة إذا لم تكن لنا معرفة بهذا الطبع، كما انه لا يكون علاقة بالإسلام إذا لم نسخر هذه المعرفة وهذا الطبع لتحقيق غايات الإسلام في هذا المجال وفي كل مجال.

وعلم السياسة بالطبع غير دراسة الأنظمة السياسية الغربية والديمقراطية الغربية، والأنظمة الغربية أو الشرقية، فدراسة أنظمة بعينها وفهمها، هو جزء تطبيقي لهذه الدراسة، وفهم الطبع الانساني السياسي يشمل دراسة الأنظمة السياسية القديمة والحديثة، ولكنه يتعدى ذلك الى دائرة أوسع طلباً لفهم الفطرة الانسانية السياسية، وجوانبها المختلفة، وكيفية أداؤها وتفاعلها وتجاوبها والدراسة السياسية التطبيقية هي وسيلة لفهم الفطرة السياسية في أوسع مدى تستخلص من دراسة الأنظمة والتطبيقات وقد خالطتها غاية أو أخرى وتأثرت بمعطيات زمانية ومكانية بعينها، واستجابت ل: حديات واجهتها بذاتها فانعكست تلك الظروف والمعطيات على الفطرة الانسانية لتعطي نظاماً أو آخر، واهتماماً أو آخر يكون موضع الدراسة والتحليل والعبرة.

فالمعرفة السياسية الإسلامية، لا يمكن ان تكون مجرد مجموعة الغايات والتوجيهات الإسلامية، ولا مجموعة الأوصاف الشكلية لحقبة زمانية أو أخرى، ولكنها المعرفة الشرعية والفطرية التي تتعلق بالظاهرة السياسية في الفرد والمجتمع الانساني وتستفاد من دراسة الوحي ومن دراسة الانسان والفطرة الانسانية والأنظمة السياسية في مختلف الظروف والإمكانات والأزمنة.

والدراسة السياسية الإسلامية بذلك تتعلق بكل ما يتصل بكليات الفرد والمجتمع، نفسياً واجتماعياً واقتصادياً وجغرافياً وتاريخياً واسلامياً فيما يتعلق بالظاهرة السياسية وأنظمتها وعلاقاته المختلفة وهي بذلك دراسة تحليلية شاملة لا تقتصر فقط على المقاصد والغايات ولكن تشمل الطابع والظروف والوسائل والتنظيم والتطبيقات.

السياسة والعلماء المسلمون:

ولو أخذنا بعد هذه الجولة في معنى الدراسة السياسية نماذج من بعض الدراسات الإسلامية في مجال السياسة والحكم لرأينا أن عدم التبلور المنهجي بشأن مصادر المعرفة

الاسلامية بشقيها في علم الفطرة وعلم الشريعة هو السبب الأهم فيما لحق هذه الدراسات من قصور في وجه أو آخر مما أدى الى عدم الاستفادة الكاملة من دراسات بعض الأفاضل المسلمين وتأملاتهم في هذا المجال.

ابن تيمية والسياسة الشرعية:

ولاشك ان شيخ الاسلام أبو العباس أحمد بن عبد الحلیم بن عبد السلام المعروف بابن تيمية (٦٦١-٧٢٨هـ) رجل فذ وعقلية نيرة. ويلاحظ ان عقلية الامام بن تيمية وبالتالي كتاباته تميزت بالتجديد والتأثير.

وابن تيمية مثل غيره من العلماء الأذكياء ممن لهم باع يتمتع بالمعرفة والاطلاع على الشريعة وكتبها ومراجعتها، ولكن ما يميزه عن كثير من أولئك العلماء هو نزوله الى المجتمع، وخلطته بالناس واهتمامه بهم وبقضاياهم، والسعي من أجلهم ومن أجل صلاحهم، ومقاومة الفساد والضلال في صفوف حكاهمهم، والعمل على اعدادهم لمقاومة أعدائهم من تثار وصليبين، ولذلك كان له اهتمام بدراسة قضايا وثقافات عصره، وما تشتمل عليه من فلسفات ومذاهب ومعتقدات وفرق.

كما أعطته خلطته وسعيه معرفة بالناس وأحوالهم وواقعهم ، ولذلك كانت كتاباته ودراساته وفتاواه مما يتسم بسمة التجديد، والتوجه إلى الناس وواقعهم وحل قضاياهم والاجابة على مشاكلهم والاستجابة الى احتياجاتهم في بيئتهم وظروفهم، فكان حرباً على الانحراف العقدي وعلى الظلم السياسي، ميسراً لحاجات الناس عاطفاً على أحوالهم، لذلك لا غرابة ان نجد أن ابن تيمية الذي يجارب أصحاب العقائد المنحرفة ويقف في وجه الظلم والظغيان، ويسجن في سجون السلاطين، بل ويموت في تلك السجون، هو الذي يخفف عن الناس في الفتوى في أمور كثيرة لعل من أشهرها فتوى وقوع لفظ الطلاق ثلاثاً طلقاً واحدة، على غير ما راه واجتهد وأفتى به الخليفة الراشد عمر بن الخطاب، وأجمعت عليه الأمة والعلماء من بعد ذلك، ولو نظرنا الى دافع ابن تيمية لرأينا بصيرته بواقع الناس الذين لم يعودوا على ما كان عليه الناس من أصحاب رسول الله ﷺ أيام عمر بن الخطاب — رضي الله عنه — من انضباط وجدية، فأخذ أصحاب الرسول ﷺ بالشدة دافع لهم، الى مزيد من الجِد والانضباط، جنوداً أشداء، والتضييق عليهم تقويم لهم. ولا يمكن ان يتخذ نفس الموقف نحو الأمم والقبائل الذين تفسى فيهم الانحراف والفساد والتسيب والتزق والجهل والضياع وعسف بهم الأعداء، ولذلك فحكمة المرات الثلاثة لوقوع الطلاق أولى بمثل هؤلاء القوم، فلا تنفك روابط الأسر ان وقع الطلاق لحماقة الحمقى، ويضيع الضعاف نساء وأطفالاً ، ولا يعيش الناس في ضعف الخطيئة وذلك مظنة السفاح بين الأزواج حين يتصلون مما نطقت به المستهم من الفاظ الطلاق البائن.

كان هذا سر قوة الامام أحمد بن تيمية وابتكاره وتجديده، وهو ليس فقط معرفة

الواسعة بالشرع بل ومعرفته أيضاً بالناس واحوالهم من حوله. الا أن عدم ادراك القوة المنهجية لهذه المعرفة عند الامام ابن تيمية كانت هي السبب اولاً في ان عقلية الامام والجددة في فكره، لم تصيح مدرسة يتابع فيها العلماء والنوابغ من بعده العطاء والتجديد من ناحية، ومن ناحية اخرى فان أعماله لم تحقق كل ما كان لثله ان يحققه لو وجد من بعده من يتابع مسيرته في العطاء المتجدد، ومن أهم الأمثلة على هذا كتابه الجليل المعروف باسم "السياسة الشرعية في اصلاح الراعي والرعية"، فهذا الكتاب الجليل يتناول القضايا التي رآها الامام بثاقب نظره نقطة الضعف في الحياة السياسية الاسلامية، وهو ضياع عنصر الكفاءة في أداء المهام والوظائف السياسية والاجتماعية، فواضح عقلياً ومنطقياً واصلاً شرعياً هذه الصفات، وهي "القوة والأمانة"، قال: ﴿اجعلني على خزائن الأرض ابي حفيظ عليه السلام﴾ ١٢: ٥٥. ولكن ابن تيمية بقي في حدود الغايات والتوجيهات والصفات المطلوبة، ولم يتطرق الى قضية الأمة الاسلامية السياسية حتى هذا اليوم، وهي كيف يتم تحقيق المطلوب، وكيف يجند الناس والمجتمع للوصول الى الغاية المطلوبة، ولا أي المناهج والبرامج والأوضاع مطلوب احداثها او تعديلها وبأي صفة، ولا أي المؤسسات والتنظيمات مطلوب إنشاؤها، لإنتاج المطلوب واحداثه، وكيف يتم التوصل الى بنائها وصيانتها. هذا المنحى لامتجد له صدى في هذه الدراسة بل اكفى بتوضيح الغايات المرجوة واناطها بالامام او السلطان الذي ما يزال الكثيرون يرونه على صورته التقليدية، هو اساس الانحراف والقصور.

أغلب الظن لو كان هناك وعي منهجي ودراية علمية بالفطرة السياسية والدراسات السياسية والتاريخ السياسي لما توقفت الدراسة السياسية الاسلامية بعمامة ودراسة الامام ابن تيمية في ذلك العمل الجليل عند ذلك الحد، ولما قصرت الدراسات السياسية الاسلامية المعاصرة في هذا الباب، رغم الاهتمام بالحكم والحكام وبالكتاب وصاحب الكتاب واعماله وتجديدهاته الكثيرة الأخرى من قبل الكتاب الاسلاميين المعاصرين اصحاب الاهتمام بالقضية السياسية الاسلامية.

ابن خلدون والمقدمة:

ولعل القضية العكسية لحالة الامام أحمد بن تيمية، هي حالة الامام ولي الدين عبد الرحمن بن محمد المعروف بابن خلدون (١٣٣٢-١٤٠٦) وسفره العلمي الجليل المعروف "بمقدمة ابن خلدون"، فهذا الكتاب من أهم ما يلاحظ عليه ان اهتمام المسلمين وحفاوتهم به جاءت على إثر حفاوة الغرب والعلماء الغربيين به، وادراكهم لقيمتها العلمية.

ومصدر اهتمام العلماء الغربيين به هو انه دراسة علمية في الفطرة الاجتماعية للانسان حاول فيها ان يعلم وان يتقصى هذه الفطرة، ليعرف كنهها وكيف تعمل وتتصرف وكيف تقم الأنظمة والدول، وما الذي يؤدي الى قيامها واسباب قوتها وضعفها وزوالها، استقرأ في ذلك عقلياً ما يعرف وما ينبج من أحوال الناس وطباعهم، وما يعرف من السير والتاريخ للدول

والشعوب ليستخلص المعرفة والعظة والعبرة المطلوبة.

والسؤال لماذا لم يحظ عمل الامام ابن خلدون بالاهتمام والحفاوة والتأثير المتوقع لدى المسلمين، قبل ان يكتشفه الغرب، بمثل ما كان من حظ كتاب ابن تيمية في السياسة الشرعية. وحتى اليوم تظل في الحقيقة الحفاوة بعمل ابن خلدون لدى الأوساط المثقفة ثقافة غربية ومدنية أصلاً، أكثر منها لدى الدائرة الاسلامية، ورغم ان ابن خلدون كان من العلماء وتولى رئاسة القضاء والافتاء المالكي مرات عديدة.

من يطلع على العمل يصعب عليه أن يلاحظ ان عمل ابن خلدون على عظمته وعمقه وأهميته في فهم الفطرة السياسية والاجتماعية للشعوب والدول الا ان جانب التأثير الشرعي والغاية الشرعية فيه ضعيفة، فلا تبدو للكتاب غاية اسلامية اصلاحية مباشرة كما في عمل ابن تيمية، بل ان دراسة ابن خلدون لم تلتزم بالمبادئ الاسلامية العامة وتجاوزتها، دون تحرير، حتى ليصدمك على سبيل المثال للمسة العنصرية التي تبدو في أحكام ابن خلدون في الحديث عن بعض الشعوب وانحطاطها عنده بالطبع، رغم ان التوجيه الاسلامي والحس الاسلامي لا يتقبل مثل هذا المفهوم في أصل الطبع، فكل الناس من نفس واحدة، وكلهم في فطرة الانسانية وحقوقها سواء.

ولا يصعب ان نفهم سر هذا التجاوز في جانب الغاية الشرعية في كتابة ابن خلدون ودراسته، وذلك اذا تعرفنا على عصر ابن خلدون وشخصيته ومطامحه.

فابن خلدون نشأ في عصر مليء بالفتن والتقلبات والحروب وعدم الاستقرار من ناحية، كما نشأ هو في أعمال الكتابة في دواوين السلاطين مما ملأ نفسه بالرغبة في السلطة والتقرب منها والسعي اليها، ولذلك كان مصدر شيابه يتقلب في البلاطات منغمساً في المؤتمرات السياسية، طالباً للسلطة والجاه والكتابة والوزارة، وتعرض في سبيل ذلك للمخاطر، ولذلك ليس عجباً حين يجلس للكتابة واستلهم خبرته ان تنعكس شخصيته وتطلعاته وخبرته على عمله العلمي، فتأتي كتاباته وأفكاره في كلياتها سعياً لفهم الدولة والمجتمع، وفهم السلطة وسبل التحكم منها، بعيداً عن الغايات الاصلاحية بمفهومها الاسلامي واهتمامات علماء الاسلام بها.

ولحظ الفكر الاسلامي العاثر هكذا حين توفر الدفع في هذه الكتابة في ذلك الوقت المبكر باتجاه علم الفطرة الاجتماعية لم يكن له نفس القدر من الدفع نحو علم الشريعة والغاية الاسلامية، فلم يحدث ذلك العمل الجليل الأثر الذي كان يمكن ان يكون له في فتح الآفاق المنهجية العلمية، التي رآها فيه علماء الغرب الذين لا يهابون للجانب الشرعي بطبيعة الحال وكذلك كان من الطبيعي ان يحنو من تتقف ثقافتهم حذوهم في الحفاوة والاهتمام، والفهم لقيمة هذا العمل، بل اننا تاريخياً نجد الحكام والسلاطين المسلمين يعطون هذا العمل قدراً من الحفاوة والاهتمام به والاطلاع عليه أكبر مما يعطيه العلماء وأصحاب التوجه الاسلامي.

ولهذا لم يقدر لهذا العمل الفكري الخطير ان يحدث التأثير المطلوب، والذي هو بالدرجة الأولى التأميل المنهجي لدراسات الفطرة الاجتماعية والاهتمام بها في دائرة المعرفة الاسلامية.

الماوردي والأحكام السلطانية:

أما الدراسة الثالثة التي تناولها في هذا الاستعراض فهو العمل الفقهي الكبير للامام أبي حسن علي بن محمد بن حبيب المعروف بالماوردي (٤٥٠هـ) من قضاة العصر العباسي الثاني المتأخر وكبار فقهاءه.

وكتابه الجليل "الأحكام السلطانية" من أهم الكتب التراثية المعروفة في شؤون السياسة والحكم الاسلامي في أنظمة الخلافة والوزارة والامارة والدواوين واحكامها، وجل من كتب من العلماء في هذه المواضيع فانما ينهل منه ويقتفي أثره.

وإذا استعرضنا الكتاب نجده يعرض أوسع العرض التوجهات الاسلامية المعهودة في هذه القضايا، كما يستعرض ويفصل ويأصل الأنظمة والمؤسسات السياسية والادارية القائمة في زمانه من زاوية العلم الشرعي.

ولكن الذي يلفت النظر، ان جهد الامام الماوردي يقف في جله في الدراسة على الجوانب الشكلية، وتبرير القائم منها، والحيلة لتأييد ما يظنه مصلحة أو يدفع به ضرراً من التمسك بالخليفة القرشي ضد الغاصبين الأعاجم، الذين مزقوا أوصال الدولة واستهانوا بالشرعية والدين، حتى لو لم يبق للخليفة من السلطة الا الأسم، ولو كان وجوده وتنصيبه أمراً صورياً وذلك استجابة لارادة الأقوى من الأمراء الذين استمرأوا قتل الخلفاء واقعادهم عن الخلافة، حتى يسهل بذلك تنصيب من يحلو للأمر الغاصب ما دام وجود الخليفة تأكيداً لاستمرار المشروعية من الدين والشرعية ولذلك اضطر لتسهيل الأمر وتخريجهم عنده على عقد النكاح، وما أبعد الشقة بين العقديين. ولتحقيق نفس الغرض لم يقبل بقيام اكثر من خلافة الا بشروط تجعل قيامها ينطبق على الواقع القائم في زمانه وهو قيام امر واقع وهو قيام خلافة مستقلة في أرض الأندلس لا امل في إزالتها واخضاعها لخلافة بغداد فلا يكون قيامها ايذاناً بممالك كثيرة خلفاؤها الأمراء الأعاجم الغاصبون الذين لا يحسنون فهماً للشرعية ولا التزاماً باحكامها.

وهكذا كان فكر الامام في كتابه تبريراً تابعاً للأحداث لا رائداً ولا قيادياً ولا صاحب رؤية اسلامية بديلة، ولا غرابة في هذه النتيجة رغم الاخلاص اذا كان منطلق الدراسة هو المعرفة التقليدية وحدها والتركيز على صيانة الشكل وصيانة ما تبقى من الشريعة قبل أي شيء آخر.

الفارابي والمدينة الفاضلة:

والنموذج الآخر الذي نستعرضه هنا في هذا المجال هو الكتابة السياسية لعلم من اعلام ما يعرف بالفلاسفة المسلمين وهو أبو نصر محمد بن زلغ بن لاخان المعروف بالفارابي (٧٨٠-٩٥٠م) صاحب كتاب "المدينة الفاضلة" وهو يمثل العلماء المتأخرين الذين تأثروا بالتراث اليوناني الأجنبي، ولذلك لا نجد لكتابه "المدينة الفاضلة" في الفكر السياسي الاسلامي

اي تأثير اصلاحي او منهجي لأنه وان كان كتاباً يحمل أصداء التوجهات الاسلامية الاصلاحية الا أن منهجه غريب اسلامياً ويمثل منهجاً مثالياً خيالياً يونانياً ولذلك فلا غرابة الا يترك أثراً ولا يلقى حفاوة في الفكر الاسلامي السياسي، وان تقتصر الحفاوة به والاهتمام بامره على المثقفين الناهلين من فكر الثقافة الغربية، المتشعبة بالتأثير اليوناني والمناهج الفكرية اليونانية. كما أن الاهتمام بفكر أمثال الفارابي من الفلاسفة قد يأتي أيضاً من بعض أصحاب الأغراض للدعاية في صفوف مثقفي الأمة أو التعريض بالقدرة الثقافية الاسلامية ومكانتها الحضارية وذلك بدعوى النقل أو التأثير الأجنبي على الحضارة الاسلامية وتقليد الثقافات الأجنبية، خاصة الثقافة اليونانية والرومانية. وكل هذا، النقد والتقويم يجب ألا يمنع من اعطاء كل ذي حق حقه ومعرفة قدره وعطائه بغض النظر عن أي اعتبارات جانبية ، وعلينا أن نكسب من التجربة التاريخية إمكاناتها الايجابية في خدمة الأمة والحضارة الاسلامية المعاصرة.

وهكذا في القديم وفي الحديث فان الدراسات الاسلامية الاجتماعية بما فيها الدراسات السياسية ما زالت كما نرى لم تكتمل لها اسباب النمو والعطاء في العصور المتأخرة بسبب هذا النقص المنهجي، الذي لا بد لنا من تلافيه حتى نشق طريقنا برؤية واضحة وبلورة مكتملة وفاعلية مؤثرة، تربط العقيدة والقيم والتوجهات بالواقع والممارسات، وترسم الوجهة والطريق، وتحدد الخطط الرائدة، المنبثقة من الاسلام، ومن واقع المجتمع وقدراته وإمكاناته وظروفه، في معرفة متكاملة من المعرفة بالشرع والخبرة بالفطرة.

ثانياً: في الحركة الاجتماعية: الفقه الشرعي الحركي

سبق ان تعرضنا بالتوضيح لما أصاب المسيرة الاسلامية بسقوط الخلافة الراشدة، وما نجم عن ذلك من عدم اكتمال عطائها وعطاء جيل الأصحاب الذي أقامها وذلك في الجوانب التنظيمية والمنهجية، لانشغال الخلافة والأصحاب بالأعباء الكبرى في ارساء قواعد الدولة ومواجهة المخاطر ونشر الدعوة.

ورغم ان منهج فكرهم كان من الممكن استخلاصه من أعمالهم ومسلكتهم وانجازاتهم، الا ان سقوط دولة الخلافة وانتقال السلطة السياسية الى قوة سياسية تعتمد على قاعدة سياسية من الأعراب والطلقاء والقبائل والبيوتات ذات النفوذ الغابر واتباع الاسلام الجدد من أبناء الأطراف والأمم المجاورة اللاحقة بالاسلام، وبعض أبناء الجيل الثاني من المسلمين، كل ذلك مما أدى الى قيام الدولة الأموية والدول اللاحقة على أساس الانقسام والمواجهة بين القيادة السياسية والقيادة الفكرية، كل ذلك ساعد على ضمور الفكر وضعف نموه وقصوره وعجزه عن استخلاص المفاهيم والدروس الكاملة من مسيرة الصدر الأول ومنهجه واسباب عطائه وقوته.

ومن أهم انواع القصور التي خلفها هذا الوضع لولان من ألوان القصور على الوجه التالي:

القصور الأول: قصور المنهج عن مجال الدراسات العلمية لعلم الفطرة الاجتماعية:

وهذا القصور هو ما سبق ان تحدثنا عنه في قضايا المنهج، من عدم تبلور علم الفطرة الاجتماعية ووضوح موضعه ومكانته في الفكر الاسلامي ومنهجه العلمي والحضاري ، رغم ان ذلك لايعني غياباً كاملاً لنظريات اسلامية وكتابات وتأملات كثيرة هنا وهناك تستقي قيمتها وعمقها عن فهم ودراية خاصة بالفطرة الاجتماعية في وجه أو آخر، نلمسها كما سبق ان ذكرنا في أعمال رجال أذكيا أفذاذ كأئمة المذاهب وأمثال الغزالي والجويني وابن حزم وابن تيمية وابن خلدون، في اعمال تناولت مجالات مختلفة كعلم النفس والاجتماع والتربية والسياسة والتاريخ، ولكن ذلك لم يكن كما سبق ان ذكرنا عملاً منهجياً متبلوراً في رؤيته لمصادره ووسائله ومعايره الاسلامية، مما جعل تلك الأعمال نوادير لأئمة مجتهدين عمالقة، كل من سواهم ناقل مقلد، لا مدارس ومناهج كل من يأخذ بنصيب منها له حظه من العطاء والابداع والاجتهاد.

وبالطبع كما ذكرنا فغياب العلماء عن مركز المسؤولية السياسية أضعف الرؤية والحاجة الى معرفة الواقع والفطرة الاجتماعية، وعمى عليهم قيمة هذا الجانب في اسلوب فكر الصدر الأول وعطائه، وبالتالي أجل وعطل قدرا كبيرا من العطاء الحضاري الاجتماعي للأمة، ولم يمكنها من تجديد مؤسساتها وتنظيماتها، وجرها الى الغياب الفكري والتدهور الحضاري المريع الذي تعيش الأمة اليوم في منحدراته ومستنقعاته.

القصور الثاني: غياب الفكر الحركي ودوره في تنمية المعرفة الاسلامية وتطور النظم والمؤسسات الاجتماعية الاسلامية:

وهذا الوجه من وجوه القصور وهو ينبع عن غيبة الالتزام الاسلامي والمتميزين المسلمين عن موقع المسؤولية في المجتمع الاسلامي وقدرة المعرفة الاسلامية والشرعية منها على وجه الخصوص للقيام بدورها في تقديم التوجيه الاسلامي المطلوب للحياة العامة.

فمن المعلوم ان مصادر المعرفة الشرعية الأساسية هي الكتاب والسنة، وأضاف اليها العلماء عدداً من الأصول المكتملة وهي الاجماع والقياس ، وعدداً من المصادر الاضافية، المكتملة الأخرى التي يستعين بها العلماء في دراساتهم وفتاواهم.

والاجماع هنا هو الاجماع الاصولي الذي يتوصل اليه كافة العلماء مما يجعله مفهوماً نظرياً لايعتد به كوسيلة ومصدر للعمل الفعلي الثمر في الفكر والعطاء الشرعي.

فيظل في النهاية — على مر التاريخ الاسلامي بعد سقوط الخلافة الراشدة — مصدر التوجيه الشرعي هو ليس ما يقرره قادتها وزعمائها السياسيون والاجتماعيون الحاملون لمسؤولية الحياة العامة كما كان على عهد النبوة والعهد الراشد ولكنه ما يتحدث به ويجرره العلماء من قضايا وفكر مستمد من الكتاب والسنة، ولذلك تعددت المذاهب وتعددت الفتاوى وتشردمت الجماعات الاسلامية، كل خلف من يحلو له من شيخ او عالم، أو غير عالم يدعي

المعرفة والافتاء والارشاد.

وبذلك بدت الأمة وهي فرق ومزق تتعدد رؤاها وولاءاتها وتوجهاتها ومفاهيمها في جانب أو آخر، وبدى العلماء وحلفاؤهم وتهويماتهم في جانب ، وبدى الساسة والسلطين وأعاونهم ونزواتهم في جانب آخر.

وانعدمت على وجه الكمال والقوة والفعل، وحدة الأمة، ووحدة القيادة، وغدا التناحر والتمزق والصراع طبيعة ثانية للأمة الاسلامية والتجمعات الاسلامية.

ومن أهم الأسباب والمنطلقات في رأينا، التي أدت الى هذه الحال، هو غيبة الوعي على مصادر التوجيه الاسلامي الشرعي كاملة متكاملة، او مكونات جهاز عملها الصحيح، الذي لا يستقيم التوجيه الشرعي ولا يؤدي ثماره بدونها، وهذه المصادر الأساسية الكاملة المتكاملة تقوم على ثلاثة أسس، وكل الأصول والمصادر تأتي بعد ذلك مكتملة ومتناسقة معها جميعاً. وهذه المصادر الثلاثة الأساسية هي الكتاب والسنة وأولياء الأمر ﴿وأطيعوا الله وأطيعوا الرسول وأولي الأمر منكم﴾.

فمن الواضح ان الطاعة والمتابعة الشرعية التشريعية كما هو واضح من الآية لثلاثة: الكتاب والسنة وأولياء الأمر، وبالطبع فإن طاعة أولياء الأمر هي من طبيعة طاعة الرسول ﷺ الذي يمثل الحكومة الاسلامية، ومتابعته هي متابعة الوحي والتزام تطبيقه بكل ما تحمله القيادة من معرفة وخبرة ودراية بالحاجات والمتغيرات في البلاد والعباد ومسؤولية في الادارة التنفيذية والتشريعية للمجتمع المسلم وخدمته والاستجابة لحاجاته وتنمية موارده وقدراته على العطاء ومواجهة التحديات، بالإضافة الى ذخيرتها من المعرفة العلمية الموضوعية بالفطرة الاجتماعية من منطلق الالتزام بالمعرفة بالتوجيه والعاية الشرعية.

وفي صدد هذه الأسس الثلاثة لإدارة المجتمع وتنظيم هذه الادارة هناك عدة ملاحظات:

الملحوظة الأولى:

الحديث عن طاعة أولياء الأمر بالجمع:

فليس الأمر ذلك التصور الشكلي البدائي في أن أمر المسلمين وحكمهم وإدارتهم التنفيذية والتشريعية، وسلمهم وحرهم رهن رجل واحد، ليس لهم بعد أن تتم له مراسم البيعة ووضع اليد على مقاليد السلطة والحكم الا حديث مجالس المواظ في وجوب العدل والأمانة ودعاء منابر الوعظ أن يعرى السلطان وصفوته بدافع الورع وجوه العدل في الحكم والبعد عن سبل الظلم والاستئثار والاستبداد في شؤون الرعية، ولا يبقى على هذه الصورة للأمة الا مجرد الآمال السرابية الخيالية في عدل المستبد، والله سبحانه وتعالى يقرر في أصل طبع الانسان: ﴿إن الانسان ليطغى أن رآه استغنى﴾. ويوجه الأمة حاكماً ومحكوماً في إدارة شؤون الأمة أن يكون: ﴿أمرهم شورى بينهم﴾. فلا يبيت في سياسة الأمة وقراراتها الكبرى دون تمحيص ونظر ومشورة وقناعة من الأمة بروح الحرص والتضامن بين جمهور الأمة وأعيانها وأصحاب العلم والرأي والحكمة فيها وحكامها الذين اصطفاهم لقيادتها ورعاية شؤونها.

الملاحظة الثانية:

إن طاعة أولياء الأمر في شاكله طاعة الرسول ﷺ في الالتزام بالكتاب والوحي وطاعة الله والاخلاص لما أمر به صلاحاً للناس بما يحببهم (فلا طاعة لمخلوق في معصية الخالق)، فالطاعة هنا مشروطة بالالتزام بالوحي وما يقصد اليه من اصلاح على ما تستقر عليه إرادة الأمة وتحقق به قناعة الجماعة.

الملاحظة الثالثة:

ان عطاء النظام الاسلامي ومصداقته ترتبط ببناء النظام على هذه الأسس الثلاثة وهي الكتاب أصلاً والرسول وسنته شاهداً وشارحاً وهداياً، وأولياء الأمر في الأمة حكاماً وقادة ورعاة ملتزمين مجتهدين على مقتضى حال الأمة وحاجاتها وإمكاناتها، وما تواجهه من تحديات على ما يقتضي به العلم الحقيقي الصحيح بالأحوال والظروف والمتغيرات بما يحقق مصلحة الأمة ويدفع عنها الضرر من منطلق التزام غايات الاسلام واحكامه المحكمة.

وعدم الوعي الكامل على هذه العلاقة الثلاثية وإهمال أية واحدة منها أو التقليل من شأنها أو تجاوزها يجعل الصورة ناقصة والعطاء معطلاً ان لم يكن سلبياً في بعض الأحوال.

الملاحظة الرابعة:

ان التزام هذه الأسس الثلاثة ليس أمراً قابلاً للتجزئة وانه أمر نسبة بمعنى ان الأمة اذا التزمت بواحد حصلت على ثلث، واذا التزمت باثنين حصلت على ثلثين، وإذا التزمت الثلاث حصلت على العطاء كاملاً.

هذا ليس منطق الحياة ولا منطق التفاعلات والتراكيب الاجتماعية الحية، بل ولا حتى التراكيب المادية في كثير من الأحوال، فالاخلال بشروط التنظيمات والتفاعلات قد لا ينجم عنه نقص الفائدة او زوالها ولكن قد ينجم عنه أشد الخلل والضرر.

ولا يصعب علينا اليوم ان نلاحظ في حالات كثيرة الأضرار الناجمة عن تصرفات خاطئة ونظرات ضالة، وقرآيات جاهلة في الكتاب والسنة، من أفراد وجماعات لا تتمتع بمؤهلات النظر الشمولي السليم ووسائله المنهجية لسبر أغوار الوحي والفطرة مما أدى بسبب قصور المنهج والفكر أن تصبح طاقة الايمان والاخلاص والغيرة لدى الكثيرين سبباً في تمزق المجتمعات، وتناحر الأمة، وشد الفكر والحركة الى متاهات وصراعات لم تزل منها الأمة خيراً.

لا غرابة في اي شيء مما ذكرنا فليس الكتاب والسنة بدعا من كل كلمة او معلومة لا يتم التعامل معها بالأسلوب الصحيح ووفق الشروط والمعطيات الصحيحة.

وهنا يجب الوضوح المنهجي الموضوعي حول أمرين وقضيتين:

الأول: أمر الدراسة الأكاديمية:

وهنا فجميع الدارسين والمهتمين مدعوون للنظر في الكتاب والسنة وتقليبهما والاستفادة منهما بكل الوجوه وإغناء الفكر والمعرفة الاسلامية.

الثاني: أمر التنظيم الاجتماعي الاسلامي:

وهذا لا يؤخذ فقط من الدراسات الاكاديمية، وان كانت مصدراً أساسياً للرؤية والتصحيح والإثراء للفائدة والخبرة، ولكنه في واقع التطبيق والممارسة يتقرر من دائرة تفاعلات الأسس الاسلامية الثلاثة وهي القرآن الكريم والسنة النبوية واولياء الأمر بشروط الالتزام والعلم والدراية والمشورة.

الكتاب والسنة وأولياء الأمر:

وإذا كان الكتاب معروفاً، مصدراً أساسياً للوعي والتوجيه الاسلامي، وكذلك السنة التي هي هداية الرسول ﷺ في أقواله وأفعاله شاهداً وتليغاً وشرحاً وتوجيهاً ونموذجاً تطبيقياً للوحي والرسالة في تصريف الأمور وفق مقتضيات زمانه وعهده وحاجة قومه، فما هو موقع أولياء الأمر، وما قيمة ما يصدر عن اولياء الأمر.

نحن نعلم ان الاسلام جاء من أجل إقامة مجتمع ودولة وحضارة، له غاية ربانية سامية، يتوجه فيها الانسان طواعية نحو الأداء الحياتي الصحيح وفقاً للتوجيه والغاية الاسلامية.

فهو ليس كتباً ولا ثقافة أدبية خيالية ترفهية او ترويحوية تتلى وتقرأ لذاتها.

ولذلك فالرسالة والوحي هي لتوجيه الحياة وتحديد مدلولاتها وغاياتها وضبط توجهاتها، وعلى عهد الرسول ﷺ وحياته كان مقتضى الالتزام هو طاعته في أقواله وأفعاله إنفاذاً لغاية الوحي وتوجيهاته لما فيه مصلحة الأمة والجماعة، وبعد انتقال الرسول ﷺ الى الرفيق الأعلى فإن أولياء الأمور هم في موضع الرسول ﷺ في وجوب التزامهم بالوحي والرسالة وفي وجوب صدور القرارات التي تتصل بأداء النظام العام وقواعد النظام العام والمعاملات الاجتماعية من خلال أولياء الأمور الذين تم اختيارهم واعتمادهم لمهام الادارة التنفيذية والتشريعية في الأمة فتكون قراراتهم الشورية مناط الأداء والعمل الاجتماعي المشترك، وتحمى الأمة والجماعة شر التمرق والتناحر وتصيح طاعتهم واجباً دينياً واجتماعياً بغض النظر عن الآراء والمواقع الخاصة بأي فرد من الأفراد فيما يختص بالطاعة والإنفاذ العام.

وموقع أولياء الأمور من الكتاب والسنة هو موقع الدليل والمرشد، وعنهم يصدر الفقه الحركي للكتاب والسنة الذي يقوم على أساس موقعهم من المسؤولية والقدرة على تحصيل وجمع المعلومة والخبرة على كافة وجوهها الاجتماعية الدينية والفطرية وتسخيرها بما يمكنهم من أخذ المواقف المناسبة على خارطة التركيب النظري والعلمي الاجتماعي، ويمكنهم من اتخاذ قرار دون آخر، وتفضيل حل على آخر، والأخذ بأولوية دون أخرى، يحملون في أيديهم ثقة الأمة وقدرة السلطة، ومعلومة الشرع، وخبرة الواقع والمشورة. اجتهاداتهم واختياراتهم ومواقفهم الرائدة في التشريع والتنظيم والادارة الاجتماعية، سياسية واقتصادية وتربوية وعسكرية، وهي كثيرة وهامة أسوة بمقام قيادة الرسول ﷺ وحتى فيما تابعوه فيه لم تكن متابعتهم متابعة عمياء جاهلة دون دراية أو رعاية للواقع ولروح الشريعة ومقاصدها، ومن ذلك قرار أبي بكر

— رضي الله عنه — التاريخي بقتال الأعراب المرتدين حين فهمها عمر رضي الله عنه على انها قضية ايمان، وان الأعراب قد آمنت باقرارها بالشهادة، وفهمها ووعبها الخليفة الراشد أبو بكر — رضي الله عنه — انها قضية اسلام والتزام بالجماعة والنظام الاجتماعي، وانه لذلك قاتلهم الرسول ﷺ في حياته بعد فتح مكة، ولذلك كان اعلانهم التمرد والعصيان والامتناع عن أداء الزكاة من موجبات قتلهم وردهم الى حظيرة الجماعة والتنظيم الاجتماعي الذي يليق بالبشر ويحفظ الحقوق الأساسية للبشر. وبروح الالتزام الاسلامي وتمحيص الأمر وتقليب وجوهه رأى عمر — رضي الله عنه — والأصحاب ما رأى قائدهم وخليفة رسول الله فيهم أبو بكر رضي الله عنه.

﴿قالت الأعراب آمنة قل لم تؤمنوا ولكن قولوا أسلمنا ولما يدخل الايمان في قلوبكم﴾، ومنها قرار الخليفة الراشد عمر بن الخطاب اتخاذ الخراج في أرض السواد عوضاً عما ظنه البعض بتوزيع الأرض على جنود الفتح، ومنها اجتهاد الخليفة الراشد عثمان بن عفان رضي الله عنه بالأذان يوم الجمعة إيداناً بقرب وقت الصلاة والاستعداد للانضمام لها وغير ذلك مما هو معلوم من اجتهادات الخلفاء والأصحاب الذين كانوا في موقع المسؤولية في إدارة شؤون الأمة التنفيذية والتشريعية وفقههم الحركي الذي ينبع من التزامهم ومسئوليتهم ودرابتهم بأحوال الأمة وحاجاتها والتحديات التي كانت تواجهها.

فالشريعة والتوجه الاسلامي في المجتمع، لا تقوم لهما قائمة بالتركيز فقط على دور الكتاب والسنة في بناء وتوجيه المجتمع الاسلامي وتنظيم أداؤه، وتجاهل دور أولياء الأمور ومنطوقهم التشريعي في أمر ذلك التنظيم، وبلورة سياساته وقراراته العملية والتطبيقية والتنظيمية، فإن إهمال ذلك الدور أو التقليل من شأنه كان له — وما يزال — أوحش العواقب على سلامة رؤية الأمة ووحدة صفها وسلامة أداؤها وتوليد قوتها الحضارية وتجديدها.

الدور الإسلامي الشرعي لا تقوم له قائمة إلا بالقواعد الثلاث مجتمعة، والمعرفة الاسلامية بشقيها الالهي المنزل والالهي الفطري، لاثوث ثمارها الاجتماعية والتنظيمية اذا لم يعمم المنطوق الشرعي التنظيمي للمجتمع على الأسس الثلاثة وهي الكتاب والسنة وأولياء الأمر المسلمون الملتزمون الذين هم موضع اختيارهم وموضع ثقتهم في الالتزام وفي الخبرة والدراية.

ولذلك ستبقى المعلومة والمعرفة الاسلامية، أيًا كانت صورتها، مادة نظرية، ويبقى المجتمع غير قادر على السير والمتابعة الاسلامية، دون أن يأخذ دور أولياء الأمور المسلمين مكانه الصحيح، في الصورة الصحيحة، على أساس من الالتزام، والمعرفة والرؤية الاسلامية المنهجية الصحيحة.

لا بد من معرفة اسلامية منهجية صحيحة على أساس الفطرة والتنزيل. ولا بد من رؤية اسلامية صحيحة مبنية على معرفة صحيحة، وعلى دليل فهم شرعي موحد، تستقيم به المعرفة والرؤية الشرعية، وتستجيب لحاجات الأمة وظروفها وإمكاناتها وتراكيبها وأولوياتها، على أساس من غاية وتوجيه وأوامر ونواهي الكتاب والسنة فلا تعود الأمة مرقاً والآراء فرقا،

كل فريق منهم بما لديهم فرحون، وهكذا هو الفقه الحركي الذي هو عطاء القيادة الاسلامية الموحد الملتزمة المستندة الى منهج ومعرفة اسلامية صحيحة فاعلة متكاملة في قيادة الأمة. وفي الحيار للأمة وفي التشريع للأمة وفق مقتضيات التنزيل ومقتضيات الفطرة ومقتضيات الأحوال.

لقد كان فقد وحدة القيادة الاسلامية وفقد مستلزمات تأهيلها مما أدى الى فقد الفقه الحركي الذي يعطى الأمة دليل حركتها الموحد من أهم الأسباب خلف ضعف الرؤية الاسلامية وتششت التوجه وقصور المعرفة وغياب الأمة.

ولو توفرت أسباب المعرفة الاسلامية الصحيحة بتأصيل علم الفطرة الاجتماعية، ولو أخذ دور أولياء أمور المسلمين مكانه، في تقديم دليل العمل الحركي الاسلامي اي الفقه الحركي الاسلامي المطلوب لجمع الأمة ودفعها الى العمل والابداع، لو كان قد تحقق ذلك، وكان وعينا وممارساتنا المنهجية الصحيحة في البؤرة لكنا اليوم في موقع حضاري مختلف، ولكانت صورة الدراسات الشرعية مختلفة في وعيها على دلالة الزمان والمكان خاصة في دراسات السنة النبوية المطهرة، وكذلك في فهم النموذج الاسلامي الاجتماعي للصدر الأول، وتمتعت الدراسات الفقهية الاسلامية الأكاديمية بقدر أكبر من التنظير والتجديد، ولأزيلت عنها السمة الوصفية، ولما عادت أبواب الدراسات الفقهية قضايا تتجاوز دون رابطة نظرية أوسع، لكان لدلالات التوجيه الاسلامي مدى حضارياً واجتماعياً أعمق وأفضل، مما نشاهده في حياة المسلمين اليوم، في ظل التوجيه الفقهي والشكلي المشهود.

النظافة بين التوجيه الشكلي والتوجيه التحليلي التربوي:

فالتوجيه القرآني والسنة النبوية المطهرة مثلاً لا تهدف الى جعل قضية الوضوء مجرد ممارسات شكلية عبادية، يقتصر عليها استكمالاً لطقوس دينية تستوفي مواصفات محددة تسجلها كتب الفقه في أبواب الغسل والطهارة، ولكن التوجيه القرآني والسنة النبوية تجعل من الوضوء ومتطلباته حلقة من حلقات الممارسات الصحية والتوجيه التربوي لاستيفاء حاجات الوجود الانساني الصحي النظيف الطاهر.

والدراسة الشكلية القانونية الوصفية ما كان لها أن تتجاوز الأداء الى ادراك كليات الشريعة ومقاصدها في الصحة والنظافة والطهارة وتحدث الى الحس التربوي في النفوس للحفاظ على مقاصد الشريعة شكلاً ومعنى وترتفع بالوجود الاسلامي والحس الاسلامي الى الحفاظ على الآفاق الحضارية السامية التي جاءت بها تعاليم الاسلام وتوجهاته، ولذلك فلا عجب ان نجد رغم كل ما تزخر به الكتب من تفاصيل فقهية في أوصاف طقوس الطهارة ان نجد أداء الأمة في تدهور مستمر في شؤون النظام والنظافة، وان نجد الاستهانة بالنظافة والعناية باللبس والمسكن والمظهر والبيئة شائعة بين المسلمين، وان نجد كثيراً من بيوت الطهارة والمراحيض حتى في جوار بيوت الله مما لا يتحقق فيه معنى الطهارة، ولا معنى للنظافة، وترى الفرد لا يهتم بالنظافة ما دام قد حققها بمفهومها الشكلي رغم ما يقضي من الوقت في بيوت

الله أداء للفروض والنوافل وكأنه لا يعنيه من أمر النظافة وغاياتها الصحية والجمالية في حياته وبيته شيئاً، بل ولا يستشعر الواجب في نظافة المراحيض المساجد التي يقع فيها ويبالغ في النوافل طلباً للأجر والثوبة وحسن المآب.

وهكذا فقدت مقاصد الشريعة دلالتها في نفوس الناس والناشئة وفي المجتمع، وما هذا المثال في شأن الطهارة والنظافة بمفهومها الفقهي والشكلي وبين النظافة والصحة بمفهومها الحياتي الحضاري الا نموذجاً لهذا الضياع الفكري والحضاري والمنهجي، فما أعجبه من حال أمة ودين، ليس أحرص منهما على النظافة والصحة والتألق في كل موضع يناسبه، حتى أنه أصبحت ممارسات نظافة الأعضاء الظاهرة التي تتعرض للتساخ واجباً دينياً حياتياً يقوم به خمس مرات في اليوم والليلة، ومع ذلك تخفى هذه الدلالة في الأمر والتوجيه والتربية والتوجيه الديني الحضاري في حياة الأمة حتى تصبغ في عالم الأمم عرضة للاهمال والزراية الصحية والجمالية فما أعجبه من حال وما أعجبه من فهم وتعليم وتوجيه وتربية.

ويحزني هنا في هذا المقام ما ذكره لي وفد من المسلمين اليابانيين، ان المسلمين اليابانيين اسوة وتأثراً ببيئتهم اليابانية التي يشيع في شعبها روح التعاون وممارساته، جمعوا فيما بينهم تعاونياً بعض الأموال وبعثوا بعض شباهم لتلقي العلوم والثقافة الاسلامية، وعند عودة هؤلاء الشباب بعد عيشهم ودراستهم الاسلامية في البلاد الاسلامية، لاحظوا عليهم فقدان روح التعاون وانهم أصبحوا لا يهتمون إلا بانفسهم، فما أعجبه من تأثير وما أعجبه من ثقافة وتعليم وتربية، يؤثر في واقع الممارسة والتربية وبناء النفوس وتعليم على غير غايته وعلى غير شاكلة مقاله عند رصد الحقائق المجردة لممارسات الصدر الأول من الاسلام وما يمكن ان يستمد منها من دروس وعبر وعظات وتنظيرات تنظيمية وحضارية تجعل واقع ممارسات المجتمع الاسلامي وتنظيماته الاجتماعية العامة تقوم فعلاً على أساس مبادئ التعاون والتكافل الكرم، ليس العجز في فكر معرفة الغايات والتوجهات ولكن العجز في فكر التنظير التنظيمي الذي يعي دروس الصدر الأول وممارساته ودلالاتها ويواكب بالتطور المستمر السياسات والتنظيمات ومناهج التربية البديلة التي تحافظ على الغايات الاسلامية إطاراً وموجهاً لواقع الممارسة والتنظيم الاجتماعي.

من الواضح أن الأسلوب والمنهج الذي تقدم به الثقافة الاسلامية والفكر الاسلامي ما يقصران عن بناء القيم والغايات الاسلامية، والشعارات المرجوة في نفوس الناس، ويعجزان عن تحقيقها في حياتهم وكيانهم الاجتماعي، ولهذا فمن المهم التأكيد والتذكير بأنه لا بد للأمة الاسلامية وللфكر الاسلامي الجاد من اصلاح مناهج الفكر وإقامة صرح الفكر الاسلامي على أساس معارف التنزيل والفترة في وقت وبناء واحد متكامل. كذلك من المهم لانجاح الاصلاح المنهجي واستعادة البعد العملي والتنظيمي والتربوي الاجتماعي والحضاري للفكر الاسلامي والنظام الاسلامي التفهم المتجدد للأهمية البالغة للأساس الثالث لبناء المجتمع وهو ولاية الأمر الاسلامية والوعي الكامل على أهمية المطلقات والمقتضيات والسياسات العملية التي يملحها توجيه التنزيل وسنن الفترة حتى يمكن قيام ولاية الأمر الاسلامية ويحافظ عليها

في أداء دورها في بناء المجتمع وتنظيماته الاسلامية ويمكن لها من امداد الأمة بدليل الحركة الاجتماعية وفقه الحركة الاجتماعية واجتهاداته الحية التي تقيم الاسلام ومقاصده رائداً وموجهاً وقائداً لكل الحاجات والتحديات والمتغيرات.

المنهج: ما قبله وما بعده:

ليس إصلاح المنهج في المعرفة الاسلامية وبالتالي إصلاح المعرفة ووضعها في منطلقاتها وصورها السليمة، غاية في ذاتها، ولكن من الواضح ان هذا الاصلاح وسيلة فمآذا نرجو من وراء هذه الوسيلة؟

نرجو من وراء هذه الوسيلة إصلاح حال الأمة، واستعادة دورها الحضاري والقيادي، يصاحبه النموذج الحياتي الصحيح والأداء الحياتي الصحيح، والتنظيم الاجتماعي الصحيح والعلاقات الاجتماعية الصحيحة، تتألق وتضيء وتنضوي تحت الخير الذي ترفعه الأمم والنماذج الحياتية والاجتماعية الأخرى لتلوذ بها وتستمد منها القدوة ولتنصهر في بوتقتها الصالحة.

وهكذا فإننا من منطلق تصحيح المنهج واستكمال أسس بناء المجتمع ننطلق الى مختلف أبعاد حياتنا لئلا نرى أثر هذا التصحيح ومانتوقه منه، ونوع التصحيح الذي يقوم عليه ونرجوه منه.

القيم وعلاقتها وأولوياتها:

بمنهج الشمولية في دراسة هدى التنزيل وسنن الفطرة لا بد لنا من رجعة الى إطار الشخصية الاسلامية، وأسس وجودها وكيانها، وما تنبني عليه من مجموعة القيم الكريمة التي ندين بها، فنضع حداً للجزئية وفكر الجزئية الذي أضّر بفكر الأمة، وبذلك يصبح للفكر ضوابط تربط بين الغايات والنتائج فلا تعود القيم مجموعة من الأوامر والنواهي قائمة الى جانب بعضها البعض دون رابط أو عناية باوزانها النسبية فيما بينها، وعلاقتها المتبادلة وأولوياتها وصيغها المختلفة وأساليب تقديمها والمواقف والمراحل والفئات المختلفة التي تتعلق بها وباسلوب عرضها.

لاشك أن الفرق بين أجيالنا وبين جيل الصدر الأول على عهد النبوة وعلى عهد الخلافة الراشدة، ليس في ادراك كم القيم والمبادئ الاسلامية ومفرداتها، ففي هذا الصدد لعل ما يتوافر لنا بسبب الوسائل الميسرة لحشد المفردات النصوصية أكبر اليوم بكثير مما كان يتوفر في العصور الماضية بما فيها رجال الصدر الأول الذين تميزوا بالقدرة الفاعلة الملتزمة الشمولية الاجتهادية الرائعة. فإذا لم يكن الادراك الكمي هو الفارق المميز لرجال الصدر الأول فلا بد ان يكون الفارق المميز فارقاً نوعياً.

ومن ينظر الى اسلوب المتأخرين في عرض القيم والمبادئ الاسلامية يدرك غلبة النظرة الجزئية، وضياح النظرة الشمولية، والعجز عن العرض المنظم الذي يلتزم الأولويات ويراعي

نسبية الأوزان ومتغيرات الأحوال والمواقع والحاجات وتفاعلات المواقف والعلاقات.

كذلك لم يكن ينقص الصدر الأول شيء مما سعى اليه اللاحقون من الزهد وعدم التشوف، بل ان حياتهم وممارساتهم مثال متألق في ذلك المجال ولكن لم يكن للصدر الأول هذا القصور في المهمة، والضعف في القدرة، والعجز في الأداء الذي اتسم به جل من أقبل على الزهد والتصوف من اللاحقين.

ان الفرق في منهج فكر الأولين هو وضوح رؤيتهم التي اتسمت بالدراية والشمولية وادراك الأسس والمنطلقات والغايات الاسلامية مع أكمل ما يكون العلم والادراك باحوال الناس وتحديات العصر.

فاقبالهم على الله واقبالهم على الحق واقبالهم على الخير واقبالهم على الحياة واقبالهم على الموت وعلى البعث وعلى الثواب والعقاب كان اقبالاً بفهم صحيح متكامل، فقد كانوا ينظرون الى كل ذلك كحقيقة واحدة متكاملة كل جانب منها يمثل وجهاً وطرفاً لا معنى له بدون سواه، ولا يتم سواه الا به.

فالحياة حقيقة والأعمار حقيقة والشر حقيقة والبعث حقيقة، يتعاملون معها على أنها حقائق، يحققون معنى وجودهم وغايتهم بالتعامل الكامل معها على ما خلقت له وفطرت من أجله.

لا حقيقة للموت والبعث دون حقيقة الحياة والسعي والأعمار، المادة حقيقة بقدر ما تمثل الارادة وتعبر عنها، والارادة حقيقة بقدر ما تتحقق في المادة وتتجسد بواسطتها، والثواب حقيقة بقدر ما يتحقق الوجود الصحيح والمثال الصحيح الذي يعكس قيم الحق والعدل ومعاني الاحسان والاتقان والجمال التي تنطوي على حقيقة الأمن والسلام والنعيم في الحياة الدنيا وفي الحياة الأبدية، والعقاب حقيقة بقدر ما ينجم عنه من معاني الظلم والفساد وما تنطوي عليه من حقيقة القلق والخوف والشقاء في الحياة الدنيا وفي الحياة الأبدية.

خلاصة القول: ان الصدر الأول توازنت في ضميره الحياة الدنيا وسيلة وامتداداً للدار الآخرة منها وبها يتم الوجود الصحيح، لذلك تعاملوا مع الحياة وشؤونها تعاملًا حقيقياً جاداً بناءً محققاً للغاية منها، فكانوا عاملين جادين قادرين بكل قواهم وحاجتهم وجوارحهم كما هي فطرة الوجود، لا قعوداً ولا انصرافاً ولا عزلة. ولكن هذه الجدوية وهذه الإيجابية في أبعادها المتكاملة لم تجعلهم في عروض المادة طامعين ولا بها أشحاء، ولا اليها متشوفين، فكانوا قدرة لا عجزاً، ورفعة لا دناءة، وعتاء لاشحاً واختلاصاً، وتكافلاً وكرماً، على البر أعوان وعلى الخير خلان، جماعة على الحقيقة كالبنيان يشد بعضه بعضاً.

الحب والوعي والتوازن والشمول هو واقعهم وهو منهجهم، فأعطوا عطاء القادر المحب وحرص المحب، وخشية المحب فكان عطاء خالصاً وافرأ ما زال يتألق ويضيء على مر الزمان.

مطلوب أن يستقيم فهمنا للقيم وأن يستقيم أسلوبنا في عرض القيم وأن يحسن فهمنا ومنطلقاتنا في الدعوة والتعليم والتربية والتنشأة على هذه القيم من منطلق الحب والعلم والاعتزاز

بالكرامة والثقة بالنفس والشعور وبمسؤولية الخلافة.

- ألا ترى كم يعطي الحب وكم يصبر المحب وكم يضحى المحب؟
 - ثم ألا ترى كم يذعن العالم وكم يتلطف المدرك وكم يثابر الواعي؟
 - ثم ألا ترى كم ينجز الحر ويبدل الكريم؟
 - الحب والكرامة والعلم قوة وثقة وعطاء واعمار وبناء
- أما الأثرة والخوف والجهل فضعف ووهن وملق وجبن وهدم وفساد.

مطوب قيم ينظمها نظام له مرتكزات وأسس واضحة الوزن والعرض لشخصية سوية قوية ببناء فاعلة، والمنهج والدراسة الواعية من جانب، والفقہ الحركي من جانب آخر سوف يجعلان هذا التصحيح في الأسلوب والعرض والتنظيم والتربية أمراً ممكناً ان شاء الله.

الغاية والتنظيم:

في منهج التكامل بين هدى الرسالة وسنن الفطرة الاجتماعية لن يغيب عن الادراك أن كل غاية ومطلب في النفس لا يتحقق إلا بالعمل، ولكن لا يغيب عن الادراك ان العمل لا يمكنه ان يحقق الغايات المرجوة الا اذا تم بشكل منظم يسخر الوسائل والإمكانات والطباع في اطار ادراك سليم للسنة وخطة ونسق سليم التكوين والتفاعل حتى يمكن ان تتفاعل به حتى يؤدي الى الغايات المطلوبة وانه دون العلم والحيلة والتنظيم لا يتم عمل على وجهه الصحيح، مهما سمت الغاية وحسنت النية وعظمت التضحية، ولكن بسمو الغاية وحسن النية وعظيم التضحية واخلاص العمل يؤتي الجهد والتنظيم أفضل النتائج والثمار.

منهج الشرع والفطرة لا يكتفي بالقيم وسمو القيم وسلامة القيم ، ولكنه يحتم العناية بالوسيلة وبالتنظيم ، ضرورة مكملة للغاية، متفاعلة معها، يداً بيد، كل واحد لا يتجرأ، مطلب وغاية ووسيلة، وغاية يحملها نظام وأجزاء يتنظمها نسق، وأنظمة تتكامل وتتفاعل لتكون نظاماً اجتماعياً مثمراً بالغايات والآمال والعطاء.

التربية والقيم والنظرية:

في منهج الشرع والفطرة الاجتماعية لا يقف الأمر والاصلاح عند حد بلورة القيم ورسم خطط التنظيمات والاجراءات الاجتماعية ولكن الأمر يمتد الى بعد التربية بما يلحق به من اعلام وتعليم، هنا فلا بد من عناية خاصة بالتربية وأساليبها وحسن اختيار ما يعرض خاصة على النشء في نعومة أظفاره لتستقيم شخصيته ويتكون في بؤرة نفسه وطبعه وعاداته ومنهج فكره ماهو صحيح وتصلح به الحياة من قيم ومنهج وعادات وغايات.

لا يألو المجتمع المسلم جهداً في العناية بالتربية وما يتصل بها وأولوياتها وحاجاتها ومرتكزاتها وفي توفير متطلباتها وصيانتها في مؤسسات التربية ومحاضنها وفي المدارس والمعاهد

والمنازل والأسر.

ومع ذلك فان الواقع المؤسف هو أن الأمة والأسرة المسلمة لاتعرف اليوم لنفسها أسلوباً واضحاً او متميزاً في التربية، ولا في مرتكزاتها ولا في أولوياتها ولا في نظرياتها، مما أورث الطفل المسلم والشخصية المسلمة هلامية وتسياً وانغلاقاً ووحشة.

إنّ من أهم ما يجب على جهود ترقية المعرفة الاسلامية واستكمال البناء الاسلامي هو إقامة مدرسة تربوية اسلامية واضحة المعالم والمرتكزات، والعمل على التوعية وكسب القناعة بها بين الآباء والمربين لا بسبب سلامة غاياتها فقط ولكن لسلامة أساليبها، ووضوح مرتكزاتها ايضاً.

إن بناء نظرية تربوية إسلامية — ذات أسلوب ومنهج عملي سليم متميز يتسم بالبساطة والوضوح — من أهم الأولويات التي يجب على المفكرين والأمة ايلأؤها الاهتمام المناسب وبذل الجهود ومواصلتها حتى تتحقق غاياتها وتتفهمها جماهير الأمة.

إسلامية العلوم الفيزيائية التطبيقية:

والسؤال الآن اذا كنا قد أدركنا معنى إسلامية العلوم الاجتماعية والانسانية والاصلاحات المنهجية المطلوبة لها لتقدم المعرفة من منظور وغاية اسلامية ولخدمة الانسان المسلم ومجتمعه وآدابه في هذه الحياة في تناغم وتفهم للحياة وفطرتها وغايتها وتفاعلاتها.

وإذا كنا قد أدركنا ان الوجود الفيزيائي والكون له فطرته وقوانينه وتفاعلاته وتنظيمه، وأن التعامل معه لايد أن يكون من خلال فهم فطرته، فأين يأتي دور الاسلامية هنا؟ وما هي علاقة الفطرة الفيزيائية والتطبيقية بالاسلامية ، إن إسلامية العلوم الفيزيائية التطبيقية لا تعني مجال من الأحوال تصوراً خاصاً بالمسلمين للفطرة الفيزيائية ، فالفطرة هي الفطرة وسنن الفطرة هي سنن الفطرة لا موضع للتغيير والتبديل، فالجاذبية هي الجاذبية والكهربية هي الكهربائية.

— الاسلامية في مجال المعرفة الفيزيائية تأتي في فهم معنى الوجود الفيزيائي من خلق الله وابداعه، ومدعاة للإيمان والاجلال للمخلوق المبدع.

— الاسلامية هي اجلال للفطرة الفيزيائية والسعي لمعرفتها والتعامل الذي يحقق غايتها وغاية الحياة معها وبها.

— الاسلامية تتصل بفلسفة الوجود الفيزيائي وأسس التعامل معه ودلالته.

فليس الاشكال حقاً في كيف خلق آدم، وليس الاشكال في كيف أصبح الأحياء على ماهم عليه والكون على ما هو عليه؟ الاشكال هنا هو: هل قدرة الله الخالق الذي ليس كمثلته شيء ﴿أَعْطَى كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلْقَهُ ثُمَّ هَدَى﴾، دافع الى الإيمان والتوجه الخير والاحسان؟ أم ان المعرفة الفيزيائية والقدرة الفيزيائية باعث على الكبر والغرور والتسلط وانتهاك حرمة الوجود

وغايته وتسخيرها للأهواء والنزوات والفساد والدمار؟

هل العلم والقدرة مدعاة الى الانكار والكفر والعشوائية؟ أم ان العلم والقدرة مدعاة الى الايمان والحكمة والرفق؟

— إسلامية العلوم الفيزيائية والتطبيقية هي السعي الى تأصيل هذه الفلسفة وهذا التوجه وهذا الفهم في النفوس وتنشأة النفوس، وبناء المناهج على أساسها، وبذر حبها والتعلق بها، وتأصيل منطلقاتها والتعامل معها في التربية الاسلامية والمنهجية الاسلامية وفي حنايا الشخصية الاسلامية، والفكر الاسلامي وجعلها جزءاً لا يتجزأ من وجود الانسان على الأرض تحقيقاً لوجوده وترقية لهذا الوجود، واعماراً وترقية للحياة، وتعرفاً على الابداع والجمال والقدرة والنظام الالهي في الوجود.

— اسلامية العلوم الفيزيائية والتطبيقية هي في فلسفة المسلم في فهمه لها وفهمه لغايتها منها وتسخيرها لتتحقق قيم الايمان والخير في الحياة وفي ترقية الحياة واعمار الوجود.

— اسلامية العلوم الفيزيائية هي اخلاقيات العمل والتعامل مع القوى الكونية فيما يتصل بكيانها وغايتها وحمايتها من الفساد وتسخيرها للإعمار والاصلاح وفيما يتصل بتسخيرها للحياة الانسانية والحاجات الانسانية، وفيما يتصل بأصول وقواعد مزاوتها.

— اسلامية العلوم الفيزيائية والتطبيقية جهود لنقل وترجمة الأعمال الهامة الى اللغة العربية واللغات الاسلامية وترجمتها، وتهذيب لغتها وتقديمها وتبسيطها بما يجعلها جزءاً لا يتجزأ من الثقافة والممارسة الحياتية للأمة، ابداعاً وعملاً وترقية واعماراً وعبادة، لا جسداً غريباً وممارسة قلقة وفلسفة كافرة ومطلباً مصطنعاً لقوم لا يطلبون الحياة ولا المعرفة الحياتية وليس لها موضع في منهجهم وفي فهمهم للحياة ودورهم في الوجود.

المطلوب:

لاشك ان الحديث طويل في أمر أزمة الأمة الاسلامية الحضارية ولاشك ان منطلق اصلاح الفكر واستقامة أمر المعرفة الاسلامية قضية أساسية لتحقيق الشروط الموضوعية اللازمة للانجاز في مجالات العمل والانجاز الحياتي والحضاري نحو إعادة تركيب الحياة الاسلامية وفق المناهج والمعطيات في تصوراتها وعلاقاتها وإمكاناتها وطموحاتها التي يلمها واقع العصر. ولكن لا بأس بالتركيز على بعض هذه القضايا الهامة والتذكير بها في نهاية هذا البحث.

— مطلوب اصلاح منهج المعرفة الاسلامية والفكر الاسلامي وتأصيل النظر الشامل في كافة قضاياها، وتسخير الوحي والعقل كلاهما كما اراد الله لهما لخدمة الحياة والفكر والوجود الاسلامي.

— مطلوب تأصيل دراسات الفطرة في المنهج الاسلامي وتفصيلها كما تم تأصيل دراسات التنزيل وتفصيلها فيما مضى. كل انواع الفطرة اجتماعية وفيزيائية تتكامل فيها المعرفة التنزيلية والمعرفة والفطرية في خدمة الحياة المسلمة وتكوين المفهوم الاسلامي للحياة والعلاقات

والغايات.

— مطلوب إعادة النظر في ضوء هذا المنهج الشامل في منهج دراسة النصوص الاسلامية وسيرة الصدر الأول وتطويره بما يناسب واقع العصر وتحدياته وقضاياه وإمكاناته ووسائله العلمية والحضارية.

— مطلوب تخطي التجارب التاريخية الحاطقة والاقبال على تجربة الاصلاح بروح الاصاله والاقدام والمبادرة مع الاستفادة من التجارب الماضية لتكون دافعاً ايجابياً لتجارب متجددة ناجحة باذن الله.

— مطلوب تصحيح تأصيل مفهوم التربية الاسلامية ونظرياتها الأساسية وتقديم منهج وفكر وأسلوب ووسائل تربوية لينشأ الطفل على الاسلام، من منطلق الايمان ومن منطلق المحبة ومن منطلق العزة ومن منطلق قوة حس الرسالة وخلافة الاعمار والاصلاح.

— مطلوب تعليم يمد الناشئة والأمة بالزاد والمعرفة المتجددة بكل ما تفرسه وتوفره من دوافع الطلب والاقبال والتفكير والابداع.

— مطلوب اعلام يرشد ويثقف ويروح، على علم ودراية بالفطرة الاجتماعية والشخصية الاسلامية ومفاتيح تجاوزها لايقدم في اي صورة ترويجية، الا التماذج والخبرات الاجتماعية التي ترقى الحياة، ويتابعها الناشئة والصغار لترسم في ذاكرتهم ومخيلتهم وضماثرهم صوراً وخبرات وتجارب بناءة داعمة لكل معنى خير وممارسة خيرة وتطلع خير.

— مطلوب الوعي على أن الغاية الخيرة وحدها لا تكفي فلا بد من استكمال الأداة وحسن الادراك للمتطلبات حتى تتم الحاجة.

لايكفي سرد وصفي مدرسي لغايات الاسلام السامية، فلا بد من التسلح بفهم جيد واسع لمعطيات الحياة والكائنات وفطرتها وواقع علاقاتها وإمكاناتها وتفاعلاتها فهي أشد تعقيداً من التفاعلات والمعادلات الفيزيائية وجديرة بالعناية والدراسة المنهجية.

ادراك الغايات والقيم لا يكفي وحده لبناء الحياة والواقع الحياتي بل لا بد من ادراك قيمة التنظيم ودواعيه ووسائله وآثاره وعلاقاته، لتسيير الحياة العامة في اتجاه الأهداف والغايات المطلوبة، فالأمر والغاية الصالحة والفرد الصالح والتنظيم الصالح وجوه مختلفة لكيان واحد وعملة واحدة في قيام الحياة الاسلامية العامة والخاصة.

لا يمكن للمفهوم الاسلامي ولا المنهج الاسلامي ان يأخذ دوره الحقيقي في بناء الحياة وتنظيم المجتمع اذا لم يتم الوعي على الاصلاحات الأساسية والتصورات المنهجية.

وأول هذه التصورات علاقة الوعي بالعقل. وثاني هذه التصورات تأصيل الدراسات الاسلامية للفطرة الاجتماعية ومنهجه. وثالث هذه التصورات تطوير منهج دراسات الوعي والتنزيل بما يستجيب لحاجات الأمة والتحديات التي تواجهها في هذا العصر وبالتكامل مع الدراسات الاسلامية للفطرة الاجتماعية. والرابع استعادة البعد الحركي والفقہ الحركي للتشريع

والتنظيم والتنفيذ الاسلامي باستعادة بعد ولاية الأمر الملتزمة بالاسلام في المجتمع الاسلامي الى جانب الكتاب والسنة حتى يمكن للتوجيه الاسلامي ان يأخذ مكان التوجيه والتنظيم في كافة وجوه المجتمع في عالم الحقيقة والواقع.

ولتحقيق ذلك لا بد من اصلاح الرؤية الاسلامية والمنهجية الاسلامية وأساليب التربية الاسلامية والدعوة الاسلامية وما يترتب على ذلك من اصلاح مفهوم السياسة الاسلامية والتنظيم السياسي الاسلامي حتى يؤدي الى قيام نظام اسلامي يرتكز الى قاعدة سياسية اسلامية حقيقية قادرة على ان تقيم وان تنصب قيادة سياسية اسلامية مؤهلة بالقدرة والدعم السياسي من الأمة، ملتزمة بالاسلام ومجتمع الاسلام وغاية الاسلام متحلية بثقة الأمة، ومتابعتها والعمل معها لتحقيق الغاية المشتركة.

وحتى يمكن ان نحقق كل ذلك علينا ان نبدأ بأنفسنا بالتحلي بالخلق الاسلامي والأفق الاسلامي لنبدأ الحوار الفكري المطلوب لتوضيح الرؤية وبناء المنهجية وطرح البدائل والحلول دون انفعالات الجهل أو الفرض ودون خطأ الخلط بين نظرات الفكر وقداصة الوحي. علينا ان نجعل التسامح العلمي والترحيب بالرأي والخلاف وتفاوت الادراكات وتكاملها هو خلقنا ليكون وسيلتنا الى النمو ووضوح الرؤية وتحقيق القناعة وحل الاشكالات.

مطلوب من الأمة وهيئاتها الاقبال على أعمال البحث والنشر العلمي سعياً الى تحقيق نقلة اسلامية كبرى في مجال بناء المعرفة الاسلامية في مجالات العلوم الاجتماعية والانسانية والفيزيائية والتطبيقية.

مطلوب استكمال اصدار الدوريات العلمية وأدوات البحث العلمي الميسرة لأعمال الدراسة والثقافة ومن أهمها الموسوعات والدوريات الناقدة والمخصصة للأعمال والدراسات العلمية الجيدة.

مطلوب دراسات جادة واسعة لتيسير التراث العلمي الاسلامي والإفادة من جهود السلف ومواصلة الجهد والانتاء العلمي الصحي الى ذلك الفكر والتراث، بإعادة التوبيع والفهرسة وشرح المصطلحات وتسخير الأجهزة العلمية الحديثة وأهمها الكمبيوتر لهذه الغاية حتى يصبح هذا التراث في متناول أيدي الدارسين والباحثين والمفكرين والمثقفين من أبناء الأمة.

مطلوب تأصيل النظرة العلمية الشاملة كجزء لا يتجزأ من المنهجية الاسلامية ورفض الجزئية في دراسة الفكر الاسلامي والمعرفة الاسلامية وعروضها العلمية، ومن الدراسات الشمولية المطلوبة دراسات شاملة للحضارة والثقافة الحديثة وفهم أهدافها ومرتكزاتها وانجازاتها ومناهجها ووجوه النقص والقصور فيها لتكون هذه الدراسات معرفة ونبراساً للدارسين والدارسات الاسلاميين للحضارة المعاصرة والتجارب الحضارية والاجتماعية المعاصرة فيحسنون فهمها والتعامل معها من منطلق الدراية والعلم لا من منطلق الجهل او الانبهار.

مطلوب فهم روح المبادرة والابداع ومتطلباتها وغرسها في نفوس ناشئة الأمة وكافة

فئاتها رجالاً ونساء وفي كل موقع حتى يمكن حقاً قيام تحقيق الرؤية الاسلامية الحضارية البديلة بإمكانات العصر ولمواجهة تحدياته وأفائه.

مطلوب غرس روح الجدية، جدية الحياة، وجدية بناء الحياة، وقيادة الحياة ومواجهة تحديات الحياة، مطلوب روح الاخلاص والابداع والجدية حقيقة واقعة في ضمير الأمة ومهمة الأمة وواقع الأمة ورسالتها.

المعهد العالمي للفكر الإسلامي:

والمعهد العالمي للفكر الإسلامي قد قام لتحقيق هذه الغايات في الفكر الاسلامي، والمنهجية الاسلامية، وللبداء في العمل العلمي الجاد لتوفير الشروط الموضوعية المسبقة لكل ما يستقيم به الفكر الاسلامي ومنطلقاته وتصلح به الحياة الاسلامية المعاصرة.

والمعهد يدعو اخوانه أفراداً وجماعات ومؤسسات للتعاون معه وعونه والاستعانة به لتحقيق هذه الغاية ، ولتحقيق اصلاح الفكر الاسلامي والمنهجية الاسلامية وتحقيق اسلامية المعرفة واسلامية العلوم الاجتماعية وإخراج الكتاب الاسلامي الجامعي المنهجي، وتزويد الشباب والمثقفين بالفكر والرؤية الاسلامية الصحيحة في مواجهة الغزو الثقافي الأجنبي وتضليلات الفكر الهدام ودعاياته. وان المعهد ليتطلع الى هذا العون والتعاون والى تكاتف الجهود من أجل انجاز هذه المهمة الصعبة وبدء تسيير عجلتها بنجاح باذن الله.

اننا نرجو ان يدرك اخواننا المسلمون في كل بقاع الأرض اهمية ما ندعو اليه ، ونسعي الى تحقيقه، وان يمدوا لنا يد العون والتعاون، والا يأتي هذا الوعي وهذا الادراك متأخراً، فحرج حال المسلمين ليس بحاجة الى شرح ولا إفاضة فليس لديهم ما يفقدونه في سوق القدرة والحضارة الا الضعف والعجز والتخلف والهوان.

والله من وراء القصد وبه نستعين

IV
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Philosophy of Science from the The Qur'ānic Perspective

Mehdi Golshani

Philosophy of Science from the Qur'ānic Perspective

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By science here we mean the branch of knowledge that deals with the material world. The philosophy of science deals with all philosophical problems that arise in connection with science. Among its most important problems are:

1. How does our knowledge of the physical world expand?
2. What are the principles unswerving scientific research?

Here we intend to discuss these two problems from the Qur'ānic point of view.

Epistemological problems from the Qur'ānic viewpoint

From the Qur'ānic point of view, there is a real world independent of our mind:

﴿وفي الأرض آيات للموقنين وفي أنفسكم أفلا تبصرون﴾. (الذاريات: ٢٠-٢١).

And in the earth there are signs for those who are sure; and in your own souls (too); will you not then see? (51:20-21)

﴿الحمد لله الذي خلق السموات والأرض وجعل الظلمات والنور...﴾، (الأنعام: ١).

All praise is due to Allah, who created the heavens and the earth and made the darkness and the light . . . (6:1).

﴿أو لم ينظروا في ملكوت السموات والأرض وما خلق الله من شيء...﴾، (الأعراف: ١٨٥).

Do they not consider the spiritual dimension of the heavens and the earth and whatever things Allah has created? (7:185)

And we are ordered to study the physical world to get closer to Allah (through signs in nature), and to use the provisions He has made for us:

﴿قُلْ انظروا ماذا في السموات والأرض وما تغني الآيات والنذر عن قوم لا يؤمنون﴾
(يونس: ١٠١).

Say: Consider what is it that is in the heavens and the earth; and the signs and warners do not avail a people who would not believe (10:101).

﴿الله الذي رفع السموات بغير عمد ترونها ثم استوى على العرش وسخر الشمس والقمر كل يجري لأجل مسمى يدبر الأمر يفصل الآيات لعلكم بلقاء ربكم توقنون﴾. (الرعد: ٢).

Allah is He who raised the heavens without any pillars that you see, and He is firm in power and He made the sun and the moon subservient (to you); each one pursues its course to an appointed time; He regulates the affair, making clear the signs that you may be certain of meeting your Lord (13-2).

﴿وسخر لكم الليل والنهار والشمس والقمر والنجوم مسخرات بأمره إن في ذلك لآيات لقوم يعقلون .. وهو الذي سخر البحر لتأكلوا منه لحماً طرياً وتستخرجوا منه حلية تلبسونها وترى الفلك مواخر فيه ولتبتغوا من فضله ولعلكم تشكرون﴾. (النحل: ١٢-١٤).

And He has made subservient for you the night and the day and the sun and the moon, and the stars are made subservient by His commandment; most surely there are signs in this for a people who ponder . . . and He it is who has made the sea subservient that you may eat fresh flesh from it and bring forth from it ornaments which you wear, and you see the ships clearing through it, and that you might seek of his bounty and that you may give thanks (16:12-14).

If the study of nature were not possible, the Qur'ān would not recommend us to study the origin and the course of evolution of beings and phenomena. Moreover, there are verses in the Qur'ān that explicitly show this point:

﴿سنريهم آياتنا في الآفاق وفي أنفسهم حتى يتبين لهم أنه الحق..﴾، (فصلت: ٥٣).

We will soon show them Our signs in the universe and in their own souls, so that it will become clear unto them that this (revelation) is indeed the truth (41:53).

On the other hand, the Qur'ān is a book of guidance for all people and has not neglected anything relevant to the conduct of man's life:

﴿ونزلنا عليك الكتاب تبيانا لكل شيء وهدى ورحمة وبشرى للمسلمين﴾. (النحل: ٨٩).

and We have revealed the book to you explaining clearly everything and a guidance and mercy and good news for those who submit (16:89).

﴿... ما فرطنا في الكتاب من شيء..﴾ (الأنعام: ٣٨).

We have not neglected anything in the Book . . . (6:38).

We therefore expect that through a careful study one should be able to deduce from it the tools and prescription for studying nature.

Tools for the Cognition of Nature

According to the Qur'ān, the general tools for the study of nature are our senses and our intellect:

﴿والله أخرجكم من بطون أمهاتكم لاتعلمون شيئا وجعل لكم السمع والأبصار والأفئدة...﴾

And God has brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers – you did not know anything – and He gave you the hearing and the sight and the heart (16:78).

We learn through observation and experimentation backed by reflection:

﴿قل سيروا في الأرض فأنظروا كيف بدأ الخلق...﴾

Say: Travel on the earth and see how He made the first creation (29:20).

﴿أفلم يسيروا في الأرض فتكون لهم قلوب يعقلون بها..﴾ (الحج: ٤٦).

Have they not traveled in the land so that they should have hearts with which to understand . . . (22:46).

The first parts of these verses refer to observation and experimentation and the second part to the use of the faculty of reasoning. Thus, experimental work is an indispensable tool for the understanding of nature, but, contrary to what some schools of thought claim, not all of our information about nature comes directly from sensations. If we confine ourselves to sensations and do not use our intellect, we are no better than animals:

﴿لهم قلوب لا يفقهون بها ولهم أعين لا يبصرون بها ولهم آذان لا يسمعون بها أولئك كالأنعام بل هم أضل أولئك هم الغافلون﴾، (الأعراف: ١٧٩).

They have hearts with which they do not understand, and they have eyes with which they do not see, and they have ears with which they do not hear; they are as cattle, nay, they are in worse errors; these are the heedless ones (7:179).

Furthermore, the Qur'an frequently mentions that the perception of divine signs in nature is only possible for men of intellect and reflection:

﴿إن في خلق السموات والأرض واختلاف الليل والنهار آيات لأولي الأبصار، الذين يذكرون الله قيامًا وقعودًا وعلى جنوبهم ويتفكرون في خلق السموات والأرض...﴾، (آل عمران: ١٩٠-١٩١).

Most surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night and day there are signs for men who understand. Those who remember Allah, standing and sitting and lying on their sides and reflect on the creation of the heavens and the earth . . . (3, 190-191).

﴿إن في خلق السموات والأرض واختلاف الليل والنهار والفلك التي تجري في البحر بما ينفع الناس وما أنزل الله من السماء من ماء فأحيا به الأرض بعد موتها وبث فيها من كل دابة وتصريف الرياح والسحاب المسخر بين السماء والأرض آيات لقوم يعقلون﴾، (البقرة: ١٦٤).

Most surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth the alternation of the night and the day, and the ships that run in the sea with that which profits men, and the water that Allah sends down from the cloud, then gives life with it to the earth after its death and spreads in it all (kinds of) animals, and the changing of the winds and the clouds made subservient between the heaven and the earth, there are signs for a people who understand (16:164).

Also, the Qur'an teaches us that there are many realities in the physical world that we do not perceive through our senses:

﴿فلا أقسم بما تبصرون وما لاتبصرون﴾، (الحاقة: ٣٨-٣٩).

But nay! I swear by that which you see, and that which you do not see (69:38-39).

﴿خلق السموات بغير عمد ترونها...﴾، (لقمان: ١٠).

He created the heavens without pillars as you see them . . . (31:10).

Finally, the Qur'an condemns those who think that our only sources of information about the physical world come through sense perception:

﴿يسئلك أهل الكتاب أن تنزل عليهم كتاباً من السماء فقد سألوا موسى أكبر من ذلك، فقالوا أرنا الله جهرة، فأخذتهم الصاعقة بظلمهم...﴾، (النساء: ١٥٣).

The followers of the Book ask you to bring down to them a book from heaven; so indeed they demanded of Musa a greater thing than that, for they said: Show us Allah manifestly; so the lightning overtook them on account of their injustice . . . (4:153).

Unfortunately, the wind of positivism that blew in the early part of this century has affected many Muslim scholars' minds, and there are many Muslim scientists who think that our knowledge of the physical world extends no further than mere description of sensory experiences. Concerning this line of thought, we have the following observations:

1. We never encounter nature with empty minds, and therefore, there is no such thing as pure experimental data. Our interpretation of experimental data and even our view of the reliability of experimental data depends to some extent upon preconceptions and assumptions that are held by the investigator. Planck explains this point beautifully:

Every measurement first acquires its meaning for physical science through the significance which a theory gives it. Anybody who is familiar with a precision laboratory will agree that even the finest and most direct measurements – such as those of weight and current – have to be corrected again and again before they can be employed for any practical purpose. It is obvious that these corrections cannot be suggested by the measurement process itself. They must first be discovered through the light which some theory or other throws upon the situation; that is to say, they must arise from an hypothesis.¹

2. As Einstein has rightfully pointed out, the fundamental concepts and postulates of science cannot be derived from sense experience by any process of induction. Rather they are free inventions of the human mind.²

Physics constitutes a logical system of thought which is a state of evolution, whose basis cannot be distilled, as it were, from experience by an inductive method, but can only be arrived at by free invention. The *justification* (truth content) of the system rests in the verification of the derived propositions by sense experiences,

whereby the relations of the latter to the former can only be comprehended intuitively. Evolution is proceeding in the direction of increasing simplicity of the logical basis. In order further to approach this goal, we must resign ourselves to the fact that the logical basis departs more and more from the facts of experience, and that the path of our thought from the fundamental basis to those derived propositions, which correlate with sense experiences, becomes continually harder and longer.³

The reason for this fact is that a theory can be considered to be a direct result of an experiment if we can show that there can be no alternative explanation for that experiment; but this we can never claim, and past experience has warned us against this type of mistake. The agreement between a theory and a set of experimental facts does not necessarily mean that it is a correct one, because, logically speaking, a conclusion can be drawn from different premises. Thus, we can never claim that a theory is a direct result of experimental data. Infinitely many theories could be set up to explain a set of experimental facts. One has to add other assumptions or bring in other information to single out one of them. When Kepler was studying the data about the relative position of Mars against the background of fixed stars, he tried to infer a “good-looking” law from the available data, but he failed. Then after working on the theory of ellipse in another context, he assumed that the orbit was an ellipse. He checked this assumption against the experimental data and found it to work well. Thus, the assumption of an elliptical orbit for Mars was not a direct result of the observed positions of Mars.

The growth of science is, therefore, due to both experimental work and theoretical speculations.

3. Many concepts are not derivable from sense experience. For example, the concept of “causality” is not derived from sensory impressions. All that we receive through our senses is that, e.g., B comes regularly after A, that there is a casual relation between A and B is a judgement of our intellect. Even in the physical sciences, many concepts are not direct by-products of observations and have been introduced by scientists to explain experimental facts. For example, we use the concept of the atom to explain thousands of experimental observations, yet no one has ever observed an atom (even with sense-extending instruments). We know atoms by inference. Similarly, our information about distant regions of space and time is not direct.

The conclusion we want to derive from this discussion is that experimentation alone, without theoretical reasoning, cannot give us significant information about nature. Even though observation and experimentation are a must for having a thorough picture of the physical world, not all of our knowledge about nature is derived from sensory experiences.

The process of getting a correct picture of the physical world is a lengthy one and can be accomplished only through the interplay of experimental work and theoretical enterprise.

Barriers against Correct Reasoning

As we mentioned, the Qur'an commands us to observe nature and reflect on what we observe. Reflection, in turn, involves using existing information and moving toward fresh knowledge. This intellectual movement, however, can lead to a correct result only if certain principles and rules are observed. Thus we come to logic, which is the study of the principles of correct reasoning. The use of logical principles alone, however, cannot guarantee correct results, unless we make sure that the premises used in the reasoning are faultless. It is for this reason that the Qur'an has warned us about those things that can prevent our intellect from functioning properly. Here we mention the main factors that prevent a correct cognition of nature:

1. Lack of faith

According to the Qur'an, knowledge without faith cannot lead one to a correct understanding of nature:

﴿قل انظروا ماذا في السموات والأرض وما تغني الآيات والنذر عن قوم لا يؤمنون﴾
(يونس: ١٠١)

Say: consider what is it that is in the heavens and the earth; and signs and warners do not avail people who would not believe (10:101).

The principal role of faith in understanding is to restore man's faculty of intellect to its proper state, away from devilish inducements and temptations.

2. Partiality in judgment

Following one's desires, whether in love or hatred, unjustifiable prejudices, and pomposity are the most important factors that prevent the faculty of intellect from impartiality and sound judgment:

﴿ولئن اتبعت أهواءهم بعد الذي جاءك من العلم ما لك من الله من ولي ولا نصير﴾
(البقرة: ١٣٠).

And if you follow their desires after the knowledge that has come to you, you shall have no guardian from Allāh, nor any helper (2:120).

﴿لقد جئناكم بالحق ولكن أكثركم للحق كارهون﴾، (الزخرف: ٧٨)

Certainty we have brought you the truth but most of you are adverse to the truth (43:78).

فلما جاءتهم آياتنا مبصرة قالوا هذا سحر مبين، وجحدوا بها واستيقنتها أنفسهم ظلماً وعلواً...﴿، (النمل: ١٣-١٤).

So when Our clear signs came to them, they said: this is clear enchantment, And they denied them unjustly and proudly while their soul had been convinced of them . . . (27:13-14).

3. Blind imitation of ancestors and men of authority:

﴿وقالوا ربنا إنا أطعنا سادتنا وكبراءنا فأضلونا السبيلاً﴾، (الأحزاب: ٦٧).

And they shall say: O our Lord! surely we obeyed our leaders and our great men, so they led us astray from the path (33:67).

﴿بل تتبع ما آلفينا عليه آباءنا أولئو كان آباؤهم لا يعقلون شيئاً ولا يهتدون﴾. (البقرة: ١٧٠).

Nay, we follow what we found our fathers upon. What! and though their fathers had no sense at all, nor did they follow the right way (2:170).

4. Unreasonable negations and confirmations

One of the main sources of error in judgments is due to the replacement of knowledge by conjecture:

﴿وما لهم به من علم، إن يتبعون إلا الظن وإن الظن لا يغني من الحق شيئاً﴾، (النجم: ٢٨).

And they have no knowledge of it; they do not follow anything but conjecture, and surely conjecture does not avail against the truth at all (53:28).

An important principle in scientific research is that one should not confirm or reject anything without a reason:

﴿ولا تقف ما ليس لك به علم، إن السمع والبصر والفؤاد كل أولئك كان عنه مسئولاً﴾، (الإسراء: ٣٦).

And follow not that of which you have not the knowledge; surely the hearing and the sight and the heart, all of these, shall be questioned about that (17:36).

A Priori Principles of Scientific Research

We mentioned that scientific research is a combination of experimental work and intellectual activity. In order to make this endeavor meaningful and guarantee the attainment of correct results one has to assume certain principles prior to any kind of scientific activity. There have been various views about the number and the interpretation of these principles. Using the Qur'ān as your guide, we think that, in addition to the basic principles of logic (e.g., the principle of noncontradiction), the following are the principles that one has to assume prior to any kind of scientific activity.

1. The principle of monotheism (*al tawhīd*)

From the Qur'ānic viewpoint the study of nature should not be for the sake of satisfying one's own curiosity. Rather, it should be for the cognition of the wise Creator and Governor of the universe. All natural beings are sign of the Almighty and any study of them should lead us to Him.

Furthermore, there are many references in the Qur'ān to the presence of order, harmony, and purpose in the physical world:

﴿وخلق كل شيء فقدره تقديراً﴾، (الفرقان: ٢).

And Who created everything, then ordained for it a measure (25:2).

﴿ما ترى في خلق الرحمن من تفاوت فارجع البصر هل ترى من فطور﴾، (الملك: ٣).

You see no incongruity in the Creation of the Beneficent, then look again; can you see any disorder? (67:3)

﴿وما خلقنا السموات والأرض وما بينهما لاعبين، وما خلقناهما إلا بالحق ولكن أكثرهم لا يعلمون﴾، (الدخان: ٣٨-٣٩).

And We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in sport. We did not create them both but with the truth, but most of them do not know (44:38-39)

This cosmic order and coordination is attributed to the Creator and Coordinator of the universe:

﴿لو كان فيهما آلهة إلا الله لفسدتا..﴾، (الأنبياء: ٢٢).

If there had been in them [in the heavens and the earth] any gods except Allah, they would both have certainly been in state of disorder . . . (21:22).

﴿...صنع الله الذي أتقن كل شيء...﴾، (النمل: ٨٨).

. . . The handiwork of Allah Who has made everything thoroughly
. . . (27:88).

﴿أفلا يتدبرون القرآن ولو كان من عند غير الله لوجدوا فيه اختلافاً كثيراً﴾، (النساء: ٨٢).

Do they not then meditate on the Qur'ān? And if it were from any other than Allah, they would have found in it many a discrepancy (4:82).

﴿وهو الذي جعل الشمس ضياءً والقمر نوراً وقدره منازل لتعلموا عدد السنين والحساب ما خلق الله ذلك إلا بالحق...﴾، (يونس: ٥).

It is He Who made the sun a radiance, and the moon a light, and ordained for it mansions, that you might know the number of the years and the reckoning. Allah did not create that save with the truth . . . (10:5).

A firm belief in the principle of monotheism causes the research scholar to cast a comprehensive look at nature as a whole rather than while the isolated pieces and enables him to explain the harmony and order present in the physical world.

On the other hand, without a firm belief in the presence of order and coordination in nature, scientific research will not have any universal significance, and, at the most, will have a temporary value only.

There are some scientists who believe in the presence of order and coordination in nature without believing in or paying attention to the principle of the monotheism; but, in our view, without belief in *al tawhīd*, there is no satisfactory explanation for cosmic order.

2. The reality of the external world

As we mentioned earlier, from the Qur'ānic standpoint there is a real external world independent of the perceiving subject:

﴿والله أخرجكم من بطون أمهاتكم لاتعلمون شيئاً، وجعل لكم السمع والأبصار والأفئدة...﴾، (الحل: ٧٨).

And Allah has brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers—you do not know anything—and He gave you hearing, sight and minds . . . (16-78)

﴿... وجعل لكم فيها سبلاً لعلكم تهتدون... والذي خلق الأزواج كلها وجعل لكم من الفلك والأنعام ما تركبون﴾، (الزخرف: ١٠-١٢).

He who made the earth a resting place for you, and made in it ways for you that you may go aright . . . and He Who created pairs of all things, and made for you of the ships and the cattle, what you ride on (43:10-12).

The belief in an objective world is the basis of all physical and natural sciences, and without it any scientific endeavor would be only a play or idle sport. This belief has always been one of the strongest motivations for scientists' activities. Planck expresses this point beautifully:

“The choicest and most original minds, men like Kepler, Newton, Leibniz, and Faraday, were inspired by the belief in the reality of the external world and in the rule of a higher reason in and beyond it.”

3. Limitation of human knowledge

We learn from the Qur'an:

That human knowledge is limited:

﴿وما أوتيتم من العلم إلا قليلاً﴾، (الاسراء: ٨٥).

And you are not given aught of knowledge but a little (17:85).

that there are many things that our sensory organs do not perceive:

﴿...فلا أقسم بما تبصرون وما لا تبصرون﴾، (الحاقة: ٣٨-٣٩).

I swear by what you see and what you do not see (69:38-39).

﴿الله الذي رفع السموات بغير عمد ترونها..﴾، (الرعد: ٢).

Allah is He Who raised the heavens without any pillars that you see (13-2).

﴿سبحان الذي خلق الأزواج كلها مما تنبت الأرض ومن أنفسهم وما لا يعلمون﴾، (يس: ٣٦).

Glory be to Him Who created pairs of all things, of what the earth grows, and of their kind and of what they do not know (36-36).

And that we should believe in the unseen, that is, in the supernatural truth:

﴿ذلك الكتاب لا ريب فيه هدى للمتقين، الذين يؤمنون بالغيب ويقيمون الصلاة وما رزقناهم ينفقون﴾، (البقرة: ٢-٣).

This Book, there is no doubt in it, is a guide to those who guard (against evil), those who believe in the unseen and keep up prayer and spend out what We have given them (2:2-3).

The faith in the limitation of human knowledge and the unseen is an incentive for us not to stop our mind at the sensory stage and never to think that we have discovered everything.

The Principle of Causality

This principle states that every event has a cause. The principle has two important corollaries:

1. The principle of determinism: any cause has effect, and without a cause has an effect, and without a cause it is impossible to have an effect.
2. The principle of uniformity of nature: similar causes entail similar effects.

It has been a long-time assumption by many scientists of all times that there are certain laws governing our physical universe. The principle of causality is the postulate that gives meaning to the application of any law used to explain natural phenomena.

In the Qur'ān, we find reference to this principle in several contexts:

There are several verses that speak about unchangeable patterns of Allah in the universe:

﴿فهل ينظرون إلا سنة الأولين، فلن تجد لسنة الله تبديلا ولن تجد لسنة الله تحويلا﴾، (فاطر: ٤٣).

Then should they wait for aught except the way of former people? For you shall not find any alternation in the Course of Allāh (35:43).

﴿فطرة الله التي فطر الناس عليها لا تبديل لخلق الله...﴾، (الروم: ٣٠).

The nature made by Allāh in which He has made men; there is no altering of Allah's creation (30:30).

There are many verses that talk about fixed mechanisms for the occurrence of certain events:

﴿وَلَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ مِنْ سَلَالَةٍ مِنْ طِينٍ﴾، (المؤمنون: ١٢).

And certainly We created man of an extract of clay (23-12).

﴿... وَأَنْزَلَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً فَأَخْرَجَ بِهِ مِنَ الثَّمَرَاتِ رِزْقًا لَكُمْ...﴾، (البقرة: ٢٢).

And (Who) sends down rain from the cloud then brings forth with it subsistence for you (2:22).

Some of the Qur'ānic verses explain the intermediary role of some events in the appearance of others:

﴿وَأَرْسَلْ عَلَيْهِمْ طَيْرًا أَبَابِيلَ تَرْمِيهِمْ بِحِجَارَةٍ مِنْ سِجِّيلٍ﴾، (الفيل: ٤-٣).

And sent down upon them birds in flocks, casting them against stones of baked clay (105:3-4).

﴿قَاتِلُوهُمْ يُعَذِّبُهُمُ اللَّهُ بِأَيْدِيكُمْ...﴾، (التوبة: ١٤).

Fight them, Allāh will punish them by your hands . . . (9:14).

On the other hand, there are some verses in the Qur'ān that attribute the creation and direction of the world to Allah:

﴿قَالَ اللَّهُ خَالِقُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ﴾، (الرعد: ٥٤).

Say: Allāh is the Creator of all things (13:16).

﴿أَلَا لَهُ الْخَلْقُ وَالْأَمْرُ﴾، (الأعراف: ٧).

Surely His is the Creation and Command (7:54).

Putting these two sets of verses together, one can conclude that everything is realized by Allah's will, but through special channels. Verses of the following type confirm this interpretation:

﴿وَالْبَلَدِ الطَّيِّبِ يَخْرُجُ نَبَاتُهُ بِإِذْنِ رَبِّهِ وَالَّذِي خَبِثَ لَا يَخْرُجُ إِلَّا نَكْدًا﴾، (الأعراف: ٥٨).

And as for the good land, its vegetation springs forth (abundantly) by the permission of its Lord; and (as for) that which is inferior (its herbage) comes forth but scantily (7:58).

This verse indicates that although Allah's will is necessary for the growth of the plants, the fertility of the land is important, too. Not every sort of plant, can be raised in every sort of land.

Some well-known Muslim theologians (like Imām Ghazālī and Imām Rāzī) of the *Asharite* school rejected necessary causal relations (determinism) in the physical world and said that physical means have no role in the realization of natural phenomena. The cause of any occurrence is Allah's will, except that it is Allah's habit to create what we call "effect" after what we call "cause," without any relation between them that necessitates the "effect" to follow the "cause." If Allah does not want it, the so-called effect will not follow the so-called cause.⁴

The reason these theologians denied determinism is that they thought the assumption of necessary causal relations would negate Allah's unlimited power and leave no room for miracles. This conclusion, however, is not right, because what is commonly called a cause is simply an intermediary or preparing cause, rather than the efficient cause. The role of intermediary means is to prepare the ground for the creation of everything, but He creates everything through definite intermediary and preparing causes, and these are themselves created by Allah. The need for the presence of intermediaries is not due to any deficiency in the Creator, but is related to deficiencies in the receivers of Allah's effusion.⁷

After the appearance of quantum theory in physics and the presentation of the principle of uncertainty by W. Heisenberg in the 1930s, some of the founders of this theory denied the principle of determinism and the principle of uniformity of nature in the atomic realm. In their view all laws of microphysics have a statistical status, referring to averages drawn from numerous similar observations, and admitting exceptions for single observations.

Most physicists, with the exception of some prominent ones like Planck and Einstein, accepted the new theory and its orthodox interpretation, a situation that still exists, although the lapse of time has increased the number of opponents.

Einstein and Planck and other prominent physicists could not accept that laws of probability are governing the universe. For them the events in nature should ultimately be explained in terms of absolute laws, and a deterministic foundation should underlie the apparent statistical behavior. One uses the laws of probability either because the underlying laws are not precisely known or because of the difficulties in handling large numbers.

In this regard, Einstein made the following comment:

I cannot but confess that I attach only a transitory importance to this interpretation. I still believe in the possibility of a model of reality—that is to say of a theory which represents things

themselves and not merely the probability of their occurrence⁸

And in his letter to Max Born of December 1926, Einstein wrote:

Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does not really bring us any closer to the secret of the 'old one'. I, at any rate, am convinced that He is not playing dice.⁹

Unfortunately, in recent years we have come across some Muslim scholars who have revived the forsaken theory of the *Ash'aris*, citing quantum mechanics as a proof of their claims. We refute this kind of outlook on the following grounds:

A. If we deny the validity of the principle of causality in the atomic and subatomic world, this would mean defacing this principle in relation to the whole world, because causality relates different parts of the world together.

B. Should the principle of causality turn out to be untrue, there would be no relationships between the premises of an argument and its conclusion, because the premises are the cause of one's accepting the conclusion. Without the principle of causality, nothing should be the conclusion of an argument, and from any set of premises one can derive any conclusion, and there would be no difference between proving something and not proving it.

It is for this reason that even those who refute the principle of causality do so implicitly using this principle, because if they did not believe that their argument would cause a change in our belief, they would not attempt to argue with us.¹⁰

C. As martyred professor Murtada Mutahhari¹¹ and martyred Ayatollah Sadr¹² have pointed out, the impossibility of prediction in the atomic domain is not due to lack of determinism, but is a result of our ignorance about the deterministic laws governing atomic phenomena, and this could be either because our present experimental and theoretical knowledge is incomplete or because we cannot measure the effect of the observer on his measurement precisely.

In any event, one should be aware that our failure to discover determinism in the atomic domain does not imply that necessary causal relations do not hold, and we do not have any right to claim that we have discovered all parameters relevant to this domain.

At this point it seems appropriate to quote what Dirac wrote in 1979:

It seems clear that the present quantum mechanics is not in its final form. Some further changes will be needed, just about as drastic as the changes which one made in passing from Bohr's orbits to a quantum mechanics. Some day a new relativistic quan-

tum mechanics will be discovered in which we don't have these infinities occurring at all. It might very well be that the new quantum mechanics will have determinism in the way that Einstein wanted. This determinism will be introduced only at the expense of abandoning some other preconceptions which physicists now hold, and which it is not sensible to try to get at now.

So under the conditions I think it is very likely, or at any rate quite possible, that in the long run Einstein will turn out to be correct, even though for the time being physicists have to accept the Bohr's probability interpretation—especially if they have examinations in front of them.¹⁵

In short, by the negation of causality nothing would be a requisite for another, and anything could be derived from anything, so there would be no room for science. Science has to accept the principle of causality with all its corollaries, so that its existence could be meaningful.

وآخر دعوانا ان الحمد لله رب العالمين...

NOTES

- ¹ Max Planck, *The New Science*, Greenwich Editions (1959); p. 51.
- ² Einstein, *A Centenary Volume*, A. P. French ed., Heinemann (1979), p. 312.
- ³ Albert Einstein, *Ideas and Opinions*, trans. Sonja Bargman. New York, Crown Publishers (1954), pp. 322-323.
- ⁴ Max Planck, *The New Science* (1959), p. 250.
- ⁵ Abu Ḥāmid Ghazali, *Tahafut al-Falāsifah*. Cairo, 1972, pp. 239-240.
- ⁶ Fakhr al-Din Razi, *al-Tafsir al-Kabir*, vol. 2, pp. 110-111; vol. 14, pp. 193-195; vol. 30, p. 53.
- ⁷ Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Asfar*, vol. 6, p. 371.
- ⁸ *Ideas and Opinions* by Albert Einstein, p. 276.
- ⁹ Einstein, *A Centenary Volume*, p. 310.
- ¹⁰ Averroës, *Tahafut al-Tahafut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), trans. S. Van den Bergh, London, Luzac & Co., 1954, pp. 316-319.
- ¹¹ M. H. Tabatabai, *Usul Falsafah*. vol. 3, p. 217 (Mutahhari's footnote).
- ¹² M. B. Sadr, *Falsafatunā, Dar al-Taaruf*. Beirut, 1980, pp. 305-309.
- ¹³ *Some Strangeness in the Proportion*, Woolf ed. Addison-Wesley, p. 65.

**The Role of Islamic Thought
in the Resolution of the Present
Crisis in Science and Technology**

**Mazhar Mahmud Quraishi
Sayid Maqsud Ali Shah**

The Role of Islamic Thought in the Resolution of the Present Crisis in Science and Technology

*Mazhar Mahmud Quraishi and
Sayid Maqsud Ali Shah*

When asked to prepare poisons, Rāzī, the great Muslim scientist of the ninth century A.C. is reported to have replied with a firm refusal, even though he was quite capable of doing so, because it was against his religious convictions. The incident is not a casual one, but highlights the fundamental difference in the two opposing approaches to science and technology: one consciously based on directing science and technology to serve humanity with due regard to social values and ecological balance, and the other professedly value-neutral, yet leading, among other things, to unprecedented damage to man's social, moral, psychological, economic, and environmental systems.

The second approach has emerged with full vigor since the Industrial Revolution. Perhaps science's bitter confrontation with the Church at its very rebirth in the West led it to adopt a stance that was, consciously or unconsciously, opposed to religious and moral ideals. Subsequently, scientists claimed to have adopted an apparently neutral and value-free attitude.

But how value-free has this attitude been? Leaving aside some of the deliberate efforts aimed at using science as a tool to support atheistic, materialistic, and agnostic tendencies, considerable harm has also been to man's peace and security. No doubt, science and technology have rendered great services to man in raising his standard of living, and they have, above all, served the need of satisfying man's quest for knowledge; there can be no two opinions on this issue. Yet, the absence of proper values to direct its development has led, among other things, to an unprecedented arms race, producing enough arsenals to annihilate man's own existence. This is underscored by the fact that funds being spent on destructive capability

by the major world powers are several times higher than those required for solving man's food, health, and educational problems.

All this should compel us to pause for a moment, search our consciences, and decide to do something in earnest to check our progress in directions that may ultimately destroy all progress. This brings us to the point of adopting a radically different approach, such as the first of the two approaches alluded to in the opening paragraph. The search for this approach has become all the more necessary in the Muslim world, which finds itself sandwiched between the need for rapid progress in science and technology with a view to harnessing these for the basic needs of its teeming millions, on the one hand, and the desirability of preserving the high ideals of its cultural, social, and environmental systems, on the other.

A Look at the Neutrality of Science and Technology

Contrary to the general claim that science is absolutely value-free or neutral in respect of all moral, social, and other systems, values directly or indirectly projected by science and technology have affected the social and moral structure of society more than any other phenomenon in recent history. The well-known example of the theory of evolution may be cited. In addition to the fact that mere opinions were projected on the origin of man, beyond the limits of actual observation and experiment, the concept of "struggle for survival" was advocated without regard to the higher social feelings characteristic of man. The results were disastrous: not only was damage caused to established institutions but the concepts of "struggle for survival" and "survival of the fittest" unjustifiably penetrated into the fields of economics, trade, international relations, sociology, etc. And all this was based largely on conjecture and free interpretation, without any conclusive proof of values so projected.

This brings us to another important aspect of the issue, insofar as views and beliefs based on science are concerned. It is unfortunate that very often theories and values are projected that are not yet proved and that are later abrogated after new findings. For instance, the atom was once considered indivisible; the concept later stood as badly shattered as the atom itself. Likewise, the concept of conservation of mass was once a fundamental "law"; it is not even a theory now. We were once told that a certain quantity of butter or animal fat taken daily was essential for our health, but the effects of cholesterol accumulation have considerably reduced this importance of fats. And so on and so forth. This goes to prove that some findings of science are of a transient nature and subject to frequent revision. This is in contrast to the assertions of religion, especially Islam. The truth revealed by

Islam 1400 years ago has no transient hypothesis in it: all that has been revealed is final as guidance for man. Hence it is not at all wise to be influenced by the values and opinions (not fully proven facts) emerging from science, especially when these are in contradiction to the teachings of Islam.

Here an important question arises: what if Islamic teachings involve verses that are against a fact "proved" by science, as has happened with many biblical statements? The answer to this question brings us to the standing miracle of the Qur'ān. It was revealed 1400 years ago, yet all the scientific research carried out to date has not contradicted a single verse of the Qur'ān despite the fact that a large number of verses in the Qur'ān describe or reveal scientific phenomena and facts, some of which were not even known or readily conceivable at the time of the revelation of the Qur'ān. Most scientific research has, in fact, verified the truth of the scientific references in the Qur'ānic revelations and even in the hadith of the Prophet (SAAS). Scholars like Maurice Bucaille have dealt with the subject in some detail. The following is an excerpt from his book, *The Bible, the Qur'ān and Science*:

The relationship between the Qur'ān and science is a priori a surprise, especially when it turns out to be one of harmony and *not* of discord. A confrontation between a religious book and the secular ideas proclaimed by science is perhaps, in the eyes of many people today, something of a paradox. The majority of today's scientists, with a small number of exceptions of course, are indeed bound up in materialist theories, and have only indifference or contempt for religious questions which they often consider to be founded on legend. In the West, moreover, when science and religion are discussed, people are quite willing to mention Judaism and Christianity among the religions referred to, but they hardly ever think of Islam. So many false judgements based on inaccurate ideas have indeed been made about it, that today it is very difficult to form an exact notion of the reality of Islam.

. . . The relationship between religions and science has *not* always been the same in any one place or time. It is a fact that there is no writing belonging to a monotheistic religion that condemns science. In practice however, it must be admitted that scientists have had great difficulties with the religious authorities of certain creeds. For many centuries, in the Christian world, scientific development was opposed by the authorities in question, on their own initiative and without reference to the authentic Scriptures. We already know the measures taken against those who sought to enlarge science, measures which often made scientists go into ex-

ible to avoid being burnt at the stake, unless they recanted, changed their attitude and begged for pardon. The case of Galileo is always cited in this context: he was tried for having accepted the discoveries made by Copernicus on the rotation of the Earth. Galileo was condemned as the result of a mistaken interpretation of the Bible, since not a single Scripture could *reasonably* be brought against him.¹

It may be pointed out that Islam is not against the proven facts and explanations of science at all; the Qurʾān repeatedly invites man to study nature and its laws. However, science and scientists would do well to restrict their conclusions to proven facts only. The trouble starts when scientists and their protagonists go beyond the limit of the actually observed or proven facts and indulge in subjective interpretations that have implications for social and moral phenomena, for example, using kinetic theory to support determinism or using quantum mechanics to substantiate the concept of free will. It is precisely here that the need for the Islamization of science becomes imperative.

It is very often claimed that science does not go beyond what is observed or proved; but the facts are otherwise. In addition to the example cited above, it is interesting to note how such transgression exists even in purely scientific matters and what profound influence (although adverse) they have on the progress of science. The well-known example of suppression of work on the wave nature of light for nearly a century, as a result of the prestige of the corpuscular theory of Newton, may be cited. Even today, it is often difficult to project scientific work that is contrary to certain opinions or the beliefs of some influential scientists, but it is much easier if it has the support of prestigious authors.²

The Crisis of Science and Technology in Relation to the Muslim World

Apart from the grave issues discussed above, the immediately apparent crisis of science and technology in the Muslim world is its present lag behind more advanced countries. The answer to this immense problem lies in hard and devoted work, careful planning, and viable joint ventures, as was precisely spelled out in the recently held International Conference on Science in Islamic Polity³ and the Fourth Summit Conference of the Organization of Islamic Conference at Casablanca in 1984. However, this effort is well-nigh impossible without first resolving a crisis of an equally serious nature that prevails on the ideological front, which was acknowledged in the "Statement on Scientific Knowledge Seen from an Islamic Perspective," issued at the Conference on Science in Islamic Polity. The most serious problem here is the one that

concerns education in Muslim countries in general, and scientific education in particular. The current syllabi, which were brought in by the colonial powers to the total exclusion of the Islamic educational system that prevailed earlier, are all based on the vision of knowledge and truth as evolved and practiced in the West. Their approach to moral, social, and historical issues in general, and scientific subjects in particular, based on the confrontation between Western religion and science, results in the production of graduates either almost completely molded in the same Western framework or having a “bifurcated” mind divided against itself: a part holding the modern vision as true and predominant and a part containing Islamic views mostly as a matter of personal belief. Of these graduates, those who then obtain higher education in the West and later assume important educational and other responsibilities in their countries usually get further instilled with the same philosophy of confrontation.

The result of this situation is that the Muslim world, already lagging behind in the field of science and technology, is unable to integrate its thinking with modern science and technology. It is helpless in trying to rectify the errors being committed in the interpretation and application of science and technology in the contemporary world. In most Muslim countries, the traditional Islamic educational system exists mostly as a private organization alongside “modern” education. The dilemma is that, on the one hand, the man educated in the modern system lacks a correct perspective of history and ideology, and, on the other hand, the man produced by the traditional system acutely lacks knowledge of modern science. This produces two classes of people in the Muslim world, insofar as their overall approaches to life and modern realities are concerned, living together in the same society but not comprehending each other’s values.

The main problem with modern education is that either it completely lacks Islamic instruction or religious education is included as just one more subject, while all the other subjects are still taught with their one-sided Western interpretation based on confrontation with religion. The inclusion of Islamic instruction in this way does not really serve the purpose, and the result is compartmentalization of the vision of the persons so educated into a general outlook and a personal belief. There is thus a persistent dichotomy in thought and belief which influences not only our daily actions but prevents us from devoting ourselves wholeheartedly to any particular activity.

The Islamic Viewpoint on Science and Technology

One result of Islamic belief and practice was the great advance of science in the period immediately following the *Hijra* (i.e., from the ninth to the twelfth century A.C.). Islam stresses the *unity of all knowledge* and its use for the

recognition of Allah and the benefit of mankind. However, Islam's stand on science is not an isolated phenomenon; rather, it is one of the elements in the overall system of Islam, which teaches total submission to the will of Allah, mobilization of man's energies and resources for the welfare of the Muslim *ummah* and man at large, and inculcation of a collective spirit that will channel what is constructive in man. In the words of Allama Iqbal:

Islam has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually *unify scattered individuals and groups*, and finally transform them into a well-defined people, possessing a moral consciousness of their own.⁴

Of course, man has been given certain capabilities that enable him to subjugate most of the things around him and put them to his use, whether it be a good and noble use or a bad, destructive, and ignoble one. Herein lies the basic problem of today, namely, how to induce men to use their faculties in essentially noble, constructive, and useful directions. It may perhaps be easy to motivate isolated individuals to do what is right; but the real test is to motivate the masses and keep them on the path of righteousness. Islamic thought and ideology provide us with such a motivation, which finds clear interpretation in the power of congregational worship (*صلوات الجماعة*) and *da'wah*. (One is faced with a problem of interplay of a few orienting or motivational forces with a large number of disturbing interactions and forces, which tend to produce disorder and chaos.) The balance between these two will determine the ultimate course of the system. In the context of human motivation, the rewards for *ṣalāh* in congregations of increasing size are shown in Figures 1 and 2, the data being based on information contained in various *aḥādīth*.

A Study of Collaborative Motivation in Ṣalāh

There are several traditions in which the Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS) discussed the value and rewards of worship (*ṣalāh*) and especially congregational worship (*صلوات الجماعة*), but only a few of these provide a quantitative or comparative measure in detail. Of these, there is a *ḥadīth* that says: "A big congregation is more liked by Allāh (SWT) than a small one," and there is the narration (in Ṭabrani and Bazzaz) by Qubath bin Ashyam Al-laithi, who heard the Prophet (SAAS) say:

Two persons performing *ṣalāh* (worship) together, with one as *imām*, are liked by Allah (SWT) more than four persons saying

Figure 1





Figure 2



ṣalāh individually; similarly, four persons performing *ṣalāh* with *jama'ah* (congregation) are liked by Allah (SWT) more than eight persons saying it individually, and (again) eight persons performing *ṣalāh* with *jama'ah* are liked by Allah (SWT) more than one hundred persons saying it individually.

From these two traditions, we can deduce that (1) the value and reward for each worshipper in a congregation increases continuously with the size of the congregation, and (2) taking the value/reward for an isolated worshipper as unity, that for each worshipper in a congregation of two persons it is 4/2 the value, that is, twice as much, while in a congregation of eight persons it is at least 100/8, or 12½ times as much, as shown in table 1.

Table 1

Number of persons in congregation	1	2	4	8
Total Reward (in units)	1	more than 4	more than 8	more than 100
Reward for each person (in units)	1	more than 4/2=2	more than 8/4=2	more than 100/8=12½

This can be depicted graphically by plotting the total value or reward (in the above units) against the numbers of the congregation, as shown in Figure 1, where a logarithmic scale has been used for plotting the reward, so as to facilitate extrapolation to higher values.

Looking at the curve drawn in figure 1, it is at once clear that the increase in reward is not exponential but could perhaps be a power law. Also, one might intuitively conjecture that the reward would increase relatively slowly for very large congregations, and may perhaps even reach a maximum upper limit. After some consideration, it is found possible to determine at least the first approximation to the law of reward for small congregations by replotting figure 1 on a “log-log” paper. This graph is depicted in figure 2, in which the thick broken straight line, representing the best line through the four plotted points, has a slope of 2.0, and corresponds to the formula

$$[\text{Value or Reward}]_N = N^2 \text{ units} \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

or the total reward for a congregation of N persons equals $N \times N \times$ the reward for a solitary worshipper. However, since the *ḥadīth* lays down inequalities of the form:

$$[\text{Value or Reward}]_N > f(N) \text{ units,}$$

the correct variation satisfying all three inequalities will be given by the thin chain-dotted line passing a little above the top-most point, which has a slope of 2.22 (or a bit more). So the exponent may be taken as 2.22, as against the earlier preliminary estimate of 2.0. This leads to the formula:

$$[\text{Reward}]_N = (N)^{2.22} \text{ units} \dots\dots\dots (2)$$

for small $N (< 10)$, with a possible uncertainty of less than 0.15 in the exponent 2.22 (as indicated by the scatter of the four plotted points).

It follows that the average reward for each person in the *jamā'ah* is given by the formula:

$$\text{Reward} = \frac{1}{N} [\text{Reward}]_N = N^{1.22} \text{ units} \dots\dots\dots (3)$$

that is, it is proportional to $N^{1.22}$ and increases slightly faster than N .

On the other hand, one may in a general way surmise that as a congregation becomes bigger and bigger, ultimately some of its cohesive character may be lost and so the reward for *ṣalāh* may not increase as fast as the simple formulae (1) and (2) might indicate. For such a case we may use an equation derived by the author (Quraishi) in a study of the scientific output of research groups of the form:

$$\text{Output} = \left\{ \frac{N}{N_0} \right\}^{2+x} / [1 + (N/N_0)^{2+y}] \dots\dots\dots (4).$$

It appears that this possibility can be substantiated by the interpretation of another *ḥadīth* (from Bukhārī, Muslim, Abu Dawood, and Tirmizi), in which Abu Hurairah (RA) narrates that he heard the Prophet (ﷺ) say that the *ṣalāh* with *jamā'ah* is increased/doubled twenty-five times (خمسا وعشرين ضعفا). One learned interpretation of the *ḥadīth* is that this particular statement of the reward implies a “doubling” 25 times⁵:

$$(2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \dots\dots\dots 25 \text{ times}) = 2^{25} = 33,554,432,$$

which is an increase of more than 33 million times. This interpretation can be reconciled with the foregoing deductions [equations (1) and (2)] from the previous *hadīth* if we assume that this last-mentioned *hadīth* gives us the maximum limit (or asymptotic value) of the reward for the whole congregation, as shown in figure 3 (full line). On this basis, we can then write equation (4) as

$$\text{Total Spiritual Activity} = 2^{25} \times - \left\{ \frac{N}{N_o} \right\}^{2.22} / [1 + \left\{ \frac{N}{N_o} \right\}^{2.22}] \dots\dots\dots (5)$$

which tends to 2^{25} for very large $N =$ and from which we can deduce that $N_o^{2.22} = 2^{25}$, whence $N_o = 2,450$. The per capita reward is then given by

$$N^{1.22} / [1 + (N/2,450)^{2.22}] \dots\dots\dots (6).$$

This per capita reward exhibits a maximum between $N = 1,000$ and $10,000$, followed by a steady fall according to $1/N$, as shown by the dotted curve in figure 3. It follows that the maximum reward (and motivation) of about 8,000 units per person is obtained around $N = 3,000$, indicated by the small vertical arrow in figure 3. This will therefore determine the optimum size of a *jami'a* mosque for maximum motivation. (Several of the well-known grand mosques in Muslim history had roofed capacities of this order.) It may also define the size of a “neighborhood” population for a mosque.

The above results bring out the importance and significance of group interactions for implementation of Islamic concepts and their further development. A factor worth emphasizing is that each person at once activates the others and also receives active support or “feedback” from the others. Accordingly, the above data are to be compared with a theoretical formulation based on an approximate model whose results are shown in figure 4. This model is based on the activity of an assembly of N persons, each person passing on a fraction r (between 0 and 1) of activity or motivation through *da'wah* to his immediate “neighbors” who may be anywhere from 4 to 8, depending on the type of packing of the assembly.⁶ Four curves for $r = 0.5$ to 0.8 are drawn in figure 4, and the curve for $r = 0.8$ shows a general similarity with the dotted curve in figure 3, indicating the basic correctness of the model, which of course still needs refining.

Such studies would be fruitful in showing how the practice of Islamic ideology and *da'wah* could lead to the production of a type of person who is a kind of “superman” in his performance. Typical examples from Islamic history are the sixty men with Khālid ibn Walīd who overcame 60,000, the

Figure 3





Figure 4



Corresponding logarithmic plots of per capita activity against the total population N for the two-dimensional model with feedback, showing the initial rise to a maximum per capita activity followed by a decrease inversely with N ; the height of this maximum increases approximately as $2/(1-r)^{2.5}$.

unarmed 313 at Badr who overcame 1,000 armed opponents, and of course the galaxy of versatile Muslim scientists of the third to fifth centuries A.H. These apparently surprising phenomena find a rational explanation on the above scientific basis.

Having demonstrated above the great significance in human beings of collaborative motivation, which is today so important in all scientific work, it would be worthwhile to briefly delineate here again the Islamic attitude and approach to science. Although a quite detailed exposition is now available in the "Statement on Knowledge Seen from an Islamic Perspective," as adopted by the International Conference on Science in Islāmic Polity, some basic points may be given:

1. Man as well as the entire universe are the creation of Allah; the whole scheme is governed by His divine will. Man as the caliph (vicegerent) of Allah on earth can best serve Him by his complete submission, manifested basically through collective worship and devotion.
2. Acquisition of knowledge, both religious and mundane, is a duty of all Muslims, men and women.
3. Specifically, Muslims have been invited to study nature and physical laws, both as the signs of Allah's providence and for harnessing them for the use of man.
4. The resources of the world are a trust (*amanah*) that has to be managed with due regard to ecological balance for the future.

Some Priority Actions toward a Solution

There is no denying the fact that Muslim countries will have to make every effort to acquire adequate capabilities in science and technology. The gap with the developed world is very wide, the task is uphill, and there is no way out except through hard work and concerted, dedicated effort. This is an urgent task in view of the impending economic realities. An initial blueprint has already been drawn up at the recently held International Conference on Science in Islamic Polity and the Fourth Summit Conference of OIC, and it is now highly desirable that the plan be implemented in letter and spirit with adequate equipment and motivated manpower. To produce fully motivated science and technology manpower, the educational system needs to be reformed. The Islamic way of thinking and Islamic convictions will put science to proper interpretation as well as use, as was done in the early Islamic era. As a first task, training courses on Islamic teachings and practices must

be introduced at all levels in schools, colleges, and universities. The courses should be aimed at producing a true Islamic consciousness, spirit, and character in the students, especially through the blessings of salah *صلوة* and *da'wah* *دعوة*. This will help to harness the mainstream of inner energy that lies hidden in every human being, awaiting only a proper impulse for its effective utilization.

The next task is the Islamization of scientific subjects. This Islamization does not at all mean that the basic laws of physics, chemistry, and so on, will have to be modified. The effort simply aims at (1) inculcation of a spirit to develop and apply science and technology for the good of mankind in accordance with the high ideals of Islam and (2) the reinterpretation of sciences insofar as moral, social and economic issues are concerned, so as to replace the present amoral or even anti-moral attitude with one that is in harmony with the Islamic concept of man's vicegerency of Allah to manage the world's resources as a sacred trust for mankind.

The major objective of this Islamization or reinterpretation should be to produce graduates and scientists who do not have two compartments in their minds: one for contemporary knowledge and one for personal belief. The educated person should have one personality, and should be able to visualize the unity of knowledge as maintained by Islam. This Islamization of knowledge will put an end to the schizophrenic compartmentalization of human minds, which has infected not only the minds of the Muslim educated in the modern systems but also the Western mind ever since the confrontation of science and the Church. The end product would be an integrated and highly motivated person, provided that the application of Islamic principles and injunctions is fully and practically implemented, with due regard to the balance between the spiritual and the mundane, the *ākhirah* between *al ākhirah* *الآخرة* and the *dunyā* *دنيا*, with a clear edge to the former.

The priority actions to be taken for the development of scientific and technological capability, in accordance with the *ummah* plan, may then be identified as follows:

1. Reinterpretation of moral and social implications of science in accordance with Islamic teachings so that no dichotomy exists between scientific overtones and Islamic belief.
2. Teaching of a compulsory subject oriented toward the dynamic Islamic way of life and the *sunnah* of the Prophet at all educational levels from primary schools to universities.
3. Islamization of the approach of various subjects in general and scientific subjects in particular.
4. Inculcation of a true Islamic spirit, by example, that is aimed at the utilization of science and technology for the good of mankind.

To sum up, the objectives will be achieved by projecting a proper philosophy of knowledge and science and reinterpreting the moral and social implications of science and technology in their proper perspective. The result will then be a unified whole in which faith, devoted religious observance, practical morality, and science and technology with economic growth will all find their proper places, *in that order*. This will also be in consonance with the spirit of the first five verses of the Qur'ān (Sūrah Al Baqarah, 1-5):

﴿الم ذلك الكتاب لا ريب فيه هدى للمتقين، الذين يؤمنون بالغيب ويقيمون الصلوة وما رزقناهم ينفقون. والذين يؤمنون بما أنزل إليك وما أنزل من قبلك وبالآخرة هم يوقنون. أولئك على هدى من ربهم وأولئك هم المفلحون﴾. (البقرة: ١-٥).

The process as outlined above will be slow, but sure. While some people may feel impatient, we must not be forgetful of the Qur'ānic admonition: in (Surah al Qiyāmah: 20)

﴿كلا بل تحبون العاجلة وتذرون الآخرة﴾. (القيامة: ٢٠)

Only when the inner self has been properly cultivated will outward changes be lasting and effective.

NOTES

- ¹ Maurice Bucaille, *The Bible, the Quran and Science*, translated from the French by A. D. Pannell and Maurice Bucaille, *Anjuman-i-Itahad-ul-Muslimin*, Karachi, 1979, pp. 110-115.
- ² K. W. McCain, "The Author Cocitation Structure of Macro-economics," *Scientometrics*, 5, 277, 1983.
- ³ Proceedings of International Conference on Science in Islamic Polity—Its Past, Present and Future, Nov. 1983, Ministry of Science and Technology, Islamabad, pp. 11-12; 15-18.
- ⁴ Allama Iqbal, Address to All-India Muslim League Conference at Allahabad, 1930, and other writings.
- ⁵ Zakariyya, Maulana M., "Virtues of Salaat" (English translation of فضائل نماز), *kutub khana Faizi*, Lahane, 1981, pp. 54-55.
- ⁶ M. M. Qurashi, "A Statistical Analysis of Motivation, Cooperation and Achievement, Part III, Semi-Quantitative Prediction of Dependence on Group Size on the Basis of Two Simple Models," Proceedings of the Pakistan Academy of Science 20, pp. 49-60, 1983.

V
PSYCHOLOGY

**Research in Psychology
Toward an Ummatic Paradigm**

Hasan Langgulung

Research In Psychology: Toward An *Ummatic* Paradigm

Hasan Langgulang

Before writing a textbook in a specific scientific discipline one has to remind oneself that a textbook is but a compilation of data based on research conducted by a group of researchers dealing with different topics in a specific discipline. Research is therefore the most important part of the series of activities that should be done in the field of psychology before the textbook writers in psychology are able to do their work. Before the researchers can function properly, however, they have to bear in mind the diversity of research methodologies under which their approaches will be categorized. The most dominant of these are the realist and the idealist approaches. The following is an attempt to highlight these approaches and to suggest some approaches by which we hope Muslim researchers will be able to create an *ummic* paradigm.

Much of the uncertainty surrounding the social sciences can be traced to the question of the purpose of science. J.K. Smith suggests that confusion over the appropriate goals and methodologies for social science can be linked to an epistemological conflict that is currently dividing social scientists.¹ Smith characterizes this epistemological dispute as a conflict between the realist and idealist positions. He describes the followers of realist epistemology as believing that the purpose of science is to discover universal truth. Scientists who have adopted the realist position believe that “knowledge and truth are questions of correspondence—what is true is what corresponds to reality” (p. 8). The ultimate goal of the realists in the social sciences is to discover universally true laws that can be communicated through a neutral, culture-free language and that can be applied in any situation to predict, understand, and govern behavior. The realists believe that it is “possible to have a definitive, objective science for all society that would eventually produce *the* system of laws . . . [and that these] laws are, by definition, universally applicable, regardless of time and place” (pp. 8, 11).

The followers of the idealist epistemology, on the other hand, are characterized as believing that what humans learn about the world around them is filtered through their senses, and that therefore scientific knowledge does not reflect the true nature of the world. Instead, it represents our best opinions about what is the true nature of the world. For the idealists, the idea that people can possess universal knowledge independent of themselves and that this universal knowledge can be expressed through a neutral or culture-free language is absurd. Idealists believe that human experience is culturally and contextually dependent and that “what is to count as knowledge or to be considered true is a matter of agreement within a socially and historically bounded context” (p. 8). Smith concludes his analysis of the realist-idealist conflict in social science by observing that “the issue brings to the forefront the epistemological question of what is to count as knowledge. If researchers do not discuss this question, they are forfeiting any participation in determining the basis for the authority of their knowledge” (pp. 12-13). It is my belief that implementing a variation of the idealist epistemology in social science would improve the effectiveness of social sciences or human sciences as they relate to the Islamic paradigm and would help resolve the field’s feeling of self-doubt.

I. Paradigmatic Epistemology and Scientific Progress

In his brief description of the history of epistemological disputes in science, Smith erred when he assumed that the conflict between the realist and idealist epistemologies was confined to the social sciences. In fact, the philosophical and epistemological soul-searching that currently pervades the social sciences also has been occurring in the physical sciences.² Research, for example, challenges the traditional realist belief that the physical sciences have historically progressed through the accumulation of context-free facts; instead it suggests that researchers in the physical sciences have always progressed through a variation of the idealist epistemology, an epistemology we will henceforth refer to as the *paradigmatic* epistemology.

Kuhn examined the development of selected scientific achievements in fields such as chemistry and physics and concluded that in the physical sciences, scientific progress historically has occurred through what he termed “scientific paradigms.” According to Kuhn, a scientific paradigm is a theoretical framework, or a way of perceiving and understanding the world, that a group of scientists has adopted as their world view. Scientific paradigms act as lenses through which scientists are able to perceive and understand the scientific problems in their fields and formulate scientific answers to these problems.

A scientific paradigm can be thought of as a socially shared cognitive schema. Just as one's cognitive schema provides each of us, as an individual person, with a way of making sense of the world around us, a scientific paradigm provides a group of scientists with a way of collectively making sense of their scientific world. When a scientist observes a phenomenon and interprets what this observation means, that scientist is using a particular scientific paradigm to give that observation meaning. In the same way that the meaning a cat has for a child depends on the cognitive structure (or schema) the child has developed about cats, the meaning that a scientific fact has for a scientist depends on the scientific paradigm through which the scientist perceives and interprets that fact.³

Kuhn refers to a group of scientists who have adopted a common view of the world (that is, a common scientific paradigm) as a scientific community. The term "scientific community" is not meant to imply a group of scientists working in the same physical location; a scientific community is an intellectual community. The members of a scientific community who share a common paradigmatic view of their scientific world share common language, values, assumptions, goals, norms, and beliefs.

The interdependency of scientific paradigms and scientific communities is one of the keys to Kuhn's understanding of how the physical sciences historically have progressed. According to Kuhn, by definition, scientific paradigms and scientific communities cannot exist independently of one another: "A paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share, and conversely, a scientific community consists of [scientists] who share a paradigm" (p. 176). Implicit in this interdependency is the understanding that science is a social process based on socially agreed-upon rules designed to facilitate the development of social progress. Understanding the sociological dynamics of how scientific communities are organized and how they function is essential to understanding science itself.

Kuhn's research suggests that scientific communities in the physical sciences historically have progressed through the interdependent processes of *normal* and *extraordinary* science. Normal and extraordinary sciences are social processes that assume the existence of scientific communities organized around scientific paradigms.

Normal science refers to the research that a scientific community does in an attempt to interpret its scientific world through its scientific paradigm. Kuhn describes normal science as a strenuous and devoted attempt by scientists to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by their scientific paradigm. For the purpose of illustration, he equates normal science with putting together a jigsaw puzzle. Just as the solvers of jigsaw puzzles use the picture on the box to guide them as they fit the pieces together, a scientific paradigm provides a scientific community with a picture of what their scien-

tific world should look like once all the pieces of their scientific research have been properly fitted together. Progress in normal science is measured in terms of how many pieces of the puzzle have been assembled, that is, how much of their scientific environment a scientific community is able to perceive and understand; the more of their world a community of scientists is able to assemble (that is, explain) through the lenses of their scientific paradigm, the more scientific progress they have made. For example, the more behavior the members of the behavioristic community in psychology are able to explain through the use of their various stimulus-response models, the more scientific progress they have made.

Extraordinary science occurs when, during the course of normal science, a scientific community begins accumulating data that are inconsistent with their paradigmatic view of the world. As these inconsistencies, called anomalies, begin to accumulate, the scientific community begins to question whether its paradigm is adequate and whether a new paradigmatic view of the world is needed.

When a scientific community begins questioning the adequacy of its paradigm, it slips into what Kuhn refers to as a state of crisis. The community's attempt to resolve the crisis is the process of extraordinary science. Crises occur only after prolonged periods of normal science and are a necessary step in the process of scientific advancement. According to Kuhn, a crisis is a "self-correcting mechanism which ensures that the rigidity of normal science will not forever go unchallenged" (p. 181). The question the members of a scientific community attempt to answer during the process of extraordinary science is: "Which scientific paradigm will best allow us to engage in successful puzzle-solving?"

If a scientific community resolves its state of crisis by reorganizing itself according to a new paradigm, a scientific revolution occurs. Kuhn suggests that scientists who participate in such a revolution experience a Gestalt-like switch in the way they perceive and understand the world:

It is rather as if the professional community had been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects are seen in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as well. . . . After a revolution scientists are responding to a different world (p. 111).

After a scientific community experiences a revolution and the accompanying Gestalt-like switch, the puzzle-solving progress previously achieved during the period of normal science must be totally reevaluated – the process of putting the jigsaw puzzle together must begin anew because the final picture has changed. When a scientific community reorganizes itself around a new

paradigmatic view, it adopts new values, norms, assumptions, language, and ways of perceiving and understanding its scientific world.

To summarize, Kuhn's model to explain how the physical sciences have historically progressed supports a version of the idealist view of knowledge, which we have referred to as the paradigmatic epistemology. Kuhn's paradigmatic epistemology is founded on the notion that the knowledge accumulated through science does not represent universal truth that is true in all contexts, as the realists contend, but instead represents a socially agreed-upon theoretical and contextual truth, as the idealists maintain. Kuhn's research has shown that knowledge in the physical sciences has not evolved through a gradual accumulation of context-free facts but rather through successive periods of paradigmatic development (normal science), questioning (crisis caused by anomalies), and change (scientific revolutions).

II. Psychology and Paradigmatic Epistemology

Although Kuhn developed his model for scientific progress by examining the history of scientific achievements in the physical sciences, we believe his paradigmatic epistemology is as applicable to the social sciences as it is to the physical sciences. If Kuhn is correct in suggesting that researchers in the physical sciences perceive and understand their scientific world through the lenses of their scientific paradigm, and if he is correct when he suggests that the knowledge accumulated by these physical-science researchers is not true in all contexts but is true only within a given paradigmatic context, then it seems logical to assume that researchers in the social sciences must likewise perceive and understand their scientific world through paradigmatic lenses. There is nothing in the nature of the physical or social sciences to suggest that social scientists are able to perceive and understand universal truth, while physical scientists are not. In fact, as Smith has pointed out, social scientists traditionally have believed that the epistemology and methodology of the physical sciences could be applied effectively to the social sciences:

When Durkheim said that we should treat social facts as things, he was saying in effect that the objects of study in the social sciences should be treated in the same way physical scientists treat physical things. This means that if physical scientists can stand apart from their subject and think of it as having an independent, object-like existence, with no intrinsic meaning, the same is true for social scientists (p. 7).

The irony here is that according to Kuhn's research, the realist methodologies

that most social scientists have been attempting to replicate since the nineteenth century do not exist and in fact never have.

In psychology, for example, empirical psychologists believe in the materialistic concept of the soul as the only concept that justifies the study of the correlation between psychic phenomena and physiological processes.⁴ Recently, there were attempts to apply Kuhn's paradigmatic epistemology to psychology—with little success because there has never been any modification and adjustment made. For example, although the concept of scientific paradigm, as Kuhn defined it, might be adequate to explain scientific progress in fields such as physics or chemistry, the concept is clearly too limiting in the social sciences, for example, psychology. The concept of scientific paradigm must be expanded if it is to be applicable to the social sciences because the context in which social scientists solve problems differs so greatly from the context in which physical scientists solve problems. Kuhn, in response to Sir Karl Popper, recognized these contextual differences as the primary reason why the social sciences have taken longer to mature than have the physical sciences:⁵

Whenever Sir Karl contrasts science with philosophy, as he does at the start of his paper, or physics with sociology, psychology, and history, as he does at the end, he is contrasting an esoteric, isolated, and that still aims to communicate with and persuade an audience larger than a single profession. [Physical] science is not the only activity the practitioners of which can be grouped into communities, but it is the only one in which each community is its own exclusive audience (p. 254).

III. Psychology and the Ummatic Paradigm

Islam demands the existence of a Muslim community or *ummah* on earth. Allah said: "And there may spring from you a community (*ummah*) who invite to goodness, and enjoin good conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful (Qur'an 3:104). The Muslim community represents a system of social relations meant, among other aims, to maximize the enjoyment of the goods on earth within the divine plan. It is a system meant to facilitate the flowering of spiritual aspiration while at the same time representing an ordered way in exercising the *amānah* regarding life, intelligence, power, and property. In effect, the emergence of the *ummah* is to actualize or make operative the trust or *amānah* desired by Allah. It can thus clearly be seen that Islam is a religion that does not define relations merely between Allah

and mankind but also between individuals and society as well as those between mankind and the resources of this world. Regarding this last detail on earth's resources, Allah said: "See ye not how Allah hath made serviceable unto you whatsoever is in the skies and whatsoever is in the earth and hath loaded you with His favors both without and within?" (Qur'an 31:20)

Accordingly Islam demands that the material cares of men must not be at all neglected but should be a matter of concern, provided that one holds fast to the fundamental guidelines. Islam demands the development and search for knowledge in accordance with the prescribed prayer: "My Lord! Increase my knowledge" (Qur'an 20:114). Knowledge here includes the kind of knowledge that comes about in the study of the different manifestations of nature—veritable revelations of Allah. Besides the development of the intellect, a virtuous and moral life is enjoined. Then and only then can the desired *ummah* be realized. Allah said: "Ye are the best *ummah* that hath been raised up for mankind. ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in Allah" (Qur'an 3:110).

But the fact that Islam requires a community as a witness to it implies that Islam has a social function. In other words, it is not confined solely to the definition of the relations between the individual as such and his Lord and Creator. It prescribes a strong, healthy, and well-organized social life. This has been one of the aims of the *Sharī'ah*. Another function is to sustain the intellectual life of the Muslim community, without which the whole community will disintegrate. As Allah says:

If a *tā'ifah* (community)
 From every expedition remained behind
 They could devote themselves
 To studies of religion and admonish the
 People when they return to them
 That thus they (may learn) to guard
 Themselves (against evil) [Qur'an 9:22].

The above verse demands that a community (*tā'ifah*) within the Muslim *ummah* has to confine itself to the study of religion to sustain the life of the community. In other words, a community within the *ummah* has to pursue knowledge for the whole *ummah* to survive. This *tā'ifah* of knowledgeable members of the *ummah* form a scientific community within the *ummah*. This scientific community is not meant to imply a group of scientists working in the same physical location, but rather is an intellectual community. The members of this early scientific community, mentioned in the above verse, share a common language, values, assumptions, goals, norms, and beliefs due to their membership in the *ummah*.

The history of the early development of science in the Muslim world shows that a scientist mastered all the branches of knowledge existing in his lifetime. The history and development of *revealed knowledge* in the early history of Islām showed the existence of a group of scholars, especially among the companions, who learned and recited the Qur'ān ad Sunnah.⁶ Those were the pioneers, such as Mu'ādh ibn Jabal (RAA), who spread Islam to newly discovered territory. Therefore anything pertaining to Muslims' affairs in those early days was always referred to those groups (*ṭā'ifah*) of companions who had mastered the Qur'ān and Sunnah, and especially to those knowledgeable in *ibādāt*, family, economics, education, and so on. In the first few centuries of Islam, however, on account of political changes as well as the emergence of new social situations, the Muslim community was led to produce various schools of jurisprudence (*madhāhib*). In effect, these schools, at least in the minds and interpretations of their founders and immediate disciplines, represented an effort to maintain a well-ordered Muslim society, which while adhering closely to the imperatives of revelation could, at the same time, confront the exigencies of the times as brought about by new economic, social, and other forces. During the historical development of Islam, these schools, by means of certain jurisprudential techniques such as *ijmā'*, *qiyās*, *istihsān*, and *istiślāh*, succeeded in generating certain social structures and cultural institutions, many of which have persisted to the present. The schools in jurisprudence are the clear evidence of the existence of *ṭā'ifah* (community) within the Muslim *ummah* dealing with paradigmatic epistemology concerning certain aspects of *Shari'ah*, that is, jurisprudence.

Having described the development of one of the sciences in Islam dealing with revelation, namely, jurisprudence, in terms of paradigmatic epistemology, let us proceed to see how psychology could be perceived from a paradigmatic point of view. Psychology, as can be seen from figure 1, is one of the sciences categorized as *human sciences*, which in turn are a branch of the acquired sciences as contrasted with the revealed sciences.⁷ We will describe below how scientific progress will occur through *psychological community*.

IV. Scientific Progress through Psychological Community

The organization of psychological communities around psychological paradigms, as done by physical science communities around physical paradigms, will make psychological progress through normal and extraordinary science possible. Let us assume, for example, that one group of psychological researchers is organized around a paradigm based on the prin-




FIG. 1: Schematic View of Scientific Communities Within Ummatic Paradigm.

ciples and methodologies of behaviorism, while another psychological community is organized on the principles and methodologies of humanism. During the period of normal science, psychological researchers in both communities would be functioning as normal scientists, trying to solve psychological problems (that is, paradigmatic puzzles) through their respective paradigms. The more effective each paradigmatic community is in developing psychological technologies that are consistent with their paradigm's goals, the more scientific progress each community will make.

The psychological problem-solving that occurs during normal science provides the best illustration of why the membership of psychological communities must include psychological researchers as well as practitioners. During normal science the job of the psychological scientists and practitioners is the same: to develop, implement, and evaluate a psychological technology based on their paradigmatic assumptions. For a scientific community to make progress during normal science, psychological scientists and practitioners must realize that their jobs are interrelated and that they are dependent on each other for success.

It is also important to remember that the scientific progress achieved by the humanistic community during normal science is of little use to the behavioristic community that is attempting to solve a different paradigmatic puzzle through the use of different norms, values, language, assumptions, and goals. One community's attempt to solve the problems of another paradigmatic community is like trying to assemble a jigsaw puzzle with the pieces from two different puzzles; as the current failure of the psychological sciences indicates, this is not the most effective method of puzzle-solving (meta-analysis is an example of this type of misguided activity). During periods of normal science, scientific progress for the behavioristic community can be measured only in terms of how many problems are solved within the behavioristic paradigm.

As Kuhn's research in the physical sciences has shown, the scientific progress made during normal science makes extraordinary science possible. If the members of the behavioristic community find that despite their best research efforts they are not able to develop an effective educational technology to achieve the educational goals articulated by their paradigm, the behavioristic community will cease the technical problem-solving of the normal science and begin the philosophical and theoretical questioning that is characteristic of extraordinary science. If these technical failures continue, the members of the behavioristic community will begin to question the adequacy and correctness of the behavioristic paradigm. To resolve their doubt, the members of the behavioristic community could decide to revise some of the basic assumptions implicit in the behavioristic paradigm and, in effect, organize a new psychological community around a new psychological paradigm,

or they could simply adopt the values, goals, norms, and ways-of-perceiving of the humanistic paradigm and become members of this already existing psychological community. If the behavioristic community does abandon the behavioristic paradigm for a new or competing psychological paradigm, a scientific revolution will have occurred. A scientific revolution represents scientific progress because the members of the behavioristic community would not discard the behavioristic paradigm and the work they put into developing this paradigmatic view of psychology unless there were overwhelming evidence that a new or already existing psychological paradigm was more effective than the behavioristic paradigm.

During periods of extraordinary science, the field of psychology must decide which of the competing paradigmatic communities has developed the most effective psychological technology. The reason that normal science is so crucial to this process is that the answer to this question can be determined only after a prolonged period of normal science during which the members of the competing psychological communities have developed the best possible psychological technology based on the assumption of their psychological paradigms. Without the accomplishments (and failures) of normal science to guide them, the members of the psychological communists would have no basis on which to choose between the competing psychological paradigms.

Seen from an *ummatic* point of view, especially in jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and technology (*kalām*), the above conception of scientific progress is very pertinent. The schools of jurisprudence, such as Ḥanafī, Shafīʿī, and Ḥanbali, as well as the schools of theology—*Ashʿriyah* and *Muʿtazilah*—went through successive paradigmatic developments from normal science through the extraordinary science of questioning and change (scientific revolution) at which point the old schools abandoned their paradigmatic views to adopt the new paradigms.

V. Resolving Paradigmatic Disputes

In his writings, Kuhn has been vague about how paradigmatic disputes are resolved, suggesting simply that the specifics of this process probably could be understood with the assistance of psychology and sociology.⁸

Fortunately, Muslims have their own tradition of resolving such disputes from the history of the development of jurisprudence (*fiqh*), as we have mentioned earlier. As already stated, the two fundamental or primary sources of Islamic law are the Qurʾān and the *Ḥadīth*. But since the Qurʾān and the *Ḥadīth* did not specify all the details for every legal problem that a social organization could potentially generate, Muslim jurists were led to apply certain

juristic techniques so that any emerging problem would fall within the scope of religious and moral precepts. Among these are: *ijmā'*, or the consensus of the community, in our case the psychological or the paradigmatic community, which became, in effect, the consensus of the learned; *qiyās*, or reasoning by analogy; *istihsān*, or juristic preference (in our case paradigmatic preference), and *istiślāh*, or taking public welfare or interest into account, or, in present terminology, taking the pragmatic approach. Jurists have also used *ijtihād*, or disciplined individual reasoning, to deduce a legal rule from other legal premises. It is accepted that the *fiqh* and *uṣūl al fiqh* are the greatest expressions of Islamic spirit as well as the most developed disciplines in the history of Islamic civilization. This tradition should be continued if psychology is to develop an Islamic spirit as well as a strong and mature scientific field.

VI. The Hierarchical Nature of Paradigmatic Communities

Another major concern that needs to be addressed is the question: How will members of competing psychological communities, with different values, norms, languages, and ways of perceiving and understanding the psychological process, be able to communicate well enough to arrive at Islamically satisfactory resolutions? We believe that psychological scientists and practitioners will be able to communicate well enough to resolve paradigmatic disputes Islamically for two reasons: first, because paradigmatic communities are organized in a hierarchical fashion, and second, because psychological scientists and practitioners are members of several hierarchically organized paradigmatic communities at the same time. For example, as scientists we are members of the community of all scientists in the disciplines of acquired knowledge. As members of this community of scientists we share a belief with chemists, biologists, geologists, and other scientists in the importance of science and join them in subscribing to common values, norms, assumptions, and ways of giving meaning to our experience. As members of the "community of acquired scientists" we are members of the general community (*ṭā'ifah*) of all scientists. As members of this *ṭā'ifah* we share a belief with the jurists, theologians, philosophers, and *sūfīs*, and join them in subscribing to common values, norms, assumptions, and ways of giving meaning to our experience. All these scientists believe in the unity of Allah, the unity of creation, the unity of knowledge, the unity of life, and the unity of humanity, as described by Isma'īl al Fārūqī,⁹ and believe that science is a never-ending process, which constantly seeks to expand the quality of our existing body

of knowledge, in accordance with the prayer taught by Allah to the Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) "Oh Lord! Increase my knowledge" (Qur'an 20:114).

This general community of all scientists breaks down into subcommunities. As psychologists, we are not only members of the scientific community at large but are also members of communities of specialists in science, of human scientists, and of all psychologists. In addition to sharing the values and assumptions of the entire scientific community (*tā'ifah*), as psychologists we also share values, norms, language, assumptions, and ways of perceiving and understanding the world with other human scientists and especially with other members of the psychologists' community. The paradigmatic view of the world that all psychologists share as members of the psychologists' community is not shared by biologists and physicists. Biologists, physicists, geologists, and other scientists have likewise organized themselves into smaller subcommunities that are based on their unique paradigmatic views of the world. So even though psychologists, biologists, and physicists may all be members of the same paradigmatic community at the general level, we are all members of different paradigmatic communities at more specific levels. The paradigmatic puzzles that physicists are trying to solve are not generally the same puzzles that occupy psychologists. Progress made by psychologists in understanding some aspect of human behavior, for example, does not help physicists gain a better understanding of the nature of matter at the submolecular level, though at least one scholar of paradigm does suggest a parallel.¹⁰

The community of psychologists also breaks down into subcommunities. Behaviorism and cognitivism, for example, are subcommunities within the larger psychological community. Psychologists who are members of the behaviorist community believe that behavior can be understood and explained by examining physically observable (and measurable) stimuli and responses. Members of the cognitivist community believe that psychologists must take into account mental operations if they are to understand and explain behavior. The paradigmatic view of the world that all behaviorists share is different from the paradigmatic view shared by all cognitivists, even though behaviorists and cognitivists all share a common paradigmatic view as members of the community of all psychologists. Because cognitivists and behaviorists are working on different paradigmatic puzzles, the progress made by the behavioristic community during periods of normal science is of little use to the cognitivist community, and vice versa.

So how is the paradigmatic dispute between the cognitivists and the behaviorists to be resolved *unmatically* if the members of the competing communities perceive and understand human behavior through different paradigmatic lenses? The paradigmatic dispute between behaviorism and cognitivism cannot be resolved at the paradigmatic level at which the dispute has occurred; instead, it must be resolved by a community at a higher

paradigmatic level. The dispute between the Māliki and Shāfi schools of jurisprudence cannot be resolved between Māliki and Shāfi schools but by a paradigmatic community at a higher level, that is, the community of jurists (*fuqahā*).

The dispute between the cognitivist community and the behaviorist community will not be *ummatically* resolved by cognitivists or behaviorists but by the community of all psychologists. It is necessary to resolve paradigmatic disputes at a higher paradigmatic level because the quality of communication and understanding necessary to resolve these disputes ummatically does not exist at the level the conflict.

Because all psychologists share a paradigmatic view of the world, they are able to communicate well enough to eventually reach an *ummatic* resolution of the behaviorist/cognitivist dispute. Members of the behaviorist and cognitivist communities will of course participate in the resolution process, but they will do it as members of the community of psychologists and not as members of the behaviorist or cognitivist communities. As long as they continue to perceive and understand the world strictly as cognitivists or behaviorists, they will be unable to decide which paradigmatic view is best able to explain and understand behavior. Disputes among psychological communities will be resolved by communities that are functioning at a higher paradigmatic level.

The same principle, it has been suggested, can operate even among devout members of different religions, which is the major purpose of interfaith dialogue.

VII. Toward an *Ummatic* Paradigm

The term *ummah* is not translatable and must be taken in its original Islamic Arabic form.¹¹ The *ummah* is a universal society of ethnicities or communities, but whose commitment to Islam binds them to a specific social order. Its territory is not only the whole earth but all of creation. It is transracial and regards all humanity as its actual or potential members. The *ummah* is not a state because it is a transnational world-polity within which may be included and contained several nations. Persons may be members of the *ummah* even though they may not fall under the political sovereignty of any Islamic "state." The *ummah* is a sort of *United Nations*. The *ummah* is the social order of Islam, and the movement that seeks to actualize its goals is called *ummaticism*.

The social order of Islam therefore is universal, enveloping the whole of mankind without exception. Islam recognizes the nature of groupings of humans into families, tribes, and nations as a God-created and God-ordained

arrangement.¹² But it rejects every rationale of such groupings as ultimate or absolute, that is, as definitive of man and as constituting a final criterion of good and evil.

Although the message of Islam is universal in intent and character, it defines the conditions for the emergence and formation of a Muslim *ummah* with the assumption that there will always be other religious communities existing alongside it. The *ummah* is meant to serve as a witness to the concretization of the divine message as expounded in the Qur'ān or, in particular, as Professor al Fārūqī puts it, the operationalization of both worship and *amānah*.

The *ummah* therefore is the uniting force among the diverse paradigms and communities within the Muslim community. Diversity in paradigms is welcomed as it is a sign of progress, so long as it does not exceed the boundary of the *ummah*. This *ummatic* model also provides for resolving disputes among scientific communities (*tawā'if*) within the *ummah*. The application of the model to nonscientific communities—political, economic, social, and so on—is possible with some modification.

NOTES

- ¹ J. K. Smith, "Quantitative versus Qualitative Research: An attempt to clarify the issue," *Educational Researcher* 12:3, 1983, pp. 6-13.
- ² Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press), 1964; 2nd ed 1970; and S. Toulmin, *Human Understanding*, Vol I (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).
- ³ J. Piaget in *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (New York, International University Press, 1952), developed the concept of *schema* as compared to paradigm for cognitive individual development (progress) through the interdependency of assimilation and accommodation.
- ⁴ W. Turner, *History of Philosophy* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1929).
- ⁵ Thomas S. Kuhn, "Reflection on My Critics," *Op. cit.*, p. 254.
- ⁶ The classification of knowledge into revealed and acquired was developed in the First World Conference on Muslim Education held in Makkah, March 31-April 8, 1977. The idea however, is not new. Muslim scholars such as Ibn Khaldun used the same classification with different terms, such as *naql* and *'aql*, *farḍ 'ayn* and *farḍ kifāyah*. See *Umm al-Qura*, University World Center for Islamic Education, Mecca al-Mukarrama, Recommendation of the Four World Conferences on Islamic Education, Makkah al-Mukarramah, 1403 (1983).
- ⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁸ Thomas S. Kuhn, *op. cit.*, 1964 and 1970.
- ⁹ Isma'īl R. al Fārūqī, "Islamization of Knowledge: Problems, Principles and Perspective," in *Islam: Source and Purpose of Knowledge* (Herndon, Virginia: The International Institute of Islamic Thought), 1987; first published in *Knowledge for What?* (Islamabad: Ministry of Islamic History, Culture and Civilization, 1982).
- ¹⁰ Muhammad Arif, "The Islamization of Knowledge and Some Methodological Issues in Paradigm Building: The General Case of Social Science with a Special Focus on Economics," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 4:1 September 1987, page 51.
- ¹¹ Ism'ail al Fārūqī, *op. cit.* See also his *Toward Islamic English* (Herndon, Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought), Islamization of Knowledge Series, 1986.
- ¹² See Qur'ān 49:13.

Al Tawjīh wa'l Irshād
Falsafatuhu Wa Akhlāqīyātuhu fī
al Mujtama'āt al Islāmīyah

(The Philosophy and Ethics of
Counseling and Guidance in Islamic Societies)

Kamal Ibrahim Mursi
Bashir al Rashidi

التوجيه والإرشاد
فلسفته وأخلاقياته في المجتمعات الإسلامية

إعداد

كمال إبراهيم مرسي و بشير الرشيدى

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كمال ابراهيم مرسي

تلخيص

تهدف الدراسة الحالية الى توضيح جذور التوجيه والإرشاد كمهنة حديثة في المجتمعات الإسلامية، وبيان فلسفتها وأخلاقيات ممارستها، ولتحقيق هذا الهدف ناقشت الدراسة نشأة التوجيه والإرشاد في القرن العشرين في أمريكا، وظروف نموه وتطوره وانتقاله إلى كثير من دول العالم المتحضرة والنامية، وبينت عيوب نقل الإرشاد كما يطبق في أمريكا إلى المجتمعات الإسلامية من هذه العيوب: الفروق الثقافية والدينية والاجتماعية بين المجتمع الأمريكي والمجتمعات الإسلامية واختلاف أسلوب حياة الفرد الأمريكي وقيمه وطموحاته وفلسفته في الحياة وقيم الفرد المسلم وطموحاته وفلسفته في الحياة. وناقش البحث التوجيه والإرشاد الحديث ونظام الحسبة في الإسلام والعلاقة بينهما، وانتهى إلى أن بينهما أوجه شبه واختلاف فهما يتفقان حول مساعدة الإنسان على اختيار ما ينفعه ويصلح حياته الاجتماعية، وترك ما يضره ويفسد حياته الاجتماعية، ولكنهما يختلفان في الهدف والقصد فهذه الإرشاد الحديث وقصده سعادة الانسان في الدنيا أما هدف الحسبة فسعادة الإنسان في الدنيا والآخرة، وقصدها وجه الله وطلب مرضاته.

وانتهت المناقشة حول هذا الموضوع الى توضيح مفهوم التوجيه والإرشاد الإسلامي الذي يقوم على تحقيق هدفَي الحسبة وقصدها بالتقنيات والأساليب التي توصل إليها علماء النفس الإرشادي.

ويستمد الإرشاد مسلماته ومبادئه من الشريعة الإسلامية، التي تعتبره عماد الدين وقوامه، وتعتبر المرشدين في منزلة المجاهدين في سبيل الله إذا صلحت نواياهم، وتلزم أولي الأمر بتعيينهم في جميع المجالات وتوجب على كل مسلم طلب الارشاد كلما شعر بالحاجة اليه.

ويقوم التوجيه والإرشاد الإسلامي على أساس أن كل إنسان مسئول عن صلاح نفسه وصلاح مجتمعه، وهو — أي الإنسان — حر في اتخاذ قراراته بنفسه شريطة ألا يجاهر بالمعاصي. والمرشد المسلم ملتزم بالمحافظة على النظام الاجتماعي الإسلامي فيما يرشد إليه وليس له أن يقبل منكراً وإن وافق هواه، ولا ينهى عن معروف وإن خالف هواه. وتطرق البحث بعد ذلك إلى الشروط التي يجب توفرها في المرشد المسلم، فأشار إلى تعلم الإرشاد وفنونه الدينية والدينية، وإلى ضرورة توفر الاستعداد الشخصي والرغبة في الإرشاد والالتزام باخلاقه الإسلامية التي من أهمها أن يقصد بإرشاده وجه الله وطلب مرضاته، فلا يشوبه رياء ولا مراء، وإن يلتزم طاعة الله فيما يأمر به وينهى عنه، وإن يكون هيناً ليناً رقيقاً حسن الخلق علماً بما يدعو إليه وبأحوال من يرشدهم وظروفهم الاجتماعية، وأن يكون أميناً في عمله، محافظاً على أسرار الناس عفيف النفس يعمل ما ينفع الناس ويدفع عنهم ما يضرهم ويفسد حياتهم.

وانتهى البحث إلى بعض التوصيات التي قد تساعد على النهوض بمهنة الإرشاد في المجتمعات الإسلامية كما أثار بعض المشكلات التي تحتاج إلى دراسات أخرى يقوم بها فريق من المتخصصين في علم النفس الإرشادي والشريعة الإسلامية.

مقدمة

نشأ التوجيه والإرشاد (Guidance & Counseling) كمهنة وتخصص في أمريكا في العقد الأول من القرن العشرين، عندما أسس فرانك بارسونز (Frank Parsons) أب الإرشاد والتوجيه في أمريكا أول مكتب للتوجيه المهني في بوسطن سنة ١٩٠٨، لتوجيه الشباب الأمريكي إلى العمل المناسب. ثم نما التوجيه والإرشاد نمواً سريعاً في الخمسينات وما بعدها حيث تعددت نظرياته، وتطورت أساليبه، وتنوعت مجالاته، وغداً صحيحة من صيحات القرن العشرين لإصلاح مسار التعليم والتدريب والتأهيل، وترشيد الحياة الأسرية، وتحسين برامج رعاية المجرمين والمجانحين والمعوقين، والأطفال المشردين والأيتام، واستخدم في المستشفيات وفي المصانع وفي الجيش وغيرها. (Shertzer & Stone, 1981).

وانتقل التوجيه والإرشاد كمهنة وتخصص في أمريكا الشمالية إلى أوروبا وآسيا وأفريقيا وأمريكا الجنوبية وإستراليا، وجعلت دول كثيرة ضمن خططها الخمسية في السبعينات والثمانينات إدخال التوجيه والإرشاد والتوسع في برامج المدارس الثانوية ومراكز التدريب وغيرها (Mack, 1979, Shertzer & Stone, 1981).

تحديد المشكلة:

أخذت كثير من الدول الإسلامية بتطبيق التوجيه والإرشاد في مدارسها ومعاهد التدريب ومراكز التأهيل ودور الرعاية الاجتماعية، مقتدية في ذلك بالنموذج الأمريكي حيث تبنى المرشدون التربويون والنفسيون في هذه المجتمعات فلسفة الإرشاد في أمريكا. وأخذوا

باهدافه ومبادئه وأساليبه ونظرياته، واستمدوا من أخلاقيات جمعيات التوجيه والإرشاد الأمريكية معاييرهم وقواعد ممارسة الإرشاد في بلادهم.

ونعتقد ان النموذج الأمريكي في التوجيه والإرشاد متطور في تقنياته ، متقدم في نظرياته، وعلماء علم النفس الإرشادي الأمريكيان هم أجبار العالم المعاصر في هذا الميدان. ومع هذا فان نقل الإرشاد كما هو معروف في أمريكا إلى المجتمعات الإسلامية ليس مناسباً لأنه ليس النموذج الأمثل للتطبيق في هذه المجتمعات لاعتبارات كثيرة من أهمها الآتي:

(١) يعتبر نقل التوجيه والإرشاد من مجتمع إلى مجتمعات أخرى تختلف عنه في عقيدتها ومناهج الحياة فيها ومعايير الإصلاح والفساد فيها من الأخطاء المنهجية التي ينبغي إعادة النظر فيها لأن الإرشاد لا يمارس في معزل عن قيم وعادات وفلسفة الحياة في المجتمع الذي يطبق فيه (Bingham, 1976) فالإرشاد الذي يمارس في أمريكا يمارس في إطار فصل الدين عن الدولة (Separation of Church and State) ويقسم إلى نوعين: إرشاد ديني وآخر دنيوي، يمارس الأول في البيت والكنيسة، ويطبق الثاني في المدارس والمصانع ومراكز التوجيه الأخرى (Pallone & Lee, 1969).

أما في المجتمعات الإسلامية فالدين والدنيا لله سبحانه وتعالى، والإسلام دين دولة، وهو عقيدة وشريعة في الحياة، وعبادات ومعاملات وإيمان ونظام اجتماعي واقتصادي وسياسي (ابن تيمية ١٩٧٦، الغزالي ١٩٧٦) وهذا يجعل التوجيه والإرشاد في المجتمعات الإسلامية قائماً على أساس ديني دنيوي، لا يفصل بين ماهو ديني وما هو دنيوي. فكل أفعال الانسان في الدنيا لله حُكم فيها يبيئه عليها إن كانت صالحة، ويعاقبه عليها إن كانت غير ذلك.

(٢) يقدم التوجيه والإرشاد في أمريكا لأفراد وجماعات، يعيشون في مجتمع يدين بالبراجماتية النفعية، والاستقلالية الفردية والحرية الشخصية في اتباع الشهوات ولا يعني بحماية المرأة، وصيانة الروابط الأسرية، وتقديس الحياة الزوجية، ولا يعبأ بالعواطف الانسانية، ولا بمشاعر المودة والرحمة، فالحياة منظمة وكل فرد مسؤول عن نفسه وله الحرية في أن يفعل ما يشاء شريطة الا يؤذي غيره.

أما الإرشاد في المجتمعات الاسلامية فيقدم لأفراد وجماعات يعيشون في مجتمع يقدر الحياة الأسرية، ويحترم المرأة، ويحث على التراحم والمودة والمحبة والتعاون، ويشجع البر والتقوى ومساعدة الضعاف، ويدعو إلى الأخلاق الفاضلة، والطهارة من الرذائل والقبائح، ويُحتمل كل فرد مسؤولية إصلاح نفسه وإصلاح مجتمعه. فكل إنسان مسئول عن إزالة الفساد من مجتمعه قدر استطاعته، فإن لم يستطع فعليه أن يمتنع هو عن اتبانه (زيدان، ١٩٧٥) . نلمس هذا في حديث رسول الله ﷺ الذي حث فيه على الاهتمام بأمر المسلمين حيث قال [من أصبح ولم يهتم بأمر المسلمين فليس منهم]^(١). وفي حديثه الآخر الذي أمر فيه كل فرد بإصلاح مجتمعه حيث قال [من رأى منكراً فليغيره بيده، فإن لم يستطع فبلسانه، فإن لم يستطع فبقلبه، وذلك أضعف الايمان]^(٢). وكل مسلم له الحرية في ان يفعل ما يشاء لأن ﴿كل نفس بما كسبت رهينة﴾^(٣). ولكن ليست له الحرية في أن يجاهر بالمعاصي والمنكرات فإن عملها

بينه وبين نفسه فأمره إلى الله. أما إن جاهر بها فیدعی إلى تركها باللين، ثم يغلظ القول له، فإن لم يرتدع يمنع بالقوة، فليس لأحد الحرية في أن يجاهر بارتكاب المعاصي لأن ضررها لا يعود عليه وحده بل تؤذي المجتمع كله. قال تعالى: ﴿وَاتَّقُوا فِتْنَةً لَأْتِيَنَّ الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا مِنْكُمْ خَاصَّةً، وَاعْلَمُوا أَنَّ اللَّهَ شَدِيدُ الْعِقَابِ﴾^(٤)، وقال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [والله لتأمرن بالمعروف وتنهون عن المنكر، ولتأخذن على يد الظالم، ولتأطرنه على الحق أطراً، ولتقصرنه على الحق قصراً، أو ليضربن الله بقلوب بعضكم على بعض ثم ليعنكم كما لعنهم]^(٥).

(٣) هناك كثير من الأفعال محرمة في المجتمعات الإسلامية، ويمنع المسلم من عملها، وغير محرمة في المجتمع الأمريكي، وللأمريكي أن يأتيها متى شاء. من هذه الأفعال الزنا واللواط والسحاق والربا والخمر ولعب الميسر والإجهاض والتبني وتنازل الآباء عن الأبناء، وعقوق الوالدين في الكبر، والعشق Boy Friend وغيرها، لذا فإن نظرة المرشد النفسي الأمريكي إلى هذه الأفعال تختلف إلى حد كبير عن نظرة المرشد المسلم.

(٤) بالرغم من نمو الإرشاد والتوجيه في أمريكا في العقدين الماضيين فإن مشاكل الشباب في المدارس وخارج المدارس، ومشاكل الزواج والأسرة في تزايد من الناحيتين الكمية والكيفية، مما يعني أن النموذج الأمريكي في الإرشاد لم ينجح في تحقيق أهدافه في أمريكا نفسها. والدليل على ذلك أنه في بداية القرن العشرين ظهرت دعوة المصلحين الاجتماعيين في أمريكا إلى التوجيه والإرشاد لإنقاذ الأجيال القادمة من التشرذم والفساد، وحماتهم من العمل في سن مبكرة، ومساعدتهم على حسن اختيار برامج التعليم والتدريب التي تناسب قدراتهم، وإرشادهم في الحياة بما يحقق لهم الشعور بالكفاءة والسعادة.

ولقيت هذه الدعوة آذاناً صاغية في المجتمع، فبنيت الحكومة الفيدرالية برامج الإرشاد والتوجيه ومولتها، وتأسست الجمعيات العلمية والمهنية في الإرشاد وزاد عدد معاهد وكليات إعداد المرشدين من معهد واحد سنة ١٩١٠ بولاية بوسطن إلى ٤٧٥ معهداً وكلية سنة ١٩٨٠، وبلغ عدد المرشدين حوالي ٥٠ ألف مرشد نفسي وحوالي ٧٠ ألف مرشد تربوي ومهني، وامتد الإرشاد إلى جميع مناحي الحياة وقدم إلى فئات كثيرة من الناس (Shertzer & Stone, 1981).

ومع هذا التقدم الكبير في أساليب الإرشاد وإمكاناته البشرية والمادية فإن مشاكل الأطفال والشباب والأسر والزواج زادت زيادة كبيرة في السبعينات. فالاحصائيات تشير إلى أن معدل جناح الأحداث زاد من ١٩٠١ في الألف سنة ١٩٥٧ إلى ٣٧٥ في الألف سنة ١٩٧٤. وفي سنة ١٩٧٧ وحدها عرض على محاكم الأحداث مليون و ٢٠٠ ألف جناح، وكان لثلاثة أمثال هذا العدد مشاكل مع الشرطة، وخالف فتى من كل ثلاثة فتیان قواعد المرور وكانت لهم قضايا مرورية (Lee & Klopfer, 1978).

ومن المشكلات الخطيرة التي تواجه المجتمع الأمريكي الحمل غير الشرعي عند تلميذات المدارس فقد وجد مكثري وزملاؤه أن ١٠٪ من المراهقات حوامل بدون زواج، و ٣/١

حالات الاجهاض القانونية التي تم في أمريكا تجري المراهقات (Mckenry et al., 1979). وارتفعت نسبة الإصابة بالأمراض التناسلية بين تلاميذ المدارس الثانوية سنة ١٩٧٤ عما كانت عليه سنة ١٩٥٦ رغم تحسن الرعاية الصحية فزاد عدد المصابين بالزهري ١٠٠٪ وعدد المصابين بالسيلان ٣٠٠٪ (Wynne, 1981).

وانتشر تعاطي الخمر والمخدرات بين تلاميذ المدارس والجامعات فزادت نسبة تعاطي الخمر من ٥٢٪ سنة ١٩٥٦ الى ٧٢٪ سنة ١٩٧٣ م. و ٨٧٪ سنة ١٩٧٧. وزادت نسبة تعاطي المروجوانا بين تلاميذ الثانوي من ٢٧٪ سنة ١٩٧٥ الى ٣٥٪ سنة ١٩٧٧. (National Counsel, 1979, Millmun, et at, 1981, Margolis & Popkin, 1980).

وأشارت التقارير الرسمية سنة ١٩٧٩ الى ارتفاع معدل العدوان والتخريب والتسرب بين تلاميذ المدارس الثانوية. فقد بلغ معدل اعتداءات التلاميذ على المدرسين ٥ آلاف حادثة في الشهر، وسجلت حوالي ٤/٣ مليون حالة هروب من المدرسة، ووجد أن حوالي من ٢٥٪ إلى ٣٠٪ من التلاميذ الذين يلتحقون بالمدارس الثانوية يتركونها قبل أن يكملوها (Nation Center, 1974). وهذا ماجعل رجال التربية والاجتماع وعلم النفس في أمريكا ينادون بضرورة إعادة النظر في أساليب وبرامج التعليم والإرشاد.

(٥) من الدراسات التي اجريت على كفاءة الإرشاد والتوجيه في بعض المجتمعات النامية، وجد المرشدون إن بعض أساليب الارشاد الأمريكية غير مناسبة في إرشاد تلاميذ المدارس في مجتمعاتهم. ففي دراستي اولوي وبولبيانك في نيجيريا وجد ان طلبة المدارس خجولون ولم يتعودوا على حل مشاكلهم وعلى اتخاذ قراراتهم بانفسهم مما جعل طريقة روجرز في الإرشاد (التمركز حول العميل) (Client Centerd Approach) غير مناسبة في إرشادهم لأنهم يتوقعون من المرشد ان يرشدهم إلى ماذا وكيف يعملون؟ أكثر من ان يساعدهم على اكتشاف انفسهم (Rogers, 1962, Olooye, 1974, Pulleybank, 1974).

أسئلة البحث:

إذا كان النموذج الأمريكي في التوجيه والارشاد ليس النموذج الأمثل للارشاد في المجتمعات الاسلامية، فما هو النموذج الأكثر ملاءمة للإرشاد في هذه المجتمعات؟ وما هي فلسفته؟ وماهي أخلاقياته؟

ونجيب عن السؤال الأول بان النموذج الأفضل من وجهة نظرنا هو النموذج الإسلامي في التوجيه والإرشاد، الذي نعتبره فرعاً من فروع الحسبة في الإسلام. وقبل مناقشة هذا النموذج نتوقف عند تعريف الإرشاد والتوجيه كمفهوم علمي حديث ونظام الحسبة كمفهوم شرعي قديم، لنبين العلاقة بين المفهومين ثم نتنقل بعد ذلك إلى مناقشة التوجيه والإرشاد الإسلامي ونستخلص فلسفته وأخلاقيات ممارسته في المجتمعات الإسلامية.

تعريف التوجيه والإرشاد:

قيل في التوجيه والإرشاد تعريفات كثيرة، تشير معظمها الى أنها عمليات فنية مهنية، هدفها ترشيد وهداية وتوعية وإصلاح الأفراد، ومساعدتهم على تحسين سلوكهم ، وتحقيق توافقهم الشخصي والمهني والتربوي والأسري والزواجي، حتى يشعروا بالجدارة والكفاءة والسعادة في الحياة.

ويتم التوجيه والإرشاد في موقف مواجهة بين متخصص في علم النفس الإرشادي (المُرشد Counselor) وشخص آخر يُقدم له التوجيه والإرشاد (العميل Client) بهدف مساعدته على فهم نفسه، وتحديد قدراته واستعداداته وميوله، وتوضيح اتجاهاته ودوافعه وطموحاته، ومعرفة مشكلاته وظروفه البيئية التي يعيش فيها والإمكانات المتاحة له فيها، ومساعدته على كيفية توظيف هذه المعلومات في تحديد أهداف واقعية لنفسه، وتشجيعه على اتخاذ القرارات المناسبة لتنمية قدراته، والاستفادة منها بأقصى قدر ممكن في ضوء فرص الحياة المتاحة له.

ويقدم التوجيه والإرشاد للأشخاص العاديين بهدف مساعدتهم على تنمية أنفسهم واختيار نمط الحياة (Life Style) المناسبة لطموحاتهم ووقاية أنفسهم مما قد يعوقهم عن النمو أو يحد من شعورهم بالجدارة والسعادة في الحياة، كما يقدم التوجيه والإرشاد إلى الأشخاص العاديين الذين يعانون من صعوبات في اختيار المهنة أو الدراسة أو يعانون من مشكلات نفسية أو اجتماعية أو مهنية وتربوية، بهدف مساعدتهم على التخلص منها، وتخفيف مشاعر الاحباط والتوتر والقلق، وإرشادهم إلى تنمية أنفسهم وحمايتهم من الانتكاس ، ووقايتهم من الاضطراب.

ويقوم التوجيه والإرشاد على أساس تكوين علاقة مهنية طيبة بين المرشد والعميل، ليس فيها تسلط أو إجبار أو تأديب أو تعصب، فالمرشد يسعى إلى تبصير العميل وإقناعه بخطة تعليمه أو تدريبه أو علاج مشاكله، ويركز على مافي العميل من صفات حسنة، ويترك له حرية الاختيار واتخاذ القرارات المناسبة له حتى يتحمل مسئوليتها، ويرضى بنتائجها.

وتقدم عمليات التوجيه والإرشاد في أي مكان مناسب لإجراء المقابلات والاختبارات التشخيصية والعلاجية، فيقدم في المدارس ومراكز التدريب ومعاهد التأهيل ودور الرعاية ومراكز رعاية الأمومة والطفولة، ولا يشترط أن يقدم في العيادات النفسية أو مستشفيات الطب النفسي كالعلاج النفسي المتعمق.

ويتناول التوجيه والإرشاد الفرد ككل ويمتد إلى جميع مجالات الحياة الشخصية والتربوية والمهنية والأسرية والزواجية. فتعددت فروعه وظهر التخصص في مجالاته وأساليبه التي منها: التوجيه والإرشاد النفسي والتربوي والمهني والزواجي والأسري والعلاجي والتأهيلي والديني وغيرها (باترسون، ١٩٨٣، زهران ١٩٨٠، سليمان ١٩٨٢، ١٩٨٢، Super, 1962, Gustad, 1953,

.Shertzer & Stone 1981)

الحسبة في الاسلام:

الحسبة شرعاً أمر بمعروف ظهر تركه، ونهى عن منكر ظهر فعله، واصلاح بين الناس. ويقصد بها مرضاة الله، ومساعدة الناس على اكتساب ما يدفعهم وينميهم جسيماً ونفسياً واجتماعياً، ويحميهم من الفساد والضلال والهلاك. قال تعالى ﴿ولتكن منكم أمة يدعون إلى الخير، ويأمرون بالمعروف وينهون عن المنكر ، وأولئك هم المفلحون﴾^(١) وقال أيضاً ﴿لاخير في كثير من نجواهم الا من أمر بصدقة أو معروف أو إصلاح بين الناس، ومن يفعل ذلك ابتغاء مرضاة الله فسوف نؤتيه أجراً عظيماً﴾^(٢).

والأمر في الحسبة يعني طلب الفعل وإرادته في اتيان المعروف الذي هو اسم جامع لكل ماطلبه الشرع، ويدخل فيه جميع الأفعال والأقوال التي فيها مصلحة الفرد والمجتمع، وأمر الله بها على وجه الوجوب أو الندب.

أما النهي فهو يعني ترك الفعل وإرادته في الابتعاد عن المنكر الذي هو إسم جامع لكل مانهى عنه الشرع، ويدخل فيه جميع الأفعال والأقوال التي فيها شقاء الفرد وفساد المجتمع (القرشي ١٩٣٧، يكن ١٩٧٧، ابن تيمية ١٩٧٦ زيدان ١٩٧٨، العمري ١٩٨٠)

وهذا يعني أن الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر في الحسبة قائمان على الاقناع والتشجيع والتبصير، حتى يدرك الشخص فائدة المعروف وضرر المنكر فتنشأ عنده إرادة فعل الخير وترك الشر، وينمو فيه الدافع لعمل المعروف وينطفئ في الدافع لعمل المنكر عن بصيرة وقناعة.

فالحسبة عملية تعليم وتعلم إجتماعي تتم في موقف مواجهة بين شخص متخصص في موضوعات الأمر والنهي والاصلاح (المحتسب) وشخص يطلب الحسبة أو يباشر فعلاً يجب أو يجوز فيه الاحتساب (المحتسب عليه) وتنشأ بينهما علاقة انسانية مهنية فيها تواصل بالحق والصبر في أفعال تجري عليها الحسبة (المحتسب فيه).

وتقوم الحسبة أساساً على الرفق واللين والرضا لا على التسلط والقهر والتحقير حتى تنشأ عند "المحتسب عليه" الرغبة والدافع والإرادة في عمل المعروف وترك المنكر: روى الامام أحمد عن أبي امامة أن غلاماً شاباً أتى النبي ﷺ فقال: "يا نبي الله أتأذن لي في الزنا؟ فصاح الناس به فقال النبي: قربه، أذن.. فدنا الغلام حتى جلس بين يديه فقال النبي: [أتجبه لأملك؟ قال: لا. جعلني الله فداك. قال النبي كذلك الناس لايجبونه لأمهاتهم. أتجبه لأبتك؟ قال: لا. جعلني الله فداك. قال النبي: كذلك الناس لايجبونه لبناتهم. أتجبه لأختك؟ قال: لا. جعلني الله فداك. قال النبي: كذلك الناس لايجبونه لأخواتهم. وزاد ابن عوف أن النبي ذكر العمة والحالة والغلام يقول في كل مرة لا. جعلني الله فداك. فوضع الرسول يده على صدر الغلام وقال اللهم طهر قلبه، واغفر ذنبه وحصن فرجه]. فلم يكن شيء أبغض إليه من الزنا. واختلف الفقهاء في حكم الاحتساب فالبعض رآه فرض عين على كل مسلم ذكر أو انثى، واستدلوا على ذلك بقوله تعالى: ﴿المؤمنون والمؤمنات بعضهم أولياء بعض يأمرون بالمعروف وينهون عن المنكر﴾^(٣) وقوله سبحانه ﴿والعصر إن الانسان لفي خسر الا الذين

آمنوا وعملوا الصالحات وتواصوا بالحق وتواصوا بالصبر^(١٠) ومن حديث جابر رضي الله عنه قال "بايعت رسول الله ﷺ وسلم على إقامة الصلاة وإيتاء الزكاة والنصح لكل مسلم"^(١١).

في حين رآه آخرون فرض كفاية إذا قام به البعض سقط عن الباقي وإذا لم يقم به أحد أتم القادرون عليه. فالاحتساب يلزم القادرين عليه من العلماء لأن الدعوة إلى الخير مشروطة بالعلم بالمعروف والمنكر، وبكيفية التوجيه والإرشاد، واستدلوا على ذلك بقوله تعالى: ﴿ولتكن منكم أمة يدعون إلى الخير ويأمرون بالمعروف وينهون عن المنكر وأولئك هم المفلحون﴾^(١٢).

ومهما يكن حكم الحسبة فرض عين أو كفاية، فهي عمل تعبدية عظيم، فيه جلب المنافع للناس ودرء المفسد عنهم وإصلاح لأمرهم، وشرح لصدورهم في الدنيا والآخرة. لذا اعتبر مَنْ أمر بمعروف ونهى عن منكر خليفة الله في الأرض وخليفة رسوله وخليفة كتابه وكان عمله أفضل جهاد في سبيل الله. جاء رجل إلى رسول الله وهو على المنبر وسأله: "من خير الناس يارسل الله : قال: [آمرهم بالمعروف وأنهاهم عن المنكر واتقاهم لله وأوصلهم لرحمه]^(١٣).

وقال الامام على رضي الله عنه "أفضل الجهاد الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر . فمن أمر بالمعروف شد ظهر المؤمنين، ومن نهى عن المنكر أرغم أنف المنافقين، ومن أبغض الفاسق وغضب لله غضب الله له"^(١٤).

وكان أئمة الصدر الأول في الاسلام يقومون بالحسبة ويمارسونها ويباشرونها بأنفسهم لعموم صلاحها وجزيل ثوابها. وبعد ان اتسعت الدولة الاسلامية أنشأ عمر بن الخطاب رضي الله عنه نظام الحسبة، واعتبر الاحتساب مهنة وتخصص وعين المحتسبين الأكفاء لتوجيه الناس وإرشادهم إلى الخير في جميع المجالات حيث كان الاحتساب على الخلفاء والأمراء والتجار والصناع والزراع والمعلمين وأئمة المساجد والآباء والأمهات والشباب والفتيان والأزواج والزوجات والأصدقاء والأهل والجيران (القرشي، ١٩٣٧، أبو فارس، ١٩٨٣). وكان الاحتساب يتم في البيوت والمساجد، والأسواق والمدارس والحقول والشوارع والمصانع، ويطلبه كل شخص عادي يشعر أنه في حاجة إلى من يرشده إلى عمل ما يحقق له السعادة في الدنيا والآخرة، ويقدم لكل شخص عادي تكاسل وترك معروفاً أو زين له الشيطان الجهر بفعل منكر.

وسار الخلفاء والأمراء في الدولة الاسلامية على نهج الفاروق رضي الله عنه، وعينوا رجالاً متفرغين للحسبة، وأجروا لهم الرواتب الجزية، وأعطوهم صلاحيات واسعة، واعتبروا وظيفتهم من أعلا مناصب الدولة، اذ كانت ولاية الحسبة منبثقة من الولاية العامة، وتتبع الخليفة أو الأمير مباشرة. قال ابن خلدون "أما الحسبة فهي وظيفة دينية من باب الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر، الذي هو فرض على القائم بأمر المهملين أن يقوم به"^(١٥). (زيدان ١٩٧٨). ومن أساليب الاحتساب الآتي:

أ - النصيحة والموعظة الحسنة:

يقدم لجميع الناس فيلنقى المحتسب بالأشخاص فى جلسات فردية أو جماعية، ويقدم لهم النصيحة والموعظة، ويبين لهم شروط الحلال الذى ينفعهم والحرام الذى يضرهم، ويدعوهم إلى عمل ما ينفعهم فى الدنيا والآخرة والبعد عما يضرهم فى الدارين.

وكانت تُعقد هذه الجلسات فى البيوت أو المساجد وأماكن العمل والعلم، أو فى أى مكان ومع أى شخص أو جماعة يرى المحتسب أن النصيحة والموعظة سوف تساعد فى جلب منفعة لهم أو دفع مفسدة عنهم.

ب - الإرشاد الفردى اللين:

يقدم لكل شخص يطلب المشورة أو المساعدة فى عمل أى أمر من أمور الدين والدنيا، حيث كان من حق كل شخص استشارة المحتسب فى أى أمر من أموره الشخصية أو الأسرية أو المهنية أو الدينية.

ويقدم هذا الإرشاد لكل شخص يعمل فعلاً يجوز أو يجب فيه الاحتساب. إذ كان على المحتسب مساعدة هذا الشخص حتى ولو لم يطلب الإرشاد، فيذهب إليه أو يدعو ويجرى معه مقابلات إرشادية (القرشى ١٩٣٧).

ويقوم "الإرشاد الفردى اللين" على أساس الرفق والتبصير والافتقار وتكوين علاقة طيبة بين المحتسب والمحتسب عليه، ويهدف إلى تنمية الدافع عند المحتسب عليه لفعل الخير وترك الشر بإرادة حرة واعية ورغبة قوية. وتشجيعه على قبول الأمر الواقع والرضا بقضاء الله وقدره، ولسان حاله يقول: ﴿لَنْ يَصِينَا إِلَّا مَا كَتَبَ اللَّهُ لَنَا﴾.

وكان الإرشاد الفردى يتم فى سرية تامة وفى رفق وهودة، مع مراعاة الحالة النفسية للمحتسب عليه حيث يعمل المحتسب على إبراز محاسنه ويزين له العمل الصالح، ويشجعه على احتسابه (حوى، ١٩٧٩).

والرفق أساس الإرشاد فى الاحتساب فقد قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [إن الله رفيق يحب الرفق فى الأمر كله].^(١٣).

ج - الإرشاد الفردى المغلظ:

يستخدم مع الأشخاص الذين يجاهرون بفعل المعاصي وترك الخيرات، ويقبلون على عمل ما يضرهم، ويصدون أنفسهم عن عمل ما يفيدهم، ولا ينفع فى إرشادهم الإرشاد اللين. ويعمد المحتسب فى مقابلاته مع هؤلاء الأشخاص إلى التشدد واغلاظ القول، والتهديد والتخويف بعواقب أعمالهم فى الدنيا والآخرة، ويحرص فى الوقت نفسه على جعل باب الرجاء أمامهم مفتوحاً، ويحسن معاملتهم، ويصبرهم ويناقشهم، حتى تنشأ عندهم الرغبة فى عمل ما ينفع وترك ما يضر، وتنمو عندهم الدافعية لفعل الخير والبعد عن الشر، مع قبول الأمر

الواقع والتسليم بقضاء الله وقدره.

وتغليظ الارشاد هنا مطلوب مع هؤلاء الأشخاص لأن مساوئ مجاهرتهم بالمعاصي لاتصيهم وحدهم، إنما تساعد على إشاعة الفاحشة في المجتمع وتفسد حياة الناس. قال تعالى ﴿وَاتَّقُوا فِتْنَةً لَأْتِيَنَّ الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا مِنْكُمْ خَاصَّةً، وَعَلِمُوا أَنَّ اللَّهَ شَدِيدُ الْعِقَابِ﴾⁽¹⁾.

د - الارشاد الجماعي:

كان يستخدم في الاصلاح بين الناس ومساعدتهم في حل المنازعات التي كانت تنشأ بين العامل وصاحب العمل، والدائن والمدين، والبائع والمشتري والآباء والأبناء والأزواج والزوجات حيث كان المحتسب يدعو أطراف النزاع أو يذهب إليهم ويجلس معهم في لقاءات تشبه جلسات الإرشاد الجماعي، التي يقوم بها المرشدون النفسيون في الوقت الحاضر.

واستمر العمل بنظام الحسبة حتى نهاية الخلافة العثمانية فالغيت ولاية المحتسب، ووزعت واجباته، إلى وظائف دينوية، تمارس بقواعد وضعية، ولأهداف دينوية. من هذه الوظائف مفتش التموين ومفتش التغذية ومفتش العمل وحماية المستهلك وحماية البيئة، والصحة الوقائية، وحماية الآداب العامة وغيرها.

وتتلخص مسؤوليات شاغلي هذه الوظائف في أمر الناس بالالتزام بشروط معينة ونهيم عن إتيان أفعال معينة، فإن أطاعوا سمحوا لهم بالعمل وإن خالفوا غلظوا لهم القول، وأوقعوا عليهم الغرامات وأقاموا عليهم الدعوات أمام القضاء.

علاقة الارشاد بالحسبة

من الوظائف الدينوية الحديثة التي كانت من مسؤوليات المحتسب في الدولة الاسلامية، المرشدون: التربويون والمهنيون والنفسيون، ومراقب السلوك والمراقب الاجتماعي وغيرهم ممن يقومون بمساعدة الناس على معرفة انفسهم، وتوجيههم وإرشادهم الى تنمية قدراتهم وإمكاناتهم، وإرشادهم إلى تعديل سلوكهم وإتجاهاتهم وطموحاتهم، وتبصيرهم بواقعهم، وتشجيعهم على قبوله والرضا به، وتسهيل سبل العمل والدراسة والانتاج، مما يؤدي الى انسجام الفرد مع نفسه وتوافق مع البيئة، وشعوره بالكفاءة والجدارة والسعادة في الحياة.

ومن الملاحظ أن هذه الوظائف الحديثة تقوم على أمر بمعروف ظهر تركه، ونهى عن منكر ظهر فعله، وإصلاح بين الناس في ضوء ماتعارف الناس على أنه خير أو شر، صاغوهما - اي الخير والشر او المعروف والمنكر - في نظم وقوانين ولوائح وضعية، وأعراف وتقاليد وعادات دينوية، وتركوا تحديد المعروف والمنكر والخير والشر في شرع الله، وبالتالي فهم قد يأمرن بمنكر وينهون عن معروف ويصبح ارشادهم منكراً من الناحية الشرعية.

ومن الملاحظ ايضاً أن أهداف المرشدين المحدثين من التوجيه والارشاد في المجالات

التربوية والمهنية والنفسية والأسرية والاجتماعية تنحصر في مساعدة المرشدين (بفتح الشين) على تحقيق السعادة في الدنيا فقط، لأن علماء النفس الإرشادي يعتبرون تحقيق السعادة في الدنيا غاية الانسان ومراده، ولا يهتمون بأحكام الله فيما يرشدون إلى الاقبال عليه أو الإحجام عنه، ويقفون عند طلب الدنيا ومتاعها مما يجعل إرشادهم إلى عرض زائل وسعادة مؤقتة. قال تعالى ﴿ومن الناس من يقول ربنا آتنا في الدنيا وماله في الآخرة من خلاق﴾⁽¹⁾.

ويهدف المرشدون المحدثون من الإرشاد إلى مساعدة الناس على حل مشاكلهم وتحقيق أهدافهم في الحياة، وهو هدف نبيل لكن تشوبه شوائب كثيرة، لأنهم لا يقصدون بالإرشاد وجه الله وطلب رضاه. وهذا ما يجعل جهودهم غير فعالة في توجيه الناس. قال تعالى في أعمال الخير من غير المؤمنين ﴿وقدمنا إلى ما عملوا من عمل فجعلناه هباء منثورا﴾⁽²⁾.

كما إن العمل في التوجيه والإرشاد الذي لا يقصد به وجه الله، لا يؤثر كثيراً على نفوس المرشدين (بفتح الشين) ولا ينفذ إلى أعماقهم وسيكون عرضة للإغراف لارتباطه بمصلحة دنيوية نفعية عند المرشد، فقد يقصد به النفع المادي أو الرياء والتظاهر، أو إرضاء الرؤساء أو الدراسة والبحث أو الرغبة في اكتساب الخبرة، أو الرغبة في النجاح وكلها مصالح قد تدفع صاحبها إلى بعض الممارسات اللاأخلاقية بقصد أو بدون قصد.

وهكذا نجد للتوجيه والإرشاد الحديث اهدافاً إنسانية نبيلة لكنه لا يهتم في تحقيقها إلى شرع الله، ويهدف إلى السعادة في الدنيا ولا يقصد مرضاة الله، مما جعله خالياً من غذاء الروح، وعلاج القلوب وإصلاح النفوس، وجعل فائدته محدودة في علاج كثير من مشكلات الأطفال والشباب والأبناء وغيرها.

لذا كان من الضروري تحديث التوجيه والارشاد الحديث بإضافة البعد الروحي إليه، وجعل هدفه مساعدة الإنسان على تحقيق سعاداته في الدنيا والآخرة، وجعل القصد منه وجه الله وطلب مرضاته، أي بإدخال هدف الحسبة وقصدها إلى أساليب وتقنيات التوجيه والإرشاد الحديث. وهذا ما نطلق عليه "التوجيه والإرشاد الإسلامي" (Islamic Guidance and Counseling) أو أسلمة التوجيه والإرشاد — إن جاز التعبير — في البلاد الإسلامية.

التوجيه والارشاد الاسلامي

التوجيه والارشاد الاسلامي عمليات تعليم وتعلم نفسي واجتماعي، تتم في مواجهة (Face-to-face) بين شخص متخصص في علم النفس الارشادي (المرشد Counselor) وشخص آخر يقع عليه التوجيه والإرشاد (المُرشد Couselee) وتستخدم فيه تقنيات وأساليب فنية ومهنية ويهدف إلى مساعدة المرشد على حل مشكلاته ومواجهتها بأساليب توافقية مباشرة، ومعاونته على فهم نفسه، ومعرفة قدراته وميوله، وتشجيعه على الرضا بما قسمه الله له، وتدريبه على اتخاذ قراراته بهدي من شرع الله حتى ينشأ عنده طلب الحلال وإرادته، وترك الحرام وإرادته، ويضع لنفسه أهدافاً واقعية ومشروعة، ويستفيد من قدراته بأقصى وسعها في عمل ما ينفعه وينفع غيره، ويجد تحقيق ذاته في فعل ما يرضي الله، فينعم بالسعادة في الدنيا والآخرة.

ولا يعني "التوجيه والإرشاد الإسلامي" الإرشاد الديني^(١٧) فحسب إنما يعني الإرشاد الديني والدنيوي لأن مفهوم العبادة في الإسلام يشمل نشاطات الانسان في جميع مناحي الحياة. فطلب العلم فريضة، والعمل عبادة والزواج واجب على من يقدر عليه، وجمع المال وامتلاك المصانع والتاجر وتشديد العمارات مشروع اذا كان من حلال، واللعب والرحلات والحفلات والزيارات مباحة في حدود ما شرعه الله، والسعي الحلال على النفس والأهل صدقة وقرى، وبر الوالدين ومودة ذوي القرى وحب الناس عبادة وغير ذلك (النوي، ١٩٧٦).

فهدف التوجيه والإرشاد الاسلامي مساعدة الانسان، وتبصيره وتشجيعه على اتخاذ القرارات لكي يوجه حياته إلى عمل ما ينفعه في الآخرة وفي الوقت نفسه لا ينسى نصيبه من الدنيا فيحقق ذاته دنيوياً وأخروياً. قال تعالى: ﴿وَاتَّبِعْ فِيمَا آتَاكَ اللَّهُ الدَّارَ الْآخِرَةَ وَلَا تَنْسَ نَصِيبَكَ مِنَ الدُّنْيَا وَأَحْسِنْ كَمَا أَحْسَنَ اللَّهُ إِلَيْكَ وَلَا تَبْغِ الْفُسَادَ فِي الْأَرْضِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ الْمُسْفِدِينَ﴾^(١٨).

مجالات التوجيه والإرشاد:

تتسع مجالات التوجيه والإرشاد الإسلامي لتشمل الإنسان في كل ميدان من ميادين الحياة الدينية والمهنية والتربوية والأسرية والترويحية، وتشمل النساء والرجال الصغار والكبار. ومع إدراكنا لتعدد مجالات التوجيه والإرشاد وتداخلها وتشابكها وصعوبة الفصل بينها، فإننا نستخلص منها أربعة مجالات رئيسية هي:

- ١ — التوجيه والإرشاد التربوي.
- ٢ — التوجيه والإرشاد المهني.
- ٣ — التوجيه والإرشاد النفسي.
- ٤ — التوجيه والإرشاد الأسري.

فلسفة التوجيه والإرشاد:

تقوم فلسفة التوجيه والإرشاد الإسلامي على أساس أن الحاجة للدين لها أساس فطري في الطبيعة الإنسانية، فقد خلق الله الإنسان ونفخ فيه من روحه (نجاتي، ١٩٨٢)، عودة ومرسي، ١٩٨٤) وهذا ما يجعل إيمانه بالله مصدر أمنه وصلاحه وسعادته، وعدم إيمانه مصدر قلقه وفساده وشقاوته.

فالدين كما قال حسن البنا — رحمه الله — أفضل الوسائل في إصلاح النفوس لأنه يحيي الضمائر، ويوقظ الشعور، وينبه القلوب، ويترك مع كل نفس رقيباً لا يغفل، وحارساً لا يسهو، والدين يدفع النفوس إلى الخيرات دفعا، ويصدها عن الآثام صدأ، ويدعو إلى تزكيتها والسمو بها، وإلى تعطر الأرواح وتصفيتها (البنا، ١٩٧٧ ص ٣٣).

لذا كان الاهتمام بتغذية الجانب الروحي لزيادة الايمان بالله من أهم عوامل نجاح عمليات

التوجيه والإرشاد في تنمية كل شخص ووقايته وإصلاحه. فالإيمان كما قال وليم جيمس أعظم علاج للقلق، لأنه يضيفي على الحياة قيمة، ويساعد على الاستمتاع بها. ولا توجد مشكلة — كما قال كارل يونج — عند الإنسان لانه يرجع في أساسها الى نقص الإيمان والخروج على الدين، ولن يبرأ أحد من مشكلاته الا حين يقوى إيمانه، ويستعين بأوامر دينه ونواهيهِ في مواجهة الحياة (الغزالي، ١٩٧٦).

مسلمات ومبادئ الارشاد الاسلامي

يستمد التوجيه والارشاد الاسلامي مسلماته ومبادئه من الشريعة الاسلامية ومن أهمها الآتي:

١ — النصيحة عماد الدين وقوامه، قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام، [الدين النصيحة قلنا: لمن يا رسول الله قال: لله ولكتابه ولرسوله ولأئمة المسلمين وعامتهم]،^(١) والنصيحة — كما قال النووي — كلمة جامعة معناها حيازة الخير للمنصوح. (النووي ١٩٧٦).

٢ — التوجيه والإرشاد من أفضل الأعمال عند الله، لأن فيه نفع للناس وقضاء لحوائجهم وعلاج لمشاكلهم وتحقيق لسعادتهم، قال رسول الله ﷺ [أحب الأعمال إلى الله عز وجل: سرور تدخله على مسلم أو تكشف عنه كربة، أو تقضي عنه ديناً، أو تطرد عنه جوعاً، ولئن أمشي مع أخي في حاجته أحب إلى من أن اعتكف في المسجد شهراً..... ومن مشى مع أخيه المسلم في حاجته حتى يثبتها له أثبت الله تعالى قدمه يوم تزل الأقدام]^(٢)

٣ — التوجيه والإرشاد خدمة نفسية يقصد بها وجه الله وطلب مرضاته، يقوم على السرية والتواضع واللين، ويخلو من الرياء والتفاخر والتسلط ولا فضل للمرشد على المرشد، فكلاهما في موقف الإرشاد ينفذ أمر الله ويطلب رضاه، قال تعالى ﴿الذين إن مكناهم في الأرض أقاموا الصلاة وآتوا الزكاة وأمروا بالمعروف ونهوا عن المنكر والله عاقبة الأمور﴾^(٣).

٤ — توفير الخدمات الإرشادية واجبة على أولي الأمر في المجتمعات الاسلامية، فنعين المرشدين في المدارس والمصانع ومراكز الطفولة ومكاتب الزواج والأسرة والوحدات الاجتماعية ودور الرعاية وغيرها، ليس ترفاً تربوياً أو اجتماعياً، إنما هو أمر إلهي وفرض على مَنْ تولى أمر المسلمين، يُؤجر على فعله، ويأثم على تركه (القرشي ١٩٣٧، زيدان ١٩٧٥).

٥ — كل انسان بالغ عاقل مستول عن أفعاله، قال تعالى ﴿كل نفس بما كسبت رهينة﴾^(٤) وقال سبحانه ﴿ولا تزر وازرة وزر أخرى﴾^(٥).

٦ — هدف الإرشاد تنمية إرادة الشخص ورغبته في طلب ما ينفعه وترك ما يضره، عن طريق التبصير والاتناع، والمساعدة على اتخاذ القرارات بهدى من شرع الله.

٧ — هدف التوجيه والإرشاد المساعدة على تحصيل مصلحة، ودفع مفسدة، وإقامة شرع

الله في الأرض وإزالة الفساد منها والوقاية منه، وعلاج المفسدين (العمرى ١٩٨٠)، ابن تيمية، ١٩٧٦، القرشي (١٩٣٧).

٨ — طلب التوجيه والإرشاد واجب على كل مسلم، يشعر بحاجة إلى الإرشاد في أي مجال من مجالات الدنيا والآخرة قال تعالى ﴿فَأَسْأَلُوا أَهْلَ الذِّكْرِ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ لِتَعْلَمُونَ﴾^(٣٣).

٩ — الإرشاد فرض عين على كل شخص متخصص في علم النفس الإرشادي، وعُيِّن رسمياً في وظيفة مرشد في أي مجال، يثاب على فعله، ويعاقب على تركه.

١٠ — التطوع في إرشاد المسلمين واجب على كل شخص قادر عليه، يثاب على فعله ولا يعاقب على تركه (القرشي، ١٩٣٧، زيدان ١٩٧٥).

١١ — المرشد المسلم يرشد بحسب ما حسنه الشرع، وإن خالف هواه، وينهى عما قبحه الشرع وإن وافق هواه، قال تعالى ﴿وَعَسَى أَنْ تَكْرَهُوا شَيْئاً وَهُوَ خَيْرٌ لَكُمْ، وَعَسَى أَنْ تُحِبُّوا شَيْئاً وَهُوَ شَرٌّ لَكُمْ وَاللَّهُ يَعْلَمُ وَأَنْتُمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَ﴾^(٣٤).

١٢ — الإنسان حر في اتخاذ قراراته بنفسه، واختيار ما يناسبه من الأنشطة التي أحلها الله له، وهو حر في اكتساب المعاصي سرأً وأمره الى الله.

١٣ — ليس لأي شخص الحرية في أن يجاهر بالمعاصي والفساد لأن الجهر بها يؤدي الآخرين بطريقة مباشرة أو غير مباشرة ويؤدي إلى شيوع الفاحشة التي تفسد المجتمع. ومسئولية حماية المجتمع من الفساد ومسئولية جماعية. قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [مثل القائم على حدود الله والواقع فيها كمثل قوم استهموا على سفينة فصار بعضهم أعلاها وبعضهم أسفلها فكان الذين في أسفلها إذا استقوا من الماء مروا على من فوقهم فقالوا: لو أنا خرقنا في نصيبنا خرقاً ولم نؤذ من فوقنا. فإن تركوهم وما أرادوا هلكوا جميعاً وإن أخذوا على أيديهم نجوا ونجوا جميعاً]^(٣٥).

١٤ — الالتزام بالمحافظة على خصائص النظام الإجتماعي الاسلامي، فيدعو المرشد إلى التمسك بالأخلاق الإسلامية يُشجعه على تقوية الروابط الأسرية ويحث على حماية المرأة، ويصبر بمسئولية الفرد في تنمية مجتمعه وإصلاحه قد استطاعته (زيدان ١٩٧٥).

أخلاقيات المهنة

التوجيه والإرشاد مهنة لا يقدر عليها إلا من امتلك ناصيتها من الناحيتين: العلمية والفنية. وهي مهنة عظيمة النفع إذا قام عليها من يُحسِنُ صناعتها علماً وفناً، من هنا اعتبر الرسول عليه الصلاة والسلام المرشدين أفضل الناس، واعتبر الإرشاد جهاداً في سبيل الله. أما إذا قام على الارشاد شخص جاهل به وغير ماهر فيه، فسوف^(٣٦) يرشد بغير علم ويهدي بغير بصيرة ويضر من يرشده.

وقد يؤدي به إلى التهلكة، فمم يروى عن جابر رضي الله عنه قال: ”خرجنا في سفر فاصاب رجل منا حجر فشججه في رأسه، فاحتلم فسأل أصحابه: هل تجدون لي رخصة في التيمم؟ قالوا: ما نجد لك رخصة وأنت تقدر على الماء فاعتسل فمات. فلما قدمنا على رسول الله ﷺ ، وأخبر بذلك قال [قتلوه قتلهم الله، ألا سألوا إذا لم يعلموا، فإنما شفاء العي السؤال. إنما كان يكفيه ان يتيمم، ويعصب على جرحه خرقة، ثم يمسح عليها، ويغسل سائر جسمه] (٢٨).

وقد يكون المرشد عالماً بعلوم الارشاد، لكنه غير قادر على تطبيقه في الحياة اليومية، ينفر الناس منه، ويشق عليهم، فيتركوا فضيلة التناصح، ويفروا من النصيحة. لذا نهى الرسول عليه الصلاة والسلام عن العنف والشدة في التوجيه والإشاد فقال: [اللهم من وُتِي من أمر أمتي شيئاً فشق عليهم فاشقق عليه، ومن وُتِي من أمرهم شيئاً ففرق بهم فارفق به] (٢٩).

وقد يكون المرشد عالماً ومهراً في التطبيق، لكنه سيء الخلق فيرى الأمور في موقف الارشاد بمقياس أهوائه. ويستغل حاجة الناس اليه استغلالاً سيئاً، ويسخر علمه وفنه لمصلحته الشخصية، ويأمر بالمنكرات ، وينهى عن المعروف فيُضِلُّ ويُضِلُّ غيره (مرسي، ١٩٨٣). من هنا كانت الحاجة إلى ممارسة هذه المهنة ممارسة أخلاقية، يلتزم فيها بمبادئ وشروط ترضي الله ورسوله، وتحقق للمهنة مكانتها العظيمة في المجتمع. وتُبين المرشد الصالح الذي يرشد إلى الخير من المرشد الفاسد الذي يدعو إلى الشر.

وتتلخص شروط الممارسة الأخلاقية للتوجيه والإرشاد في:

- أ – التخصص العلمي والفني.
- ب – الاستعداد الشخصي.
- ج – الالتزام بأخلاق المهنة.

وتحت كل بند من هذه البنود الثلاثة تفصيل نوضحه فيما يلي:

أ – التخصص العلمي والفني:

يتضمن التخصص العلمي والفني في التوجيه والإرشاد المعرفة بعلوم الإرشاد وأساليبه، والخبرة في تطبيقاته في مواقف الحياة اليومية، إذ لا تكفي المعرفة لأن المرشد ليس مجرد عالم بأصول الإرشاد ونظرياته وأساليبه، إنما هو عالم بعلم تطبيقي في حالة واقعة، فان قصر علمه عن فهم الواقع والتعامل معه فلا جدوى من علمه.

ويحتاج إعداد الممارس العام Genetalist في التوجيه والإرشاد على المستوى الجامعي إلى دراسة فروع كثيرة من علوم النفس والاجتماع والخدمة الاجتماعية والتربية والشريعة الاسلامية، وإلى التدريب الميداني أثناء الدراسة الجامعية وعند الالتحاق بالعمل واثاء الخدمة، وإلى إكتساب الخبرات من المشرفين والموجهين، ومن القراءة والزيارات العلمية.

أما إعداد المرشد المتخصص Specialization في مجال أو أكثر من مجالات التوجيه

والإرشاد فيحتاج إلى دراسات عليا متعمقة في علوم الإرشاد: النفسية والاجتماعية والتربوية والشرعية وغيرها لزيادة معرفته بالعلوم التي لها علاقة بمجال تخصصه.

ب - الاستعداد الشخصي:

يتطلب التوجيه والإرشاد خصائص معينة في الشخص حتى يكون قابلاً لتعلم علومه، قادراً على ممارسته بطريقة إسلامية.

وبأني في مقدمة الخصائص التي يجب توفرها في المرشد سلامة العقيدة، إذ لا يكفي أن يكون مسلماً فقط بل يجب أن يكون ملتزماً بالإسلام قصداً وقولاً وعملاً، ومؤمناً بأنه أعدل نظام اجتماعي، وأفضل فلسفة في الحياة، حتى يقبل على دراسة العلوم الشرعية — بالإضافة إلى العلوم غير الشرعية، ويعرف أحكام الله فيما يرشد إليه، ويقس أعماله وعلاقاته ومقاصده في مواقف الإرشاد بمقاييس الشرع، ويرضى بأحكام الله على أفعال العباد، ولا يتعدى حدوده فيما يوجه إليه أو يوجه عنه (ابو فارس، ١٩٨٣ ابن تيمية ١٩٧٦، زيدان ١٩٧٥، القرشي، ١٩٣٧، العمري ١٩٨٠). ويشترك المرشد المسلم مع غيره من المرشدين غير المسلمين في الخصائص النفسية والخلقية. ومن الدراسات على خصائص المرشدين التربويين والنفسيين والمهنيين في أمريكا توصل الباحثون إلى مجموعة من الخصائص الذهنية والمزاجية والدينامية والجسمية والاجتماعية ترتبط إلى حد كبير بنجاح المرشدين في عمليات الإرشاد مما جعل جمعيات التوجيه والإرشاد في أمريكا APA, APCA: NVGA, ASCA تدعو إلى تشجيع من تتوفر فيه هذه الخصائص على التخصص في التوجيه والإرشاد، وعدم تشجيع الآخرين.

ومن هذه الصفات أو الخصائص الذكاء والشعور بالمسئولية وتحمل الاحباط، والنضوج الإنفعالي، وسعة الاطلاع، والقدرة على تكوين علاقات مع الآخرين، وحب الناس، والصبر والتواضع، ودقة الملاحظة، والثقة بالنفس، وحسن الخلق، والرغبة في العمل مع الناس، والاهتمام بهم، والصبر عليهم والتفاعل معهم، والثقة فيهم، ومعرفة الشخص لعبوبه (Arbuckle, 1962) (Schwebel, 1962, Shertzer & Stone, 1981) وبالرجوع إلى خصائص المحتسب الناجح التي استمدها علماء المسلمين من الكتاب والسنة ومن خبراتهم الشخصية في أعمال الحسبة، وجدنا انهم سبقوا البحوث الأمريكية في تحديد خصائص المرشد الناجح، وسبقوا جمعيات الإرشاد الأمريكية في الدعوة لانتقاء المرشدين الصالحين.

ومن الخصائص التي اتفقوا عليها فيمن يتصدى للإرشاد: العلم والفظنة، والأمانة والتقوى والورع، ودقة الملاحظة، والرفق والصبر واللين، وحسن الخلق والعدل، والرغبة في العمل مع الناس، والاهتمام بأمورهم ومصالحهم، وتحمل أذاهم، وتقبل أخطائهم، وحسن الظن بهم، والتواضع معهم، ومعرفة عيوب نفسه والتمسك بالسنن والنوافل، واتساق أعماله مع أقواله حتى يكون موضع ثقة الناس واحترامهم (ابن تيمية ١٩٧٦، القرشي ١٩٣٧، زيدان ١٩٧٥، أبو فارس ١٩٨٣). وسوف تبين الأدلة الشرعية على هذه الخصائص عند مناقشة أخلاق المهنة.

ج - الالتزام بأخلاق المهنة:

يعتبر التزام المرشد بأخلاق المهنة من عوامل نجاح الإرشاد إن لم يكن أهمها، لأن الالتزام يعنى توفر شرطي التخصص العلمي والاستعداد الشخصي. كما تحدد المعايير الأخلاقية مَنْ يقوم بالإرشاد ، ولماذا يرشد ومتى يرشد وكيف يرشد.

وأخلاقيات مهنة التوجيه والإرشاد مستمدة من اخلاقيات الحسبة فالإرشاد — كما قلنا من قبل — فرع من فروعها.

وأهم القواعد الأخلاقية التي يجب التزام المرشد المسلم بها في ممارسته لمهنته الآتي:

(١) قاعدة حسن النية في طلب مرضاة الله:

يجب أن يقصد المرشد بعمله وجه الله وطلب مرضاته، فلا يشوب إرشاده رياء ولا مرء ولا مفاخرة ولا مصلحة شخصية، لينشر الله عليه — كما قال القرشي رحمه الله — رداء القبول وعلم التوفيق، ويقذف له في القلوب مهابة وجلال، ومبادرة إلى قبول إرشاده بالسمع والطاعة. قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [وَمَنْ أَحْسَنَ فِيمَا بَيْنَهُ وَبَيْنَ اللَّهِ، أَحْسَنَ اللَّهُ فِيمَا بَيْنَهُ وَبَيْنَ النَّاسِ، وَمَنْ أَصْلَحَ سِرِيرَتَهُ أَصْلَحَ اللَّهُ عِلَاتِيَّتَهُ، وَمَنْ عَمِلَ لِآخِرَتِهِ كَفَاهُ اللَّهُ أَمْرَ دُنْيَاهُ] (القرشي ١٩٣٧ ص ١٣). فالمرشد المسلم يؤمن بأهمية النية في كل أعماله، لأنها هي التي تحدد مدى صلاحية أفعاله فقد قال الرسول عليه الصلاة والسلام [إِنَّمَا الْأَعْمَالُ بِالنِّيَّاتِ وَإِنَّمَا لِكُلِّ امْرِئٍ مَا نَوَى] (٣٠) ، وهذا يعنى أن الإرشاد الصالح ما كان خالصاً لله ولو كان المرشد موظفاً حكومياً تدفع له الرواتب.

٢ — قاعدة الاستقامة:

تعنى الاستقامة شرعاً لزوم طاعة الله في القول والفعل (النوي ١٩٧٦) وتعنى في الارشاد التزام المرشد بطاعة الله فيما يأمر به وينهى عنه، فيرشد إلى عمل المعروف وترك المنكرات، ولا يحشى إلا الله . قال تعالى ﴿إِنَّ الَّذِينَ قَالُوا رَبُّنَا اللَّهُ ثُمَّ اسْتَقَامُوا فَلَا خَوْفَ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ﴾ (٣١).

ومن الاستقامة أن يكون عادلاً في أقواله وأحكامه فلا يتسرع في استنتاجاته وتوصياته حتى لا يظلم أحداً، قال تعالى ﴿إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَأْمُرُ بِالْعَدْلِ وَالْإِحْسَانِ﴾ (٣٢) ، وقال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [إِنَّ الْمَقْسُطِينَ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ عَلَى مَنَابِرٍ مِنْ نُورٍ: الَّذِينَ يَعْدِلُونَ فِي حُكْمِهِمْ وَأَهْلِيهِمْ وَمَا لَوْ] (٣٣).

ومن الاستقامة أن يلتزم المرشد بما يرشد إليه ويدعو إليه ليزداد وقاراً أو يؤثر إرشاده في الناس. أما إذا كان عمله مخالفاً لما يرشد إليه فإثمه كبير، وذنبه عظيم لأنه قد يفسد بإرشاده أكثر لأنه مما يصلح. لذا غلظ الإسلام عقوبة مَنْ يُرشد الناس إلى عمل الخير ولا يفعله، أو يدعوهم إلى ترك المنكرات ويفعلها. قال تعالى ﴿يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَمْ تَقُولُوا مَا لَا تَفْعَلُونَ، كَبُرَ مَقْتاً عِنْدَ اللَّهِ أَنْ تَقُولُوا مَا لَا تَفْعَلُونَ﴾ (٣٤). وقال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام

يؤتى بالرجل يوم القيامة فيلقى في النار فتندلق أقتاب بطنه، فيدور بها كما يدور الحمار في الرجا، فيجتمع إليه أهل النار فيقولون، يافلان مالك؟ ألم تكن تأمر بالمعروف وتنبى عن المنكر؟ فيقول: بلى كنت آمر بالمعروف ولا آتبه، وأنبى عن المنكر وآتبه^(٣٥).

٣ — قاعدة العلم والخبرة:

لا يرشد المرشد إلا إذا كان عالماً بما يرشد إليه، خبيراً بحالة من يرشده. فالعلم أمام العمل والعمل تابع له. فقد قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام، [لا ينبغي للرجل أن يأمر بالمعروف وينهى عن المنكر حتى تكون فيه خصال ثلاث: رفيق بما يأمر وينهى، عالم بما يأمر وينهى، عدل فيما يأمر وينهى]^(٣٦).

ومن العلم سعي المرشد إلى رفع مستواه الثقافي وإلى اكتساب الخبرات المهنية، فيطلع على كل ماهو جديد في علوم الإرشاد وأساليبه وتطبيقاته، ويلتحق بالدورات التدريبية، ويحضر المؤتمرات والندوات، ويقوم بالدراسات والبحوث.

ومن العلم ألا يُقحم المرشد نفسه في مجالات ليس له علم بها ولا خبرة فيها، ويكفيه إذا طلب منه الإرشاد فيما لا يعلم أن يقول لا أعلم، قال عبدالله بن مسعود رضي الله عنه "أبها الناس من علم شيئاً فليقل، ومن لا يعلم فليقل الله أعلم، فإن من العلم أن تقول لما لاتعلم لا أعلم" (التووي ١٩٧٦ ص ٦٣٣).

ومن العلم أن يسترشد المرشد برأي وخبرة من هو أعلم منه وأكثر منه خبرة في الارشاد أو بالحالات التي يرشدها، قال تعالى ﴿فأَسْأَلُوا أَهْلَ الذِّكْرِ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ لِتَعْلَمُونَ﴾^(٣٧).

٤ — قاعدة الرفق واللين:

لنكن شبيمة المرشد الرفق ولين القول ، وطلاقة الوجه، وسهولة الأخلاق، عند إرشاده لغيره، فإن ذلك أسلوب بليغ في استئالة القلوب، فيقبل الناس عليه، وتنشرح صدورهم بالتفاعل معه. قال تعالى لرسوله ﴿ولو كنت فظاً غليظ القلب لانفضوا من حولك﴾^(٣٨) وقال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [إن الله رفيق يحب كل رفيق، ويعطى على المرفق مالا يعطى على التعنيف]^(٣٩).

وقال [إن الرفق لا يكون في شيء إلا زانه، ولا يُنزع من شيء إلا شانه]^(٤٠). ومن الرفق في الإرشاد سعة الصدر في التعامل مع الناس، وتيسير أمورهم وتبشيرهم بالنجاح، وتزوين الخير لهم، وإزالة الحواجز النفسية في المواقف الإرشادية، مما يسر تكوين العلاقة المهنية بين المرشد والمرشد، التي اعتبرها خبراء الارشاد مفتاح العملية الارشادية (Rogers, 1962) قال تعالى ﴿أدع إلى سبيل ربك بالحكمة والموعظة الحسنة﴾^(٤١) وقال سبحانه ﴿ولا تستوي الحسنة ولا السيئة أدفع بالتي هي أحسن، فإذا الذي بينك وبينه عداوة كأنه ولي حميم﴾^(٤٢).

ويتفق فقهاء المسلمين على أن الإغلاظ في القول لايعتبر في الارشاد لأنه يؤدي إلى تنفير

القلوب من الموعظة، وصرف النفوس عن النصيحة، لذا قال الرسول عليه الصلاة والسلام [يسرروا ولا تعسروا وبشروا ولا تنفروا]^(٤٢) وما يروى أن رجلاً دخل على المأمون فأمره بمعروف ونهاه عن المنكر، واغظ له في القول فقال له المأمون: يا هذا إن الله أرسل من هو خير منك لمن هو شر مني، فقال للموسى وهارون ﴿فقولا له قولاً لينا لعله يتذكر أو يخشى﴾ (القرشي ١٩٣٧).

ودعى ابن تيمية الى عدم تغليظ القول في الارشاد فمن الحكمة أن يكون الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر غير منكر (ابن تيمية ١٩٧٦).

ومن الرفق في الإرشاد مراعاة الفروق الفردية بين الناس في القدرات والميول والاتجاهات فيخطبهم المرشد على قدر عقولهم، ويعطيهم قدر مايطيقون، وينزلهم منازلهم، ويحدثهم بأسلوب حسن يصيب الهدف ويبلغ القصد. قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [ما أحد يحدث قوماً بحديث لا يبلغه عقولهم الا كان فتنة على بعضهم]^(٤٣). وقال أيضاً [نحن معاشر الأنبياء أمرنا ان ننزل الناس منازلهم، ونكلمهم على قدر عقولهم]^(٤٤)، وفيما يروى عن عائشة أم المؤمنين قالت: "كان كلام رسول الله كلاماً فصلاً (أي بيناً ظاهراً) يفهمه كل من يسمعه"^(٤٥).

ومن الرفق في الارشاد الصبر وكظم الغيظ وتحمل أذى الناس والصفح عنهم. قال تعالى ﴿واصبر وما صبرك الا بالله﴾^(٤٦). وقال ﴿وما يلقاها الا الذين صبروا وما يلقاها الا ذو حظ عظيم﴾^(٤٧). وقال ﴿والكاظمين الغيظ والعافين عن الناس والله يحب المحسنين﴾^(٤٨). واوصى الرسول عليه الصلاة والسلام بعدم الغضب فقد جاءه اعرابي وقال: "يارسول الله اوصني فقال: لا تغضب. فردد مراراً قال: لا تغضب"^(٤٩). وقال [من كف غضبه ستر الله عورته، ومن كظم غيظاً ولو شاء أن يمضيه امضاه ملأ الله قلبه رضا يوم القيامة]^(٥٠).

ومن الرفق تقبل أخطاء الناس، وفتح باب التوبة أمامهم، فكل ابن آدم خطاء، وخير الخطائين التوابون، فشعور الخطيء بأنه مقبول، وادراكه أن أخطائه يمكن أن يُساح عليها، عاملان هامان في إصلاحه وتوجيهه إلى الخير. قال تعالى: ﴿إن ربك للذين عملوا السوء بجهالة ثم تابوا من بعد ذلك وأصلحو ان ربك من بعدها لغفور رحيم﴾^(٥١).

ومن الرفق الرحمة بالناس، فعلى المرشد أن يكون رحيماً بمن يرشده، فقد قال رسول الله [ارحموا من في الأرض يرحمكم من في السماء]^(٥٢). وقال [من لا يرحم لا يُرحم]^(٥٣).

٥ - قاعدة حسن الخلق:

يقصد بحسن الخلق السماحة وطلاقة الوجه، وبذل المعروف، وكف الأذى (التنوي، ١٩٧٦) ويعتبر حسن الخلق كالرفق واللين من أهم عوامل إزالة الحواجز النفسية بين المرشد والمرشد مما يسهل تنمية العلاقة المهنية بينهما في مواقف الارشاد. ولحسن الخلق منزلة عظيمة. فقد قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [أكمل المؤمنين إيماناً أحسنهم خلقاً]^(٥٤) وقال ان المؤمن ليدرك بحسن خلقه درجة الصائم والقائم^(٥٥).

ومن حسن الخلق أن يكون المرشد باش الوجه، طيب الكلام، محب الخير، يؤثر الناس ويسعى إلى إسعادهم، ويمشي في قضاء حوائجهم. قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [من نفس عن مؤمن كربة من كرب الدنيا نفس الله عنه كربة من كرب يوم القيامة، ومن يسر على معسر يسر الله عليه في الدنيا والآخرة، ومن ستر مسلماً ستره الله في الدنيا والآخرة، والله في عون العبد مادام العبد في عون أخيه]^(٥٧). وجاء في شرح هذا الحديث الشريف أن من فرج عن مسلم ما أهم نفسه وغم قلبه ونفعه بما تيسر من علم أو مال أو جاه أو نصح أو دلالة على خير، أو إعانة أو وساطة أو شفاعة أو دعاء له بظهر الغيب فله أجر عظيم عند الله عز وجل (النووي، ١٩٧٦ ص ١٢٦).

ومن حسن الخلق أن يكون المرشد عفيف النفس سخياً كريماً. فقد قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [ومن يستغفب يعفه الله ومن يستغن يعنه الله]^(٥٨)، وقال: [ولا تسألوا الناس شيئاً]^(٥٩)، وقال عليه السلام للحكيم بن جزام [ياحكيم إن هذا المال خضر حلو فمن أخذه بسخاوة نفس يورك له فيه، ومن أخذه بإشراف نفس لم يبارك له فيه]^(٦٠).

ومن حسن الخلق بعد المرشد عن الشبهات ومواطن الريية فقد قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام. [إن الحلال بين وإن الحرام بين وبينهما مشابهات لا يعلمهن كثير من الناس، فمن اتق الشبهات فقد استبرأ لدينه وعرضه ومن وقع في الشبهات وقع في الحرام]^(٦١) وإذا وقع المرشد في الحرام ساءت سمعته وضاعت هيئته وفسد عمله. قال رسول الله [وإن سوء الخلق ليفسد العمل كما يفسد الخل العسل]^(٦٢).

ومن حسن الخلق أن يكون المرشد حسن المظهر، نظيف اللبس، طيب الرائحة، مقصداً في كلامه، يحفظ لسانه عن جميع الكلام إلا من كلام فيه مصلحة، ومتى استوى الكلام وتركه في المصلحة، فالسنة الإمساك عنه لأنه قد يجر إلى كلام مكروه أو غير مباح (النووي، ١٩٧٦ ص ٥٧٣).

٦ — قاعدة الأمانة في الارشاد:

يجب أن يكون المرشد أميناً في عمله، ومع من يرشدهم ومع زملائه في العمل. ومن الأمانة أن يكون صادقاً فيما يقول ويفعل، حتى يثق الناس في إرشاداته، ويطمئنون إلى نصائحه وتوجيهاته. فالصدق — كما قال الرسول الكريم — [إن الصدق يهدي إلى البر والبر يهدي إلى الجنة وما زال الرجل يصدق حتى يكتب عند الله صديقاً]^(٦٣).

ومن الأمانة التزام المرشد بمواعيده ووفائه بعهوده قال تعالى ﴿يَأْتِيهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَوْفُوا بِالْعَهْدِ﴾ لأن عدم المحافظة على المواعيد والغدر في العهود يجعلان المرشد منافقاً، لا يطمئن أحد إليه، ولا يثق أحد به. قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [آية المنافق ثلاث: إذا حدث كذب، وإذا وعد أخلف، وإذا عاهد غدر وإذا اتمن خان]^(٦٤).

ومن الأمانة أن يثق المرشد بالناس، ويطمئن إليهم، حتى يقبل عليهم ويقبلوا عليه. قال عليه الصلاة والسلام [دع مايريك إلى مالا يريك فإن الصدق طمأنينة والكذب

رية[^(١٥)].

ومن الأمانة النظام والدقة في العمل وعدم إضاعة الوقت الرسمي في غير أعمال التوجيه. فالمرشد المسلم يشعر بمراقبة الله له أينما كان قال تعالى ﴿وَهُوَ مَعَكُمْ أَيْنَمَا كُنْتُمْ﴾^(١٦).

ومن الأمانة حفظ أسرار الناس، والستر عليهم، وعدم التشهير بهم، ونصحهم في السر، قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [من نصح أخاه في السر فقد زانه ومن نصحه في العلن فقد شانه]^(١٧). وقال [من ستر مسلماً ستره الله في الدنيا والآخرة]^(١٨). وقال [من سمع الله به، ومن يُراي يراي الله به]^(١٩).

ومن الأمانة عدم تتبع عورات الناس، وعدم التجسس عليهم. فالمرشد يرشد فيما ظهر له، وما خفي عليه فأمره إلى الله، وليس من حقه أن ينتزع من المرشد اعترافات بالحيلة والخديعة، أو بالقوة والتهديد. قال رسول الله عليه الصلاة والسلام [إنك إن اتبعت عورات الناس أفسدتهم أو كدت أن تفسدهم]^(٢٠). ومن الأمانة احترام رأي المرشد، وعدم التسلط عليه، فمن حقه إذا كان راشداً أن يتخذ قراراته بنفسه مادامت مقبولة شرعاً. فقد روى ابن عباس رضي الله عنه أن امرأة تدعى بريرة جاءت إلى الرسول عليه الصلاة والسلام تطلب الطلاق من زوجها. فقال لها عليه الصلاة والسلام [لو راجعتي؟ قالت: يا رسول الله تأمرني؟ قال: انما أشفع. قالت: لا حاجة لي فيه]^(٢١).

ومن الأمانة الدقة في جمع المعلومات وفي التشخيص، وتحديد الخدمات التي يحتاجها الشخص، وتوجيهها إليها في الوقت المناسب ومتابعته حتى يتحقق القصد.

ومن الأمانة إذا كانت الحالة لا تدخل في اختصاصه أو لا يقدر على إرشادها أن يجولها إلى الجهات المتخصصة في الوقت المناسب.

ومن الأمانة إذا علم المرشد أن الشخص يحصل على إرشاد من جهة أخرى ألا يبدأ معه الإرشاد إلا بعد موافقة هذه الجهة.

ومن الأمانة الدقة في اختيار الاختبارات النفسية وعدم استخدامها إلا بعد التدريب والالتزام بتعليماتها في التطبيق والتصحيح والتفسير.

٧ - قاعدة تحصيل المصالح ودفع المفاسد:

يجب أن يلتزم المرشد بهدف الارشاد، وهو مساعدة الناس على تحصيل المصالح ودفع الفساد، والاصلاح بينهم، فإذا تعارضت المصالح والمفاسد - أي إذا وجد المرشد أن الخير الذي يرشد اليه سوف يجز معه بعض المفاسد، أو أن الشر الذي يوجه إلى تركه سوف يمنع معه بعض الخيرات، فيجب عليه ترجيح الراجح منها، فيرشد بما يؤدي إلى المصالح اكثر من المفاسد، ولا يأمر بعمل تكون مفسدته اكثر من مصلحته فإذا كان المعروف اكثر أرشد إليه، وإذا كان المنكر اكثر أرشد إلى تركه، وإذا كان المعروف والمنكر متساويين لا يرشد إلى أي منهما (ابن تيمية ، ١٩٧٨).

وفي ضوء هذه القاعدة يستطيع المرشد أن يتصرف في بعض المواقف الحرجة التي قد يتعرض لها في عمله. منها ماذا يفعل عندما يطلب منه رئيسه في العمل (وهو غير متخصص في الإرشاد) اطلاعه على نتائج مقابلاته مع مَنْ يرشدهم كل يوم حتى يتابع العمل أولاً بأول؟ ماذا يفعل عندما يخبره الشخص انه ارتكب جريمة؟

ماذا يفعل عندما تخبره إحدى الفتيات أن أحد معارفها قد اعتدى عليها جنسياً؟ ماذا يفعل عندما تطلب منه الشرطة الاطلاع على البيانات المتوفرة عنده عن شخص متهم في قضية؟ ماذا يفعل عندما يعلم أن أحد زملائه يمارس التوجيه ممارسات غير أخلاقية؟

الخلاصة والتوصيات

نخلص من هذه المناقشة إلى أن التوجيه والإرشاد مهنة رفيعة الشأن في الإسلام عظيمة النفع للناس في الدنيا والآخرة. لذا وجب على أولى الأمر تعيين المرشدين النفسيين والمهنيين والتربويين لإرشاد الناس إلى ما يفيدهم ولا يضرهم، ويساعدهم على الالتزام بشرع الله، فيسعدوا في الدنيا والآخرة.

ولكي يؤتي الإرشاد ثماره، ويحقق أهدافه، يجب أن يتصدى، ويتولى مسئولياته نفر عندهم الاستعداد له، والرغبة فيه، والعلم بعلمه، والخبرة بفنونه، والالتزام بأخلاقياته. ويرتّب على هذه الخلاصة بعض التوصيات نوجزها في الآتي:

(١) ضرورة التوسع في تعيين المرشدين التربويين والمهنيين والنفسيين في المدارس والمصانع، ومراكز التدريب ودور الرعاية الاجتماعية ومراكز رعاية الأسرة والأمومة والطفولة ورعاية الشباب وغيرها. امتثالاً لأمر الله تعالى في الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر والإصلاح بين الناس.

ونحن نلمس التطور السريع في أساليب وبرامج التعليم والتدريب والتأهيل، والتغير الكبير الذي طرأ على الحياة في مجتمعاتنا، والمؤثرات الثقافية التي باتت تعصف بعقولنا وقلوبنا مما جعل كل شخص في حاجة إلى مَنْ يساعده على اختيار أسلوب حياته، ويرشده إلى ما يحميهِ من المشكلات، ويهديه إلى ما يصلح دنياه وآخرته.

(٢) إيجاد الأساليب المناسبة لاختيار المرشدين الصالحين في إرشاد الناس، وتشجيع مَنْ تتوفر عنده الاستعدادات لمهنة الإرشاد على التخصص فيها.

(٣) إيجاد البرامج العلمية والعملية لإعداد المرشدين على مستوى الدراسة الجامعية الأولى والدراسات العليا، فالإرشاد علم وفن لا يقدر عليه إلا من امتلك ناصية علومه وفنونه.

(٤) إدخال دراسة العلوم الشرعية في برامج إعداد المرشدين على المستويين الجامعي والدراسات

العليا، لتنمية القصد الاسلامي للإرشاد عندهم، ومساعدتهم على معرفة أحكام الله فيما يرشدون اليه وينهون عنه. فالمرشد المسلم يجب أن يتفقه في علوم دينه بالقدر الذي يمكنه من تنمية الحاجة إلى الدين وزيادة الايمان عند من يرشده.

(٥) وضع برامج منتظمة لتدريب المرشدين التربويين والمهنيين والنفسيين قبل الالتحاق بالعمل وأثناء ممارسة العمل، لزيادة خبراتهم وتجديد معلوماتهم، فمهنة التوجيه والإرشاد مهنة نامية متطورة.

(٦) تشجيع الدراسات والبحوث في مجالات التوجيه والإرشاد، وتمويل برامج إعداد الاختبارات النفسية والتربوية والمهنية التي يحتاج اليها المرشدون في عملهم.

(٧) تنظيم مهنة الارشاد في المجتمعات الاسلامية، ووضع المعايير التي تحدد مؤهلات المرشد وحقوقه وواجباته الوظيفية، ومسئوليته الاخلاقية في ممارسة المهنة، حتى يمكن تمييز المرشد الكفاء من غير الكفاء، وتشجيع الكفاء على الاستمرار في الإرشاد، ومنع غير الكفاء من الإرشاد لأنه يفسد أكثر مما يصلح.

فنحن نعتقد أن مهنة الإرشاد كمهنة الطب لايمارسها إلا أشخاص على مستوى معين من التخصص العلمي والفني. فإذا كان الطب لعلاج الأجسام وتنميتها، فالإرشاد لاصلاح النفوس وتركيبتها، والعمل في إصلاح النفوس أكثر أهمية من إصلاح الأجسام.

(٨) تكوين فريق من المتخصصين في علم النفس الإرشادي والشريعة الإسلامية، للقيام بدراسات حول بعض المسائل العلمية والعملية في الإرشاد الإسلامي، والتي أثارها الدراسة الحالية، ولم تجب عليها ونطرح هذه المسائل في صيغة أسئلة من أهمها الآتي:

أ — كيف نختار طلاب تخصص التوجيه والإرشاد على مستوى الدراسة الجامعية والدراسات العليا؟ وماهي المحكمات والأدوات المناسبة لذلك.

ب — ماهي العلوم الشرعية التي يجب أن يدرسها طلاب تخصص التوجيه والإرشاد على مستوى الدراسة الجامعية والدراسات العليا؟

ج — هل يحتاج المرشد الجامعي إلى اشراف علمي وفني في ممارسة التوجيه والإرشاد؟ ومانوع هذا الاشراف؟

د — ماهو الفرق بين ممارسة من يحمل مؤهل جامعي في الإرشاد ومن يحمل مؤهلات عليا في الإرشاد (دبلوم — ماجستير — دكتوراه) من حيث نوع ومستوى الخدمات الإرشادية؟

هـ — ماهي واجبات المرشد من الناحية الشرعية في المواقف الحرجة التي تواجهه في عمله؟ من هذه المواقف: عندما يُخبره من يرشده بجرمة ارتكباها، أو يطلب منه رئيسه في العمل الاطلاع على المقابلات التي يجربها مع من يرشده، أو تطلب منه الشرطة الاطلاع على البيانات والمعلومات التي لديه عن شخص متهم في قضية وغيرها.

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 - (٢) رواه مسلم.
 - (٣) سورة المدثر : ٣٨.
 - (٤) سورة الأنفال: ٢٥.
 - (٥) رواه أبو داود.
 - (٦) سورة آل عمران: ١٠٤.
 - (٧) سورة النساء: ١١٤.
 - (٨) سورة التوبة: ٧١.
 - (٩) سورة العصر.
 - (١٠) رواه مسلم.
 - (١١) سورة آل عمران ١٠٤.
 - (١٢) رواه أبو أحمد.
 - (١٣) رواه مسلم.
 - (١٤) سورة الأنفال: ٢٥.
 - (١٥) سورة
 - (١٦) سورة الفرقان: ٢٣.
 - (١٧) يقصد بالارشاد الدينى **Religious Counseling** فى المجتمعات التى تفصل بين الدين والدنيا — عمليات يقوم بها القسيس لمساعدة الشخص على تصحيح اخطائه والتطهر من ذنوبه والتخلص من آثامه وتشجيعه على تنمية عقيدته وتقوية الروابط بينه وبين ربه حتى يحبه الله ويحبه الناس ويعتق ذاته دينياً. **Self-actualize religiously**.
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 - (٢٠) من حديث طويل رواه الطبرانى.
 - (٢١) سورة الحج: ٤١.
 - (٢٢) سورة المدثر: ٣٨.
 - (٢٣) سورة فاطر: ٣٨.
 - (٢٤) سورة النحل: ٤٣. والأبياء: ٧.
 - (٢٥) سورة البقرة: ٢١٦.
 - (٢٦)
 - (٢٧) يتفق فقهاء المسلمين على ان الجاهل ان خاض فيما لا يعلمه كان مايفسده اكثر مما يصلحه، قالوا: العامى لا يحتسب الا فى الجليات. لمزيد من المعلومات يرجع الى: القرشى، محمد بن محمد بن احمد — مالم القرية فى احكام الحسبة عني بنقله وتصحيحه روين ليوي. كمبرج: دار الفنون، ١٩٣٧.
 - (٢٨) رواه أبو داود.
 - (٢٩) رواه مسلم.
 - (٣٠) متفق عليه.
 - (٣١) سورة الأحقاف: ١٣.
 - (٣٢) سورة النحل: ٩.
 - (٣٣) رواه مسلم.
 - (٣٤) سورة الصف: ٢، ٣.
 - (٣٥) رواه البخارى.
 - (٣٦) رواه الديلمى: تضمن حديث الرسول ثلاث قواعد فى الارشاد هى الرفق والعلم والعدل وقد تناولنا موضوع العدل فى قاعدة الاستقامة وسوف نتناول الرفق فى قاعدة الرفق واللين.

- (٣٧) سورة النحل: ٤٣.
- (٣٨) سورة آل عمران: ١٥٩.
- (٣٩) رواه مسلم.
- (٤٠) رواه مسلم.
- (٤١) سورة النمل: ١٢٥.
- (٤٢) سورة فصلت: ٣٤.
- (٤٣) رواه ابو داوود.
- (٤٤) متفق عليه.
- (٤٥) رواه ابو داوود.
- (٤٦) رواه ابو داوود.
- (٤٧) سورة هود: ١١٥.
- (٤٨) سورة فصلت: ٣٤، ٣٥.
- (٤٩) آل عمران: ١٣٤.
- (٥٠) رواه البخاري.
- (٥١) من حديث طويل رواه الطبري.
- (٥٢) سورة.
- (٥٣) رواه البخاري.
- (٥٤) رواه الطبراني.
- (٥٥) رواه الترمذي.
- (٥٦) رواه أبو داوود.
- (٥٧) رواه مسلم.
- (٥٨) حديث طويل متفق عليه.
- (٥٩) حديث طويل متفق عليه.
- (٦٠) من حديث طويل متفق عليه ويعني ان من جمع المال دون طمع وبلا شره بآرك الله له ومن جمع المال عن طمع وتطلع وجشع لم يبارك الله له فيه.
- (٦١) حديث طويل متفق عليه.
- (٦٢) حديث طويل رواه الطبراني.
- (٦٣) متفق عليه.
- (٦٤) متفق عليه.
- (٦٥) رواه الترمذي.
- (٦٦) سورة الحديد: ٤
- (٦٧) رواه
- (٦٨) رواه مسلم.
- (٦٩) متفق عليه.
- (٧٠) رواه البخاري.
- (٧١) رواه أبو داود ، والدارمي ، وابن حنبل.

VI
ANTHROPOLOGY

**Western Anthropology:
A Critique of Evolutionism**

Muhammad Ma'rūf

Western Anthropology: A Critique of Evolutionism

Muhammad Ma'ruf

An Overview

The scope of this chapter is determined by specifications suggested in steps 1 and 2 of al Fārūqī (1982). However, this chapter is not so much a survey of the entire discipline of anthropology as it is of the various uses of evolutionary theory by anthropologists. As such it is a survey of evolutionary anthropology, one of many schools of thought discernible in contemporary Euro-American anthropology (see Mauroof 1980a, b).

This chapter contains summaries of the uses of evolutionism in anthropology. The resulting formulation is intended to be a step toward a deeper analytical study. Such a step is required before an Islamic examination of anthropological evolutionism may be initiated. If serious attention is paid to Islamization issues, the result will be a fresh synthesis of anthropological evolutionism, unlike introductory pieces on aspects of evolutionary theory to be found in Western anthropology textbooks. Such a synthesis should provide a perspective on the program of evolutionist discovery as practiced in a wide ranging field. In this preliminary presentation, however, I have restricted myself to providing summaries of only some of the significant uses of evolutionism, in an effort to share a view of how a critical synthesis, useful for Islamic educational concerns, may be developed.

It is important to emphasize that anthropology is not much more than evolutionist humanism. Evolutionism as contained in several contemporary anthropological studies, as either a central or a marginal issue, is clearly axiomatic to thought, analysis, and interpretation in anthropology. As such it is taken here to be a fundamental issue in the consideration of the discipline of Western anthropology for inclusion in and recasting for Islamic educational purposes. Evolutionary study is a consistent theme in the history of Western

anthropology. It is a fundamental idea of the discipline, so much so that if one were to remove its permutations in the various subfields of anthropology, one would be left with a large number of different mini-fields of inquiry without any internal connection. They would then have to seek a connection, as some sub-specialties have done, with some other social science or humanities field. But these other fields of Western thought, with a few exceptions, by their subscription to the world view of the scientific and educational establishment of the West, presuppose the axioms of evolutionary theory and seek leadership from anthropology (among other fields) for guidance in this regard. It would be a mistake for those who are looking at anthropology from the perspective of understanding the wider implications of Western thought to ignore the place of evolutionary theory in it. The debates of the professionals within the discipline cannot be accurately fathomed without understanding the tenets of the protagonists and antagonists of various segments of the development of evolutionary theory over time.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, soon after Charles Darwin's and Alfred Russel Wallace's initial publications of evolutionary postulates, anthropologists, who are now, by and large, vociferous advocates of the evolutionist position, were hesitant in accepting it (see Stocking 1968, p. 46). During the intervening period, evolutionary theory has been refined and developed by virtually all life science disciplines and some other disciplines, such as anthropology, that are grounded partly in the life sciences and partly in the social sciences. The theory has thereby gained wide acceptance in all sectors of the Western scientific establishment. Adherence to and propagation of an evolutionist worldview has become a symbol of the liberalist mission of Western science in the face of periodic opposition from conservative evangelical Christians and the politicians who represent them. A few of the anti-evolutionists are also scientists. They have given leadership to the most recent form of opposition to evolutionism, called scientific creationism. Within the scientific and educational community, their present view is, at best a minority view, the dominant view being the pro-evolutionary one. Surveys among the Judaeo-Christian population in the United States indicate that about half of the people give credence to the evolutionary view and the other half do not.

Mutation, Selection, and Evolution

The theoretical position that evolutionists have developed in the life sciences is most appropriately seen as a way of explaining the observed diversity of life forms and the emergence or origin of new species and varieties. The position that the evolutionists have taken has roots and consequences in Western science as well as ideology. The initial results of the scientific adoption of

this position in the West during the nineteenth century changed entirely the criteria by which the ancestry and age of the world and of life forms within it were to be subsequently known (Eiseley 1958; Simpson 1960). The world, and man within it, were no longer seen to have been created during a period of six days in 4004 B.C., as the archbishop of Canterbury had decoded the chronology of the Book of Genesis. For the first time in the West, the world began to be seen as a product of millions, and according to most recent calculations, of billions of years of gradual evolution. Prior to evolutionary explanations, the received explanation for changes in the forms and distribution of life forms was that they were the result of huge natural calamities, such as the flood that is reported to have taken place at the time of Noah (*alaihi Salem*). The discovery of fossils of extinct marine life on top of mountains, for instance, was explained as remnants of what was washed ashore at the time of the great deluge, which the Church believed encompassed the whole earth. The evolutionary position, in some of its recent statements does not preclude natural calamities, but it also emphasizes that the time framework that biblical history posits for the development of life forms is insufficient to cover the development and extinction of all the life forms to which fossil record attests and that millions of species of life forms have become extinct through entirely natural and gradual processes. The acceptance of the notion of geologic time (Newell 1964) and the doctrine of geological uniformitarianism heralded the opening of a gate to the understanding of the earth, its environs, and its inhabitants as natural systems, changing throughout history under the action of the same observable and quantifiable material forces.

Charles Darwin's major contribution to biology (Darwin 1958 [1859]), which was influenced by the advances in geology, was the convincing way in which he attempted to demonstrate the action of material forces on organic life forms. His emphasis was on the explanation of the multitude and endurance of distinct species of animals and plants. He demonstrated the existence of a pattern of natural selection of organic life forms for survival in specific environment and sought to explain the causation of the diversity of species of life forms as due to the nature of selective processes. In the subsequent development of the theory of natural selection, problems of the origins of life have come to be seen as, in effect, the same as problems of the origins and maintenance of the diversity of species. Darwin himself stayed away from attempting to explain the origins of life itself. Although in several later works (e.g., 1871, 1965 [1872]) he attempted to show the application of principles of selection upon human behavior and physical characteristics, he did not delve as deeply into problems of human origin or evolutionary diversification as he did for nonhuman species. The speculations of contemporary evolutionists, strengthened by the creation of bacteria and other life forms in the laboratory, assume that organic evolution (as distinct from inorganic evolution such as

of the stars and elements) is a completely general principle of life as applicable to Drosophila as it is to Hominoidea. In such a view there is no special status for man other than his definition as a distinct species of animal. There are numerous unanswered questions that arise from such an assumption even from the point of view of evolutionary theory. However, the general theory is assumed to hold in the absence of any other equally or more cogent explanation. The answering of the remaining questions is seen to be entirely a matter of time and work toward validating the theory through the improvement of techniques and methods of study. Even a cursory glance at the anthropological literature on the debates regarding the application of evolutionary theory to human history and contemporary affairs, segments of which will be reviewed in this chapter, would reveal that there is nothing even approaching consensus of scientific opinion on the specifics of the issues involved. However, the pursuit of the debate is in fact evidence of the continued subscription of anthropologists to evolutionary theory and of the strain to emulate the methodologies and prestige of the evolutionary model for the systematic investigation of the nature, history, and characteristics of the distinct species of animal called the human being.

Even though there are disagreements in the application of evolutionary principles for the interpretation of nonhuman life forms also (see, e.g., Gould 1980), there is widespread consensus on basic structures and principles. Familiarity with the basic biological evolutionary theories is necessary for a proper understanding of the ways in which such theories are applied to the study of human phenomena. As such, a brief sketch of the fundamental principles of general and specifically physical anthropology (see e.g., Dobzhansky, 1962) is provided here:

1. Contemporary discussions of the theory of evolution attempt to incorporate developments coming out of *mutation theory* owing their origin to the discovery of genetic transmission of physical characteristics through the reproductive process to *selection theory* on which the earlier Darwinian evolutionary theory was based.

2. Heredity in each individual instance is governed by genetic systems. They are composed of genes and chromosomes, separable and interacting in complex ways. The processes of sexual reproduction effect a diffusion of genes, their combinations into chromosomes and combinations of chromosomes, across populations within which reproduction takes place. As such, random variation of characteristics is maintained in succeeding generations of populations. Although each individual inherits a different assortment of genetic characteristics from his or her parents, the total genetic inheritance of the whole population remains stable and varied.

3. A change in this regular pattern occurs when there is a mutation which in the broadest sense may affect individual genes, chromosomes, or com-

binations of chromosomes. Mutations, that is, alterations of the genetic material, may result from various forms of physical and chemical interference at the subcellular level. In recent times mutations caused by radiation have become widely known. Such changes cause entirely new processes of variation within the genetic system, as well as in regard to the survival chances of the offspring containing the mutations in the population.

4. A population or a species, for the purposes of evolutionary study, is a reservoir of genetic information—a gene pool. It is composed of similar animals that breed among themselves. At the genetic level the composition includes the total of genetic units that the individuals in the population have inherited and the distribution of combinations of such units.

5. Evolutionary changes observed to be taking place in successive generations of populations (see Dobzhansky 1950 for good illustrations) are changes that originate in an individual but endure so that they alter the genetic pool. Such alterations may arise out of mutations, fluctuations in the frequency of genetic units and combinations of units, and by differential reproduction.

6. Differential reproduction is the tendency of individuals with certain genetic characteristics to consistently multiply at a faster rate than those without those characteristics. The advantage of differential reproduction is effective because it tends to be adaptive. The adaptive advantage is the sum of the concept of natural selection.

7. Evolution through natural selection is not necessarily directed toward better or higher forms. The fossil record testifies to the immense number of species that became extinct—many more than the number that have survived and evolved. Newell (1967, p. 37) estimates that approximately 2,500 families of animals have been tracked by the study of fossils. Of these only a third are still living. A majority of the others dropped out of sight, leaving only a few to evolve into new families. Cockroaches and amoeba, along with man, were selected to survive but not the dinosaurs.

The picture of man that emerges out of the pages of anthropological literature is painted on an evolutionary canvas. Human history is inextricably linked to the history of all organic life. The biological aspects of the linkage are supposed to show the specifics of relationships at the genetic and anatomical levels. From an anthropological point of view, what remains to be done now is to study the ways in which man is unique: ways in which he has changed to evolve as a cultural and moral being as well as a biological organism. The principal instrument of human adaptation is culture. Culture is not acquired or transmitted through genes. Very complex human communication systems transmit cultural information. However, the study of the nongenetic transmission or inheritance of culture cannot be separated entirely from genes as it is in fact genetically based.

The anthropological usages of evolutionism to be discussed below, the distinguishing characteristic of which is the attempt to combine the study of organic and cultural evolution, need to be viewed against the conceptual background of organic evolutionary theory all too briefly sketched above. The Western anthropological program assumes the possibility of the combination of the physical portion of human history, that is, the history that may be culled from bones, genes, and the like, and the history that is to be learned from the record of political, social, and intellectual achievements. The uniqueness of anthropological concepts, techniques, and methodologies among the social sciences derives from this holistic assumption. The nature of anthropological data, a significant portion of which is obtained from small socioeconomic units such as tribes and villages which are assumed to be self-contained and isolated and thereby available as a whole to the anthropologist for study, has made such an assumption seem not unreasonable. The results of the use of the idea of human evolution interpreted and employed by different schools of Western anthropology may be segregated into those that are related to human biology and those that are related to human society and culture. While we recount these separately, we must not lose sight of the fact that, historically, it is the unified approach to human biology and culture that made the anthropological contribution sensible and that it is the adoption of a basic evolutionary framework that seems to have made it possible for anthropologists to even imagine the possibility of a combined approach.

Human Biology

The early stages of the development of physical or biological anthropology were characterized by a preoccupation with the measurement and typological classification of physical differences among human beings. The object of such studies, apparently, was the discovery of races, and the racial diversity of human beings. These studies were limited by the problems of typology characteristic of pre-Darwinian biology. Elaborate taxonomies of human races had been developed even before Darwin. The continuation of such studies after Darwin contributed to the development of scientific racism. At the time of their introduction, Darwinian evolutionary postulates ran counter to notions advanced by some anthropologists in regard to whether the different "races" and colors of humankind were the products of a single ancestral stock or of several. The issue, referred to in the literature as the debate between the monogeneticists and the polygeneticists, had implications for physical as well as cultural evolutionary theory and for racism. No answer for this problem has been arrived at to alter racist prejudices. However, anthropologists are now agreed on the need to base their resolutions on firm evolutionary principles.

Many contemporary anthropology textbooks contain some discussion of issues in human racial taxonomy. Such recent discussions, influenced in part by modern genetics as well as sociopolitical realities, vehemently protest racism.

Mendelian genetics, on which the modern form of evolutionism rests, quickly transformed the principles of the anthropological study of human variation. Anthropologists have found extensive use for the application of the principles that Mendel discovered. Working with human populations from all over the world anthropologists are now able to document patterns of human physical variation at the genetic level which can be tested under laboratory conditions. The racial, and often racist, classifications of human beings of pre-Mendelian times have now become merely a chapter in the history of physical anthropology. The present-day emphasis on tracking genotypic variations have led to some very interesting studies of previously unrecognized relationships between social and cultural environments, on the one hand, and human physiological processes, on the other. Such relationships are seen to be unrelated to conventional sociological categorizations of race and ethnicity.

A good illustration of such studies is provided by the study of the relationship between the sickle-cell gene, *falciparium malaria*, and agricultural practices that encourage the multiplication of malarial mosquitoes (see Allison 1956). Sickle-cell anemia is a fatal inherited disease. The first systematic documentation of its occurrence among U.S. blacks was done at the turn of this century. As it is a deleterious genetic mutation, questions regarding how the mutant gene has survived at all have been raised by physiologists, anthropologists, and several others. The question is particularly pertinent in regard to West African populations where the incidence of the sickle-cell trait is in some cases as high as 40 percent. The evolutionist laws of survival, mutation, adaptation, and selection provide the answer. Allison and others have demonstrated that while the sickle-cell disease is fatal, carriers of the trait for the disease, that is, those who have inherited a sickle cell gene from one parent and a normal gene from the other, are relatively resistant to malaria. Malaria is endemic to agricultural regions where certain methods of irrigation conducive to the malarial mosquito are practiced. In portions of West Africa, southern Italy, Sicily, Greece, Turkey, and India the persistence of the gene in human populations could be explained in terms of normal evolutionary laws. Allison also shows how the decreasing incidence of the trait in the nonmalarial North American environment is in fact an example of microevolution taking place within full view of modern science bespectacled with the understanding of evolutionary principles.

Human breeding populations that are the operational units of the study of such evolutionary processes are usually defined as micro-populations; they have no necessary connections with groups that speak the same language or

share the same cultural traditions. Where such reproductively isolated groups have been found, they have provided data for the understanding of the ways in which physical and biological processes interact with attitudinal and cultural processes within the same natural system. Quite often the combined social and biological study of such systems conducted within an anthropological framework have provided a basis for the articulation of findings on significant human hereditary characteristics within general evolutionary theory. The contemporary anthropological position on human races summarized above is one of them. Similar works (see, e.g., Dobzhansky 1962; Campbell 1976) clarify the genetic basis of human variation and associated concepts such as that of human reproducing populations. Theoretical advances in this branch of evolutionist anthropology could be said to have rescued anthropology from the previous vain attempt to identify distinct, phenotypical, pure racial types among humans. Whether such increase in knowledge has affected human racist ideologies and attitudes is, of course, quite another question.

The genetics-based study of human breeding populations is usually concerned with micro-evolutionary processes. The greater and more picturesque part of biological anthropological textbooks, however, concern anthropological findings on macro-evolution. I am referring here to the study and interpretation of the fossil record. The study of fossilized bones, some of which were believed to be those of primate ancestors of the human being, was also a part of the beginning of studies that have now evolved into biological anthropology. The study of the primate ancestry of the modern human and the evolutionary stages that have been completed in the evolutionary process, said to have intervened between the ancestor and the descendant, is still an important segment of the study of humanity in anthropology.

This aspect of the study of human evolution (see e.g., Brace 1979; Campbell 1982; *Scientific American Readings* 1967, 1972; Washburn and Moore 1974) has roots in paleontology, geology, archeology, and a number of other related fields. In fact, the training that anthropologists specializing in this subfield receive parallels the training that paleontologists, geologists, and so forth, receive. The anthropologist's task, in addition to recovering the remains of ancient and extinct beings in the most scientifically exact manner, is to attempt to interpret such evidence as it relates to the broad chronological and systematic concerns of evolutionary theory in anthropology. The achievements of this subfield are in discoveries made in the field as well as in the most engrossing laboratory task of typing and classifying the finds as belonging to this order, superfamily, family, genus, species, and subspecific category or another. Biological anthropologists in Europe, the United States, and other parts of the world have been digging in the soil, and typing, classifying, retyping, and reclassifying the meager finds that they have made in the search for the origin of man for over a hundred years now. The scientific opinion that

anthropologists have developed as a consequence of these studies aims to be an exact recording and explanation of the history of man from the very earliest stages in the phylogenetic separation of the stock that evolved into the modern human. The stage of *Australopithecus Africanus*, the stage of the famous man-apes/ape-men is now said to have been reached as early as 2.5 to 5 million years ago. There is, however, much disagreement on the classification of the reconstructed fossil remains as belonging to this or the other prehistoric population. Within the framework of these studies, such problems are expected to be resolved through further research.

An examination of the literature produced by this modern anthropological venture into the past, reveals an interesting addition to the previously noted definition of man merely as a distinct species of animal. In searching for evidence for the existence of human beings from a time for which no written or other records are available, anthropologists have had to zero in on skeletal evidence that displays human characteristics. The specification of such characteristics raises numerous philosophical as well as scientific problems in regard to the definition of fundamental and distinct human characteristics. The conventional Western anthropological attempt to resolve the scientific problems in this regard may be summarized as follows: The evolutionary processes leading up to *Homo sapiens* involve a succession of temporal species resulting from the operation of the laws of natural selection. Successive species in the sequence exhibit internal variability at every stage. Such species, unlike ancestral species of other animals, for example, horses, become increasingly generalized physiologically. Other animal species tend to become physiologically specialized in order to cope with different physical environments. In humans, the need for physiological specialization was replaced by the ability to develop cultural specializations.

Those who do not believe in the theory of evolution or are skeptical about it are tempted to ask why this should have taken place. It is important to note here that evolutionary reasoning postulates that this change into the human dimension took place entirely by chance. The chance explanation, however, is not always entirely clear in all presentations of this story. In fact, it is not uncommon to find a teleological explanation in many evolutionary speculations and reconstructions of this sort. Once the change took place in one animal by the random combination of genetic traits available at that time, in an evolutionary sense there were two possibilities. If the change provided the animal with some additional advantage over other members of its species, that is, if the change was adaptive in the environment in which it took place, the number of animals who possessed the new characteristic would gradually increase. If it did not confer any special advantages for survival it is likely that the change or mutation would have disappeared from the gene pool of that population. The reasons a genetic change would have taken place by which

cultural adaptation would eventually replace biological adaptation have to be sought in the conditions in which the change originated, not in the subsequent stage that shows the advantages of the change. Many evolutionary reconstructions in human biology as well as historical, cultural evolution do not follow this logic and tend to explain the “selection” of characteristics on the basis of a kind of hindsight. Such explanations are teleological and unsatisfactory. At the present time there are no proper explanations available for this and numerous other evolutionary changes that are said to have taken place. The answers dished out in many textbooks are clearly tautological. The persistence of the scientific search for the answer is based on the assumption that increasing the amount and nature of the relevant evidence will provide the answer.

The substance of these studies is thus empirical, not philosophical. At present the emergence of culture is thus equated with the emergence of something the evidence for which has been found to occur along with the evidence for the imputed associated anatomical changes: the use and primitive manufacture of tools. To an anthropologist, man is originally and essentially a tool maker. How else is technological Western man to define man? A number of psycho-behavioral characteristics with antecedent physiological characteristics are shown to be demonstrable. A case can then be made for a number of specialized culture-inducing physiological characteristics, the evidence for which is assiduously sought all over the world. Among the more celebrated findings of such proto-human traits are: skeletal evidence for erect posture, bipedal locomotion, an opposable thumb, and a large brain capacity. Such characteristics are considered to have developed together as part of an organized evolutionary response to the development of tool use, language, and culture.

The psycho-behavioral characteristics that are reconstructed in such studies are inferred from bone, lithic, and other fragments. Due to the impossibility of observing the actual “evolution” of such characteristics, the inferences have had to be buttressed by intricate speculations on how such behaviors may have come to be and progressed up to modern human behavior. Such speculations on “our primitive past” or “our primate heritage”—sometimes used interchangeably as categories of modern Western thought—have weaved their way into the popular literature and movies of the Western world. This new mythology attempts to provide a “scientific” substitute for the biblical story of creation and human history.

In addition, solutions to the problems created by the void in history were sought in the study of the behavior of contemporary primate and other animal species, first in captivity and subsequently, with increasing sophistication, in their natural habitats. Since the 1950s a large number of long-term, expensive field studies of animal behavior have been supported by the Western scien-

tific establishment. Some of these studies have proceeded from assumptions resulting from the interpretations of fossil finds. Almost all of them have implications for the interpretation of fossil finds. Devore (1965), Barkow (1978), and others have attempted to specify the roots of human behavioral organization. Such attempts are part of the general anthropological tendency to seek to discover a psycho-behavioral corollary to arguments on human evolution from the combined study of ancient remains and contemporary animals.

Traditionally there have been a couple of distinct emphases in the wide-ranging primatological studies within anthropology. One of them is the phylogenetic development of primate stocks in regard to their habitats and the adaptation of their physiology and anatomy to the particular niches in which they evolved. In tracing that development, the specifics of a number of physiological and anatomical adaptations, which may be seen as crucial nodes in the development of the branch of life leading to homo sapiens, have been demonstrated to have evolved following the laws of evolution. The other emphasis has been the study of the social life—infant dependency and childhood learning, dominance and territoriality, sexual bonds, grooming, and other features—of the modern primates which has been interpreted as evidence of a rudimentary form of primate socio-political organization. Primates are taken to be descendants of the same ancestral stock from which humans evolved. Among primates, gorillas and chimpanzees are considered to be the closest to the human from the point of view of physical characteristics. Their behavioral characteristics have received the most attention from anthropologists searching for the most primitive forms of social life.

Social Darwinism

There is much to be gained from a proper understanding of the conditions that prevailed among intellectuals and in the society of Darwin's times. What Darwinian evolutionism gained from this milieu, and vice versa, raises important and controversial questions (see, e.g., Eiseley 1958; Freeman 1974; Harris 1968; Opler 1964; Reed 1961; Stocking 1968). One of the questions that historians of ideas have debated—a question significant for the relevance of evolutionism to the social sciences—is whether the trend of Darwin's biological thinking was a product of the trends of social science thought of those times. While it is not my intention to provide any simplistic answers to complex historical questions, some points relevant to the incorporation of evolutionism in social and cultural anthropology, primarily in the form of social Darwinism and cultural evolutionism, need to be briefly noted here.

It has been argued that Darwinian principles were the application of social

science concepts to biology. Darwin himself acknowledged that the Malthusian statement of the principle that human population, when unchecked, increases in geometrical ratio while subsistence increases only in arithmetical ratio influenced his idea of natural selection in its formative stages. In this sense evolutionism was an exposition of the economy of nature. Darwin received the idea of selection from the experience of animal breeders. However, his exposition of the theory of its process in nature was couched in the language of Victorian social and economic dialogue—in terms of profit, increments, persistence, diligence, inheritance, saving, utility, and progress through competition. Competition and struggle were old ideas that had been used in social and cultural studies and, perhaps more successfully during Darwin's century, in geology.

The idea of struggle, a materialist outlook, and the belief in the inevitability of progress are common to Darwinian evolutionary theory and to Karl Marx's revolutionary theory. Marx very cogently established the principles of evolution, progress, and competition among groups for sociology. To Marx the competition was for political dominance rather than for survival in the Darwinian sense. While the struggle within groups during particular historical epochs such as that of capitalism, feudalism, and primitive communism was dialectical, the progress from each of these stages of society to the other was evolutionary in the progressionist sense of that concept. Dialectical progression is not, however, dependent on Darwinian or other forms of biological evolution.

It could be said that one of the effects of the publication of Darwin's theory of biological evolution was to bring anthropology to the fore in Euro-American thought. If organic evolution had been understood, the question seems to have been, what of human evolution? How does man fit in the evolutionary sequence? The search for the answers to that question may be recounted here in terms of the work of two post-Darwinian schools of social and cultural thought: social Darwinism and cultural evolutionism. In the history of both approaches one of the effects of Darwinism was initially to coalesce the social and cultural sciences with biology. This was soon abandoned in a separation from biology so that the distinctly human sciences could develop their own form of evolutionism. But, as we will see in later sections, that separation did not last long either.

Herbert Spencer, one of Darwin's contemporaries, developed the philosophical implications of biological evolutionism, along with the notion of the inevitability of social progress, in many works that influenced the development of sociological thought. While Marx's version of evolutionism called for revolution, social Darwinism, the version that came to be associated with Spencer, was a defense of the status quo. Spencer is credited with having brought into parlance such words as "evolution" and "survival of the fittest." Darwin adopted them to describe processes about which he and other

intellectual worthies of that time seem to have been very concerned. Spencer's expositions of the evolutionary process were much more eloquent than Darwin's and aimed to establish their occurrence not just among plants and animals but at all levels of phenomena, inorganic, organic, and, most emphatically, human. Apologists for Darwin point out that Spencerian evolutionism was not the same as the Darwinian, and that the social Darwinism that developed contemporaneously with evolutionism is more appropriately described as biological Spencerism.

To Darwin, and to Darwinian biologists who carried the idea of natural selection further with the aid of the subsequently developed notion of genetic inheritance, the transmission of characteristics from one generation to the next involved only the genetic material innate to the species involved and not the characteristics that animals acquired after birth. Spencer, following Lamarck, a contemporary biologist who differed with Darwin in regard to this issue, aimed to produce a theory of social evolution in which the transmission of acquired characteristics was to be the basic premise (Freeman 1974). From the point of view of selection theory this was a fundamental error, and as such Spencerian social evolutionism was bound to flounder.

Although based on the much cited Lamarckian error and although for the present generation of social scientists only of historical interest, social Darwinism or biological Spencerism, however one wishes to label it, had an interesting history. Social Darwinism was one of the first paradigmatic reactions of the Euro-American social sciences, then barely established as academic disciplines, to the emergent triumphs of biology. It borrowed from biology notions of competitive struggle, survival of the fittest, and hereditary determinism, and attempted to employ such concepts in the interpretation of the history of nations, classes, and races. The Social Darwinists, as represented by Spencer, believed (Stocking 1968) that people's mentalities are the product of their ancestral and thereby racial history. Inherited mental traits force habits which in turn are inherited by future generations of the same race. Such characteristics as being warlike, peaceful, nomadic, commercial, slavish, and so forth, which are related to the occupations of certain races of people, have been gradually produced in the course of generations. As such it could be assumed, for instance, that the white Euro-American was cultivated by nature to rule, and that all other peoples on earth were born to serve. Each individual made certain adaptations that were then transmitted to future generations, thereby producing distinct human races. The works of many prominent Western social thinkers, such as Walter Bagehot, W. I. Thomas, and W. G. Sumner, toward establishing autonomous sociology and anthroposociology during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were based on such assumptions and concentrated on race formation and mental evolution as problems for which they would provide answers.

The Social Darwinists did not get very far in their pursuits partly because Lamarckianism, the inspiration for their intellectual precursor Herbert Spencer, came to be increasingly questioned by biologists. Within American sociology the environmentalists reacted against the biological determinism and conservatism of the Social Darwinists. Cultural anthropologists began to shift interest toward defining culture as an independent variable undetermined by, perhaps even unrelated to, biology. The reaction in American anthropology in the hands of Franz Boas went full swing the other way in discrediting the evolutionist approach altogether. Anthropology was to study the cultures and physical types of individual tribes and other social entities and eschew theoretical considerations, evolutionist or otherwise, involving the totality of human civilization. In "The Superorganic" (1917), a famous critique of the Social Darwinistic social psychology of Gustave Le Bon, who had argued that Napoleon's genius and prowess were caused by the nature of the French race, Boas's student Alfred Kroeber signaled the breakaway of social and cultural anthropology, and thereby of sociology and social psychology, of the social psychology, from the biological determinism of the Social Darwinists. During the early decades of the twentieth century the modern American concept of "culture," seen as a learned and not an inherited property, was inserted in place of the old idea of "race temperament." At about the same time American social scientists began to argue against the innate superiority or inferiority of any of the human races, and biologists in the United States and Europe were rejecting Lamarckianism. Without Lamarckianism the relevance of evolutionary theory to society and culture seemed more and more remote. But for some notable Marxist exceptions, perhaps even due to them, evolutionism did not become prominent again in Euro-American social and cultural theory until about the middle of the twentieth century. Social Darwinism did not evolve in the sense that it did not produce viable offspring. Evolutionism, however, did not get all burnt out, as we shall soon see.

Cultural Evolutionism

The contemporaries of Charles Darwin—such as Edward Tylor, Lewis Morgan, John Lubbock, and James Frazer—to whom the beginnings of Euro-American anthropology are usually traced, were social/cultural evolutionists. Among them, Tylor more than the others is credited with having fashioned the humanist conception of culture into an anthropological one. In doing so he began the process of attempting to meet the challenge of the questions regarding human evolution that were being raised by the public discussion of Darwin's work. Tylor's answer was an evolutionist theory of the origin and develop-

ment of culture, in which was also implied a theory of the evolution of the human mind.

Progressionism was a main ingredient of Tylor's theory, as it was of other cultural evolutionary theories of that time. Tylor was quite explicit about formulating his argument in the context of the progressionist versus degenerationist debate of the times. Even before Darwin, the Victorian gentlemen of the time were engaged in the discussion of how the "savages" that the British imperial military and trading apparatus encountered all over the world had come to be. The degenerationists, prominent members of the ecclesiastical establishment among them, were of the opinion that the contemporary savages had degenerated from an original higher culture that had been conferred upon man by God. The argument against this position by Tylor and other early anthropologists was partly aimed at this assertion itself but also, and more significantly, against the assertion that since savagery was a product of divine actions a study of it based entirely on rational and historical premises could not be undertaken.

Tylor's evolutionism, emphasizing progress rather than degeneration, was born out of the effort to establish such a program of study. His method was to start with the civilized European and deduce the general principles with which that state had been reached from a savage or possibly still lower state. His polygenetically-oriented conclusions, based on the study of "useful arts"—a concept that dominated his view of culture—were that while there had been local degeneration among some tribes, on the whole the history of mankind had been a history of progress. In several scholarly exchanges with the degenerationists, Tylor, Lubbock, and others established the evolutionist assumption that human history is part and parcel of natural history and that human life is governed by natural laws in the same way that organic and inorganic matter are operating according to laws discernible to science. As such social, psychological, and cultural entities including religious phenomena were to be studied using the methodology of the newly emerging social and cultural anthropology.

Tylor's contributions to such studies laid the foundation for much of what was to transpire in the field. He outlined a sequence of human cultural development and sought to explain the processes by which such development or evolution took place. His sequences, for example, in religion, were such complexes as: animism, animatism, polytheism, monotheism. His processes were combinations of rather vaguely defined processes of invention and cultural borrowing. The rudimentary nature of such concepts and, from the perspective of present-day anthropology, their insufficiency to explain cultural evolution are really not as important as the fact that he made it possible for later scholars to pursue lines of cultural evolutionary inquiry. His methodology was also marked by the attempt to analyze culture by first subdividing it into discrete

elements that might be classified and compared outside their specific cultural contexts and then rearranged in stages of probable evolutionary development. The “comparative method” so envisaged has stayed, in its various later forms, with anthropologies of the evolutionist as well as nonevolutionist schools. Tylor was quick to see that the evidence that archeologists were then digging up on past culture would provide an even more natural historical basis for his enterprise. This idea has also stayed with cultural evolutionist anthropology ever since.

Lewis Morgan was Tylor’s American contemporary and fellow cultural evolutionist. The criticism of Morgan’s work may have been influenced by the perception of Morgan’s guilt by association with Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, who based a major portion of their accounts of pre-capitalist social formations on Morgan’s evolutionary reconstruction of “ancient society.” Unlike Tylor, Morgan had the opportunity to observe directly the workings of a “savage” society, that of the Iroquois who were living on a reservation not far from his home in Westchester County in New York. He developed a sequence of civilizational development of much greater detail than Tylor’s. The sequence had three stages of savagery, characterized by the achievement of language, the use of fire, and hunting with bow and arrow and the manufacture of pottery; three stages of barbarism, beginning with plant and animal domestication, leading to cultivation by irrigation and the manufacture of iron, and the invention of a phonetic alphabet; and a civilized stage characterized by the production of written records. The teleology of evolutionary reconstructions has been previously noted, and this one is no different. It is also important to note the materialist origin of the definition of the units by which Morgan as well as Tylor aimed to reconstruct the evolutionary development of human culture. Tylor emphasized technological achievements even though they were of a rudimentary level of development in “primitive” cultures. The Marxist use of Morgan’s research sought in it the association of typical forms of social, cultural, and ideational development with certain modes of economic activity, particularly subsistence activity.

The chief ingredient of the several versions of the theories of the early cultural evolutionists—referred to by such labels as the unilinear evolutionists or main sequence evolutionists in anthropology textbooks—was the stagelike conception of the cultural development of mankind. Underlying this theoretical stance was a kind of belief in the psychic unity of all humans. Everybody had the chance to evolve into Victorian gentlemen. Their theories aimed to show how, “from being a savage, man rose to be a Scotsman,” so to speak. The debate over the polygeneticist versus the monogeneticist theories of the origins of races—the competing physical explanations for human variation—was part of the intellectual background of this trend of early evolutionist thinking. To the cultural evolutionists, racial differences that had caused the “lower”

aces to lag behind or to get lost on the way to a civilized state were not important. The civilized state had been attained by the large-brained, white-skinned races and effectively separated them from other races. The physical characteristics of those who had reached the top of the pyramid were products of their cultural evolution. At the same time, their cultural evolution was the product of their environmentally-acquired racial characteristics.

On examination of this argument it becomes very clear that the early theories of cultural evolution, in fact, the origins of Euro-American anthropology itself, were, even if they were not designed to be, rationalizations for the sociopolitical and military position of the Euro-Americans in the world during the nineteenth century and for the continued colonization of all other peoples. The milieu of the debate on the political economy of early industrial capitalism provided Darwin with the language with which to express his findings on biological processes. The milieu of the debate over Darwin's theories provided the language for the expression of the new theories of social and cultural processes. The psychological distance separating the gorilla from the gentleman, instinct from reason, was to be bridged by the study of the evolution of savages and prehistoric man. The stages of human evolutionary development were thus crucial. They filled the gap between the end point of organic evolution, the principles of which Darwin had mastered, and the beginning point of the history of civilized man, upon which the cultural evolutionists were postulating.

The early evolutionists, unlike twentieth-century evolutionists, felt no embarrassment regarding the crassly evaluative and prejudiced assumptions that supported their hierarchical arrangement of the stages of cultural development. The hierarchy of cultures was a corollary of the progressionist argument. The achievement of cultural progress was to be studied on the basis of the evidence of the material products of culture. But values, beliefs, and morality were part of the complex whole of culture. The evolutionists differed with the degenerationists in arguing that savage culture and morality was a form, however different, of human culture and morality, and argued instead that in comparison with nineteenth-century European culture it was partial, inferior, and lower. Primitive peoples would eventually evolve to take on the same characteristics as Europeans.

Darwin, himself a progressionist, found such views quite congenial. The cultural hierarchy, of which there were many versions, some of them from such eighteenth-century thinkers as Montesquieu, and the emerging polygeneticist racial hierarchy seemed to be producing further evidence of a general scheme of organic evolution of which human history was an aspect. The native Fuegians and the animals whose observation had led to Darwin's discovery were all part of the same organic universe and were governed by the same general principles. Darwin's own studies of the behavioral

characteristics of the human species were not formulated in terms of the theory of cultural evolution (1871, 1872) but in terms of his more basic theory of biological evolution. In his later years he wrote of the defeat of the Turks at the hands of the “more civilized” Caucasians as further evidence of the way in which natural selection worked for the progress of civilization, and of the future when the “lower” races would be eliminated by the “higher, civilized” races throughout the world.

The historical conditions of the world during the latter part of the nineteenth century combined with prevalent theories of organic and human evolution, racial and cultural, to produce a hierarchical view of humanity in which “large-brained”, “white” men were the most civilized, superior to all others. Had Darwin lived into our own times and seen, for instance, that Islam, which was one of the things for which the Turks stood, was not eliminated but revitalized itself, he might have been disappointed. He might have said, as some Westerners have, that it is a “barbaric” remnant, a survival in the Tylolean sense. However, it is more likely that, as a true scientist, he would have changed his opinion of the process and course of human history. For the twentieth century has been a revelation to anthropologists in how much more complicated human evolution is than organic evolution and how elusive is its substance. The more than a hundred years of post-Darwinian development of anthropological theory in the West has been based on the criticism of the early evolutionist theories. In biological anthropology, as previously noted, the techniques of measurement by which such typologies as large and small brains were arrived at have been discredited by the results of genetic studies of human variation. The anthropological criticism of cultural evolutionist studies has had the effect of exploding myths of inherent European superiority. Adherence to social and cultural relativism, important to the philosophical basis and methodology of contemporary social and cultural anthropology, has developed in the social and cultural context of cultural pluralism, ideals of a democratic, peaceful, and just society, and in the academic context of the argument against the inherent superiority of the Caucasian races and their culture.

The enduring direct consequence of the nineteenth-century cultural evolutionist studies was the development of the study of “savage” or “primitive” cultures. Evolutionist theorizing brought primitive culture under close Euro-American academic scrutiny. Information on savagery and barbarism solved an important problem for the anthropologists of that time: establishing the “lowest limit of human existence.” Social Darwinists as well as cultural evolutionists enjoyed information that made it possible for them to deduce the principles by which their own civilization had progressed. As such the study of the nature of the primitive provides the substantial data base for the study of anthropology. Issues in the study of peoples perceived to be un- or semicivilized were heightened at the expense of others. A picture of “primitive

man" as savage, dark-skinned, and possessed of a small brain and incoherent mind had been framed in the early stages of the development of the field. As the years progressed, anthropologists worked on painting, erasing, and repainting that picture. They adulated the picture even as they created, attacked, and recreated it. It is possible that there was some idealism and romanticism in the celebration of this exotic hero. But there was also a great deal of empiricism, rationalism, materialism, and dedication to the pursuit of knowledge. Anthropological sources available at the present time probably contain more information on non-Western cultures and societies than Western language sources in any other field. The critical study of that information requires, among other things, an understanding of the evolutionist theories that provided the framework for the collection and analysis of that information.

As the discipline of anthropology progressed, the pejorative, evaluative connotations of the word "primitive" in the idea of "primitive culture" were questioned and a convention developed by which such euphemistic epithets as "simple," "small-scale," and "preliterate" were substituted for "primitive" (see discussion in Chilunga, 1976). Anthropology is now an international discipline, and many individuals born in societies that were once "primitive" objects of study are among its practitioners. The idea of social and cultural primitives as a level in the structure of an entity continues to be a basic category of anthropological thought. Totemism, for instance, a stage widely adopted by anthropologists as well as sociologists following Durkheim, is a primitive form of collective representations, the understanding of which provides to the study of the symbolic behavior of human groups an added evolutionary significance. Similar illustrations can be provided from the study of most social institutions and technological achievements of modern society. The effort to make the definition of social and cultural primitives, now no more seen only in relation to specific ethnic entities of the present or the past, less subjective and more quantitative is a key to the future implementation of the anthropological program (see Beals and Kelso 1975; Pershitz 1977, 1978).

The Continuity of Evolutionist Thought

Recent discussions in anthropology on theoretical issues such as evolutionism as well as on methodological issues pertaining to the refinement of concepts and variables have relied on increasingly rigorous techniques of data-gathering from ethnographic and linguistic field observations, biological studies, and archeology, as well as from archival and other historical sources. This contrasts significantly with the "arm-chair speculations" of the nineteenth-century anthropologists. Among the results of recent and continuing efforts

to reconcile evolutionism with other theories and approaches are to be found open-ended "interactionist" as well deterministic theories. The latter theories seek to demonstrate the determination of all relevant aspects of human culture and behavior from one set of criteria, such as the genetic or technological. The interactionist approach recognizes the mutually dependent interaction of several sets of variables, such as the social, cultural, biological, environmental, and so forth, the study of which has to be pursued separately so that a holistic synthesis may eventually come about. Both approaches recognize the relevance of the evolutionary past of the human species. Evolutionary theories have influenced all, and determined some, of the approaches to the analysis of subsets of variables in the internationalist style.

With near-unanimity, anthropologists are agreed on the distinctiveness and uniqueness of culture as the mechanism through which man progresses and evolves. This is contrasted with biologically inherited modes of adaptation and evolution in animals. As such, in an evolutionary sense culture is adaptation. The several uses of culture by evolutionary anthropologists impinge on differences in the understanding of how precisely human adaptation takes place. What the components of human culture are exactly and how they relate to the biological and environmental factors that also affect the adaptational process have been important issues in twentieth-century debates on human evolution.

Among the various schools of thought that have attempted to tackle this problem, the ecological anthropologists have at times seemed to hold the key to the identification of items of culture, discrete and indivisible, that could be used in the combined analysis of biological, cultural, and environmental factors. The return of evolutionism as a theoretical issue of major importance to anthropologists coincided with the rediscovery of anthropological ecology. Ecology, in its widest sense of the relationship of man and his environment was always present, implicitly or explicitly, in the anthropological program. However, during its initial development anthropologists allowed themselves to stray away from the central basic assumption that man could be understood only when studied both biologically and culturally. In that process they lost the concentration on environmental relationships. Steward (1955) combined ecological variables with principles of cultural evolutionism and other approaches that had been developed during the years of the anti-evolutionist reaction to produce an ambitious program for the discovery of what he thought were parallel processes of identical causation in the growth of complex civilizations from simple agricultural beginnings. He used archeological and ethnographic data derived from ancient Peru, Meso-America, Mesopotamia, China, and Egypt to test his formulations. While critics have questioned the sample he chose and thereby the level of general significance that his speculation holds, his efforts did lay the foundation for a new wave of ecological

thinking in evolutionary anthropology. Another mode of analysis of the man-environment relationship attempted to examine relationships of possible adaptation of the human body to such environmental factors as extreme cold or heat (Coon 1950). Although some regularities in the physiology of peoples living in extremely hot or cold environments were observed, nothing of causal significance was discovered. Studies furthering the ecological understanding of many kinds of man-environment relationships have continued into recent years (Bennet et al. 1975). Some studies have employed the availability of massive amounts of physical measurements of human beings to test hypotheses in regard to the relationship between human stature (height, weight) and environmental and other factors. Similar studies testing hypotheses relating adaptation to environment, particularly in regard to nutrition and disease, have received a lot of support because of possibilities for medical applications.

The ecological anthropological works attempt to examine the actual evolution of eco-systems in which human behavior is one of the factors. A major analytical problem for which such studies are still trying to find a solution arises from questions pertaining to what the systems being investigated are and how the biological, cultural, and ecological subsystems are constituted within such systems. Armed with a wealth of information, sophisticated methodologies, and computer technology and with the active collaboration of scientists trained in biology, genetics, ecology, and other sciences, ecological anthropologists have made several solid efforts aimed at understanding the complex interactions among culture, biology, and ecology. In such ecological studies the most impressive demonstrations have been made in regard to observed gene frequencies whose relationships to human adaptational consequences are clear. From the point of view of evolutionary theory such observed frequencies are the result of past selection pressures. Such studies bring widened perspectives to the understanding of historical processes in addition to their value in themselves. The study of the adaptive significance of sickle-cell anemia and its distribution noted earlier is an example. Historians have suggested, for instance, that certain ancient agrarian civilizations, dependent on tank irrigation, may have died of a causal process beginning with warfare, leading to the neglect of the maintenance of the tanks, leading to the breeding of the agent of the destruction of civilizations: the malarial mosquito. Ecological anthropologists attempt to look at such processes in the present as well as in the past. The environmental and social consequences of the introduction of pesticides such as DDT is a recent example.

As a consequence of such studies there is confirmation of a great variety in people's responses to similar environmental and technological situations. Adams, in a penetrating study (1960) of the problem that Steward had raised earlier, concluded that cultural-environmental relationships of different civilizations are preeminently a matter of independent adjustment to available con-

ditions and resources. Whether Adams Steward were wrong in their conclusions is one aspect of evaluation of such studies. The other significant aspect is that both studies originate theoretically from an evolutionary standpoint. Such studies are more than histories of the civilizations they attempt to analyze. They are comparative and attempt to find similarities in subsistence patterns, to construct ecological typologies, and to define the general observable characteristics of early civilizations. The speculations that are being tested on archeological data are derived from interactionist general anthropological evolutionary theory. Others, such as White (1959) and Harris (1968), have attempted to restate the determination of culture by factors such as energy storage and production, or efficiency of "techno-environmental" production processes.

Analyses in many studies in archeology, ethnology, linguistics, and primate behavior-testing formulations derive from anthropological evolutionary theory, and their synthesis in scholarly debate has contributed to the standardization of a tentative taxonomy of cultural evolution more diversified and elaborate than the stages of cultural evolution postulated by the early evolutionists. The worldwide variation in technologies of food production, for instance, has been typologized in terms of categories such as hunting and gathering, domestication of animals and plants, horticulture, pastoralism, nomadic pastoralism, agriculture, agri-business, and so on. The anthropological discussion of family and kinship systems is usually couched in terms of such taxonomic categories as nuclear and extended families, bilateral, unilineal, and double unilineal descent rules, tribes, clans, phratries, moieties, and so forth. The taxonomy of items of culture and social organization incorporates all known elements such as economic, social, and political organization, ideology, the arts, and language. The positive contribution of such anthropological taxonomies is that they make the naming and classification of patterns of human life, necessary for systematic comparative study, possible. Due however, to the artificiality of the concern with discovering systems for theoretical purposes not usually related to the practical everyday concerns of people, there is no consensus on how closure can be attained on taxonomic issues. As such, not much progress has been made in delineating the processes by which one system changes into another: how, for instance, the evolution from agriculture to agri-business occurs. Those who have attempted to deal with such processes have limited themselves to specifying stages conceived similarly to earlier versions. In one view (Hockett and Ascher 1964), humanity has advanced through a series of spruts: acquisition of the ability to speak, the paleolithic revolution of stone tools and implements, the neolithic revolution of the beginnings of agriculture, the industrial revolution, and so on. Of course, each of these "revolutions" took place over long periods of time. The advance that such recent segmentations of history have made over prior ones is due to the increase

in the amount, verifiability, and thereby reliability of the information that forms their basis. Among such methodological advances are techniques of dating and analyzing prehistoric materials. The increased awareness of the holistic anthropological parameters that has informed the discussion of typologies has made it possible to apply them in reconstructions or comparative studies of regional, national, or religious histories that may or may not have an evolutionary focus. An evolutionary focus centering on a hierarchical sequencing of human history in which the modern and modernized Euro-American society is at the top is, however, central to anthropological taxonomic categories. Geertz's well-known studies of Islam, looking forward to a future stage of "religionless Islam," for instance, is derived from biases traceable to such evolutionary hierarchies (cf. Al Zein 1977). The idea of progress is a significant element in the construction of such hierarchies. As such, the philosophical and historical elucidation of the Islamic idea of progress has to be achieved before or as part of the Muslim effort to adapt Western typological and taxonomic categories.

Similar problems, stemming from the nature of the original principles of the evolutionist program, arise in the consideration of the Islamic use of descriptive and comparative categories of social and cultural anthropology. The uncritical use of such categories would make Muslim anthropologists vulnerable to the criticism of selling out. The impressive and voluminous collection of facts pertaining to so many forms of social, cultural, economic, legal, and other areas of human history and civilization and its availability should, however, also be noted. In the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), for instance, all ethnographic information available up to the 1950s has been sampled, coded, sorted, and maintained in a form that facilitates the testing of hypotheses on a varied "cross-cultural" basis of data. Such sources are not entirely free from bias and other methodological problems, but they are probably more comprehensive and at least as free from bias as any other sources about the worldwide distribution of patterns of human civilizational development. Some of the hypotheses tested on the HRAF information have been evolutionary. A computer-assisted utilization of the World Ethnographic Atlas, a subsidiary product of the HRAF (Arsenberg and Lomax 1977), has attempted to classify significant sociological and ethno-musical co-variants of agricultural and pre-agricultural subsistence systems as an evolutionary model. The technical sophistication of the definition and scoring of variables in such a way as to incorporate them into an analytic computer program is noteworthy. Such a development is possible given the prior methodological advances in the anthropological collection of cultural data devoted to the cultivation of systematic thought on general evolutionary questions. The resulting typologies noted before make the encyclopedic cultural information amassed through anthropological means amenable to storage, cataloging, and program-

ming through simple filing and co-variance analysis techniques.

The anthropological attempt to fill the gap of information on humans in biological evolutionary theory, with and without the aid of techniques from biology and other modern sciences, has concentrated largely on the retrieval of information from the past or from the ethnographic present. The ethnographic present was an extension of the primitive past which, conveniently, was present in the approach of anthropological search for the meaning of Western civilization. The categories by which man was defined and his cultural products classified, were those of the present Western civilization. Ideologically, all of this effort was also a way of defining and shaping the future of that civilization which, parallel to the development of anthropology, had branched out and developed beyond the West into many parts of the world. While such evolution was obviously not monotonous but colorful, rich, and varied in pattern, the strain to find ways to bring it under monotonic control was not absent. The contemporary radical shift toward socio-biological studies represents the most recent of such attempts to establish such control.

Socio-biology attempts to apply principles derived from population genetics and evolutionary theory to the study of all social behavior in life forms ranging from the ant to the human. Socio-biologists, of whom E. O. Wilson of Harvard (1971, 1979, 1981) is the pack leader, seek to eventually practice genetic engineering on human beings. One does not need a lot of imagination to figure out who the intended engineers are and who are to be the engineered. In the socio-biological view, functional similarities in social behavior are emphasized at the expense of the contrasts among the various species in regard to the biogenetic mechanisms that serve functionally equivalent social adaptations. Sociologists also emphasize the genetic basis of all behavior to the extent of proposing the reduction of all social scientific and humanities studies to aspects of the study of genetics. Even ethical and moral choices are believed to be made according to a determinate pre-programmed genetic code to fit the survival requisites of a race, species, or generation.

The successes of the biological sciences in recent years in regard to such human problems as disease and population and in regard to the possibilities of genetic engineering that they have opened up are indeed very impressive. This success has given a new impetus to the emphasis on the biological level and thereby created this new anti-discipline of socio-biology. While the claims of this new field are somewhat extremist, it would be a mistake even for humanists to ignore the recent developments in the life sciences.

The deterministic evolutionist theories, some of them coming from biology and others from social and economic sciences, which are relatively few, may be distinguished from evolutionist approaches that have sought to establish

formal analogies between biological evolution and cultural evolution. Evolutionary formalism contrasts with ecological evolutionism in that it does not seek to establish direct adaptive relationships between man and the environment; nor does it attempt to reduce human existence to genetics as the socio-biologists want to do. Instead they see its in evolutionary theory a model that can usefully be employed for the description and comparison of socio-cultural phenomena. As such the logic and procedures of evolutionary discovery in the life sciences may be applied to social and cultural research.

Some proponents of this way of looking at cultural phenomena have attempted to use evolutionary models to examine problems of cultural origins (Diener and Robkin 1978; Diener 1980). The speculative nature of discussions of origins, particularly when historical documentation does not exist or is unknown to the researcher, vitiates such exercises. Other enthusiasts of evolutionary formalism (Bohannon 1973; 1981; Goodenough 1981) reflect the continuing anthropological preoccupation with evolutionist thought. Evolutionist thought, as has been noted before, is to the anthropologist the link between the biological and the cultural realm and in that sense the theory that holds his discipline together.

Goodenough's version of this approach is perhaps the most well thought out of them. His attempt at formulating the fundamentals of the cultural anthropological approach begins by noting the not so apparent complications that anthropologists have had to grapple with in their attempts to uncover the precise ways in which languages, cultures, and peoples relate to one another. The analysis of culture should ideally lead to a set of hierarchically ordered formal statements on the nature, content, and mutual interrelationships of the major foci of cultural anthropological study such as society, individual, culture, language, values, and beliefs. Due to the impressive strides that have been made in the study of linguistic variation, the techniques and methodology of linguistics are taken to be worthy of emulation in the description and comparative analysis of other forms of social and cultural variation. The success of comparative linguistics begins with the precision of the understanding of the formal properties of linguistic systems (phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, symbols, meaning, and so forth). The discovery of "emic" and "etic" levels in the description of languages was particularly significant.

From the point of view of achieving the natural science objective of social and behavioral sciences, namely, the description, typing, and classifying of social and cultural phenomena, the contributions of linguistics, including the analytical tool based on the emic/etic distinction are impressive. An emic (from phonemic) description is based on elements that are recognized as already being components of the system by the actors who are in it. An etic (from phonetic) description is one that is based on the conceptual constructs that the scientist makes up in order to understand the system. A human being in

the process of learning the highly complicated linguistic system into which he or she is born proceeds to acquire the ability to communicate within that system by learning a series of concepts that are recognized by others in his or her socio-linguistic group as meaningful. A linguist who sets out to learn the language goes through a process of investigation to uncover contrasts that may be employed in conceptually abstracting the elements that would contribute to learning and providing an objective description of that language. The description that he provides is intended to be valid in terms of the emic concepts of the actors from whom he has learned the language as well as in terms of phonetic abstractions that comparative linguists have developed and that have universal significance for all languages. The many useful consequences that the methodological paradigm of linguistics has had for the learning and teaching of thousands of languages imply to Goodenough and several other anthropologists that the study of all socially meaningful behavioral systems ought to be grounded in it.

The approach being recommended has many implications for the philosophical and methodological assumptions of anthropology. One approach affecting methodology would change the way in which ethnographic field work is to be carried out. More significant for our purposes is the way in which this approach provides coherence to the anthropological idea of culture by arguing that culture and language need to be studied as products of similar learning experiences, thereby providing additional substance to the evolutionist position of traditional general anthropology. It is also quite a contrast to the avid concern with human animality characteristic of some of the other forms of evolutionism.

Cultural variation, as such may be studied in a way similar to the study of linguistic variation. A language defined by the standards of modern linguistic science is clearly distinguishable from another language. The comparison of different languages, leading to the unraveling of the history and evolution of language families, is a solid achievement of recent Western science.

Socially significant variations of a language that are internal to it occur at levels that may be objectively distinguished as those of dialects and idiolects. Goodenough terms an individual's perception of a particular language or dialect as "idiolect." A language, then, is a range of variance among several idiolects that does not hinder communication. "Dialects" and "languages" are to be distinguished on the basis of the tolerance of variation for social and behavioral purposes. Such a taxonomic scheme facilitates the measurement of the linguistic behavior of peoples who live in proximity to each other regionally, historically, or socially. Field studies quantifying the variations as they are seen to occur in contemporary settings provide the basis for a framework by which the historical evolution of languages can be studied.

Goodenough sees the taxonomy of linguistic variation and the principles

of linguistic evolution as similar to the taxonomy and principles of biological evolution. Languages are like species and dialects are like subspecific units such as races. No two individuals (with the exception of identical twins) are phenotypically or genotypically the same. The same is true of idiolects. Mutual reproductive ability defines inclusiveness in a species. Mutual communicability defines membership in a group that is considered to be using the same language.

Pursuing the parallels in the principles of the evolutionary formation and structure of human biology and languages, Goodenough makes a further elaboration. The plan of speech behavior embedded in an individual has to be distinguished from his or her actual speech behavior. This distinction is significant for Goodenough's model of culture, in which culture as an inherent property embedded in an individual is distinguished from behavior and social organization as the external observable enactment of culture.

In Goodenough's model, when we speak of the language of a community we are referring to two levels of organization for communication within that community. There is the level of a collection of plans for speech available to the individuals who constitute the community. This level parallels the gene pool of a biological population and contains possibilities analogous to the various allelomorphs for each genotype. Selections from the language pool would be the parallels of the phenotypic makeup of a community. Consistent selections made by individuals over a period of time would determine the evolutionary path of the language of that community. The determination of the status of a particular pattern of language through such a selection process makes the idealization of that pattern as the language of that community possible and leads to its cultivation. Consistent selections made of variant patterns within a language determine the evolution of that and related languages. The selective process enunciated in such a theory (see also Hymes 1961) is taken to be common to language and biology. Evolutionary principles in such a view are fundamental to human biology as well as language, and Goodenough anticipated that advances in cultural anthropology will show that they apply similarly to other aspects of human behavior.

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Toward Islamic Anthropology

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I. Introduction

A. The Science of Anthropology

This study is speculative and concerns a difficult and complex subject. Its task is made more difficult as it defends a metaphysical position, advances an ideological argument, and serves a moral cause. It will therefore remain an incomplete part of an on-going process in the debate on key issues in contemporary Muslim society.

The major task of anthropology¹ – the study of man – is to enable us to understand ourselves through understanding other cultures. Anthropology makes us aware of the essential oneness of man and therefore allows us to appreciate each other. It is only quite recently in history that it has come to be widely accepted that human beings are fundamentally alike, that they share basic interests and so have certain common obligations to one another. This belief is either explicit or implicit in most of the great world religions, but it is by no means acceptable today to many people even in “advanced” societies, and it would make no sense at all in many of the less-developed cultures. Among some of the indigenous tribes of Australia, a stranger who cannot prove that he is a kinsman, far from being welcomed hospitably, is regarded as a dangerous outsider and may be speared without compunction. Members of the Lugbara tribe of northwestern Uganda used to think that all foreigners were witches, dangerous, and scarcely human creatures who walked about upside-down and killed people by magic. The ancient Greeks believed that all non-Hellenic peoples were barbarians and uncivilized savages whom it would be quite inappropriate to treat as real people. Many citizens of modern states today think of people of other races, nations, or cultures in ways not very different from these, especially if their skins are differently colored or

if they hold other religious or political faiths.

An eminent British anthropologist has noted: "When I was an administrator in Tanzania, it was widely held that Europeans were cannibals, who kidnaped African children and others and processed them for sale as tinned meat.¹¹ Some European stereotypes about Africans were no less absurd. I have heard Europeans who had lived for many years in Africa (but who had never bothered to learn an African language properly, or to get to know any Africans outside the master-servant relationship) assert that Africans are lacking in natural family affections, that they do not know the meaning of gratitude, and that their languages lack a word for "thank you."²

We will not here discuss in detail the historical development of social anthropology; full accounts are available elsewhere. But it will be easier to see why contemporary social anthropology is the kind of subject it is if we have some idea of what has led up to it. As a branch of empirical, observational science, it grew up in the context of a worldwide human interaction that has vastly increased in the past century. What is most familiar is often taken for granted, and the idea that the study of living human communities was of legitimate scientific interest in its own right became evident when detailed information began to be available about hitherto remote and unfamiliar human societies.

Initially, the reports of eighteenth and nineteenth century missionaries and travellers in Africa, North America, the Pacific and elsewhere provided the raw material upon which the first Western anthropological works, written in the second half of the last century, were based. Before then there had been plenty of conjecturing about human institutions and their origins to say nothing of earlier times in the eighteenth century. Although their speculations were often brilliant, these thinkers were not empirical scientists; their conclusions were not based on testable evidence.

Modern social anthropology owes much to these nineteenth-century scholars, in spite of their misconceptions. Although they were mainly preoccupied with the reconstruction of a past that was lost forever, they, like their successors, were interested in social institutions and the interrelations between the cultural and social institutions of different societies.

By the end of the nineteenth century a considerable amount of miscellaneous ethnographic information had been assembled from all over the world. The most celebrated collection is that of James Frazer. His compilation of religious beliefs and practices was published in several editions around the turn of the century as *The Golden Bough*. In this work Frazer collected a vast body of information about "primitive" religious and magical practices throughout the world. Like his predecessors, Frazer was mainly interested in origins, but he did claim that social anthropology (he was one of the first to apply the adjective "social" to the discipline) should seek regularities

or general laws. Like most of his contemporaries, however, Frazer was still concerned with isolated "customs," reported from various parts of the world largely by people with little or no scientific training. These "customs" accordingly were considered apart from the living social contexts that could give them their real meaning.

As the quantity of ethnographic information increased and its quality gradually improved, it began to dawn on some scholars that this material was too important to be used merely to illustrate preconceived ideas about primitive peoples or about presumed earlier stages of human society. More and more this extensive ethnography was seen to demand some sort of comparative analysis in its own right. Practical concerns stimulated this interest. Colonial administrators and missionaries began increasingly to see that their work would benefit by an understanding of the social and cultural institutions of the populations with which they dealt. Some of the best of the earlier monographs on the simple societies were written by serving missionaries and administrative officers and will be discussed below.

Aided by the colonial enterprise at the turn of the century, there began to develop a scientific concern for a systematic undertaking of first-hand field studies of human communities that had hitherto been known to scholars only through the piecemeal observations of non-professional observers. Individual field studies, a few of very high quality, had been made earlier. But it was in the early 1900s that the systematic collection of information in the field, covering a wide segment of the social and cultural life of particular peoples, came to be generally regarded as an essential part of the social anthropologist's task. An important stimulus in British anthropology was the Torres Straits expedition in 1898, in which a team of anthropologists led by A.C. Haddon undertook a comprehensive field survey of a part of Melanesia. Later, Radcliffe-Brown's study of the Andaman Islanders, undertaken before the First World War, and Malinowski's work in the Trobriand Islands of the western Pacific during World War I, became particularly important influences in modern social anthropology.

It was with the change of interest from the reconstruction of past societies to the investigation of contemporary societies that modern social anthropology began. "Primitive societies" had at last come into their own; they were no longer merely a vast storehouse from which all kinds of exotic materials could be drawn by the diligent researcher. It was now recognized that, however different they were from the familiar states of Western Europe, they were, nonetheless, systematically organized and viable communities. So, for the first time, the question arose: how are these unfamiliar social and cultural systems to be understood?

The answer was attempted by French sociological thought with its analytical, intellectualist tradition. Eighteenth and nineteenth century French

writers about human society were much concerned with the “nature” of society and of human social institutions. Their interest lay in what human society essentially is, rather than in the history of its development, either generally or in particular cases. Thus Comte, like his predecessor and teacher, Saint-Simon, was much concerned with stressing that societies are systems, not just aggregates of individuals. The French thinkers saw that if societies were systems, they must be made up of interrelated parts. They also thought that these parts must be related to one another and to the whole society of which they were parts in accordance with laws analogous to the laws of nature, which in principle at least, it should be possible to discover. So the understanding of societies, and of Society, like the understanding of the physical organisms with which they were either explicitly or implicitly being compared, was to be achieved by discovering the laws of social organization that operated to maintain the whole structure. This “organic” approach to the study of human societies has some grave limitations and can be misleading. But it did point to the important truth that the customs and social institutions of human communities are somehow interconnected and that changes in one part of the system may lead to changes in other parts. When this was understood it became possible to ask, and sometimes even to answer, questions about real human societies—questions that arose less readily so long as the “piecemeal” view of human cultures, which had hitherto been dominant, prevailed. This “organic” approach reached its most sophisticated expression in the writings of the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, who is still one of the most important influences in social anthropology.

Our concern here is to stress that the two most important strains from which the fabric of modern social anthropology is woven are the fact-finding, empirical, graphic tradition represented by British and by much German and American anthropology and the “holistic”, analytical intellectualism of French social philosophy.

Can we then, at this point, give a preliminary statement of what modern social anthropology is about? Anthropology is by definition the study of man. But no one discipline can possibly study man in all his aspects, though some anthropologists have written as though it could. On the whole, social anthropologists have concentrated on the study of man in his social aspect, that is, in his relationships with other people in living communities. The multifarious dimensions of the social and cultural life of more complex, literate societies have for the most part been left to historians, economists, political scientists, sociologists, and a host of other specialist scholars.

Of course, the anthropologist is interested in people; they are the raw material with which he works. As a social anthropologist, however, his main concern is with what these people share with other people, the institutionalized aspects of their culture. For this reason social anthropologists are not interested

in every social relationship in the societies they study; they concentrate mainly on those that are habitual, relatively enduring features of the societies in which they occur.

The emphasis today is essentially empirical and functional. Contemporary social anthropology is centrally a study of relationships among different kinds of people and, at a higher level of abstraction, of relationships among relationships. Let us make this clear. The social anthropologist is not just interested in the relationship between, for example, a particular chief and a particular subject. He is, as we have just noted, interested in the kinds of relationships between chiefs and subjects that are characteristic of the society being studied and of which the particular case is an example. Further, he is interested in the implications that the institutionalized chief-subject relationship has for other institutionalized relationships in the society, for example, the relationships between different kinds of kin or the system of land-holding.

B. Anthropology and Other Sciences of Man

Social anthropologists study peoples' customs, social institutions, and values, and the ways in which these are interrelated. They carry out their investigations mainly in the context of contemporary, small-scale communities, and their central, though not their only interest, is in systems of social relations. It is useful to say something about social anthropology's relationship to other branches of anthropology and also to certain other social sciences. In Britain the term "anthropology" loosely designates a number of different branches of study that are more or less closely associated. Thus physical anthropology, prehistoric archaeology, primitive technology, ethnology, and ethnography are usually subsumed with social anthropology under the rubric, anthropology, while sociology is not, even though its problems and methods overlap to a considerable degree with those of social anthropology. So, it is not a bit surprising that the word "anthropology" means different things to different people. Even when it is qualified by the adjective "social," anthropology still suggests to some people an interest in bones and head measurements, to others a concern with prehistoric man and his works, to yet others an obsessive interest in exotic, preferably sexual, customs.

Let us discuss briefly the present relationship between social anthropology, as the subject is understood in Britain and the Commonwealth, and some other kinds of anthropology, namely, physical anthropology, prehistoric archaeology or prehistory, ethnography and ethnology, and cultural anthropology. Then we will consider its relationship with history and psychology. Social anthropology has some concern with other branches of knowledge, too—political science, economics, human geography, agronomy, even philosophy and

theology, to name a few. This relationship is not surprising, since social anthropologists claim to take at least some account of the whole social and cultural lives of the peoples they study, and all of these disciplines are concerned with aspects of human culture. Although social anthropology often borrows from and sometimes lends to these other studies, the borderline between them and anthropology is not a matter of ambiguity or disagreement. In the case of the subjects discussed in this section, however, the link with social anthropology is not only close, but it is also often confused and sometimes disputed.

On the European continent anthropology means physical anthropology. It deals with such topics as the classification of early forms of man; the physical differences among the races of the species, homo sapiens; human genetics; and the modes of physiological adaptation and reaction to different physical environments. This study is important and interesting, but it has little to do with the analysis of peoples' social institutions and beliefs.

It is now usual, at least in Britain, to distinguish ethnography from ethnology. The term "ethnography" refers to descriptive accounts of human societies, usually of those simpler, smaller-scale societies that anthropologists have frequently studied. In this sense ethnography may be said to be the raw material of social anthropology. The term "ethnology" was formerly used as a kind of blanket term to designate almost all of the anthropological studies, including physical anthropology and prehistory. It is still sometimes so used in America and on the Continent. But British social anthropologists have found it useful to restrict it to studies of the preliterate peoples and cultures that attempt to explain their present in terms of their remote past. In this sense, ethnology is the science that classifies people in terms of their racial and cultural characteristics, and attempts to explain these by reference to their history or to their prehistory.

Nowadays a distinction is often drawn, as I have already indicated, between social anthropology and cultural anthropology. Culture has been variously defined, since Sir Edward Tylor described it nearly a century ago as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." In this broadest sense, "culture" refers to the whole range of human activities that are learned and not instinctive and that are transmitted from generation to generation through various learning processes. Often the physical products of human activity are included under the term "material culture." Thus understood, cultural anthropology obviously covers an exceedingly broad field, including practically all the non-biological aspects of human life. Men's social institutions and values, social anthropology's central concerns, occupy only a small part of this range.

To study this whole range of activity would be difficult and most British social anthropologists consider "culture" too extended a concept to be designated

a specific field for systematic study. In fact, cultural anthropology has broken down into many specialist fields such as linguistics, acculturation and personality studies, ethnomusicology, and the study of primitive art. On the whole, American scholars have laid more stress on cultural than on social anthropology, which some of them have regarded as a more restricted interest concerned mainly with "social structure." Much American anthropology is nearer to ethnology, as defined above, than it is to social anthropology as it is understood in Britain.

In America the concern with items of culture rather than with social systems may be partly due to the nature of the ethnographic material most readily available to scholars in that country. Most British social anthropology is based on field studies of people whose societies are still "going concerns," such as island populations in the Pacific and tribal societies in Africa. Until recently American researchers have had much less access to such live material. Many (though by no means all) of the North American Indian groups among which American anthropologists worked had long ago ceased to exist as viable societies, although their members often preserved extensive knowledge of their traditional cultures. In America problems of social and political organization could not present themselves with the same urgency as they did in the study of the still viable societies of Africa and the Pacific. Thus less work has been done in America than in Britain and the Commonwealth in the analysis of actual communities as working social systems, the field in which recent British social anthropology has made its main contribution.

In America cultural anthropologists emphasize the study of symbols and examine how such symbols explain individual and group behaviour in society. Clifford Geertz, one of the leading American anthropologists, writes of culture:

the concept of culture is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after, construing social expressions on their surface enigmatical.³

In contrast, British anthropology, terming itself social anthropology, looks at social structure and organization with a view to explaining society. Following is an example of how these different schools interpret the same society differently.

Clifford Geertz at Princeton and Ernest Gellner at London, two of the most prominent Western anthropologists and both leading their distinct schools of anthropology on either side of the Atlantic, have studied Moroccan society.

To the former, society is interpreted in his book, *Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society*,⁴ through the *suq* (market) and relationships that arise from transactions generated in buying and selling. The market becomes symbolic of relationships in society and helps explain larger societal behavior and society. In contrast, Ernest Gellner, who worked among the Berbers in the Atlas mountains, found social life to be organized on the basis of principles characteristic of segmentary tribal society.⁵

However significant, these differences in approach and their importance can be exaggerated. It must be remembered that for the most part they imply only a difference in emphasis. They do not, or at least they should not, imply that social anthropologists and cultural anthropologists study different subject matters. Whether the observer's main interest is in society or in culture, the reality that he observes, that is, people in relation to one another, is one and not two.

So much for the relationship between social anthropology and other kinds of anthropology. Let us turn now to its relationship with some other social sciences, first of all with history.

Historians are chiefly interested in the past, whether remote or recent; their business is to discover what has happened and why. On the whole, they are more interested in particular sequences of past events and their conditions than they are in the general patterns, principles, or laws that these events exhibit.

Although the two disciplines are different, social anthropology has a very close relationship with history in two important ways. First, an anthropologist who aims to achieve as complete an understanding as possible of the present condition of the society can hardly fail to ask how it came to be as it is. In the 1920s and 1930s some social anthropologists, reacting against the pseudo-historical hypotheses of the preceding generation, went so far as to imply that history could never be relevant for social anthropologists, whose proper concern was with structural relations, not with historical ones. Few social anthropologists today adopt so extreme an approach. Many of them have worked in relatively advanced communities that have documented histories. So, most modern social anthropologists do take account of the histories of the societies they study, where historical material is available and where it is relevant to the understanding of the present. Second, the study of social change is by definition a historical one, though it makes use of sociological categories as well. Though they are different, the aims and methods of social anthropologists and historians coincide in some degree. Historians use documentary evidence infrequently available to anthropologists, and anthropologists employ first-hand observation rarely possible for historians. Both anthropologists and historians attempt to represent unfamiliar social situations in terms not just of their own cultural categories, but, as far as possible,

in terms of the categories of the actors themselves. The main difference between anthropology and history lies not so much in the subject matter (though generally this does differ) as in the degree of generality with which it is dealt.

Social anthropology is not psychology, although, like sciences that deal with human affairs, it constantly makes use of psychological terms and concepts. Psychology is concerned with the nature and functioning of individual human minds, and although it is generally accepted that human mentality is a product of social conditioning, the study of that mentality differs in important ways from the study of the social and cultural environment that is its context.

Rather, as in the study of history, a tendency to deny that psychology can have any relevance for social anthropology is now being replaced by a recognition of the important contributions it can make to the understanding of people's social behaviour. This recognition is associated with social anthropology's concern with what people think and with their systems of beliefs, symbols, and values. The impact of Freud on social anthropology, as on human thinking generally, has been considerable, though for the most part indirect. His one incursion into anthropology, his theory of the origin of totemism, is hardly convincing, but his massive demonstration of the primacy of symbolic, irrational elements in human thought has had far-reaching influence on the subject.

In fact, every field anthropologist must be to a considerable extent a practicing psychologist. An important part of his job is to discover what the people he is studying think, which is never a simple task. Ideas and values are not given as data; they must be inferred, and there are many difficulties and dangers in such inferences, particularly when they are made in the context of an unfamiliar culture. It may well be that there is much to be learned through the techniques of depth psychology about the less explicit values of other cultures (as well as about those of our own), especially about the symbolism involved in rituals and ceremonies. But a word of warning is necessary. The incautious application in unfamiliar cultures of concepts and assumptions derived from psychological research in Western society may lead – and indeed has led – to gross distortions. The Oedipus complex, for example, is something to be proved, not assumed, in other cultures.

Social anthropologists, more than other social scientists, need to have some acquaintance with the concepts and methods of a number of subjects. The simpler, small-scale societies that they usually study and many of the institutionalized social relationships and values in which they are interested are in fields that in more complex cultures are studied with respect to other specialized disciplines. Thus, for example, social anthropologists who study "primitive law" should know at least some of the vocabulary of law and jurisprudence; those who are concerned with relationships of political power

and authority, should know some of the categories of political science; and those interested in production and exchange in the societies they study should know those of economics.

C. Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter

Modern anthropology is seen by its Marxist and Third World critics as a product of colonialism, which is true to the extent that anthropology and anthropologists have aided the colonial enterprise sometimes overtly and sometimes indirectly.

Ethnographic investigation and colonial enterprise have gone hand in hand from the first. In Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt were 150 scientists including ethnographers with pen and notebook in hand. This first contact between colonizing Europe and colonized Asia or Africa laid the foundation of ethnographic methodology for these continents. The ethnographic interest in colonized people was to culminate in the exhaustive studies of African, Asian, and Oceanian society.

The Orientalist (the Western scholar of peoples and customs of the Orient) contributed to the image of the Oriental. During the colonial decades a cumulative picture of the Orient formed in Western minds. Let me cite the author of *Orientalism* for a description of the Oriental, "The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, 'different.'" In contrast, "the European is rational, virtuous, mature, 'normal'"⁶

The colonial period produced some of the most informative ethnographic material on "native" and "primitive" peoples. For instance, some of the most detailed and accurate ethnography on the Pukhtuns comes from the British colonial period. It begins with a colonial officer⁷ and ends with one⁸. Similarly Robert Montagne, a French colonial administrator, is the author of the most rewarding work on the Berbers in Morocco. Not all colonial ethnography is defective, although its political assumptions are. Sometimes political officers administering tribal groups were more sympathetic to their charges than some of the postcolonial native officials who succeeded them.

Deeper studies of the famous "Arab" scholar-travelers are now being written. Their relationships to Islam, for instance, obviously determined their attitudes to its adherents. We know that Doughty hated Islam, which to him symbolized everything decadent and corrupt. In contrast, Blunt almost became a Muslim, such was his fascination with Islam. Some officer-scholars were motivated by forces that lay deep in family psychology and childhood memory. The scholar-travelers wore native clothes and spoke the native language. In their flamboyant behavior and eccentric appearance, they imagined they found acceptance far from home (Burton's moustache, which had provoked adverse

comment at Oxford, was appreciated by tribal chiefs). Rejected in some childhood memory, they could indulge every fantasy in the East. They were not adult men playing at boys, but boys playing at men. Kings and chiefs were made and unmade by them (from Edwardes to Lawrence they prided themselves on this power), and they created grand sounding titles from exotic places for their heroes: Edwardes of Bannu, Gordon of Khartoum, Roberts of Kandahar, and Lawrence of Arabia. They were not just Orientalist villains destroying native custom and trampling on native culture. The picture is more complex.

Orientalists were only partly racist; a number of them sought identity among and with tribal groups, and sometimes the former were subordinated to the latter. The romance, however, was one-way only.

European colonial scholarship was not politically innocent. Its aim was to understand the colonials better in order to dominate them more efficiently. This knowledge was translated into administrative policy. A crude example may be given from both the British and French colonies.

Determined attempts were made to separate the people of the hills from the people of the plains. Hill tribes were projected as proud, honest, hospitable, egalitarian people abiding by a traditional tribal code. In contrast, groups living in the plains were seen as servile, unreliable, and racially inferior. The former provided the prototype of the noble savage. To the French, the Berbers, and to the British, the Pukhtuns, fell in this group.

Similarly, and perhaps unconsciously, some modern anthropologists follow the imperial attempt to separate Muslim groups. One means is to distinguish "good" from "poor Moslems." Certain anthropologists go to great lengths to establish that nomad/tribal groups possess "a reputation for being poor Moslems."⁹ Barth found the Basseri in Iran "poor Moslems."¹⁰ There is, however, general though scattered evidence to the contrary.¹¹

The link between colonialism and academic anthropology continued even after the Second World War when most Muslim countries were free or almost free of their colonial masters. It is not entirely a coincidence that some of the better known post-war British anthropologists were officers who had held colonial posts in the empire.

II. Anthropological Fieldwork

The work of the anthropologist is to study other cultures. Through them he learns to understand his own culture and, equally important, himself. He remains essentially a seeker. In the distant village and among strange people he comes face to face with himself—a chilling prospect. In that encounter is reflected his true self. His writing, too, reflects the encounter. The Pukhtuns

say, "What we see in ourselves, we see in the world." Perhaps anthropologists would do well to keep the Pukhto proverb in mind.

Social anthropologists must test their hypotheses about social and cultural institutions and their interconnections in the course of fieldwork in societies and situations that they have no power to control. Their tools are observation, interpretation, and comparison rather than experiment. This does not mean that anthropologists can do without any theory. It is as essential to anthropology as it is to other scientific disciplines.

Whether we like it or not, social anthropology has become a specialized subject. It has its own theoretical equipment, some account of which has been given in preceding sections, and it has by now a considerable body of comparative material upon which to draw. No one who writes about the social institutions of a small-scale community without knowledge of contemporary theory in social anthropology, and without some knowledge of the social and cultural institutions of comparable societies elsewhere, can hope to produce a scientifically adequate account. Without specialized training he cannot know the most important things for which to look, the most useful questions to ask, or the best techniques for obtaining answers.

Living in a hut or tent within the village, the anthropologist gradually begins to understand what is happening around him. As his knowledge of the language and his acquaintance with the community advance, things begin to make sense. An overheard conversation is understood; a pattern of behavior is fitted to a learned social relationship. With luck he now has a few friends in the community, people who are willing to take time and trouble to explain things to him, to take him around the neighborhood, and to introduce him to others. From this point onward, the pace accelerates. The anthropologist gets to know most of the members of the community as separate individuals, differing in temperament and in social status. He learns their often intricate ties of kinship and marriage; he comes to understand what they think about one another, about the world in which they live, and about him. He learns not only what are the appropriate questions to ask, but of whom to ask them. He begins to feel "at home" in the community. He now knows it in some respect more thoroughly than he has ever known any community, even the one in which he grew up. He has made the breakthrough into another culture: as a field anthropologist, he has arrived. He has accomplished the major characteristic of anthropological "participant observation."

To a Western anthropologist, probably born and brought up in an urban culture, this can be a vivid, almost traumatic, experience. The field worker who spends a year or more of his life as a member of a group of hunters and gatherers in Borneo or of a tribe of African peasant or pastoralists lives in more intimate contact with the basic conditions of human existence than has been possible for generations in the modern world. Birth, illness, and

death, the daily effort to win food from the environment with the simplest equipment, the smell of the hot earth, the wind and the rain, the urgent, first-hand awareness of these things is something new and yet familiar to the visitor from a city culture.

III. Theoretical Frames in Western Anthropology

If it is virtually nonexistent in the Muslim world, anthropology in the West is in a state of general theoretical stagnation. Alarmist titles such as “Crisis of British Anthropology”¹² and “The Future of Social Anthropology: Disintegration or Metamorphosis?”¹³ reflect this. Apart from extending or varying the classical theoretical themes, contemporary anthropology has produced no major recent work. In addition, an acute sense of crisis accentuated by real problems – the shrinking job market, disappearing “primitive” groups, the emergence of “native anthropologists” – troubles the discipline. In particular the confidence of Western anthropology appears to be shaken by the emergence of the “native anthropologist.”

It may be said that the anthropologist's first task is descriptive. In any empirical inquiry, we must know what the facts are before we can analyze them. Although the distinction between description and analysis is indispensable, it can be misleading, especially in the social sciences. The difference is not simply between studies that imply abstraction and those that do not. Even the most minimal descriptions include abstractions, generally unanalyzed and implicit. Description does more than describe, it also explains. Theories are involved in even the simplest descriptions. Not only do they determine the kinds of facts selected for attention, but they dictate the ways in which these facts shall be ordered and put together. The important question is not whether an account of a social institution (or of anything else) implies generalization and abstraction, for this it does. The critical questions are: What is the level of abstraction, and what are the kinds of theories involved? It is especially necessary to be explicit in social anthropology, for the social situations it deals with are often unfamiliar ones. Anthropologists have thus devised different models to explain society that combine theory and empirical inquiry.

A. Social Structure

Until very recently most social anthropologists, especially in Britain, stressed the analysis of social systems as systems of action, that is, in causal

terms. The most celebrated contributions of the past half-century (derived through Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski from Durkheim and his predecessors) have been made at this level. The key that opened the door to the systematic understanding of the simpler, "primitive" societies was the organic analogy, which derived from French sociology. And the functioning of organisms, like the working of machines, makes sense without any reference to the states of mind of their constituent parts. Scholars on the Continent and in America, and a few social anthropologists in Britain, have throughout sustained an interest in people's thoughts and ideas, both on their own account and as effective elements in systems of action. The theoretical models most characteristic of modern social anthropology have been those that take societies as systems of action and that either explicitly or implicitly invoke the organic analogy. It is only in the last few years that the study of social and cultural institutions as systems of meanings has become of primary concern.

On the "action" level, two different though associated kinds of questions can be asked about social institutions, both concerned with causes. The first relates to the problem of how things came to be as they are, and so is essentially historical. If it can be shown (as it very often cannot) that a certain social institution is as it is because of certain historical happenings, social anthropologists take (or should take) note of these happenings, provided that there is sufficient evidence for them. The happenings need not themselves be physical events on the "action" plane of social reality; we know that ideas and values may play an important part in history. The second relates to the anthropologist's understanding of the current working of social attitudes and relations. History is not only important for sociology as a chain of causes and effects running back into the past. It is also important as a body of contemporary beliefs about those events.

The two most celebrated protagonists of functionalism in British social anthropology have been Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. Malinowski held that human society and culture are best understood as an assemblage of contrivances for satisfying the biological and psychological needs of the human organisms that make up the society. He found it necessary to supplement his list of needs with "derived" and "integrative" needs (not themselves strictly biological), but his central thesis was that anthropologists may best study human cultures as machines for satisfying men's organic needs.

Although the classification of human institutions in terms of the needs they serve (such as the provision of food, the propagation of the species, and the maintenance of physical security) provides convenient categories for fieldworkers to use, few if any anthropologists today find this approach satisfactory. Basic physical needs must be at least partly satisfied if human beings are to survive, and there can be no society without people. It is not illuminating

to analyze social institutions solely in terms of such needs. Their satisfaction is a condition of the maintenance of any life, not only of social life, so they can hardly throw any distinctive light on the latter. The sociologist is interested in the conditions of living together, not merely of living. Since fundamental human needs are presumably much the same everywhere, differences between social and cultural institutions can never be explained by them.

The second type of "total" functionalism, which Radcliffe-Brown derived largely from Durkheim, has been more influential. It asserts that the function of any social institution is the correspondence between it and some general need or, in Radcliffe-Brown's phrase, some "necessary condition of existence" of the society. Radcliffe-Brown wrote of society as if it enjoys some kind of real existence, and he thought that the ultimate value for any society is its continued survival. This, so his argument goes, can be achieved only through the maintenance of social solidarity or cohesion among its members. Social solidarity is the end to which social institutions must contribute, and this contribution is their function. Radcliffe-Brown does say that functionalism is a hypothesis, not a dogma; his thesis is that social institutions may contribute to the maintenance of the whole society. He does not claim that they must invariably do so. Radcliffe-Brown thought of social function in the context of what he sometimes called "the total social system," and he asserted that functional unity is achieved when "all parts of the social system work together with a sufficient degree of harmony or internal consistency; that is without producing persistent conflicts which can neither be resolved nor regulated."

The first thing to observe is how heavily this formulation depends on the organic analogy; it seems to imply that a "total social system" is an empirical entity to which definite attributes can be ascribed. In recent years, it has become clear that the "holistic" view of society that it implies is of little value in actual research. How, for example, could the lack of "a sufficient degree of harmony" be proved except by the physical destruction of the whole community? In any case "society" is not something given in experience. It is an intellectual construct or model, built up on the basis of experience, but not itself a datum.

The organic analogy has led to error in one further respect. It implies not only that societies are empirically given systems, but also that they are harmoniously integrated ones, or should be if they are "healthy." These systems are then thought of as being in a state of equilibrium or "homeostasis" by a set of smoothly interacting and somehow self-adjusting social institutions.

To summarize, the notions of social function and social structure have been the most important forces in British social anthropology during the past half-century. By the study of social function, anthropologists have generally meant the study of the causal implications of social institutions for other social

institutions and systems of institutions in the same society. By the study of social structure they have generally meant the definition of those enduring aspects of social institutions that have appeared to be most important in terms of their interest in them. Modern British social anthropology has sometimes been identified with what has been called the "structural-functional approach." Although there is much more to British social anthropology than this, these concepts have provided the operational framework for many field studies of high quality.

It may be said that despite the great advances in our understanding of the working of small-scale societies as revealed by the development of functional and structural theory, this development has tended to distract attention from the equally important problem of how to understand other peoples' systems of beliefs and values. Systems of beliefs and values were of interest to anthropologists long before the intensive development of structural-functional theory, but it is only quite recently that the interests of a significant number of British anthropologists have returned to them. There has been a tendency to regard ideas and values as "cultural" data, and for many years "culture" has been regarded as at best a peripheral interest of structurally-oriented social anthropologists. It is now more generally recognized that the social anthropologist is directly and legitimately concerned with both dimensions.

A larger argument envelops and partly overlaps these schools. I refer to Marxist anthropology. Anthropologists calling themselves Marxist employ traditional Marxist tools to analyze social structure, organization, and relationships. Talal Asad's analysis of the Swat Pukhtuns, for example, is a straightforward and successful class analysis.¹⁴ The usefulness of Marxist theory is somewhat curtailed in the over-enthusiasm of Marxist scholars wishing to apply their theoretical framework irrespective of ecology or ethnography. For instance Marxist analyses of segmentary societies living in low production zones¹⁵ remain unsatisfactory and have been termed by Godelier, himself a Marxist, "vulgar Marxisms."¹⁶

B. Kinship and Political Organization

According to the dictionary, kinship has to do with relationships by blood, or consanguinity, whereas affinity has to do with relationships brought about by marriage. In social anthropology the two topics are very closely connected. All cultures distinguish various categories of kin and affines, and these categories with their associated patterns of rights and obligations make up what social anthropologists call kinship systems.

Social anthropologists are accused of concerning themselves overmuch with the refinements and complexities of kinship terminologies, of indulging

in what Malinowski called “kinship algebra,” and there are good reasons for this concern. Very few of the interpersonal relationships that make up a Western European’s social world are kinship ones. Kinship plays little or no part in his relations with his friends, his employers, his teachers, his colleagues, or in the complex network of political, economic, and religious associations in which he is involved. But in many smaller-scale societies, kinship’s social importance is paramount. Where a person lives, his group and community membership, whom he should obey and by whom he should be obeyed, who his friends are and who his enemies are, whom he may and may not marry, from whom he may hope to inherit and to whom pass on his own status and property—all these matters and many more may be determined by his status in a kinship system.

Why is kinship so important in small-scale societies? The short answer is that in all human communities, even the most technologically simple ones, the basic categories of biological relationship are available as a means of identifying and ordering social relations. This is true even though some of these categories may be differently defined in different cultures. Everywhere people are begotten of men and born of women, and in most societies the fact of parenthood and the bonds of mutual dependency and support that it implies are acknowledged. It also leads to the recognition of other links, such as those among siblings (children of the same parents), and between grandparents and their grandchildren.

The question of social relationships among kin brings us to the broader issue of political organization. Radcliffe-Brown’s formulation, based on the classical definitions used by Max Weber and others, is more useful, though we shall see that it is not quite adequate either. In the Preface to *African Political Systems*, he wrote that political organization is concerned with “the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force.” This definition employs two different criteria. First, reference is made to the end to which political activity is directed, namely, the regulation and control of the social order within a certain territory. And second, the means whereby this is achieved is brought in, namely, the organized exercise of authority backed by force. Social anthropologists can make good use of the first of these criteria, for some degree of social order is attained in every society, and social anthropologists are interested in finding out how this is done. They are concerned with identifying and analyzing the social institutions through which order is maintained on a territorial or tribal basis and through which relationships with other territorial or tribal groups are created and maintained. It is not disconcerting that some institutions, like the blood feud in certain societies, are not what we ordinarily think of as “political.” Our interest is in the realities of social life, not primarily in the

names we use to identify these realities. We do, however, have to use words with care, lest the reality be obscured. When we are discussing political phenomena in small-scale societies, there is much to be said for speaking of the political aspect of certain social institutions, rather than of specifically political institutions. Often institutions that have political importance are socially significant in a number of other contexts as well.

The second of Radcliffe-Brown's criteria, the organized exercise of authority backed by force, leads to difficulty when it is applied to some of the societies anthropologists study. Anthropologists can certainly speak of authority and force when they are considering centralized states like those with which most of us are familiar in the Western world, with their kings, parliaments, courts, judges, and police forces. Many of the smaller-scale societies are of this type, though usually their political organization is less elaborate. But some of them are not. In such tribes as the Nuer or the Tallensi of modern Ghana, there are (or were) no specialized political functionaries, and there is no organized structure of authority backed by physical force. This is not to say that physical force is not exercised in such societies. Nonetheless, these societies do possess order and structural continuity; they may even be shown to have a political structure. The fact that political authority may be widely diffused, for example, among grades of elders or lineage heads, and that it may be backed by religious or magical sanctions rather than by organized physical force, does not mean that such authority is lacking, though it may be relatively unspecialized and very hard to identify.

Even where no political authorities at all can be found, as in some segmentary societies, the ends that I have defined as political may be brought about through the interplay of other institutions not overly political. We shall see later how this happens. Here, as elsewhere, the classical conceptual apparatus of Western culture does not quite fit much of the unfamiliar social material.

To the question of how political order is thought of and maintained (so far as it is maintained) in segmentary, lineage-based societies where there are no political authorities to make and enforce political decisions, there is no short and simple answer. The maintenance of some degree of territorial order is a function of several different social institutions. Where lineal descent provides the principle upon which corporate local groups are established, it provides also the idiom through which inter-group, even inter-tribal, relations operate, as we can see in the case of the blood feud. Where, as among the Nuer, lineal membership or non-membership is a relevant aspect of practically all social relationships, then lineal attachments and loyalties provide a framework for territorial relations also, and territorial grouping and lineal structure tend to show a rough-and-ready correlation. Even where other factors besides lineal membership play a significant part in many social situations,

as among the Tallensi, the lineal organization is still of great importance. Once again, the matter is very much one of degree. The question is not so much whether such and such people "have" lineages. The important questions are these: What kind of social and political importance, if any, does lineal descent have in the society concerned? If groups are formed on this basis, how large are they and of how many generations do they take account? What patterns of social behavior and value are associated with membership in these groups?

Lineal descent, and the accompanying social behavior implied and imposed through the social code, acts as an indicator distinguishing those on the genealogical charter from those not on it. There is thus an exaggerated social awareness of lineal descent in many societies. Ideally, identical segments are arranged symmetrically on the genealogical chart and the ascendant or descendant levels structurally reflect one another. Segmentary structure and the principle of lineal descent pervade the whole system and contribute to social cohesion. The political superstructure of segmentary tribes tracing descent from a common apical ancestor is an extension of this segmentary lineal organization. The descent chart defines a hierarchy of homologous groups which can direct fusion or fission of social and political interests within a merging or diverging series of such groups. Ideally such tribal genealogy "is a conceptualization of a hierarchy of ordered territorial segments."¹⁷

When we turn to consider "centralized" societies, we are faced with similar problems of identification and of degree. As Lucy Mair has recently pointed out, we cannot simply divide societies into those with chiefs and those without. If we could, the classification of small-scale political systems would be much simpler. Two factors contribute to the difficulty of classification. The first is that lineal organization may still be of major political importance even in societies that have a titular head or king and that may therefore be characterized as centralized. If, for example, the segmentary Nuer were to acknowledge one man, or one lineage, as ritually pre-eminent, while retaining their present segmentary social organization, should we say that they had a centralized political system? We would, rightly, hesitate to do so, and yet a common loyalty to a central head, however tenuous and however restricted the authority allotted to him, certainly has political implications. When we are considering so-called centralized societies, we have to look very closely at the nature and scope of the political authority, if there is any, that is centralized in such societies.

The second, more taxonomic factor was touched on earlier. It is that there are many societies or social aggregates, possessing a common language and culture and more or less conscious of their tribal identity, that have no central head but consist of congeries of small, relatively independent units. These units may be based neither on lineal kin groups nor on age sets. They may

themselves be politically centralized statelets or chiefdoms, each centered on its own chief and politically independent of all the others. The important Sukuma and Nyamwezi peoples of Tanzania form such groups. Whether we regard them as centralized or as segmentary societies depends upon whether we regard them from the point of view of their component units, or from the point of view of the whole social aggregate. We shall do well to bear in mind, first, that centralization is very much a matter of degree and depends on the point of view from which the social situation is regarded and second, that centralization, however we define it, is only one of a number of criteria useful in classifying small-scale systems.

In conclusion, *African Political Systems* by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard¹⁸ distinguishes three types of tribal social organization: the Bushmen, among whom political relations equal kin relations; a second type, called Group A, which are unitary states with kings or paramount chiefs ruling centralized states with societies that are ranked; a third type, Group B, which are segmentary lineage systems, characterized by: (1) segmentation of tribal groups; (2) lineal descent from a common eponymous ancestor (patrilineal descent is of primary importance as against matrilineal descent in other societies);¹⁹ (3) monadism wherein “the small group is the embryo tribe, and the tribe is the smaller group writ large”;²⁰ and finally, (4) egalitarianism or an acephalous form of political organization. To these categories of tribal systems may be added another classification, that of the “segmentary state.”²¹

C. Beliefs, Magic, and Religion

Social anthropologists have always had to take some account of the beliefs and values of the peoples they study. Although functional theory has tended to distract attention from this field, it has greatly advanced our understanding of other peoples' ways of thought. This understanding implies reference to what people think, as no human social institutions or relationships can be adequately understood unless account is taken of the expectations, beliefs, and values that they involve. Nevertheless, with a few notable exceptions, systematic field studies of peoples' modes of thought, and their values and beliefs, have only recently begun to be made.

For the earlier anthropologists, problems about the modes of thought of so-called “primitives” scarcely arose with any complexity. It was easy for the Victorians to assume that such thinking as primitives did was simple and “childish” (one of their favorite adjectives), an inferior version of their own. The intensive fieldwork that was to provide an intimate understanding of “simpler” peoples' ways of life and thought and was so to demonstrate the superficiality and inadequacy of such views had not begun.

In France, in the early years of this century, the famous sociologist Emile Durkheim founded a school of social anthropologists called the *Année Sociologique* group, after the journal they founded. These writers devoted much attention to the study of the ideas, their *représentations collectives*, that so-called "primitive" peoples held about themselves and about the world around them. Like their predecessors, these scholars did little or no fieldwork, so they were dependent for their information mostly on the reports of travelers and missionaries, which varied a good deal in quality.

We must stress that only the development of intensive fieldwork permitted the subtlety, complexity, and, often, profundity of the ways of thought of preliterate or only recently literate peoples to be at all adequately understood. As soon as anthropologists began to live for periods of months and even years among the people they studied, communicating with them in their own tongue and sharing in their daily activities, it began to become plain that the old Western stereotypes about primitive modes of thought were quite inadequate and often misleading. A landmark in the growth of this recognition is Evans-Pritchard's *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among the Azande*.²² In this study the beliefs of this highly intelligent people of the southern Sudan are shown, not as a set of weird and irrational delusions about occult forces, but rather as embodying a mode of adjustment to the strains and frustrations of everyday life, which in the whole context of Zande culture is eminently practical and sensible. The Zande system of beliefs, and others like it, provide both an explanation of misfortune (why did this have to happen to me?) and a way of dealing with it. In a pre-scientific culture there may be no other means of coping with such situations.

Radcliffe-Brown's theory of ritual proposes that one of the functions of ritual is to express and so to reinforce certain sentiments or value adherence on which the smooth running of the society depends. The important truth in this view is now plain. Ritual, magic, and taboo are essentially symbolic and so are expressive, and they are often thought to be instrumental as well. Certainly they may have important social consequences for the people who have them. The difficulty with Radcliffe-Brown's account of ritual is that it is too general to be of much practical use in investigating real human cultures. To say, as he does, that the communal performance of ritual may express, and so sustain, values that contribute to the maintenance of social solidarity may be true. But it is not always so. Communal ritual may be divisive as well as cohesive, and notions other than social solidarity may be symbolically expressed by it. Some of the rites involved in sorcery, for example, can hardly be said to sustain patterns of behavior conducive to social cohesion. Further, Radcliffe-Brown's hypothesis, as he states it, affords no room for testing. Social cohesion itself is taken to be exhibited by the communal performances that are supposed to sustain it. There is circularity in

the argument that dancing together contributes to the kind of situation in which people like to dance together. The thesis could be disproved only by finding a society that failed to carry out the necessary ritual and therefore perished. To Radcliffe-Brown's great merit, however, (following Durkheim) he made the point that ritual is an essentially expressive activity, and that it can and does have important social implications. Society is the indispensable condition of human life as we know it. In worshipping God, he contends, man is really worshipping his own social system.

Durkheim's theory of religion has been subjected to a good deal of criticism. It is rather less naive than it appears to be, when we realize (and Durkheim sometimes failed to make this clear) that society is not a "thing," but rather a system of relationships, in some sense a construct. Social relationships, involving beliefs, expectations, and values as well as human interactions in space and time, are not "given" empirically in the same sense that the data of the natural sciences are. It is one thing to say that totemism or religion means that a man worships the actual groups of people of which he is a member. It is quite a different thing to say that what he is revering is a complex system of moral imperatives, rights, and obligations. Most modern students of religion would hold, as against Durkheim, that religious belief and practice are more than merely a system of social and moral symbolism. Group symbolism can be very important, in secular as well as in religious contexts, and it was to Durkheim's great merit that he pointed this out.

As a theory of totemism, it is not quite adequate, although it makes the important point that totems, like flags and old school ties in Western societies, are symbols of group unity. It is worth mentioning in passing what the great psychologist Sigmund Freud contributed to the study of totemism. Like Durkheim, he based his hypothesis on the Australian material. He surmised that the origin of the institution lay in the Oedipus complex, which he held to be universal. In the primeval family, he said, sons cover their father's wives, and in order to acquire them they kill and eat their father. Afterwards they are smitten with remorse, and the totemic feast (which occurred in Australia but is found nowhere else) is really a symbolic re-enacting of that first patricidal crime. Freud does not make clear at what point in human history he thinks that this happened, or whether it happened only once or on many occasions. His theory is not taken seriously by social anthropologists, who in any case are not greatly interested in the undiscoverable origins of human institutions. What Freud does is to translate what may be a scientific insight of profound importance (at least in Western cultures) from psychological into socio-historical terms. But this turns it into an undemonstrable and therefore valueless hypothesis, significant only as a mythical expression of psycho-analytic value.²³

The term totemism covers a multitude of phenomena. As it is generally

used, however, it refers to situations where each one of a number of discrete social groups into which a society is divided maintains a particular regard – though not necessarily one of worship or reverence – for a particular object in the natural or cultural spheres.

This leads to a final point. What is symbolized in religious behavior? Durkheim said that in totemism (for him the elementary form of religion) society is worshipping itself. Radcliffe-Brown argued that ritual expresses symbolically certain sentiments or values, upon the acceptance of which the smooth running of society itself depends. This view is essentially a restatement of Durkheim's position, and like it, it obscures the important fact that conflict and opposition may be important components of social systems as well as harmony and may also become focuses of ritual. Radcliffe-Brown argued also that ritual sometimes expresses more than man's need of society; it expresses his fundamental dependence on the natural world that he occupies and of which he is a part.

We have seen that much ritual and religious behavior translates uncontrollable natural forces into symbolic entities that, through the performance of ritual, can be manipulated and dealt with. Ritual is a language or saying things that are felt to be true and important but that are not susceptible to statement in scientific terms. Even if sophisticated modern man is less inclined to attach instrumental efficacy to the symbols that he has created to express his apprehension of the universe and of its ultimate meaning, he still feels the need to express this awareness. In the areas beyond science, there is no way of expressing it except symbolically. To say that religious symbols are man-made is not to decry the validity of religion, for ritual is a statement about something, not just about itself. But the comparative study of the religious beliefs and practices of other cultures may suggest that in religion, no less than in other forms of symbolic behavior, reality is misrepresented if the symbol, and not the often indefinable thing that it symbolizes, is taken to be the ultimate truth.

D. Economic Anthropology

This section may be introduced by briefly mentioning the two main theoretical positions in economic anthropology, substantivist versus formalist. Polanyi sums up the respective positions in his statement²⁴ that the substantivist economic approach: (1) derives from fact, (2) implies neither choice nor insufficiency of means, (3) implies power of gravity, and (4) implies laws of nature.²⁵ The formalist approach: (1) derives from logic, (2) has sets of rules referring to choices between alternative uses of insufficient means, (3) has the power of syllogism, and (4) derives from the laws of the mind.²⁶ The

title of Cancian's paper "Maximization as Norm, Strategy, and Theory" clearly states the formalist position. Volumes containing both viewpoints are standard academic fare.²⁷

Without wishing to become involved in a substantivist versus formalist debate in economic anthropology, on which there is a flourishing and sophisticated literature, few anthropologists or economists would deny that there exists the closest possible relationship between social groups and their economic environments and those activities that determine social organization in society.

The study of the economics of simpler societies falls into two main divisions, which will be dealt with separately. First, there is the question of how people manage to extract the physical necessities of life from their environments; here we are concerned with the means by which resources are exploited and the kinds of social activities involved in production. Second, there is the question, what is done with the goods after they are produced? In the end, of course, they are (mostly) consumed, but often quite complex mechanisms of distribution and exchange are involved, and not all of these can be understood simply in economic terms.

A first and most essential requirement for any human community is to feed itself, and in some of the very simple societies this is everybody's main preoccupation from childhood to death. It is a truism that everything we eat, whether animal, vegetable, or (occasionally) mineral, comes either directly or indirectly from the earth. This is much less obvious to the modern man, who lives in a world of processed foods and supermarkets, than it is to a member of a peasant community, living at or near a bare subsistence level. As well as food, the environment also produces shelter, clothing, and essential tools. Anthropologists have usually distinguished three main methods by which these necessities have been secured, and in the eighteenth century and later it was usual to rank the communities that practiced them in an evolutionary order of "progress." The very simplest communities subsist entirely, as it were, by raiding the environment: these are the hunters, collectors, and sometimes fishermen. The Eskimo are such a people and have achieved a remarkable command over a very harsh environment. Tropical forest peoples like the pygmies of equatorial Africa and Southeast Asia have a far simpler technology and a less rigorous environment with which to cope. Dwellers in arid regions like the territory of the South African bushmen and the Australian aborigines have developed delicate adjustments to their sparse environments. In consequence, material goods are few and easily portable, and often there is no tribal organization over and above the level of the small family groups that compose the effective economic units. It is natural that in such conditions the very highest value is usually attached to the solidarity of these small groups, for every one is dependent on the support and cooperation of

his fellows.

At some time in the unrecorded past, men began to domesticate wild animals. With the domestication of such important species as cattle, goats, and sheep, it became possible for human communities to sustain life on the produce of their flocks and herds. Though many societies, including the most "advanced," have a mixed pastoral and agricultural economy, the emphasis differs widely from society to society, and there are still many people who subsist wholly, or almost wholly, on their herds. Some nomadic peoples of the Asian steepe fall, or fell, into this category, as do the Nilo-Hamitic Masai of East Africa. Traditionally the Masai lived exclusively on the meat, milk, and blood provided by their cattle; they rejected vegetable foods and despised those who dug the earth to produce them. This way of life also imposes certain restrictions on those who practice it. They must have adequate supplies of grazing and water for their stock, and often this means that they cannot stay for very long in the same place. Sometimes they are transhumant, which means that they make seasonal movements from their base in search of water and grass. Sometimes they are strictly nomadic, that is, they are forever on the move to new pastures. A pastoral way of life also imposes limits on possible population density; a herding population is more thinly scattered on the ground (though usually not so thinly as hunters and collectors), and this precludes intensive or highly centralized administration. It is often said of pastoral people that they are independent and resentful of authority. It is easy to see why this should be so. It is easy to see, too, why their social systems are so often adapted to raiding and warfare. Unlike some other forms of property, livestock are easily stolen and transported, and raiding is a common diversion in many such societies.

Agriculture makes possible a more settled way of life. Although in many parts of the world cultivation is of the shifting "slash and burn" type, whereby new ground is cleared for planting every few years and old gardens allowed to revert to bush, this mode of subsistence does permit long residence in the same area. It also entails a different attitude toward land from that commonly held by hunters and herders. Whatever the system of land holding, cultivators, as individuals, families, or lineages, have a very specific, if rarely exclusive, concern with the plots of land they cultivate and from which they hope to harvest. This is not the place to discuss the growth of the first great civilizations that originated with the early cultivators in the great river valleys of the Middle East and elsewhere. Certain consequences of an agricultural way of life should be noted. First, the greater population density possible, combined with the relative stability of agricultural populations, enables the establishment of wider-scale political units than family or clan. In some fertile areas, such as West Africa (to say nothing of the early riverine civilizations), agriculture has also made possible urban concentrations of considerable size,

with all the administrative complexity that this implies. Another consequence of the adoption of agriculture has been the emergence of a leisure class and, often, of some form of aristocracy. With good growing conditions and suitable crops, a cultivator, unlike a hunter or a herder, need not give all his time to food production. Also, a surplus may be produced which can be used to feed noncultivators, who may thus be freed for other forms of productive activity.

Polanyi made his major contribution to economic anthropology by distinguishing three main categories of economic relationships in society: reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange.²⁸ Reciprocity denotes movements between correlative points and symmetrical groupings, redistribution designates movements towards the center and out of it again, and exchange refers to vice versa movements taking place under a market system. Sahlins further analyzed reciprocity.²⁹ Although this theoretical categorization of economic relationships within tribal structure is an interesting starting point for a discussion on economic interaction within tribal groups, I cannot sustain it with my own data. In its simple form reciprocity is a “between” relationship, the action and response of two parties, whereas redistribution is a “within” relationship, the collective action of a group with a defined socio-center where goods are concentrated and thence flow outward. “Redistribution is chieftainship said in economics.”³⁰

E. Processes of Social Change

Change is taking place in all human societies all the time. Sometimes it is sudden and catastrophic, as when a system of government is destroyed by revolution and replaced by a radically different ruling system. Sometimes it is so gradual and imperceptible that even the members of the society themselves scarcely notice it. But, it is always there, and social anthropologists who wish to understand the working of the societies they study must take account of it. Here they must be historians. Changes take place in time, and they can be understood only as causal sequences of events leading to new states of affairs. These new states of affairs are “the present,” and that is what the social anthropologist is trying to understand. He is a historian, but only in a particular context and for a particular purpose.

Changes in peoples’ social and cultural institutions through time can not be understood in terms of any single “blanket” principle. A multiplicity of social processes is involved, and these often operate concurrently. One of these is conflict within society.

Though there is conflict in all societies, it may differ considerably in kind and degree. It is sadly a common observation of anthropologists (and

others) that under the stress of culture contact many societies have ceased to function as they once did and in some cases have broken down altogether. Sometimes social systems, even peoples, have been totally or almost destroyed. The Tasmanian aborigines, the Tierra del Fuegians, and the North American Indians are examples. Often the damage has been more subtle, though hardly less radical. The functional, organic model seemed plausible enough when it was applied to those small-scale societies that were virtually unaffected by outside contact and had apparently not changed significantly in generations. When increasing contact with the West brought radical social change and new and more disruptive social conflicts, however, and when the more intensive fieldwork of modern times disclosed these changes and conflicts, then this approach, by itself, became plainly inadequate. There was no use plastering up the cracks in institutional functionalism with concepts like dysfunction (a notion better expressed by Durkheim in his concept of anomie or "lawlessness," a state of affairs in which hitherto accepted and acceptable standards are no longer meaningful). The functional model still implied the untenable assumption that there was an ideally harmonious, "functional" state of society and that this had somehow been breached.

Social anthropologists have increasingly concerned themselves with situations of conflict and social stress, and they have done so mostly in the context of culture contact. But "conflict" is a vague term. Two problems, in particular, arise. We must ask, first, what are the things that are supposed to be in conflict and, second, what kind or degree of conflict is it that concerns us?

Anthropologists have accordingly distinguished between two kinds of social conflict, and so between two kinds of social change. First there are those conflicts and changes that are provided for in the existing social structure. The Nuer blood feud or the succession struggles that occur in many states when the king dies are examples of these. Obviously, changes in personnel are a feature of every society, as all people grow old, die, and are replaced by others. But so long as the roles themselves continue more or less unchanged, these conflicts and replacements do not affect the structure of the social system itself. They operate within its existing framework, are resolvable in terms of shared systems of values, and offer no challenge to the existing institutions.

The second kind of change is more radical. It is change in the character of the social system itself: some of its constituent institutions are altered, so that they no longer "mesh" with other co-existing institutions as they once did. This is structural or "radical" change, and the conflicts to which it gives rise are not resolvable in terms of the existing values of the society. Structural changes engender new kinds of conflicts, and tradition provides neither precedents nor cures for them. They are especially disturbing and involve confusion and strain. If the social system is to persist, sooner or later further radical modifications will have to be made in it, and so the society will become

something other than what it originally was. Here again, the ineptness of the organic analogy for the understanding of social change may be noted: organisms do not change from one species into completely different ones. Under the stress of social change, societies often do.

To these two types of change, Firth has added a third one that he calls organizational change. Organizational changes are changes in ways of doing things that themselves continue to be done and in the extent and range of particular complexes of social relationships, which remain formally unaltered. This further distinction is useful, although in the last resort structure and organization are rather two aspects of the same reality than two different things.

Having stated the major positions of Western anthropology let us now examine where and how Orientalist literature has influenced the perception of Muslim societies.

IV. The Orientalist Anthropologist

Edward Said's *Orientalism* is a powerful indictment of the subject and its practitioners. He states explicitly the prejudices and tendentious arguments of the Orientalists. It is altogether too passionate and angry an argument. Because of the power and passion, the more down-to-earth, simpler weaknesses of Orientalist scholarship are left out. For instance, rather than accusing Bernard Lewis of mental exhaustion and moral bankruptcy, one should as an anthropologist point out some of the conceptual weaknesses in his study. His categories of tribe and peasant in society are seriously at fault.³¹ The one is often employed for the other. This to an anthropologist is not a minor slip.

My quarrel is with some of the technical terms used by Lewis in describing social structure and organization in Arabia. "Arab society," he writes, "on the eve of Islam consisted of kings, feudalism, vassals, peasants, and tribes" (p. 25). "Feudalism", "vassals", and "peasants" are the vocabulary of medieval Europe. Without doubt, the concept of feudalism was not applicable within the highly developed tribal structure in Arabia (before or after Islam). In any case the two would find it difficult to co-exist ("kings" and "feudalism" and segmentary tribal groups are at different ends of the social spectrum). Feudalism, as we know, is a discrete social category with associated characteristics. It is the wrong time, place, and people for such concepts. Lewis, a few pages later, contradicts himself when—correctly this time—he talks of the domination of "Bedouin tribalism" (p. 29).

Even today, Orientalists in a holdover from a past age continue to offend Muslims by the use of "Mohammedanism" for Islam.³² Such perception affects those who look to the Orientalists for guidance. The Oxford dictionary

still uses the word “Mohammedanism” in spite of its obvious odium for Muslims.

Of the numerous derogatory references to Muslims in Orientalist literature, let me pick a few at random to illustrate the point.³³ In the last chapter, “Assessment,” of the standard biography of the Prophet, Watt speaks of his “neurotic” character.³⁴ He relates these to the “neurosis” of his followers. This is immediately followed by a discussion of the creative imagination of the Prophet: the point being made to a Western audience, just sixteen years after the Second World War, is as explicit as it is crude.³⁵ Another social scientist sets out to demonstrate why and how Muslim society responds to the *Fuehrer*-type leader.³⁶ The Hitler motif is, once again, introduced.

The Orientalists have neither tired nor relented. In a new work, *Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World*, the authors, Crone and Cook, attack the very core of Islam (1980).³⁷ It is the traditional Orientalist attack on the authenticity of prophethood with a more sophisticated and academic approach.

Claiming to have discovered original contemporary documents, Crone and Cook put forward a thesis that the prophethood of Islam belonged to Caliph ‘Umar al Faruq (RAA, d. 24 A.H. / 644 A.C.). They argue that the Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) was sent to preach the coming of Hazrat Umar but decided to appropriate the role for himself. The authors further challenge the historicity of the *hijrah* and its date 622.⁴⁰ Academic neutrality is abandoned in their dislike for Islam. In a discussion of comparative intellectual trends in Islam, Judaism, and Christianity the authors conclude: “The only obverse to the *gravitas* of Muslims is the giggling of their womenfolk” (p. 147). The authors themselves suggest the book will cause offense to Muslims: “This is a book written by infidels for infidels” (p. 8). They do not wish for academic dialogue.

The Orientalists compare the Prophet’s age of “violence” and “barbarism” to theirs of “gentleness” and “peace”! Montgomery Watt—suggesting the death of Ka’b ibn al Ashraf, an enemy of Islam, was instigated by the Prophet—observes, “In the gentler. . . age in which we live men look askance at such conduct, particularly in a religious leader.”⁴¹ He compares his own age with that of the Prophet’s and concludes that “in Muhammad’s age and country such behavior was quite normal.”

What, Watt is saying, can we expect from people who had no “common decency” (p. 173). “We,” as Edward Said has alerted the West, “are rational and virtuous and they—the people of the Orient—are irrational and depraved.”

Taking this cue from Orientalists, certain anthropologists have employed the “peace and war” distinction to classify “primitive” tribes and “civilized” nations.⁴² Tribesmen are constantly killing each other or engaging in “war.” Civilized nations, on the other hand, live in “peace.” The comparison never fails to amuse me. It is made by members of the civilized nations who in

this century alone have plunged the entire world into wars that lasted for years at a toll of millions of lives.

We are still paying for those years of global madness. The scale, organization, and savagery of the two World Wars has never been matched before in human history. And today we may be drifting to a Third World War—a nuclear one this time—again fought by the advanced and civilized nations of the world.

Is the Orientalist really serious about the gentleness of our age? How do we explain the millions “gently” killed by Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot. Hitler is accused of having exterminated between five and six million Jews alone in the most savage and unprecedented manner, an event that has permanently scarred the consciousness of modern man. This from a “gentle” age characterized by “common decency.” In contrast let me cite the example of “primitive” people at war.

When the Prophet (SAAS) finally reconquered Makkah—after suffering extreme personal humiliation from the city—he forgave all those who wished to live in peace. A general amnesty was declared and, apart from a few criminals, no one was killed. The conquest of Makkah—a turning point in the history of Islam—involved the death of less than 30 people in combat (and during the march on the city the Prophet’s humanity was undiminished and displayed itself when he ordered the protection of a bitch that had given birth to new puppies). During the Prophet’s entire career and campaigns, only about a thousand men—Muslims and non-Muslims—died. Be that as it may, the myth of anarchy and instability among Muslim groups persists.

Perhaps it was the Victorian emphasis on order and stability that was reflected in the perception of Muslim tribal groups. These tribal groups were seen as intrinsically turbulent and unstable “ordered anarchies.” Violence was seen as characteristic of society. One may agree with Professor Abdullah Laroui, the Moroccan historian, that the colonial cliché describing hill tribes as “a scattering of tribes killing each other” was the aim rather than the cause of colonialism. Nonetheless the “anarchic” perception of tribal society is a legacy that persists in contemporary anthropology. Thus Meeker writes: “North Arabian Bedouin culture turned in large part upon the notion that violence lay at the center of political life. Men tended to think of themselves, their possessions, and their relationships in terms of this violence.”⁴⁴ And “the Cyrenaican Bedouin often perceive the entire domain of political experience as a wild world of brutality and savagery” (p. 207). Similarly, Frederik Barth examining the Swat Pukhtuns found them ceaselessly and insatiably engaged in “attacking,” “seizing,” and “killing” each other.⁴⁵

And the end is not yet in sight. The Orientalist scholars—Arberry, Gibb, Lewis, Von Gunebaum, Watt—have provided the academic base for most of anthropology. Also Richard Tapper’s work leans heavily on that of the Orientalists such as Lambton.⁴⁶

Younger anthropologists, who write with elegance⁴⁷ and sympathy⁴⁸ of their groups, nonetheless have not been able to entirely free themselves of the Orientalist heritage.⁴⁹ For Meeker, who uses Musil's material extensively, the world of the Bedouin remains anarchic (see quotations from his work above). Eickelman's comprehensive summary of Middle East anthropology relies heavily on Orientalist sources, too.⁵⁰ Eickelman acknowledges this fact by calling his chapter on the Orientalists, no doubt without being fully aware of its implications, "Intellectual Predecessors". Both cite Doughty, whose hatred of Islam bordered on the pathological, with high regard.

Women's studies—or more correctly—studies by Western women of Muslim women—are no exception to the traditional Orientalist image of Muslim society. A recent study of Muslim women in Delhi is called *Frogs in a Well*.⁵¹ No women—Muslim or otherwise—would take kindly to the imagery of the metaphor. It reflects the ethnocentric arrogance of the scholar. (For other studies of Muslim women see Beck, Fernea, and Keddie.)

Even some of the work of the great Western scholars has recently been analyzed as prejudiced against Islam. Bryan Turner's book, *Weber and Islam*, clearly pointed out Weber's personal prejudices which led him to certain conclusions regarding Islam and in particular the person of the Prophet (SAAS).⁵²

It is little wonder that Professor Fazlur Rahman, himself once under attack from more right-wing Islamic scholars in Pakistan, doubts the impartiality of Western scholarship on Islam.⁵³

Let us turn to a technical discussion in the discipline, as an example. Frederik Barth has been accused by me of reductionism in his portrayal of the Swat Pukhtuns.⁵⁴ Barth, responding to the criticism, revisited Swat. The visit did little to change his ideas.⁵⁵ He provides us with a lengthy example—"new" ethnography—purporting to explain his thesis. The driver of the bus he was on refused to give way to another van on the Nowshera bridge, an old pre-Independence one-lane railway bridge (pp. 131-32, 163). Both held their ground and the situation, made tense by the arrival of a train, was only diffused after considerable delay. Barth sees "deep structures" in the incident. This then, is serious anthropology explaining human behavior among Pukhtuns.

If I were to cite examples of bad drivers—or, more accurately, bad-mannered drivers—from England or the USA, would they support a more general thesis on Western society? I think not. The example is thus parody, not science—and what does the construction recently of a new dual carriageway at Nowshera do to Barth's thesis?

For Pehrson and Barth the harsh desert fieldwork conditions (the former died in the field) among the Baluch were made worse by their perception of the Baluch as an unpleasant people. Baluch etiquette reflected "hollowness," and Baluch "intimate life" was one of "deceit."⁵⁶ They found the Baluch "suspicious"—a word that occurs frequently in the book.⁵⁷

For Hobbes, the condition of man “is a condition of war, of everyone against everyone.” Barth’s perception of Muslim society is Hobbesian: Muslim life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” The Hobbesian view of life is not unnaturally reflected in the work of Mrs. Frederik Barth—who was one of Professor Barth’s students.

Mrs. Barth, on the basis of interviewing females—in this case the poor women of Cairo—concludes that Muslim women are exceedingly “suspicious.” She also finds they spend their time in back-biting, intriguing, and squabbling.⁵⁸ In Cairo we are presented with a female mirror-image of the belligerent Pukhtun, who is forever “attacking,” “seizing,” and “killing.” Man is merely the expression of the methodological individualist.

Are we being presented empirically observed social reality, or simply the perceptions of a husband-wife team imposing their theoretical models at random on the Muslim world? On the basis of Barth’s Swat material we would be justified in assuming the latter.

Surely Barth does not wish to suggest that all Swat Pukhtuns do with their time is “attack” and “kill.” This is one aspect of their lives. Unfortunately his data convey this impression. Even the *hujra*, the guest house, the social center of hospitality, guests, and folk-song, is for Barth reduced simply to another political instrument and part of political strategy. It is the traditional Orientalist view of tribal Muslim groups forever absorbed in “war,” their society forever “anarchic.”

Frederik Bailey, following Barth, goes one step further. To him Pukhtun society resembles the Mafia.⁵⁹ An entire code (the *Pukhtunwali*) and entire body of culture, folklore, and literature of a highly developed tribal society that has perpetuated itself for at least five centuries is reduced to a modern Western urban gangster civilization.

Serious doubts have been raised on the two occasions Muslim anthropologists have critically analyzed Western anthropologists on their home ground. Talal Asad⁶⁰ made telling criticism of Abner Cohen’s work among Arab villages in Israel. Unfortunately, the criticism of “native” anthropologists is sometimes easily misunderstood. When I suggested we refer to the holistic Islamic framework (Islam as culture and politics) when examining Muslim tribal groups,⁶¹ I was criticized for attacking Western anthropologists and colonialism.⁶²

But not all non-Muslim writing is offensively critical. The work of other younger anthropologists is enhanced by sympathy for the people of whom they write, for example, Fischer’s recent study of Iran, its religion and religious leaders⁶³ and *Singer’s of the Pukhtuns*. The methodological direction indicated by the work of these anthropologists may break the impasse imposed on the discipline by Orientalism. Interestingly, the two main broad divisions in anthropology discussed above appear to be divided by the Atlantic: Fischer, the

American professor at Harvard, is a cultural anthropologist and Singer, the Oxford anthropologist, is a social anthropologist.

One cannot escape the conclusion arrived at by Edward Said that anthropologists to be included in the list of Orientalists are defined as “anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient.”⁶⁴

When the authors of *Hagarism* attack the Prophet (SAAS) and the very foundation of Islam or—less seriously—Western anthropologists equate entire Muslim societies to the Mafia, ought Muslims to bury their heads in the sand and pretend they do not hear these voices? Should they simply reject Western—or non-Muslim—scholarship by banning its entry into their countries? If so, do they build an intellectual iron curtain around their societies? Or ought they to assess, argue, synthesize, and then prepare and reply in terms of an “Islamic anthropology.” One aim of this paper is to illuminate the above questions.

V. Islamic Anthropology

A. The Problem of Definition

It would appear from the previous section that anthropology is, if not a child, a creation of the West and more specifically Western imperialism. This is not so. The work of Ibn Khaldun is reflected—with theoretical frame and supporting data—in that of some of the most influential contemporary Western theorists, including Karl Marx, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, and Ernest Gellner. Weber's typology of leadership, Pareto's circulation of elites, and Gellner's pendulum-swing theory of Muslim society betray the influence of Ibn Khaldun. It is indeed a tragedy that the science of sociology or anthropology did not develop after Ibn Khaldun. And Ibn Khaldun was not alone. There were al Biruni, Ibn Battuta, and al Mas'udi, to name a few.

Of these, perhaps al Biruni (973-1048) A.C. deserves the title of father of anthropology.⁶⁵ If anthropology is a science based on extended participant observation of (other) cultures using the data collected for value-neutral, dispassionate analysis employing the comparative method, then al Biruni is indeed an anthropologist of the highest contemporary standards.⁶⁶ His work on (Hindu) India—*Kitab al Hind*—remains one of the most important source books for South Asia. The most perceptive of contemporary Hindu scholars, including mavericks like Nirad Chaudhari, quote him approvingly.⁶⁷ So, almost a thousand years before Malinowski and Geertz, al Biruni was establishing the science of anthropology. Therefore the study of society by Muslims developing Islamic sociology or anthropology is not a new or Western science.

We may define Islamic anthropology loosely as the study of Muslim groups

by scholars committed to the universalistic principles of Islam, humanity, knowledge, and respectful tolerance and relating micro-village tribal studies, in particular, to the larger historical and ideological frames of Islam. Islam is here understood not as theology but sociology. The definition thus does not preclude non-Muslims.

Certain conceptual points must first be clarified. What is the world view of the Muslim anthropologist? In the ideal the Muslim orders his life according to the will of Allah. In actuality this may not be so. Does he see society as motivated by the desire to perform the will of Allah or not? If so, the Muslim must strive to bring the actual into accord with the ideal.

Let us pose these questions in the context of the two major—sometimes overlapping—theoretical positions in the Western social sciences. These divisions are between the “methodological individualists” and the “methodological holists.” Briefly, the individualists examine man in society as an actor maximizing and optimizing. Social interaction is seen as a series of transactions in which “value gained and lost” is recorded in individual “ledgers.”⁶⁸

The holists, on the other hand, view man as motivated by configurations of economy and society that transcend the individual. These divisions are not rigid and are made more complex by the different schools of anthropology.

Such debates must be directed to scientific inquiry in order to discover the dynamics of society. For society is dynamic and studies of social phenomena not directed towards clarifying it are reduced to academic exercises.

Which framework is applicable when analyzing a Muslim social actor? Does he behave as an individualist recording units of value gained and lost in a personal ledger? Or does he respond to social configurations of which he is part? With Muslims, we may suggest the latter.

Islam teaches us to deal with the major concern of human beings, which is to relate to our environment. And our relationships with people—individuals and groups—are the main features of our environment. Islam, then is a social religion. The implications for the Muslim are clear. He is part of the *ummah*, the community, to which he gives loyalty and which provides him with social identity. In the ideal, he belongs in part to his immediate group, in part to the larger *ummah*.

For the Muslim, rules of marriage, inheritance, and an entire code—covering the most intimate details of human behavior—are laid down explicitly. The ideal organization of society and the behavior of its members are predetermined. For Muslims, therefore, the dilemmas of this world are reduced. Man's mission is to reconcile society with the instructions of Allah. Debates between one or another school of thought thus become merely academic exercises.

Life, Allah has repeated, has not been created in jest. It is a struggle to better humanity, that is, to improve the moral quality of our brief span on

earth. The struggle to do so—the *jihad*—must be maintained.

The Muslim remains part of the *ummah*, the community. A too blatant expression of individual ambition will provoke disapproval from the community, which is not to say individuals do not break rules or behave in an entirely un-Islamic manner. But we are concerned with Muslim groups and not individuals. This social ethos is in contrast to the West, where man is an individual first and last. Politics, business, and even private life in the West are an expression of this individuality. It is this contrast that sometimes makes it difficult for the two civilizations to see eye to eye on certain key issues.

How do Muslims tackle the subject of an anthropology of Islam as Muslims—as believers. ‘Ali Shar’ati has attempted an answer:

Religion is therefore a road or a path, leading from clay to God and conveying man from vileness, stagnation, and ignorance, from the lowly life of clay and satanic character, towards exaltation, motion, vision, the life of the spirit and divine character. If it succeeds in doing so, then it is religion in truth. But if it does not, then either you have chosen the wrong path, or you are making wrong use of the right path.⁶⁹

Anthropology, I am arguing, can assist in illuminating “the right path.” But the primary problem before us is not the balancing of options but finding out what they are.

The two myths pertaining to the Muslim social world that continue to provide material for attacking Muslims are the status of women (their lack of rights, their suppression and, connected to this, polygamy in the society) and the continuing tyranny, anarchy, and despotism of Muslim politics (in 1981 the paperback version of Wittfogel’s *Oriental Despotism* displays a picture of a mosque on its cover).⁷⁰ We have seen how anthropologists often reflect the second in their depiction of Muslim political life. The first point is less well adverted, as the literature has been largely by male anthropologists who have had little access to Muslim women.

Minor religious injunctions or customs are exaggerated to ridicule Islam. For instance, Muslims are prohibited from eating pork as it is not considered *ḥalāl*, or pure. Many other animals are also considered *ḥarām* or impure. This is one of the features best known about Muslims by non-Muslims. A minor social injunction has become a major theological issue (pig taboo among Muslims was the theme of an academic controversy in *Current Anthropology* recently). The prohibition is a subject of caricature and satire. It has become one of the symbols dividing the Western (pork-eating) and Muslim (non-pork-eating) world.

What methodological position would Islamic anthropology adopt to tackle these issues? One answer—and perhaps the easiest way out—is to be eclectic. But eclecticism is self-defeating, not because there is only one direction in which it is heuristically useful to move, but so many. We must choose—what Shari’ati calls—“the right path.”

There has been a suggestion by Muslim anthropologists that there is not one Islam but many Islams,⁷¹ a suggestion taken up by Western anthropologists.⁷² I disagree with this position. There is only one Islam, and there can be only one Islam, but there are many Muslim societies. We must then not look for numerous “Islams” but attempt to place the multitude of Muslim societies within the framework of one universal Islam.

In a paper written a few years ago, I had argued that the romantic view of the tribesman created as a result of the colonial encounter was false.⁷³ The view did not take into account the real hardships the tribesmen faced in militarily challenging imperial power. To the Pukhtuns in the Tribal Areas, for instance, there was no romance in fighting the British. Barbed wires and bombed civilian populations do not win friends. For the Pukhtuns, the encounter remained unceasing struggle for religion and freedom.

The debate between those examining tribal or nomad groups “romantically” versus those who see them realistically persists in modern anthropology. The Bedouins of Saudi Arabia provide a contemporary example. Lancaster, an Englishman, sees the Bedouins as “the noble savage,” embodying the virtues of the desert,⁷⁴ in contrast to the American anthropologist Cole,⁷⁵ one of the few Western anthropologists allowed to do fieldwork in Saudi Arabia. Muslim intellectuals do not necessarily harbor romantic views of tribesmen. To them Islam—and Islamic culture—lie in the city.⁷⁶ The “romantic” image obfuscates the real problems of the tribesman. The tribesman cannot ignore or reject the twentieth century; he cannot will away the state of which he is part.

To understand better the segmentary tribal social structure and organization with reference to the Pukhtun, one may use a taxonomic exercise.⁷⁷ Pukhtun society may be divided into two discrete categories. Each category is symbolized by a key concept, *nang* (honour) in one and *qalang* (rents and taxes) in the other case. *Nang* and *qalang* are the major conative and affective symbols in society. *Nang* society, based largely in the Tribal Areas, is acephalous, egalitarian, and placed in low production zones. *Qalang* society is ranked, literate, and dependent on large irrigated estates. *Qalang* creates superior and subordinate social roles. *Nang* and *qalang* are useful categories when looking at Muslim groups elsewhere.⁷⁸

In a recent study I have suggested we examine not the macro level of society—dynasties, armies, finances—nor the typical anthropological village but an intermediate level—the district.⁷⁹ On this level three key and distinct categories of society interact: the representatives of central government (whether

army or civil), traditional leaders (based on land or genealogy) and religious leaders (usually the *mullahs*). For this purpose we may construct the Islamic district paradigm (Islam here is understood in a sociological rather than theological sense). In particular, roles such as that of the *mullah*, one of the least understood and least studied, must be carefully researched. We have two distinct images of the *mullah*. One derives from the Western stereotype, the “mad mullah,” from Swat to Sudan. The image of the fanatic was fostered by the British as the *mullahs* stood against them when other groups in society and quietly acquiesced. The other image is that of saintly figures incapable of wrong, as suggested by Muslim writers. The truth is somewhere in between.⁸⁰ It is at this district level of society where we may predict and foretell the shape of things to come in Muslim society. The Islamic district paradigm will help us do so.

The anthropologist in some ways is an ambassador of his world to the village he is visiting. He not only interprets the native group to his world but his own world to them. If he is not conscious of his relationship he may create problems for future social scientists in that area or working with his group.

The question raises a related issue. Is good anthropology—from the point of view of the native, at least—sympathetic anthropology? Not necessarily. Anthropologists must record society as it *is* not as it *should be*. But I think it is imperative that anthropology be fair. More than the warts on the face of society need to be emphasized. It is for this reason we may today read *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*⁸¹ and find it a fair account although it was written by a colonial officer a generation ago. Some understanding of the virtues of a people especially as anthropologists see them, along with a scientific analysis, are important to the discipline.⁸²

It is worth noting that anthropology as a discipline is yet to grow in the Muslim world. Muslim anthropologists of stature are few and far between. The two outstanding examples are Nur Yalman of Turkey and Imtiaz Ahmed of India. Nur is almost unique in that his topic of study was a Buddhist village in Sri Lanka. He is unique in that for once in the contemporary world Islam was observing and not being observed. Imtiaz Ahmed, an Indian Muslim, examines his own people. He reflects the major sociological problems confronting Indian Muslims, in particular the continuing interaction with the larger Hindu cultural system. His work also discusses the growth of caste among Muslims.

The Muslim intellectual confronting the world today is sometimes moved to despair. He is ill-equipped to face it. His vulnerability diminishes him in his own eyes. He wanders between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born. His wounds are largely self-inflicted. At the root of his intellectual malaise lies his incapacity to come to terms with Islam in the twentieth

century.

The aim of anthropology remains to move from the specific to the general, to draw universal conclusions from specific situations. If so, is “Islamic anthropology” only for Islam or Muslims? No. The lessons we may learn will be methodologically valid for other world religious systems specifically and Third World cultural systems generally.

B. Muslim Societies

Let me briefly attempt a taxonomy of Muslim society—providing models with associated characteristics—based on historical sequences and social structure and organization. The taxonomy of Muslim society will illustrate the variety of structures and therefore the complexity of the problem. The models generally provide a chronological sequence corresponding to broad periods in Muslim history. But the categories are neither complete nor incontrovertible. The taxonomy is merely a starting point for a sociological discussion of Islamic anthropology.

The first, primordial model, one that is associated with early Islam and continues until today, is “tribal segmentary Islam.” This category may include the Bedouin, the Berber, and the Pukhtun. These tribes are spread from one end of North Africa to northwest Pakistan, but the model is recognizable and in many ways similar. A sense of tribal identity and an understanding of the tribal code are highly developed and the world is seen in relationship to one’s place on the genealogical charter. It was perhaps on account of his awareness of this form of social organization that the Prophet (SAAS) in his well known *hadith* warned against giving preference to blood relationship over Islam. Islam, then, transcends tribal loyalties.

The second category provided a model that may be called the “Ottoman” or the “cantonment” model of Islam and this contrasts sharply with the previous model. Chronologically, this model evolved during the zenith of Islamic history. The Ottomans had hit upon a solution that rather neatly solved the tribal problem. They selected administrators from one part of their empire and gave them charges in distant parts. Loyalties with tribal kin or land were therefore eliminated. The administrator served only the empire. To some extent the other great empires of Islam, such as the Safawis and the Mughals, also adopted the *Uthmanli* (Ottoman) model.

More lasting than the *Uthmanli* model were the “Great-River Islamic civilizations.” These civilizations, on the Indus, the Tigris, and the Nile, produced societies and dynasties with characteristic splendor, palaces, standing armies, and vast bureaucracies. Their rise and decline sometimes coincided with Islamic empires mentioned above, sometimes not. One aspect of these civilizations has been termed “Oriental despotism.”⁸³ With the slow pro-

cess of decay, Islamic societies fell prey to expanding Western powers eager for colonies and markets.

The fourth category (covering the last two centuries) may be termed “Islam under Western imperialism.” The West conquered and colonized the Muslims. In this phase a determined attempt was made by the West to portray Islam as stagnant and decadent. Along with discrediting or smashing the centers of Islam, other more interesting attempts were made to create alternative societies.

The most famous examples of these were the canal colonies of the Punjab in the late last century. A model province was ordered for South Asia. Virgin land was provided to settlers but the village scheme reflected the South Asian caste and structure. The *choudhry*—or *lambardar*—headed the village. Beneath him were members of the dominant *bardari* or *qom* (tribe or lineage). At the bottom of the ladder were the *kammis*, the occupational groups—the barbers and carpenters. The *mullah*, the religious functionary, who symbolized Islamic function in village society, was deliberately included among the *kammis* as a sign of humiliation. It was made explicit that Muslim rule was over. The *mullah*, the man who led the Muslim prayers in the mosque, was clearly subordinated to the *choudhry* or the *lambardar* of the village, who was appointed by the British. Perhaps the harshness was due to British incapacity to deal with an other altogether different category of *mullahs*, those among tribal groups who led revolts throughout the empire. The British dismissed the leaders of Islamic revolts against them as mere fanatics. The “mad mullah” was a handy imperial label to explain away Muslim leaders from Sudan to Swat. Until today the *mullah* has not entirely shaken off his association with the *kammis* of the village (for instance in the revenue records such as the *jamabandi*).

“Re-emergent Islam” is the fifth and contemporary model of Islam. Re-emergent Islam in the contemporary Muslim world is perhaps best symbolized by Pakistan both in its moments of glory and its moments of pain. The very creation of Pakistan itself was a living symbol of a renascent Islam and its power to mobilize followers. The name of its capital further symbolizes its self-conscious destiny, Islamabad—the abode of Islam. The defeat, humiliation, and physical disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 were symptomatic of the counter pressures that were generated by means of this form of force and vitality by the enemies of Islamic endeavor.

It is in this phase that the immediate past is sometimes renegotiated and sometimes rejected. For instance, Lyallpur, one of the major towns of the Punjab, named after the British Governor Lyall—who was referred to earlier—has been renamed Faisalabad after the popular King Faisal of Arabia.

But perhaps Iran has surpassed Pakistan as a living symbol of Islam. It is too early, however, to comment on the situation in Iran. The 1970s were—and it is predicted the 1980s and 1990s will be—decades of “re-emergent Islam.”

This model is as dynamic and as exciting with possibilities as it is unpredictable.

But Muslim social history is not all defeat and conquest, and societies not all dynasties and tribes. Muslim society is also characterized by towns and trade (which account for the spread of Islam in the distant parts of Southeast Asia) and the presence of vigorous minority groups living in Thailand, China, Russia, and India.

It is no coincidence that in the Western world Islam remains weak. There are only small Islamic groups in Western Europe, North and South America, Australia and South Africa. Islam remains confined in the main to Asia and Africa.

Over the last centuries, the world of Islam has rarely been tranquil. Internally it has constantly challenged and renewed itself. Religious leaders have emerged in the heart of Arabia, such as Muhammad ibn 'Abd al Wahab and Sidi al Hasan Lyusi in Morocco. Apart from these leaders who strove to reform the Muslims from within were those whose first task was to challenge the enemies of Islam. Through the ages Muslim leaders have emerged to challenge and engage those forces hostile to Islam. In the last century in South Asia, Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi in what is now Pakistan and Hajj Shari'at Allah in Bengal emerged to conduct *jihad*. Later in the century, the Mahdi emerged in Sudan, the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, and the Akhund in Swat to organize Muslims according to Islam and fight to maintain their religious and cultural boundaries against imperial forces.

Today Muslim society is again moving. Tribes and peasant groups in the Muslim world today are changing and will continue to change rapidly.

Weber has underlined the role of the Protestant ethic in the success story of modern capitalism. Work for its own sake, thrift, and austerity have combined to lay the foundations of capitalist society. But in parts of the Muslim world, the discovery of oil has brought new and untold riches abruptly. Wealth has been generated by forces that are not internal to the structure of society. Society is being changed as a result of economic changes that remain external. Unless anthropologists analyze the social situation and then the leaders of society utilize this knowledge, the tensions can be severe. Here, too, anthropological studies can assist in our understanding of the process of change.

C. Society During the Time of the Prophet (SAAS)

When Muslim leaders talk about creating a perfect contemporary Muslim society, what do they mean? To assist us in building this society we may refer to the original, ideal Muslim society at the time of the Prophet (SAAS). But have we a clear understanding or even picture of that model? Do we know the various inter-connected parts of the structure of that society? We must clearly—and through sociological models—know about the household, the

rites de passage, the genealogical charters related to questions of exogamy and endogamy, the role of elders, and the general code of behavior permeating society.

There are some speculative anthropological papers on the subject.⁸⁴ But we need a thorough study. It is fundamental to those talking of creating a contemporary Muslim society on the basis of an early Islamic model first to create a model of the original. To the best of my knowledge no such task has been attempted.⁸⁵ Related to the question of writing on early Islam is the life of the Prophet himself (SAAS).

The life of the Prophet (SAAS) needs to be produced in simple and clear terms for the contemporary generation of Muslims. As his life and example remain the primary paradigm of Islamic behavior, the exercise is vital to an understanding of Islam—both for Muslims and non-Muslims. His social roles—father, husband, friend, and so on—illuminate some key principles of Islamic social behavior. How these roles relate to fathers, husbands, and friends in our world needs to be discussed and elaborated.

The traditional Islamic scholar needs to shift the personality of the Prophet (SAAS) to where it belongs—the forefront of the Islamic argument. We need to know more of him as a social person: his humility (his doubts to Hazrat Khadijah (RAA) when he received the first revelations, his humor (rebuking his closest companion Abu Bakr (RAA) who had lost his temper and was beating a man for letting a camel stray during a pilgrimage. With a smile, he said, “look at this pilgrim”), his humanity (forgiving Hind, who is her hatred of him ate the liver of his uncle Hamzah, the lion of Allah), his gentleness (he could not contain his tears when he told the children and wife of Ja’far ibn Abu Talib of his death), his love of children (the Madinah boy with whom he joked, and whom he comforted when the boy’s pet nightingale died), and his kindness to animals (posting a man to guard the puppies of a bitch who had given birth on the way to the conquest of Makkah). These examples speak of a man of extraordinary perception, goodness, and gentleness.

A biography written by Muslims for Muslims is needed. And in spite of the need for such a biography those worthy of the subject are few and far between; of these al Fārūqī’s translation of Haykal⁸⁶ and Lings⁸⁷ may be mentioned. A notable—if somewhat apologetic—attempt was made a century ago by Sayyid Amir Ali.

Some Muslim biographers have rarely risen over simple hagiography. For our purposes what is needed is sociology not hagiography. On the other hand, the standard Western biographies—and some of the material is based on extensive research—are for the most part a generation old or older and reflect some of the traditional animosity to their subject.⁸⁸ Watt’s biographies still remain the standard Western work on the subject. There are a few “modern” biographies, such as Rodinson,⁸⁹ which relies on psychological analysis.⁹⁰

Recent Western scholarship appears undecided on how to treat the life of the Prophet.

VI. Conclusion

A. Recommendations

Muslims cannot dismiss Western—or more correctly non-Muslim—scholarship out of hand. They must come to terms with it. For instance, anyone reading about the Pukhtun will probably come to them through Caroe. The inaccuracies will thus be perpetuated. If Muslims are to object to such scholarship, they can do so only by creating their own alternative scholarship rather than by berating Western scholarship.

Anthropology is important to the study of Muslim society. It has much to offer in helping to understand and solve contemporary social problems. For instance, I have argued that the distribution of aid to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan would benefit if anthropological expertise were available.⁹¹ Sometimes the lacuna between the “actual” and the “ideal in Muslim society is wide. A good example is the actual status of Muslim women among certain groups, which contrasts with the ideal.⁹² Anthropological studies can help to compare the two positions in the hope of attempting a bridge. As another example, ethnic tensions which are often read as expressions of political secession in most nation states, may be minimized by a national understanding of different local cultures and their social characteristics.

Muslims are not living in a social vacuum. They are living in a world sometimes operating on different levels within their own society, and outside their society on levels that are sometimes hostile, sometimes neutral. They have to meet the challenge on every one of these levels. For better or for worse, Muslims are being “observed.” And the observations indicate lack of understanding and are usually hostile.⁹³

Keeping the above in mind, it is therefore recommended that:

1) A simple, lucid sociological account of the life of the Prophet (SAAS) by prepared by a Muslim. The book should address a wide audience—both Muslim and non-Muslim—and, as indicated above, be neither too academic nor too abstruse.⁹⁴

2) One major anthropological textbook of high standard should be produced and then translated into the main languages of the Muslim world. It should be used at the B.A. level and include sections on each major cultural zone.

3) Anthropological monographs on each major Islamic region should be produced for distribution in the Muslim world.⁹⁵ Initially, Morocco for

the Maghrib, Pakistan for South Asia, and Indonesia for Southeast Asia as distinct cultural-geographical types might be selected. These monographs should be simple, lucid, with attractive photographs, and used in colleges and universities.

4) Visits of Muslim anthropologists within Muslim countries should be arranged and encouraged and joint projects initiated. For instance, the study of the Berbers and the Puktuns is a logical and exciting study.

5) Long-term studies should be conducted comparing the major social categories, which would help us better understand and reach conclusions regarding Muslim society and its immediate contemporary problems.

The social categories to be examined could be peasants, tribes, and cities. For the first, I recommend a village in Pakistan (preferably the most populous province, Punjab) and an Egyptian village typically dependent on irrigated networks. For the tribes, the Berbers and the Puktuns would be a natural study, and for the cities, Cairo, Madinah, and Lahore.

6) Practical and development-oriented social studies should be framed in order to enable us to better plan for Muslim society in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

7) The ethnographic and anthropological content from the writings of the great Muslim writers should be extracted and compiled in a discrete set of volumes.⁹⁶ In this exercise classical Islamic scholars will have to assist the anthropologist.

A great store of anthropology exists in the writing of the classic Muslim scholars. It is disguised as history in one text, as memories in another, and straightforward ethnography in a third.

B. Conclusion

By failing to predict the contemporary Islamic re-emergence or assess its importance, Western scholars of Islam and its peoples were encouraged to make one of their most spectacular mistakes in recent times. They assumed secular trends in Muslim society as a logical development after the Second World War. Such was the direction pointed out by the Orientalists a generation ago.⁹⁷ The scholars of modern times, however, seem to follow blindly in the footpaths of their predecessors and fall into the same errors. A Western scholar of Iran, for example, wrote recently that:

although it is difficult to be certain, the trend seems to be away from physical resistance movements such as those during Muharram of 1963, and more towards ideological resistance through involvement and participation in the decision-making apparatus of the government.

His paper concluded thus:

Religiously oriented individuals, who may oppose the government, nevertheless join its ranks in the hope that they will have the opportunity to implement policies that will be more in accord with their view that Islam is an all-encompassing system of beliefs.⁹⁸

And this from an Iran expert on the eve of the religious revolution that brought down the Shah.

Muslim scholars trained in the West commit the same mistake. 'Aziz Ahmad concluded a paper on Islam in Pakistan thus: "The *'ulama*, having suffered a setback in 1970, Islamic socialism, in which Islam is largely decorative and diplomatic, has for the time being at least gained a complete victory over the religious parties."⁹⁹ The vigor of the Islamic revival has repudiated the predictions of, and surprised, Islamic scholars. To his credit, Clifford Geertz was one of the few Western writers who saw differently.¹⁰⁰

Having conceded the vigor of the Islamic revival, Muslims must now plan directions for it in order to best utilize its finer and dynamic impulses. They must, as Shari'ati suggests, prepare to discover what "the right path" means today and should mean in the future.

The anthropologist would do well to remember Socrates' statement, "I am not an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world." In the end the anthropologist must transcend himself, his culture, his universe, to a position where he is able to speak to and understand those around him in terms of their special humanity, irrespective of their color, caste, or creed.

This sentiment is a poor echo of the Prophet (SAAS)—who in his last great address spoke to mankind:

Allah has made you brethren one to another, so be not divided . . .
An Arab has no preference over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab; nor is a white one to be preferred to a dark one, nor a dark one to a white one, except in righteousness.

NOTES

- ¹ From *anthropos*, Greek for man.
- ² H. Beattie, *Other Cultures* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 273.
- ³ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (Basic Books, 1973) p. 3.
- ⁴ Clifford Geertz and L. Rosen, *Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society: Three Essays in Cultural Analysis* (Cambridge University Press, 1979).
- ⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969); and *Muslim Society* (Cambridge University Press, 1981).
- ⁶ W. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 40.
- ⁷ M. Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, Vol. I and II (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972).
- ⁸ O. Caroe, *The Pathans* (London, Macmillan, 1965).
- ⁹ R. Tapper, *Pasture and Politics: Economics, Conflict, and Ritual among Shahsevan Nomads of Northwestern Iran* (New York: Academic Press, 1979).
- ¹⁰ F. Barth, *Nomads of South Persia & The Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh Confederacy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961).
- ¹¹ Akbar S. Ahmed, *Pukhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); "Order and Conflict in Muslim Society: A Case Study from Pakistan," *Middle East Journal*, Spring 1982, pp. 184-204; and Akbar S. Ahmed and D. M. Hart, *Islam in Tribal Societies: From the Atlas to the Indus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); and I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy* (Oxford University Press, 1961).
- ¹² J. Banaji, "Crisis of British Anthropology," *New Life Review*, No. 64, 1970, pp. 71-85.
- ¹³ R. Needham, "The Future of Social Anthropology: Disintegration or Metamorphosis?," *Anniversary Contributions to Anthropology: Twelve Essays* (Leiden, 1970).
- ¹⁴ T. Asad, "Market Model, Class Structure, and Consent: A Reconsideration of Swat Political Organization," *MAN*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1972. For uneven Marxist analyses of Punjab villages, see S. Ahmad, "Class and Power in a Punjabi Village," *Monthly Review Press*, 1977; and H. Alavi, "The Politics of Dependence: A Village in West Punjab," *South Asian Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1971, and "Kinship in West Punjab Villages," *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, New Series, No. 6, 1972.
- ¹⁵ P. P. Rey, "The Lineage Mode of Production," *Critique of Anthropology*, London, No. 3, Spring 1975; and E. Terray, "Marxism and Primitive Societies: Two Studies," *Monthly Review Press*, New York, 1972; "Technology, Tradition, and the State," *Critique of Anthropology*, London, No. 3, Spring, 1975, and "Classes and Class Consciousness in the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman," in M. Bloch, ed., *Marxist Analyses and Social Anthropology* (London: Malaby Press, 1975).
- ¹⁶ M. Godelier, *Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology* (Cambridge University Press, 1977).
- ¹⁷ E. Peters, "The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica," *JRAI*, Vol. 90, 1960, pp. 29-53.
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- ¹⁹ E. R. Leach, *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon, and Northwest Pakistan* (Cambridge University Press, 1971).
- ²⁰ Gellner, *op.cit.*, p. 48.
- ²¹ A. W. Southall, *Alur Society* (Cambridge: W. Heffer, 1953).
- ²² E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937).
- ²³ Freud, *Totem and Taboo* (London, 1950).
- ²⁴ K. Polanyi, "The Economy as Instituted Process," in E. E. LeClair and H. K. Schneider, eds., *Economic Anthropology* (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 122.
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- ¹⁸ Polany, *op. cit.*, footnote 24.
- ¹⁹ Sahlins, *op. cit.*, footnote 25, 1969.
- ²⁰ Sahlins, *op. cit.*, footnote 25, 1968, p. 95.
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- ²² H. A. R. Gibb, *Muhammadanism* (Oxford University Press, 1980), first published in the Home University Library, 1949; and Gustave E. von Grunebaum, *Muhammadan Festivals* (N.Y.: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1951).
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- ⁴¹ W. M. Watt, *ibid.*, footnote 34, pp. 128-9.
- ⁴² M. D. Sahlins, 1968, *ibid.*, footnote 25, p. 5: "In its broadest terms the contrast between tribe and civilization is between War and Peace. . . lacking these institutional means and guarantees, tribesmen live in a condition of War, and War limits the scale, complexity, and all-round richness of their culture, and accounts for some of their more 'curious' customs."
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- ⁴⁵ F. Barth, *Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans* (London: Athlone Press, 1972).
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- ⁵⁵ F. Barth, *Selected Essays of Frederik Barth: Features of Person and Society in Swat: Collected Essays on Pathans*, Vol. II (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).
- ⁵⁶ Barth in Pehrson, footnote *infra* 57, p. vii.
- ⁵⁷ R. N. Pehrson, *The Social Organization of the Marri Baluch* (Chicago: Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 43, 1966); compiled and analysed from his notes by Federik Barth.
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- ⁶⁰ Talal Asad, "Anthropological Texts and Ideological Problems: An Analysis of Cohen on Arab Villages in Israel," *Economy and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1975, pp. 251-82.
- ⁶¹ A. S. Ahmed, *ibid.*, footnote 54 above.
- ⁶² J. Anderson, "Review of Ahmed's *Pukhtun Economy, 1980*," *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1981.
- ⁶³ M. M. J. Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). Fischer dedicated his book "to the warm, courageous and complex people of Iran," at a time when the crisis of the hostages in America and, consequently, anti-Iranian feeling, was at its height.
- ⁶⁴ W. E. Said, *ibid.*, footnote 6 above, p. 2.
- ⁶⁵ See A. S. Ahmed, "Al-Biruni: the First Anthropologist," Royal Anthropological Institute News, London, Spring 1984.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*; and H. M. Said, ed., *Al-Beruni: Commemorative Volume, International Congress* (Karachi: Hamdard Academy, 1979); and H. M. Said and A. Zahid, *Al-Beruni: His Times, Life, and Work* (Karachi: Hamdard Academy, 1981).
- ⁶⁷ N. C. Chaudhri, *The Continent of Circe* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965).
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- ⁶⁹ 'Ali Shari'ati, translated by Hamid Algar, *On the Sociology of Islam: Lectures by 'Ali Shari'ati*

- (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979), p. 94.
- ⁷⁰ Karl Wittvogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (Yale University Press 1957; N.Y.: Vintage Books, paperback version, 1981).
- ⁷¹ A. H. M. El-Zein, *The Sacred Meadows: A Structural Analysis of Religious Symbolism in an East African Town* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974); "Beyond Ideology and Theology: The Search for the Anthropology of Islam," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 6, 1977, pp. 227-254.
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- ⁷⁷ A. S. Ahmed, 1976, *ibid.*, footnote 54 above; 1980, *ibid.*, footnote 11 above.
- ⁷⁸ A. S. Ahmed and D. M. Hart, 1983, *ibid.*, footnote 11 above.
- ⁷⁹ A. S. Ahmed, 1982, *ibid.*, footnote 11 above; *Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan* (Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- ⁸⁰ For a contemporary political study of a *mullah* operating within traditional tribal networks in Waziristan, see my *Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan* (Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- ⁸¹ E. E. Evans Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford University Press, 1973).
- ⁸² Members of the First World—anthropologists and others—are not the only ones guilty of lack of sympathy for the Third World. The colonial mentality was never a monopoly of the West. The *kala sahib* (black sahib), one feature of empire in South Asia, still lives. A good example of a Third World writer living in and writing for the First World is V.S. Naipaul. His characteristic features—sharp powers of observation and brilliant skill at description combined with cynicism and contempt for his subject—are displayed to the full in his new book on Muslim society: V.S. Naipaul, *Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey* (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981). His method is what I would call "First World contemporary colonial," that is, fly into the local Intercontinental Hotel, pick up a taxi and drive around for a few hours or days picking up trivia before moving to the next place. In the course of his interviews, he uses the most objectionable methods, such as lying—as to Ayatollah Shirezi in Iran (Naipaul pp. 49-53)—and repeating private conversations confided by his hosts, whether Indian housewives or petty officials in Pakistan. To him these people, whose lives are sunk in personal and public chaos and irreversible poverty, appear to do little more than hawk, fart, nose-pick, deceive (themselves), and despair. Despair—the word sounding like a death-knell—is repeated in his work. His people are caricatures of a caricature.
- This is Naipaul's world view of the Third World. Muslims are no exception. Yet nowhere have I read an expression of personal gratitude for people who with such limited resources are so generously hospitable to him; no word of sympathy for their aspirations and struggle; no suggestion of hope for their goals. The "First World contemporary colonial" visits these people with a set objective in mind: he is extracting a new book from their lives. He cannot be distracted by humanity and its suffering. For a rebuttal of Naipaul by a Muslim scholar see Khushid Ahmad, "What an Islamic Journey, A Review of V.S. Naipaul, 1981," *Muslim World Book Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Spring, 1982.
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- ⁶⁵ This is an exercise I hope to conduct in the near future in *The Social Structure and Organization of Early Muslim Society* (Ahmed forthcoming).
- ⁶⁶ M. H. Haykal, translated by I. R. al Faruqi, *The Life of Muhammad* (Indianapolis; North American Trust Publications, 1976).
- ⁶⁷ Martin Lings, *Muhammad* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983).
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- ⁶⁹ Rodinson, *ibid.*, footnote 88 above.
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- ⁷³ H. M. Said and a. Zahid, 1981, *op. cit.*, footnote 66 above.
- ⁷⁴ For example, as a model, see Professor I. al Faruqi's translation of Haykal's *The Life of Muhammad* (1976). For interesting work along these lines, see some of the recent publications of the newly formed Islamic associations like: The Islamic Foundation, Leicester; the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, and the International Institute of Islamic Thought, Washington.
- ⁷⁵ For an attempt at bringing together the Islamic tribes under one cover in anthropology, see Ahmed and Hart, 1983, *op.cit.*, footnote 11, above.
- ⁷⁶ For one such attempt in this direction, see Akbar S. Ahmed, *Muslim Society: Readings in Thought, Development, and Structure* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).
- ⁷⁷ H. A. R. Gibb, 1980, *op.cit.*, footnote 32 above.
- ⁷⁸ G. Thaiss, "Religious Symbolism and Social Change: The Drama of Husain," in N. R. Keddie, ed., *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 366.
- ⁷⁹ Aziz Ahmad, "Activism of the 'Ulama in Pakistan," in N. R. Keddie, ed, *Scholars, Saints and Sufis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 272.
- ¹⁰⁰ Sarcastically, Clifford Geertz writes for the benefit of his overhasty Western colleagues: "We have a while to wait yet, I think, even in Tunisia or Egypt, before we see an explicit movement for a 'religionless Islam' advancing under the banner, 'Allah is dead!'" See Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 115.

VII
ECONOMICS

Islamizing Economics

Muhammad Najatullah Siddiqi

Islamizing Economics

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Since the Islamization of economics is already in progress, I prefer first to describe it as it is actually taking place. I will then suggest some priorities for future work with a view to speeding up the process.

The starting point of this process of Islamization is the mind of the economist who is aware of Islam or of the concerned Muslim who is also an economist. Neither can escape the realization that Islam is relevant to economics. This realization is not based only on what the Qur'ān *prescribes* in economic matters: moderation in consumption, spending in the cause of Allāh, prohibition of interest, etc. It is also underscored by the way the Qur'ān *describes* good life and approved behavior, contrasting it with bad life and undesirable behavior. Men's attitudes toward property, work, trade, saving, spending and so on may differ, and these attitudes have different consequences for the individual as well as for society. Man is certain to be concerned about these consequences and hence the need to analyze, describe, and prescribe. Thus a concerned Muslim economist is drawn to the study of motivation, behavior, institutional arrangements, and policies. His analysis is objective, but the perspective set by moral and social concerns is never lost. His policy prescriptions are directed toward goals whose desirability is based on revealed guidance, but the need for being realistic and for correct analysis of the existing situation is never forgotten. The professional economist who is aware of Islamic perceptions is also able to launch similar ventures even though they are purely "scientific," that is, devoid of the moral concern of a committed Muslim. In a mixed world of concerned Muslim economists and economists who are aware of Islam but not committed to it, Islamic economics is able to draw on the labors of both.

This process has been going on for some time. It is time to ask what has been its outcome to date. Has it resulted in the discovery of some new truths? Could it succeed in adding new dimensions to man's understanding of his economy? Has it enabled him to arrive at new ways of making Islamic economics more conducive to human welfare?

It can be argued that the Islamization process has drawn attention to behavior patterns and institutional arrangements resulting from the Islamic nature of the individual and society. The realization that these patterns may be more relevant to an Islamic as well as an Islamizing people than those incorporated into modern economics has diverted some energies to their study. New tools are being designed to analyze an Islamic economy and to help it achieve its policy ends. It will be useful to report briefly what has been achieved in this regard. We will then address ourselves to the question of how to proceed further in this venture.

Behavioral and Institutional Setting

Islamic economists have noted a number of behavioral characteristics specific to Islamic individuals. These are:

1. Economic agents care for others and serve social objectives in all economic activities such as consumption and saving, investment and production, employment and work.
2. The social objectives recognized and served by economic agents are (a) fulfillment of basic needs of all human beings, (b) balance and equity in the distribution of income and wealth, (c) stability, and (d) economic development.
3. Economic agents are motivated by self-interest and personal gain within the framework of social objectives and care for others.
4. Individuals exercise moderation in consumption and abstain from wasteful and luxurious living.
5. Individuals are inclined toward cooperation and mutual consultation with a view to realizing social objectives. This is especially relevant to the relation between labor and management, consumer and producer, and government and business.
6. The individual income-earner's decision to save is closely linked with his decision to invest.

Islamic economists have also identified the institutional arrangements unique to the Islamic system. These are:

1. Replacement of interest by profit sharing. (Of the several consequences of this departure from the capitalist system, the one to be noted, is that reward for financial investment is determined in the real market rather than in the money market.)

2. Creation of money through a process of investment (rather than through a process of lending, as in a capitalist system), effecting a firm linkage between the expansion of the money supply and the expansion of production.
3. Social institutions, especially the state, play an active role in the economic process in order to ensure the realization of the social objectives.
4. *Zakāh* serves as an effective instrument of transferring some resources from the rich to the poor, thus contributing to the realization of the social objectives.
5. A minimum level of income is guaranteed to all members of society who are, however, expected to work for it, to the extent that they are able.

What is the source of this knowledge? Did Islamic economists discover these behavior patterns and institutional arrangements through empirical studies? No. They discovered these characteristics in the Islamic society as envisioned by the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The source of their knowledge is, first, ideational not empirical. It is the Islamic description of, and prescription for, the good life. There is also a secondary source, that of Islamic history, especially in its authentic period, namely, the first forty years. The history of this early period of Islam confirms these findings. Though the later periods waver, they too confirm the long-term trends. Contemporary Muslim societies are no exception. Despite the strong influence of materialism, it is more instructive to understand contemporary Muslim economic behavior and institutions as deviations from these norms rather than as expressions of conventional economics. Even though the existing institutional arrangements in Muslim societies are very different from those in the early period of Islam, the latter remain the proper points of reference for an Islamizing people.

Tools and Instruments

Do Islamic economists find the existing kit of tools sufficient for the study of the new scenario presented by the characteristically Islāmic institutions and behavior patterns? Not quite. For one thing, there are new rates and ratios which to play. There is the array of the *zakāh* rates applicable to various kinds of assets. Then there are the profit-sharing ratios among the savers, the financial intermediaries, and the entrepreneur-producers. There are new instruments of central bank policy to control the supply of money and channel investible

funds in desired directions. There are the refinance ratio and the lending ratio*.

There is the minimum level of consumption to be guaranteed to all. Then there is the whole range of qualitative arguments to be introduced into the various functions in order to capture the social objectives. The conventional kit of tools is fine so far as geometry and algebra are concerned. But these tools are being increasingly harnessed to unravel the mysteries of phenomena unknown in the world of conventional economics. This has become more noticeable in the writings of the last few years. We have macro-models of consumption, income determination, and income distribution incorporating care for others with a utility function to be maximized; while *zakāh* and profit-sharing influence the decisions to save and to invest, the demand for money and the distribution of income. We have studies on monetary and fiscal policies incorporating new instruments of control and new ways of effecting transfers from the rich to the poor. Guarantee of a minimum level of income and moderation in consumption have also been incorporated into a macro-model of the economy. At the micro-economic level, multiplicity of objectives on the part of producers is being explored with a view to discovering what happens if the firm cares not only for profits but also for creating and maintaining job opportunities and ensuring adequate supplies of essential goods and services, for example. The impact of a cooperative spirit and mutual consultation on worker-employer and consumer-producer relationships is also being explored.

Drawing upon the Legacy

The study of *fiqh* by professional economists is proving to be productive. One recent example is a reclassification of factors of production on the basis of how workers are rewarded in accordance with Islamic law, namely, whether they are paid contractual wages or whether they share in the profits, and may thus be liable to losses. This classification places wage labor, land, buildings, and machinery in one group. Financial capital, the entrepreneur, and land and physical capital whose owners wish to supply them on a profit-sharing basis rather than for hire are placed in the other group. This classification is more relevant to a study of income distribution than the conventional classification into land, labor, capital, and enterprise, which focuses on production. There is a general awareness now, on the part of Islamic economists, that the details of *fiqh* literature are a must in taking a stand on such issues

*The lending ratio refers to the percentage of demand deposits the commercial banks in an Islamic system will be obliged to lend short-term, free of interest. The refinance ratio refers to the percentage of these interest-free loans that the commercial banks will be eligible to borrow from the central bank, free of interest.

as the stock and commodity exchanges, speculation and forward sales, and so forth.

Islamic economists often find themselves in a position in which they first have to listen to businessmen, bankers, and men of affairs and then have to discuss the problems posed by them with *Shari'ah* scholars with a view to advising the former. This can best be explained by the example of *murabahah*, which is a contract between A and B stating that B will buy a certain commodity for A, which A will purchase from B on deferred payment with a mark-up on the purchase price of B. The jurist bases his opinion on juridical texts relating to similar propositions. But the economist analyzes the issue in terms of its behavioral and institutional implications and its impact on the economic system as a whole. The businessmen's convenience as well as the society's overall interest both are involved. The point at issue is whether the contract is in harmony with the abolition of interest in letter as well as in spirit. The economist's analysis can help bridge the gap between conflicting juridical verdicts on the matter.

Other developments are also likely to contribute to the process of Islamization of economics. Dozens of doctoral theses are being written on subjects relating to Islamic economics. Those done in Western universities are mostly supervised by non-Muslim professors. The most popular subject has been Islamic banking, but economic thought and economic development have also been chosen in some cases. The interaction between professional notions and Islamic concepts during the process of writing these theses is likely to be productive. Those under preparation in the colleges of *Shari'ah* of various Islamic universities tend to focus on subjects of Islamic economics involving details of *fiqh*. There is some effort to provide the student with the supervision of a *Shari'ah* scholar as well as an economist. Here again the interaction between the student and the two supervisors is opening up new possibilities. The unique nature of Islamic economics, which must draw upon *Shari'ah* studies as well as economics, makes these experiments worthy of attention.

The teaching of Islamic economics in some colleges of *Shari'ah* at the bachelor's as well as the master's level is also bringing expertise in *Shari'ah* and economics closer together for both students and teachers. These programs provide an environment in which a synthesis between the Islamic legacy and modern knowledge in the field of economics may take place. The teaching of economics at modern universities in the Muslim world has not gone beyond a course on the economic system of Islam, the rest of the courses being taught along conventional lines. But even this preliminary step has opened a window through which a new awareness may enter that Islam is relevant for economics. The need for introducing Islamic concepts and values into the other economics courses is generally recognized but adequate literature for either teachers or students is not available. Some literature is being produced

by the research centers and institutes serving Islamic economics, but it is not designed for the classroom. Sooner or later the university departments themselves have to take the initiative for meeting this need, in which task the research institutions may actively collaborate.

Practical steps toward the Islamization of the economy recently taken in some Muslim countries have provided the greatest impetus to Islamic economics. The main areas of action so far have been the collection and disbursement of *zakāt* and the elimination of interest. Islamic economics has now become the concern of all: bankers, economists, businessmen, and even foreign investors are paying attention to it. Legislatures and ministries of finance, planning, commerce, etc. in some Muslim countries are dealing with issues necessitating the consultation of literature on Islamic economics. There is now some interaction among administrators, *Shari'ah* scholars, and economists in the wake of these new steps, which augurs well for the progress of Islamic economics.

The one issue all Muslim countries face is that of economic development. Islamic economics is appearing on the scene when imported strategies for development, whether capitalist or socialist, have failed. If Islamic economists have something to say on this subject they will get a hearing. Islamic economics also has the advantage of being the only indigenous school of economics in the Third World. Before the emergence of Islamic economics the Third World societies were obliged to opt for either socialist or capitalist economics, Muslim societies being no exception. For the first time, the Third World in general and the Islamic countries in particular are being introduced to a new approach to their economic problems, rooted in the ideas and cultural heritage of their own people. Given clarity of vision on the part of the spokesmen of this new approach, there is every chance of its being given a fair trial. But the sponsors of the new approach will have to be more specific and come forward with greater details.

Program for the Future

Inter-disciplinary Studies

There is a need to study the behavioral assumptions of Islamic economics, adopting an interdisciplinary approach. The assumption that men care for others, that they are not motivated by self-interest alone, is basic to Islamic economics. It is this assumption that distinguishes Islamic economics from Western economics. Next in importance is the assumption that education can sustain and promote altruistic behavior, that it can make men work for the social good even if it involves some sacrifices of personal gain. The economist needs the insights of psychology and sociology and those of history and an-

thropology for a proper study of these assumptions. Such a study may also define the limits within which the principle of care for others may operate. It is the balance between the two apparently conflicting principles of self-interest and altruism that supports the edifice of Islāmic economics, with its clear recognition of private ownership and its overriding emphasis on public purpose. An interdisciplinary approach is needed to spell out the implications of conflict and point to the ways in which conflict situations may be resolved. There is an abundance of *fiqh* literature relevant to this issue.

Empirical Studies

Empirical studies on the effects of *zakāt* collection and disbursement and the abolition of interest are now possible to the extent that these steps are being taken in some countries. Hypotheses relating to the impact of *zakāt* and the replacement of interest by profit-sharing, which have been presented in the literature so far, need to be put to the test. Even hypotheses relating to the behavior of the producer under the influence of Islamic teachings may be tested in selected regions.

The possibility of empirical studies underlines the need for more specific and narrowly focused hypotheses. Those we find in the literature relating to consumption, work, and so on, are couched in general terms.

Interaction with Shari'ah Scholars and Economists

Further progress of Islamic economics calls for closer cooperation between Islamic economists and *Shari'ah* scholars, on the one hand, and between Islamic economists and their colleagues, especially the non-Muslims among them. The way in which a *faqih* arrives at *hukm* or policy prescription (in matters not directly covered by the texts of the Qur'ān and Sunnah) and the way in which an economist does so have a great deal in common. Both are trying to promote the social good and resolve any conflict between private interest and public interest. But each does it in his own way. The jurist often quotes authorities more than reporting arguments or stating his reasons. The economist is trained to deal with reasons in an analytical manner. Interaction with the economist is likely to force the jurist to go back to first principles more often than he has lately been accustomed to. The jurist, however, has a broader perspective on the objectives of the *Shari'ah* in relation to economic transactions, with which the economist's narrowly focused training never provides him. Any policy prescriptions coming from the economists need to be reexamined in a broader perspective. The economist should not, however,

accept the juristic verdicts passively. Rather, he should understand the jurist's methodology, assimilate his perspective, and reexamine the issue. Only this kind of close interaction, centered on specific issues such as rent, profit-sharing, or *zakāh* on industrial assets, is likely to yield a body of *ahkām* or policy prescriptions more responsive to the needs of society and in consonance with the objectives of the *Shari'ah*.

Interaction with the profession of economics is needed to ensure rigor in analysis and relevance to the international economic situation. Islamic economics is not meant to be specific to Muslim countries. Its appeal is universal. Let its descriptions and prescriptions be examined closely by men of robust common sense in comparison and contrast with that with which they themselves are familiar. They may judge Islamic economics on the twin criteria of logical consistency and practical efficacy in the light of their own understanding of the economic situation. Since these criteria also constitute the points of reference for Islāmic economists, along with the objectives of the *Shari'ah* which is their unique point of reference, they definitely stand to gain by this interaction. It is also a necessary exercise for gaining universal acceptability for Islamic economics. The objectives of the *Shari'ah* are none other than the repositories of what is good for man. Professional economists cannot but appreciate that Islamic economics is seeking to ensure through reason, aided by divine guidance, some of the very ends they are seeking to secure through reason alone.

Putting Ideas to Practice

Islamic economics has recently attracted the attention of the rulers of some Muslim countries who want advice on development strategies, financial management, and welfare programs. This is a welcome development as it makes fresh demands on this nascent discipline and obliges it to move from the general to the specific and from the academic to the practical and the operational. Islamic economists need to make their own analysis of the existing conditions in the countries in which they operate before they can translate their models of banking and finance, fiscal policy and distribution, into operational programs in specific countries. So far this has not been a strong point of Islamic economics. The research institutions serving Islamic economics should pay special attention to this aspect of their work.

Teaching Programs

The classroom and the faculty lounge have been the cradle of academic disciplines, but Islamic economics has yet to find its proper place in these

areas. A concerted effort on the part of its sponsors can easily win ground, as their case is strong. No department of economics anywhere can afford to ignore it altogether. Colleges and universities in the Muslim world can be persuaded to accord it a much better treatment. But the lack of suitable teaching materials and the difficulties in gaining access to what is already available are frustrating indeed. Better arrangements of distribution of the available literature and a planned effort to prepare suitable reading materials, including textbooks, should receive top priority.

Conclusion

The crucial factors in implementing this program are leadership and organization. The idea of Islamic economics has proved its vitality by making significant progress so far with little institutional support. But the demands addressed to it now are too large to be met without adequate institutional arrangements. Some of the vast intellectual resources of the *ummah* have to be mobilized through specialized centers of learning to meet these challenges. Fortunately, some institutions are already prepared to do just that. It remains to be seen whether they have the kind of leadership and organization needed to bring it off.

Toward Islamic Economics

Muhmoud Abu-Saud

Toward Islamic Economics

Mahmoud Abu-Saud

In this paper, I shall confine myself to the development of a basis for an economic system within an Islamic state. By Islamic state, I mean that state which believes in and applies Islamic injunctions and teachings in all spheres of life. The aim is to formulate a general theory for a system of Islamic economics that, once defined, can help researchers to begin their analytic studies without difficulty.

All Muslims at present are living under governments that do not observe the *Shari'ah* and whose laws are mainly derived from non-Islamic doctrines. A new awareness however, among Muslims urges them to proclaim the application of their Islām.

Any economic system is derived from the general ideology that prevails in a the society that applies it as a means to achieving the goals promised by that ideology. Accordingly, the realization of the Islamic economic system is dependent on the adoption of an Islamic doctrine (*Shari'ah*) or ideology in the political, social, and aesthetic spheres of life. All these different spheres of human life are interdependent; it is impossible to completely separate one sphere from the other. To treat one of them on its own is only a means of facilitating the study.

Methodology

Subject

To study Islamic economics, we have to consider two main issues: (1) the relationship of economics to the other spheres of secular life within Islamic ideology; and (2) the principles of Islamic economics.

As to the first issue, economics represents the material element that unites with the spiritual to constitute the human being. The classical Muslim jurists cited its contents under the expression *mu'āmalāt*, meaning all material dealings. This encompasses all rules administering the material dealings among

individuals and the exchange of goods for the purpose of mutual benefits. In this sense, economics has its effects on, and is likewise affected by, the political, social, and moral aspects of individuals and their collectivity.

The second issue constitutes the core of this study.

Means of Research

To study the two above-mentioned issues, one should consider the following:

1. All Qur'anic and *Sunnah* texts touching upon the subject must be identified. Further, the study must clarify the *raison d'être* behind the texts.
2. Reference to classical *fiqh* must be invoked to help interpret the texts and apply them in our times.
3. Full benefit must be drawn from the science of *uṣūl al fiqh*.

Such criteria should be applied within wider Islāmic rules (*al kulliyāt*), the most important of which is that of general license (*al ibāḥah*). Modern contractual dealings should not necessarily be expressed in old forms. It is necessary to adapt *uṣūl* instruments in judging modern dealings.

The Economic System in an Islāmic State

Subject of Economics

In Islamic system, economics comprises two elements:

1. *Al Mu'āmalāt*, the study of human activities related to the exchange of utilities to the satisfaction of material needs as regulated by Islamic rules.
2. The study of the behavior of individuals and society in the course of their production, consumption, and distribution of goods.

When studying *al Mu'āmalāt*, we have to bear in mind that we are not bound to limit ourselves to the various forms and modules our ancestors established to suit their requirements. On the contrary, one should establish new forms and new formulae to adopt to the exigencies of our complicated modern lives.

Moral values per se should not be considered a quantum in our new concept of Islamic economics. They have to be reflected in economic behavior as the “motives” behind material activities and transactions. In the ideal Islamic state, Islamic moral values have a great impact on individuals’ every-day transactional behavior. To emphasize Islamic moral values, to describe them as a distinct characteristic feature of Islāmic economics, and to try to quantify them in the guise of factors or coefficients is futile. Supply and demand curves, market movements, productivity—all these phenomena carry the traits of Islamic values and accordingly are influenced by them.

The Western principles of utilitarianism or materialism are not the only motivation behind each and every economic activity in the West. Individuals and societies have other motives and incentives, and psychological factors also affect transactional behavior. One should also be careful not to exclude the material motive from Islamic analysis, since there is nothing against it in Islam. In fact, it is natural that the investor wants to maximize his profits and that the consumer wants to maximize his benefits and satisfaction.

The basic principles on which Islamic economics is founded are derived from moral values that do not contradict or negate the maximization criterion. On the contrary, I see them as conducive to the maximization of profit and utility without a harmful effect on the dealings among individuals as collaborating members of their societies or between individuals and their collectivity. After all, moral values are the subject of study in disciplines other than economics.

Zakāh

Zakāh is the essence of Islamic economic philosophy and the frame of its functional system.

As a philosophy, it propounds the fact that Allah is the Lord and Creator of all beings and the Original Owner of all wealth. In this capacity, He imposes a tax on all fortunes in the hands of His servants.

Zakāh also implies that everything depreciates and vanishes except the Eternal Allah. All material wealth, including money, must depreciate by the lapse of time. Unless wealth is invested, it depreciates in value or in substance. These two major principles—the origin of ownership and depreciation—constitute the corner stones of Islamic economic doctrine from which the basic principles of the system are derived. The first is herein called ritualistic *zakāh* (*zakāt al ta’abbud*), while I refer to the second as the transactional *zakāh* (*zakāt al mu’amalāt*).

Principles of Islamic Economic System (Transactional Zakāh)

Principle of Vicegerency (Istikhlāf)

This principle is derived from the cardinal Islamic principle of Tawhīd. Allāh is the Lord of all beings (*Rabb al 'Ālamīn*). Accordingly, ownership in Islam belongs to Allāh, Who entrusted man with all wealth on earth with a view to exploiting it according to Allāh's will. Private ownership is recognized by Islām but only as *per pro*—as a delegation from the original Lord to His agent man. Thus, man cannot dispose of whatever is in his possession without restrictions, or in a manner discordant with the terms inscribed by the Lord.

Private ownership is *not* a social function, nor is natural wealth the property of the society or collectivity. All wealth belongs to Allāh alone and private ownership is only a metaphoric expression. There are three main restrictions on private ownership:

1. Ownership must be acquired by legitimate means.
2. Private ownership should not jeopardize the public interest. Accordingly, if public interest requires the acquisition of a private property, the owner must be fully and fairly compensated.
3. The owner must invest and utilize what he owns in a satisfactory manner and without violating the stipulated laws.

The Law of Depreciation

Again, this is a principle derived from Tawhīd, and it is universally acknowledged as a law of existence. Economists apply this law in their calculations of the gross national product of any society and, indeed, in every calculation of any assets. It is important to note that money is exempt from this law in non-Islamic concept, while it is not in Islam.

Islam, by considering money as a means to procure economic satisfaction, does not recognize it as a genuine good. Nevertheless, it can be taken as a “representative of goods,” and hence it can bear some qualifications ascribed to goods. If so, and if all goods do depreciate by the lapse of time, money cannot be considered a “super-good,” nor can it be immune from depreciation.

Once this law is put into practice, the entire system of economic concepts and models that prevails in the non-Islamic West takes a completely different shape.

If money were subjected to depreciation, as it should be, nobody would be interested in holding it back. It would be put back into circulation as soon as it were received, causing more demand on available goods. Continuous effective demand would lead to boosting production to increase supply, leading to more employment and higher wages. Higher wages would lead to higher demand and more supply, and so on.

Work and Reward

No work should be done without reward, and no reward should be distributed without work. Productive work is imperative, according to Qur'anic injunctions, and to reward it is only a law of existence.

Except in cases of inheritance, grants or gifts, and payment of *zakāh* to those who deserve it, no "reward" should be legitimized unless it is genuinely earned. Interest as a reward for saving money is usury and is categorically prohibited. Even rent for agricultural land without any contribution of the landlord to the tilling of the land is considered by most to be unearned income and is forbidden. As a corollary, the reward must be commensurate to the work. Fair reward is characteristic of an Islamic system. Authorities' intervention is least needed to enforce this rule if the system – as a whole – is adopted.

Loss for Gain

Besides the *hadīths* that propound this principle, it can also be deduced from the general concept of justice in Islam. In fact, it is almost axiomatic to say that those who hope for gain out of any transaction must also be ready for a comparable loss.

There is consensus among Muslim jurists that this principle is basic all Islamic transactions. Any contractual dealing that stipulates an assured gain without possibility of loss is illegal and therefore void. Even if in such a contract the principal is guaranteed in case of loss, the contract is null and void.

On the basis of this principle, *muḍārabah* and all forms of joint ventures and association have been formulated and sanctioned since the dawn of Islam.

No Harm or Hurt

This *hadīth* is essential for delineating the rights and obligations of persons – natural or moral – when dealing among themselves. No one is allowed to inflict harm on himself or others when exercising any economic activity.

There are certain injunctions citing harm. For instance, dealing in alcohol, pork, obscene material, or narcotics, is strictly forbidden. Other fraudulent or harmful dealings have to be defined by the authorities and obviously differ from place to place and from time to time.

If we apply the above-mentioned five principles, we take many moral values into consideration in our everyday material dealings. Our economic decisions, whether on the individual or on the societal level, should be administered by these principles, which are essentially moral but effectively practical and actually imparted in our material economic activities.

The Role of the State in the Economic Order

In Islam, the individual is originally free. He enjoys political, social, moral, and economic freedom as defined by Islam. As human freedom cannot be absolute, however, an independent entity is formed, not to deprive individuals of their freedom but to defend this freedom and allow it to function within the framework of Islamic rules and regulations.

The *Shari'ah* allows the state to interfere in all societal activities of its citizens, but only within the narrowest limits and mainly in order to apply the basic principle of "enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong," to safeguard citizens' rights, to defend the country, and to provide public services and utilities when individuals are not in a position to undertake such responsibilities. Accordingly, nationalization as a general policy and as applied by any Muslim country is neither Islamically legitimate nor warranted.

Islamic Economics: The State of the Art

Muhammad Akram Khan

Islamic Economics: The State of the Art

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Introduction

The present paper is intended to achieve three objectives: 1.) To discuss in board terms, the issues and methodology of Islamic economics as it exists today; 2.) To point out deficiencies in the contemporary literature on Islamic economics and 3.) To suggest a plan for further research.

Before proceeding, three explanations seem appropriate. First, although the tradition of writing on economic issues can be traced back to the second century of Islam, the present study focuses on the literature produced during the last fifty years. Second, this chapter is not a survey of the literature and hence does not summarize different shades of opinion on each subject. Such useful surveys have been carried out by others, most prominently by Muhammad Najatullah Siddiqi.¹ Instead, I will emphasize the questions not faced by Muslim economists. In doing so, I have made an effort to develop a general approach for further research. Third, I have no pretensions of knowing more than the scholars on whose writings I shall be commenting. In fact, I am indebted to all these writers on Islamic economics. Without their valuable contributions I could not have written this chapter. My comments are intended to enhance the work of Islamization of economics further and not to belittle the work done so far.

Main Currents

The discussion on main currents of Islamic economics involves the identification of the background of contributors and an overview of the subjects

of study. There are three categories of scholars who have contributed toward Islamic economics: *‘ulamā*, modernists, and Western-educated economists. The *‘ulamā* have been torch-bearers of the subject. They have done pioneering work to instill an awareness among the Muslim elite that Islamic economic teachings are comprehensive and offer a suitable solution to the economic problems of man. Their main emphasis has been on delineating the economic teachings of Islam in contemporary terms. They have adopted an orthodox approach that traces all the teachings back to their sources. The modernists, on the other hand, have been mainly engaged in reinterpreting the primary sources and adjusting the orthodox line of arguments to contemporary situations. Here, one finds significant departures from the orthodox position. Because of the common man, the modernists have not been able to receive popular support for their views. The third category of scholars, Western-educated economists, have recently shown remarkable enthusiasm for developing Islamic economics. They have the expertise in economic analysis. Based on what the *‘ulamā* enunciate as basic economic teachings of Islam, Muslim economists have started to develop economic analyses. Efforts in model-building and generalization have also begun. Western-educated economists hold a bright promise for the future of Islamic economics. But most of them do not have direct access to the primary sources of Islam. A more useful contribution may be made by them as soon as this deficiency is overcome.

A survey of the literature reveals that the development of Islamic economics has been lopsided. Some areas, such as interest, interest-free banking, *zakāh*, land tenure, and public finance, have attracted more attention from scholars than others. Scholars have paid only scant attention to other subjects. Some questions have not been addressed at all. They are the gaps of Islamic economics.

Methodology

We discern a variety of approaches in the methodology of Islamic economics. The *‘ulamā* have been, mainly, restating the position of the *Sharī‘ah* on various questions. Their explanations contain an implicit awareness of the social reality but their emphasis has been on the legality of each situation. In their writings, juridical content is predominant. In a strict sense their contributions may not be classified as economics, but in the context of Islamic economics their writings form the core of the subject. They have provided a strong toehold for the development of the subject.

The writings of both modernists and Western-educated Muslim economists are mainly *conceptual* and not *theoretical*. They are conceptual because they provide an elaboration or analysis of the basic principles of Islāmic economic teachings. They are not theoretical because they do not take into account real-

life situations. A theory is generally considered to be a non-falsifiable abstraction of complex real-life situations to explain certain phenomena and to forecast future behavior of the variables involved. The literature on Islamic economics, as it exists today, explains or analyzes the teachings of Islam. It is not related to real-life situations. That is what makes it conceptual and not theoretical. To illustrate, the idea that the Islāmic law of inheritance leads to a greater distribution of wealth is conceptually sound and understandable. But a theory propounding the same conclusion would require study of a real-life situation in a time-space framework. Before such a theory is generalized for other, similar situations it has to be tested against empirical evidence and modified, if necessary. As long as an idea is not based on the observation and analysis of real-life situations it remains a concept that may appear to be logical intuitively. The literature on Islamic economics is conceptual and not theoretical in this sense.

At this point it seems pertinent to quote Abdul Mannān on the secularization of Islamic economics: "The tendency to test each and everything with limited human knowledge and bias may destroy the basic foundations of Islamic economics."²

Abdul Mannān fears that economists, to remedy the lack of empiricism in Islamic economics, will now "test each and everything." This can never be done. The fundamental framework and the axioms of Islamic economics have been derived from divine sources, and there is no question of their being tested empirically. But behind the shield of divine axioms are hidden hundreds of ideas derived from these axioms. Empirical evidence is required to verify these ideas, which themselves are not divine. They have only been conceived within the divine framework. Escape from empirical validity of these ideas would weaken the foundations of Islamic economics and might not let it transcend juridical restatements.

CONTRIBUTORS	AREA OF STUDY	METHODOLOGY
' <i>Ulāmā</i>	Economic Teachings of Islam as in Primary Sources	Re-stating <i>Shari'ah</i> Position; Legal Jargon
Modernists	Re-interpreting Primary Sources	Conceptual and Not Theoretical; Legal Jargon
Economists	Economic Analysis Based on Economic Teachings of Islam	Conceptual and Not Theoretical; Economic Jargon

Another escape from empirical testing lies in the statement that Islamic economics is a “perceived reality of the future.”³ A large part of the literature on Islamic economics deals with the *ideal* Islamic society—a goal toward which the Muslim *ummah* should move. To the extent that this approach sets up the objectives and brings to light the extent of departure from the ideology, it is a valuable contribution. But it does not provide Islamic economics with a theory. The approach remains conceptual.

In sum, what the *‘ulamā* have stated in theological jargon, Muslim economists have restated in economic jargon. They have tried to explain how Islamic teachings may be applied to a modern society. On its own it is no mean task. They have gone a long way toward soliciting support from the Muslim elite for the economic concepts of Islam. But stripped of its economic jargon, the basic approach remains the same as that of the *‘ulamā*. This is not to belittle the contribution of Muslim economists. Their work has provided a sound footing for further research. Without this basic work, the contribution of the *‘ulamā* would have remained unheeded. But they have tackled the subject at no higher plane than that of the *‘ulamā*. If the work of the *‘ulamā* was not helpful to solving the economic malaise of the *ummah*, neither is the work of the Muslim economists.

To our mind this is a premature effort. Muslim economists should not worry about the recognition of Islamic economics. If they are able to offer adequate solutions to the economic problems of man, recognition will come by itself. Islamic economists need to work without any artificial attempt to integrate Western techniques of analysis. Once real-life situations permit empirical studies and theoretical formulations, they may, as a natural course of action, adopt mathematical tools. At the present stage of evolution, Western methods create a displacement of goals and are not imperative for discussing the concepts of Islamic economics.

Critical Analysis of the Main Themes

We shall now analyze the main themes of Islāmic economics. The objective is to show the gaps and deficiencies of the existing literature and to prepare a plan for future action.

Ribā

Ribā has been one of the most extensively discussed subjects in Islāmic economics. Its earlier discussions revolved around juridical clarifications. Later, the modernists tried to argue that Qur’ānic *ribā* does not cover interest charg-

ed by banks. But the writings of the *‘ulamā* and Muslim economists and the deliberations of successive seminars and conferences have clarified the ambiguity. There is a consensus now that *ribā* covers all types of interest.

The discussion of *ribā* has almost always implicitly assumed that the abolition of interest is a legal issue. Except for N. H. Naqvi's *Ethics and Economics*,⁴ there is hardly any explicit awareness of the economic roots of interest. Mere legal prohibition of interest may not effectively eliminate interest from the economy. Even if it is legally banned, it may continue to exist in disguised forms until an economic mechanism is discovered to make it redundant. To our knowledge (and Allah knows best), this area of inquiry is still waiting for someone's efforts. The literature so far produced has not yet examined all the varieties of explicit and disguised forms of *ribā* prevalent in various business transactions. A first step should be an investigation into these forms before a theory for its effective elimination from the economy can be formulated.

Discussions of *ribā* often encompass its dysfunctional role. For example, it is argued that *ribā* is responsible for unemployment, inflation, trade cycles, stagflation, and concentration of wealth. The arguments for these issues are mostly intuitive and deductive. Hardly any material cites real-life data in support of these conclusions. Although *ribā* is a fact of life and real-life data are abundantly available, Muslim economists have not utilized them. This is not to argue that their conclusions are invalid, for such an argument would, again, be intuitive. The point is that they need to be substantiated.

Another blank area is the absence of a critique of the theory of interest. Muslim economists have not faced it squarely. The critique needs to be developed in a Western as well as an Islamic framework.

Islamic Banking

Islamic banking also has attracted the attention of Muslim scholars. From the crude conjectures on alternatives to modern banking to sophisticated models, the literature in the area is perhaps the richest. The establishment of a number of Islamic banks has led the discussion further.

The research on Islamic banking has mainly concentrated on the types of transactions Islamic banks are permitted to do. This is a legitimate prerequisite for any Islamic bank. But the economic consequences of the forms of transactions adopted by Islamic banks have not yet received adequate attention. In other words, the focus has been on juridical rather than on economic issues.

All the conceptual models of Islamic banking (with the exception of the one presented by Bāqar al-Ṣadr⁵) have been presented in an ideal Islamic set-

ting. Consequently they do not take into account the interaction and competition with conventional banks with which Islamic banks in a contemporary situation have to deal. The model of Bāqar al-Ṣadr is an attempt to devise a juridical mechanism for an Islamic bank in a present-day not-fully-Islamic society. But now that Islamic banks are functioning without waiting for the eventual emergence of the ideal Islamic society, it is time to evaluate the impact of competition from conventional banks on Islamic banks.

The most widely accepted alternative for Islamic banking is profit-sharing (this is not to discount the other methods suggested by Muslim scholars). But the literature does not fully explore the limitations of profit-sharing for the financial system. For example, profit-sharing cannot be an adequate basis for financing short-term loans or the development of infra-structure and small businesses. The amount of financing for the above purposes is significant enough to curtail the utility of profit-sharing as an alternative for banking. This, obviously, points toward the need for a more comprehensive basis for financing. Shaikh Maḥmud Aḥmad's idea of the time-multiple-counter-loan has the potential of becoming a basis for the credit system.⁶ Unfortunately Muslim scholars have not yet given it serious thought.

The limitations of profit-sharing as an alternative to interest is also evident from the practice of Islamic banks. Islamic banks have only minimally engaged in partnerships with profit-sharing. A larger part of their profit comes from installment sales, leasing, guaranteed mark-ups, and foreign exchange transactions. Their preference for these types of transactions stems from the higher risk involved in profit-sharing, the prevalence of dishonest business practices, the problem of controlling managing partners, and the absence of sound management practices among clients.⁷

The situation not only speaks for limitation of profit-sharing as an alternative to interest but also points toward the trap into which Islamic banks are most likely to fall. The legality of installment sales, leasing, and mark-ups is not beyond doubt. Interest seems to have sneaked into them in a disguised form. The literature on Islamic banking does not take full cognizance of this departure from ideology. It does not explore thoroughly the ways in which interest may creep back into the economy. In other words, the prophetic wisdom to prohibit *ribā al faḍl* as a preventive measure has not been extended to its logical end.

Another blank area is the evaluation of Islamic banks in operation. A system of continuous appraisal of the functioning of Islamic banks needs to be introduced. The focus of evaluation, however, should be adherence to the *Shari'ah* and the achievement of stated objectives.

Zakāh

Zakāh is another area in which Muslim scholars have shown substantial interest. Since *zakāh* is an article of faith as well as a unique measure to fight poverty, it has attracted the attention of Muslim scholars. Most of the literature on *zakāh* deals with legal and administrative matters. The economic implications of *zakāh* discussed by Muslim economists are intuitively appealing and logically sound. But these deductions are no more than romantic assertions. For example, it is often argued that *zakāh* will lead to a redistribution of wealth. But there are no clear answers to the following questions:

What is the state of distribution of wealth in Muslim economies at present?

How many Muslims are paying *zakāh* on their own without government enforcement?

What would be the probable level of evasion, once *zakāh* law is enforced by the state?

What is the impact of *zakāh* in countries where it is in force at the state level?

What is the extent of poverty and to what extent can *zakāh* be helpful in alleviating it?

How far are the growth-and-distribution arguments in favor of *zakāh* compatible with other?

How does *zakāh* affect work incentives?

Although most of the literature on *zakāh* deals with juridical issues, many of these still need to be resolved. As long as it is not clear which types of property are subject to *zakāh* and at what rates, it is dangerous to accept the economic implications of *zakāh* discussed in the literature.

Literature on *ushr* is scanty. Most writers treat *ushr* and *zakāh* as being identical. Separate discussion of *ushr* in the context of rural economies of the Muslim world is rare. Like the literature on *zakāh*, discussions on *ushr* are not related to the mass poverty existing in the Muslim countries. Policy issues justifying *ushr* and romanticizing its impact have already been discussed.

Public Finance

Discussions of public finance in Islam are mainly inspired by earlier works on *kharāj*. Most of the literature enumerates the various forms of revenue in early Islamic societies. Little attention is paid to the change that has taken

place during the last thousand years or more. Some writers have deduced the principle of taxation in Islam. Most of the discussions have a legal slant. Like the rest of the literature on economics, they are devoid of any real-life content. For example, there is no discussion on the contemporary situation of taxation. How would the Islamic taxes fit into the secular taxes? What would be the economic impact of Islamic taxation? There is almost no analysis of the existing taxation from an Islamic point of view. Until real-life conditions are integrated into the ideological postulates, little will be achieved by present discussions.

Land Tenure

The Muslim economies are suffering from gross social injustice. The rural sectors have a devastatingly exploitative land tenure system. The studies on the land tenure system of Islam deal mainly with:

- The legal position of different contracts of land tenure;
- The legal status of different types of land;
- The taxes leviable on land;
- A general plea for a more just system;
- General, ad hoc, reformatory measures.

Most issues that have attracted the attention of scholars have not been fully resolved. The question of land tenure has been dealt with in isolation of the economy as a whole. Egalitarian recommendations have been made by social reformers who have not analyzed the economic implications of their suggestions.

A lot of useful work on the rural economies of the Muslim world has been done by international agencies and independent development economists. These studies cannot be utilized as such because they have been carried out in the analytical framework of Western economics. But parts of these studies may be used with benefit to construct a theoretical model for the improvement of Muslim rural economies in the Islamic framework. The major thrust of future research in this area should be toward acquiring an awareness of the real-life conditions of the Muslim world. This may give a starting point for transforming these economies into the just economic order of Islam.

Although the literature on land tenure systems is mainly historical, it does not trace the development in the contemporary era. It would be of vital significance if the land tenure systems of Muslim economies were traced historically to the present era. This process may provide us with a cutoff point

at which the colonial powers replaced the Islamic land tenure system with a secular land tenure system. This may help us to understand the historical process of social injustice and may also give us insights into how to undo it. This would be a tremendous task but would put the whole question of social justice in proper perspective.

Labor

The literature on labor is scanty. It is mainly inspired by Western movements for greater labor rights. Muslim scholars have tried to adjust and reinterpret their basic sources to look more progressive. But questions of fundamental significance have been left out of the discussion. Recommendations for a just wage, profit-sharing, better working conditions, benevolence toward employees, interest-free loans, etc., have been made quite frequently. But no attempt has been made to treat these concerns in an overall economic model. Capitalist economies have recently adopted many improvements in the condition of workers. It has been fully appreciated that the organization of the production sector on the basis of an employer-employee relationship is characteristic of capitalism. The Islamic teachings of *ukhuwwah*, *shūra*, *ta'āwun*, *ihsān*, and so on, do not fit into this model. They present various inherent contradictions. The maximization of profit, which is the objective of an employer, is achieved by equalizing marginal productivity of employees with a marginal wage rate. The employer-employee relationship makes maximization of profit possible, but in an Islamic setting where the above values have to be practiced, the employer-employee relationship cannot be sustained. The firm organized on the basis of an employer-employee relationship cannot function profitably if the employer has to practice the above values of Islam. We need to think of some alternative basis for organizing economic activity in the production sector.

Even if we grant that there is no contradiction between Islamic values and an employer-employee organization of the production sector, the literature does not face all the logical questions. For example, how shall wages be determined without becoming trapped in the neoclassical doctrine of marginal productivity? How to reconcile the right to strike and lock-out with Islamic values of *ukhuwwah*, *shūra*, *ihsān*? These and similar questions have not been addressed by Muslim economists.

Consumption

Muslim scholars have written very little on consumer behavior. In fact, except for Anas Zarqa's⁸ and Mundhir Kahf's⁹ papers, analytical literature on

consumer behavior does not exist. Among the *‘ulamā*, Maudoodī and some others have talked of consumer behavior in purely mechanistic terms. The summary of their ideas is that Islam prescribes simple living and shuns a luxurious lifestyle. Then they list a few items of luxury have been specifically prohibited in the Qur’ān or *Sunnah*.

Anas Zarqā’s paper reports on valuable research and introduces original insights. But while discussing consumer behavior he has taken into account the behavior of an individual Muslim. Thus, unwittingly, he has isolated the individual from his family. Mundhir Kahf has studied the consumption behavior of a household. In an Islamic society, the institution of the family is very strong. Islam has supported the concept of the extended family where all members are dependent on each other for their material and emotional needs. Consumer behavior in Islam is not that of an individual. The family is the basic unit of consumption. Consumption decisions are taken in a family setting. A realistic consumption model in the Islamic framework cannot be conceived in isolation of the family. The practical model of consumption behavior may be much more complex than the addition of a variable in the capitalistic model.

The concept of the extended family introduces a number of economies. If people live under one roof and eat from the same kitchen they may spend much less as compared to multiple units living separately as independent families. This also affects the demand pattern for housing, furniture, and other household durables in the economy. In a consumption model, all these factors may change the conclusion significantly.

If we continue to adopt Western analytical methods, with its implicit assumptions, and add a variable here and there, we may end up with a capitalist consumer behavior model couched in Islamic terms. We must visualize the situation as a whole. Piecemeal integration of capitalism into Islam may do more harm than good.

Law of Inheritance

There are frequent references in the literature on the redistributive aspects of the Islamic law of inheritance. But the discussion has barely proceeded further. Although the impact of the law of inheritance on distribution is intuitively clear, there is no real-life study to substantiate it. We do not know whether the law of inheritance is in force anywhere or not. Nor do we know the major consequences of its non-practice. Questions of logistics to apply the law effectively also need to be studied.

Islam has granted a definite share in inheritance to women. Based on a two-to-one share between male and female, we may say that one-third of

the entire wealth of an economy is to be owned by women. But there is a strong prejudice against the social and economic roles of women. The share of women in an inheritance becomes meaningful only when their right to employ their share is accepted. Despite all the lip-service to the rights of women, this prejudice has gone a long way toward effectively depriving women from their share in the wealth. Practically, most of the wealth that the law of inheritance transfers to women is transferred back to men on one pretext or another. This raises serious issues of social significance. But for economists, the matter of importance is to reconsider the oft-applauded redistribution role of the law of inheritance. Until the law of inheritance is conceived in a non-contradictory social setting, the redistributive effects of the law of inheritance must be accepted with serious reservations.

Economic Development

Islamic literature on economic development has a strong capitalist bias. Despite all the qualifications that Muslim economists have been adding to the Western models, they have not been able to transcend the Western approach to economic development. Most of them have argued that Islam stands for material prosperity, entrepreneurship, full employment, economic stability, and just distribution in the value frame of Islam. In addition to the fact that these various objectives involve tradeoffs with one another, they present definite contradictions with the Islamic emphasis on simple living, life in the hereafter, and the insignificance of this life. Muslim scholars have been busy stretching and reinterpreting the primary sources of Islam to show that Islam upholds material prosperity. These attempts have safely left out of consideration the life in the hereafter, a simple lifestyle, sacrifice for others, and the emphasis on *'ibādah*. Instead, even the meaning of *'ibādah* has been extended to include struggle for material prosperity.

This is not to argue that Islam stands for poverty. The point is that in their enthusiasm to alleviate poverty, Muslim scholars have drifted too much toward the material side of life. Thus the balance dictated by Islam has been disturbed. A clearer definition of the concepts and objectives of economic activity in Islam needs to be developed. This will obviously require a study of the logistics of development in Muslim economies. The work done by Western economists has a lot of useful material but it needs to be reviewed in the light of Islamic teachings. A study of real-life conditions of Muslim countries is needed in an Islamic framework to devise a suitable strategy for development.

Although there is no explicit study to recommend greater foreign aid from the Western countries, there seems to be an implicit consensus among Muslim

economists about the positive role of foreign aid in the development process. This inference is based on the total silence of Muslim economists about the dysfunctional role of foreign aid. Foreign aid in the present era has been a major instrument in chaining Muslim economies to a vicious cycle of dependence and underdevelopment. While defining the concept of economic development in Islam, general statements on self-reliance have no doubt been made. But the extent to which foreign aid has paralyzed Muslim economies and how to get rid of it have not been seriously discussed. This obviously calls for a fresh approach to economic development.

Basic Principles

A large part of the literature on Islamic economics deals with basic principles. But in most cases the style is rhetorical and the ideas are simplistic. Although the literature is full of references to primary sources, it is astonishing to note that the literature lacks a comprehensive discussion of the basic beliefs and values. A large part of the Qur'ān and *aḥādīth* deals with *Tawḥīd*, *Risālah*, *Ākhirah* and such values as *'adl*, *iḥsān shukr*, *taqwā*, *ta'āwun*, *infāq*, *I'thār*, and *ṣila raḥm*. These subjects are repeated again to strengthen human faith in the type of personality that Allāh wants. These general principles of intellect and human nature are the source of all Islamic law.

It is astonishing to see that Muslim economists have paid only scant attention to such a vast portion of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. They have failed to determine precise meanings of these concepts, explore the relationship of these beliefs and values with the economic theory of Islam, or try to structure a design for the Islamic economy that can be deduced from these basic and general principles.

The discussion of these principles is peripheral and even implicit. The *'ulamā* wrote on these issues in theological jargon. But the tradition has not been continued by the economists. The economists started wrestling with formalization of secondary and tertiary principles. Thus they missed the vision of the society that Islam wants to develop. Instead they took up certain segments of Islamic law and started struggling with their formulation of the Islamic economics an appearance of a science and to make it acceptable to the Western world. The original emphasis to find solutions to the economic problems of man was displaced by attempts to win laurels from the West.

Cooperation among Muslim Economies

There is not much in the literature on economic cooperation among Muslim countries. On the political level, however, the Muslim elite has been

raising the issue. Proposals emulating the British Commonwealth or the European Community have been made. The theoretical rationale for such proposals emanates from the Qur'anic emphasis on the unity of the *ummah*. Except for the reference to the brotherhood of all Muslims, the literature in this area has hardly any other ideological or Islamic content. No serious effort has been made so far to assess the real-life situation, and to explore the possibilities of cooperation. Typically, proposals of greater economic cooperation among Muslim states do not take into account:

1. That different Muslim states are being governed by elite groups whose vested interests diverge from Islamic teachings. For these elite groups, economic cooperation for ideological reasons is hardly an issue. Any proposal of cooperation that ignores this reality cannot be taken more seriously than a mere expression of fond hopes.
2. That Muslim countries have trade relations with non-Muslim countries. These relations have led to bilateral commitments that may be detrimental to the idea of a Muslim Commonwealth. The literature often ignores this conflict and does not take into account the resistance that individual countries may put up to defend their existing trade patterns.
3. That any cooperation among Muslim countries can be meaningful only if it has an ideological content. If the people of the Muslim countries do not practice Islam, they cannot be expected to uphold any move for cooperation on ideological grounds. The cooperation would dwindle down to purely economic or material considerations. The literature turns a blind eye to the hard fact that the level of individual adherence to Islam among Muslims is quite low and that until an effort to strengthen the faith and practice of Islam is made the cooperation movement will not bear fruit. At best it might be a secular or material cooperation but in no case would it be "Islamic" as professed in the literature.

Main Achievements

The above discussion may create an impression of the insignificance of Islamic economics. During the last decade Islamic economics has covered considerable ground. Before we proceed with our analysis, it seems proper to take stock of what has been achieved so far:

1. There is a general realization among Muslim economists that Islamic economics needs to be developed as an independent branch of knowledge. There is a broad agreement that Western economics is not universal and contains a high content of Western values incompatible with Islamic values.
2. Since most of the literature has been produced in the framework of an ideal Islamic state, it has brought to light the extent of departure from the ideology in contemporary Muslim societies.
3. Some of the contentious issues have been resolved by a general consensus. For example, it is now generally agreed that *ribā* covers all forms of interest. The early controversy raised by modernists that *ribā* does not cover commercial interest has died down.
4. Certain areas of inquiry have received more attention from Muslim economists than others. Literature in these areas comes up to the generally accepted standard of research in the social sciences. For example, literature on the monetary and fiscal economics of Islam is of a high quality.
5. A number of research institutions are devoting their resources on research in Islamic economics. At least one research journal has begun publication.
6. Islamic economics is being taught as a subject at a number of Muslim universities.

General Theory of Islamic Economy

Islamic economics is often criticized for lack of a general theory of the Islamic economy.¹⁹ It is even dismissed as utopian and non-operational. Is this criticism fair?

A general theory of an economy can emerge from the study of real-life conditions. Theory, as discussed earlier, is an abstraction of a complex reality. It is intended to explain, analyze, and predict the behavior of real-life variables. But there is not one truly Islamic society in the world. How can a general theory be developed about a nonexistent society? This is precisely the reason that Islamic economics, at present, is merely a statement of the *Sharī'ah* position on economic issues.

In this situation it seems unfair to demand a general theory of Islamic economy. At best the Muslim economists may be expected to formulate a general theory of *transition* to an Islamic economy. But a theory of transition

is a complex matter because Muslim economies, at present, differ widely in their resource endowment, adherence to ideology, and social infrastructure. As a result, there does not exist any generally accepted theory of change. The Islamic movement in different countries has advocated different theses, and there exists a wide controversy on the most suitable path of change. In our opinion, the evolution of a generally accepted route to Islamization would require the concerted efforts of scholars of different disciplines. What is the role of Muslim economists in this context? Should they sit back and wait for the opportune moment when a generally accepted theory of change emerges? We think Muslim economists have both a responsibility and the capability to break the ice and take the necessary initiative.

We believe that a theory of transition to an Islamic economy, much less a general theory of Islamic economy, cannot emerge from the level of discussion and the methodology of research now in vogue. To set the stage for a theory of transition, considerable preliminary research will have to be done. We think that the following points lead in that direction:

1. Real-life social and economic conditions of Muslim countries must be studied in a series of research projects conceived in a master plan. The focus of these studies should be the relationship of these conditions with non-adherence to Islamic ideology. Development economists have done much research on the real-life conditions of the Third World, including Muslim countries, but their work is both inadequate and irrelevant to our purpose. It is inadequate because it is not related to the Islamic framework. It is irrelevant because it has used Western analytical tools which are often value-loaded and may not be suitable for the purpose. Therefore, new research designs have to be conceived that take into account the real-life conditions of the Muslim countries.
2. Another series of research projects should examine critically the socio-economic policies of Muslim countries from *Shari'ah* point of view. The impact of these policies on the process of change can provide valuable insights.
3. There is a need to examine social, cultural, and educational institutions and their impact on economic situations. Again, they require a critical look from an Islamic point of view.
4. Wide-ranging studies in behavior patterns of the Muslim population and their probable response to the teachings of Islam needs to be assessed. This would help modify the utopian approach toward Islamic economies.

Basic research organized on this pattern and conceived in a broad and coordinated plan would provide some understanding of the existing situation. The research should not only be conceptual but should also involve field work. Modern logistics and technology may be commissioned to help the researchers. We believe that a fundamental awareness of the existing conditions is mandatory for any general theory of change. This awareness cannot come by mere conceptual conjectures. We have got to go to the grass-roots.

We believe (and Allah knows best) that a generally accepted theory of transition to an Islamic economy is a prerequisite to a general theory of Islamic economy. The general theory of Islamic economy would be an explanation and analysis of the Islamic economy as and when it comes into being. To ask for a general theory of a nonexistent economy is to demand the impossible. Attempts to produce such a theory cannot be more than intellectual gratification for the Muslim scholars.

Plan for Research

A five-year plan for research in Islamic economics may be developed along the following broad lines. The research may proceed in two distinct directions: basic research and applied research.

Basic Research

The objective of basic research is to provide basic paraphernalia for further and applied research. To make a beginning the following areas are suggested.

(A) Economic Concepts of the Qur'ān

There is a need to cast a fresh look at the text of the Qur'ān to seek guidance about economic matters. The early works on Qur'ānic exegesis need to be researched thoroughly to understand the historical continuity of interpretation. The material on economic concepts of the Qur'ān is widely scattered in these works. A representative sample of exegetic works of each century may be drawn and the relevant material sifted. This may be supplemented by critical notes in the light of contemporary situations. The primary objective is to make available in a usable form the legacy of earlier scholars and to relate it to the present-day situation.

(B) Economic Teachings of the Prophet (ṢAAS)

The *hadīth* sources of Islamic economics are scattered in a large number of books. It is not possible to make ready use of these *aḥādīth*. The major books of *aḥādīth* need to be studied and the material relating to economic matters classified. The selected material may contain short explanatory notes wherever necessary.¹¹

(C) Fiqh

There is a vast *fiqh* literature, but most of it was written many centuries ago. The jurists propounded various legal theories in the light of the social realities of their respective times. A series of research projects should (1) select the material relevant to economic matters, (2) analyze and understand the temporal context of various legal theories, (3) identify the areas where *ijtihād* is needed, and (4) seek *ijtihād* of competent scholars in these areas.

(D) Economic History of the Muslim People

There is an enormous gap in the Islamic history about the economic conditions and policies of the Muslim people. The Muslims ruled over vast territories for over a thousand years. An economically weak people could not have sustained this rule for such a long time. But no readily usable documentation of the economic history of the Muslim people is available. In a series of research projects this history needs to be placed on record.

(E) Readings in Islamic Economics

A series of selected readings on Islamic economics needs to be published to consolidate the work published in various journals and languages. This not only would provide a basis for further research but would also save the future researcher the trouble of searching for this scattered material.

(F) A Dictionary of Islamic Economics

A research project to compile a dictionary of terms of Islamic economics needs to be planned. The objective should be to provide a source book for terms used in the literature and to provide authentic meanings. Confusion about the meanings of basic concepts could thus be dispelled.

(G) Textbooks

A number of textbooks for different levels and in different languages needs to be prepared. The objective should be to synthesize generally accepted ideas for classroom use. These textbooks should also point out areas for further research to initiate a spirit of inquiry among students.

(H) Applied Research

A master plan should be made for applied research in different areas. The objective should be to attain a deep understanding of the real-life situation in Muslim countries. Different fields of study should be delineated as part of a unified plan. This should involve the participation of specialists in other areas as well. Once real-life data are collected, the following questions should define the objectives of each study:


1. To what extent is the existing situation the result of a departure from Islamic teachings at the individual or systemic level?
2. What policy measures may lead the initiation of a process of change?
3. What should be the priorities in such a situation?
4. What are the expected costs of such a strategy, both financial and other?
5. What would be the time-span for change?
6. What are the prerequisites for this change?

As a result of such studies in the Muslim world, a theory of change may emerge. This theory in turn may lead to a strategy for change and set the stage for a general theory of Islamic economy.

Conclusion

Islamic economics until now has been a restatement of the *Sharī'ah* position on various economic issues. So far every analysis has been of a utopian nature. If Islamic economics is not to wither away as an intellectual luxury, it must address itself to the real-life conditions of the Muslim *ummah*. It must provide tools for solving the economic problems in the light of Islam. It must transcend and soar from the utopian ground in which it is embedded. In this lies the challenge for Muslim economists.

Toward a General Theory of Islamic Economy



NOTES

- ¹ Şiddīqī, Muhammed Najatullah, *Contemporary Literature on Islamic Economics*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1978, 68 pp.
- ² Mannān, Muhammed Abdul, "Islamic Economics as a Social Science: Some Methodological Issues," *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics*, (1:1) Summer 1983, p. 56.
- ³ Ibid, p. 59
- ⁴ Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1981.
- ⁵ *Islami Bank* (Urdu Trans:) Sargodha: Maktaba Asghariyya, n.d.
- ⁶ "Banking in Islam," *Muslimnews International*, (8:1) June 1969 pp. 5-11.
- ⁷ Nienhaus, V., "Monetary, Social and Internatinal Economics: some Thoughts on the Islamic View," *Economics*, Tubingen, Vol. 28, 1983, p. 79.
- ⁸ "Islamic Economics: An approach to Human Welfare" in *Studies in Islamic Economics*, Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1980 pp. 3-19.
- ⁹ "Contribution to the Theory of Consumer Behaviour in the Islamic Society," in *ibid*, pp. 18-37.
- ¹⁰ For example, Nienhaus, V., "Islamic Economics – Policy between Pragmatism and Utopia," *Economics* Vol. 25, 1982, pp. 80-100.
- ¹¹ This writer has completed one such study. It is in the process of publication.

The Frontiers of Islamic Economics: Some Philosophical Underpinnings

Muhammad Abdul Mannan

The Frontiers of Islamic Economics: Some Philosophical Underpinnings

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Objectives and Assumptions

This paper is intended to: 1) initiate serious discussion on a number of selected problems and issues in Islamic economics by drawing attention to some of the neglected or less recognized areas of Islamic concern, a clear understanding of which should widen the frontiers of Islamic economics and help develop an Islamic economic science; 2) unfold a number of key issues and problems by raising pertinent questions that can serve as a basis for further research in Islamic economics, finance, and development; 3) advance a number of hypotheses, intuitive assertions, and propositions that need to be examined further in depth; and 4) provoke researchers to come up with new issues or to critique the issues outlined.

I assume in this chapter that ethical and moral imperatives are the overriding concern in Islamic economics. The integrated economic, social, and political needs are subordinate to imperatives of faith and morality of Islam. The so-called distinction between normative and positive economic considerations are not considered to be significant in Islamic economics. The integrative analysis of “revealed knowledge” and “acquired knowledge” are not always subject to testing. Islamic economic values, which need to be integrated both in theory and in policy formulation, are part of a social framework that knows no distinction between material and spiritual activity of man.

I further assume that readers have some elementary knowledge of economics as well as some knowledge of the Shari’ah. As such the relevant verses of the Qur’an or *hadiths* have not been reproduced. The clarification of the following issues and problems will provide readers with a number of clues that can serve as a basis for further advancement of Islamic economics as a distinct branch of knowledge:

1. The role of Islamic economic theory.
2. Limits of individual, society, and state.
3. The theory of conspicuous underconsumption.
4. The limits of Islamic economic analysis.
5. Efficiency versus equity and equality.
6. Cooperation versus competition and control.
7. *Halāl* versus *ḥarām*
8. Monetary versus non-monetary return.
9. Altruistic behavior—its implications and limits in Islamic economics.

1. The Role of Islamic Economic Theory

It is perhaps possible to demonstrate that once an Islamic economic theory is formulated in a particular social context, it can be changed or altered or even rejected by a superior formulation of an alternative theory.¹ What we can *not* change is the unalterable framework provided by the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. Once we understand this internal dynamism of Islamic laws, there are immense possibilities for the development of the science. An alternative theory can then explain the *facts* as they are. But this explanation may not be in the way the positivists do. For the facts are to be examined in the light of Islamic economic values. This exposure of facts to Islamic values may be revealing in the sense that theory, as formulated, may agree with facts, thereby further consolidating the position of the existing socio-economic institutions and policies; or the theory may disagree with the facts in their totality, thereby initiating new socio-economic institutions. Lastly, the theory may agree with the facts in a substantial degree, thereby initiating a process of marginal change. It follows then that Islamic economic and social theory may advocate a status quo, a structural or marginal change depending on the nature, level and stage of social and economic development.

The recognition of these tripartite roles of the theory have a number of contemporary implications. Our theoretical investigation can immediately identify a number of economic institutions and social practices and customs, operating in contemporary Muslim societies as Islamically passive or neutral, and some others as negative. One may not be surprised to find some others that are consistent with Islamic economic values. Islamic theoretical formulation thus may contain policy implications for both marginal and structural change. The moral and ethical overtones of these changes make it distinctive from the neoclassical notion of change. Islamic economic theory can, therefore, contribute to identifying the gaps between actuality and perceived reality, so

that we can initiate the process of change. The critical question is how to identify the socio-economic institutions, prevailing local customs, and human attitudes that need to be changed structurally or molded marginally. The study needs an institutional approach in a wider sense of the term—an approach that takes into account not only what conventional economists perceive as economic factors but also institutions, human attitudes, and other relevant social, ethical, and spiritual factors.

The fact is that we each desire change for the better in our own way. The individual's choice for his own betterment and the Islamic choice for collective moral, spiritual, and social welfare may not always go together. The notion of betterment in Islam is much more complex than neoclassical economists' secular perceptions of betterment. Islamic complexity arises because of its simultaneous thrust on material and spiritual development in this life and the life after death. Therefore, theoretical reformulation and consequent policy implications must be directed toward moving the system upward as much and as rapidly as possible.

This distinct life-philosophy is bound to influence the theoretical development of Islam. We need to identify endogenous and exogenous variables having roots in the teaching of Islam so that Islamic economic theory can generate a policy package for implementation of ensuring better material conditions coupled with spiritual development. Islamic economic theory cannot therefore be divorced from the ethical imperatives of its earliest stages of formulation.

Once such a theory is constructed, it could very well be either relevant or irrelevant in terms of explaining the present reality. When the formulated Islamic economic theory is found to be contra-factual or unrealistic, this in itself is a positive contribution in understanding the perceived reality of the future. I am using the word contra-factual because it contradicts the facts as they are and identifies the gap between the present, Islamically unjustified reality and the perceived justified reality. In view of the present complex socio-economic realities and colonial legacy of the Muslim world, there is an immense scope for further development of Islamic economic theory by contradicting the facts of today. This contradiction can help to build a future based on our own socio-economic values.

It should, however, be clearly recognized that the role of Islamic economic theory is not merely confined to reformulation of present reality but also to future reconstruction of societies. It can very well be confined to explaining past distortions or confirming past practices. The tendency to consider all interpretations or research findings of our predecessors as Islamic may retard the process of Islamic reform. We are perhaps better equipped than ever before in conducting our research by collecting relevant data and information in a more scientific way.

While our predecessors have, of course, done a great job in developing a comprehensive science of the Shari'ah and left behind a treasure of knowledge, it would be a mistake to assume that all their practices and actions can be styled Islamic. There is an urgent need to examine their legacy in the light of the explicit and implicit injunctions of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*. This is how the process of reconstruction should begin. What is needed is a critical evaluation of their works in the context of their and our times. This calls for an understanding of the social and economic history of their times as well as the history of Islamic economic thought. Therefore, an Islamic economic theory reformulated on the basis of this process has a role to play in correcting past distortions, should there be any, so that we can understand the present in a better way for a meaningful future.

It logically follows that Islamic economic theory can contribute both to the formulation of a new society and to the reformation of the old existing society. We can reform only when there is a form. Even when a society is totally un-Islamic, Islamic economic theory can still help develop an ideal form of Islamic economic society as envisaged in the Qur'anic principles and implemented by the Prophet (SAAS) in establishing the first Islamic state in Madinah fourteen centuries ago, which was subsequently consolidated by early caliphs and their great companions. It is worth mentioning here that this early Islamic state survived the severe test of time when nations with different cultural backgrounds came within the fold of Islam. This fact illustrates the viability of the Islamic socio-economic system at an operational level, although early caliphs and their companions helped to institutionalize the Islamic model of economic society.

Despite some setbacks and loss of Islamic momentum due to diverse historical factors, Islamic economic and social values continued to guide succeeding generations in one way or another. The contemporary resurgence reflected in the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Islamic Development Bank, and other local Islamic banks, as well as in the implementation of *zakah* and *ushr* by some modern Muslim states, simply confirms this. It is, therefore, understandable that even where a so-called Muslim society does not have any Islamic form for reform and reconstruction, Islamic economic theory can contribute to developing a framework and blueprint for such a society, thereby initiating a process of evaluation of a new form of government. Can we conclude then that Islamic economic theory serves a revolutionary doctrine in such a context? In a sense it does, particularly when it fulfills a crucial function in the development of a society by transferring power from a reactionary class to an Islamic government. But the totality of change implicit in the definition of revolution may be inconsistent with the concept of Islamic evolution, which embodies the belief that the Qur'anic blueprint of society is capable of development by a process of

gradual and continuous change from previously existing forms through interpretation, reinterpretation, and consensus. The point I am making is that, even in such a revolution, we only implant a blueprint of a society that has been existing since the birth of Islam in one way or another. Our job is not to invent but to rediscover, reconstruct, and recreate Islamic values. Hence the role of theory in Islam.

2. The Limits of Individual, Society, and State

In understanding the frontiers of Islamic economics, it is extremely important to understand the dynamic limits of the relationships among individual, society, and state. Very early in our inquiry, it is to be recognized that individuals do not exist for society or the state. It is society and the state that exists for the individual. It is the individual who is accountable for his actions before Allah. This notion of accountability gives him freedom to participate in the construction of the society to which he belongs and puts restrictions on him not to degrade the society Islamically. In an Islamic state, the individual is seen as an integral part of his own family, his community, his state, and the international community at large. Therefore, he has economic and social responsibilities toward each of the components of his integrated life.

Now the question arises as to where individual freedom ends and social control begins. Actually, social control guarantees individual freedom as it enables the individual to perform his duties as prescribed by the Shari'ah. Freedom and control are therefore not contradictory but complement each other because control protects freedom, and vice versa. This is the essence of the Islamic concepts of freedom and control. What is important, then, is to describe the operational limits of altruistic behavior of individuals in a particular social and economic context. In Islamic economics we recognize money as a medium of exchange. We may very well use this money to measure Islamic motives, however limited they might be. It should be possible to introduce an element of objectivity in explaining altruistic behavior of the individual in an Islamic state by the measuring rod of money.

Depending on the level and stage of Islamic awareness in a society, the ratio of control versus individual freedom can be determined. However, the person who will determine this ratio must be well-versed in the Shari'ah to do so. As noted earlier, Islamic law has formulated a number of individual rights and has assigned the individual several obligations toward his family, his kinship, his community, and the world at large in order to develop a structure of universal brotherhood or *ummah*. The amount of government control thus depends on the extent to which a society is prepared to respond to these Islamic

injunctions. In an ideal state of affairs, perhaps there is no need for any social control by the state, because the individual will be expected to perform his duties without any social persuasion or coercion.

Due to several historical factors, most of the contemporary Muslim societies lack the necessary conditions for the Islamic momentum they need to mold their societies. It is reasonable to assume that social control of individual behavior is expected to be prominent in such societies during the initial phase of social change. So we should not be surprised by the intervention of the state to regulate and control individual behavior. Once we understand the limits of such intervention, it should be possible for us to develop different policy choices for different Islamic societies and thereby contribute to the development of Islamic economics as a science.

3. The Theory of Conspicuous Underconsumption

We often talk of “conspicuous consumption” or “demonstration effect,” and most of today’s writers on Islamic literature refer to these concepts implying waste of resources. Clearly, Islam does not look with favor on conspicuous consumption, because it distorts the allocation of resources and deprives the poor of their legitimate rights in a society. But the Qur’anic stress on enjoyment of all lawful and beautiful things of the world, through exploitation of “His bounties” is not properly appreciated. On the contrary, Islamic stress on moderation and plain living is often misplaced. The concept of moderation should no longer be used as a plea to rely on individual fate and poor living conditions. Our modern statistical techniques should enable us to quantify the poverty line in terms of income or in terms of goods and services. If we take a random sample of Islamic communities of today, we will find that with the exception of a few rich communities, the vast majority of the Muslim *ummah* is living either at a subsistence or starvation level. Islamically speaking, this very fact should act as a stimulus to work hard to produce more so that we can raise the level of consumption. The critical question is not merely to raise the level of consumption but to sustain this growth over a period of time. Viewed from this perspective, we can develop a theory of conspicuous underconsumption in Islam so that we restore the balance of moderation involving integration of consumption and saving and investment behavior of the communities concerned. While it should be possible to quantify the moderation line of consumption, it is equally important to spell out its implications for saving and investment functions in an Islamic economy. Furthermore, there is a need to develop a series of theories on conspicuous underconsumption and their fiscal and monetary implications for different

Muslim societies. The development of a theory of conspicuous underconsumption is expected to provide a solid base from which to develop an Islamic theory of justified minimum and sufficient levels of consumption. Given our present stock of statistical and medical knowledge, it should be possible to prescribe minimum, moderate, and sufficient levels of living for each of the communities concerned.

4. The Limits of Islamic Economic Analysis

It is a fact that Islam is a complete code of life because it provides the most comprehensive account of the Muslim code of conduct, not only as regards earthly life, but also life after death. This very comprehensiveness of the Islamic code requires Islamic economists to research and identify the areas of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* dealing mainly with economic matters. Islamic economists specialize in the development of Islamic economics as a distinct branch of knowledge. There are areas of Islamic law, such as marriage, divorce, and burial services, where economists have little to contribute. Islamic economic theory should enable us to identify those activities with which Islamic economists should primarily be concerned. It is perhaps the area of study between what is and what ought to be. The elementary set theory and the conventional diagrams can be used to identify the frontiers of Islamic economists' main area of concern. There will be some empty or null sets or some sets having only indirect connection with the mainstream of Islamic economic analysis. The identification of elements of the empty sets should be useful in the development of the theory. This idea has further been developed in explaining the question of exchangeables nonexchangeable in my article entitled, "Scarcity, Choice and Opportunity Cost: Their Dimensions in Islamic Economics."² One of the main reasons for development of this theory is to introduce an element of objectivity into economic analysis and to identify the boundaries of activities with which Muslim economists should primarily be concerned. Another reason for introducing this concept of intersection is to enable the Muslim economist to focus on those areas of the Shari'ah that are directly related to his work. This is not to suggest that Muslim economists should study only that part of the Shari'ah that relates to economic values. The point I am making is that knowledge of the structures of logic and of set theory and their relation to mathematics should enable us to better understand the substantive content of our ethical conceptions. In this way we will be able to observe the effects of the division into those that are decidable and complete, undecidable yet complete, and neither decidable nor complete. It is possible then to find new answers to old questions of meaning and justifications of Islamic economic values.

5. Efficiency versus Equity and Equality

The conflict between efficiency and equity is well known in Western economic literature, particularly in the literature on development. We have evidence to show that this apparent conflict is also well recognized in most of the planning documents of Third World countries and that whenever such a conflict arises, the efficiency criteria take precedence over equity criteria in most cases. The Qur'ān repeatedly enjoins Muslims not to be wasteful. We must be efficient in the use and maintenance of His resources. Islam also stresses an equitable distribution of income. So what would be an Islamic solution when there is a conflict between efficiency and equity? Before answering this question, we have to develop Islamic efficiency and equity concepts instead of perceiving them in terms of Western secular values.⁹ In an Islamic economy the ultimate aim of both efficiency and equity considerations is to ensure economic justice to all, for the final goal of an efficient utilization of resources is to have them distributed equitably. This question of economic fairness may involve adjustments of weights or assigning weights to competing principles of justice. Should any conflict arise, it is to be settled by its predominant effects as admissible under the Shari'ah. In the course of solving the conflict the appeal to intuition cannot be avoided altogether. But intuitionism in an Islamic framework cannot ignore the ethical and moral imperatives of the Shari'ah, an understanding of which leads one to believe that the question of equitable distribution of goods and services ranks as a first principle of Islam. Thus the question of what is to be produced and how needs to be decided in the light of this first principle. At an operational level it can be said that at an initial stage of economic development in a society where poverty is widespread, equity consideration will take precedence over the efficiency criteria. Once minimum provisioning has been made, efficiency criteria may be taken into account to sustain the level of equitable distribution of income. Once this dynamic interplay between efficiency and equity considerations is understood in the light of Islamic humanism, we can further the cause of Islamic economics. The question that requires urgent attention is how to develop a methodology of assigning weights to competing principles of justice. What are the key elements involved in the adjustment of weights?

In this connection, it is pertinent to mention that Islam does not believe in total equality in income. This does not mean that Islam does not want to have equality of opportunities to earn income. The critical question here is how to ensure equal opportunities to all members of a community in the context of an unfavorable institutional, social, and economic setting. What is the order of the priority? Should we first try to introduce the necessary reform in the existing socioeconomic framework, which is now responsible for

generating government decisions in favor of the privileged elite? If so, how will equality of opportunity be ensured during pre-reform, post-reform, and transitional period?

6. Cooperation, Competition, and Control

Contrary to popular notions, I must say that a firm or an economic enterprise in an Islamic framework can hardly run on the basis of either perfect cooperation or perfect competition. It should be possible to conceive of a situation in which cooperation, competition, and control are all needed at the same time at an operational level, although perfect cooperation may appear to be an ideal solution from an Islamic viewpoint.

What is the optimal mix of cooperation, competition, and control in an Islamic economy? Although no definite answer can be given, the different facets of cooperative, competitive, and controlled behavior can be exposed to Islamic values. This enable us to see to what extent these three types of behavior can affect price, income, and employment policies.

There is no rule for an optimal mix or tradeoff among the three. Nevertheless, cooperative behavior as an operational strategy of firm, industry, and household perhaps ranks first in the order of Islamic priorities. This is mainly due to Islamic concern for social justice and equity in economic activities. But cooperative behavior can be either voluntary, induced, or competitive in nature.⁴ When cooperation is voluntary under the influence of Islamic values, the behavior of the firm tends to be guided by considerations of a socially desirable level of profits. In such a situation, consumers, as a class, may not resort to hoarding, which would lead to an artificial rise in price. Effective demand is likely to increase. This is only a hypothesis at this stage. Induced cooperation may also achieve the same result. This type of cooperation may not be forthcoming in the case of an economic enterprise where goods and services produced cannot readily be classified as private goods, because the private sector is generally shy in investing in production of social goods. It is not easy to put a price tag on such goods. Furthermore, even in a competitive market, producers may resort to cooperation among themselves by exchanging information, locating industries in certain areas, or conducting joint research projects. It would be naive to assume that such cooperative behavior on the part of the firm in a competitive environment will motivate firms to aim at a socially desirable level of profit. The firm may very well pursue the goal of profit maximization through cost-effective management and investment strategies. This type of cooperation may be called competitive cooperation. An Islamic economy does not, of course, preclude the possibility of such cooperation, whose motivations are derived not from the teaching

of Islam but from the exigencies of circumstances guided by crisis and conflict of the competitive environment of a market economy. The socially desirable profit motive, which is likely to be the effect of Islamically justified cooperative behavior, tends to be sustained, provided an appropriate educational program is implemented to internalize Islamic values based on altruistic behavior on the part of the producer and the consumer in an Islamic society. This ideological education program is vital, because it contributes much to awakening their motivations for work and cooperation. It gives them the necessary spiritual incentives and teaches them selflessness—factors that are so important for the success of an enterprise. Our critical task lies not only in making a comparative analysis between altruistic behavior and maximizing behavior and their relative effects on price, income, and output but also in defining the scope and nature of altruistic and maximizing behavior needed in an Islamic economy. Here maximizing behavior is viewed not as an end in itself but a means to an end.

This brings us to the question of competition and control. While the possibility of free competition cannot be ruled out in a properly run Islamic economy, in many cases competition needs to be supervised. The extent and level of intervention and economic control depends on the nature of economic activities.

The critical task before us is not merely to determine where cooperation, competition, and control begin but also to work out the details of an Islamic framework under which these three concepts and their operational strategies gain a distinct status. Their implications on the economic and social behavior of both consumers and producers in an Islamic society should provide us with an immense scope for different policy options needed for the growth of Islamic economics. The adoption and implementation of different policy options to achieve the common goal of a society require skill, tact, and imagination.

7. *Ḥalāl* versus *Ḥarām*

Contrary to a popular notion, the concepts of *ḥalāl* and *ḥarām* should not be confined to the explicit injunctions of the Qurʾān and the *Sunnah*. I am inclined to go beyond the explicit injunctions of the Shariʿah so that we have a better understanding of the implicit spirit of injunctions within the dynamic framework of a society.

In explaining the behavior of consumers in an Islamic economy, some prohibited items—pork, alcohol, for example—are often cited. The prohibition of these items has its validity in the Shariʿah. But even without consum-

ing any of these prohibited items, a Muslim consumer can indulge in a consumption style inconsistent with the spirit of Islam. Similarly, producers in an Islamic state are not be allowed to invest in *ḥarām* activities. They may, however, invest in apparently *ḥalāl* activities, whose effects on resource allocation as well as consumer behavior may be considered out of tune with the Islamic spirit. For example, given resource constraints, production of luxury cars in lieu of buses in a heavily populated underdeveloped country may not be regarded as an Islamically appropriate allocation of resources. The point I am making is that the questions of *ḥalāl* and *ḥarām* are to be examined through an approach to the problem emphasizing both letter and spirit of the Shari'ah. At an operational level, it means the study of the entire process of utilization, allocation, and maintenance of resources in an Islamic economy in order to identify the areas of Islamic concern. It has its implications in both micro- and macro-economic problems and issues, including public finance and economic development.

8. Monetary and Non-monetary Return

We have already indicated that in an Islamic economy there is considerable scope to analyze the effects of altruistic behavior of a firm or individual household on price, income, and employment. This altruistic behavior stems not only from the perception of securing the pleasure of Allah but also from the fear of punishment. This notion of reward and punishment, derived from the accountability of man to Allah for whatever he does in this life, is central to Islamic faith, as this accountability gives a Muslim a sense of completeness, direction, and a permanent code of conduct. The Muslim believes in life after death. The absence of such belief is the negation of the belief in the existence of Allah. It may not be possible with our present faculties to realize the nature of the conditions of life after death, but we can develop some approximate intuitive understanding of them through moral and spiritual experience.⁵ The Prophet (SAAS) is reported to have said that the true reality of the life after death is not possible for the human mind to conceive. As the Qur'an states, "No soul knows what bliss is kept hidden for it as a reward for good works" (32:18).

Therefore, economic activities on earth are bound to be influenced by both monetary and non-monetary returns. While the monetary returns can be measured in terms of actual money received for work done, non-monetary returns can be expressed in terms of Islamically desirable economic activities. This involves assigning Islamic weights to various alternative *ḥalāl* economic activities, although the very appropriateness of a weight itself may remain

controversial. Given the present stock of knowledge, it is relatively easy to measure the monetary return of our economic activities, but the measurement of non-monetary returns from an Islamic viewpoint is still in its infancy. Our critical task is to find out how to measure non-quantifiable values arising out of *halāl* economic activities. We need to develop a concept of Islamic cost and Islamic return. Once the substantive content of ethical and moral conceptions is better understood, the answers to questions regarding the meaning of this integrative nature of cost and return and justification of ethical judgments can be found. This will then enable us to better understand the frontiers of Islamic economics.

9. Altruistic Behavior: Its Implications and Limits in Islamic Economics

It is generally believed that man is essentially selfish. On this assumption, the concept of “economic man” has emerged as a basis for conventional analysis of the market economy. This is not to suggest that “economic man” does not have any altruistic motive or concern for others. A careful study of the Shari’ah reveals that Islam rejects the concept of “economic man” as understood in a market economy. Islam is based on the concept of the “Islamic person” who is not only concerned with his own needs but also sensitive to others’ needs. The need for such altruistic behavior on the part of consumers and producers can hardly be overestimated in an Islamic framework. It has its roots in the Qur’ān and the *Sunnah*. Man being the best creation of Allah possesses all humanly qualities, including concern for others.

Had humans been devoid of this quality of non-selfishness, the Qur’ān would not have urged the Muslims to pay *zakāh* and *sadaqah* so vigorously to mitigate the material misery of the poor and to enhance the quality of moral and spiritual life.

But at an operational level, thinking about the economics of altruism in an Islamic framework may lead to rethinking of the economics of resource allocation, resource distribution, and resource maintenance. It is possible to demonstrate that certain forms of altruistic behavior may promote economic efficiency, so that every one can be better off—not that some will be better off at the expense of others.

Thus in a properly run Islamic economy the prevalence of altruistic behavior can be manifested in several ways:

[A] producer may advertise his product truthfully when he need not, a labor union may refrain from breaking the law when it could

do so for a net gain, a producer may resist contaminating a river when he could do so without detection, a firm may elect to pay "fair wage rates" when it could exploit some workers' ignorance of wage rates and job availability elsewhere with impunity, a benevolent butcher may abstain from short-weighting. These altruistic practices involve imperfections of information and foresight in a central way: they represent the refusal to deceive through false information (truthfulness) or the refusal to mislead through concealed information (disclosure), or the refusal to test the information costs for others of investigation and prosecution (lawfulness), or the refusal to let uncertainty that others will keep their bargain discourage one's own good faith (trustingness).⁶

The need for such altruistic behavior in an Islamic economy is not merely a social and economic necessity but also a moral and ethical one. Once consumers and producers are imbued with such altruistic behavior, it tends to increase the economic efficiency of a market because it reduces the risks and anxieties of being cheated or exploited. Beyond that, it tends to improve resource allocation by lowering the transaction costs that society pays in doing business and running markets. Truthfulness and disclosure by others will often avert initial misallocations and subsequent search costs; they may result in a reduction in the investment of resources in gathering information necessary to achieve a given resource allocation. Lawfulness reduces the costs of protection against crime, particularly the costs of enforcing market contracts and the tax system. Mutual trust in the adherence to a contract or obligation will often permit a resource allocation that is superior to any allocation reached by the non-cooperative actions of distrustful individuals.⁷

It is clear that altruistic phenomena are crucial to the functioning of the economy in an Islamic framework. But it is equally important to examine what kinds of altruistic behavior are productive, non-productive, or counter-productive. What are the costs of the responsibility and power it places in private hands, particularly when it substitutes for law and regulation imposed and implemented by the public sector?

There are also the ways and means of altruism. Why do we supply a good altruistic cause without charge or at a charge less than the market price and for what reasons? These are difficult questions, and full answers to these questions may not be possible because it is almost impossible to identify all the social, economic, moral, and spiritual variables and to establish their inter-relations. It is clearly beyond the scope of so-called closed models, which deal only with quantifiable variables and exclude many important non-quantifiable factors. Nevertheless, attempts should be made to analyze the consequences of different options of allocation of scarce resources even for

altruistic purposes as objectively as possible.

This raises the question of the extent to which one should go in promoting the social interest. In other words, it is important to determine the limits of one's altruistic behavior or non-selfish attitude in an Islamic economy. Man does need food, shelter, clothing, and other basic amenities of life. He also needs resources to support the legitimate interests of his family and children. When a person is involved in acquiring these minimum resources for sustaining his life and maintaining his family, can we call it a selfish attitude? The answer is no. The Shari'ah permits individuals to earn a "sufficient" and comfortable level of living after fulfilling their social and religious obligations.

Thus the question that needs attention is: Where does the drive for self-need or self-justice end and altruistic behavior begin? Muslim economists have to address this question to solve the many problems and issues Muslim societies face. The determination of the critical line between self-need and altruistic behavior is extremely important.

As I see it, this critical line can be influenced by two possible limits—one quantitative, the other qualitative. The quantitative limit will be set by one's basic physiological need which puts a limit to altruistic behavior. However, it is a requirement of the Shari'ah that an individual must attain a minimum level of living and that he must work to get it. In case of his failure, an Islamic state must ensure that each individual obtains his minimum needs. It follows that we can learn not to want food for our living. So it is important to quantify the minimum bundle of goods and services an individual needs in a particular social context. It is also important to determine what is a sufficient as well as a comfortable level of living in a particular social context. This would enable an individual to know to what extent he should participate in pursuing the goal of altruism. Thus, in a sense, his altruistic behavior becomes a function of his disposable income.

Thus the perception of concern for others tends to be different from person to person even when they have the same incomes. This is because of the difference in abilities to perceive the difficulties of others. Sometimes this mental endowment is influenced by local customs and environments.

It is to be noted here that the Qur'an recognizes differences in individual mental endowment and differences in abilities and income. From the preceding analysis, it becomes obvious that there are at least two Shari'ah-based limits to altruistic behavior. Once these two limits are clearly understood, it should be possible to formulate guidelines to altruistic behavior for the consumer as well as the producer in an Islamic economy.

As regards consumer behavior, it is important to determine the amount of goods and services an individual household needs for its survival. The limit may not be set, but guidelines can be evolved to make comparisons between altruistic behavior and maximizing behavior by the consumer. In the light

of the Shari'ah, it is possible, then, to determine when a consumer is involved in an extravagant lifestyle in a particular social context. In such cases his maximizing behavior requires him to reduce waste and unnecessary expenditure to the limits of moderation as required by the Shari'ah. At an operational level, an increase in consumption and productive expenditure for others as a percentage of his total expenditure may be viewed as an improvement in the level of his altruistic behavior.

As regards the behavior of the producer, it should be possible to evolve a similar guideline to define the range of normal as well as excessive profit limits in the context of a particular production environment. Once this is done, it should be possible to compare between altruistic behavior and maximizing behavior of the firm. Like a consumer, a firm has to survive. So normal profits will remain a constraint pertaining to the firm's activities. This is not to suggest that a firm in an Islamic economy will not operate on a no-profit and no-loss basis or on a negative profit basis in some cases. Here also there is a need to distinguish between Islamic social profit and Islamic economic profit. Once this distinction is clear, an increase in total social profit as a percentage of the firm's total economic profit may be viewed as an improvement in the level of the firm's altruistic behavior. These are some of the hypotheses that need to be examined in depth.

Concluding Observations

From the preceding analysis it is evident that ethical and moral imperatives are the overriding concerns in Islamic economics. The integrated economic, social, and political needs are subordinate to imperatives of faith and morality. The following basic conclusions emerge from the preceding discussion within the framework of the Shari'ah.

1. The role of Islamic economic theory can be viewed in three distinctive ways:
 - (a) to correct past distortions (if any) or reconfirm past practices;
 - (b) to understand present reality; and
 - (c) to help future reconstructions of Muslim societies.

The so-called distinction between normative and positive economic considerations is not significant in Islamic economics. The integrative analysis of "revealed knowledge" and "acquired knowledge" is not always subject to testing in an Islamic framework. Islamic economic values need to be

integrated both in theory and in policy formulation as part of a social framework that knows no distinction between material and spiritual activity of man.

2. Society or the state in Islam serves the individual, who is accountable to Allah. Social control is viewed as a guarantor of individual freedom, and vice versa.
3. Consumption is a positive concept in Islam. The key to its understanding lies in the concept of moderation in consumption defined as such in a particular social and economic context.
4. Islamic economics is cooperative, competitive, and controlled at the same time. The unique mix of such principles can provide insights into the working of an Islamic economic market.
5. The question of *ḥalāl* and *ḥarām* is to be examined through a systems approach emphasizing both letter and spirit of the Shari'ah. Analogical reasoning, logical inferences, and human intuition guided by socio-economic, moral, and spiritual imperatives should then be encouraged to widen the frontiers of Islamic economics as long as they do not contradict the explicit and implicit injunctions of the Shari'ah.
6. Islamic altruistic behavior on the part of consumers and producers is not merely an economic and social necessity but also a moral and ethical one.

Altruistic behavior can be seen as a measure of economic efficiency as it reduces transaction costs. The quantitative and qualitative limits to altruistic behavior may be set by one's physiological need and psychological perception of concern for others.

NOTES

- ¹ Islamic economic theory is viewed as the body of generalizations or principles or a process of formulating or describing economic behavior or functional relationship in a particular context, developed or derived from the timeless Islamic imperatives, rooted in the Shari'ah either explicitly or implicitly. As such generalization from observed sets of facts or principles, formulations of hypotheses for testing must be exposed to Islamic revealed knowledge.
- ² Published by the *Journal of Social Economics*, University of Kuwait, 1981, Special *Hi-jra* Issue, and reprinted by the International Centre for Research in Islamic Economic (ICRIE), King AbdulAziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (1982).
- ³ Islamic equity considerations may lead to efficient allocation of resources. It tends to increase productivity. This would enable the individual to perform his social and moral responsibility in a better way.
- ⁴ See also M. A. Mannan, "Islamic Perspectives on Market Prices and Allocation," *ICRIE*, King AbdulAziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
- ⁵ See Zafrullah Khan, *Islam: Its Meaning for Modern Man*, London, 1962.
- ⁶ Edmunds S. Pheleps (ed.), *Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory*, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 1975, p. 5.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*

***Taḥqīq Islāmīyat ‘Ilm al Iqtisād
al Maḥūm Wa’l Manhaj***

(Islamization of Economics: Concepts and Methodology)

Muhammad Anas al Zarga

تحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد
المفهوم والمنهج

محمد أنس الزرقاء

تحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد: المفهوم والمنهج^(١)

محمد أنس الزرقاء

١ - تمهيد

١/١ - أسئلة أساسية:

مهمة هذا البحث هي دراسة معنى ومنهج تحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد خصوصاً والعلوم الاجتماعية عموماً. وسأشير في ثنايا البحث إلى نقاط اتصاله بمبادئ "إسلامية" العلوم كما اقترحها الرسالة القيمة التي أعدها د. إسماعيل الفاروقي ونشرها المعهد العالمي للفكر الإسلامي والتي سأشير إليها اختصاراً بالرسالة الفاروقية^(٢).

والسؤالان الكبيران في معرض تحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد، أي إعادة بنائه على أسس إسلامية، هما:

السؤال الأول: ما العلاقة بين علم الاقتصاد العادي (الوضعي) وبين الدين الإسلامي؟
السؤال الثاني: ما العلاقة بين علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي وبين الفقه الإسلامي؟

ففي ما يخص السؤال الأول جرى جمهور الباحثين في الاقتصاد الإسلامي حتى الآن على التمييز بين النظام الاقتصادي وبين علم الاقتصاد، فهم يؤكدون بحق أن الإسلام يقدم نظاماً اقتصادياً متميزاً، ويتبعون ذلك عادة بالقول بأن علم الاقتصاد لا يختلف من نظام اقتصادي لآخر.

وهذا المنحى من التفكير، إن صح، يستلزم القول بأنه لا يمكن أن يقوم علم اقتصاد إسلامي، لنفس السبب الذي لا تتوقع معه قيام رياضيات إسلامية أو فيزياء نووية إسلامية. وبعبارة أخرى لا يمكن قيام علم اقتصاد إسلامي ليس لأن الإسلام وعلم الاقتصاد متعارضان، بل لأن إهتماماتهما مختلفة، ولأن علم الاقتصاد عالمي متجرد من القيم التي تختلف من نظام لآخر.

كما أن هذا المنحى من التفكير يستلزم أيضاً القول بأن مقولات علم الاقتصاد الوضعي لا بد أن تقبل في اقتصاد إسلامي مثلما أن مقولات علم الفيزياء مثلاً صحيحة في جميع البلاد والنظم الاجتماعية.

وهناك في المقابل منحى آخر من التفكير يقول بأن علم الاقتصاد ليس إلا إفرازاً لحضارة معينة، ولا يمكن أن تكون له أية مقولات صحيحة عموماً تصدق على النظم الاجتماعية المختلفة. فإذا أردنا اقتصاداً إسلامياً حقاً فلا بد أن ننبد وراء ظهورنا علم الاقتصاد الوضعي ونبدأ ببناء علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي من نقطة الصفر.

وكل من هذين المنحيين من التفكير ينطوي على شطر من الحقيقة، لكن يفوته شطر منها، كما سآين.

وفيما يخص السؤال الثاني، هناك من يعد الاقتصاد الإسلامي فرعاً من فقه المعاملات ويرى "أنه حين تستخلص الأحكام الاقتصادية من بين ثنايا الكتب الفقهية، وتدون في أبحاث مستقلة، يتوافر لدينا ما نسميه بالاقتصاد الإسلامي"⁽³⁾. وهناك بالمقابل من لا يكاد يلاحظ كبير صلة بين الفقه والاقتصاد. فلا بد من تحديد هذه الصلة بما يمكن من الوضوح، وهذا ما سأحاوله أيضاً.

٢/١ - أهمية الموضوع:

هذا النوع من البحوث المنهجية، بالنسبة للاقتصاد وسواه من العلوم الاجتماعية، أشبه ما يكون بأصول الفقه بالنسبة للفقه. وقد يسمى اليوم منهج أو طرائق العلم. فكان يصح والحالة هذه أن نعنون هذا البحث "بعض أصول علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي".

ولا أجدني بحاجة إلى التأكيد على أهمية الوعي على المنهج في أية محاولة لتحقيق إسلامية علم من العلوم، حتى لا تتبعثر الجهود الفكرية أو تسير في اتجاهات متناقضة فيما بينها، أو مناقضة للمنهج الإسلامي الصحيح. وكيف نرجو أن يتقدم علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي أو سواه من العلوم الاجتماعية الإسلامية، دون أن تتضح الاجابات (ولا أقول تنفق) على الأسئلة المنهجية الكبرى المتصلة بأصول العلم.

٣/١ - منهج الكتابة :

لأكتب القارئ أنني أقدم على الكتابة في هذا الموضوع متيباً، على طول ما فكرت فيه وقرأت له، وكتبت من المذكرات وجمعت من الأمثلة والشواهد منذ بضع سنين، ومازلت.

والبحث الحاضر هو جزء يسير مما تراكم لدي فيه. ولا أقول هذا لأتقع القارئ بسلامة ماوصلت إليه بل لأؤكد أنني لم أهجم على هذا الموضوع الخطير دون إعداد أو تروؤ. ومع ذلك فلست راضياً تماماً عن هذا البحث بعد، ولعل تعليقات القراء تساعدني على التحسين والتصحيح في المستقبل إن شاء الله.

وقد تزايدت قناعتني بأن الموضوع أصعب مما يبدو لأول وهلة، وأن اختلاف الاصطلاحات وأساليب التعبير فيه هو عقبة كبرى تفسح مجالاً لسوء التفاهم حتى مع اتفاق الأفكار. ومن جملة أسباب ذلك هو أن مثل هذا البحث لا بد أن يخاطب الاقتصادي

والشريعين في آن واحد. وما هو مفهوم لإحدى هاتين الطائفتين يغلب أن يكون مجهولاً عند الطائفة الأخرى. وقد رأيت أن أفضل طريقة لنقل الأفكار بوضوح هي الالتزام بضرب مثال أو أكثر على كل فكرة. وهذا شرط صعب بذلت جهداً كبيراً لتحقيقه وأرجو أن يلتزم به من ينشطون للكتابة في هذا الموضوع.

٤/١ - مخطط البحث:

أتناول في القسم الثاني تعريف ومقومات العلم، أي علم، أي عناصره الأساسية، ومكانة المسلمات السابقة فيه، والقنوات التي تدلف منها القيم إلى العلم. وفي القسم الثالث أقدم تصوراً ممكناً للعلاقة بين الإسلام وعلم الاقتصاد الوضعي. ثم أبين في القسم الرابع مقومات علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي عندما يبلغ أشده، وصلته بالفقه الإسلامي والاقتصاد الوضعي وبعض فروع المعرفة الأخرى.

ويناقد القسم الخامس خطط عمل لتحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد، ومنها الخطة المقترحة في الرسالة الفاروقية.

إن التحليل الذي تنطوي عليه الأقسام (٢-٤) من هذا البحث يعد تفسيراً وتفصيلاً ممكناً للهدفين الثالث والرابع من أهداف خطة العمل الفاروقية (ص ٣٨) وهما:
 - إظهار دلالة الاسلام وعلاقته المحددة بكل فرع من فروع المعرفة الحديثة .
 - والبحث عن طريق تحقيق التمازج المبدع بين التراث الإسلامي والمعرفة الحديثة.
 وهذا التحليل التفصيلي يعد شرطاً مسبقاً لتنفيذ الخطوتين الرابعة والخامسة من الخطة الفاروقية (ص ٤١-٤٢)، التي لخصتها في الفقرة ١/٥ أدناه.

٢ - تعريف العلم ومقوماته

١/٢ - العبارات الوصفية والعبارات القيمة:

إن نقطة الانطلاق في هذا الموضوع هي التمييز بين العبارات الوصفية والقيمة. فالعبارة الوصفية: تصف واقعاً معيناً كقولنا: إن زيادة هطول المطر تزيد الإنتاج الزراعي، أو قولنا هنالك حياة على سطح المريخ. ونظراً لأن العبارة الوصفية تخبر عما هو كائن فقد تسمى أيضاً عبارة خبرية.

ويقابل العبارات الوصفية نوع آخر هو العبارات القيمة التي تعبر عما يجب أن يكون كقولنا: الوحدة خير من جليس السوء. أو قولنا: الصدق واجب. فمثل هذه العبارات تدل على تفضيلنا لحالة ممكنة الوقوع (كحالة الوحدة وحالة الصدق) على حالة أخرى ممكنة (كجليس السوء والكذب).

والعبارات الوصفية أو الخبرية تحتل الصدق أو الصواب أي مطابقة الواقع، كما تحتل الكذب أو الخطأ أي مخالفة الواقع. ولهذا يمكن من حيث المبدأ اختبار صحتها من خطئها. أما العبارات القيمة فهي لاتصف واقعاً معيناً بل تعبر عن تفضيل. ولهذا فإنها لاتحتل الصدق (أي مطابقة الواقع) أو الكذب، لكنها تحتل منا القبول إن كانت تنسجم مع القيم التي نتبناها، أو الرفض إن خالفت تلك القيم.^(٤)

ويتضح مما سبق أن سنن الله في الكون والمجتمع يعبر عنها بعبارات وصفية أو خبرية. أما الأحكام الآمرة في الشريعة — أي شريعة — وكذلك قواعد الأخلاق في أي مجتمع فيعبر عنها بعبارات قيمة. ولهذا فإن مضمون العلوم التجريبية كالفيزياء والزراعة والطب غالباً ما يتركز في القضايا الوصفية أما مضمون علوم الشريعة وقواعد الأخلاق فغالباً ما يتناول القضايا القيمة^(٥).

٢/٢ — تعريف ومقومات العلم:

لن أغوص في مسألة التعريف الدقيق للعلم بل سأكتفي بتعريف تقريبي أراه منسجماً مع التصور الإسلامي ومع عدد من التعاريف الحديثة. لا بد أولاً من التفريق بين العلم والمعرفة. فالمعرفة هي مجموعة حقائق، أما العلم فهو فرع ما من فروع المعرفة نظمت حقائقه ونتائج البحث فيه بصورة فرضيات وقوانين عامة، قابلة للتحقق والاختبار بالمنطق أو بالتجريب أو بالاستقراء، الخ^(٦). وهذا التعريف يشمل العلوم التجريبية كالفيزياء ويشمل العلوم الاجتماعية كالإقتصاد، كما يشمل النحو والرياضيات والفقهاء. الخ.

ويلاحظ أن مفهوم "العلم" في القرآن الكريم والحديث الشريف لا يقتصر فقط على المعرفة اليقينية المطابقة للواقع، بل يشمل أيضاً الظن الراجح، لذا نجد علماء الشريعة متفقين على تسمية الفقه علماً مع أن كثيراً من أحكامه مبنية على أدلة ظنية، كما أنهم متفقون على وجوب العمل بمقتضى الأدلة الظنية الراجحة.

لكن الشريعة ذمّت إبتاع الظن غير الراجح، ولم تسمه علماً. وقد وضع محمد ابن اسماعيل الأمير الصنعاني أن الظن لفظ مشترك بين معان متعددة منها: الشك والتردد بين طرفي الأمر، فهذا يحرم العمل به وهو الذي ورد في القرآن والحديث بمعرض الدم. ومن معاني الظن أيضاً: الطرف الراجح (وإن كان غير متيقن)، "وهذا متعبّد به، بل أكثر الأحكام الشرعية دائرة عليه". (نقلاً عن القاسمي، ص ٥١).

ولما كان القسم الأكبر من محتوى العلوم الاجتماعية ومنها الإقتصاد إنما يبنى على أدلة ظنية راجحة تعتمد على الملاحظة والاستنتاج والاستقراء، فلا تتردد في تسميتها "علوماً" بالمعنى الشرعي أيضاً.

ماهي مقومات علم من العلوم، أي ماهي عناصره التي يتألف منها بشكل عام؟ من المناسب لبحثنا تقسيمها إلى ثلاثة مقومات:

المقوم الأول:

المسلمات السابقة (Presumptions)، أو إختصاراً: المسلمات ، وهي افتراضات ضمنية مصدرها النظرة العامة إلى الكون، وإلى الانسان أيضاً بالنسبة للعلوم الاجتماعية، (وقد تسمى الأسس الفلسفية للعلم)، ومثالها بالنسبة للفيزياء القناعة — السابقة لأي بحث — بأن الكون والمادة تخضع لقوانين مستقرة، وأن هذه القوانين قابلة للاكتشاف. ومقابل ذلك ونظيره في العلوم الاجتماعية القناعة بأن في السلوك الانساني قدراً من الاطراد والاستقرار. فالمسلمات هي في الحقيقة عبارات وصفية عن الكون أو الانسان أو المجتمع.. تقبل بوصفها نقاط إنطلاق وتتخذ صراحة أو ضمناً أساساً لبناء العلم.

المقوم الثاني:

الأحكام القيمة التي لا مفر للعلم من الاستناد اليها، وبنين أهمها في الفقرة (٤/٢).

المقوم الثالث:

وهو القسم الوصفي من العلم، أي مجموعة الحقائق والفرضيات والنظريات العامة والقوانين المتعلقة بموضوع العلم. وهذا المقوم الثالث هو ما يجرى التركيز عليه عادة باعتباره الهدف المباشر للعلم، وهو ما يتبادر إلى الذهن لأول وهلة عندما يذكر علم من العلوم. كما أن هذا القسم الوصفي من العلم هو وحده الذي يخضع عادة للتحجيص والاختبار.

ومن الصعب تصور علم لا يعتمد على كل من المقومات الثلاثة، قل هذا الاعتماد أو أكثر. لكن يلاحظ أن دور المقومين الأولين يقل في العلوم المادية والتجريبية كالفيزياء والزراعة، ويتسع هذا الدور في العلوم الاجتماعية كالاقتصاد والتربية وخصوصاً في علم الاجتماع، ويتسع أكثر فأكثر في العلوم الإنسانية كعلم النفس، ويبلغ أقصاه في علم قيمى أساسا كالفقه الإسلامى (ر: الفقرة ١/٤/٤ أدناه).

ويلاحظ أن المقومات الثلاثة في العلم الواحد قلما تتقدم متميزة ومنفصلة عن بعضها. بل غالباً ما يقدم محتوى العلم في قالب المقوم الثالث وإن كان ينطوي صراحة أو ضمناً على المقومين الأولين.

ونظراً لأن كثيراً من المتخصصين لا ينتبهون أصلاً للمقومين الأولين من مقومات العلم حتى في حقل اختصاصهم، ولا يشعرون بالدور المهم لهذين المقومين في محتوى العلم ومسيرته التاريخية، فإننا سنعطي بعض الأمثلة الإيضاحية عن ذلك في الفقرتين (٣/٢) و (٤/٢) التاليتين.

٣/٢ — أمثلة لأثر المُسلمات السابقة في العلم:

إن من أهم وظائف أو آثار المُسلمات أنها المَعين الذي يستمد منه العالم الفرضيات التي يستعملها في تفسير الظواهر. فمثلاً، عند تفسير وقائع السيرة النبوية ، يستبعد المستشرق الملحد مباشرة أي تفسير يعتمد على الوحي أو على النبوة، ويحصر نفسه في الفرضيات الأخرى.

ثم ينظم كامل دراسته وربطه بين الحقائق على هذا الأساس.

ومثل ذلك عند تفسير ظاهرة التشابه بين الديانات. فالذي ينكر النبوات والوحي ويتخذ ذلك مسلمة أساسية، سوف يحرص تفسيره في احتمال الاتفاق أي المصادفة، أو احتمال نقل اللاحق عن السابق. أما المؤمن بالوحي والرسالات فلديه تفسير آخر هو وحدة المصدر الإلهي للديانات.

لاحظ في هذه الأمثلة أن الباحث (المستشرق أو دارس الديانات المقارنة) قلما يصرح بمسلماته، لكنه يصوغ مع ذلك تفسيراته للحقائق أو ما يقدمه بإسم العلم معتمداً على تلك المسلمات. ومن أهم أمثلة المسلمات الاقتصادية ذات الأثار العميقة في مقولات العلم ونظرياته: الافتراضات المتعلقة بفسرة الانسان وحوافزه (أنظر مثلاً على ذلك في ¼ لاحقاً، وأنظر أيضاً سامولز ص ٤٧٥).

٤/٢ — جوانب من العلم لا بد أن تستند إلى قيم سابقة: (٧)

أ — اختيار القضايا التي ستبحث:

فعندما يوجه الكثير من الموارد البشرية والمالية لدراسة نظرية معينة فإن الموارد المتبقية لدراسة نظريات أخرى تغدو أقل. ”ويصدق هذا (على الموارد الموجهة) لتدريب العلماء الجدد والوقت المخصص في قاعة الدرس، والصفحات المخصصة في الكتب والمجلات العلمية. حتى إن تخصيص حصص متساوية في الوقت (لنظريات مختلفة) يعبر عن تبني قيم معينة“ (٧:١٠٠) ومن الأمثلة الاقتصادية على أثر القيم السابقة في اختيار قضايا البحث: شدة اهتمام النظرية الاقتصادية التقليدية بدراسة وتحليل السلوك الاقتصادي الأناني، وقلة اهتمائها بدراسة السلوك الاقتصادي المدفوع بالايثار او بالحوافز الأخلاقية (أنظر المثال ب في الفقرة ¼ فيما بعد).

ب — اختيار المتغيرات والافتراضات:

إذا أردنا دراسة ظاهرة ما، التمر الاقتصادي مثلاً، نجد أنها تختلف اختلافاً عظيماً في الزمان والمكان، أو بكلمات أخرى، أنها تخضع لتأثير متغيرات كثيرة. وبدون تحليل نظري سابق لا يستطيع التحليل الكمي الإحصائي للمعلومات (كما في معادلات الانحدار المتعدد) أن يبرهن على أكثر من وجود ارتباط بين ظواهر معينة، ولا يمكن بهذا التحليل وحده تمييز الأسباب من النتائج. ولهذا لا يمكن باستعمال الطرق الكمية الاحصائية وحدها التوصل الى قوانين عامة لمسار الظواهر الاقتصادية وأسبابها ونتائجها ما لم تستند تلك الطرق الكمية إلى ”توجيه نظري قوي“ (٨).

من أين يأتي هذا التوجيه النظري الذي هو أساس للتقدم العلمي ولنجاحة استخدام الطرق الكمية في التحليل والاختبار؟ انه يأتي نتيجة لعدد من الخطوات الفكرية يمكن تلخيصها في مرحلتين: الأولى هي استعراض المتغيرات التي يُتصور إمكانية تأثيرها على الواقعة او الظاهرة الاقتصادية موضع البحث. وهذه المتغيرات عادة كثيرة جداً والعديد منها غير اقتصادي.

والمرحلة الثانية هي تصنيف المتغيرات ضمن ثلاث فئات.

— متغيرات لا علاقة لها بالظاهرة.

— متغيرات خارجية EXOGENOUS تؤثر بالظاهرة المدروسة ولا تتأثر بها.

— متغيرات داخلية ENDOGENOUS تؤثر في الظاهرة وتتأثر بها كما تتأثر بالمتغيرات الخارجية. والمتغيرات الداخلية هي التي تنصب الجهود عادة على تفسير عدد مختار منها والتنبؤ بمساره.

ونظراً لأن الظواهر الاجتماعية (من اقتصادية وسواها) والظواهر النفسية، مترابطة عموماً ومتبادلة التأثير، فإن قائمة المتغيرات التي يجب استعراضها وتصنيفها عند دراسة أية ظاهرة معينة هي قائمة ضخمة يتعذر عملياً على دارسي أي علم من العلوم الاجتماعية استعراضها بكاملها وتصنيفها. والذي يجري دوماً هو تجاهل القسم الأكبر من هذه المتغيرات وتركيز الاهتمام على متغيرات مختارة محدودة العدد من قائمة المتغيرات الداخلية والخارجية.

إن خطوة اختيار بعض المتغيرات (وإن شئت فقل خطوة تجاهل الكثير من المتغيرات) ثم تصنيفها تمهيداً لدراستها، ثم المشكلات والأسئلة التي نختار طرحها لتجيب عليها (من بين قائمة غير متناهية للأسئلة التي يمكن طرحها) كل ذلك يتأثر إلى حد بعيد بتصورات الباحثين والعلماء السابقة حول طبيعة المجتمع وهدف الحياة الانسانية، وبنوعية اهتماماتهم حول الإنسان والمجتمع، كما يتأثر طبعاً بالمسلمات السابقة الضمنية والصريحة التي يعتمدونها في بحثهم والتي لا يمكن أن يقوم بلونها علم من العلوم⁽¹⁾.


جـ — اختيار طرق البحث والرهنة والادحاض المقبولة:

إن أية طريقة للبحث النظري أو التطبيقي غالباً ماتعبر عن تصور سابق معين عن العالم كما تعطي الأهمية لأمر دون أخرى. ولنضرب على ذلك مثلاً بالطرق الكمية الإحصائية في البحث التي تزدهر الآن ازدهاراً عظيماً في مجال علم الاقتصاد وسواه من العلوم الاجتماعية. إن هذه الطرق، على قيمتها التي لا تنكر، تعطي أهمية كبيرة للمفاهيم الواضحة التي يكون قياسها الإحصائي أمراً سهلاً وقليل الكلفة، حتى ولو كانت مثل هذه المفاهيم محدودة الأهمية والدلالة، أو قاصرة عن الوصول إلى الحقائق الأساسية. ومن الأمثلة القريبة عن تأثير طريقة البحث تلك الدراسات الكمية العديدة (المبنية على طرق الاقتصاد القياسي ECONOMETRICS) لظاهرة هجرة الأدمغة من البلدان النامية إلى البلدان الصناعية، حيث استخدم في تفسير الهجرة متغيرات اقتصادية مثل: تكلفة السفر بين البلدين، ومتوسط دخل الفرد المهاجر في بلده الأصلي بالمقارنة مع البلد الذي يقصده، الخ.. وهذه جميعاً متغيرات سهلة القياس. لكن متغيرات أخرى أهم منها يتم تجاهلها لأنها صعبة القياس مثل: العوامل الاجتماعية الطاردة للأدمغة من بلادها (كالفساد والطغيان) أو العوامل الشخصية المهمة (كدرجة شعور الفرد بالانتماء إلى بلده الأصلي، وبمسؤوليته عنه، الخ..).

٣ - تحليل العلاقة بين الإسلام وعلم الاقتصاد

من السهل تشخيص العلاقة بين الإسلام (بمعنى القرآن الكريم و السنة النبوية الشريفة وما استمد منهما) وعلم الاقتصاد باستخدام الرسم المبسط التالي، حيث الدائرة الكبرى تمثل المقولات الإسلامية والدائرة الصغرى تمثل مقولات علم الاقتصاد، كما قسمنا الدائرتين كليهما بخط أفقي يفصل بين المقولات القيمية (فوق الخط) والمقولات الوصفية (تحت الخط).

رسم يوضح علاقة الاسلام بعلم الاقتصاد



ونرى من الرسم أنه صار لدينا ست زمر متميزة من المقولات رقمناها من (١) الى (٦). فالزمرة (١) تضم المقولات القيمية الإسلامية، والزمرة (٢) تضم المقولات الوصفية الإسلامية. والزمرتان (٣) و (٤) مشتركتان بين الإسلام والاقتصاد، حيث (٣) تضم مقولات قيمية يؤكد بها الإسلام كما يؤكد بها أيضاً علم الاقتصاد. والزمرة (٤) تضم مقولات وصفية إسلامية هي أيضاً من المقولات الوصفية لعلم الاقتصاد. والزمرة (٥) تضم مقولات قيمية اقتصادية لم ترد بها نصوص شرعية ولا يمكن استنتاجها من تلك النصوص. فهي قيم ينفرد بها علم الاقتصاد. وأخيراً فإن الزمرة (٦) تضم المقولات الوصفية لعلم الاقتصاد.

إن هذه الزمر الست من المقولات هي زمر نظرية قد لا يوجد ما يقابل كلا منها في الحقيقة والواقع. ولا بد لنا من تقديم مثال واحد على الأقل على كل زمرة لتؤكد من أنها ليست زمرة خالية من العناصر، بل لها أمثلة واقعية، وهذا ما سنفعله في أثناء المناقشة التالية:

أولاً: المقولات القيمية الإسلامية:

(الزمرتان ٣ و ١) : هنا يقع القسم الأكبر من النصوص الشرعية في القرآن والسنة، لأن كافة الأوامر والنواهي الشرعية (بمختلف درجاتها من وجوب واستحباب وكراهة وتحريم) هي مقولات قيمية. وبعض هذه المقولات القيمية غير اقتصادي (الزمرة ١)، كقوله تعالى: ﴿وَلَا تَصْعَقْ خَدَّكَ لِلنَّاسِ وَلَا تَمَسَّ فِي الْأَرْضِ مَرْحَأً﴾^(١) وبعضها اقتصادي (الزمرة ٣) كقوله

تعالى: ﴿يَأَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ وَذَرُوا مَا بَقِيَ مِنَ الرِّبَا﴾^(١) وقوله ﴿وَأَتُوا الزَّكَاةَ﴾^(٢) هذا وإن كافة أحكام النظام الاقتصادي في الاسلام تقع في هذه الزمرة الثالثة. ويمكن أن ننظر إلى الزمرة (٣) من وجهة نظر علم الاقتصاد الحديث فنسأل: هل ثمة مقولات إسلامية قيمية ينادي بها الاقتصاديون أيضاً؟ قد يبدو لأول وهلة أنه لا يوجد عملياً مثل هذه المقولات لأن علم الاقتصاد الحديث سعى باستمرار إلى التجرد من القيم.

على أننا أسلفنا في الفقرة (٤/٢) أن هناك جوانب من العلم لا بد أن تستند لقيم مسبقة، ومن هذه الجوانب اختيار موضوعات البحث. وهنا نجد أن موضوع الكفاءة الانتاجية (وتعني تقريباً الوصول لأقصى انتاج بأقل تكاليف) هو من أهم مايعني به الاقتصاديون، معبرين بذلك ضمناً عن تفضيل قيمي. وهذا يتفق مع الاسلام الذي ينهى عن الهدر والإسراف، (ونقصان الكفاءة الانتاجية هو صورة من صور الاسراف)، كما يتفق مع هدف حفظ المال وهو من المقاصد الشرعية الخمسة الكبرى.

وهناك مثل آخر واضح هو شدة اهتمام الاقتصاديين بتحليل النمو الاقتصادي (بمعنى الزيادة المطردة في متوسط دخل الفرد) ، وهذا يتفق عموماً مع اهتمام الاسلام بمكافحة الفقر وبتفضيله الصريح لحالة الرزق الرغد على حالة الحرمان والعوز.

وهكذا نرى أن الزمرة (٣) من المقولات ليست زمرة خالية سواء نظرنا إليها من وجهة نظر الاسلام أو من وجهة نظر علم الاقتصاد الحديث.

ثانياً: المقولات الوصفية الإسلامية:

(الزمرتان ٢ و ٤) : هذه المقولات تصف واقعاً، أو تشير إلى علاقة بين متغيرات أو تصنف الحقائق تصنيفاً معيماً. ومن أمثلة المقولات غير الاقتصادية هنا أي الزمرة:

أ — قال تعالى في شأن العسل: ﴿فيه شفاء للناس﴾^(٣) فهذه عبارة وصفية عن العلاقة بين استعمال العسل وشفاء بعض الأمراض ، وتقع في مجال علم الطب.

ب — قال تعالى ﴿ربنا لا تؤاخذنا إن نسينا أو أخطأنا﴾(البقرة ٢/٢٨٦) فيه دلالة على أن في بعض أنواع النسيان جانباً إرادياً يستطيع الإنسان أن يتوقاه، وإلا لما كان للاستغفار منه مبرر. وهذه مقولة وصفية تقع في نطاق علم النفس.

ج — قال جل وعلا في سورة البقرة ٢/١٦٦: ﴿إذ تبرا الذين أتبعوا من الذين أتبعوا...﴾، وقال في سورة الأعراف ٧/٧٥ عن صالح عليه السلام: ﴿قال الملأ الذين استكبروا من قومه للذين استضعفوا...﴾ والملأ هم الأشراف المقدمون الذين يرجع إلى قولهم، وقد تكرر ذكرهم مرات في القرآن العظيم على أنهم من المعوقات الاجتماعية لقبول دعوات الرسل. وقال تعالى في سورة الأحزاب ٣٣/٦٧: ﴿وقالوا ربنا إنا أطعنا سادتنا وكبراءنا فأضلونا السبيلاً﴾.

هذه الآيات الكريمة وأمثالها تؤكد أهمية تصنيف الناس إلى متبوعين وتابعين عند تحليل رد فعل الجماعة تجاه مواقف أو أفكار جديدة . وهذه مقولة وصفية تدخل في نطاق علم الاجتماع.

ومن أمثلة المقولات الإسلامية الوصفية المتصلة بالاقتصاد ، أي الزمرة ٤ :

(أ) قال تعالى في سورة العلق وهي أول ما نزل من القرآن ٥/٩٦-٦: ﴿كَلَّا إِنَّ الْإِنْسَانَ لِرَبِّهِ لَكَنُفٍ﴾، أن رآه استغنى ﴿، وقال في سورة الشورى ٢٧/٤٢: ﴿وَلَوْ بَسَطَ اللَّهُ الرِّزْقَ لِعِبَادِهِ لَبَغَا فِي الْأَرْضِ﴾. وهناك أحاديث نبوية عديدة تربط أيضاً بين الغنى والبطيخ، كقوله ﷺ [بادروا بالأعمال.. هل تنتظرون إلا .. فقرأ مُنْسِياً أو غَنِي مُطْفِئاً..] (١٠). فهذه مقولة وصفية اقتصادية تربط بين زيادة الثروة والميل إلى البطيخ. وهي مقولة لم ينتبه إليها الاقتصاديون فيما أعلم.

(ب) قال تعالى في سورة آل عمران ١٤/٣-١٥: ﴿زَيْنٌ لِلنَّاسِ حُبُّ الشَّهَوَاتِ مِنَ النِّسَاءِ وَالْبَنِينَ وَالْقَنَاطِيرِ الْمُقَنْطَرَةِ مِنَ الذَّهَبِ وَالْفِضَّةِ وَالْخَيْلِ الْمُسَوَّمَةِ وَالْأَنْعَامِ وَالْحَرْثِ ، ذَلِكَ مَتَاعُ الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا وَاللَّهُ عِنْدَهُ حُسْنُ الْمَآبِ . قُلْ أُوتِيتُكُمْ بَحِيرًا مِنْ ذَلِكَ، لِلَّذِينَ اتَّقَوْا عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ جَنَّاتٌ تَجْرِي مِنْ تَحْتِهَا الْأَنْهَارُ خَالِدِينَ فِيهَا وَأَزْوَاجٌ مُطَهَّرَةٌ وَرِضْوَانٌ مِنَ اللَّهِ، وَاللَّهُ بَصِيرٌ بِالْعِبَادِ﴾.

في هذه الآيات الكريمة مقولتان وصفيتان: أولاهما هي حب الإنسان للثروة بلا حدود. وفي المعنى نفسه ورد الحديث الصحيح [لو أن لابن آدم واديين من مال لأحب أن يكون معهما ثالث..] (١١) وكثرت. وثانيهما أن الإيمان بثواب الله في الآخرة يخفف من حب الإنسان للثروة في الدنيا. والمقولة الأولى يقول بها الاقتصاديون أيضاً.

(ج) قال جلا وعلا: ﴿وَلَا تَمْتَنُوا مِمَّا فِضَّلَ اللَّهُ بِهِ بَعْضَكُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ.. وَأَسْأَلُوا اللَّهَ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ﴾ (٣٢/٤) وقال: ﴿لَا تَمُدَّنَّ عَيْنَيْكَ إِلَىٰ مَا مَتَّعْنَا بِهِ أَزْوَاجًا مِنْهُمْ﴾ (١٣١/٢٠) وقال ﷺ [أنظروا إلى من أسفل منكم ولا تنظروا إلى من فوقكم، فهو أجدر ألا تزدروا نعمة الله عليكم] (رواه مسلم).

إن ما يستنتج من الآيتين الكريمتين أن طلب الفرد للبطيخ يتأثر بما يراه عند الآخرين. ومما يستنتج من الحديث الشريف إن رضا المستهلك بما عنده يتأثر بمقارنة نفسه بالآخرين أي بوضعه النسبي. وهناك نصوص شرعية كثيرة أخرى تؤكد ترابط السلوك بين الأفراد وترابط دوال المنفعة بينهم وشدة تأثير العوامل الخارجية والاجتماعية على ذلك كله.

إن مثل هذه النصوص تناقض افتراضين أساسيين في نظرتي سلوك المستهلك والرفاهية الاقتصادية WELFARE ECONOMICS، هما افتراض أن "أذواق المستهلكين" هي متغيرات خارجية، وأن دوال المنفعة لدى المستهلكين مستقل بعضها عن بعض.

(د) قال تعالى في سورة محمد (٣٧/٤٧) ﴿... وَإِنْ تَوَمَّنَا وَتَقَوَّا يُؤْتِكُمْ أَجْرَكُمْ وَلَا يَسْأَلُكُمْ أَمْوَالَكُمْ . إِنْ يَسْأَلُكُمْوهَا فِيمَحْفِكُمْ تَبْخُلُوا وَيُخْرِجْ أَضْغَانَكُمْ﴾، أي لو ألحف في طلب البذل منكم، لظهر من أحقادكم ما كان خفياً . وقال ﴿خُذِ الْعَفْوَ..﴾ (١٢) وقال ﴿وَيَسْأَلُونَكَ مَاذَا يُنْفِقُونَ قُلِ الْعَفْوَ﴾ (١٣).

والمقولة الوصفية في هذه الآيات الكريمة هي أن ما يمكن أخذه من الناس على سبيل التبرع له حدود معينة، إذا تجاوزناها ظهرت منهم أحقاد كانت مستترة.

ثالثاً: المقولات الوصفية لعلم الاقتصاد:

(الزمر ٦): على الرغم مما اشتهر عن الاقتصاديين من الاختلاف في الرأي، فإن في علم الاقتصاد العديد من المقولات الوصفية التي هي محل إجماع إن صح التعبير ، سأذكر بعضاً منها للتنبيه على خطأ الرأي القائل بأن علم الاقتصاد الحديث ليس إلا مجموعة من القيم الغربية: (أ) قانون إنجل ENGEL (وهو عالم إحصاء ألماني) القائل: إن نسبة الدخل التي تُنفق على الغذاء تتناقص كلما ازداد الدخل.

(ب) إن مجموع فوائض موازين المدفوعات للدول ذات الفائض، يساوي مجموع العجز في موازين الدول ذات العجز.

(ج) إن قيمة العملة أي قوتها الشرائية لا ترتبط بمقدار تغطيتها الذهبية.

(د) قانون تناقص الغلة: إذا زدنا استخدام عنصر انتاج بكميات متساوية (مع تثبيت عناصر الإنتاج الأخرى) فإن كمية الناتج تزداد بعد حين زيادات متناقصة.

استدراك:

لقد أغفلنا عمداً ذكر «المسلمات السابقة» المبحوثة في ف ٣/٢ حتى لا يتعقد الرسم الإيضاحي وتتعدد معه المناقشة.

وأبسط طريقة لادخال المسلمات هي أن ندمجها في رسمنا البياني مع المقولات القيمة بحيث يكون القسم الأعلى من الرسم (الزمر ١ و ٣ و ٥) شاملاً للمقولات القيمة والمسلمات. ويبقى القسم الأسفل من الرسم (الزمر ٢ و ٤ و ٦) للمقولات الوصفية وحدها.

وعلى هذا الأساس فإن الزمرة ٣ من المقولات ستضم تلك المقولات القيمة أو المسلمات التي يشترك فيها الاسلام وعلم الاقتصاد، وقد مثلنا لها أنفاً.

أما الزمرتان (١ و ٥) فتضمنان القيم والمسلمات التي ينفرد بها الاسلام أو علم الاقتصاد.

رابعاً: نتيجتان حول علاقة الاسلام بعلم الاقتصاد:

نخلص مما تقدم إلى نتيجتين أولاهما: أن الاسلام أصلاً دين هداية هدفه الأول تزويدنا بالمقولات القيمة، أي بالأحكام الشرعية الآمرة والناهية، أو المعبرة عن تفضيل قيمى لحالة على أخرى. لكن الاسلام ينهنا إلى بعض المتغيرات ويزودنا أيضاً ببعض المقولات الوصفية التي تقع ضمن نطاق بعض العلوم كالاقتصاد والاجتماع والنفس. ولهذا أهمية بالغة في تحقيق إسلامية العلوم الاجتماعية والانسانية، وفي وقاية هذه العلوم من الانحراف والخطأ.

ذلك أن الكثرة الهائلة للمتغيرات والعوامل المؤثرة في الظواهر الاجتماعية والاقتصادية،

وكثرة المقولات الوصفية المحتملة فيها، والحاجة النظرية الماسة إلى تجاهل القسم الأكبر من تلك العوامل وتركيز الإهتمام على عدد محدود من العوامل (كما سلف في ف ٢/٤/ب)، وكذلك تعذر تثبيت بعض العوامل الاجتماعية أو إخضاع البشر للتجربة العملية، كل ذلك يفسح المجال "للتخبط الهائل في العلوم الاجتماعية وتوالي النظريات المتناقضة.. فإذا شطَّ الفهم والنظر بالمسلم في قوانين الكون والوجود والعلاقات... فإن له من الوحي عاصماً.. وهكذا فإن المعرفة الإسلامية توظف، وفي وقت واحد، مصادر المعرفة العقلية والتجريبية الاستقرائية إلى جانب مصادر المعرفة الكونية الكلية الاستنباطية (المستمدة من الوحي)"^(١٧).

لهذا فإن تنويه الشريعة الإلهية ببعض العوامل والمتغيرات المؤثرة في الحياة والسلوك الاقتصاديّين، وتزويدها إيانا ببعض المقولات الوصفية، يعد مساعدة فكرية ثمينة في مجال تحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد وسواه من العلوم. لكن يلاحظ أن أكثر الكتابات المعاصرة عن إسلامية الاقتصاد والعلوم الأخرى تتجاهل الجانب الوصفي من الإسلام، ولا ترى فيه ولا تعرض منه إلا الجانب القيمي^(١٨).

والنتيجة الثانية: هي أن هناك منطقة اهتمام مشتركة بين الإسلام وعلم الاقتصاد (الزمرتان ٣ و ٤ من المقولات).

وفي ضوء ماتقدم سنين في القسم الرابع التالي من هذا البحث كيف نحقق "التمازج المبدع" بين الإسلام وعلم الاقتصاد، أو كيف نحقق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد.

٤ — مقومات علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي ونطاقه

١/٤ — الصلة بين علجي الاقتصاد الإسلامي والوضعي:

إن المحصلة النهائية لعملية الدمج المبدع بين علم الاقتصاد والإسلام ستكون علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي، الذي ينبغي أن يتكوّن من المقولات الآتية:

— الزمرة (٣) مقولات قيمية ومسلّمات إسلامية. وقد سلف القول بأن من جملة ما تضمه هذه الزمرة: أحكام وقواعد النظام الاقتصادي الإسلامي (أو المذهب كما يفضل البعض أن يسميه).

— الزمرة (٤) مقولات وصفية إسلامية تتعلق بالاقتصاد.

— الزمرة (٦) مقولات وصفية اقتصادية.

وبعبارة أخرى سوف نستبعد من هذا العلم الزمرة (٥) وهي المقولات القيمية والمسلّمات التي ينفرد بها علم الاقتصاد الحديث، أي التي لا نجد لها أساساً إسلامياً. وسوف نستعيض عنها بالزمرة (٣). ويتوقع أن تؤدي هذه الاستعاضة إلى نوعين من التغيرات في محتوى الزمرة (٦):

— تعديل أو تصحيح تلك المقولات التي كانت مبنية أصلاً على الزمرة (٥)، وإضافة مقولات جديدة (أو تأكيد مقولات لم تكن محل اهتمام كاف) مستمدة من الزمرة (٣) أي من القيم

والمسلمات الإسلامية، بل قد تؤدي هذه الاستعاضة إلى برنامج جديد شامل للبحث، وإلى تعديل واسع في عدد كبير من مقولات العلم.

(أ) ولنضرب مثلاً على التعديل المحتمل في بعض المقولات، بموضوع يكثر الجدل حوله الآن وهو: احتمال نضوب بعض الموارد الطبيعية. هناك مسلمة لدى الغربيين مؤداها أن الكون قد وجد اعتباراً ومصادفة، أو نتيجة تفاعل قوى الطبيعة العمياء، ولا يستبعد والحالة هذه أن تكون كمية بعض الموارد الطبيعية هي على غير النحو الملائم للحياة البشرية الكريمة. فعند بحث مسألة الندرة واحتمال نضوب الموارد، ستكون إحدى الفرضيات الجديرة بالبحث اعتماداً على تلك المسلمة هي فرضية التناقض المحتمل بين الموارد الموجودة والمتطلبات الإنسانية. وستراكم حول هذه الفرضية العديد من الكتابات والدراسات الاحصائية الخ... لكن طبيعة الموضوع وكون مجال التجربة فيه محدود جداً، والمشاهدات فيه ظنية (لصعوبة تقدير الكميات التي يمكن أن تكتشف في المستقبل بالإضافة إلى المعروفة حالياً)، كل ذلك يعني أن خطأ هذا الرأي لن يمكن تحميصه بطريقة مقنعة، وسيبقى الأخذ به أو رفضه مستنداً إلى المسلمات السابقة التي يتمسك بها الباحث صراحة أو ضمناً.

أما إذا انطلقنا من الآيات الكريمة: ﴿إنا كل شيء خلقناه بقدر﴾^(١١)، ﴿ولقد كرّمنا بني آدم﴾^(١٢)، ﴿ولقد مكّناكم في الأرض وجعلنا لكم فيها معاش...﴾^(١٣)، ﴿وإن من شيء إلا عندنا خزائنه وما ننزله إلا بقدر معلوم﴾^(١٤)، ﴿هو الذي خلق لكم ما في الأرض جميعاً﴾^(١٥)، أقول إذا انطلقنا من هذه الآيات الكريمة وامثالها فإننا نصل إلى مسلمة مفادها أن الأرض وما فيها سخرها الله للإنسان^(١٦)، والكميات الموجودة في الأرض من أي مورد طبيعي هي كميات مقدرّة وليست عشوائية، وقد أخذ الخالق فيها بعين الاعتبار حاجات الحياة الإنسانية الكريمة التي يرتضيها لعباده خلال فترة وجودهم المقدرة على الأرض.

والتناقض الذي يمكن أن ينشأ بين الرغبات الإنسانية وكميات الموارد الطبيعية المتوافرة سيكون مصدره الوحيد هو سوء تصرف الإنسان وانحرافه عن أنماط الانتاج والاستهلاك التي شرعها الله له، وسيكون علاجه الوحيد هو تصحيح هذه الانحرافات. وبالتالي فإن برنامج البحث والفرضيات التي ستطرح إنطلاقاً من هذه المسلمة ستتركز على دراسة العلاقات المحتملة بين انحرافات معينة في السلوك الإنساني الاقتصادي والاجتماعي وآثار ذلك على نضوب الموارد. وفي هذا المثال مجال لاختلاف الرأي، لكن غرضنا منها هو إيضاح الفكرة وليس إثبات مضمون المثال.

ويحسن أن نوضح هنا موقع المقولات الوصفية الاقتصادية (الزمرة ٦) من علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي. إن كثيراً من هذه المقولات قد توصل إليها غير المسلمين. وليس هذا يمنع أن تكون جزءاً من الاقتصاد الإسلامي (شأنها في ذلك شأن الجوانب الوصفية للعلوم التجريبية، كالزراعة، والطب، والفيزياء). لكن علينا تصحيح أو تعديل أو إعادة صياغة تلك المقولات الوصفية المبنية على قيم أو مسلمات سابقة غير إسلامية. ولا يمكننا أن نجزم مقدماً بمدى

التغيير الذي سيطرأ على محتوى الزمرة (٦) نتيجة عملية "الأسلمة" هذه ، لكن هذه العملية تتطلب جهوداً فكرية كبيرة لم يبذل منها المسلمون بعد إلا القليل. ويجسّن أن تؤكّد أن مجرد اكتشاف ما إذا كانت مقولة اقتصادية معينة تعتمد على مسلمات غير إسلامية، ليس أبداً بالأمر اليسير، ناهيك عن إعادة صياغة أو تصحيح تلك المقولة بما يتفق مع النظر الإسلامي. والمثال التالي (ب) يشخّص ذلك.

(ب) يعتمد الكثير من جوانب النظرية الاقتصادية الوضعية على مسلمة أساسية مفادها أن الإنسان أناني بطبعه وأن مصلحته الذاتية هي الحافز الأساسي لسلوكه. وقد استوحى الاقتصاديون الغربيون (النيوكلاسيكيون) من تلك المسلمة المفاهيم التي تصلح "لتفسير" السلوك الاقتصادي، كدالة المنفعة الذاتية للمستهلك، وهدف الربح الذاتي للمنتج. وعلى هذا الأساس بُني القسم الأكبر من نظرية سلوك المستهلك، ونظرية الإنتاج، وخصائص التوازن العام في اقتصاد تنافسي، وتحقيق هذا التوازن لشروط امثلية باريتو في تخصيص الموارد، الخ... والآن، دعنا نفترض جديلاً بأن دراستنا لنصوص القرآن والسنة ذات العلاقة بالسلوك الانساني قادتنا الى مسلمة أساسية مختلفة مفادها أن هناك قوتين مؤثرتين في السلوك الإنساني هما الأثرية أي الحافز الذاتي أو الأناني، والإيثاري أي الحافز الغيري أو الأخلاقي الذي يدفعا لأداء الواجب بصرف النظر عن منفعتنا الذاتية. وفي ضوء هذه المسلمة الجديدة بدأنا نرى ان علم الاقتصاد التقليدي الوضعي متقدم جداً في تحليله لاقتصاديات الأثرية، لكنه متخلف جداً في تحليله لاقتصاديات الايثار (أي التصرفات الاقتصادية المدفوعة بموافز أخلاقية).

ولعل رفض الاقتصاد الوضعي الاهتمام بالسلوك الإيثاري إنما هو موقف قيمي مستتر ينسجم مع تمجيد لمبدأ اليد الخفية في الاقتصاد (والقائل بأن سعي كل فرد لمصلحته الذاتية يحقق بطريق غير مباشر مصلحة المجتمع) أكثر مما يعبر عن مسلمة سابقة بان السلوك الإيثاري هو فعلاً قليل الأهمية في واقع الحياة.

ومهما يكن تفسيرنا لموقف الاقتصاد الوضعي، فإن محاولتنا لتصحيح هذا الموقف بما ينسجم مع المسلمة الجديدة التي تبينها عن السلوك الإنساني يتطلب برنامج بحث نظري واسع يعدل نظرياتنا عن سلوك المستهلك والمنتج، وعن القوى المؤثرة في توازن السوق، الخ..

(ج) لنضرب الآن مثلاً على إضافة مقولات جديدة إلى الزمرة (٦). أخرج مسلم من حديث أبي هريرة أن رسول الله ﷺ قال: [أنظروا إلى من أسفل منكم، ولا تظنوا إلى من هو فوقكم، فهو أجدر أن لا تزدروا نعمة الله.. عليكم] (١٥). وما يدل عليه هذا الحديث الشريف أن مستوى الرضا (أو ما يسميه الاقتصاديون: المنفعة) التي يجنبها الفرد من نعمة معينة (ولكن مثلاً مقداراً معيناً من السلع الاستهلاكية) يتأثر، من جملة ما يتأثر به، بتصوره لوضعه السليبي بالمقارنة بما عند الآخرين.

وهذا يدعونا إلى إدخال متغير تفسيري إضافي في دالة المنفعة الفردية هو الوضع النسبي للمستهلك، يضاف إلى المتغير التقليدي في هذه الدالة وهو كمية السلع والخدمات . وهناك نتائج تحليلية عديدة لإدخال هذا المتغير الإضافي ليس هنا مجال عرضها.

٢/٤ — الصلة بين علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي والتاريخ الاقتصادي للمسلمين.

إن دراسة التاريخ الاقتصادي للمسلمين منذ عصر البيعة إلى الآن يمتدّ دون شك فهمنا للنظام الاقتصادي الإسلامي عندما سعى إلى تطبيقه المسلمون في مواجهة الوقائع المستجدة. بل إن فهمنا للأحكام الفقهية الاقتصادية (كأحكام الفلوس الرائجة وعلاقتها بالربا مثلاً) لا يكتمل ما لم نتعرف على جانب من التاريخ الاقتصادي للنقود التي استخدمها المسلمون. لكن لا يصح أن نخلط بين وقائع التاريخ الاقتصادي للمسلمين وبين علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي سواء في جانبه القيمي أو الوصفي. وكثيراً ما يقع مثل هذا الخلط في كتب المالية العامة في الإسلام، حيث توصف الدواوين والإجراءات المالية التي طبقها المسلمون بأنها: النظام المالي الإسلامي. بينما الواضح أنه لا بد من التمييز بين المبادئ الكامنة خلف إجراءات معينة وهذه إن كان لها سند شرعي فهي من النظام المالي الإسلامي (كمبدأ فصل بيت مال الزكاة عن بيت المال العام)، وإن كانت تفتقد مثل هذا السند، أو كانت مجرد إجراءات إدارية تنفيذية تقع في دائرة المباحث، فهي نظام مالي استخدمه المسلمون، وليست هي النظام المالي الإسلامي.

ويلاحظ أن هناك فترة خاصة من التاريخ الاقتصادي للمسلمين لها دلالة قيمية وتشريعية هي فترة العهد النبوي بالطبع، لأنها فترة التشريع، ثم فترة الخلافة الراشدة: لقوله ﷺ: [عليكم بسنتي وسنة الخلفاء الراشدين المهديين عضواً عليها بالنواجذ]^(١). وهذا معروف في أصول الفقه فلا يفصل فيه.

٣/٤ — بين علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي وتاريخ الفكر الاقتصادي عند المسلمين.

قدم عدد من أسلافنا مساهمات فكرية قيمة تقع كلياً أو جزئياً في نطاق علم الاقتصاد الحديث. ولا مرية في وجوب الإهتمام بها دراسة وتدریساً في نطاق تاريخ الفكر الاقتصادي لأنها جزء منه، خاصة وأن الاقتصاديين الغربيين يجهلون أو يتجاهلون، ومن حقنا أن نعتز بها بوصفها جزءاً من تراثنا الحضاري.

لكن هل لهذه المساهمات قيمة أخرى خارج نطاق (تاريخ الفكر الاقتصادي)؟ هل لها قيمة إسلامية خاصة في نطاق الجهود الفكرية "الإسلامية" الاقتصادية؟ هل تحليل المقرئزي مثلاً لأثر كمية النقود على مستوى الأسعار هو بالضرورة أكثر "إسلامية" أو صحّة من تحليل لنفس الظاهرة قام به غير المسلمين؟ ويمكن أن نطرح نفس السؤال بالنسبة لتحليلات ابن خلدون الثاقبة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية.

إن مناقشتنا السابقة تسمح بإجابة واضحة عن مثل هذه التساؤلات. فمساهمات المفكرين المسلمين الاقتصادية بعضها مقولات قيمة لها سند شرعي، وبالتالي فلها أهمية خاصة في جهودنا "الإسلامية" الاقتصادية. لكن بعضها مقولات وصفية (وكثير من تحليلات ابن خلدون مثلاً هي من هذا النوع)، تعاملها تحليلاً كما تعامل المقولات الوصفية لعلم الاقتصاد،

دون أن نعدّها أصحّ من سواها مجرد أن من توصلوا إليها هم مسلمون. لكن لا بد أن نضيف أنه إلى الحد الذي تعتمد فيه هذه المقولات على المسلمات الإسلامية، وتنسجم مع النظرة الإسلامية إلى الحياة، فإن لها مزية على سواها.

٤/٤ — العلاقة بين علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي والفقهاء

١/٤/٤ — الفكرة الأساسية:

الفرق الأساسي بين علم الفقه وعلم الاقتصاد الإسلامي هو أن الهدف الأكبر للفقه هو الوصول إلى مقولات قيمية هي الأحكام الشرعية، وهذه الأحكام القيمة تشكل في الواقع نسبة عالية جداً من مادة الفقه. بينما الهدف الأكبر لعلم الاقتصاد الإسلامي (وكذلك الاقتصاد الوضعي) هو الوصول إلى مقولات وصفية تشخص الواقع وتربط بين الظواهر الاقتصادية. هذا هو الفرق الأساسي، وإن كانت تحف به استثناءات وتفصيل أسلفنا بعضها ونوضح بعضها الآن.

فالفقه أساساً هو "العلم بالأحكام الشرعية العملية مع أدلتها"^(١١) والأحكام خمسة تتردد بين الواجب والمندوب والمباح والمكروه والحرام.

وهذه الأحكام الخمسة هي مقولات قيمة صريحة، تفضل حالة على حالة، أو تقضي بان الحالتين سواء. فحالة أداء الفرض (أو الامتناع عن الحرام) هي في نظر الشريعة أفضل بكثير من حالة ترك الفرض (أو ارتكاب الحرام).. وهكذا. فالفقه الإسلامي علم أكثر مقولاته هي مقولات قيمة، تقع في الجانب الأعلى من رسمنا البياني (الزمرتان الأولى والثالثة)^(١٢). ومع ذلك فإن الفقه لا يخلو من بعض المقولات الوصفية التي ترد عند تعليل الأحكام أو بيان حكمتها. ومثال ذلك الخمر والميسر فهما محرمان وهذه مقولة قيمة. وقد ذكر الله جل وعز جانباً من حكمة تحريمهما بأنهما يوقعان في العداوة والبغضاء ويصدان عن ذكر الله وعن الصلاة، وهذه مقولات وصفية، أنظر سورة المائدة (٩١/٥).

وكما أن الفقه لا يخلو تماماً من المقولات الوصفية فإن علم الاقتصاد (حتى العادي أو الوضعي) لا يمكن إلا أن يعتمد على بعض المقولات القيمة كما أسلفنا في القسم الثاني من هذا البحث. لكن هذا لا يعني أن ينسبنا أن أهم مقومات الفقه هما المقومان الأول والثاني من مقومات العلم (أي المسلمات والأحكام القيمة)، وأن أهم مقومات علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي هو المقوم الثالث للعلم وهو الوصفي (ر: ف ٢/٢).

ولا بأس أن نوضح الفرق بين الاقتصاد والفقه في موضوع مشهور يبيحه الفقهاء والاقتصاديون وهو الإحتكار. فكتب الفقه تبحر^(١٣) في أدلة حرمة الإحتكار والسلع التي يمنع احتكارها وصفة وشروط الإحتكار المحرم ونوع عقوبة المختر من قبل الحاكم. أما كتب الاقتصاد فتبحث العوامل المؤدية لنشوء الإحتكار، وأنواعه، وأثره على توزيع الدخل، وكيف يختلف سعر السوق الإحتكارية عن سوق مماثلة لكنها تنافسية، وكيف تختلف الكميات المباعة

في السوقين، الخ. وظاهر أن الاقتصادي يتجه إلى الجانب الوصفي للظاهرة فيدرس العوامل المؤثرة عليها والعلاقات السببية المتصلة بها، أما الفقيه فينتجه إلى الجانب القيمي من الظاهرة وهو حكم الشريعة فيها ومعايير الحل والحزمة في الصور المختلفة للظاهرة. وفي ضوء ما اسلفت، لا أتردد في تخطئة من يُعرفون الاقتصاد الإسلامي بطريقة تسلب محتواه الوصفي وتجعله مرادفاً لفقه المعاملات^(٣٠١).

لكن لنا أن نتساءل: أليس من صلة بين مهمة الفقه في الوصول للأحكام الشرعية ومهمة الاقتصاد الإسلامي في وصف وتفسير الظواهر الاقتصادية المتصلة بتلك الأحكام الشرعية نفسها؟ الجواب أن هناك صلة يمكن تلخيصها بالقول بأن من مهام الاقتصاد الإسلامي اتّمس الحكمة الاقتصادية للأحكام الشرعية^(٣٠٢)، أي تحليل نتائج الحكم ومآلاته القريبة والبعيدة في الحياة الاقتصادية^(٣٠٣). وهذا يتطلب استخدام المقوم الثالث من مقومات علم الاقتصاد وهو جانبه الوصفي.

ومن الأمثلة البارزة على الفرق بين وظيفة علم الاقتصاد ووظيفة الفقه مسألة تحريم ربا الديون (ربا النسيئة). فالفقهاء بحثوا في ذلك بالتفصيل مبينين الحكم الشرعي، وموضحين انطباقه على أية زيادة مشروطة على أصل الدين مهما كانت تسميتها (فائدة، عمولة، تعويض، الخ...).

والاقتصاديون المسلمون المعاصرون بحثوا في حكمة تحريم الفائدة على القروض، ومن النتائج المهمة التي وصلوا إليها أن تحريم الفائدة على القروض الانتاجية يتوقع:

- أن يزيد من الاستقرار الاقتصادي أي يخفف من التقلبات الاقتصادية التي تتعرض لها المنشأة الواحدة والاقتصاد بمجموعه، وان التمويل الربوي يزيد من حدة هذه التقلبات^(٣٠٤).
- وأن يحقق كفاءة أعلى في استخدام الموارد ضمن شروط معينة^(٣٠٥).

٤/٤ - تفصيلات:

ويتفق فقهاء الشريعة على أن أحكام الشريعة لم يضعها الله سبحانه "بمجرد ادخال الناس تحت سلطة الدين.. بل وضعت لتحقيق مقاصد الشرع في قيام مصالحهم في الدين والدنيا معا"^(٣٠٦) فأحكام الدين مبنية على مصالح العباد سواء ظهرت لنا حكمتها أو خفيت عنا. أي هي مبنية على النتائج المتوقعة للتصرفات الانسانية وللسنن الكونية، وعلى الموازنة والترجيح الشرعي للمصالح والمفاسد، وبعبارة أخرى هي مبنية على علاقات وصفية (قوانين) تقع في نطاق علوم مختلفة سواء عرف الانسان تلك العلاقات أم لم يعرفها. فالقضايا التي وردت فيها نصوص شرعية قطعية الدلالة، قد كفى الله فيها المؤمنين مؤنة توقع نتائجها والترجيح بين المصالح والمفاسد في تلك النتائج^(٣٠٧). أما القضايا التي لم ترد فيها نصوص شرعية مباشرة، فان الاجتهاد الإسلامي الصحيح فيها يبني على:

— حقيقة القضية وآثارها المتوقعة، وهذه لاتعرف إلا من الجانب الوصفي من العلوم المختلفة كالاقتصاد وسواه.

— تقويم تلك الآثار بحسب دلالات النصوص ومقاصد الشريعة.

ويعبر الفقهاء عن فكرة بناء الأحكام الشرعية على نتائجها المتوقعة، وعلى الموازنة والترجيح الشرعي بين تلك النتائج بقولهم: "في كل أمر جهتا نفع وضرر، والعبرة شرعاً للغالب"^(٣٧). فما غلب نفعه فالحكم الشرعي فيه الإباحة، وكلما رجع نفعه انتقل إلى الوجوب. وما غلب ضرره فحكمه الكراهة، فإن اشتد ضرره ورجح كثيراً على نفعه حكمت عليه الشريعة بالحرمة. ومما يؤكد صحة هذا النظر قوله جل وعلا في شأن الخمر والميسر ﴿قُلْ فِيهَا أَثْمٌ كَبِيرٌ وَمَنَافِعٌ لِلنَّاسِ وَأَثْمُهُمَا أَكْبَرُ مِنْ نَفْعِهِمَا﴾ (البقرة: ٢١٩) ثم أنزل الله تحريمهما بقوله ﴿وَإِنَّمَا الْخَمْرُ وَالْمَيْسِرُ وَالْأَنْصَابُ وَالْأَزْلَامُ رَجَسٌ مِنْ عَمَلِ الشَّيْطَانِ فَاجْتَنِبُوهُ﴾ (المائدة: ٩٠).

وفي ضوء ما تقدم يمكن القول بأنه في القضايا التي وردت فيها نصوص شرعية قطعية الدلالة على الحكم الشرعي، فإن توقع النتائج والترجيح بينهما قد تم من قبل الشارع عز وجل، حيث أعطانا محصلة ذلك كله في الحكم الشرعي. وكلما كان النص أو النصوص الدالة على الحكم الشرعي ظنية الدلالة، اتسعت الحاجة لتحديد الآثار المتوقعة وتقويمها بميزان الشريعة. وإن تحديد الآثار الممكنة لتصرف معين هو الذي يدخل في نطاق العلوم المختلفة ومنها علم الاقتصاد.

لنعرض الآن أمثلة من الحالات التي ينبغي أن يستعان فيها بالعلوم المختلفة — ومنها الاقتصاد — لتفسير النصوص والوصول إلى الحكم الشرعي. ونقصد بالاستعانة بالعلوم الاستفادة مما تحويه من المعلومات عن الواقع أو عن الآثار المتوقعة لتصرف معين (وهذا ما اسميناها آنفاً في فب ٢/٢ القسم الوصفي أو المقوم الثالث من مقومات العلم). وتكون هذه الاستعانة للتفسير وفق القواعد الأصولية للتفسير واستنباط الأحكام التي بينها علماء الشريعة:

(أ) يرى الامام الشاطبي (الموافقات ص ٩٩/١ — ١٠٠) أنه لا يصح تفسير قوله تعالى: ﴿وَلَنْ يَجْعَلَ اللَّهُ لِلْكَافِرِينَ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ سَبِيلًا﴾ بأنه إخبار عن واقع لأننا كثيراً ما نرى "وقوع سبيل للكافر على المؤمن بأسره وإذلاله. فلا يمكن أن يكون المعنى إلا على ما يصدقه الواقع ويطرده عليه، وهو تقرير الحكم الشرعي". أي أن الآية تقرر حكماً شرعياً بأنه لا يصح أن يقبل المؤمن بأن يكون للكافر سبيل عليه. فالآية الكريمة في نظر الإمام الشاطبي تقرر ما ينبغي أن يكون وليس ما هو كائن.

فهنا نجد أن المعرفة التاريخية بما جرى للمسلمين من تسلط الكفار عليهم أحياناً، كان لها مدخل في تفسير النص^(٣٨).

(ب) اختلف المفسرون من القديم في تأويل بعض آيات الكتاب العزيز المتصلة بالأرض، فكان بعضهم يرجح أنها تدل على أن الأرض مستوية، بينما كان آخرون ومنهم الفخر الرازي يرجحون أنها تدل على كروية الأرض.

والآن لا نشك في صحة ما ذهب اليه الفريق الثاني لاتفاقه مع ما ثبت علمياً.

والمثالان (أ) و (ب) ، ومثلهما كثير، يعودان إلى مبدأ أخذ به الثقافة من العلماء، ومنهم ابن تيمية رحمه الله في كتابه: "دَرْءُ تَعَارُضِ الْعَقْلِ وَالنَّقْلِ"، حيث يرى^(١٢):

— أن التعارض بين قطعي عقلي وقطعي نقلي مستحيل.
 — فإن تعارض ظني وقطعي رجح القطعي سواء أكان عقلاً أم نقلاً.
 — فإن كانا ظنيين أخذ بالأرجح منهما عقلاً كان أم نقلاً.
 وعليه فإن ترجيح أحد معاني النص النقلي بأدلة عقلية أو حسية هو أمر مقبول. والإمام الشاطبي يؤكد هذا المعنى صراحة (الموافقات، الموقع السابق).

على أن تطبيق هذه الفكرة على وضوحها وبساطتها يتطلب تمكناً تاماً في العلم الذي نستعين بمقولته على تفسير نص معين، إذ أن كثيراً من هذه المقولات (وبخاصة في العلوم الاجتماعية) لم تصل بعد إلى درجة الظن الراجح الذي يحتاج به شرعاً. ولا يستطيع إلا المتمكنون من العلم تمييز تلك المقولات الراجح ظنها.

(ج) ومن الأمثلة على إمكان الاستفادة من المقولات الوصفية لعلم الاقتصاد في ترجيح اجتهاد على آخر: مسألة بذل فضل الماء لسقي الزرع. وخلاصتها أن من لديه ماء عِدَّة (أي متجدد تلقائياً) يُفَضَّلُ عن حاجته الشخصية وحاجة حيواناته وزرعه، فإن عليه أن يبذل الفاضل منه، لشرب الناس والدواب دون عوض، وهو يسمى فقهاً: حق الشفة.

لكن اختلفوا في وجوب البذل الفاضل من الماء دون عوض لسقي الزرع، فالمذاهب الثلاثة، الحنفي والمالكي والشافعي، ترى أن ترك العوض هنا مستحب لا واجب. لكن مذهب الإمام أحمد هو وجوب بذل الفضل دون عوض حتى لسقي الزرع.

والتحليل الاقتصادي لهذه المسألة يبين أن بذل فضل الماء دون عوض هو الذي يضمن تحقيق الكفاءة في استخدام الموارد الطبيعية ويجول دون إهدارها. وهذا مقصد شرعي معتبر يرجح رأي الإمام أحمد رحمه الله في هذه المسألة، وقد فصلت ذلك ضمن بحث سابق^(١٣).

(د) ومن الموضوعات الاقتصادية المعاصرة التي يمكن لعلم الاقتصاد أن يساعد فيها على التعمق في الفهم وعلى ترجيح بعض الآراء الفقهية على بعض، موضوع التسعير الجبري الذي بحثه الفقهاء ويبحثه الاقتصاديون بتفصيل.

ففي حالة غلاء السعر (دون وجود احتكار ولا تواطؤ بين البائعين ودون وقوع حالة اضطراب كما في الجماعات) يرى جمهور الفقهاء، استناداً لحديث مشهور ولأدلة شرعية أخرى، عدم جواز التسعير الجبري. لكن من الفقهاء من رأى جواز التسعير "العادل". وقد اتجه بعض الفقهاء المعاصرين إلى ترجيح رأي المبيحين للتسعير. ولا يتسع المقام هنا لبسط هذا الموضوع، لكن تبين لي من دراسة أولية إن ما كشفه التحليل الاقتصادي الحديث من التكاليف الإدارية والاجتماعية الكبيرة والخفية التي لا بد أن تصاحب التسعير، والتي لم تكن جميعها معلومة في زمن الفقهاء القدامى (كما هو واضح لمن يقرأ كتاباتهم في هذا الشأن) ولم يقطن إليها الفقهاء المعاصرون، إن هذه التكاليف الكبيرة الملازمة للتسعير ترجح بقوة رأي جمهور

الفقهاء المانعين للتسعير والآخذين بظاهر الحديث النبوي الشريف الذين يدل على منعه (في غير حالات الاحتكار أو الاضطرار أو التواطؤ وهي حالات تبيح تدخل ولي الأمر بالتسعير أو بسواه من التدابير كالبيع جبراً، الخ...).

(هـ) لعل في الأمثلة السابقة ما يكفي للدلالة على انه في تفسير النصوص، وفي كثير من الأحكام الاجتهادية المستمدة من عمومات النصوص أو من القياس، يتوقع أن تكون المقولات الاقتصادية الوصفية من جملة المرجحات لرأي على آخر.

ولو انتقلنا إلى الأحكام الشرعية المبنية على الاستحسان، لتوقعنا أن يكون للمقولات الاقتصادية فيها دور أكبر في المساعدة على الوصول إلى الحكم الشرعي الصحيح. ذلك أن الاستحسان عند الحنفية والمالكية (وهو ما يسميه الحنفية استحسان الضرورة) هو ترك القياس الظاهر إذا عارضته مصلحة راجحة أو أدى إلى حرج ومشقة^(٤٣). ولا ريب أن التعرف على النتائج المحتملة لحكم قياسي معين هو الذي يكشف عما إذا كانت تعارضه مصالح راجحة أو يؤدي إلى حرج ومشقة. والتعرف على هذه النتائج المحتملة لأي حكم شرعي يتصل بالحياة الاقتصادية هو بالتأكيد من مهام علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي في جانبه الوصفي.

(و) فإذا انتقلنا إلى الأحكام الشرعية المبنية على الاستصلاح لتوقعنا فيها لعلم الاقتصاد الإسلامي دوراً أكبر مما سبق ذكره في الاستحسان.

فإستصلاح هو "بناء الأحكام الفقهية على مقتضى المصالح المرسله، وهي المصالح التي لم يرد في الشرع نص على اعتبارها بعينها أو بنوعها" لكنها تحقق غايات الشرع ومقاصده العامة في الحياة الاجتماعية^(٤٤). ومن أمثلتها "الأحكام التي تتعلق بشؤون الادارة العامة المنظمة لمصالح المجتمع.. كفرض الضرائب على المقتردين عند الحاجة إلى الأعمال العامة كتجهيز الجيوش وبناء الجسور وتخطيط الأراضي واحصاء النفوس.. وسائر وجوه الضمان الاجتماعي الذي ينفي البؤس ويكفل العمل لمن يريده"^(٤٥).

ولا شك ان وضع النظم والقواعد اللازمة لتحقيق هذه المصالح وامثالها بما ينسجم مع مقاصد الشريعة يتطلب الاستعانة بعلم الاقتصاد وسواه من العلوم الاجتماعية والادارية إلى حد بعيد.

ومن القضايا الاقتصادية المعاصرة المهمة التي يتوقع أن تُبنى كثير من أحكامها على مبدأ الاستصلاح الأمور التالي:

— مدى السماح للجهاز المصرفي بتوليد النقود المشتقة^(٤٦).

— تحديد الكمية المناسبة للنقود في المجتمع. ومن المعلوم أن كمية النقود لها تأثيرات عديدة ومهمة على مستوى الاستهلاك والاستثمار والأسعار، الخ..

— قواعد توزيع عبء التكاليف المالية العامة (الضرائب والرسوم) على مختلف فئات المكلفين بها^(٤٧).

— تحديد الأسعار المناسبة للسلع والخدمات التي لا بد أن يوجد فيها احتكار، لأسباب طبيعية أو اقتصادية، كالمرافق العامة، والاحتكارات الناشئة عن منح براءات الاختراع.
— قواعد تقويم المشروعات الاستثمارية العامة⁽⁴³⁾.

إن الشؤون الاقتصادية التي يراها الفقهاء واقعة في مجال الاستصلاح تقع عند الاقتصاديين في مجال السياسة الاقتصادية (أو اقتصاديات الرفاهية أو المصلحة (Welfare Economics). وقد بذل الاقتصاديون الغربيون من أوائل القرن العشرين جهوداً فكرية حثيثة في محاولة الوصول إلى معايير للسياسة الاقتصادية لاتستند إلى أية قيم، أي معايير تسمح بترجيح موضوعي محض لحالة اقتصادية معينة (كحالة التجارة الخارجية الحرة مثلاً) على حالة أخرى (كالتجارة الخارجية المقيدة برسوم جمركية أو قيود أخرى). وكانت المحصلة العامة لتلك الجهود هي اتفاقهم على أنه لا يمكن الوصول إلى معايير موضوعية محض، بل لا بد من تبني قيم سابقة يتم على أساسها المفاضلة والترجيح بين منافع ومضار السياسات المختلفة. وأصطلح الاقتصاديون على تسمية القيم ومعايير الترجيح المتصلة بها: دالة المصلحة الاجتماعية⁽⁴⁴⁾.

وبعبارة أخرى: إن الاقتصاديين قد سلموا الآن بأن السياسات الاقتصادية لا يمكن مطلقاً أن تُبنى على الجانب الوصفي وحده من علم الاقتصاد، بل لا بد أن تعتمد أيضاً على قيم وأحكام تستمد من مصدر ما خارج نطاق هذا العلم⁽⁴⁵⁾. ومن البديهي أن هذا المصدر عندنا ليس الا الشريعة الإسلامية وما يستمد منها من قيم ومن أحكام فقهية وقواعد للترجيح. والخلاصة أن الأحكام الاقتصادية الاستصلاحية، أو ما يسمى قضايا السياسة الاقتصادية هي منطقة مشتركة لا بد أن تبنى على الفقه وعلم الاقتصاد معا.

٣/٤/٤ — مقارنة بين وظيفتي الفقه والاقتصاد الإسلامي:

يمكننا أن نستنتج مما سبق من أمثلة وإيضاحات أن علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي، من حيث علاقته بالفقه، له ثلاث وظائف:

الأولى: وظيفة متميزة عن الفقه، وهي وصف وتشخيص الوقائع، واكتشاف العلاقات والسنن التي تربط بين الظواهر الاقتصادية، وكذلك التماس الحكمة الاقتصادية للأحكام الشرعية، أي تحديد نتائجها القريبة أو البعيدة في الحياة الاقتصادية. وبينما وظيفة الفقه الأولى هي اكتشاف الأحكام الشرعية من أدلتها التفصيلية.

الثانية: وظيفة مشاركة للفقه، وذلك في مجال صياغة السياسات والأحكام الاقتصادية الاستصلاحية، أي المبنية على قاعدة المصالح المرسله في الفقه.

الثالثة: وظيفة مساعدة للفقه وهي إعانة الفقيه على التوصل إلى الحكم الشرعي نفسه في الأحوال التي يكون فيها للآثار الاقتصادية أهمية في ترجيح رأي على آخر.

ويلاحظ أن الوظيفة الأولى عظيمة الأهمية وذات صلة بالعقيدة، لأن معرفة حكمة الأحكام الشرعية تقوي الإيمان وترينه في القلوب، وتسهل دعوة الناس إلى إتباع الشريعة.

٥/٤ — مناقشة رأي فضيلة العلامة الصدر:

عقد فضيلة العلامة محمد باقر الصدر رحمه الله فصلاً قصيراً من كتابه الفذ (اقتصادنا) وجعل عنوان الفصل: "الاقتصاد الإسلامي ليس علماً" (الصفحات ٢٩٠-٢٩٤).

وخلاصة رأي الاستاذ الصدر هي أن الاقتصاد الإسلامي يتألف من قسمين أولهما: المذهب أو النظام الاقتصادي في الإسلام ومهمة هذا القسم ليست تفسير الحياة الاقتصادية بل الدعوة إلى تغييرها حتى تصبح مطابقة للإسلام. أما القسم الثاني فهو علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي ومهمته التفسير العلمي لأحداث الحياة الاقتصادية في مجتمع يطبق الاسلام.

فالأستاذ الصدر رحمه الله ينفي أن يكون ذلك القسم الأول فقط علماً^(٤٩).

أما القسم الثاني فلا ينازع في أنه علم بل هو يسميه علماً. فلا يحسن والحالة هذه إطلاق عبارة (الاقتصاد الإسلامي ليس علماً) وجعلها عنواناً للفصل بكامله. وحيداً لو كان استبدل بها المؤلف رحمه الله عبارة (المذاهب الاقتصادية ليست علماً) مادام هذا هو حقيقة ما يقصده.

فإذا انتقلنا إلى وظيفة علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي نجد أن الأستاذ الصدر يحددها بدقة في أمرين (ص ٢٩٢-٢٩٣):

الأول: جمع ودراسة الأحداث الاقتصادية في مجتمع إسلامي لاكتشاف القوانين العامة التي تتحكم فيها. ولن يتاح هذا إلا عندما يطبق النظام الاقتصادي الإسلامي في مسرح الحياة.

الثاني: افتراض واقع اجتماعي واقتصادي إسلامي ثم البحث في نتائج هذا الواقع المفترض وخصائصه العامة والسمات الرئيسية للحياة الاقتصادية في ظل ذلك. وهذا يمكن القيام به قبل تطبيق النظام الاقتصادي الإسلامي لكنه لا ينبض ويتعمق الا بعد ذلك.

وهكذا يبدو أن العلامة الصدر قد جعل وظيفة علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي قاصرة على المجتمع المسلم. ولكني أرى أنها تشمل تفسير الواقع الاقتصادي في أي مجتمع مسلماً كان أو غير مسلم.^{(٤٩) (ص ٢٩٣)}

وما يدل على صحة ما أقول، تلك الأمثلة التي سقناها على المقولات الاقتصادية الوصفية في القرآن الكريم والحديث الشريف: فشدّة حب الناس للثروة وتأثير زيادة الثروة على ميل الإنسان للطفان، والترابط في دوال المنفعة بين الأفراد، كل ذلك مقولات عامة وصفية عن الحياة الاقتصادية في أي مجتمع مسلماً كان أم غير مسلم. نعم قد تختفي في مجتمع بعض المتغيرات التي توجد في مجتمع آخر، وقد توجد فيه مؤسسات اقتصادية لا توجد في سواه. لكن هذا لا يتطلب أن يكون لكل مجتمع علم اقتصاد خاص به. بل المفترض أن يكون هذا العلم على درجة من الشمول والعموم تنطوي تحتها تلك الحالات الخاصة.

وبعبارة أخرى: إن قولنا بشمول علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي وعالميته لا يتنافى مع وجود بعض الخصوصيات في موضوعات الدراسة والاهتمام.

فمثلاً: ستظهر في علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي دراسات لا يتناولها علم الاقتصاد الغربي عادة كدراسة اقتصاديات الزكاة أو الحج. وتظهر في علم الاقتصاد الغربي بالمقابل دراسات لا يتناولها علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي كاقصاديات صناعة الخمر أو تفصيلات استخدام معدل الفائدة للتحكم في الاقتصاد.

لكن هذا لا يعني أن المبادئ العامة الوصفية والقيمية لعلم الاقتصاد الإسلامي لا تنطبق على المجتمعات كافة.

٦/٤ - نتيجة عن مقومات علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي:

نخلص مما تقدم إلى أن الإسلام يقدم نظاماً اقتصادياً مبنياً على الشريعة يتكون من أحكام قيمة عما ينبغي أن تكون عليه حياة المجتمع الاقتصادية، لكنه بالإضافة إلى ذلك يلفت أنظارنا في القرآن الكريم والسنة النبوية الشريفة وما بنى عليهما من استنتاجات ومعارف، إلى متغيرات ومسلمات ومقولات اقتصادية وصفية يجب أن نأخذ بها في تحليلنا وتفسيرنا لواقع الحياة، بالإضافة إلى أخذنا بما تدل عليه المشاهدة والتجربة والاستنتاج المنطقي مما توصل إليه المسلمون أو سواهم.

ويتألف علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي من قسمين رئيسيين: أولهما هو المذهب أو النظام الاقتصادي الإسلامي، وثانيهما هو التحليل الاقتصادي الإسلامي. فالقسم الأول يغلب عليه الطابع القيمي ويعني بما يجب أن تكون عليه الحياة الاقتصادية وفق الإسلام، كما يوضح الحكمة الاقتصادية للأحكام الشرعية مستعيناً في ذلك بالتحليل الاقتصادي الإسلامي.

أما القسم الثاني، وهو التحليل الاقتصادي الإسلامي، فهو يعني بتحليل مؤسسات ووقائع الحياة الاقتصادية للمجتمعات عموماً إسلامية كانت أو غير إسلامية، وتفسير ذلك ومعرفة أسبابه ونتائجه، كما يعني بصياغة السياسات والحلول الإسلامية للمشاكل الاقتصادية، مستعيناً في ذلك بقواعد النظام الاقتصادي الإسلامي.

٥ - خطط عمل لتحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد

١/٥ - خطة عمل كلية (الخطة الفاروقية)

عرض د. الفاروقي في رسالته (ص٣٨-٥٣) خطة عمل لتحقيق إسلامية المعارف المختلفة. وهي خطة كلية متكاملة، ويتطلب تحقيقها جهود عدد كبير من المتخصصين في كل حقل من حقول المعرفة. وتنطوي الخطة على اثنتي عشرة خطوة يمكن تطبيقها على أي علم، وتشكل بمجموعها خريطة شاملة يمكن أن نرصد عليها مدى التقدم المحقق في "إسلامية" ذلك العلم من العلوم. ويمكن تلخيص الخطوات الأثنتي عشرة كما يلي:

- (١) إعداد مخطط لمحتويات ومنهج علم معين.
- (٢) استعراض شامل لتطور ذلك العلم ومقولاته الرئيسية.

- (٣) إعداد قراءات من التراث الإسلامي تتصل بموضوع العلم ووصفه وفق تقسيمات رئيسية.
- (٤) تحليل القراءات السابقة وبيان صلتها بالعلم.
- (٥) تحديد تفصيلي للمقولات الإسلامية المتصلة بالعلم.
- (٦) تقويم لمضمون العلم ومنهجه من وجهة نظر الإسلام.
- (٧) تقويم لمساهمات المسلمين عبر العصور فيما يتعلق بذلك العلم.
- (٨) عرض المشكلات الكبرى التي تواجهها الأمة الإسلامية ذات الصلة بذلك العلم.
- (٩) عرض المشكلات الانسانية الكبرى ذات الصلة.
- (١٠) إعادة صياغة ذلك العلم من منظور إسلامي، بحيث يتحقق الاتصال والتكامل بين المقولات الإسلامية ومساهمات التراث من جهة وبين أفضل ما وصل إليه ذلك العلم في الوقت الحاضر.
- (١١) إعداد كتب دراسية جامعية في ذلك العلم.
- (١٢) نشر محتوى ذلك العلم بين المتخصصين على أوسع نطاق.

٥/٢ — خطة عمل فروعية: لكن لا بد أن نلاحظ أن هناك خطة أخرى ممكنة لتحقيق إسلامية العلوم، يمكن تسميتها (الخطة الفروعية) لتمييزها عن (الخطة الكلية) الآتية الذكر، وتتطوي الخطة الفروعية على اختيار أي من موضوعات علم ما، وتطبيق الخطوات الانتتي عشرة — جميعها أو بعضها — على ذلك الموضوع وحده.

وإذا نظرنا إلى مسيرة علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي الفعلية خلال الأربعين سنة الماضية، لرأيناها أقرب عملياً إلى الخطة الفروعية، حيث يأخذ الباحث موضوعاً معيناً كالربا أو التنمية مثلاً، فيستعرضه من وجهة نظر الاقتصاد الحديث والنصوص والتراث الإسلامي، فيقارن ويناقش، ويحاول أن يصل إلى تصور متناسق يتحقق فيه الدمج المبدع بين قيم الشريعة وأحكامها وما يراه صحيحاً من مقولات التحليل الاقتصادي.

والخطة الفروعية ليست بديلاً للخطة الكلية ولا تتناقض معها، بل يمكن أن تسيرا معاً بالتوازي. ولكل من الخطين مزاي ومخاير.

ولعل أبرز مخاير الخطة الكلية أنها تتطلب الكثير من الزمن والموارد البشرية. وأهم مزاياها أنها خطة منظمة، نتائجها أوثق ونظرتها أشمل، كما أنها تسمح بعد إنجاز الخطوات الخمس الأولى منها، بمشاركة أعداد كبيرة من المتخصصين في عملية "إسلامية" العلم. وهذه المزية الأخيرة هي في نظري المزية الحاسمة على المدى البعيد.

أما الخطة الفروعية فمن عيوبها أنها تفتقد على الغالب النظرة الشمولية التي نطمح أن تؤدي إليها الخطة الكلية. كما أن الموضوعات المختارة تكون غالباً رد فعل لقضايا يظهر فيها تعارض بين الأحكام الشرعية وبعض مقولات علم ما، وبعبارة أخرى يغلب على الطريقة الفروعية أن تكون منفصلة لا فاعلة، تترك زمام المبادرة للفكر غير الإسلامي، ثم تأتي هي لترد أو تحيب.

على أن للطريقة الفروعية بعض المزايا، منها أنها تستطيع أن تجيب على تساؤلات مُلحة خلال فترة قصيرة نسبياً، كما أنها ملائمة تماماً لرسائل الماجستير والدكتوراه. (ونلاحظ عرضاً إن القسم الأعظم من الكتابات المعاصرة في الفقه الإسلامي المقارن بالقانون هي من هذا النوع).

ومن الانجازات الجديدة بالتنويه للطريقة الفروعية تلك الكتابات التي ظهرت خلال السنوات العشر الماضية حول اقتصاديات النقود والمصارف والفائدة في الإسلام، والتي شملت في موضوعها مجموع الخطوات المقترحة في الرسالة الفاروقية (باستثناء خطوة الكتاب الجامعي). ولا أحسبني أعدو الحقيقة إذا قلت بأن كافة المزاعم الاقتصادية حول ضرورة الفائدة (الربا) لاقتصاد حديث قد تمّ تبديدها على المستوى التحليلي. هذا من الجانب السلبي. أما من الجانب الإيجابي فقد ظهر تصور متكامل نسبياً عن نظام نقدي ومصرفي إسلامي معاصر، مكتوب بلغة يفهمها الاقتصاديون — حتى من غير المسلمين — كما قدمت بعض المساهمات الاقتصادية التحليلية التي تظهر مزايا التمويل اللاربوي على نظيره الربوي (من حيث الكفاءة ومن حيث الاستقرار، كما سلف في ف ١/٤/٤). وهذه المزايا وإن لم تكن بعد مسلماً بها من جمهور الاقتصاديين، خاصة وأن المطلعين عليها والمناقشين لها هم قليل، إلا إن مجرد طرح هذه المزايا للمناقشة بصورة تحليلية رصينة يشكل في ذاته مفارقة كبيرة للوضع الذي كنا عليه قبل ثلاثة عقود من الزمن "حيث كان تحريم الإسلام للربا (الفائدة) يكاد يبدو لكثير من المثقفين، حتى من المسلمين، فكرة مستحيلة التطبيق"^(٤٠).

على أنه لا بد أن نلاحظ أن الانجازات الايجابية التي تحققت بفضل الله سبحانه في موضوع اقتصاديات النقود والمصارف في الإسلام قد ساهم في تحقيقها إلى حد كبير قيام العديد من المصارف الإسلامية.

٣/٥ — نظرة منهجية إلى خطة العمل:

لو ألقينا نظرة منهجية تفصيلية من منظور البحث الحاضر، على الخطوات الثالثة والرابعة والخامسة والسادسة من خطة العمل الفاروقية التي لخصناها قبل قليل، لأمكننا أن نستنتج أن تحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد يمكن أن يسير في ثلاثة اتجاهات رئيسية في آن واحد:

(أ) الاتجاه الأول:

دراسة النظام الاقتصادي الإسلامي، دراسة دقيقة تعمق معرفتنا به، أو تجيب عن تساؤلات معاصرة حوله، أو تستكشف من الأحكام الشرعية المتعددة قواعد عامة اقتصادية كلية، أو تستنبط الحكمة الاقتصادية لبعض الأحكام الشرعية.

(ب) الاتجاه الثاني:

استكشاف المسلمات السابقة والمقولات الوصفية ذات الصلة بالاقتصاد والتي تدل عليها نصوص القرآن الكريم والسنة النبوية، أو تنطوي عليها الأحكام الشرعية. والحقيقة أن الفقهاء

لايعنون بهذه المسلمات والمقولات، إذ لا ترتب عليها عادة أحكام شرعية مباشرة، ولا بد للوصول إليها من أن يقوم المتخصص بنفسه بتأمل النصوص والأحكام والاطلاع على تفسير القرآن الكريم وشروح السنة النبوية الشريفة المتصلة بها، ثم إعمال فكره في دلالتها التحليلية في فرع اختصاصه. وبالنظر لأهمية هذا الاتجاه الثاني وعدم انتباه الأكثرين إليه، فسنبوضحه بثلاثة أمثلة:

المثال الأول:

إن العديد من النصوص الشرعية التي تصنف عادة في باب الرقائق تدل على شدة الارتباط بين دوال المنفعة بين الأفراد (كما في الحسد حيث الارتباط سلبي، أو في الايثار حيث الارتباط إيجابي). وهذه مقولة إقتصادية وصفية تؤكدها تلك النصوص. بينما المعتاد في التحليل الاقتصادي افتراض استقلال هذه الدوال بعضها عن بعض. وترتب على التنازل عن هذا الافتراض والأخذ بالمقولة الإسلامية المؤكدة للارتباط بين دوال المنفعة، يترتب على ذلك نتائج تحليلية بعيدة المدى في النظرية الاقتصادية^(٤١).

المثال الثاني:

إن تأمل الأحكام الشرعية المحرمة للربا، والمبيحة في الوقت نفسه لعقد القراض (المضاربة الشرعية) وسواه من صور المشاركة، لا يمكن تفسيرها وتعليلها إلا بافتراض أن نتائج الاستثار من ربح أو خسارة هي نتائج غير متيقنة بل احتمالية. وهذا يؤكد أن عدم التيقن *uncertainty* هو مسلمة سابقة (أو افتراض ضمني) بنيت عليها الأحكام الشرعية، وينبغي على الاقتصادي المسلم التمسك بها تحليلياً. وتظهر أهمية هذا الموضوع إذا ذكرنا أن قسماً كبيراً من نظرية رأس المال في علم الاقتصاد الوضعي، وكذا القسم الأكبر من المزايم القائلة بعدم إمكان إلغاء الفائدة من الاقتصاد، كلاهما مبني على افتراض التيقن من نتائج الاستثار، وينهار عندما نضع مكانه الافتراض الواقعي والاسلامي وهو عدم التيقن^(٤٢).

المثال الثالث:

أن كثيراً من النصوص الشرعية المتعلقة بالسوق الإسلامية وواجبات المتعاقدين فيها (كتحريم النجش، ومنع تلقي الركبان، ومنع كتمان عيوب المبيع، وعموماً منع الخلالة أو التدليس بمختلف صورهما)^(٤٣) أن كثيراً من هذه النصوص لا يظهر لها نفع عملي ولا ضرورة إلا إذا افترضنا عدم تساوي المعلومات بين طرفي العقد عادة. فافتراض عدم التساوي هذا هو مقولة وصفية بني عليها ضمناً كثير من النصوص والأوامر الشرعية المتصلة بالسوق^(٤٤). بينما القسم الأكبر من تحليلات السوق في الاقتصاد الحديث، وبخاصة السوق التنافسية، تفترض صراحة أو ضمناً تساوي المعلومات بين طرفي العقد. وواضح أن مثل هذه المقولات الوصفية أو المسلمات لاتنص عليها عادة كتب الفقه ولا التفاسير والشروح، مع أهميتها التحليلية البالغة لإسلامية علم الاقتصاد لارتباطها بالقسم الوصفي من هذا العلم.

ولا سبيل للوصول إلى مثل هذه المسلمات إلا بتدريب الاقتصادي المتخصص على إدامة النظر والتفكير في نصوص القرآن والسنة وفي الأحكام الشرعية، مستعيناً بكل ما يساعد على فهمها، واستنباط المقولات الكامنة خلفها.

ولم تبذل بعد جهود تذكر نحو استكشاف المقولات الوصفية والمسلمات الإسلامية. بل إن أكثر المهتمين بالاقتصاد الإسلامي لم يشعروا بعد بوجودها أصلاً (بخلاف القيم الإسلامية حيث لا ينازع أحد في وجودها). ولا سبيل إلى تصحيح هذا الوضع، أو الاكثار من هذا النوع من المساهمات في زمن قصير لأنها تتطلب أفراداً متمكنين من الشريعة والاقتصاد إن واحداً. لكن من المفيد في هذا السبيل:

— نشر بضعة بحوث تسلط الضوء على هذا الموضوع وتقدم أمثلة محددة مع تحليلها اقتصادياً بدقة وتفصيل، لإثارة اهتمام المتخصصين.

— جمع نصوص شرعية مختارة من القرآن والسنة، مع الإرشاد إلى ما يتوافر لها من شروح موجزة تكون في متناول المتخصصين.

— تكليف مجموعة صغيرة من الباحثين (اثنين من الاقتصاديين وعالم بالتفسير وعالم بفقهاء السنة وشروحها) باستعراض سريع للقرآن الكريم ثم لنصوص السنة الصحيحة، مع التعليق الموجز على كل نص يرون فيه مقولة وصفية أو مسلمة من مسلمة الاقتصاد الإسلامي. ولا أجدني بحاجة إلى التأكيد بأن من المتعذر استنفاد دلالات النصوص الشرعية في هذا المجال، ولو تم استعراضها مرّات وشارك في كل محاولة أفضل المتخصصين. لكن الهدف الواقعي والمطلوب هو شق الطريق بمحاولة جدية أولى، تضع بين أيدي جمهور الاقتصاديين مجموعة من المقولات الوصفية الإسلامية والمسلمات ما كانوا يستطيعون الوصول إليها بانفسهم، وهي ذات أهمية لتطوير تحليل اقتصادي إسلامي.

(ج) النوع الثالث:

استكشاف المقولات الوصفية الاقتصادية التي توصل إليها علماء المسلمين عبر العصور. وهذا هو الاتجاه الثالث لتحقيق إسلامية الاقتصاد، ومن أمثله المقولات الوصفية التحليلية لابن خلدون والمقريري (مالم تكن مستندة إلى نصوص شرعية، أو موضحة لها، فحينئذ تدخل في النوع الثاني (ب) المذكور آنفاً).

إن هذا النوع الثالث صحيح ومفيد، لكنني لا أتردد في اعتباره أقل أهمية في المرحلة القادمة لتطوير علم الاقتصاد الإسلامي، إذ أنني أرى أن المؤثرات الكبرى التي ستحدد مسيرة هذا العلم يجب أن تأتي من المقولات القيمة والوصفية المشار إليها في (أ) و (ب) أعلاه. ويحسن بي التذكير بأن مساهمات علماء المسلمين السابقين أمثال أبي يوسف صاحب كتاب الخراج وأبي عبيد صاحب كتاب الأموال هي مساهمات قيمة مبنية على الشريعة، وهي ذات أولوية عالية في صياغة النظام الاقتصادي الإسلامي. أما مساهمات ابن خلدون والمقريري مثلاً فهي أساساً وصفية مبنية على مشاهدتهما وتحليلاتهما الذاتية، ولا أرى لها نفس الأولوية.

٤/٥ — المؤهلات البشرية اللازمة، وتوزيع العمل:

إن العلماء الذين يمكنهم المساهمة في تحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد أو سواه من العلوم يمكن تقسيمهم إلى ثلاث فئات: اقتصاديون وشرعيون ومُخضرمون^(٤٢).

أما الفئتان الأوليان فهما متوافرتان حالياً. وأما فئة المخضرمين ونعني بها الاقتصاديين ذوي الاطلاع الشرعي الجيد، والشرعيين ذوي الاطلاع الاقتصادي الجيد، فهي فئة قليلة جداً، وتُعد قلة عددها العقبة البشرية الرئيسية في طريق تحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد.

إن فئة المخضرمين هي التي تخفف من مشكلة ازدواجية وانفصام المعرفة الشرعية عن الوضعية، وهي الفئة التي تستطيع ان تتعاون وتخطب وتنسق العمل مع الاقتصاديين والشرعيين، فتسمح بالاستفادة من الأعداد الكبيرة نسبياً من الاقتصاديين والشرعيين الذين يمكن ان يساهموا في خطوات "الإسلامية" لو وجد من يستطيع أن يخاطبهم بلغتهم العلمية وأن ينسق ويوجه جهودهم.

ولو استعرضنا بدقة الخطوات (٣) إلى (٧) من خطة العمل الفاروقية (ف ١/٥ آنفاً) لرأينا تنفيذها يعتمد بصورة حاسمة على وجود فئة المخضرمين، مما يؤكد أن الندرة الحالية لهذه الفئة هي نقطة الاختناق الرئيسية لبرنامج "إسلامية" الاقتصاد.

ومما يبشر بإمكان تخفيف هذا الاختناق بعد بضع سنوات، تلك الدفعات الأولى من خريجي أقسام الاقتصاد الإسلامي في بعض الجامعات (كجامعة أم القرى، وجامعة الإمام محمد، والجامعة الإسلامية في إسلام آباد، وجامعة الأزهر والجامعة الإسلامية الدولية في ماليزيا) الذين نأمل ان يبرز منهم بعد إتمام دراساتهم العليا فئة ناضجة من المخضرمين الذين تمكنوا من المعرفة الاقتصادية والشرعية وتابعوا العمل الدائب لتحقيق إسلامية علم الاقتصاد.

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- ²¹ Zarqa, M. Anas (1983b): *Stability in an Interest-free Islamic Economy: A note*, Pakistan Journal of Applied Centre, Karachi, 1983.

هوامش

(١) استفدت في إعداد هذه الصيغة المنقحة من البحث من ملاحظات أساتذة عديدين منهم الأستاذ محمود أبو السعود و د. محمد عمر زبير و د. رفيق المصري، و د. نجاة الله صديقي و د. جعفر شيخ إدريس، ووالدي الأستاذ مصطفى الزرقاء، فلهم جميعاً جزيل الشكر. لكنهم قد لا يتفقون ممي فيما ذهب إليه، لذلك تقم على عاتقي تيمة الأخطاء في الفكر أو التعبير.

(٢) أنظر رسالة الفاروقي ضمن قائمة المراجع الانجليزية.

(٣) د. محمد شوقي الفنجري، ص ٨٥.

(٤) العبارات الوصفية DESCRIPTIVE تسمى ايضاً عبارات وضعية POSITIVE لكننا اجبتنا كلمة (وضعية) لأنها تدل ايضاً على مذهب فلسفي ينكر الغيب ويقم المعرفة فقط على الوقائع المحسوسة والتجربة المادية. اما العبارات القيمة فسمى ايضاً معيارية .NORMATIVE

(٥) نقول غالباً، لأنه حتى العلوم التجريبية لابد ان تعتمد على بعض الأسس القيمة. وكذلك فان الأحكام الشرعية القيمة تنطوي أحياناً على مسائل وصفية.

(٦) قارن بالتعاريف الواردة في قاموس اكسفورد الكبير، وقاموس Funk & Wagnalls وانظر الحاشية (٤٩) أدناه من هذا البحث.

(٧) هناك جوانب أخرى عديدة غير ما سذكروه (أ) و (ب) و (ج)، تستند ايضاً الى القيم. انظر سامولز Samuels، ص ٤٧٥-٤٨٠، حيث ذكر منها فيما يخص علم الاقتصاد: تحديد المشكلة الاقتصادية، وتغيير الأهداف من الوسائل، وتعريف الناتج والتكاليف، ومفهوم الثروة، ومفهوم سيادة المستهلك، وسواها.

(٧ مكرر) Roberts الصفحة ٥٤. وأكد Lindbeck في الصفحات (٩-٢١) نفس الفكرة، غير أنه يعتبر اختيار القضايا التي تبحث هو وحده الجانب القيمي أو الشخصي في علم الاقتصاد. وانظر ايضاً B. Ward الصفحة ١٩٣.

(٨) أكدت على هذه النقطة الدكتور ادلمان I. ADELMAN في دراستها لظاهرة النمو الاقتصادي. وانظر مناقشات اخرى ذات صلة بالموضوع في سامولسون (SAMUELSON, PP. 319-20) وفي شومبيتر (SCHUMPETER, Ch. i) وهندرسون وكوانت (HENDERSON & QUANDT, PP. 1-2).

(٩) يؤكد الاقتصادي ج. ر. هكس J.R. HICKS بحق أن "النظرية" الاقتصادية هي بالضرورة غمامة BLINDER تخرج من دائرة النظر تفاصيل الواقع الكثيرة، وتركز اهتمامنا على عناصر قليلة يتم تنظيرها ودراسة العلاقات بينها.

(١٠) سورة لقمان (١٨:٣١).

(١١) سورة البقرة (٢:٢٧٨).

(١٢) سورة البقرة (٢:١١٠).

(١٣) سورة النحل (١٦:٦٩).

(١٤) رواه الترمذي وقال: حديث حسن ونقله النووي في رياض الصالحين (ر: د. الصالح، ص ١١٥).

(١٤ مكرر) رواه ابن ماجه في سننه (ج ٢ ص ٤٣٥ الحديث رقم ٤٢٨٩) ونقل المحقق د. الأعظمي تصحيح هذا الحديث.

(١٥) الأعراف (٧:١٩٩).

(١٦) البقرة (٢:٢١٩).

(١٧) د. عبد الحميد أبو سليمان، ص ١٦.

(١٨) من الاستشارات الجديرة بالتنويه بحث الأستاذ محمد المبارك رحمه الله: "نحو صياغة اسلامية لعلم الاجتماع" والذي قدم الى المؤتمر الأول للتعليم الاسلامي بمكة المكرمة، حيث أكد على ان الاسلام يزودنا بعدد من القوانين (المقولات الوصفية) الاجتماعية، واعطى أمثلة عديدة لذلك، ص ١٥-٢٢.

(١٩) سورة القمر (٥٤:٤٩).

(٢٠) سورة الاسراء (١٧:٧٠).

(٢١) سورة الأعراف (٧:١٠).

(٢٢) سورة الحجر (١٥:٢١).

(٢٣) سورة البقرة (٢:٢٩).

(٢٤) أنظر مفهوم التسخير في الرسالة الفاروقية ص ٢٦.

(٢٥) مختصر صحيح مسلم للمنزري، الحديث رقم ٢٠٨٧.

(٢٦) أخرجه الترمذي واحمد وابن ماجه واللفظ له. انظر سنن ابن ماجه تحقيق د. مصطفى الأعظمي، (الحديثان رقم ٣٤ و ٣٥).

(٢٧) هذه هي المادة الأولى من مجلة الأحكام العدلية. (الشرح والتفصيل انظر: المدخل الفقهي العام للزرقاء ف/٢ ص ٥٩). "والتعقيد بوصف (العملية) لإخراج المسائل الاعتقادية من أصول الايمان وفروعه، فانها موضوع علم آخر" (المرجع نفسه).

(٢٨) المقولات القيمة الفقهية، اي الأحكام الشرعية، المتصلة بالحياة الاقتصادية هي أساس النظام الاقتصادي الاسلامي، وتقع ضمن الزمرة الثالثة من الرسم البياني. لكن هذه الزمرة تضم أيضاً المسلمات القليلة الاقتصادية وهذه ليست من الفقه. كما يلاحظ ان دراسة النظام الاقتصادي الاسلامي على الوجه الصحيح لا يمكن ان تقتصر على الأحكام الشرعية المتصلة بالاقتصاد اي على فقه المعاملات بل لا بد ان تتناول النتائج المتوقعة والحكمة الاقتصادية للأحكام، وهذا يتطلب استخدام الجانب الوصفي من علم الاقتصاد الاسلامي.

(٢٩) انظر مثلاً "المنقى" لأن قدامة في الفقه الحنبلي (٤/١٦٦-١٦٧) باب الربا والصرف، وحاشية ابن عابدين في الفقه الحنفي (٥/٢٥٥-٢٥٦) كتاب الحظر والاباحة فصل البيع، وانظر بحثاً فقهياً مقارناً للدكتور ضحي الدبريني (ص ٦٤-١٣٢ و ٩٣-٦٠٨)، والمنقى على الموطأ للباهي المالكي (٥/١٥ وما يليها)، والحسبة لابن تيمية.

(٣٠) انظر عبارة د. الفنجري المشار اليها في الحاشية رقم ٣ آنفاً.

(٣١) أشكر د. نجاة الله صديقي لارشادي الى هذه الفكرة ولناقشة مفصلة حولها.

(٣٢) إن كتب الفقه كثيراً ما تذكر بإيجاز الحكمة من الحكم الشرعي، لكن مهمة الفقه الأساسية تبقى هي الوصول الى الحكم بدليله وليس استقصاء حكمته.

(٣٣) انظر في ذلك بالانجليزية الزرقاء (١٩٨٣/ب)، عمر شايرا (١٩٨٥، ص١١٧-١٢٢) ووقار مسعود خان (ص٨٩-٩٢).

(٣٤) انظر بالعربية: (الصدقي (ص ١٠٠-٨ و ٢٥)، وشابرا (ص١٧-١٨)، وبالانجليزية انظر: ضياء الدين أحمد (مذكرة غير منشورة)، ووقار مسعود خان (الفصل الثالث)، وهذا المرجع الأخير هو رسالة دكتوراه قيمة من جامعة بوسطن، أثبت فيها د. وقار خان تفوق التمويل اللاربوي في الكفاءة على التمويل الربوي طالما ألزم الشركاء بالأمانة، أو كانت تكاليف الرقابة معتدلة. ولعل رسالة د. خان هي اهم تحليل اقتصادي دقيق كتب في هذا الموضوع من منظور اسلامي خلال الخمس عشرة سنة الأخيرة.

(٣٥) من مقدمة الشيخ عبدالله دراز لكتاب الموافقات للشاطبي (ج ١ ص ٣).

(٣٦) هذا يصحح على اطلاقه في النصوص الشرعية القطعية الدلالة، أما النصوص الظنية الدلالة فيبدو أن الامام مالكا رحمه الله يستعين في تحديد دلالتها وتقييد اطلاقها بالآثار الوصفية المتوقعة للحكم. انظر مثلاً أوردته القرافي في تفسير الامام مالك الحديث تفيل الامام في الجهاد (القرافي، السؤال الخامس والعشرون، المسألة الثالثة، ص١٠٥-١٠٨).

(٣٧) هذه العبارة هي للوالد حفظه الله (ر: مصطفى الزرقاء، المدخل الفقهي ج ١ ص ١٠٤ الفقرة ٢/٢٦) تعبيراً عن الفكرة التي أكدها الشاطبي في الموافقات (٢/٣٧ - ٤٨).

(٣٨) ذكر الشيخ عبدالله دراز في حاشيته على الموافقات (١٠٠/١) الاعتراضات التي اوردت على هذا الرأي للامام الشاطبي، ثم رد عليها مؤكداً اياه.

(٣٩) أشكر د. جعفر شيخ ادريس على تعريفه بذلك.

(٤٠) انظر: انس الزرقاء: نظم التوزيع الاسلامية الفقرة ٥/٤، ص١٤-١٦.

(٤١) اعتمدت في ملاحظاتي عن الاستحسان على المدخل الفقهي العام للزرقاء (الفقرات ١٥ و ٢١). ويلاحظ ان الختابة بالإضافة الى الحنفية والمالكية يعتمدون المصالح المرسله (ومنها الاستحسان) اصلاً من اصول تقرير الأحكام (المدخل الفقهي العام ف ٤/٣٠).

(٤٢) المدخل الفقهي العام للزرقاء ف ٢٣ وما بعدها.

(٤٣) المدخل الفقهي العام للزرقاء ف ٢٩.

(٤٤) انظر ممن عالجوا هذا الموضوع: في المراجع العربية : د. عمر شايرا و د. معد الجارحي.

(٤٥) ممن عالجوا هذه المسألة بآجاز د. عبدالله الهالي.

(٤٦) انظر محاولتين في هذا المجال احدهما لانس الزرقاء "القيم والمعايير الاسلامية..." والثانية للدكتور كوثر الأجي "دراسة جدوى الاستثمار...".

(٤٧) ان مصدر دالة المصلحة الاجتماعية في علم الاقتصاد الاسلامي هو الشريعة عموماً والفقه خصوصاً. وقد قدم الإمامان أبو حامد الغزالي ثم أبو اسحق الشاطبي صياغة اسلامية مبتكرة لهذه الدالة (وان لم يسمياها بهذا الأسم المتحدث). . للتفصيل انظر: انس الزرقاء "صياغة إسلامية لدالة المصلحة..." ص١٥٦-١٦٦.

(٤٨) هذه نتيجة جوهرية لمقال برغسون المشهور عام ١٩٣٨م والذي هو أحد الدعائم الأساسية للنظرية الحديثة عن اقتصاديات الرفاهية. انظر مقدمة ماملون لكتاب غراف (بين المراجع الانجليزية). ويلاحظ ان معيار أمثلة بارينو (مع تسليم الجميع بأنه قلما يمكن عملياً ترجيح سياسة اقتصادية على أخرى استناداً اليه وحده) يعتمد مع ذلك على بعض القيم الخفية، اي انه ليس موضوعياً تماماً كما ظن الاقتصاديون رداً من الزمن (انظر: هيلروتر مع ثرو، ص٢٦٧ - ٢٦٩).

وكذلك فإن معايير "اختبارات التعويض Compensation tests" كذلك التي اقترحها كالدور (Kaldor) وهكس (Hicks) إذا لم يتم فيها دفع تعويض فعلي للمتضررين من سياسة ما، فإنها ليست معايير موضوعية، بل إنها تنطوي على قيم ظاهرة تفضل فيها منافع بعض الناس على بعض (انظر مثلاً على ذلك في رينولدز مع سمولنسكي، ص ٤٥٤ - ٤٥٥). وأما إذا دفع فيها تعويض فعلي فإنها تصبح مماثلة لمعيار بارينو الذي ذكرنا أنه يعتمد على قيم خفية. وانظر غراف (ص ٩٠-٩٢) حيث يبين ان المعايير المبنية على اختبارات التعويض تعتمد عموماً على قيم تتصل بتوزيع الدخل.

لذا يصح التأكيد على انه لامعيار بارينو ولا اختبارات التعويض هي مجردة تماماً من القيم، وبالتالي فإن السياسات الاقتصادية لا بد لها - كما ذكرنا أعلاه - من الاستناد على قيم مستمدة من خارج نطاق "علم الاقتصاد" في جانبه الوصفي.

(٤٩) وهذا النهي يصح فقط عند من يأخذ بالتعريف الضيق لكلمة (علم) فيقصره على فروع المعرفة التي تتضمن عبارات وصفية (قوانين) قابلة للاختبار التجريبي. اما وقد أخذنا بالتعريف الموسع لكلمة (علم) بحيث يشمل أي نوع منظم ومصنف من أنواع المعرفة، فإن دراسة المذاهب والنظم الاقتصادية ومنها نظام الاسلام يجب ان تعتبر علماً. والتعريف الموسع هو الذي ينسجم مع مفهوم العلم في القرآن والسنة، فلا يصح ان تأخذ بالتعريف الضيق. (انظر ماتقدم ف ٢/٢).

(٤٩ مكرر) وما ذهبنا اليه في شأن علم الاقتصاد الاسلامي يتفق مع موقف الاستاذ محمد المبارك رحمه الله في شأن علم الاجتاع الاسلامي (بحته ص ١٤ وما يليها)، كما ان د. باقادر (ص ٢٢) يرى الرأي نفسه في شأن العلوم الاجتماعية عموماً.

(٥٠) من المقدمة القيمة للاستاذ خورشيد أحمد على كتاب د. شابرا (بالانجليزية، ص ٩).

(٥١) من المعلوم مثلاً ان شروط أمثلية بارينو Pareto Optimality Criteria تعتمد تماماً على افتراض استقلال دوال المنفعة بين الأفراد.

(٥٢) لا يباذع الاقتصاديون في ان افتراض عدم اليقين هو الواقعي والصحيح، وإن استخدموا افتراض اليقين على سبيل التبسيط. لكن سرعان ما ينسى الكثير من الاقتصاديين ذلك، ويتمسكون بنتائج التحليل ناسين انها تغير كلية اذا افترضنا عدم اليقين . وقد وقع ذلك لعدد من كبار الاقتصاديين. انظر على سبيل المثال التحليل التقليدي لموضوع التفضيل الزمني Time Preference، وكذلك القول بان استخدام معدل الفائدة ضروري لقرارات الاستثمار الرشيدة. للتفصيل انظر بالانجليزية (أنس الزرقاء، ١٩٨٢ و ١٩٨٣/ أ).

(٥٣) انظر شرح ذلك في المدخل الفقهي العام للأستاذ الزرقاء ج ١ ص ٤٠٤ - ٤١٧، الفقرات ١٨٦-١٨٨.

(٥٤) ممن نوهوا بهذه الفكرة د. عوض، ص ٨٩-٩٠.

(٥٥) المُخَضَّرَم: من أدرك عهدين مختلفين كالمجاهلية والاسلام (ر: المعجم الوسيط).

VIII
FIQH

Fiqh al Islām Lā Fiqh al Fuqahā'

(The Fiqh of Islam not the Fiqh of the Jurists)

Muhammad Abdallah al Samman

فقه الإسلام لا فقه الفقهاء

محمد عبدالله السّمان

فقه الإسلام لا فقه الفقهاء^(١)

محمد عبدالله السمّان

لقد سعدت وشرفت بدعوتي إلى هذا المؤتمر، لألقي بين أيديكم ملخصاً للبحث الذي تقدمت به، وهو: "فقه الإسلام.. لا فقه الفقهاء". وهذا البحث يتضمن مقدمة، وأبواباً أربعة هي:

- * فقه الإسلام والترف الفكري.
- * فقه الإسلام ومصالح العباد.
- * فقه الإسلام ومطالب الحياة.
- * فقه الإسلام والتخلف المعاصر.

ثم خاتمة: حاولت فيها رسم الطريق الذي يؤدي — في نظري — إلى المساهمة في إزاحة كابوس التخلف الحضاري الذي نحن فيه، الذي لن يزاح إلا إذا توافرت لدينا رؤية جديدة في فقه الإسلام: نصاً وروحاً، ومراجعة جادة حاسمة لتراثنا... ووقفة حازمة لتصحيح مفاهيم الإسلام التي غشيها طوفان من اللبس والتشويه. أيها الأخوة المسلمون:

حين فكرت في اختيار هذا الموضوع وهو: "فقه الإسلام لا فقه الفقهاء" ... لم يدر بذهني أن أمسّ من قريب أو بعيد شيوخيًا وبخاصة فقهاء السلف الذين أدوا إلى الفكر الإسلامي أجل الخدمات، وتركوا لنا تراثاً نفخر به ونعتز. وإنما الذي دار بذهني: إن فقه الإسلام هو الذي ننشده، وأعني الإسلام: روح الشريعة السمحة.. المستمدة من كتاب الله — بعيداً عن مزلق التأويل — ومن سنن رسوله الصحيحة — بعيداً عن متاهات الخضم الهائل،

(١) كل بحث من البحوث يمثل وجهة نظر صاحبه ويعبر عنها، ولا يعني نشرنا له تأييد الأفكار الواردة فيه أو تنيها بقدر ما يعني الرغبة في نشر ما من شأنه أن يحقق فائدة فكرية ما، سواء في مجال الإضافة إلى الفكر الجيد، أو الفقد للفكر الرديء، أو المعالجة المؤدية للبررة بعض الأفكار، وتنقية بعض الآراء، وقدح زناد الفكر، وشحن الأذهان.

وفي عنوان هذا البحث من العف ما يلبسه القارئ في ثنايا البحث وتفصيله، وقد أثرنا عدم تغيير العنوان تحقيقاً لرغبة الاستاذ الكاتب، ولما استهدفه من عنصر الإثارة ولفت الإنتباه إلى محتوى المقال، وإن كان الأفضل — في نظرننا — هو: "الفقه العمل لا الترف الفقهي" أو نحو ذلك مما يؤدي غرض الكاتب ويناسب المعاني التي استهدفها.

من الأحاديث التي حفلت بها المدونات والمطولات، دوغما تمييز بين المعتمد منها دراسة ورواية، والمقبول نقلاً و عقلاً، وبين المرفوض منها دراية ورواية، والمردود نقلاً و عقلاً.

وقد يقول قائل:

”إن فقهاءنا الأوائل.. لم يبدأوا من فراغ.. لقد استنبطوا الأحكام من مصادرها المعتمدة، لهذا يجب أن يكون لآرائهم قيمتها، فقد توافرت فيهم كل مؤهلات الإجتهد، وبخاصة الأصوليين منهم“.

ونقول لهذا القائل:

”إن ما تقوله الحق ولكن هؤلاء السادة.. لم يفكروا في أن يحجروا على من يأتون بعدهم، لأنهم بذلك يحكمون على شريعة الله بالجمود، وما دامت آراؤهم ثمرة اجتهاداتهم.. فهي عرضة للأخذ والرد والقبول والرفض، وقد كان لسان حالهم جميعاً: كل انسان يؤخذ من كلامه ويرد عليه، إلا صاحب الروضة الشريفة — صلوات الله وسلامه عليه — ورجم الله حافظ المغرب ابن عبد البر، فقد كان يقول:

”لا كلمة أضر بالعلم والعلماء والمتعلمين... من قول القائل: ما ترك الأول للآخر شيئاً“.

الباب الأول:

فقه الإسلام والتurf الفكري

هذا الباب يعرض لمسائل ثلاث:

- أ — ما المقصود بالتurf الفكري؟
- ب — ماهي دوافع التurf الفكري؟
- ج — الانحراف عن فقه الإسلام

● أولاً: مالمقصود بالتurf الفكري؟

هو أن تبذل فكراً.. ولسنا في حاجة اليه. أو أن تبذل فكراً نحن في حاجة اليه.. ولكن بقدر، إلا اننا نبالغ في بذله حتى يتلاشى المضمون في متاهات التurf الفكري. أننا — مثلاً — لا يمكننا أن ننفصل عن تاريخنا، لأن الماضي امتداد للحاضر والمستقبل، ولكن حين نسترجع تاريخنا يجب أن يكون لذلك هدف سام، ففي تاريخنا صفحات مشرقة، وعلينا أن ندرس الأسباب التي جعلتها مشرقة لكي نلزم أنفسنا بالأخذ بها، وفي تاريخنا صفحات معتمة، وعلينا أن ندرس العلل التي جعلتها معتمة، لكي نلزم أنفسنا ببندها.

فإذا انخرطنا عن هذا المسار.. وجعلنا من أنفسنا قضاة تصدر أحكاماً على التاريخ لاتقبل النقص، وفي قضايا عفى عليها الزمن، كنا بصدد ترف فكري هم ثقيل.

إننا على سبيل المثال — ما نزال ناقش : أيهما كان أحق بالخلافة/ أبو بكر أم علي؟ وناقش الخلاف بين بني أمية وبني هاشم، والذي سالت فيه دماء آلاف المسلمين بلا ثم.. ما شأننا اليوم بهذا وذاك.. كان الخليفة الراشد عمر بن عبد العزيز لا يسمع بإثارة مثل هذه المسائل في مجلسه، ويقول: نحن قوم برأ الله ايدينا من دمائها، ونرجو أن يبرئ السنتنا من الخوض فيها^(٢).

● ثانياً: ماهي دوافع التurf الفكري؟

هناك دافعان رئيسيان، هما: هواية الجدل، والإنحراف عن فقه الإسلام.

(٢) اللفظ المنسوب لأمر المؤمنين عمر بن عبد العزيز: "تلك دماء طهر الله منها ايدينا فلا تلوث بها السنتنا".

وهواية الجدل تعني أن يكون الجدل لذات الجدل، ويجب أن نفرق بين الجدل في عصوره السابقة، وبين الجدل في حياتنا المعاصرة، وهذا الفرق يشمل الكم والكيف معاً. بالنسبة للكم، فقد كان الجدل مجرداً لاساحل له.. ولك أن تستعرض تاريخ الفرق والنحل، التي انشقت وخرجت على مذهب أهل السنة والجماعة.

وبالنسبة للكيف، فقد كان معظم الجدل يمارس في أصول الاعتقاد وأن تجاوز مرحلة النصوص إلى مرحلة الرأي، صحيح أن الجدل — ابتداء من النصف الثاني من القرن الثالث الهجري — قد خاض غمار النظريات الصوفية المشبوهة.. إلا أن هذه المرحلة كانت مرحلة استثنائية، جنى الفكر الاسلامي وحده ثمارها المرة.

أما الجدل المعاصر فبالنسبة للكم، فهو قليل نسبياً وبالنسبة للكيف، فقد انحط مستواه إلى درجة كبيرة، ولا يكاد يتصل منه شيء باصول الاعتقاد، باستثناء "عقيدة التوحيد" وما يواجهها من رواسب الجاهلية.

ولعل أوضح مظاهر الإسفاف الذي يسيطر على الجدل المعاصر، إثارة قضايا إما أنها ثانوية، وإما أن الجدل فيها أصبح مكرراً مموجاً، واليك أمثلة منها: اللحية.. الإسرائء والمعراج بالجسد ام بالروح؟ أم بهما معاً؟ مسألة المهدي المنتظر الذي ينزل آخر الزمان أو يظهر على الأرض؟ مسألة كرامات الأولياء..

هذه بعض النماذج أو مهازل مبكية، في الغرب يغزون الفضاء، ويصلون إلى القمر، ونحن ما نزال مشغولين بالصورة الفوتوغرافية.. أهى حلال أم حرام؟ وهذا هو الإفلاس الفكري بعينه.

أما الدافع الثاني من دوافع الترف الفكري، "الانحراف عن فقه الإسلام"، فيتمثل في الانحراف عن الخط الذي يمثل فقه الإسلام الصحيح في فجر الإسلام وضحاها، سار انتاج العقل المسلم وفق ما خطط له فقه الإسلام، فازدهرت علوم: الأصول والحديث باعتبارهما سباجاً لمسار التشريع الإسلامي، وعندما واجه الفكر الإسلامي تسلل الفلسفات الوافدة، وجد من يتصدى لها، وكانوا أكفاء لذلك التصدي.

ووسط تلك السحب القائمة، لم يتوقف الانتاج الفكري السليم عن مساره الصحيح، في شتى فروع المعرفة: العقيدة والشريعة، الاقتصاد والهندسة، الطب والصيدلة.. الفلك وعلم طبقات الأرض، وغيرها.. كذلك لم يتوقف عن مساره الانتاج الفكري المنحرف الذي تولى كبره غلاة المتصوفة، الى جانب بعض العلماء الذين كانت هوايتهم توفير الكم دونما اعتبار للكيف.

والإنحراف عن فقه الإسلام يتمثل في صورتين:

- (١) الإنحراف عن فكر الإسلام روحاً.
- (٢) الإنحراف عن فكر الإسلام سلوكاً.

والإنحراف عن فقه الإسلام روحاً، يعني الانفصال التام عن الإسلام، في فكره الأصيل، ونلتبس مثل هذا الإنحراف في تراث الصوفية، والباطنية، وبخاصة في مجال التفسير للقرآن الكريم، وهو مجال خصيب أمكن للأهواء أن تلعب فيه دوراً خطيراً.

وليس الإنحراف عن فقه الإسلام روحاً، وفقاً على تفسير القرآن الكريم، بل شمل الانحراف سائر الاتجاهات والأفكار، وبخاصة في مجال التصوف، وحسبك إن تقرأ كتب ابن عربي، وعبد الوهاب الشعراي، ورحم الله الدكتور زكي مبارك فقد ذكر في رسالته عن التصوف التي حصل بها على إحدى دكتوراته ، فقال:

”من قرأ كتب ابن عربي... خرج منها وهو زنديق“.

”ومن قرأ كتب الشعراي خرج منها وهو مجنون“.

أما الإنحراف عن فقه الإسلام سلوكاً، فلا يعني التناقض — كما هو الشأن في الإنحراف عن فقه الإسلام روحاً بل يعني التسبب وعدم الالتزام، وأكثر ما يكون هذا النوع في كتب التفسير وكتب السيرة، ومن المسلم به أن في القرآن اعجازاً بيانياً، ولكن المفسرين يحرصهم على الحشو طمسوا ذلك الاعجاز البياني.

وترى في كتب السيرة العجب العجاب، القديم منها يسير على وتيرة واحدة، والجديد منها — إلا أقله — اقتباس من القديم وتكرار له، والحشو الممل أكثر ما يكون في سيرة الرسول عليه الصلاة والسلام قبل البعثة، وما هو أدهى أن كتب السيرة، ومدونات كتابات التاريخ الاسلامي ، تعتمد على سرد الأحداث ، ولا تعتمد على دراستها وتحليلها.

وبعد، فإن الترف الفكري — دون شك — يمثل انحرافاً عن فقه الإسلام روحاً وسلوكاً، وفيما مضى كان لهذا الترف مبرراته، ولكن لامبرر له اليوم، والأمة المسلمة المعاصرة في حاجة الى بعث فكري جديد، لكي تنفض عن نفسها غبار التخلف، فقد وقع في يدي كتاب عن الموضوع في أكثر من ثلاثمائة صفحة من القطع الكبير، مع أن القرآن الكريم عرض له في أقل من آية واحدة، وكم أشفقت على الإسلام من مثل هذا المؤلف.

إن الترف الفكري يتناقض مع فقه الإسلام، الذي يليق — في المقام الأول — مصالح العباد، ومطالب الحياة، حتى يتفوق الإسلام — في كل زمان ومكان — على هذه المواجهة الحضارية التي تواجهه من الشرق والغرب على السواء.

الباب الثاني:

فقه الإسلام ومصالح العباد

لاجدال في أن شريعة الله تقوم على مصالح العباد، وحيثما كانت المصلحة فتم شرع الله كما يقول الفقهاء.

ولا جدال كذلك في أن المصالح التي نعيها هي المصالح المعتبرة التي يقرها الإسلام، وليست المصالح التي تستجيب لأهواء الناس، والحديث عن مصالح العباد يقتضي منا التعرض إلى بعض المبادئ المقررة.

● أولاً: الإسلام دين يسر لا عسر:

في العقيدة، وفي العبادات والمعاملات على السواء، فالله سبحانه وتعالى يقول لنا: ﴿...إلا من أكره وقلبه مطمئن بالإيمان﴾، ﴿لا يكلف الله نفساً إلا وسعها﴾، ﴿يريد الله بكم اليسر ولا يريد بكم العسر﴾، ﴿وما جعل عليكم في الدين من حرج﴾، ﴿فمن اضطر غير باغ ولا عاد فلا أثم عليه﴾.

والأحاديث الصحيحة في هذا المضمار كثيرة.

● ثانياً: شريعة الله شريعة متطورة:

لاتعرف الجمود ولا التزمّت، ولا التنطع ولا التعنت، وهذا المبدأ مبني على المبدأ السابق: اليسر لا العسر، والتطور يقتضي أن تظل شريعة الله صالحة لكل زمان ومكان، تلبّي حاجات الناس وتسهم في حل مشكلات المجتمعات، والمشكلات متجددة — أو كما يقول الدكتور محمد البيهي في مؤلفه: "الإسلام في حل مشكلات المجتمعات الإسلامية المعاصرة"، يقول: "الإسلام ليس لعهد ولا لمجتمع، وليس للسان، هو للإنسان أينما وجد الانسان، وفي أي زمن كان وجوده".

● ثالثاً: شريعة الله تقوم على الاجتهاد لا التقليد، عند خلو النص:

من المشهور عن الإمام احمد بن حنبل — رحمه الله — قوله: "لا تقلدني ولا تقلد مالكاً ولا الشافعي ولا أبا حنيفة ولا الثوري، وتعلم كما تعلمنا، وحرام على الرجل أن يقلد في دينه الرجال، فإنهم لم يسلموا من أن يغلطوا، والتفقه في الدين فرض، فمن لم يعرف ذلك لم يكن متفقهاً في الدين.

وأُنحى ابن تيمية باللائمة على المقلدين، وحمل حملة شعواء على التقليد لأنه مدعاة إلى التعصب، وحائل دون الاجتهاد، يرى — رحمه الله — أن من تعصب لواحد بعينه من الأئمة، فقد شابه أهل الأهواء، الذين يتبعون هواهم، ولا يدينون دين الحق، وليس لأحد أن يتخذ قول بعض العلماء شعاراً يجب اتباعه، ينهي عن غيره مما جاءت به السنة، وقد أنحى — كما في الفتاوى — باللائمة على الفقهاء وكذلك على الصوفية الذين أرادوا نوعاً من الورع وأفرطوا فيه بغير دليل شرعي، لأن ذلك غلو، وبعد عن الاعتدال الذي رسمه الإسلام.

وبقي ان نشير إلى المصالح المرسله، فمما امتازت به شريعة الإسلام هي أنها تقوم على رعاية مصالح العباد، وإذا كانت التشريعات الوضعية عند خلو النص القانوني الصريح ترى الرجوع إلى العرف وقواعد القانون الطبيعي، فإن فقه الإسلام كان أسبق منها في معرفة ذلك، بل أن أبا يوسف القاضي وصاحب أبي حنيفة، كان يرى أن النص إذا كان قائماً ومبنيّاً على العرف والعادة فإن العبرة للعرف والعادة..

ويقول فقيه من المحدثين، ومن أوائل الذين درسوا الشريعة في كليات الحقوق بمصر، يقول في كتابه "علم أصول الفقه": "إذا لم يوجد نص صريح في نصوص الكتاب والسنة، وجب الاجتهاد لاتماس الحكم على قواعد العدل.

وأقول إن المصالح المرسله — كمصدر من مصادر التشريع التكميلية — دليل على أن فقه الإسلام يتمتع بفكر حضاري، ولقد عرفها الفقهاء الأصوليون بأنها جمع مصلحة، وهي مقصود الشارع من جلب المنافع، ودرء المفاسد عن الخلق.. والمراد بالمرسله مالا ترجع إلى نص معين من نصوص الشرع، ولم يرد فيها ما يشهد لها بالاعتبار ولا بالإلغاء.

لقد حمل الإمام مالك لواء الأخذ بالمصالح المرسله، مستنداً إلى أدلة ثلاثة:

أولاً: أن الصحابة سلكوا مسلك الأخذ بالمصلحة المرسله، وهناك شواهد كثيرة تشهد بذلك.

ثانياً أن المصلحة إذا كانت ملائمة لمقاصد الشارع، ومن جنس ما أقره من مصالح، فإن الأخذ بها يكون موافقاً لمقاصده، وإهمالها يكون إهمالاً لمقاصده، وإهمال مقاصد الشرع باطل في ذاته.

ثالثاً أنه إذا لم يؤخذ بالمصلحة في كل موضع تحققت فيه، ما دامت من جنس المصالح الشرعية، كان المكلف في حرج وضيق، وقد قال تعالى: ﴿وَمَا جَعَلْ عَلَيْكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ مِنْ حَرَجٍ﴾.

وتقول عائشة أم المؤمنين: "ما خيّر رسول الله ﷺ بين أمرين إلا اختار أيسرهما، ما لم يكن إثماً".

إنّ الشيخ أبا زهرة، وهو من الفقهاء المحدثين المحافظين، يرى في كتابه "أصول الفقه"، إن المصلحة لاتقف أمام نص قطعي الدلالة والورود، أما إذا كان الحكم ثابتاً بنص ظني في سنده أو دلالاته، والمصلحة ثابتة ثبوتاً قطعياً، فإن المصلحة تخصص النص إذا كان عاماً غير

قطعي، وترد خبر الآحاء إن عارضها، لأنه يكون بين أيدينا دليلان: أحدهما ظني والآخر قطعي، ومن المقررات الفقهية أنه إذا تعارض ظني مع قطعي، خصص الظني بالقطعي، أو رد إن كان غير قابل للتخصيص.

الباب الثالث:

فقه الإسلام ومطالب الحياة

إن الحياة التي يريدها الإسلام لأمنه بوجه خاص — وللإنسانية بوجه عام — هي الحياة الطيبة، وجماع هذه الحياة الطيبة: الاستقرار والرخاء، وثمرة الاستقرار والرخاء: المدنية والحضارة، ووسيلة المدنية والحضارة: الأخذ بأسباب العلم والمعرفة، والأخذ بأسباب العلم المعرفة إنما يأتي عن طريق التحصيل والإكتساب.

إن هذه القضية تركز أساساً على المفهوم الصحيح لمعنى الحياة في نظر الإسلام، لنكون يصدد حياة طيبة، لاشك أن هناك لبساً في مفهوم الحياة الدنيا ذاتها من وجهة النظر الإسلامية التي تحتاج إلى مراجعة، فالقرآن والأحاديث تصف الحياة الدنيا بأنها لهو ولعب، ومتاع الغرور، ومن هذا المطلق تعكس الآيات والأحاديث على المال صورة مؤداها: أن المال فتنة، وأنه زينة الحياة الدنيا، وما إلى ذلك.

وإرى أن كلا من تلك الآيات والأحاديث لاتعني الحياة الطيبة التي أشارت إليها الآية الكريمة ﴿مَنْ عَمِلْ صَالِحاً مِنْ ذَكَرٍ أَوْ انْتَهَى فَلْنَحْنِئْهُ حَيَاةً طَيِّبَةً﴾، ولا تعني المال الصالح لمسيرة الحياة الطيبة، إذن فاستثمار الحياة ثم استثمار المال الذي هو عصب الحياة، هما اللذان يحددان قيمة الحياة وقيمة المال معاً، أهما في درجة أعلى أم في درجة أدنى؟

ويجب أن نلاحظ أمرين:

الأمر الأول: أن الآيات والأحاديث التي وجهت إلى الدنيا والمال، كانت بمثابة تحذير من التكالب عليهما، ومن أن يكونا فتنة للناس.

الأمر الثاني: إن ظهور حركة الزهد التي أسسها الحسن البصري، وازدهار طبقة الزهاد في ظلها، كامتداد لها، كانت في نظرهم تمثل قاعدة "سد الذرائع" المعروفة، كان هدفها مواجهة الترف الذي ظهر في عهد الدولة الأموية، ثم تقادم خطره في عهد الدولة العباسية ثم الفاطمية.

وأرى أن حركة الزهد، كانت حركة سلبية محضة، آثر دعواتها السلامة على التصدي للسلطة المترفة. وأخطر ما في هذا الأمر شيان:

الشيء الأول: أن حركة الزهد قد اصطنعت كثيراً من الأحاديث الموضوعية، والقصاص المختلفة التي تؤيد صحة مسارها، وما تزال حتى يومنا هذا سارية المفعول في بعض الكتب وبخاصة كتب الخطب المنبرية.

الشيء الثاني: أن حركة الزهد كانت تمهيداً لظهور ونشأة الحركات الصوفية في القرن الثالث الهجري، التي احتوتها الفلسفات الأجنبية عن الإسلام، والحق أن الحركات الصوفية كانت موجات تعطيل لمسار الحياة الصحيحة الجادة.

ولنعد من حيث بدأنا: إن مطالب الحياة الطيبة غير قابلة للحصر ولا للتوقف، ولكن هذه المطالب إنما تقدر بقدر إسهامها في إقامة الحياة الطيبة.. وهذه المطالب إنما هي نتاج العقل والتفكير، وهما لا ينتجان إلا علماً ومعرفة، ينهضان بالحياة حضارة وبناء ورخاء.

لقد نهض الغرب أحياناً عن طريق العلم، وقبله بقرون عديدة بلغت الأمة المسلمة ذروة النهضة عن طريق العلم، ثم تراجعت أحياناً مع أنها صاحبة فضل على نهضة الغرب، والبحث ضروري هنا عن أسباب تخلف الأمة المسلمة المعاصرة.. ولا شك أن قطب الدائرة لهذه الأسباب هو تخليها عن العلم بمفهومه الواسع، وتجاهلها مطالب الحياة الرئيسية التي توفر لها الحضارة والازدهار والتقدم.

والحق أن مفكري المسلمين فيما مضى كانوا أجل قدرأ من مفكري الخلف، ولك أن تستعرض تاريخ الحضارة الإسلامية، ليتأكد لديك أننا نفتقد اليوم عقليات أمثال: الرازي، وابن الهيثم، والخوارزمي، وابن سينا وابن جبير وابن ماجد، والقفطي والهرثمي والقزويني والبيروني، وجابر بن حيان.. وغيرهم، ومما يدعو إلى الأسى الممض أن الغرب قد اهتم اهتماماً كبيراً بتراث أسلافنا العلمي، أما نحن فقد شغلنا أنفسنا بالهزلي من الفكر المنسوب إلى الإسلام على الرغم منه، وحسبك أن ترى أن مفكراً اقتصادياً مسلماً في القرن السادس الهجري كان يلقب بأبي الاقتصاد واسمه جعفر بن علي الدمشقي، قد اكتشفه مستشرق ألماني ولم نكتشفه نحن.

أبها الأخوة والأخوات:

إن رصيدنا من التراث الفكري وفي شتى النواحي كبير، ولكن ليس كله اليوم صالحاً لتحقيق مطالب الحياة المعاصرة، إننا نعيش عصر التكنولوجيا والالكترونيات واقعاً لا سبيل إلى تجاهله، ولكننا ما نزال مصرين على اجترار ما دونه الغزالي في إحياء علوم الدين، وأبو نعيم في حلية الأولياء، والسلمي في طبقات الصوفية، والشعراني في طبقات الأولياء.

ولك أن تدهش إذا علمت أن العشرات من خريجي الأزهر الذين يَمَمُّوا وجوههم شطر الغرب للحصول على الدكتوراه، اتجهوا في دراساتهم — إلا قلمهم — إلى التصوف، وإن اثنين منهم حصلوا على الدكتوراه في تصوف الغزالي، وقد جلس كلاهما على كرسي مشيخة الأزهر.

صحيح أن أساتذة تلك الجامعات في الغرب — وجلهم من المستشرقين قد خططوا لذلك، حتى لا يعود شباب الأزهر بشيء ذي بال يمكن ان يسهم في النهوض بالأمة المسلمة، ولكن ما رأيك فيما حدث في داخل الأزهر نفسه منذ أكثر من عشرين عاماً فقد رؤي طبع رسائل أعضاء هيئة كبار العلماء للإفادة منها، وقد وكل أمر بحثها إلى لجنة كان أحد اعضائها الأستاذ أحمد حسن الزيات، وقد قال لي رحمه الله: لقد انتهت اللجنة بعد البحث والتحصيص

إلى أن شيئاً من هذه الرسائل لا يصلح للنشر في حياتنا المعاصرة.
ونحن لانغبط الأزهر حقه، ففيه علماء أفادوا ونفعوا بفكرهم ، إلا أننا نشير إلى واقع
حدث فحسب.

وخلاصة القول إن الحاجة اليوم ماسة إلى أن نعيد التفكير في إنتاجنا الفكري، ولا ندع
الأمر تسير وفق هواها ، بلا ضوابط ، وإذا كنا لا نملك أي شيء بالنسبة لدور النشر الخاصة،
فإننا نملك الكثير بالنسبة لهيئات النشر الرسمية، وفي مقدمتها المجامع العلمية، ومجمع البحوث
الإسلامية التابع للأزهر، ولك أن تراجع الانتاج الفكري فلن تحصل على كتاب واحد يمكن
أن يعتبر كتاباً علمياً، يسهم في البناء والتنمية والتعمير، ودفع عجلة الأمة المسلمة ولو خطوة
واحدة إلى الأمام.

الباب الرابع:

فقه الإسلام والتخلف المعاصر

إن واقع الأمة المسلمة المعاصر، واقع يتسم بمرارة التخلف، وهذه حقيقة — وإن كانت مريرة — وأسباب هذا التخلف ترجع إلى أسباب ثلاثة رئيسية:

أولها: وجود أزمة في العقل المسلم، جعلتنا نسير على غير هدى.
 ثانياً: إن تراثنا أصبح عبئاً ثقيلاً ، لأننا نفترض فيه القداسة — ككل — دونما تمييز بين الغث منه والسمين، بل لقد تركنا الغث منه يتخمر فكراً، أما السمين منه، فلم نحسن توظيفه. ثالثها: إننا ما نزال ننظر إلى الماضي نجتر الفخر به، ونترك الحاضر والمستقبل رهن ميثقة القدر وحده، وكانت النتيجة هي أننا فقدنا ذاتيتنا وأصبحنا تابعين لغيرنا، وعالة عليهم في كل مقومات حياتنا.

وأقول أن أسباب التخلف هذه وثيقة الصلة بالترف الفكري، وتحويل الإسلام — فقهاً — من مساره الطبيعي الصحيح إلى مسار آخر لا يستجيب كثيراً لمصالح العباد ومطالب الحياة المعاصرة، ونتيجة لذلك، كان التخلف الذي تعاشه وتعيشه أمة الإسلام.

والإسلام إذا لم يلب مصالح العباد ويستجيب لمطالب الحياة الصحيحة، ويتدخل لحل مشكلات مجتمعاته التي تتجدد مع تجدد الحياة ذاتها زماناً ومكاناً لا يكون هو الإسلام الجوهر الذي رضي الله تعالى لعباده ديناً، فالله — سبحانه وتعالى — حين يقول لنا: ﴿اليوم أكملت لكم دينكم وأتممت عليكم نعمتي ورضيت لكم الإسلام ديناً﴾. إنما يعني سبحانه أن هذا الدين قادر على أن يكون صالحاً لكل زمان ومكان، فإذا انزوى عن هذه المهمة، فالعلة ليست فيه، وإنما فينا نحن — المسلمين — فالإسلام هو القوة، والقوة لا تتحرك من تلقاء نفسها، وعقولنا هي التي تحركها في المسار الصحيح أو غير الصحيح، والإسلام كما يقول ليبولدفايس في كتابه "الإسلام على مفترق الطرق" ليس عقيدة صوفية.. ولا هو فلسفة.. ولكنه نهج من الحياة ، حسب قوانين الطبيعة التي سنها الله لخلقها". ولم ينس هذا المفكر التمسائي الأصل — الذي أسلم وحسن إسلامه — أن يجيل ما نحن فيه من تخلف إلى قصورنا نحن المسلمين وليس إلى قصور الإسلام نفسه، لقد تأيد الإسلام بما وصل إليه الإنسان من أنواع الإنتاج الانساني، لأن الإسلام كشف عنها قبل أن يصل إليها الناس بزمن طويل، ولقد تأيد أيضاً على السواء بما وقع في أثناء التطور الإنساني من قصور وأخطاء وعثرات، لأنه كان قد رفع الصوت عالياً وواضحاً بالتحذير منها، قبل أن تتحقق البشرية أن هذه أخطاء ، ونحن لاحتجاج

إلى فرض إصلاح على الإسلام — كما يظن بعض المسلمين — لأن الإسلام كامل بنفسه من قبل، أما الذي نحتاج إليه — فعلاً — فإمّا هو إصلاح موقفنا من الإسلام، بمعالجة كسلنا وغرورنا، وقصر نظرنا وبكلمة واحدة معالجة مساوئنا نحن لا المساوىء المرعومة في الإسلام. ونقول إن مرد هذا كله إلى أزمة العقل المسلم المعاصر، ومرد هذه الأزمة ضيق الأفق، والجمود، والرضا بالتقليد الأعمى، والافتناع بمنطق العجز، الذي يقول لنا: ليس في الإمكان أبدع مما كان.

يقول المفكر المسلم مالك بن نبي في كتابه: "مشكلة الأفكار في العالم الإسلامي" "وعندما يكون الفكر الإسلامي في حالة أفول — كما هي حاله في الوقت الحاضر — فإنه يفرق في التصوف، وفي المبهم وفي المشوش، وفي عدم الدقة، وفي النزعة إلى التقليد الأعمى، وفي الإعجاب بأشياء الغرب".

أيها الأخوة ايها الأخوات.. إن الحديث عن التراث حديث مثير، وبخاصة لدى العقليات التقليدية الهامشية التي تتوهم أننا حين ندعو إلى مراجعة تراثنا، نتنكر له، ونحن نساءل: أولاً: هل تراثنا الفكري برمته يفرض علينا تقديسه لا لشيء إلا لأنه منسوب إلى السلف؟ إن الإجابة بنعم معناه أن نلغي عقولنا ونحكم على الفكر الإسلامي بالجمود والركود، لقد رفض الإمام مالك رغبة الخليفة في إلزام الناس بكتابه الموطأ، وكانت حجة مالك التي خضع الخليفة لها أن أصحاب الرسول ﷺ قد تفرقوا في البلاد وتركت آراؤهم التي اختلفت بصماتها على أذهان الناس.

ثانياً: وهل نحن إذا دعونا إلى غريبة التراث، فأهملنا الغث منه وأبقينا على الجيد — ليس على اطلاقه — لأن منه ما أصبحت حياتنا المعاصرة في غنى عنه.. هل إذا فعلنا ذلك اتهمنا بأننا أعداء التراث؟

لو كانت الاجابة ايضاً بنعم لكان معنى ذلك اليأس من أي إصلاح يرفع به عن كاهل الأمة المسلمة ركام التخلف الحضاري.

إنّ فكرة إهمال تراثنا جملة وتفصيلاً فكرة غير مطروحة على الاطلاق، لأنه ما من أمة تحترم نفسها تحاول الانفصال عن ماضيها، كما أن القول بأن تراثنا لم يسهم في بناء الحضارة الإنسانية، فكرة مرفوضة من أساسها.

والقضية التي نحن بصددها، ماذا يجب علينا أن نفعله تجاه تراثنا الفكري، حتى يصلح لعاشنا، ويكون منطلقاً لحاضرنا ومستقبلنا...؟ فإذا نحن قصرنا كان تراثنا عبئاً ثقيلاً علينا، والمسؤولية تقع على كواهلنا، ولا مسؤولية على التراث نفسه.

بقيت مسألة ذات أهمية، هي اجترار الفخر بالماضي.. أقول، لا عيب في أن تفخر الأمة بماضيها المشرق، وتزهو بأبجد السلف من ابنائها، لأن الأمة التي تنفصل عن ماضيها تخسر حاضرها ومستقبلها ولكن العيب في أن تقف الأمة عند حدود اجترار الفخر بماضيها،

كعملية تعويض عن قصور حاضرها، وعجزه عن اللحوق بالحضارة، وقديماً قال الشاعر العربي:

ليس الفتى من يقول كان أبي

ان الفتى من يقول ها أنذا

إن عشرات الكتب ألفت في حضارة الإسلام في عصره الذهبي، وفي انتصارات المسلمين في العديد من المعارك، ولم نحاول أن نسأل أنفسنا: أين نحن اليوم من الحضارة بمفهومها الإنساني وقد تخلفنا عن ركبها؟
وأين نحن اليوم من النصر والبطولة... والأمة الإسلامية بأسرها عاجزة عن أن توقف دويلة كاسرائيل عند حدودها؟

لقد كان من نتيجة الوقوف عند اجترار الفخر بالماضي هو أننا فقدنا ذاتيتنا، وأدى الأمر بهذه الأمة أن تحرم اكتفاءها الذاتي، وتصبح دولاً مستهلكة، وليست دولاً منتجة، ودولاً مستوردة، وليست دولاً مصدرة، ودولاً مسفة وليست دولاً طموحاً.. وإزاء إفلاسنا الحضاري والعلمي أصبحنا نهاجم حضارة الغرب ونهمها بالافلاس الروحي، وتجاهل أننا عاجزون عن أن تكون لنا حضارة يشع فيها الإغداق الروحي. نهاجم كتاب كارل ماركس رأس المال، وقد فشلنا في أن نصوغ نظرية إسلامية اقتصادية، برغم أننا نملك المادة العلمية ونملك الأفكار.

خاتمة:

انه لا يكفي أن نقف عند حدود تشخيص الداء، دون أن نوفق في وصف الدواء، إنهما عمليتان لاغنى بأحدهما عن الأخرى، والمكمل لهاتين العمليتين عملية ثالثة، هي تعاطي الدواء بانتظام وانضباط.. وما أيسر أن نقول أن الرجوع إلى الإسلام هو الدواء الناجح الشافي، وهذا حق بالنسبة للمضمون، ولكن محور المشكلة يظل دائراً كيف يتسنى لنا أن نجد توظيف هذا المضمون حتى يكون منتجاً؟

وأوجز القول لكي نتخلص من التخلف يجب أن نكون على مستوى جيد من نضوج العقل، وسعة الأفق، وأصالة الفكر، وهذه أبرز مقومات فقه الإسلام، وإذا كنا جادين في رفع التخلف عن الأمة المسلمة المعاصرة يجب أن نكون على استعداد لأن يكون لنا خطة ومنهج وإصرار على العمل، وان نفض عن كواهلنا غبار الدعة والتواكل، والخوض في سفساف الأمور، وان نكون على دراسة واعية بأسباب تخلفنا. إن العلامة أبا الحسن الندوي يرى في كتابه المشهور: "ماذا خسر العالم بالتحطاط المسلمين"، يرى أن العالم الاسلامي قد أحل بالناحية العلمية والصناعية، وهي من صميم فقه الاسلام، فعوقب بالعبودية الطويلة والحياة الدليلة.

ويعرض الشهيد سيد قطب للقضية في مؤلفه، "هذا الدين"، يقول "إن هذا الدين منح الهي للبشرية، يتم تحقيقه في حياة البشر بمجدد البشر أنفسهم، وفي حدود الواقع المادي للحياة الإنسانية في كل بيئة، ولكن الخطأ كله ينشأ عن عدم إدراك طبيعة هذا الدين، أو من نسيانها، ومن انتظار الخوارق المجهولة الأسباب على يديه، تلك الخوارق التي تبدل فطرة الإنسان ولا تبالي بطاقاته المحدودة، ولا تحفل بواقعه المادي البيئي".

أيها الأخوة، أيها الأخوات، هذا ما اردت عرضه في إيجاز من البحث الذي تقدمت به، أرجو ان أكون قد وفقت وأشكر لكم، والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته.

محمد عبدالله السمان (اختصار د. طه جابر العلواني)

١٩٨٤/٧/٣١ م

IX
LAW

Islam and Law

Ahmad Ibrahim

Islam and Law

Ahmad Ibrahim

Unlike other system of law, the law of Islam has its source in divine revelation. It is the Muslim's belief that Allah has from time to time sent His prophets and messengers to teach mankind the correct way of life so as to achieve success and felicity in this world and the next. Muslims also believe that the Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS) was the last of these prophets and, therefore, the teachings of Islam constitute the complete and perfect code of conduct for humans. Legislation in Islam is to be found in the teachings revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS) and contained in the Qur'an. The source of this legislation is Allāh (SWT). As there can be no further revelation after the Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS), it follows that the laws contained in the Qur'an are final, valid for all times and places, and that no human hand can amend or reform them.

In addition to the legislation contained in the Qur'an, we find that the method of interpretation and application of the legislation has also been provided for.¹ Whereas modern legislation has to be interpreted by courts, interpretation of Qur'anic legislation has been provided by the *Sunnah*, that is, the inspired teaching and practice of the Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS). Again, by Qur'anic authority, the Prophet was not only the transmitter of the divine revelation but also exemplified it in his words, attitudes, judgements and actions.

We read in the Qur'an the following verse:

You have indeed in the Messenger of Allah a beautiful pattern of conduct for anyone whose hope is in Allah and the Final Day and who engages much in the praise of Allah²

Nor does he [the Prophet] say aught of his own desire. It is no less than inspiration sent down to him.³

The example of the Prophet as contained in the *Sunnah* and recorded in the *Ḥadīth* therefore forms a source of Islamic law, as in effect a supplement to the Qur'an. The acts, the sayings and even the silence of the Prophet

(ṢAAS) have become a source of guidance for Muslims, of what they regard as the data of revelation. In all matters that have been dealt with and explained by him, all Muslims are bound to accept his ruling. Since there can be no higher source of guidance, it follows that the rulings of the *Sunnah* cannot be overturned by any human being.

The Qur'an does not however contain a code of laws. Except in a few matters, the guidance given in the Qur'an is in the form of general principles rather than detailed prescriptions. The Prophet (ṢAAS) was also careful not to bind the Muslims with too much detail. His approach was practical. Whenever he was asked to give a ruling on a particular matter, the Prophet (ṢAAS) would ask if the matter had already occurred, and he discouraged his companions from raising hypothetical questions by which they would find themselves later bound.⁴ Moreover, he was careful to distinguish in his rulings between those instructions that he gave as the Messenger of Allah, and hence as divine revelation, and those that he gave on his own authority. He, and the Muslims after him, regarded only the former as binding. The Muslims treated the latter with utmost respect,⁵ and in most cases worthy of emulation, but they continued to keep the distinction between the divine and the human in the *Sunnah*. Thus, while the Qur'an is a complete guide for everything⁶, much was left to the reasoning, or *ijtihad*, of the Muslims. When Mu'adh ibn Jabal was sent as the Prophet's delegate to Yemen, he was asked how he would decide matters referred to him. His reply was, "According to the Qur'an. "The Prophet (ṢAAS) then asked him "What if you do not find a definite ruling in the Qur'an?" Mu'adh replied, "I will look into the *Sunnah* of the Prophet." Once again the Prophet (ṢAAS) asked, "What if you do not get a definite ruling therefrom?" Mu'adh replied, "I will then use my reasoning to arrive at a solution." The Prophet (ṢAAS) was pleased with this answer and gave praise to Allah for giving him such a worthy delegate.⁷

To those who argue that because the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* are fundamental and cannot be amended or changed there is little scope for the intellect in formulation of Islamic law, one has only to point to the vast library of Islamic jurisprudence, the result of the efforts of Muslim jurists in using their reason and powers of intellection to arrive at solutions to problems not specifically dealt with in the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*, and to expand upon and extrapolate from the *data revelata* either to cover new cases or to realize greater equity under the challenging circumstances of history. And yet, throughout Islamic history, the divine and the human elements in legislation were never mixed. The vast difference between the inspired sources of Islamic law—the Holy Qur'an and the *Sunnah*—and the non-inspired sources—the result of *ijtihad* by Muslim scholars has never been far from sight. Imam Shafi'i explained this by using the analogy of a Muslim seeking to face the Ka'bah when he wished to perform his *Ṣalah*. If the person is in Makkah al Mukarramah and

in the presence of the Ka'bah itself, he can have no choice but to turn toward it. In such situation, there is no room for the use of the intellect. The sight of the Ka'bah experienced by him obliges him to perform his ritual facing it. The experience, which is instantly verifiable, precludes any argument about it. On the other hand, if the Muslim is far away from the Ka'bah and cannot see it with his own eyes, then he must use his reasoning to find out in which direction he should turn to face the Ka'bah. The solution he arrives at is the result of *ijtihad*. It cannot have the certainty of the person seeing the Ka'bah with his own eyes, and it may be right or wrong.⁸ But the Muslim gets a blessing for using his intellect to the best of his ability.⁹ This then is the way of the Muslim scholar who uses his intellect.

Development of Islamic Law

It might be useful to have a quick glance at the history of the development of Islamic law. In the lifetime of the Prophet (SAAS), the law could be enacted and amended by divine revelation and any disputes or problems that could be referred to him for solution. After his demise, the law could not be developed further through divine inspiration since the medium of Divine communication was no more. If any problems, arose the Muslims had to solve them by reference to the Qur'an or the *Sunnah*. It was the practice of the early caliphs to try to arrive at solutions through discussion and consensus among those best fitted to do so. Practical problems received their practical solutions. The caliph in power took an active role in the deliberations. When once a solution was arrived at, it became binding on other Muslims. The early caliphs never tried to dictate or impose their wills. In many cases the caliphs were told that the solutions they proposed were contrary to the teachings of Islam, and they accepted the criticism and withdrew their suggestions. The solutions were therefore the best the Muslims could agree upon at under the circumstances. The practice of the Muslims thus conformed to the teachings of Islam.

After the time of the early caliphs, there came a time when the development of Islamic law came to be divorced from its practice. The Ummawi caliphs, for the most part, left the administration of Islamic law to the state officials, the *qādīs*, not all of whom were qualified to exercise the duty of *ijtihad*. The result was that the law that was administered by the *qādīs* ceased to draw its inspiration from Islamic law. Practice diverged from theory, and it became dangerous to rely on the practice of the Muslims as a mirror of the conscience of Islam. The scholars of Islam criticized the administration of the law and in the process built up their own system of theoretical law.

Thus the law was developed by scholar-jurists rather than by judges or by the executives in power. This meant that Islamic law had no longer the advantage of the Muslims' experience of living and marrying, of buying and selling, and of contracting. This explains why the student of Islamic law or a *qāḍī* today seeks the normative injunctions of Islamic law not in the decisions of the courts or the rulings of the executive power but in the theoretical writings of scholar-jurists. There is of course a "silver lining, namely" that the efforts of the scholar-jurists have helped to preserve Islamic law and to keep it free from the influence of secular rulers and their agents, even when these were *qāḍīs*. For this we should be grateful to the scholar-jurists. They have left a vast treasure of learning as an inheritance to us. It is for us to learn how to use it.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Muslims came under the influence of the Europeans. Most Muslim countries lost their independence. Executive, legislative and judicial power came to be influenced or exercised by the Europeans. European codes and systems of law were substituted for Islamic law and for centuries the law of the land was exercised, by decree of the colonialist rulers. In the Arab countries, European commercial, criminal, and civil codes were adopted. In Turkey, after an attempt to codify the theoretical civil law, the whole of the Muslim law was abandoned in favor of a European code. In India, the Penal Code, Evidence Act, Contract Act and others were enacted, again to replace Muslim law. The changes spread to Malaysia, where the Indian Codes were adopted to take the place of Muslim law. In most cases, Muslim governments and people are still trying to adjust to this invasion of foreign legal systems and practices. The results, however, are still far from satisfactory.

In some Arab countries, attempts have been made to replace the European codes with codes more compatible with Islamic law. New civil codes were promulgated in Egypt, Libya, and Iraq. More recently, attempts are being made in a number of Muslim countries to reintroduce Islamic criminal law. Muslim scholars everywhere feel that they should return to Islamic law; but so far, no clear consensus has emerged among them as to the precise contents of that law. Unfortunately, their difficulties are exacerbated by a class of Westerners educated judges and executives who combine ignorance of Islamic law and jurisprudence with an inferiority complex toward Western laws and institutions to which they have become accustomed.

Early Examples

If we go back to the time of the Prophet (SAAS) and the early caliphs,

we find that decisions were given on actual cases brought before them for judgement. This practical bent of Islamic law is its strength. It keeps the law alive and dynamic, running closely in line with the spirit of Islam, animating the Muslims. But the jurists of today are pressing for systematic codifications that envisage all possible cases, real, hypothetical, or extremely speculative.

Thus we read in the *hadīth* of a number of cases in which the Prophet (SAAS) reached judgements based solely on the data available. A few examples are given below:

- a) Al Khansā bint Khidam al Anṣāriyyah reported that her father gave her in marriage when she was a widow and she disliked the marriage. So she went to Allah's Messenger (SAAS) and he declared the marriage null and void.¹⁰
- b) 'Āishah (RAA) reported: "Sa'd b. Abu Waqqās and 'Abdullah b. Zaman disputed with each other over guardianship of a minor. Sa'd said, 'O Messenger of Allah, the boy is the son of my brother 'Utbah b. Abu Waqqās. Look at his resemblance to him.' 'Abdullah b. Zaman said, 'O Messenger of Allah, he is my brother as he was born on the bed of my father from his slave girl.' Allah's Messenger (SAAS) looked at the boy and found in him clear resemblance to 'Utbah. But he said 'He is yours O 'Abdullah b. Zaman for the child is to be attributed to the person on whose bed it was born; and stoning is decreed for the fornicator.'"¹¹
- c) 'Āishah (RAA) reported: "The wife of Rifā'ah al Qurazi came to the Messenger of Allah and said 'I was married to Rifā'ah but he divorced me, making my divorce irrevocable. Afterwards I married 'Abd al Rahman b. Al Zubayr, but all he possesses is like the fringe of a garment.' Thereupon Allah's Messenger smiled and said, 'Do you wish to return to Rifā'ah? You cannot do it until you have tasted his sweetness and he, 'Abd Al-Rahmān, has tasted your sweetness.'"¹²
- d) Ibn 'Abbās narrated: "The wife of Thābit bin Qays came to the Messenger of Allah and said, 'O Messenger of Allah! I do not blame Thabit for any defects in his character or his religion but I dislike to behave in an un-Islamic manner (in another narration: but cannot endure to live with him).' On that Allah's messenger said to her, 'Will you give back the garden that your husband has given you?' She said, 'Yes.' Then the Prophet said to Thabit 'O Thabit! Accept the garden and divorce her.'"¹³

- e) Ibn 'Abbās narrated: “Barīrah’s husband was a slave called Mughith. I imagine I can see him now, going behind Barīrah, and weeping with his tears flowing down his beard. The Prophet said to Ibn ‘Abbas, ‘O Ibn ‘Abbās! Are you not astonished at the love of Mughith?’ The Prophet then said to Barīrah, ‘Why don’t you return to him?’ She said, ‘O Messenger of Allah. Do you order me to do so?’ He said ‘No, I only intercede for him.’ She said, ‘I am not in need of him.’ The Prophet let her do what she pleased.”¹⁴
- f) Jābir reported that the wife of Sa’d b. Rabī came with her two daughters by Sa’d to the Messenger of Allah. She said, “O Messenger of Allah, these are the two daughters of Sa’d b. Rabī. Their father was martyred on the day of *Uḥud*, and their uncle has taken their property. Their father left no other inheritance for them and they cannot be married unless they have some property.” Then the verse of inheritance was revealed. So the Prophet sent for their uncle and said, “Give the two daughters of Sa’d two thirds and give their mother one-eighth. What remains is for you.”¹⁵
- g) Sa’d bin Abu Waqqās narrated: “The Prophet came visiting me while I was sick in Makkah. I said ‘O Allah’s Messenger. May I will all my property in charity?’ He said, ‘No.’ I said ‘Then may I will half of it?’ He said, ‘No.’ I said, ‘One-third?’ He said, ‘Yes, one-third, though one-third is too much. It is better for you to leave your natural heirs provided for than to leave them poor and begging from others.’” At that time Sa’d had only one daughter.¹⁶

We are told that when Abū Bakr (RAA), the first caliph, had to pass a judgement, he looked into the Qur’ān for guidance. If he found an applicable text, he would apply it forthwith. If not, he turned to the *Sunnah*. If he found an applicable text therein he would apply it with no less determination. If not, he would ask the people whether any of them knew of a judgement passed by the Prophet on the particular issue. It sometimes happened that some people would come forward and state that the Prophet had passed a judgement on an identical or similar matter. If there was nothing at all, he would summon the chief representatives of the people and consult with them. ‘Umar (RAA), the second Caliph did the same, except that he used to ask whether Abū Bakr had passed judgement on the issue before him.¹⁷ There is no reason why we should not follow the rule of precedent in Islamic law. By relying on decided cases as precedents we will be keeping closer to the practical aspects of the law. It is not suggested that we should follow a strict doctrine of binding precedent as is to be found in English law. There is no need for us to

copy the English doctrine, as we have had our own principles of precedent long before English law was born.

The Qur'an and Sunnah

In a famous letter written by 'Umar (RAA), the second caliph, to a *qāḍī*, Abū Mūsā Al Ash'ari, he wrote:

Jurisdiction is to be administered on the basis of the Qur'an and *Sunnah*. First understand what is presented to you before passing any judgement. Full equality for all litigants: in the way they take place in your presence and in the way you look at them and in your jurisdiction. That way no highly placed person would look forward to your being unjust nor would a weak one despair of your fairness. The burden of proof is the responsibility of the plaintiff and the oath is upon the denying party. Compromise is always the right of litigants except if it allows what Islam has forbidden or forbids what Islam has allowed. Clear understanding of every case that is brought to you for which there is no applicable text of the Qur'an and *Sunnah* is an absolute requisite. Your role will then be one of comparison and analogy, so as to distinguish similarities and dissimilarities. Thereafter, seek your way to the judgement that seems nearest to justice and apt to be best in the eyes of Allah. Never succumb to anger or anxiety, and never get impatient with the litigants before you.¹⁸

Ideally the study of Islamic law must therefore begin with the Qur'an and the precedents established by the Prophet (ṢAAS). In this respect, a knowledge of Arabic is essential. As Imām Shafī'ī said:

The reason I began to explain why the Qur'an was communicated in the Arabic tongue rather than in another is that no one understands clearly the meanings of the Book of Allāh would be ignorant of the intensiveness of that tongue and of the various meanings of its words. The doubts which occur to one who is ignorant of the Arabic tongue have no hold on him who knows it.

In the same vein, Abul A'lā al Mawḍūdī also stated:¹⁹

The first and basic reform is to decide that a knowledge of Arabic shall be a prerequisite for admission to law college. This

knowledge of Arabic should be such as to enable the students to study the Qur'an, the *ḥadīth* and the tradition of *fiqh* and legal thought. Insight into Islamic law cannot be gained unless one knows the language of the Qur'an and that of the Prophet (ṢAAS). The study and understanding of the Holy Qur'an and especially the verses dealing with the law must be the basis of the study of Islamic law. Next to the Holy Qur'an or rather together with the Holy Qur'an, we need to study the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet (ṢAAS) to see how the teachings of the Holy Qur'an were exemplified and applied to the Muslims.²⁰

Again to quote Mawdūdī:²¹ "Along with the teaching of Arabic, the students must be made to study the Qur'an and the *ḥadīth* before beginning their education in law so that they become capable of understanding the spirit and the broad outlines of the system of life envisaged by Islam—A student must acquire an understanding of Islam as a system through a study of the Qur'an and the *ḥadīth* before he begins the study of *fiqh*."²¹

In Malaysia, where knowledge of Arabic among staff and students is neither widespread nor deep, it is necessary to resort to translations and interpretations of the Qur'an and the *ḥadīth* in English or Malay. Fortunately, a number of these are available and may be referred to with confidence. Similarly we have the translations of Ṣahīḥ Muslim, the Sunan of Abū Dāwūd, the Muwattā' of Imām Mālik and Mishkāt al Masābiḥ. These can be utilized in the study of the Qur'an and the *ḥadīth*. In addition, selected passages—especially those dealing with the law—can be referred to in the original and explained to students.

While there is now a fairly common and accepted method of referring to the verses of the Qur'an, by *surah* and *āyah*, there is as yet no such method used for referring to the *ḥadīth*. Often we find that when a *ḥadīth* is cited, the reference given is to Bukhāri, Muslim, or Abū Dāwūd, for example, without volume or page reference. Hence it is difficult for the reader or listener to check the reference. We need therefore to work out an accepted system of reference.

Apart from the Qur'an and the *ḥadīth*, we have need to refer to the *fiqh* textbooks, as in these books we find the best material for legal precedents and their explanations. Here again until we reach the ideal situation where the student can refer to and understand the original texts in Arabic, we need to have translations of the more important textbooks, and those generally in use. Not only is there a need to translate such textbooks but they need to be edited and indexed. It may be necessary too, as Mawdūdī suggested, for us to rearrange the contents of the textbooks on the pattern of modern textbooks of law. New headings will have to be given, scattered discussions on legal

problems will have to be gathered and collected under relevant headings and indices will have to be prepared.²²

In many Muslim countries, secular systems of law have invaded the juristic life of the people and it is necessary for anyone who wants to practice law in these lands, even if his practice were to be restricted to the *Shari'ah*, know the system of law in force. Thus in Malaysia to be a practitioner in the courts one needs to be proficient in Malaysian law, which is based on English common law and statute law, as well as Islamic law. A comparative approach must be adopted so that the study of the *Shari'ah* is integrated with the study of the local law in force. Thus the branches of the law like the law of contracts and torts, family law, criminal law, company law, the land law, and constitutional law, to name a few examples should be studied in both the *Shari'ah* and in the local law.

To conclude we might quote from the recommendations of the First World Conference on Muslim Education, 1977, which appear to be relevant—:

Education should aim at the balanced growth of the total personality of Man both individually and collectively, through the training of Man's spirit, intellect, the rational self, feelings and bodily senses. Education should, therefore, cater to the growth of man in all its aspects—spiritual, intellectual, imaginative, physical, scientific, linguistic—and motivate all these aspects towards goodness and attainment of perfection. The ultimate aim of Muslim education is in the realization of complete submission to Allah on the level of the individual, the community, and humanity at large.²³

The Conference recommended that all Muslim countries necessarily implement Allah's *Shari'ah* and mould the lives of their peoples upon Islamic principles and values, because only then can they succeed in systematizing their educations according to the aims given above. There must be a core knowledge drawn from the Qur'an and *Sunnah* which must be made obligatory to all Muslims at all levels of the educational system, from the highest to the lowest. It should be graduated so as to conform to the standards of each level. This, along with the compulsory teaching of Arabic, should form the major section of the core curriculum. These two alone can sustain Islamic civilization and preserve the identity of the Muslims.

The study of *fiqh* (Islamic law) and of *uṣūl al fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) should be linked with and bear on our contemporary lives, as they are actually lived and experienced, and their problems and issues, with particular emphasis on Islamic solutions as they must be applied in an integrated form in Muslim society. The study of the *Shari'ah* with all its related branches should form the core course in faculties of law together with comparative studies between *Shari'ah* and secular laws in the advanced stages of study. Such courses

should be given by a panel of specialists who, in virtue of their deep faith, commitment, and scholarship, are competent to elucidate the integral, comprehensive, and sublime character of the *Sharī'ah* as an effective instrument in serving the interests of the people, meeting the needs of the community, and avoiding the pitfalls arising from the application of secular laws as have been recognized by contemporary capitalist and communist societies alike.

NOTES

- 1 Qur'an 75:19.
- 2 Ibid, 33:21.
- 3 Qur'an 53:3-5.
- 4 Sa'id Ramaḍān, *Islamic Law*, p. 66.
- 5 Ibid., *Islamic Law*, p. 76-77.
- 6 Qur'an 16:89.
- 7 Sa'id Ramaḍān, *Islamic Law*, p. 74.
- 8 Ibid., p. 82f; Shafi'īs *Risālah*, p. 290f; p. 295f.
- 9 Shafi'īs *Risālah*, p. 299 quoting Muslim vol. xii p. 13-14 and Abū Dāwūd vol. iii, p. 299.
- 10 Ṣaḥīḥ al Bukhārī, "Kitāb al Nikāh" (52) Ḥadīth 69; vol. 7, p. 52.
- 11 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, "Kitāb al Nikāh" (8) Ḥadīth 3435; vol. 21, p. 744.
- 12 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, "Kitāb al Nikāh" (8) Ḥadī 3345; vol. 2, p. 729.
- 13 Ṣaḥīḥ al Bukhārī, "Kitāb al Ṭalāq" (63); Ḥadīth 177; vol. 7, p. 150.
- 14 Ṣaḥīḥ al Bukhārī, "Kitāb al Ṭalāq" (63) Ḥadīth 154; vol. 7, p. 154.
- 15 *Mishkāt al Maṣābīh*, vol. 2, p. 334, Ḥadīth 54.
- 16 Ṣaḥīḥ al Bukhārī, "Kitāb al Waṣāyā" (51) Ḥadīth 5; vol. 4, p. 3.
- 17 Sa'id Ramaḍān, *Islamic Law*, p. 34-35.
- 18 Ibid., p. 35.
- 19 Shafi'īs *Risālah*, p. 63-64.
- 20 Maudūdī, *Abul Alā, Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 110.
- 21 Ibid., p. 110.
- 22 Ibid., p. 107.
- 23 "Recommendations of the Fourth World Conference on Islamic Education," Makkah al Mukarramah, 1403/1983, p. 16-18.

X
PHILOSOPHY

The Balance Sheet of Western Philosophy in this Century

Roger Garudy

The Balance Sheet of Western Philosophy in this Century

Roger Garaudy

Today, Western philosophy is all too close to its origins because it has never really answered the questions that brought about its birth. These questions are: What is the meaning of life and death? What is the source and what is the vocation of our freedom? How are we to act in order to fulfill the patterns of God? Such essential questions of philosophy are raised only by man, and properly so. For only man cannot live without raising them.

In nature, every being has a place and a function which are not of its own choosing. Every creature is subject to the law of God: a stone must fall when released, a plant must grow when nourished, an animal must follow its instinct. All of them obey and fulfill this divine law without choice or question.

With man, however, a new realm begins. He is the only creature that God has endowed with the choice of either disobeying or fulfilling that law after a free, deliberate, and responsible decision.

The Qur'an says: "We have offered Our trust to the heavens, to earth and mountains. But they all rejected it in fear and trembling. Only man arose to accept and carry that trust. He alone is unjust and ignorant (33:72)."

It was thus that human history began, a history that man himself makes, unlike all other creatures which fulfill the law of necessity.

In order to regain this lost unity, that is to say, in order to integrate himself into the whole of creation and thus give his life and death their place and meaning in the divine order, man created all sorts of myths. But he also received divine assistance through the revelations brought by the prophets of every people.

In the sixth century before Christ, throughout Asia, the great myths of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the wise sayings of the Upanishads of India, and those of Chinese Taoism raised and considered the basic problems of the ultimate reality of this world, its meaning and significance, our role in it,

and our possible action.

It was man's first attempt to reach a satisfactory answer to the question of relations between man and nature, between man and God. In the Near East, where the great revelations of the Book of God had taken place, in which the divine answers to human questions were given, the sages deliberated over the basic problems with great concentration.

One of those sages, Heraclitus, had already proclaimed in the sixth century B.C. that

"All things are one."

"The Law is to follow the will of the One."

"Wisdom consists in a single thing only, namely: to know the thought that governs and orders everything."

Similarly, the *Hanifs* had come very close to these answers in their search for the will of God.

Under these circumstances came the first "secession" (withdrawing) of the West. Consuming involvement in trade had caused man to lose contact with nature nature being cultivated through slaves. Likeise, the fierce commercial competition among the cities, and among the citizens of each city, caused men to lose sight of the divine unity.

It was then the fashion to deny any absolute, to assume man's self-sufficiency, and to proclaim him "the measure of all things." By rejecting both transcendence and community at once, human society was turned into an arena of confrontation among individuals and groups driven by their will to growth and their will to power.

The first philosophers of the West, the sophists of Athens, gave us the first formulation of this moral. "The good," they said, "consists in having the strongest desires as well as the means to satisfy them." Obviously, this law of the jungle continues to this day to characterize Western societies bent upon growth as well as maintaining "the balance of terror."

Such was the birth of philosophy in the West in the fifth century B.C. It was an occasion that prompted Socrates to seek new foundations for moral knowledge which, he thought, might save man from the impending chaos and downfall of Athens, from its total moral disintegration. As he saw it, the problem was one of finding a principle for making value judgements, a principle that was viable enough to withstand the array of happenstance answers given by the sophists.

One of Socrates' disciplines, Plato, in pursuit of the same objective, elevated the search for knowledge of virtue and politics to a science. But that science, in his view, consisted of relating reasons and concepts together in necessary, unbreakable bonds.

This conception of science leaves no room whatsoever for faith, which was relegated to a position of inferior knowledge. Nor does it leave any room

for love. For what is called “Platonic love” is not the love of other persons but of an intellectual search for a total truth. Nor does it leave any room for beauty. Indeed, Plato chased the poets out of his ideal republic because their creative imagination was deemed by him to be a menace to the established order.

This reductionist conception of reason, which deprives man of his noblest dimensions (faith, love, beauty) radically separated the soul from the body, the sensory from the intelligible. And this is still the most salient characteristic of Western philosophy.

It is a kind of lame rationalism, this Greek philosophizing, which robs man of his essential dimensions, of love, of beauty, and of faith. The philosophy’s dualism of soul and body, of the sensory and the intelligible, has brought sterility to Western thinking since Plato and Aristotle. Moreover, it impoverished religion by pretending to bring it within the framework of Greek philosophy, as it did with Judaism at the hands of Ibn Maymūn (Maimonides), with Christianity through St. Thomas Aquinas, and with Islam in the hands of Ibn Rushd.

There was a time when the West might have cut itself loose from this reductionist conception of reason. That moment came when, from the Muslim University of Qurtūbah—from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries—a new vision shone over Europe. In this Islamic view, reason in its full dimensions was being taught and advocated.

First, the natural sciences cultivated the experimental method and, through it, enabled Arab-Islamic thought to break away from the speculative thinking of the Greeks. When that science moved to the Europe of the Middle Ages, it degenerated into scholasticism. The Islam experimental and mathematical sciences enabled the Muslims to discover a new order of relations among things within the chains of necessary causality.

Second, Islamic philosophy, which studied purposes as against science which studies causes, was able to establish, in line with Qur’anic teaching, the role of every object and every event as a sign of divine presence and action. Islamic philosophy was able to institute a way of thinking regained for life its meaning and purpose by means of determining things and events as happenings in a divine scheme.

Third, faith was understood by Muslims not as a limitation of either science or wisdom; on the contrary, faith worked their continuation and perfection. By moving from cause to effect and from effect to a new cause, science could never reach a first and satisfying cause. Likewise, philosophy, by moving from end to end and purpose to purpose, could never arrive by itself to a final end or purpose. For their proper exercise, both natural sciences and Islamic philosophy require the presence of faith so that they may know their proper limits. In this sense, faith could well be the culmination of science and wisdom,

given the axioms and postulates of scientific and moral inquiry. Indeed, faith is reason without frontiers or limits.

In the face of these Muslim breakthroughs, the West made another secession instead of following the new light provided by Islam. This retreat of the West was marked by Bacon, Descartes, and Auguste Comte.

Roger Bacon, who is regarded in the West as the father of the experimental method in the natural sciences, admitted that his major work and achievement was borrowed from a translation of the *Optics* of Ibn al Haytham, who taught the subject at Qurtubah. He separated experimental science however, from the Islamic legacy of learning, which included morality and faith as well.

Likewise, Descartes proclaimed unequivocally that one must separate the problems of morality and faith from the domain of reason. In his truncated view, ends or purposes and transcendence have nothing to do with reason. In his twenty-eighth "meditation", he wrote that it is futile to ask the question *why* God did a certain thing. One should only ask *how* he did it. Since Descartes, the West has stopped asking *why* questions. Its interest is solely in the *how*. *How* to make an atom bomb? Never, *why* should one make an atom bomb?

As to transcendence, it has lost its reason and ground when one pretends that existence has for ultimate evidence the proposition "I think, therefore I am" and that the existence of any object will have to come at the tail end of a process of reasoning that moves from that base through a chain of deductive syllogisms. Indeed, transcendence is lost forever when through a contemptuous ontological proof of God, one claims that one can deduce the existence of all real things—including God—by arguing from the reality of *thought* to a presumed reality of *being*. Revelation and its whole claim for faith thus becomes futile and useless when the existence of God could be the conclusion of logical reasoning.

This line of Western thinging led to the positivism of Auguste Comte. Positivism, or the denial of reality to anything not perceived through the senses or not measurable by mathematics, has become the tacit postulate of all that goes under the name of "modern science" or "Western science." This attitude has unfortunately pervaded all the human sciences (the humanities and social sciences) since Comte as well. All of them rest on the ultimate premise that man is just another object of nature, not unlike the objects that physics, chemistry, and biology study.

The postulates of this positivism are three:

1. Every scientific truth, being an exact and definitive copy of natural reality, precludes that any of the fundamental notions of science be subject to doubt. Progress of knowledge is hence an accumulation of these truths.

2. Every reality, whether natural or human, is susceptible to be studied by one and the same method, of which physics and mathematics are the ideal paradigm.
3. It follows that all problems, including those of morality, politics, and society, can indeed be solved by the same method.

With these postulates, science has become scientism, technology has become technocracy, and politics has become Machiavelianism.

The disadvantages of this positivistic conception of science become especially exacerbated when the method is applied to the sciences of man. They are not sciences since they take no account of the specificity of their object. They apply to man the methods that fit the knowledge and manipulation of things.

A typical example of this bungling is the discipline of Western economics. It is not a science but an ideology of justification of a given social system which regards man as *if* he were an animal. The so-called classical economics taught in all the universities of the West, and unfortunately elsewhere as well, hides behind mathematical equations its fundamental axiom. This axiom is that man is merely a producer and consumer of goods and that man is moved solely by his individual self-interest. This Western notion of man as *homo economicus* is the diametrical opposite of the notion of man in Islam. Whenever we send our sons and daughters to study in the West, we send them unknowingly to learn militant atheism. For it is not possible to treat economics scientifically when one abstracts man and denudes him of his specificity, of his transcendent dimension, of his morality and values. To give our students intellectual armament with which to defend themselves against this sad state of knowledge at the present time is what Ismā'īl al Farūqī calls "Islamization of the Disciplines."

In fact, all the mutations of the twentieth century demonstrate the false premises and postulates of positivistic science. In the natural sciences, the changes in physics since the emergence of the relativity and quantum theories have rendered questionable all the conceptions once held eternal and necessary, of space and time, of determinism, of the relation of matter to energy, of the subject to the object of knowledge.

In politics—history in the making—atomic weaponry and the invasion of space, on the one hand, and the end of colonialism, on the other, have rendered questionable all the values that were once necessary and untouchable in that domain. Equally questionable have become the values of nations and armies, of order and revolution, indeed, of the whole West with its progress, its hegemony, and the false universalism of its culture.

The double accomplishment of atomic armament and the conquest of space

has given birth to the “absolute weapon,” that is to say, to the possibility of hitting any objective with missiles fired from any base on earth, or to that of destroying the earth and all life with the present stockpile of weapons equaling one million times the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

The disequilibrium is growing, indeed it has become prodigious, between the United States and Europe, where meat and butter are kept in cold storage, and a so-called Third World where millions of humans are dying of starvation and malnutrition.

These are only two examples, among many, that prove that surrender to the logical implications of Western culture or to its peculiar brand of growth and development after five centuries of Western hegemony does lead and has led the entire planet Earth to the brink of suicide.

Islam can bring to the world a different future, as it did to Qurtubah and Madinah. It can do so through its eternal message of transcendence and *um-mah*. In fact, Islam is the only faith capable of effectively countering the fatal implications of Western dominion. Against positivism, it gives us transcendence; against individualism, it gives us the *ummah*.

Today, Islam has opportunities for spreading far greater than those it enjoyed at its height in the seventh and eighth centuries. But Islam must be presented not as a religion among others. Rather, it must be seen as the point of convergence of the faith that upholds the world, as the climax of all forces leading toward that ideal faith.

Islam did not conquer the world by military feats. Rather, it achieved its glorious victory over the world through a cultural revolution which gave a new purpose for living and a new life to the human masses populating the disintegrating empires of those days.

The Prophet (SAAS) never claimed that he was creating a new religion. Rather, he called all humans to submit to God as the *Hanifs* of old did, beginning with Adam, the first human and the first prophet, with the purpose of actualizing the Divine plan on earth.

When God sent those early messengers of the purpose of showing mankind “the straight path,” He chose men capable of reaching and convincing the millions. He did so by treating every culture on the level and in the language proper to it. Allah (SWT) did not send doctors of law or philosophers to convey the message—neither an Ibn Maymun, nor an Ibn Rushd, nor a St. Thomas Aquinas. He sent a shepherd like Amos, a carpenter like Jesus (AS), an illiterate tradesman like Muhammad (SAAS). Nor did He charge them with conveying the complete science of an encyclopedia. God sent His messengers to all men, including the ignorant, to teach the meaning of life, to call for submission to the plans and patterns of God, to exercise their responsibility as God’s vicegerents (*khilafah*) on earth.

Primordial Islam has known well how to integrate the cultures of all

peoples, from Byzantium and Greece to Persia and India. It did so in a creative and selective manner, while critically assessing other cultures. In this century, living, dynamic Islam must do likewise. We, the Muslims, ought to exercise the same creative effort as did our ancestors.

As far as the natural sciences are concerned, the problem today is that of the "transfer of technology." These transfers are never as innocent as they look. Often, they bring into the Muslim world the life and thought styles of the West. And in all cases, they help perpetuate Muslim dependence upon the West, upon the West's research centers, upon its experts and professional cadres. They determine the future course of Muslim development, and make Muslim countries dependent upon the West's philosophy underlying Western science and technology.

Hence it is crucial, in this, as in other domains, to avoid two errors: blind copying of the West and outright rejection of everything Western. We should acquire Western science and technology selectively, creatively, and critically.

First, our adoption must be *selective*. The countries of the West developed their science and technology to satisfy their own peculiar needs, given their own historical circumstances and style of living. These are not the same on other continents of the world. It is not evident, for example, that in industrial technology the greatest priority must always be accorded to the economizing of labor resources. Likewise, in the fields of medicine and pharmacology, Western peoples have their own rhythms of life and their own habits of feeding. These particular conditions dictate that in the West priority be assigned to cardiovascular diseases, just as the nervous tensions and breakdowns which Western life presents demands tranquilizers. In areas where the majority of the population is constantly undernourished and lives on the land as farmers, medical and pharmaceutical research, as well as hospital needs, are obviously different.

Second, our adoption of science and technology must be *critical*. Transfer of technology always implies a tacit adoption of modes of living and thinking, of the mentality of development, the philosophy of positivism, which is the antidote of faith. It brings in its trail an individualism destructive to the social fabric of the *ummah*. This phenomenon is more obvious when the matter imported into the Muslim world consists of films and television series, of books and other publications. Let us remember that Hollywood does not constitute modernity but decadence. It is the disintegration of life. It is not by accident that those countries that are the most "developed" and the richest—like the United States and Sweden—have the highest incidence of teenage suicide. Those countries where people seek death because they have no reason to live, would they be the educators of mankind?

When I travel through the Maghrib cities still under the influence of French culture, it upsets me when people ask me for information about Western ex-

istentialists, Western structuralists, the so-called new philosophers, who have absolutely nothing to contribute to the future of humanity.

Let us repeat it once and for all: modernization is not Westernization. This does not mean that we Muslims have nothing to learn from the West. For example, when a Muslim learns from Immanuel Kant and his disciples that all that he says about God, nature, man, and history is something human, susceptible to criticism and revision, something that must be relative and conditional, that Muslim has learned a major truth about humanity. This truth is the other side of another truth that Muslims have contributed to humanity, namely, that although it is God Himself who dictated the Qur'an, it is nonetheless humans who read, understand, and comment upon it. Their word can never be of the same status as His word. Humans are the products of history, of their problems and needs, of their time and environment. It is therefore always a difficult task to distinguish what is divine and eternal from what is human and relative.

Third, our adoption of Western science and technology must be *creative*. Wholly new branches of scientific and technological development should arise out of the specific needs of each country or region, and be fed by its own local resources. Whether it be a matter of energy resources, or the artificial production of foodstuffs for animal growth, the United States' monopoly on these industries must be broken.

It is hence not necessary, for the *da'wah* of Islam to succeed in the modern world, that we should produce a new "philosophy." For such would entail the risk of producing a philosophy not unlike that of the Middle Ages, one borrowed from the Greek tradition or one following the lines of Christian systematic and scholastic theology.

Nor is there any need for us to produce one commentary after another, without end, on books of law that were designed to solve the social problems of a former epoch. At any rate, there is nothing, in the old books, to prevent us from making our own creative and fresh contributions.

In my humble opinion, the major task confronting the Muslims today is to rediscover the majestic simplicity of the message of Islam, to present it to the new century in compensation for all the wealth of values that the West had caused humanity to lose. We must recapture, for the benefit of future generations, the conviction of Islam that the world and history do have meaning and constitute a single unity. It is indeed the personal responsibility of each one of us to acknowledge this meaning and unity by our unconditional submission to the call of Allah (SWT), just as Sayyidina Ibrahim (AS) did.

As far as philosophy is concerned, the central problem for Muslims today is not the integration into the Islamic view of the philosophy of Aristotle and the Greeks, which in the past had swayed the Muslims from the straight path, nor of that which has dominated the modern West since the Renaissance,

which has only deepened man's doubt of his own significance and even driven him to despair.

On the contrary, the Muslim thinker today needs to learn from Western philosophy nothing but its critical methodology, which is really its essential core from Socrates to Galileo, from Kant to Husserl. The Muslim thinker needs to go back to the period of the first "secession" of the West (the sixth century B.C.) when human thought first posed the fundamental issues of life: 1) the relation of man to God, to other men, and to nature; and 2) the meaning and purpose of life, of death, of history, of the necessary significance that attaches itself to them because they are the acts and dispositions of Allah (SWT). Such science, philosophy, and wisdom never preclude revelation or our need for the same. On the contrary, they invoke and demand it to specify both their axioms and their limits.

In loyalty to the highest traditions, the faith and culture of Islam cannot be isolated from the world out of our fear to learn from others. This can only bring division and narrow-mindedness. Indeed, the faith and culture of Islam will be enriched and modernized not only by openness to the West, but to all that is human and universal.

Let us come to our final and essential point. We do not wish for Islam to be presented as one religion among many. Rather, we must seek to present it as the primordial religion (*"al Din,"* not simply *"din"*), the culmination and apogee and conclusion of all other revelations. Allah (SWT) has ordered us in the Qur'an to honor all prophets. The message the Muslim is expected to convey to the People of the Book (which enjoys a tremendous penetrative power), testifies to his understanding of and respect for the earlier revelations. It should always show the culmination of that tradition of divine revelations in Muhammad (SAAS).

The knowledge of the other religions is a Muslim's duty. In the lands of Asia and the Near East, how could any Muslim be a stranger to the Vedas and Upanishads, to the first sages of Taoism, to the teachings of the Buddha, of Heraclitus and Zoroaster, of Jeremiah and Jesus? How could he fail to command such mastery of the origins, of how the divine messages were corrupted and falsified by their followers; or how the Qur'an preserved for the benefit of mankind all the best that those earlier messages had contained? Indeed, how could the Muslims fail to present the fact that the Qur'anic revelation developed the seeds of earlier revelations to their fullest perfection?

The greater dangers for Muslim thinkers today, is to succumb to a false sense of self-sufficiency, of triumphalism, or self-isolation. The certainty and conviction of the truth of our faith should not be a product of our ignorance of others, but rather of our full knowledge of them.

If we can avoid these dangers, a non-Muslim convert to Islam will not

feel a lapse from his past religious development but a culmination and realization of it. This is the first condition of viability of our *da'wah*: to impart to each an awareness of this living continuity of divine revelations and religious life.

The second condition is to prove ourselves capable of solving the problems that the West is incapable of solving. We need to discover new forms of growth and development, a culture that does not lead to human destruction but to the flowering of humanity.

For this, it is of capital importance not to read the words of Allah in the Qur'an with the eyes of the "dead", that is to say, with the eyes of those who may have found the straight path but went no further than to solve the problems of their own time and localities. We must read the Qur'an with eyes fixed on the solutions of our problems and with minds and wills determined to discharge our responsibilities as the vicegerents of Allah (SWT) on earth. We must, in short, find answers to our own problems in light of the eternal message of the Qur'an.

To be faithful to our ancestors is not to preserve the ashes of their fire but to transmit its flame.

Towards a Critical World Theology

Ismā'īl Rājī al Fārūqī

Towards a Critical World Theology

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I. Five Stages of the Study of Religion

Religion has been defined as the experience of a reality that is assumed to be ultimate as well as personal, thus making the experience an encounter.¹ This modern definition is not without merit; for in religion, the object of experience is indeed regard as ultimate and in most cases as a commanding person. It is inadequate, however, because it does not specify the experience. In order to fulfill the meaning of religion, one has to add that the ultimate reality experienced must be apprehended and understood, expressed and proclaimed; its commandments accepted and embraced with individual and collective action.

Religion therefore is the most important constituent of man's humanity. First, it includes the vision of reality and the articulation of that vision—its expression in concepts for the understanding and in percepts for the imagination. This vision and its expression have constituted most of man's intellectual output throughout history. Second, it includes acquiescence in the commanding nature of ultimate reality and actualization of its commandments and hence includes most of man's subjective conditions and personalist values. Third, since the commandments have as their goal the actualization of the highest good, religion includes most or all of man's action as it relates to himself, to other men, and to nature. Evidently, the study of man's religion is that of all humans, of their legacies of thought and action, and of human history.

The fact that the object of experience is ultimate implies understanding of it as transcendent in both the theoretical (that is, metaphysical and epistemological) and the practical (valuational, ethical) senses. On the metaphysical level, ultimate reality is perceived as the first cause, or principle of sufficient reason, which explains all beings and all events. On the axiological level, it is perceived as the last end, or principle, which justifies

all beings and all events. Its relevance therefore is total. All aspects of reality and history are understood as effects and instruments of the activity of a being perceived in experience as ultimate reality.

Under these terms, likewise, religion is the very essence and core of culture. The content of religion is the lens through which all understanding and thinking take place: the realm of meditation and contemplation, of admiration and adoration. It is the sublime aesthetic expression. Finally, religion is the essence and core of civilization, in that it is the foundation of all decisions and actions, the ultimate explanation of civilization with all its inventions and artifacts, its social, political, and economic systems, and its past and future promise in history. Religion constitutes the spirit of which the facets of civilization are the concrete manifestations. In an earlier age, religious ideas, or practices were at the center of human activities. The realization that religion lies at the center of culture and civilization is recent. It came about only when an explanation of history as an integral unity of all its facets and constituents was sought, a need which did not arise before the modern period. And yet it was in the modern period itself that religion and its role were subjected to the greatest misunderstanding, as we shall see below.

A. Stage 1: Classical Antiquity

Although the greatest care must have been given to the indoctrination of priests and to their training to perform the requisite functions, classical antiquity knows little or nothing of the study of one religion by the adherents of another. The followers of the other religion may have been enemies, vassals, or allies, but they were all certainly strangers. Their religious doctrines and practices were inseparable from their identity as aliens, or more properly “barbarians,” and were not worthy of study. It was only in the sixth century B.C., when Greek thinkers had lost faith in their own religion and began to criticize its incoherence and false claims and to condemn the immorality of its gods, that some tolerance and curiosity for other religions developed. In the first decades of the sixth century, Thales denied that the Greek gods had any authority; Anaximander declared the sun and the moon to be not the deities the Greeks had thought them to be, but balls of fire; and Xenophanes, as the exemplar of skepticism, taught that all religious claims were unfounded.² Two centuries later, when the notables had nearly completely lost their faith in the Olympian deities and their religion, Herodotus (484–425 B.C.) could give accounts of the religions of other peoples (Egyptians, Mesopotamians, Persians) with some measure of detachment or objectivity. Even then, Herodotus painted pictures of these alien religions in the likeness of the Greek religion and its gods, indeed identifying Zeus, Apollo, and Hephaistos with Amon, Horus,

and Ptah, respectively. In the period following Alexander, the fusion of religions and cultures and the general skepticism of the elite enabled Berossus, a Babylonian, Megasthenes, a Syrian, and Manetho, an Egyptian, to produce similar works on their and other peoples' religions reflecting the same skepticism and syncretism.

The initial antagonism to the religions of others of the earlier ages persisted. If it was not dictated by the attitude of faith, it was done so by a complex of superiority of one's faith or unfaith to the faith studied or reported. Cicero's *De natura deorum*, Varro's *Antiquitates rerum divinarum*, Strabo's references to the Celtic Druids and Indian Brahmins in his *Geography*, Tacitus's discussion of Teutonic religion in his *Germania*, and Euhemerus's *Hiera anagraphē* all found something to transform into classical form and cite approvingly and much to contrast therewith and cite condemningly.

B. Stage 2: Judaeo-Christianity

The religion of the Hebrew patriarchs and of their states of Israel and Judah (until the Assyrian invasion, which blotted out the former) developed with awareness of other religions. The patriarchs regarded them as legitimate for their adherents. If the Old Testament reports are to be trusted, Solomon must at one time have thought a combination of Hebrew and Canaanite religion (and deities) possible. At later times, however, when the existence of Judah was threatened, the other religions and their gods were severely condemned and any Hebrew participation in them was prohibited. Since insecurity has been the hallmark of Jewish existence ever since, and because all the materials we have about Judaism date from the post-exilic period and went through a sieve of Jewish hatred for and fear of all *goyim* (non-Jews), we may characterize the attitude of Judaism toward other religions as one of hatred, fear, and a false sense of superiority or election. The other religions, their gods and rituals, were given the worst possible presentation, the most emphatic condemnation and derision. To Canaan, Egypt, Moab, Edom, Babylon, and Assyria, the redactors of the Old Testament text reserved the worst possible abuse. For the Jew, any consideration of these religions was "adulterous," a piece of "whoring" after other gods, to use the expression of Hoseah.

Christianity inherited this Jewish attitude and saw in the religions of Greece, Rome, and the Near East what Judaism saw in its neighbors. For both Judaism and Christianity were formed in an atmosphere of struggle against overwhelming odds, a struggle lasting for centuries during which the religions gained and crystallized their doctrines and world views.

The only religion on which Christianity looked with any kind of favor was Judaism. But it interpreted it so radically as to transform it into something else in order to make of it a *preparatio evangelica*, an Old Testament in con-

trast to which Christianity could establish itself as a “New Testament” and a “New Israel.” Consequently, the on-going, living Judaism that did not dissolve into Christianity and all other religions were evil, demonic, to be utterly rejected and vanquished.³ The gnostic theologians of Alexandria were less inclined to total condemnation than the Semitic or Roman Christians. Some of them, particularly Clement and Origen, saw the gods of other religions as “fallen angels,” “evil spirits,” “wild beasts,”⁴ and the god of Judaism as “Demiurge.”⁵ If they saw any good in those religions, they conceived of it as the work or presence of the *logos spermatikos* of the Holy Trinity.⁶

This attitude of hatred and condemnation of the other religions on the part of both Judaism and Christianity, including their relation to each other, has persisted for millennia. In Judaism, the same attitude continued to this century, when a handful of Jews who had lost faith in the Holy, and regarded Judaism merely as an ethnicity and a political program or platform, began to see in the person of Jesus a rabbi bent on self-purification, altruism, and charity (a far cry from the third person of a holy trinity). Also in this century, some Christians began to see Judaism as a religion justified in itself, but reduced to an ethic subsumable under the Christian dispensation. The other Christians, for whom Christianity had not lost its essence (namely, the mysteries of Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption, the paradoxes of peccatism [sin and fall] and saviorism [salvation as *fait accompli*] and of the Church as Christ’s “body” being the only avenue to salvation) continue to see in Judaism not a religion *de jure* but the mere preparation for religion which became obsolete with the advent of Christianity.

When Islam came to the scene in the seventh century, Christian hatred and condemnation combined with fear of Islam’s expansion and conversion of Christians. Already, the loss of the Eastern and African shores to Islam and its march on Byzantium, Spain, and France produced a terror at once political-military and religious. Christians poured out their genius in vituperating and vilifying Islam, its God, its Prophet, and its scripture. They sent out their men to fight it in the Crusades (numerous campaigns ranging from 1095 to 1270) and in the colonialist expansions of the last two centuries. Their condemnation of Islam continues to this day, though for some of them the ground and motivation for such antagonism may have shifted from religion and faith to racism and economics.⁷

C. Stage 3: Modernity Since the Enlightenment

The Enlightenment removed religion as principle and base of identity and set up reason in its place. Ethics and utility, rather than creed and piety, became the criteria of human worth. If religious dicta or divine command-

ments did not agree with the dictates of reason, all the worse for religion. This defiance was generated and enhanced by the discoveries of astronomy and other natural sciences which, stimulated by the achievements of Islam, took a sharp turn upward toward great breakthroughs of their own. The magisterium that the Church held for a thousand years finally began to crumble. It received a tremendous blow in the Reformation; and the successful challenges of the scientists, despite the burning at the stake of Hugo Brache and the terror of Galileo, pushed it further away from human affairs.

While most of the great mouthpieces of the Enlightenment were Christians, they derided religion and its men, permitting it a role only if it fell "within the boundaries of reason alone," as the famous book of Kant indicated in its title. Whereas Descartes, a century earlier, used reason to prove the existence of God, the princes of the Enlightenment reduced its importance and regarded it, as Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd had done, as necessary for the poor in spirit, to prevent them from doing evil and orient them toward some virtue. They of course, stood above such plebeian need. Behind this demotion of religion stood the epistemology of rationalism under whose criteria the claims of religion were found wanting. Only a psychological – rather, pastoral – role may therefore be played by religion.

This tyranny of reason did not last long. Soon the forces of skepticism, having been victorious over the Church and all that it stood for, rampaged again, this time under the pressure of rising European particularism. Reason is by nature opposed to particularism; it loves the universal. When it became a movement during the Enlightenment, it resulted in the Napoleonic unification of Europe (or the attempt to unify it) and the emancipation of the Jews from their ghettos and separate identities. Europe, however, was in no mood for universalism. The development of navigation, industry, and trade had whetted its appetite for world dominion. But this can only be justified by nationalism, a brand of particularism that can be justified by feeling alone. Romanticism was the result. It dethroned reason and set feeling in its place as the criterion of truth and value. The genius of Schleiermacher, the greatest theologian of the nineteenth century, was to ransom Christianity from the abyss into which the Enlightenment had thrown it. He gave it a new foundation, namely, feeling or experience, and he thus enabled it to be honored as the highest expression of the people's common feeling. He subtitled his major work "Address to the Despisers of Religion" and invited them to adhere to Christianity because to be Christian is to share in the treasury of common feelings and experiences, in short, to be "folkish."

Skepticism did not stop at "shared feeling" or "common experience." The shared commonality or uniformity of the group was elevated in status to an arbitrary entity, formed by an arbitrary organism, the state. Though centered on some natural characteristics such as language, territory, physical traits,

and social customs, these are never necessary. They are the accidents of history. So, while group sharing remains the fact and mainstay of romanticism, and hence of nationalism as well, epistemologically it cannot rest but on the inef-fable experience of the individual. This is epistemological individualism; in plain English, relativism, Protagorean in foundation and cultural in manifesta-tion. Of necessity, it implies denial of religious knowledge, denial of transcen-dent reality, denial of the Absolute, in short, denial of God as traditional Chris-tianity and Judaism have known Him.

Little wonder therefore that those Western thinkers who were not, pro-perly speaking, theologians, sought explanation of the phenomena of religion in the stresses and distresses of individuals and groups. The genesis of Chris-tianity in the messianism of Isaiah and the worldly despair of the Jews in and after their exile in Babylon, its rise among the slaves of the Roman Empire, and the struggle to ovosturn the *virtu* of the Roman soldiers and replace their masterly values with those of the humble slaves – these were turned into the living contexts explaining the pressures to be Christian. Many a thinker, such as Feuerbach, Freud, William James, John Dewey, Fromm, and Jung saw religion as an effective prop and savior from a predicament which, if not called original sin, is assumed to be man's existential plight.

D. Stage 4: Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religion

It was with this attitude towards Christianity – their own religion – as background that Western thought was thrust by developments in industry, maritime trade, and the resultant colonial expansion upon the religions of Asia and Africa. Darwinism had provided Western thinkers with a methodology which, assuming differences from Europe to be signs of primitiveness, led them to seek in the phenomena of other peoples the “original sources,” the “primordial forms” of a religious development whose apex was their Christianity.

A number of approaches to the study of religion developed, and they con-tinue to have their advocates today in every department of comparative studies: the anthropological, the sociological, the psychological, the philosophical, the theological, and the phenomenological. The anthropological method focus-ed on the religions of the primitives as reported by direct observation of pre-sent practices, or the confessions and descriptions of the living adherents. It sought to understand them as functions of human conditions affected by the natural environment and the life of the ethnic entity in question. An-thropology is bound by evolutionist axioms as well as by an epistemology that recognizes only the behavioral data as valid, whether verbal or actional.

Its emphasis on the ethnic entity is so exaggerated that it regards any analysis not based on it as abstractionist. Ethnicity, it holds, makes the man. The sociological approach places the emphasis on the social group and understands religion as a factor, constructive or destructive, uniting or separating, integrating or disrupting, classifying or distinguishing humans in their group membership. Like anthropology, it recognizes as data only the behavioral and the empirical. The psychological method places its emphasis on the internal state of the subject and the determinants that affect it in its purely subjective moment. It understands religion as states of consciousness as such, depressive in case of insecurity or need, projective in case of desire and hope, ecstatic in case of fulfillment, and so forth. Its empiricism and behaviorism guard it when, in social psychology, the discipline seeks to describe group consciousness as an entity *sui generis*, causing it to fall back upon the hard data of the given individual.

The historical method depends upon all these to provide it with its data, in which it seeks to uncover patterns of change which it can then establish as applicable in other or similar situations. Its axiom is evolutionist, holding that every reality comes to be what it is because it was what it was. History being a self-determining process, its explanation is the uncovering of its earlier stages with as many of its determining factors as possible.

Finally, the theologians of Christianity, advocates of the theological method, avowedly declared Christianity to be the only true religion, the only criterion and norm of religious truth, and hence the judge of all other religions. The missionaries and Orientalists went out to study the other religions as if they were enemy territory, to reconnoiter enemy defenses, to probe for weakness in anticipation of the onslaught. The philosophers, for their part, were not as blunt as the theologians to declare off hand that their brand or "ism" is the only right one. Standing either behind the wall of skepticism as to the very knowability of truth or behind that of an absolutism no less Western and dated than the stance of the theologians, they criticized the claims of religions concerning the world, divine providence, freedom, resurrection, judgment, and paradise and hell.

In an attempt to avoid all these shortcomings at once, a number of students of comparative religion sought a different method and approach to their materials. Taking their clue from Edmund Husserl in his attempt to avoid the pitfalls of idealism and realism, they thought that it is possible to reach an eidetic vision of a religion (that is, an understanding of its essence, its structuring or ordering principles) by suspending one's own categories and prejudgments, beholding the phenomena of religion as they are and, as it were, allowing them to speak for themselves. This will to objectivity was genuine; for it was born out of disgust with all previous studies of religion, especially the philosophical and the theological. Its candidness pushed its advocates to

call the approach *Religionswissenschaft*, or science of religion, and to pour their energies on the sheer collection, classification, and establishment of the data. They prescribed *epoche* to the student of religion, that is, the suspension of all principles and norms not derived from the data, and the constant reexamination of one's understanding of the essence of a religion in light of the data of that religion. Without doubt, the phenomenology of religion is the highest point the academic study of religion has reached in the West.

E. Stage 5: The Phenomenological Study of Religion

The phenomenological study of religion, however, is not without limitations. It consists of two branches: reportage, or the collection of data, and construction of meaning—wholes, or the systematization of data.

1. Reportage, or the Collection of Data

The history of religions has known two influences that sought to reduce its jurisdiction by limiting the data that constitute its subject matter: one was the attempt to redefine the religious datum in a restricted and narrow manner, and the other was an isolationist policy observed vis-à-vis Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

The attempt to limit the jurisdiction of phenomena of religions by giving the religious datum a narrow definition led to theories that have tried to isolate the religious element and to identify it in terms of “the religious,” “the holy,” “the sacred.” The problem these theories faced was primarily the reductionist's analysis of the religious phenomenon into something else that would lend itself more readily to his kind of investigation. This well-intended movement had the effect of limiting the scope of the investigation. If the religious is a unique, irreducible, and identifiable element in human life, the religious discipline should aim at it first and last. The other elements of which human life is supposedly composed may be the objects of other disciplines and they may be studied by the history of religions only as *relata* affecting or affected by the uniquely religious element.

Among Western phenomenologists, where the act of faith has been held to consist in the confrontation of the person with God in his most personal moment when everything or almost everything that is non-self has been detached from consciousness, the discovery of “the religious” as a unique element fell on fertile ground and was taken as a matter of course. Today, fortunately, the relevance of God to every aspect and element of space-time is being rediscovered by Western Christendom, and the repudiation of an isolated, unique, religious holy or sacred is being prepared for. In its place, the religiousness

of everything is being discovered, a religiousness that does not consist in the thing's being a mere *relatum*. Islam has for centuries been teaching the religiousness of all space-time, of all life.

Not the personal act of faith, nor the social act, nor the whole of space-time and life as *relata*, but the whole of life and space-time as such should constitute the data of phenomenologists of religions. Every human act is an integral part of the religious complexus. Religion itself, however, is not an act (the act of faith, or encounter with God, or of participation), but a dimension of every act. It is not a thing but a perspective with which every thing is invested. It is the highest and most important dimension, for it alone takes cognizance of the act as personal, as standing within the religio-cultural context in which it has taken place, as well as within the total context of space-time. For religion, the act includes all the inner determinations of the person as well as all its effects in space-time. And it is this relation of the whole act to the whole space-time that constitutes the religious dimension. Everything then is subject matter for the study of religion. The cultic and dogmatic have too long monopolized without challenge the definition of the religious; and the addition of the scriptural, of the theory of origin and destiny of man and cosmos, of the moral and of the aesthetic, and finally, of "the sacred" or "the holy" is certainly not enough. Every human act is religious in that it involves the inner person, the member of society, and the whole cosmos all at once, and all being, whether so-called sacred or so-called profane, is the "religious." It was an impoverishment of the realm of the religious to limit it, as it were, to a unique act of man, to a unique aspect of his life, or to the sacred as opposed to the profane. The first two views are not compatible with our modern field theory of meaning, of value or of causation, where the particular is not a unique element but a point in space-time at which converge and from which diverge an infinite number of elements in all directions.⁸ The third denies half and more of the realities of the religious experience of mankind.

This restoration to the religious of its universal scope and relevance widens the horizon of the phenomenology of religion. Henceforth, it should include every branch of human knowledge and pursuit. For its purposes, mankind may still be divided into Christians, Buddhist, Hindus, Muslims, and others, but the whole history, culture, and civilization of the Christians, the Buddhists, the Hindus, the Muslims, and so on, should be its object.

The phenomenology of religion had its jurisdiction further curtailed in another direction. While, theoretically, it was supposed to be a history of all religions, it turned out to be in reality a history of "Asiatic" and "primitive" religions, on the one hand, and of the the extinct religions of antiquity, on the other. By far the overwhelming majority of the literature of the library of comparative religion has been devoted to them. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam always managed somehow to escape. This is not to plead that one group

of materials is better, richer, or more important than another. Primitive and ancient religions may very well hold for us many great lessons. But they are far more impenetrable than the other group because of obstacles of language, of remoteness of time, of wide difference between their categories and ours. The truth that cannot be gainsaid here is that the comparativist has so far found the remoteness of primitive and ancient religions far more reassuring than the explosive character of the living world religions. Hence, he has been far bolder to collect the data of the former, to systematize, generalize about, and judge them than the latter. He seems to have shied away, whether in awe or in panic, from handling the data of the living religions.

2. *Construction of Meaning—Wholes, or the Systematization of Data*

This great mass of data, once identified and collected, must be systematized, or ordered, in three different operations:

First, it should be classified in a way that fulfills the organizational needs of a modern inquiry. Under each heading the relevant data should be so analyzed and related to one another as to reveal the nexus of ideas of which they are the embodiment. The organization of the material must enable the modern researcher to put under the lucid light of consciousness, quickly and certainly, the whole field of ideas and all the particular items therein that in any religion or aspect of a religion, constitute a single network or system of meanings. It should be topical as well as historical and should endeavor to put at the disposal of the understanding a comprehensive picture of all the facts pertinent to all topics, periods, or groups within the religious culture under examination. In turn, these groups of data should be analyzed and related among themselves so as to disclose the essence of the religious culture as a whole.

Second, the relations of each datum with the whole complexus of history to which it belongs should be shown and established for thought. Its origin must be discovered, and its growth and development, its crystallization, and, where necessary, its decay, misunderstanding, and final repudiation must be accurately traced. Developments of ideas, of institutions, of evaluations and discoveries, of human attitudes and deeds, have to be projected against the background of historical facts. For they did not develop in the abstract but in a given milieu, and a need for precisely that development must have been felt. The datum in question must have been meant either to serve or to combat that development. Equally, every one of these developments must have had a whole range of effects which must be brought within the field of vision to be systematized if the understanding of the given data, the given movement, or the given system of ideas is to be complete.⁹

Third, the religious data thus classified and systematized ought to be

distilled for their meanings, and these meanings should be elucidated and systematized in turn. That is to say, they should be related as meanings, and not as facts as in the first two steps of systematization, to the historical complexus so that the civilization as such becomes both a structured whole of meanings and a whole with a meaning. Every religious datum, whether it is an expression of an idea, an attitude or feeling-state, refers to something that is the content expressed, the meaning intuited or felt, the purpose realized or violated, or the object of inaction if no action whatever has taken place other than inaction. This something is a value. It is the meaning to which the religious datum is the human response, noetic, attitudinal, or actional. As the human response could not become intelligible without its relation to the complexi of history, it cannot be meaningful without its relation to value. The former is a planar relation; the latter is a relation in depth. Unless the plane of historical relations is seen against the background of and is related to values in a depth relation, the religious datum may never be grasped for what it really is.¹⁰

In the discernment, analysis, and establishment of this depth relation – the relation of “categorical existence” to “axiological being” or value – the history of religions meets serious perils and grave pitfalls. And it is true that a great number of comparative accounts of religions have failed in this requirement of constructing meaning-wholes out of the given religious data. But this failure is the failure of the investigator's own effort. It is not an argument against the history of religions or its methodology, but against the investigator and his research. The pitfalls of exegesis are reading into a religious datum something that is not there, or perceiving therein no value or a value other than that which the adherent himself perceives. This constitutes, in most cases, the rejection of the religious wisdom of the adherents themselves is a reconstruction meets the requisities of scholarship while at the same time the adherents of the religion in question find it meaningful and accept it as saying something to them about their own faith, surely it has passed all that can be reasonably required of the comparativist. This was essentially the insight of W. C. Smith.¹¹

Certainly, the application of the principle presents a number of serious practical difficulties. The consent of which adherents of the faith may be taken as proof, and how may such consent be expressed? Moreover, it must be at least theoretically possible that the adherents of a religion may have gone so far in interpreting their religion that they have missed its primeval essence, that they do not find it any longer meaningful. This is of course tantamount to their acquiring a new religion, despite the fact that the new may still be called by the name of the old. Smith's criterion cannot therefore be taken as a test of validity in the strict sense. Nonetheless, if we take it as a pedagogic principle and ask the historian of religions to check his work, as it progresses,

against the perspective of the adherents of the religion under investigation, we would have a check-and-balance technique to safeguard the work against aberration.

The principle governing the work of systematization is therefore that the categories under which the systematizing work should proceed must be innate to the pertinent religious culture investigated, not imposed thereon from the outside. The divisions constituting the various religious cultures must not be interchanged; the data of each must be classified, analyzed, and systematized not under categories alien to that religious culture, but under categories derived from it. Those Christian investigators of non-Christian religions who regard ritual law as self-sacrifice, as atonement or salvation, and who speak of purity as morality, of destiny in contrast to history, of redemption as the end and purpose of religion, betray an obvious governance by Christian principles that vitiates against them. The suspicion that the investigation in question has been carried out in order to show the deficiency of the non-Christian religion in the same areas where Christianity is claimed to be superior can never be removed.

The history of religions shows its purely scientific character particularly here. Within any one religion, the task of organizing the data into a systematic whole, of relating doctrinal, cultic, institutional, moral, and artistic facts to the history of the civilization concerned as a whole, is a purely scientific affair, despite the fact that the materials with which the historian of religions works are unlike those of the natural or social scientist. The scientific character of an inquiry is not a function of the materials but of what is done with them. The materials may be chemical facts or religious meanings. An inquiry into either is scientific if it starts from what is historically given and seeks to uncover the relations that govern the existence and actuality of these facts. It is immaterial that in one case the facts are laboratory materials in test tubes and in the other, ideas and facts recorded in books in a library or lived by a living community of men.¹² Certainly the "whats" in the two cases are different, but the presuppositions of methodology are the same. Just as the economist, the sociologist, the psychologist, the anthropologist apply the term "social science" to their scientific treatment of data, we shall invent the term "humanistic science" to describe the phenomenologists' scientific treatment of materials other than those of the natural and social sciences. It is granted that religious as well as moral and aesthetic meanings are always instantiated in some overt social or personal behavior and that, except through abstraction, they are really inseparable from their instances.

II. Shortcomings of the Phenomenological School

A. The Necessity of Judgment

However scientific and reliable the above-mentioned operations may be, a phenomenology of religion that has accumulated as many scientific and reliable articulations and systematizations as there are religions is a mere boodle bag in which religio-cultural wholes have just been put one beside the other in cold juxtaposition. The first two steps of phenomenology of religion, (namely, reportage and the construction of meaning — wholes) therefore justify the specialized disciplines of Islamic, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist studies, and so forth, but not the comparative study of religions as an autonomous discipline. For this, a *third* step or branch of study is necessary, namely, judgment or evaluation. Out of the meaning-wholes constructed by the first two branches, one meaning-whole should be arrived at, which would belong to man as such. Like the second, this third operation is also a systematization, not so much of particular data as of meaning-wholes. Its task is that of relating the given meaning-wholes to the universal, the human, and the divine as such. For this, *meta-religion* is necessary or principles belonging to such order of generality as would serve as bases of comparison and evaluation of the meaning-wholes.

Such relating does involve a judgment of the individual meaning-wholes, an evaluation of their large claims. That this is itself a very large claim is not denied. Indeed, it sounds quite presumptuous to want to judge the religio-cultures of mankind. But the point is that the significance of the whole discipline of phenomenology of religion will stand or fall with the establishment or repudiation of this third branch.

First, we have seen that the first two branches can succeed in putting in front of us a series of internally coherent wholes of meanings, the constituents of which are related to one another as well as to their respective categorial existents manifest in the history, life and culture of that religion as well as to their respective axiological grounds. If the first two operations have been successful, every meaning-whole will contain within it the claim not only that it is true, but that it is the truth. The claim is essential to religion. For the religious assertion is not merely one among a multitude of propositions, but necessarily unique and exclusive. It is of its nature to be imperative in addition to being propositive, and no command can issue therefrom if it did not mean to assert that its content is better or truer than the alternative content of another assertion if not the only true and good content überhaupt.

Imperativeness is always a preference of something to something else; and this always implies that what is commanded in any instance is the best thing commandable in that instance. Where alternative commandments are of identical value, none may be said to be, by itself, commandable. Religious exclusiveness, when it is asserted not on the level of accidentals but on that

of the essentials of a religion, can be dispensed with only at the cost of axiological relativism. But this sacralization of relativism may not contend with our assertion of exclusiveness without contradicting itself. What we then have is not a series of meaning-wholes, simpliciter, but a juxtaposition of several meaning-wholes each of which claims to be the only autonomous expression of the truth. These wholes do not vary only in detail, nor merely in the important issues. They diametrically contradict one another in most of the principles which constitute the framework and structure of their house of ideas. How then can the phenomenologist of religion, who is above all an academician, stop after the presentation of these wholes? As academician, the historian of religions is above all concerned with the truth. But to present the meaning-wholes of the religions and acquiesce to their pluralism is nothing short of cynicism. There is no alternative to this cynicism except in judging and evaluating the claimant meaning-wholes. The phenomenologists of religion must therefore do much more than steps 1 and 2.

Second, "knowledge" in the study of religions does not consist merely of the apprehension of data. In science, a datum is gnoseologically valuable in itself, inasmuch as the natural fact held in consciousness is itself the end of the scientific investigation. In comparative religion a datum has little significance unless it is related to the feeling, propensity, aspiration or value-apprehension of which it is the expression, the affirmation or negation, the satisfaction or denial, the approbation or condemnation, the exaltation or denigration, and so forth. But feelings, propensities, aspirations are human, not only Christian or Muslim, and value-apprehension is apprehension of a real value in experience. It is not therefore enough to know that for a certain religion, such and such are held to be facts. Movement from the Christianness or Muslimness of a factum to its human-ness or universal reality is indispensable. Likewise, no meaning-whole is complete unless its insights, claims, desiderata, and damnata are related to their human and therefore real roots, and thence to the real values and disvalues they seek to make real or to eliminate. Knowledge itself demands this relating to man as such, to existential and axiological reality. But to relate the data and meaning-wholes in this manner is certainly to judge them.

Mutually contradictory as they are, to relate the data of religions or their meaning-wholes to the same reality, whether human or valuational, is really to present an incomplete picture with which the human understanding can do nothing. Indeed, such relating of them cannot be maintained in consciousness without coercion. But data that cannot be treated except coercively, that is cannot be related to the universal and the real without dislodging or being dislodged by other data, cannot be simply true. Either the dislodging or the dislodged data are wrong, or their place in the meaning-whole has been wrongly assigned. The consequence therefore is that either the construc-

tion of the meaning-whole has been faulty or the meaning-whole as a whole has laid a false claim to the truth.

B. The Desirability of Judgment

Since the data that the phenomenologists of religion collect are universally related to meanings or values, they are, in contra-distinction to the dead facts of natural science, life-facts. In order to perceive them as life-facts, an *epoche* is necessary in which, as the phenomenologists have argued, the investigator would put his own presuppositions, religion, and perspective in brackets while he beholds the given religious datum. This is necessary but insufficient. That the life-fact is endowed with energizing and stirring power implies for epistemology that to apprehend it is to apprehend its moving power in experience. Hence, life-fact cognition is life-fact determination, and to perceive a religious meaning is to suffer determination by that meaning. The phenomenologists of religion must therefore be capable of moving freely from one context to another while enabling his ethos to be determined by the data beheld alone. Only thus can he construct the historically given data into self-coherent meaning-wholes, which is his objective as a comparativist. But what does this peregrination mean for him as a human being, as a searcher for wisdom? And consequently, what does it mean for him to present to his fellow men these mutually repulsive, severally appealing and determining meaning-wholes?

It may be argued that the comparativist should do no more than present these meaning-wholes from the highest level of detachment possible. Ivory-tower detachment is not only impressive but necessary when the subject matter investigated and presented to man belongs to the realm of nature which we called "dead facts." To apply it in the realm of life-facts, where cognition is to be determined in discursive thought as well as in feeling and action, is to expose men to their energizing power and moving appeal. Now, if the comparativist of religions takes no more than steps 1 and 2, he is exposing man to galaxies of meaning-wholes that pull him apart in different directions. There can be no doubt that every human being must reach his own personal decision regarding what is finally meaningful, and that the phenomenologist of religion is an academician who must remain absolutely aloof from all attempts to influence man's decision-making. But has he, by presenting to man merely the meaning-wholes in cold juxtaposition, that is, without relating them to the necessarily universal, the necessarily real, the human, presented him with the whole truth?

In this age, when the world community has become conscious of a universal human identity and is repeatedly calling for a discipline that will think

out its spiritual problems as a human world community, has the ivory-tower phenomenologist of religions, whose training has equipped him best for the job, the right to shy away? Does his shying away cast no doubt on his whole enterprise? By wanting to preserve the religions of man frozen as they are, this ivory-tower scholarship detaches itself from the world of man and life that is constantly being made and remade and degenerates into superficiality.

These three considerations discussed from the perspective of necessity and desirability of judgment — the first two being theoretical, affecting knowledge of religions, and the third practical, questioning the wisdom of avoiding judgment — lead us to think that judgment is both necessary and desirable. There is hence no escape for the phenomenologist of religion from developing a system of principles of meta-religion under which the judgment and evaluation of meaning-wholes may take place. Although there have been many Christian theologies of the comparative study of religions, there is, as yet, unfortunately no critical meta-religion. This shortcoming points further to the unpreparedness of modern Christendom to meet the world community that is rapidly coming into being.

It is not within the purview of this essay to elaborate on a system of meta-religion. But it would indeed be incomplete if, having striven to establish its necessity and desirability, we omit discussing its possibility.

C. The Possibility of Judgment

Perhaps the most common genre of meta-religion is that which looks upon the differences among religions as belonging to the surface, and upon their common agreements as belonging to the essence. This view does not always have to assume the superficial form it usually takes in interreligious conventions, where “lowest common denominator” agreements are emphasized at the cost of all differences. It can be sophisticated, as when it claims that underlying all differences there is a real substratum common to all which is easily discoverable upon closer analysis. But it is nonetheless false because it seeks that substratum on the level of the figurizations and conceptualizations of the different religions where no such unity can be found except through selection of the materials investigated or a coercive interpretation of them. The profound differences that separate the religions on the level of teachings here all disappear in order to clear the road for generalization.

When hindrances are found to be obstinate, they are subjected to an interpretation capable of bearing the required meaning. Such is the case of the analysis of Friedrich Heiler, who goes to great lengths to prove that all religions teach the same God and the same ethic, and whose conclusions are not even true to the theory of empirical generalization, not to speak of meta-religion whose principles must be apodeictically certain. For him, Yahweh, Ahura

Mazdah, Allah, Buddha, Kali, and – presumably, though his enumeration carefully omits him – Jesus, are all “imagery” in which the one and same “reality is constantly personified.”¹³ Moreover, “this reality of the Divine” is identified as “ultimate love which reveals itself to men and in men”¹⁴; and “the way of man to God is universally the way of sacrifice.”¹⁵ Obviously this is to see the non-Christian religions with hopelessly Christian eyes, to bend the historically given so as to accord with a predetermined Christian order.

Despite the fact that this sort of “scholarship” may serve to instill among the rank and file a little sympathy for “the others” who, hitherto, have been regarded as “infidels,” it remains at bottom a gratuitous condescension. As a methodology of the comparative study of religions, it is utterly worthless.¹⁶

A far more profound and philosophical theory of history of religions has been briefly laid out in an article by B. E. Meland.¹⁷ It too regards the religions as fundamentally one, not on the level of doctrine or figurization, but on that of a deeper lying substratum – which is true – and seeks to reach, reconcile, or judge the pronouncements of the different religions on the figurization level by reference to that deeper reality that is common to all. It is in the latter aspect that the theory runs aground. Whereas the unphilosophical theories fail because they do not seek humanity on the deeper level where it really is but on the figurizational level where it certainly is not, Meland’s philosophical theory runs short because he identifies that reality in such a way as to make any knowledge – and hence any methodological use – of it impossible. Let us see how this is so.

Meland analyzes the nature of man as consisting of three elements: first, “the primordial ground of the individual person as actualized event,” that is, the primordial substratum of reality in which he has his being, his createdness. This deep-lying substrate is ontological and hence it transcends all particularisms; but “in its actuality . . . (it) is concrete.” It is “man’s life in God.” It is “universal”; hence, “all concretion is ultimately due” to it. All perspectives, judgments, and formulations of or within a religion “partake of this concreteness” and are, hence, “relative to it” in the “decisive” sense “that in this time and place reality has spoken.” It “defines the base of our humanity” and gives man the capacity to understand the humanity of another.¹⁸ Second is “the individuated selfhood of each person,” and third, “the cultural history in which the drama of corporate existence is enacted.”¹⁹

In contrast to the first element, which is universal, the second and third are specific and particular, and belong to the level of history and culture. It is true that neither the universal nor the particular is found one without the other; but whereas the particular is readily and directly available for knowledge, the universal is never reached except through the particular. Thus the particular, which is a concretization of the universal, is relative thereto in the ontic sense; for it owes to the universal its very being. This may be granted.

As to the availability of the universal for knowledge, Meland rules out all hope for the historian of religions ever to attain it outside his own culture and concretization on the grounds that "the structure of faith [i.e., the particular] is so deeply organic to the individuation of the person in any culture. . . [or so] much of this is below the level of conscious awareness. . . [that man's] processes of thought cannot escape or transcend its conditioning, however disciplined they may be."²⁰

This reduction of all human knowledge to relativity, to the particular cultural structure of the subject (which Meland calls the "fiduciary framework," borrowing the expression of Michael Polanyi), stems from a mistaking of relativity. The afore-mentioned ontic relation between primordial reality and its concrete actualization in space-time, which is the one-directional dependence of the particular on the universal, is here interpreted as epistemological and is turned around so as to become the absolute dependence of the universal on the particular. For this twist, however, no reason is given; and its net purport is the resolution to recognize only the particular as given, thus closing the gate of any reliable knowledge of the universal. But knowledge of the universal, of primordial reality, must be possible if the particular culture or religion, the "fiduciary framework," is not to be final.

Passage from the particular to the universal, that is to say the search for universal, that is to say, the search for a meta-religion with which the particular may be properly understood as well as evaluated, is possible because, to parody the words of Kant, although all history of religions begins with the historically given data of the religions, the concrete religious experience of men in history, the given of the particular religions, it is not necessary that it all arises therefrom. Meland too is keen to save this possibility, though he is opposed to any facile *dogmatique* of the universal. With this in mind, he suggests the method of negotiation of meaning in personal interreligious encounter, asserting that the impenetrable opaqueness of meaning which the alien religion presents to the investigator could be dissipated by the encounter between him and the adherent of the religion, provided that both are aware of their fiduciary frameworks, as well as of the fact that they are, as living concretizations of primordial reality, anchored in that one and the same reality. In such an encounter, Meland holds, it would not be their particularistic *dogmatique* that carries the religious meaning sought, but the persons saying such words as they do.²¹

One may ask, however, what the adherent means besides what is affirmed and denied, which belongs to the level of the fiduciary framework. For an encounter to serve the purpose Meland has assigned to it, it should have a meaning and a relevance to the study of religions, that is to say, to the interest transcending the particular religions of the adherents, under which the latter could be illuminated, understood, evaluated, and judged. But what is

that meaning and relevance which must be other than what the psychologist, the economist, the historian, and other social scientists are interested in? Meland gives us no indication of it. How then can the desired “negotiation of meaning” be possible? How may that of which the fiduciary framework is the figurization be critically established for knowledge? Indeed, Meland has already laid down that the primordial reality is utterly unknowable. In this case, what reliance should be placed on any person’s claim that in affirming and denying what he does, he is expressing “primordial reality”? How can one differentiate between a person communicating a particularized “primordial reality” and one communicating a particularized hallucination? Does any fiduciary framework express, take account of, and constitute a concretization of “primordial reality” as well as any other? Are men absolutely free to develop any fiduciary framework they wish? Has all human wisdom not attained anything final at all concerning that primordial reality besides its *Dasein*?

If these questions yield only negative results, then negotiated meaning is impossible and encounter is futile. If, on the other hand, the yield is positive, then certainly meta-religion is possible, and the comparativist should apply himself to the task of elaborating it. In doing so, he may not take the stand of skepticism. For to assert God and not to allow Him to be differentiated from a hallucination is idle, as it is for a Muslim to assert the unity of God and not that of truth, or for any rational being to assert reality and then to declare it utterly unknowable. To assert with Polyanyi and Meland that all we can ever have is a Muslimized or Christianized, Germanized or Russified version of the truth is skepticism – the denial of truth itself, including that of the skeptic’s thesis, à la Epimenides.

The rock-bottom axiom of this relativism in religious knowledge is the principle that “the roots of man are in the region; or, more precisely, in that matrix of concrete experience, however much he may succeed in venturing beyond these psychic barriers through various efforts at shared experience.”²² First, this is not self-evident. The opposite, namely, that the root of man is in the human universal rationality in which he partakes by nature, is quite conceivable. Nor can it be made to accord, second, with the wisdom of those religions that expressed men’s universal brotherhood in their common descent from Adam, and attributed their cultural peculiarities to environment.²³ Third, it stems from an unfortunate fixation in the Western mind that whatever is, is first of all either French or German or English or Christian or Jewish, and is human, but is universal or real only in second place. This fixation is so chronic that the Western mind not only cannot see reality except as geographically, nationally, culturally, or sectarianly determined, but also assumes that God created it so. “Each [concrete occasion of reality] in its own circumstances, bodies forth its distinctive disclosure as an event of ac-

tuality, prehending the creative act of God with its own degree of relevance.”²⁴ That is the end of the road. It is relativism claiming for itself divine sanction.

D. The Benefits of Judgment

Certainly, what unites men of different fiduciary frameworks is, as Meland says, their standing as actualizations of primordial reality, their createdness by one and the same Creator. Religiously speaking, the Creator has not only granted man something of the Creator's spirit, that is, a capacity to transcend his creatureliness and recognize the Creator who is his source, but has also taken several measures to bring to man a knowledge of Himself. Man therefore knows God, the primordial reality, if not naturally, then by means of revelation. On the other hand, metaphysically speaking, the level of being at which man stands is differentiated from the lower levels of things, plants, and animals not only by that instrument of the will to live called the understanding, but by spirit, which enables man to cognize and evaluate his standing in Being's multileveled structure. This is none other than Being's attainment of consciousness of itself. In man, Being judges itself. That it has often misjudged itself is the proof that it can judge itself and consequently that it must, can, and in fact does know itself. For it is as inconceivable that Being would enable the emergence of a creature that is a judge of Being without endowing it with the faculty to know the object of judgment, which is itself, as it is to find a being on any level that is not accompanied by the development of such cognitive faculties as enable the higher concretization of Being to fulfill that which distinguishes it from the lower levels and hence constitutes its *raison d'être*.

Pursued in its three branches, the study of religions is the sovereign queen of the humanities. In a sense, all the humanities, including the comparative ones, are here front-line soldiers whose duties are the collection of data, and their analysis, systematization, and reconstruction into meaning-wholes. The subject matter of these disciplines is men's ideas and actions in all fields of human endeavor; and all these are, as we have seen, constituents in the religio-cultural wholes that the science of religions proper studies as wholes that and compares and relates to man and God in the attempt to reach the truth of both. The queen's concern is for every battlefield and hence for every individual soldier. But her real work is at headquarters to observe where the ship of humanity is going. Comparative religion, then, is not a course of study; it is not a department in a divinity school. It is, rather, by itself a college of liberal arts, each department of which is organically related to the center, whose job is to make sense out of the infinite diversity of the religio-cultural experience, and thus contribute to the reconstruction of man's knowledge of himself, to his rehabilitation in an apparently alien cosmos, to his realization

of value. Inasmuch therefore as comparative religion is a collection and systematization of facts about human acts, life, and relations, it is a college. Inasmuch as comparative religion is an evaluation or judgment of meaningful wholes with the aid of a body of critical meta-religious principles, it is the queen of the humanities.

At any university or college, however, these disciplines operate in an autonomous manner without recognizing their organic relation to religion. This is not undesirable. First, a measure of evaluation and judgment relative to the data under immediate examination is necessary for collection and systematization. Second, and in a deeper sense, their attempts at evaluation are desirable inasmuch as intellectual curiosity, or the will to know, is dependent upon the recognition of the unity of truth, that is, upon the realization that the discovery of truth is a discovery of a reality that is not divisible into unrelated segments but constitutes a unique and integral whole. This is quite consistent with the second principle of Islamic methodology, namely the unity of truth and knowledge (*Islamization of Knowledge*, p. 26). Such a realization is always a requisite for venturing into the unknown fields of reality.

Third, their evaluations and judgments are of inestimable value to the student of religions, even though they may be biased or erroneous. They serve as a check and balance to the comparativist whenever he is inclined to set the facts aside in favor of abstract constructionism. Such evaluation and judgment as the specialist data-reporter and systematizer are likely to make at least will be truer to the facts in question; and this is a need which the study of religions can never overemphasize and no historian of religion can oversatisfy.

Fourth, the study of religions should keep aware of these developments and be ready to evaluate the discoveries attained by these disciplines. The real issue is the need for and desirability of evaluation on the level of religion, that is to say, on the highest, the most comprehensive, and most critical level of all.

III. Shortcomings of the Other Schools

A. The Sentimental Ecumenists

All of us have heard superficial scholars, moved more by sentiment than reason, claim that the religions of mankind are all one. With no little demagoguery, they flash out their claims at public conventions that all the religions command the golden rule of Christianity, namely, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," or "Love thy neighbor as thyself," or,

venturing new mottos, such claims as “Every religion has some notion of ultimate reality, or commands the having of a good heart, observance of good conduct, altruism, or a spirituality or something beyond the material life of this world.” Little do these sentimentalists realize that the road to hell is paved with good intentions; that a good will, reciprocity, spirituality, and ultimate reality as such do not specify what we are to do with our lives on earth; that humans hold these values and at the same time perpetrate atrocious crimes against humanity. The lowest common denominator may be common; but it is the lowest not only in the sense that it is the least important constituent in the religion in question but also in that the demand it makes on the adherent hardly distinguishes him from other religions. Facing such a lowest common denominator as an index of commonality, the conscientious adherent is bound to shout: “*Vive la difference!*”

Such latter-day ecumenists who have laid aside their religious identities and call upon others to do the same need not deter us from our quest. Their call appeals to the shallow-minded, and its effect is always brief. There are others though, far more sophisticated, whose call is oft based upon more solid grounds. They can be classified into three groups: those who find their base in man, those who find their base in the world, and those who find it in some vague though transcendent reality. Naturally, there are always some — perhaps they are the majority — who hold their own religion to be the religion of the world and to find world theology in the tenets of their own religious tradition.

This last class comprises today the overwhelming majority of the theologians of Christianity. Their claim may be read in Hendrik Kraemer’s *Christianity and the Religions of the World* and in Emil Brunner’s study, *Christianity and Human Civilization*. And it can be deduced from the writings of Paul Tillich, Karl Rahner, and the comparativists of religion in the West. While the theologians of the ethnocentric religions — like Judaism and Hinduism — are deliberately unecumenical, those of the other religions are for the most part altogether unaware of the problem.

Those who base their world theology on man happen to be today’s skeptics as far as religious truth is concerned. That was the conclusion of our analysis of the claim of Bernard Eugene Meland, as we have already seen. As we shall see below, the claim of Wilfred Cantwell Smith derives from the same skepticism regarding religious truth.

Finally, there are those who base their world theology on transcendent reality. These are the mystics. Fritjhof Schuon is the leading figure. His call for “the transcendent unity of the religions” (also the title of his book) has won him a number of followers, including such Muslim neo-Sufis as Hossein Nasr.

B. The Religious Skeptics

Trained as a historian, and often claiming to be one, Smith learned the historical method and assumed doubt to be the first principle of human knowledge. Applied to religion, this doubt is claimed to prove that there is no such thing as religion, that no such reality exists. What we call "religion," he claims, is a reified abstraction of the mind, created by our propensity to abstract from observed reality and to reify — or make into a thing or substance — the observation the mind has perceived.

Religion, he claims, is only a succession of states of consciousness which had better be named faith, or faithfulness. "Faith" is a personal quality, always an attribute of a person, an attribute that qualifies the person's fears, attitudes, and hopes and is hence changing at every moment. Like the river of Heraclitus, one never steps in the same river again. Faith is not religion; faith is dynamic, internal, personal, and ineffable, directly determining all attitudes and actions. Religion, on the other hand, is static, external, impersonal, a cumulation of states of faith, discursive epi-descriptions of something that once was and hence is subject to a thousand mistakes. These accumulated descriptions are then hypostatized as "religion," whereas they are nothing but cumulative abstractions of states of faith.

While this description of religion may be true of biblical Judaism and church Christianity, it can hardly apply to Islam, which the Qur'an declared to be "*al Islam*," "*al Din*," "*fiṭrat Allah*," revealed *in toto* and completely during the last two decades of the Prophet's life (SAAS), and recorded in an absolutely integral, historically established document — *al Qur'an al Karim*. Nobody, whether Muslim or otherwise, has confused his own personal faith with *al Islam*, as if they were one reality. Personal *Islam* as a *maṣḍar* (principle) distinct from *al Islam*, the religion of God recorded in the Qur'an. The Muslim seeks always to improve his personal faith to accord with the Qur'anic *al Islam*. The latter is normative, absolute, unchanging; the former, as Smith rightly indicates, is changing, relative to its subject. It is the reality to be judged by *al Islam*, *al furqān* (the criterion), of all judgment.

Further critical analysis of Smith's allegations may be read elsewhere (cf. this author's essay, "The Essence of Religious Experience in Islam," *Numen*, 1972). Suffice it to say that Smith's notion of religion does not even permit him to call himself a Christian. For how does he distinguish himself from the adherents of other religions without a constant unchanging substance (a *res*, as he called it) as norm and standard of Christian-ness? If Christianity were the river of Heraclitus, how could any issue of orthodoxy-heresy, of tradition-reform, or saintliness-sinfulness ever be recognized, let alone established?

And yet it is precisely on this really flimsy foundation that Smith builds

his theory of world theology. His argument is contained in his most recent publication, *Toward a World-Theology: Faith and The Comparative History of Religion* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1981) His claim is that, while the reified religious traditions of the world may differ from one another in the images they have built of themselves in the minds of adherents prone to reification, their condition of faithfulness, of believing in a transcendent reality, of having attitudes to life engendered by such notion, is one and the same. It is this condition that makes them human and distinguishes them from plants and animals. Faith, in a sense resembling piety, is common to all religious adherents and gives significance to life. Indeed, faith is the source and criterion of all significance.

Thus the notion of faith that does not distinguish between Christian and Christian — let alone between Christian and Muslim — is for Smith the basis of a world theology precisely because it does not distinguish at all. But however universal the state of having faith may be, it does not define religion. We understand religion not as a characteristic of the human person, like hunger, sex, fear, hope, pleasure, hatred, anger, or jealousy. Indeed, religion is that which determines what we do with any or all of these human propensities, including the propensity of faith. Is faithfulness as such any different from hunger? What kind of world theology can be built over a human propensity? or predicament?

Smith's answer that religious content does not matter derives from epistemological despair of ever being able to establish any religious claim. Questions of religious truth are for him, as for Meland, ever personal and subjective, ever relative, ever devoid of objective validity, a prerogative that belongs to empirical propositions alone. May religious content be treated with such epistemological unconcern, nay, contempt? Is it of such little importance for Smith whether a person has a faith that commits him to the saintly, self-sacrificial life of Jesus or to that of a vicious, debauched tyrant? Of what good is the description of both as "men of faith"? Obviously, Smith's world theology is epistemologically, ethically, and religiously worthless.

C. The Mystics

Unlike the claims of the skeptics, that of the mystics is old. Muslims have known it as claimed by the Batinis as well as Ibn 'Arabi, and world scholars have known it in the claims of the Advaita School of Shankara, the Deuta School of Ramanuja Hinduism, or the modern ecumenism of Sarvapalli-Radhakrishnan. Fritjhof Schuon's claim (*The Transcendent Unity of Religions*, Tr. by P. Townsend, London, 1953), and that of his follower and pupil, S. Hossein Nasr (*Ideals and Realities of Islam*, London, 1966), is not different as to substance, but only in insignificant detail.

Schuon and Nasr claim that all religions are anchored in a reality that is absolute and transcendent. This reality may be conceived of in personal, theistic terms, as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam do; but to perceive it otherwise, as Taoism and Buddhism do, is equally possible. All religions conceive of transcendent reality as normative, a source of standards or commandments relevant for the conduct of life. And all seek to center human consciousness and life on the transcendent reality because it is ultimate and absolute in all aspects.

The life of mankind hovers around its consciousness of this reality, for which it coined the words “sacred” and “holy.” Consciousness of the sacred and obedience to an emulation of the holy are the hallmarks of all religions. This attitude toward the holy is particularly evident by its absence from the contemporary West, as contrasted with its life of a previous age, and with Asian and African life where it still predominates, but where it is fighting what seems to be a losing battle against the threat of Western materialism, atheism, and secularism.

Schuon and Nasr affirm that in this relation of the religious to the sacred, a base may be found for a “*philosophia perennis*,” a “universal human religion.” Advocates of such universal religiosity, such as Pythagoras and the mystics of all religions, abound in history. But history has known them as belonging to differing traditions and cultures with differing consequences to their lives and those of their followers. It is nonetheless true that in proximity to and in consciousness of the sacred, humans curb their wills, repudiate the relativities of history, and walk humbly and lovingly together toward the source of all truth and all bliss.

This sounds more like wishful thinking than reality. Often, the fiercest religious opponents were mystics, endowed with differing insights into what transcendent or ultimate reality commanded, exhorted, or expected them to do. Granted the ontological qualities they ascribe to transcendent reality, and granted their common humble subservience to and love of that reality, nothing necessarily follows for human life, either from acknowledging its existence, its being transcendent and real, or from the attitude of humility and obedience it elicits and obtains from its advocates. It is certainly possible for diametrically opposed religious tenets and ethical commandments prescribing the most cruel savagery to issue from transcendent reality, from a sacred conceived to be sacred and holy by its followers. Indeed, isn't the history of confrontation between the religions, or between parties within one and the same religion, ample evidence that opposites may well claim to issue from a transcendental source?

As the Batinis and Ibn 'Arabi and their critics have told us in our own tradition, a reality esoterically known, however transcendent or real it may be, may be thought of as validating any view, any commandment. That is

why transcendent reality must give us this content through revelation or subject any content presented in its name to scrutiny by reason. Otherwise, there would be no telling whether the transcendent reality claim is indeed a reality or simply a great hallucination. That is why every Batini form of religion must end in corruption. It rejects *ex hypothesi* the possibility of correction, except by its own source and advocate. Unless that source is absolutely without blemish, and ever-right in the perception of truth and value — a condition no human can claim — Batini (esoteric) and mystical theories have all ended in exaggeration and abuse by their own followers.

As a world theology, mysticism's claim for a transcendent unity of all the religions is empty. It is on a par with the claim of ecumenical sentimentalism; and, though the claim is anchored in an affirmation rather than a negation, like the skeptics, it avails nothing. It does not provide criteria for settling differences among the religions of the world, nor does it provide positive indications for conduct. A critical world theology cannot be content with such affirmation, because it cannot rest with a relativist understanding of the content commanded.

IV. Towards an Islamic Theory of Meta-Religion

The relation of Islam to the other religions has been established by God in His revelation, the Qur'an. No Muslim therefore may deny it, since for him the Qur'an is the ultimate religious authority. Muslims regard the Qur'an as God's own word *verbatim*, the final and definitive revelation of His will for all space and time, for all mankind.

The only kind of contention possible for the Muslim is that of exegetical variation. But in this realm, the scope of variation is limited in two directions. First, continuity of Muslim practice throughout the centuries constitutes an irrefutable testament to the meanings attributed to the Qur'anic verses. Second, the methodology of Muslim orthodoxy in exegesis rests on the principle that Arabic lexicography, grammar, and syntax, which have remained frozen and in perpetual use by the millions ever since their crystallization in the Qur'an, leave no contention without solution.²⁵ These facts explain the universality with which Qur'anic principles have been understood and observed, despite the widest possible variety of ethnic cultures, languages, races, and customs characterizing the Muslim world, from Morocco to Indonesia, and from Russia and the Balkans to the heart of Africa.

As for the non-Muslims, they may contest the principles of Islam. They must know, however, that Islam does not present its principles dogmatically, for those who believe or wish to believe, exclusively. It does so rationally, critically. It comes to us armed with logical and coherent arguments and ex-

pects our acquiescence on rational, and hence necessary, grounds. It is not legitimate for us to disagree on the relativist basis of personal taste or that of subjective experience.

We propose to analyze Islam's ideational relation in three stages: that which pertains to Judaism and Christianity, that which pertains to other religions, and that which pertains to religion as such, and hence to all humans, whether they belong to any or no religion.

A. Judaism and Christianity

Islam accords to these two religions special status. First, each of them is the religion of God. Their founders on earth – Abraham, Moses, David, Jesus – are the prophets of God. What they have conveyed – the Torah, the Psalms, the Evangel (gospels) – are revelations from God. To believe in these prophets, in the revelations they have brought, is integral to the very faith of Islam. To disbelieve in them, nay to discriminate between them, is apostasy. “Our Lord and your Lord is indeed God, the One and Only God.”²⁶ God described His Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) and his followers as “believing all that has been revealed from God”; as “believing in God, in His angels, in His revelations and prophets”; as “not-distinguishing among the prophets of God.”²⁷

Arguing with Jews and Christians who object to this self-identification and claim an exclusivist monopoly on the former prophets, the Qur'an says: “You claim that Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob and their tribes were Jews or Christians [and God claims otherwise]. Would you claim knowledge in these matters superior to God's?”²⁸ “Say, [Muhammad,] We believe in God, in what has been revealed by Him to us, what has been revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, the tribes; in what has been conveyed to Moses, to Jesus and all the prophets from their Lord.”²⁹ “We have revealed [Our revelation] to you [Muhammad] as We did to Noah and the prophets after him, to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, the tribes, to Jesus, Job, Jonah, Aaron, Solomon, and David.”³⁰ “It is God indeed, the living and eternal One, that revealed to you [Muhammad] the Book [i.e., the Qur'an] confirming the previous revelations. For it is He Who revealed the Torah and the Gospels as His guidance to mankind . . . Who revealed the Psalms to David.”³¹ “Those who believe [in you, Muhammad], the Jews, the Christians or the Sabaeans – all those who believe in God and in the Day of Judgment, and have done good works, will receive their due reward from God. They have no cause to fear, nor will they grieve.”³²

The honor with which Islam regards Judaism and Christianity, their founders and scriptures, is not courtesy but acknowledgment of religious truth.

Islam sees them in the world not as “other views” that it has to tolerate, but as standing *de jure* as truly revealed religions from God. Moreover, their legitimate status is neither sociopolitical, nor cultural or civilizational, but religious. In this, Islam is unique. For no religion in the world has yet made belief in the truth of other religions a necessary condition of its own faith and witness.

Consistently, Islam pursues this acknowledgment of religious truth in Judaism and Christianity to its logical conclusion, namely, self-identification with them. Identity of God, the source of revelation in the three religions, necessarily leads to identity of the revelations and of the religions. Islam does not see itself as coming to the religious scene *ex nihilo* but as reaffirmation of the same truth presented by all the preceding prophets of Judaism and Christianity. It regards them all as Muslims, and their revelations as one and the same as its own.³³ Together with Hanifism, the monotheistic and ethical religion of pre-Islamic Arabia, Judaism, Christianity and Islam constitute crystallizations of one and the same religious consciousness whose essence and core is one and the same. The unity of this religious consciousness can easily be seen by the historian of civilization concerned with the ancient Near East. It is traceable in the literatures of these ancient peoples³⁴ and is supported by the unity of their physical theater or geography, in their languages (for which they are called “Semitic”), and in the unity of artistic expression.

This unity of the religious consciousness of the Near East consists of five dominant principles that characterize the known literatures of the peoples of this region. They are: (1) the ontic disparateness of God, the Creator, from His creatures, unlike the attitudes of ancient Egyptians, Indians, or Chinese, according to which God or the Absolute is immanently His own creatures; (2) the purpose of man’s creation as neither God’s self-contemplation nor man’s enjoyment, but unconditional service to God on earth, His own “manor”; (3) the relevance of Creator to creature, or the will of God, as the content of revelation and as expressed in terms of law, of oughts and moral imperatives; (4) man, the servant, as master of the manor under God, capable of transforming it through his own efficacious action into what God desires it to be; and (5) that man’s obedience to and fulfillment of the divine command results in happiness and felicity, its opposite in suffering and damnation, thus coalescing worldly and cosmic justice together.

The unity of “Semitic” religious and cultural consciousness was not affected by intrusion of the Egyptians in the days of their empire (1465-1165 B.C.),³⁵ nor by the Philistines from Caphtor (Crete?), nor by the Hittites, Kassites, or “People of the Mountains” (the Aryan tribes?), who were all semiticized and assimilated, despite their military conquests.³⁶ Islam has taken all this for granted. It has called the central religious tradition of the Semitic peoples “Hanifism” and identified itself with it. Unfortunately for the early

Muslim scholars who benefited from this insight as they labored, the language, histories, and literatures furnished by archeology and the disciplines of the ancient Near East were not yet available. Hence they scrambled after the smallest bits of oral tradition, which they systematized for us under the title of "History of the Prophets." In reading their materials, we must remember, however, that the accurate-knowledge of Abraham, of Julius Caesar, of 'Amr ibn al 'As³⁷ and of Napoleon, about the Sphinx or the pyramids of Egypt, for instance, was equal – i.e., nil.

The Islamic concept of "Hanif" should not be compared to Karl Rahner's "anonymous Christians." "Hanif" is a Qur'anic category, not the invention of a modern theologian embarrassed by his church's exclusivist claim to divine grace. It has been operating within the Islamic ideational system for fourteen centuries. Those to whom it is attributed are the paradigms of faith and greatness, the most honored representatives of religious life, not the despised though tolerated approximators of the religious ideal. Islam's honoring of the ancient prophets and their followers is to be maintained even if the Jews and Christians stop or diminish their loyalty to them. "Worthier of Abraham are those who really follow him, this prophet and those who believe in him."³⁸ In the Qur'an, the Christians are exalted for their self-discipline and humility, and they are declared the closest of all believers to the Muslims. "[O Muhammad], you and the believers will find closest in love and friendship those who say 'We are Christians,' for many of them are ministers and priests who are truly humble."³⁹ If, despite all this commendation of them, of their prophets, and of their scriptures, Jews and Christians would persist in opposing and rejecting the Prophet and his followers, God commanded all Muslims to call the Jews and Christians in these words:

O People of the Book, come now with us to rally around a fair and noble principle common to both of us, that all of us shall worship and serve none but God, that we shall associate naught with Him, and that we shall not take one another as lords beside God. But if they still persist in their opposition, then warn them that We shall persist in our affirmation.⁴⁰

Evidently, Islam has given the maximum that can ever be given to another religion. It has acknowledged as true the other religion's prophets and founders, their scriptures and teaching. Islam has declared its God and the God of the religions of Jews and Christians as One and the same. It has declared the Muslims the assistants, friends, and supporters of the adherents of the other religions, under God. If, after all this, differences persist, Islam holds them to be of no consequence. Such differences must not be substantial. They can be surmounted and resolved through more knowledge, good will and wisdom.

Islam treats them as domestic disputes within one and the same religious family. And as long as we both recognize that God alone is Lord to each and every one of us, no difference and no disagreement is beyond solution. Our religious, cultural, social, economic, and political differences may all be composed under the principle that God alone — not any one of us, not our passions, our egos, or our prejudices — is God.

B. The Other Religions

Islam teaches that the phenomenon of prophecy is universal; that it has taken place throughout all space and time. “Every human,” the Qur’an affirms,

is responsible for his own personal deeds. On the Day of Judgment, We shall produce publicly the record of such deeds and ask everyone to examine it as it alone will be the basis of reckoning. Whoever is rightly guided is so to his own credit; whoever errs does so to his own discredit. There is no vicarious guilt; and We shall not condemn [i.e., We shall not judge] until We had sent a prophet.⁴¹

It follows from God’s absolute justice that He would hold nobody responsible unless His law has been conveyed, promulgated and is known. Such conveyance or promulgation is precisely the phenomenon of prophecy. The same principle was operative in the ancient Near East, where the states carved their laws in stone stelae that they erected everywhere for people to read. Ignorance of the divine law is indeed an argument when it is not the effect of unconcern or neglect, and it is always an attenuating factor. Being absolutely just as well as absolutely merciful and forgiving, God, Islam holds, left no people without a prophet to teach them the divine law. “There is no people,” the Qur’an asserts, “but a warner/prophet has been sent to them.”⁴² Some of these prophets are widely known; others are not. So neither the Jewish nor the Christian nor the Muslim ignorance of them implies their nonexistence. “We have indeed sent prophets before you [Muhammad]. About some of them We have informed you. About others We have not.”⁴³ Thus the whole of mankind, past and present, is capable of religious merit and felicity as well as of demerit and damnation, because of the universality of prophecy.

As Islam conceives it, the divine system is one of perfect justice. Universalism and absolute egalitarianism are constitutive of it. Hence, the phenomenon of prophecy not only must needs be universally present but its content must needs be absolutely the same. If different in each case, the universalism of the phenomenon would have little effect. Therefore Islam teaches

that the prophets of all times and places have taught one and the same lesson; that God has not differentiated among His messengers. "We have sent to every people a messenger," the Qur'an affirms, "to teach them that worship and service are due to God alone; that evil must be avoided [and the good pursued]."⁴⁴ "We have sent no messenger except to convey [the divine message] in the tongue of his own people, to make it [the content] clearly comprehensible to them."⁴⁵ With this reassurance, no human has any excuse for failing to acknowledge God, or to obey His law." "[We have sent to every people] prophets to preach and to warn, that no human may have an argument against God[s judgment of that individual's deeds]."⁴⁶

Islam thus lays the ground for a relation with all peoples, not only with Jews and Christians, whose prophets are confirmed in the Qur'an. Having once been the recipients of revelation, and of a revelation that is identical to that of Islam, the whole of mankind may be recognized by Muslims as equally honored, as they are, by virtue of revelation and also as equally responsible, as they are, to acknowledge God as the only God and to offer Him worship, service, and obedience to His eternal laws.

If, as Islam holds, all prophets have conveyed one and the same message, whence the tremendous variety of the historical religions of mankind? To this question, Islam furnishes a theoretical answer and a practical one.

1. Islam holds that the messages of all prophets had but one essence and core composed of two elements. First is *tawhid*, or the acknowledgment that God alone is God and that all worship, service, and obedience are due to Him alone. Second is morality, which the Qur'an defines as service to God, doing good, and avoiding evil.

Each revelation had come figurized in a code of behavior particularly applicable to its people, and hence relevant to their historical situation and conditions. This particularization does not affect the essence or core of the revelation. If it did, God's justice would not be absolute and the claims of universalism and egalitarianism would fall to the ground. Particularization in the divine law must therefore affect the "how" of service, not its purpose or "what," the latter being always the good, righteousness, justice, and obedience to God. If it ever affects the "what," it must do so only in those areas that are nonconstitutive and hence unimportant and accidental. This principle has the special merit of rallying humanity, whether potentially or actually, around common principles of religion and morality; of removing such principles from contention, from relativism and subjectivism.⁴⁷

There is therefore a legitimate ground for the religious variety in history. In His mercy, God has taken due account of the particular conditions of each people. He has revealed to them all a message that is the same in essence; but He has conveyed to each one of them His law in a prescriptive form rele-

vant to their particular conditions, to their own grade of development on the human scale. And we may conclude that such differences are *de jure* as they do not affect the essence.

2. The second cause of religious diversity is not as benevolent as the first. The first, we have seen, is divine; the second, human. To acknowledge and do the will of God conveyed through revelation is not always welcomed by all men. There are those with vested interests that may not agree with the divine dispensations, and there are numerous circumstances favoring such disagreement.

First, divine revelation has practically always and everywhere advocated charity and altruism, ministering by the rich to the material needs of the poor. The rich do not always acquiesce in this moral imperative and may incline against it. Second, divine revelation is nearly always in favor of ordered social living. It would counsel obedience of the ruled to the law and self-discipline. But it always does so under the assumption of a rule of justice, which may not always be agreeable to rulers and kings who seek to have their own way. Their will power may incline them against the social ethic of revelation.

Third, divine revelation always reminds man to measure himself by reference to God and His law, not by reference to himself. But man is vain; and self-adoration is for him a constant temptation. Fourth, revelation demands of humans that they discipline their instincts and keep their emotions under control. Humans however, are inclined to indulgence. Orgies of instinct-satisfaction and emotional excitement have punctuated human life. Often, this inclination militates against revelation.

Fifth, where the contents of revelation are not judiciously and meticulously remembered, taught, and observed publicly and by the greatest numbers, they tend to be forgotten. When they are transmitted from generation to generation and are not embodied in public customs observed by all, the divine imperatives may suffer dilution, shift of emphasis, or change. Finally, when the divine revelation is moved across linguistic, ethnic, and cultural frontiers — indeed, even to generations within the same people but far removed from its original recipients in time — it may well change through interpretation. Any or all of these circumstances may bring about a corruption of the original revelation.

This is why God has seen fit to repeat the phenomenon of prophecy, to send forth prophets to reconvey the divine message and reestablish it in the minds and hearts of humans. This divine injection into history is an act of sheer mercy. It is continual, always ad hoc, unpredictable. To those who inquire, What was the rationale behind sending Muhammad (SAAS) at that time and place? the Qur'an answers: "God knows better where and when to send prophets to convey His message."⁴⁸

C. Islam's Relation to all Humans

Islam has related itself equally to all other religions, whether recognized, historical, or otherwise. Indeed, even to the a-religionists and atheists – of whatever hue – Islam has related itself in a constructive manner, its purpose being to rehabilitate them as integral members of society.

This relation constitutes Islam's humanism. At its root stands the reason for creation, man's *raison d'être*. The first mention of the divine plan to create man occurs in a conversation with the angels.

I plan to place on earth a vicegerent for Me. The angels responded: Would you place on earth a being who would also do evil and shed blood while we always praise and glorify and obey You? God said: I have another purpose unknown to you.⁴⁹

The angels, evidently, are beings created by God to act as His messengers or instruments. By nature, they are incapable of acting otherwise than as God instructs them to act, and hence they are incapable of morality. Their necessary predicament, always to do God's bidding, differentiates them from the human creature God was about to place on earth.

In another dramatic and eloquent passage, the Qur'an reports: "We [God] offered the trust to heaven and earth and mountain. They refused to carry it out of fear. But man did carry it."⁵⁰ In the heavens, on earth, and in the mountains, God's will is fulfilled with the necessity of natural law. Creation therefore, to the exclusion of man, is incapable of fulfilling the higher part of God's will, namely, the moral law. Only man is so empowered. For morality requires that its fulfillment be free: that its opposite or alternative, that which is amoral or immoral, be possible of fulfillment by the same person at the same time and in the same respect. It is of the nature of the moral deed that it be done when the agent could do otherwise. Without that option or possibility, morality would not be morality. If done unconsciously or under coercion, the moral deed might have utilitarian but no moral value.

Vicegerency of God on earth means man's transformation of creation – including above all himself – into the patterns of God. It means obedient fulfillment of His command, which includes all values, all ethical imperatives. The highest of imperatives are the moral. Since man alone is capable of moral action, only he can carry the "divine trust" from which "heaven and earth and mountain" shied away. Man therefore has cosmic significance. He is the only creature through whom the higher part of the divine will could be realized in space and time.

To clarify the *raison d'être* of man, the Qur'an has rhetorically asked mankind: "Would you then think that We have created you in vain?"⁵¹ The

Qur'an further praises "men of understanding" who affirm: "O God! Certainly You have not created all this [creation] in vain!"⁵² As to the deniers of such a purpose for creation, the Qur'an turns to an assertive, even offensive tone. "Indeed We have not created heaven and earth and all that is between in vain. That is the presumption of unbelievers. Woe and Fire to them."⁵³ As to the content of the divine purpose, the Qur'an asserts: "And I have not created men and *jinn* except to worship/serve Me."⁵⁴ The verb *'abada* means worship as well as serve. It has been used in this double sense in all Semitic languages. In the Qur'an, it is given further elaboration by the more specific answers given to the same questions of why creation? Why man? "It is He Who created heaven and earth . . . that you [mankind] may prove yourselves in His eye the worthier in the deed." "And it is He Who made you His vicegerents on earth . . . that you may prove yourselves worthy of all that He had bestowed upon you."⁵⁵

In order to enable man to fulfill his *raison d'être*, God has created him capable and "in the best of forms."⁵⁶ He has given him all the equipment necessary to achieve fulfillment of the divine imperatives. Above all, "God, Who created everything perfect . . . created man out of earth . . . perfected and breathed into him of His own spirit." He has bestowed upon him "his hearing, his sight and his heart [the cognitive faculties]."⁵⁷ Above all, God has given man his mind, his reason, and understanding, with which to discover and use the world in which he lives. He has made the earth and all that is in it – indeed, the whole of creation including the human self – malleable, that is, capable of change and of transformation by man's action, of engineering designed to fulfill man's purposes.

In religious language, God has made nature "subservient" to man. He has granted mankind "lordship" over nature. This is also the meaning of man's *khilafah* or vicegerency of God in the world. The Qur'an is quite emphatic in this regard: "God has made the ships [the winds which drive them] subject to you. . . . And the rivers. . . the sun and moon, day and night."⁵⁸ "He has made the seas subservient to you. . . camels and cattle. . . all that is on earth and in heaven."⁵⁹ God has planted man on earth precisely to "reconstruct and use it as a usufruct"⁶⁰ and to this purpose, made him "lord of the earth."⁶¹ In order to make this engineering of nature and its usufruct possible, God has imbedded in it His *sunan* or patterns,⁶² the so-called laws of nature which we know to be permanent and immutable solely through our faith that He is not a malicious but a beneficent God.⁶³ Reading God's patterns in nature or creation is equally possible in psychic or social nature⁶⁴ thus opening nearly all areas of creation to human observation and cognition, as well as a fair portion of the divine purpose or will.

Besides all this, God has revealed His will through the prophets directly and immediately, and commanded them to proclaim it to their peoples in their

own tongues. He has sent the Prophet Muhammad with a final version which he covenanted to guard against tampering and corruption,⁶⁵ and which has been preserved intact, along with Arabic grammar and syntax, lexicography, etymology, and philology — all the linguistic apparatus required to understand it exactly as it was revealed. Certainly this was a gratuitous gesture, an act of pure charity and mercy, on the part of the benevolent God. Its purpose is to make man's knowledge and fulfillment of the divine will easier and more accessible.

Every human being, Islam affirms, stands to benefit from these divine dispensations. The road to felicity is a free and open highway which anyone may tread of his own accord. Everybody is innately endowed with all these rights and privileges. God has granted them to all without discrimination. "Nature," "the earth," "the heavens" — all belong to each and every human.

Indeed, God has done all this and even more! He has implanted His own religion into every human at birth. The true religion is innate, a *religio naturalis*, with which all humans are equipped.⁶⁶ Behind the dazzling religious diversity of mankind stands an innate religion inseparable from human nature. This is the primordial religion, the *Ur-Religion*, the one and only true religion.⁶⁷ Everyone possesses it unless acculturation and indoctrination, misguidance, corruption or dissuasion have taught him otherwise.⁶⁸ All men, therefore, possess a faculty, a "sixth sense," a *sensus communis* with which they can perceive God as God. Rudolph Otto called it "the sense of the numinous"⁶⁹ and phenomenologists of religion have recognized it as the faculty that perceives the religious as "religious," as "sacred,"⁷⁰ autonomous and *sui generis*, without reductionism.

Finally, Islam entertains no idea of "the fall of man," no concept of "original sin." It holds no man to stand in an innate, necessary predicament out of which he cannot pull himself. Man, it holds, is innocent. He is born with his innocence. Indeed, he is born with a thousand perfections, with faculties of understanding, and an innate sense with which to know God. In this all men are equal, since it follows from their very existence, from their creatureliness. This is the basis for Islamic universalism.

Concerning morality and piety, man's career on earth, Islam countenances no distinction among humans, no division of them into races or nations, castes or classes. All men, it holds, "issued from a single pair," their division into peoples and tribes being a convention designed for mutual acquaintance.⁷¹ "Nobler among you," the Qur'an asserts, "is only the more righteous."⁷² And the Prophet added, in his farewell sermon: "No Arab may have any distinction over a non-Arab, no white over non-white, except in righteousness."⁷³

V. Islamic Meta-Religion in History

Under these precepts, whether explicitly revealed in the *ipissima verba* of God or implied therein, the Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) worked out and proclaimed the constitution of the first Islamic state. He had barely arrived in Madinah (July 622 A.C.) when he brought together all the inhabitants of Madinah and its environs and promulgated with them the Islamic state and its constitution. This event was of capital importance for the relation of Islam to the other religions, and of non-Muslims to Muslims of all times and places. Four years after the Prophet's demise in 10/632, 'Umar ibn al Khattab (RAA), the second caliph, ordered that the date of promulgation of this constitution was so crucial for Islam as a world movement that it should be considered the beginning of Islamic history.

The constitution was a covenant, whose guarantor was Allah (SWT), between the Prophet, the Muslims, and the Jews. It abolished the tribal system of Arabia under which the Arab defined himself and by which society was governed. Henceforth, the Arab was to be defined by Islam; his personal and social life was to be governed by Islamic law, the *shari'ah*. The old tribal loyalties gave way to a new social bond which tied every Muslim to all other Muslims across tribal lines, to form the *ummah*. The *ummah* is an organic body whose constituents mutually sustain and protect one another. Their personal, reciprocal, and collective responsibilities are all defined by law. The Prophet was to be its chief political and juristic authority; and, as long as he lived, he exercised this power. After his death, his *khulafa'* (pl. of *khalifah*, "successor") exercised political authority, while juristic authority devolved exclusively upon the '*ulama'* (the jurists), who had by then developed a methodology for interpretation, renewal, and expansion of the *shari'ah*.

A. The Jewish Ummah

Alongside this *ummah* of Muslims stood the *ummah* of the Jews. Their old tribalist loyalties to the Arab Aws and Khazraj tribes were to be supplanted by the bond of Judaism. Instead of their citizenship being a function of their clientship to this or that Arab tribe, it was hence to be a function of their Jewishness. Their life was to be structured around Jewish institutions and governed by the Torah, their revealed law. Political authority was vested in the chief rabbi who was also known as *Resh Galut*, while juristic authority rested with the system of rabbinic courts. Overarching both *ummahs* was a third organization, also called *al ummah*, or *al dawlah al Islamiyyah* (the Islamic polity, government, or "state") whose constituents were the two *ummahs* and whose *raison d'être* was the protection of the state, the conduct of

its external affairs, and the carrying out of Islam's universal mission. The "state" could conscript the *ummah* of Muslims in its services, whether for peace or for war, but not the *ummah* of Jews. Jews, however, could volunteer their services to it if they wished. Neither the Muslim nor the Jewish *ummah* was free to conduct any relation with a foreign power, much less to declare war or peace with any other state or foreign organization. This remained the exclusive jurisdiction of the Islamic state.

The Jews, who entered freely into this covenant with the Prophet (ṢAAS) and whose status the new constitution raised from tribal clients on sufferance to citizens *de jure* of the state, later betrayed it. The sad consequence was, first, the fining of one group, followed by the expulsion of another group found guilty of greater offense, and finally the execution of a third group that plotted with the enemy to destroy the Islamic state and the Islamic movement. Although these judgments were made by the Prophet himself (ṢAAS), or by an arbiter agreed upon by the parties concerned, the Muslims did not understand them as directed against the Jews as such, but against the guilty individuals only. Islam recognizes no vicarious guilt. Hence, when the Islamic state later expanded to include northern Arabia, Palestine, Jordan and Syria, Persia, and Egypt, where numerous Jews lived, they were automatically treated as innocent constituents of the Jewish *ummah* within the Islamic state. This explains the harmony and cooperation that characterized Muslim-Jewish relations throughout the succeeding centuries.

For the first time in history since the Babylonian invasion of 586 B.C., and as citizens of the Islamic state, the Jew could model his life after the Torah and do so legitimately, supported by the public laws of the state where he resided. For the first time, a non-Jewish state put its executive power at the service of a rabbinic court. For the first time, the state-institution assumed responsibility for the maintenance of Jewishness, and declared itself ready to use its power to defend the Jewishness of Jews against the enemies of Jewishness, be they Jews or non-Jews.

After centuries of Greek, Roman, and Byzantine (Christian) oppression and persecution, the Jews of the Near East, of North Africa, of Spain, and Persia, looked upon the Islamic state as a liberator. Many of them readily helped its armies in their conquests and cooperated enthusiastically with the Islamic state administration. This cooperation was followed by acculturation into Arabic and Islamic culture, which produced a dazzling blossoming of Jewish arts, letters, sciences, and medicine. It brought affluence and prestige to the Jews, some of whom became ministers and advisers to the caliphs. Indeed, Judaism and its Hebrew language developed their "golden age" under the aegis of Islam. Hebrew acquired its first grammar, the Torah its most highly developed jurisprudence, Hebrew letters their lyrical poetry; and Hebrew philosophy found its first Aristotelian, Musa ibn Maymun (Maimonides),

whose thirteen precepts, couched in Arabic first, defined the Jewish creed and identity. Judaism developed its first mystical thinker as well, Ibn Gabirol, whose “Sufi” thought brought reconciliation and inner peace to Jews throughout Europe. Under ‘Abd al Rahman III in Cordoba, the Jewish prime minister, Hasdai ben Shapirut, managed to effect reconciliation between Christian monarchs whom even the Catholic Church could not bring together. All this was possible because of one Islamic principle on which it all rested, namely, the recognition of the Torah as revelation and of Judaism as God’s religion, which the Qur’an attested and proclaimed.

B. The Christian Ummah

Shortly after the conquest of Makkah by Muslim forces in 8/630, the Christians of Najran in Yaman sent a delegation of chieftains to meet the Prophet (SAAS) in Madinah. Their purpose was to clarify their position vis-à-vis the Islamic state, and that of the state vis-a-vis them. The conquest of Makkah had made the Islamic state a power to reckon with in the region. The delegates were the guests of the Prophet (SAAS), and he received them in his house and entertained them in his mosque. He explained Islam to them and called them to convert to his faith and cause. Some of them did and instantly became members of the Muslim *ummah*. Others did not. They chose to remain Christian, and to join the Islamic state as Christians. The Prophet constituted them as a Christian *ummah*, alongside the Jewish and Muslim *ummahs*, within the Islamic state. He sent with them one of his companions, Mu’adh ibn Jabal (RAA), to represent the Islamic state in their midst. They converted to Islam in the period of the second caliph (12-24/634-646), but the Christian *ummah* in the Islamic state continued to grow by the expansion of its frontiers to the north and west. Indeed, for the greater part of a century, the majority of the citizens of the Islamic state were Christians, enjoying respect, liberty, and a new dignity they had not enjoyed under either Christian Rome or Byzantium. Both these powers were imperialist and racist and they tyrannized their subjects as they colonized the territories of the Near East.

An objective account of the conversion of the Christians of the Near East to Islam⁷⁴ should be required reading for all, especially for those still laboring under the Crusades—old prejudice that Islam was spread among Christians by the sword. Christians lived in peace and prospered under Islam for centuries, during which time the Islamic state saw righteous as well as tyrannic sultans and caliphs. Had it been a part of Islamic sentiment to do away with the Christian presence, it could have been done without a ripple in the world or history. But it was Islam’s respect for and acknowledgment of Jesus as Prophet of God and of his Evangel (gospel) as revelation that safeguarded that presence. The same is true of Abyssinia, a neighboring Christian state,

which harbored the first Muslim emigrants from the wrath of Makkah and maintained with the Islamic state at the time of the Prophet a covenant of peace and friendship. The expansive designs of the Islamic state never included Abyssinia precisely on that account.

C. Ummah of Other Religions

Persia's incursion into Arabia had left behind it some, though very few, Arab converts to the Zoroastrian faith. A larger number of these lived in the buffer desert zone between Persia and Byzantium, and in Shatt al 'Arab, the lower region of the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, where Arabia and Persia overlapped. Notable among the Persian Zoroastrians in Arabia was Salman al Farisi (RAA), who converted to Islam before the Hijrah and became one of the illustrious companions of the Prophet (SAAS).

According to some traditions, it was the Prophet himself (SAAS) who, in the "Year of Delegations" (8-9/630-631), the year that saw the tribes and regions of Arabia sending delegations to Madinah to pledge their fealty to the Islamic state, recognized the Zoroastrians as another *umma* within the Islamic state. Very soon afterward, the Islamic state conquered Persia and included all its millions within its citizenry. Those who converted to Islam joined the *umma* of Muslims, and the millions of others who chose to remain Zoroastrian were accorded the same privileges and duties accorded by the constitution to the Jews. The Prophet (SAAS) had already extended their application to the Christians eight years after the constitution was enacted. They were extended to apply to the Zoroastrians in 14/636, following the conquest of Persia by the Prophet's companions (RAA), if not sooner by the Prophet himself (SAAS).

Following the conquest of India by Muhammad bin Qasim in 91/711, the Muslims faced new religions which they had never known before, Buddhism and Hinduism. Both religions co-existed in Sind and the Punjab, the regions conquered by Muslims and joined to the Islamic state. Muhammad bin Qasim sought instruction from the caliph in Damascus on how to treat Hindus and Buddhists. They appeared to worship idols, and their doctrines were at the farthest remove from Islam. Their founders were unheard of by Muslims. The caliph called a council of *ulama* and asked them to render judgment on the basis of the governor's report. The judgment was that as long as Hindus and Buddhists did not fight the Islamic state, as long as they paid the *jizyah* or tax due, they must be free to worship their gods as they please, to maintain their temples, and to determine their lives by the precepts of their faith. Thus, the same status as that of the Jews and Christians was accorded to them.⁷⁵

The principle governing Islam and the Islamic state's relations with other

religions and their adherents had thus been established. It was implemented as the Islamic state entered into relations with those adherents, a process that took place either during the Prophet's life or very soon after it. When the *shari'ah* crystallized in prescriptive form, the status, rights, and obligations of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens were already included. For fourteen centuries in many places, or less because of a later arrival of Islam or the imposition of Western law by colonial administrations, the *Shari'ah* successfully governed Muslim - non-Muslim relations. It created a *modus vivendi* that enabled the non-Muslims to perpetuate themselves — hence their continuing presence in the Muslim world — and to achieve felicity as defined by their own faiths.

The atmosphere of the Islamic state was one replete with respect and honor to religion, piety, and virtue, unlike the tolerance of modern times in the West born out of skepticism regarding the truth of religious claims, of cynicism and unconcern for religious values. The Islamic *shari'ah* is otherwise known as the *millah* or *millet* system (meaning “religious communities”), or the “*dhimmah*” or *zimmi* system (meaning the covenant of peace whose *dhimmah* or guarantor is God).

Evil rulers cannot be denied to have existed in the Muslim world any more than in any other empire. Where they existed, Muslims suffered as well as non-Muslims. Nowhere in Islamic history, however, were non-Muslims singled out for prosecution or persecution. The constitution that protected them was taken by Muslims to be God-inspired, God-protected. The Prophet (SAAS) had already warned: “Whoever oppresses any *dhimmi*, I shall be his prosecutor on the Day of Judgment.” No other religion or societal system has ever regarded the religious minority in better light, integrated it into the stream of the majority with as little damage to either party, or treated it without injustice or unfairness as Islam did. Indeed, none could. Islam succeeded in a field where all other religions failed because of its unique theology, which recognized the true, one, and only religion of God to be innate in every person, the primordial base of all religions, identical with Sabaeianism, Judaism, and Christianity.

Evidently, far from being a national state, the Islamic state is a world order in which numerous religious communities, national or transnational, co-exist in peace. The universal *Pax Islamica* recognizes the legitimacy of every religious community, and grants it the right to order its life in accordance with its own religious genius. It is superior to the United Nations because, instead of national sovereignty as the principle of membership, it has taken the principle of religious identity. Its constitution is divine law, valid for all, and may be invoked in any Muslim court by anyone, be he a simple Muslim or non-Muslim individual or the chief of the largest religious community.

VI. Conclusion: The Critical Methodology of Islam

Let us, in conclusion, review the characteristics of meta-religion according to Islam, those characteristics that make it rational and critical.

A. Islamic meta-religion does not a priori condemn any religion. Indeed, it gives every religion the benefit of the doubt and more. Islamic meta-religion assumes that every religion is God-revealed, God-ordained, until it is historically proven beyond doubt that the constitutive elements of that religion are human made.

B. Islamic meta-religion readily links the religions of history with the divine source on the ground that there is no people or group but God had sent them a prophet to teach them the same lesson of religion, of piety and virtue.

C. Islamic meta-religion grants ready accreditation to all humans in their religious attempts to formulate and express religious truth. For it acknowledges all humans to have been born with all that is necessary to know God and His will, the moral law, to discriminate between good and evil.

D. Islamic meta-religion is painfully aware of human passions, prejudices, and deficiencies and of their sinister influence upon what was revealed or discovered to be primordial religion (*din al fitrah*) or primordial truth. Thus, it calls upon all humans, especially the '*ulama*' of each religion, to subject their religious traditions to rational, critical examination, and to discard those elements that are proven to be human additions, emendations, or falsifications. In this task of historical criticism of all the religions of history, all humans are brothers and must cooperate to establish the primordial truth underlying all the religions.

E. Islamic meta-religion honors human reason to the point of making it equivalent to revelation in the sense that neither can discard the other without imperiling itself. That is why in Islamic methodology, no contradiction, or non-correspondence with reality, can be final or ultimate. The Islamic scholar of religion is therefore ever tolerant, ever open to evidence, ever critical.

F. Islamic meta-religion is humanistic *par excellence*, in that it assumes all men to be innocent, not fallen or vitiated at birth, capable of discerning good and evil, free to choose according to their reason, conscience, or best knowledge, and personally, that is, individually, responsible for their own deeds.

G. Islamic meta-religion is world- and life-affirmative, in that it assumes creation, life, and history not to be in vain, not the work of a blind force, or of a trickster-god, but ordered to lead to value. It acknowledges the critical principle that nature is incapable by itself to produce critical self-consciousness and a trickster-god would be in foolish self-contradiction to create man and endow him with his critical faculties.

H. Finally, Islamic meta-religion is an institution, not a mere theory, tested by fourteen centuries of continuous application, of success against tremendous odds. It alone among the religions and ideologies of the world was large enough in heart, in spirit as well as in letter, to give mankind the gift of a pluralism of laws with which to govern their lives under the aegis of its own meta-religious principles and laws. It alone acknowledged such plurality of laws as religiously and politically *de jure*, while it called their adherents with wisdom and fair argument to consider rationally, critically, and freely why they should not unite under the banner of the one religion that is the one and only meta-religion.

NOTES

- ¹ Joachim Wach, *The Comparative Study of Religion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 30 ff.
- ² Gilbert Murray, *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co, 1951), p. 73 ff.
- ³ I Corinthians 10:20.
- ⁴ Clement of Alexandria, *Exhortations* I, II.
- ⁵ Justin Martyre, *Apology* I, 16:1-4; Ireneus, *Against Heresies*, I, 24:1-2. This apologete of Christianity identified Socrates as a Christian following his gnostic assertion that Jesus was *logos* (Mind or reason) and that Socrates participated in Jesus as rational faculty.
- ⁶ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromathais* I, 13.
- ⁷ For a comprehensive survey of Christian thinking and attitude to Islam and its people, see the works of Norman Daniels and Jacques Waardenburg.
- ⁸ Ushenko, Andrew Paul, *The Field Theory of Meaning* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 111 ff.
- ⁹ This has been well pointed out by Joseph M. Kitagawa in the opening essay on "The History of Religions in America" in *The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology*, edited by himself and M. Eliade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 26, where he says: "One must study the historical development of a religion, in itself and in interaction with the culture and society. One must try to understand the emotional makeup of the religious community and its reaction or relation to the outside world . . . There must be added a religious-sociological analysis, in our sense of the term, the aim of which is to analyze the social background, to describe the structure and to ascertain the sociologically relevant implications of the religious movement."
- ¹⁰ To take an example from this author's study of Christianity, (*Christian Ethics: A Historical and Systematic Analysis of Its Dominant Idea* [Montreal, McGill University Press, 1967], "The Fall" or "Original Sin" is a datum of the Christian religion. We must first understand what it means discursively, by reading the definition and analyses of Hebraic and Jewish thinkers for the Old Testament precursors, and of Christian thinkers from the New Testament to Paul Tillich. Having grasped the doctrinal development of the idea, we then relate it to the historical development of Christendom, showing how, in every stage, the Fall developed in answer to certain sociological and doctrinal developments. Thus systematized into a developing stream or complex of ideas, each member of which is a network of a number of closely-related facts, this complex religious datum is then related in depth

to the values which, at each stage of the development, the datum was meant to and actually did, serve. This last relation is usually more evident in the general literature of the civilization than in the strictly doctrinal statements.

- ¹¹ "No statement about a religion is valid unless it can be acknowledged by that religion's believers" (Smith, W. C., "Comparative Religion: Whither – And Why?", *The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology*, cit. supra, p. 42).
- ¹² It was this consideration that misled Professor Kitagawa to assign to the history of religions a position intermediate between descriptive and normative (Op. cit., p. 19). He clearly saw the descriptive nature of the discipline when it studies the history of a religion, or when it appropriates the analyses of psychology, anthropology, sociology, philology, etc., applied to scriptures, doctrines, cults and social groupings. But when he came to differentiate the history of religions from the normative disciplines, he wrote: "While *Religionswissenschaft* has to be faithful to descriptive principles, its inquiry must nevertheless be directed to the meaning (*sic*) of religious phenomena" (*ibid.*, p. 21). This concern with meanings is, in his view, sufficient to remove the history of religions from the ranks of descriptive science. Evidently, he precludes the possibility of a descriptive treatment of normative content such as value-realist philosophy has been suggesting for a generation (cf. the tradition of Max Scheler, Nikolai Hartmann, etc.).
- ¹³ Friedrich Heiler, "The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions" in *The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology*, cit. supra, p. 142.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 143.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 143-44.
- ¹⁶ Other examples betraying the same shortcomings are Albert Schweitzer's *Christianity and the Religions of the World* (Allen and Urwin, London, 1923); Hendrik Kraemer, *Why Christianity of all Religions?* (Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1962); Stephen Neill, *Christian Faith and Other Faiths: The Christian Dialogue with Other Religions* (Oxford University Press, 1961); A. C. Bouquet, *The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions* (James Nisbet and Co., London, 1958); Jacques-Albert Cottat, *La Rencontre des Religions* (Aubier, Editions Mouton, Paris, 1957); R. C. Zaehner, *The Convergent Spirit: Towards a Dialectics of Religion* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963); etc.
- ¹⁷ "Theology and the Historian of Religion", *The Journal of Religion* 41, no. 4 (October 1961): pp. 262-276.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 265.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 265-66.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 272, 261, 275. Here Professor Meland finds himself in agreement with Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 266), who identifies the particular for knowledge as "fiduciary framework" outside of which "no intelligence, however critical or original, can operate" (Meland, B. E., *Op. cit.*, p. 271).
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 274-75.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 264.
- ²³ Genesis II: 1-9; Qur'an 49:13, 45:16.
- ²⁴ Meland, B.E., *Op. cit.*, p. 265.
- ²⁵ On this point Muslim scholarship is unanimously in agreement. To those who are not familiar with this longstanding tradition, suffice it to warn that the situation of hermeneutical despair and confusion that exists in the case of Jewish, Christian, Buddhist and other scriptures has absolutely no parallel in Islam.
- ²⁶ Qur'an 20:88, 29:46, 42:15.
- ²⁷ Qur'an 2:285.
- ²⁸ Qur'an 2:140.

- ²⁹ Qur'an 3:84.
- ³⁰ Qur'an 4:163.
- ³¹ Qur'an 3:2-4.
- ³² Qur'an 5:69.
- ³³ Qur'an 3:67, 21:71-94.
- ³⁴ An analysis of ancient Near Eastern religious consciousness may be read in this author's *Historical Atlas of the Religions of the World* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1974), pp. 3-34.
- ³⁵ The evidence of *Tall al Amarnah (Akhetaten)* is the very opposite. The Egyptian colonial governors in Palestine communicated with the Pharaoh not in Egyptian but in Akkadian.
- ³⁶ Regarding the latter, Sabatino Moscati wrote: "In the course of establishing themselves, the new peoples thoroughly absorbed the great cultural tradition already existing. In this process of absorption, Mesopotamia seems to prevail . . . Like Rome in the Middle Ages, despite its political decadence, Mesopotamia . . . celebrates the triumph of its culture (over its enemies)." *The Face of the Ancient Orient* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962). p. 164.
- ³⁷ Leader of the Muslim conquest of Egypt in 19/641 and later governor.
- ³⁸ Qur'an 3:68.
- ³⁹ Qur'an 5:82.
- ⁴⁰ Qur'an 3:63-64.
- ⁴¹ Qur'an 17:13-15.
- ⁴² Qur'an 35:24.
- ⁴³ Qur'an 40:78, 4:163.
- ⁴⁴ Qur'an 16:36.
- ⁴⁵ Qur'an 14:4.
- ⁴⁶ Qur'an 4:164.
- ⁴⁷ It should be added here that Islam holds its revelation to be mainly a revelation of a "what" that can become a "how" befitting any historical situation. Thus, the "how" or prescriptive form of the law may and does change in substance as well as in application, but not its spirit, purpose or "what." *Usul al fiqh* discipline has devised and institutionalized a system to govern the process of evolution of the law.
- ⁴⁸ Qur'an 6:124.
- ⁴⁹ Qur'an 2:30.
- ⁵⁰ Qur'an 33:72.
- ⁵¹ Qur'an 23:116.
- ⁵² Qur'an 3:191.
- ⁵³ Qur'an 38:27.
- ⁵⁴ Qur'an 51:56.
- ⁵⁵ Qur'an 11:7.
- ⁵⁵ "We have not created heaven and earth but for . . . We have created life and death . . . for you to prove yourselves worthier in your deeds . . . All that is on earth and all the worldly ornaments We have made thereof are to the purpose of men proving themselves worthier in the deed" (Qur'an 11:7, 6:165, 18:7).
- ⁵⁶ Qur'an 95:4.
- ⁵⁷ Qur'an 32:7-8.
- ⁵⁸ Qur'an 14:32-33.
- ⁵⁹ Qur'an 16:14, 22:36-37, 22:65, 31-20, 45:12.
- ⁶⁰ Qur'an 11:61.
- ⁶¹ Qur'an 67:15.

- ⁶² Qur'an 30:30, 48:23.
- ⁶³ On the philosophical uncertainty of the laws of nature, see Clarence Irving⁴ Lewis, *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (Lasalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing co., 1946) and George Santayana, *Skepticism and Animal Faith* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923). Their position, which is that of contemporary science, is *epistemologically* identical to that held by al Ghazali (d. 504/1111) in his controversy with the philosophers (see his *Tahafut al Falasifah* or *Refutation of the Philosophers*, tr. by Sabih Kamali [Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963]).
- ⁶⁴ Qur'an 51:21, 33:62, 35:43.
- ⁶⁵ Qur'an 15:9.
- ⁶⁶ Qur'an 30:30.
- ⁶⁷ Qur'an 3:19.
- ⁶⁸ This is the substance of the Hadith, "Everyman is born with natural religion – i.e. a Muslim. It is his parents that make him a Jew, a Magian or a Christian."
- ⁶⁹ Rudolph Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).
- ⁷⁰ Mircea Eliade, *Patterns of Comparative Religion* (London: Sheed and Ward, Ltd., undated) and *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961).
- ⁷¹ Qur'an 49:13.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*
- ⁷³ Ishaq ibn Hisham, *Sirat Rasul Allah (The Life of Muhammad)*, tr. by Alfred Guillaume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946).
- ⁷⁴ Thomas Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam* (London: 1906; Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf Publications, 1961).
- ⁷⁵ Al Kufi's *Shah-Namah*, tr. by H. M. Elliott in his *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians* (London: 1867-77, vol 1, pp. 184-87).

XI
ART & ARCHITECTURE

Islamizing The Arts Disciplines

Lamyā' al Fārūqī

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In the publication *Islamization of Knowledge*, the first of the twelve steps suggested for the concern of Muslim disciplinarians is labeled “Mastery of the Modern Discipline: Categories Breakdown.”¹ Our paper for this Third conference on Islamization of knowledge seeks to take that initial and basic step toward bringing the discipline pertaining to the Islamic arts into focus and in proper relation to *tawḥīd*.

A short introductory section will provide some clarifications of terminology to be used. From there the discussion moves to the descriptive section of the paper. Part I of that major section describes the five most important subdivisions of the arts discipline. Part II outlines some of the most important trends within the discipline with which the scholar who wishes to Islamize the theory, study, and appreciation of the Islamic arts should be familiar.

An evaluative section discusses the relevance of categories and trends within the Western arts discipline for the study of the Islamic arts, as well as their significance for the Islamization of the discipline. Like the descriptive section, it is divided into two parts. In this case, part I deals with the categories of the arts discipline, and part II, with trends within the arts discipline.

In order to understand and exchange views on materials connected with the Islamization of the arts discipline, we must arrive at some common understanding of terms. First of all, how will we define the term “art”? Second, what precisely do we mean by “aesthetic,” a term often used to characterize art ideas, products, and activities? What Arabic terms correspond to these words? What new expressions are called for in the Islamization of the discipline?

The word “art” is derived from an ancient Latin word, *arts* (pl. *artes*), which was applied to any craft or special skill. This very broad sense of the term is still recognized and used in Western languages, as in the expression

“the art of healing,” “the art of medicine,” and so on. Since the Middle Ages, however, “art” has also had another widely accepted meaning, one that pertains more specifically to the intellectual and cultural pursuits of learning as opposed to the technical or mechanical activities and skills of mankind. In medieval Europe, the word “art” was used to designate those seven branches of academic knowledge and study known as the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*.² This connotation persists today in our designation of the non-vocational and non-technical disciplines in our colleges and universities as “the liberal arts,” and of ranks in academia as “bachelor of arts” and “master of arts” degrees. Both of the above-mentioned definitions of the term “art” are, however, outside the scope of the present study. We shall here use that term—as well as *fann* (pl. *funūn*), the most closely correlated Arabic term—in a more specific and particularized way. “Art” will refer here only to that important division of human culture that includes the creative skills, products, and activities of significant *contentual* and formal beauty that are used or intended as sensory stimuli for a culturally “satisfying” experience.³ Thus the term “art” implies four important constituents: (1) presentation through one or more of the sensory means available to mankind;⁴ (2) a measure of expertise or special ability in creation or presentation; (3) an expressed meaning regarded by the culture as significant; and (4) an element of pleasant, interesting, moving—that is, “satisfying”—intellectual and emotional effect on the percipient.⁵ It may, in addition, have other uses within the culture—educative, political, social, therapeutic, psychological, religious, and so forth.

“Aesthetic” is an equally important term for us to define precisely in order to master the contemporary field of study and research concerning the arts. Derived from the Greek for perception, “aesthetics” originally referred to all sensuous knowledge. More recently it has pertained to “those products of the hand and brain which afford delight in contemplation, by reason either of their formal structure, their spiritual content, or both in combination.”⁶ The aesthetic experience therefore is regarded as one of the prime aims and functions of the arts and, like them, is consistently associated with beauty and the beautiful.

In the case of the term “aesthetic” or “aesthetics,” the difficulty of finding Arabic equivalents has proven to be even more troublesome than for the term “art.” The words *dhawq* or *dhawqī* (pertaining to “taste”) have sometimes been used, but these terms imply an undue emphasis on an individualistic interpretation and appreciation of the aesthetic materials, an interpretation not congruent with Islamic aesthetic considerations. *Jamīl* and *Jamīlah* (meaning “beautiful” and “the beautiful”) have also been used; but their connotation in the language goes far beyond the realm of artistic skills, activities, and products, and therefore is beyond the purposes of the present study. *Fannī* and *fanniyyah* seem to be the most suitable terms of equivalence in Arabic

since they carry a linguistic association with the term for art (*fann*).

Descriptive Section

I. Breakdown of Categories

In the case of the arts there is no single term—comparable to “sociology,” “political science,” “economics,” for example, in other disciplines—that designates a single discipline and is inclusive of all aspects of the field. This is true for Western languages as well as for the Muslim languages, though there have been attempts on the part of some scholars to create for “aesthetics” such a wide significance.⁷ Therefore the categories breakdown in this field may seem closer to an enumeration of separate fields of study related to the arts than the subdivision of a single composite discipline.

A. *Aesthetics, or Philosophy of Art.*

Of the subdivisions of the field, the one of generally widest coverage and inclusiveness is known in English as “aesthetics.”⁸ This term, derived from the Greek word *aisthesis* (“perception”), is a relatively new one; it first came into use in the eighteenth century. Many of the thinkers of the West, from the time of the Ancient Greeks to the present, had expressed ideas about the arts and the beautiful. But they had usually discussed these matters, along with others, as part of a more comprehensive theory of knowledge. It was only with Alexander G. Baumgarten (in his *Reflections on Poetry*, 1735) that the term was given its present meaning. With his followers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, “aesthetics” came to be regarded as a recognized branch of philosophy. It is in this sense that we use the term here.

Aesthetics, or *falsafah al funūn* (“philosophy of the arts”), as it can be designated in Arabic, is an even more recent discipline in its Islamic context. There it has suffered from both Muslim neglect and Western monopoly. Many passages in the Islamic literary legacy await collection and systematic study while Muslim scholars continue to regard the aesthetic conquest of the minds and spirits of the *ummah* by alien arts as inconsequential. Though supposedly pertaining to the Islamic arts, the writings that could be regarded as *falsafah al funūn* are often written or inspired by Western thinkers. Even in the infrequent instances of Muslim involvement in aesthetics, the participants have had little or no training in the Islamic legacy. They are almost exclusively the product of Western institutions and teachers.

Aesthetics in Western scholarship has dealt primarily with the more theoretical and speculative aspects of the arts disciplines. In its early stages, it was concerned particularly with questions of aesthetic value, with classifications of the various arts, and with seeking laws of beauty based on metaphysics.

More recently it has followed those trends that have taken philosophy farther and farther away from a commitment to absolutes. As the pervasiveness of relativist doctrines became more pronounced, many recent studies in the West have avoided all claims to finality of judgment on aesthetic values.⁹

B. Analysis of Content and Form.

Analysis of content and form is the second subdiscipline or subdivision within the arts discipline that has been developed in Western thought. The arts are dependent for their effect and appreciation on the message they convey—that is, their content—and upon the organization of their constituent elements—in other words, their form. While some writers have concentrated on the various aspects of content—for example, the figures, scenes, or events included in the art work, the symbols used, or the more subtly implied content behind the surface presentation—others have been more interested in describing the formal aspects that govern the combination of verbal, visual, or sounded elements. In contrast, for Clive Bell and many important aestheticians after him, art has embodied “significant form,”¹⁰ or forms that are “aesthetically moving.” According to these philosophers, content and form are so integrally related that their separation for analysis is barely possible.

The subdivision of content and form analysis puts emphasis on the intrinsic details of the art work itself rather than on the more theoretical philosophy treated by aesthetics. These two categories within the field are, however, inextricably related to each other; for to present the values behind the work of art and not to know how they are expressed in content and form would result in a study as truncated and unsatisfactory as the opposite extreme of analyzing aspects of content and form without understanding their deeper significance.

C. Art History.

Art history is the third category included in the Western discipline concerned with the arts and aesthetic experience. It is a descriptive field of study and research that seeks to document the artistic history of mankind. Its practitioners are concerned with facts pertaining to provenance of works of art, to date and place of origin or use of particular items or styles, to materials and techniques of production, to titles and subjects of works, etcetera. Western scholars have performed an admirable job in this category—both in connection with the arts of the West and with other art traditions. However, they are prone to losing themselves in the collection of historical minutiae and to finding satisfaction in the unearthing of data, regardless of their consequence or significance for the discipline or for the welfare of mankind and civilization. The concern with details has often discouraged students of the arts from penetrating to deeper understandings of the art works they study, and the great contributors to this discipline have often evidenced such exaggerated specialization that their work verges on pedantry. Art history is, never-

theless, a basic and indispensable subdivision of the arts discipline.

D. *Art Criticism.*

Art criticism is a fourth disciplinary division dealing with the arts and aesthetic experience. It results from interactions between works of art and perceptive minds, which, in turn, stimulate verbal communication. To be successful and helpful to the consumer of these oral or written communications, the art critic has need of all the theoretical, analytical, and practical knowledge that the various divisions of the arts discipline can afford. He/she must be able to appreciate and recognize aesthetic aims and principles of the individual art work, of a genre or class of works, or of a period or cultural style. He must be capable of analyzing the content and form of the work. He must be knowledgeable about the important historical and material factors pertaining to the work of art. In addition, the art critic must be able to react aesthetically to the art, and must be able to describe how it affects him personally or how it may affect other readers, viewers, or listeners. Art criticism varies considerably, depending on the ability and training of the critic. Sometimes it is a dispassionate analysis of content or form; at other times it involves the recounting of personal feelings of the critic or the motivations of the artist; sometimes it sinks to the level of entertaining but inconsequential gossip about artists or performers.

E. *Art Education.*

The fifth category of the discipline pertaining to the arts and aesthetic experience is art education. Here we find still other goals to be achieved and a different set of problems to be solved, but there is a similar need for a grounding in all the other aspects of aesthetic knowledge. The values and perceptions of aesthetics or philosophy, the techniques and intellectual tools of content and form analysis, the historical information, and the ability to respond aesthetically to the work of art—all are necessary ingredients for the art educator if his or her aims are to be achieved.

Regardless of the type of art they teach—poetry, painting, calligraphy, weaving, woodworking and metal tooling, music, architecture, landscaping, or urban renewal, what are the aims of art educators? What are the purposes or functions of art education, as it has been defined by Western scholarship? The functions of art education, as it pertains to the preschool, elementary, and high school student, as well as to the training of the professional artist, scholar, teacher, consumer, or patron of the arts, can be divided into two classes: (1) aesthetic functions and (2) general or nonaesthetic functions.

Probably the most significant of the aesthetic functions of art education are the following:

1. to encourage development of the innate, God-given artistic talents and capabilities of the individual students through study, observation, production, performance, and discussion of works of art;

2. to convey to every student as much of the national and cultural artistic heritage as possible;
3. to train the student to appreciate that heritage;
4. to train for vocational and professional success and productivity; and
5. to train perceptive, imaginative, and affective components of personality.

The general or nonaesthetic functions of art education as discussed by Western scholars are the following:

1. to reinforce the religio-cultural ideology and to provide understanding and stimulation of the products and performances which assist in this—the *religious* function;
2. to provide morally uplifting relaxation for mind, body, and emotions—the *recreational* function;
3. to stimulate a martial spirit or a feeling of patriotism and loyalty to the nation, party, or ruler—the *military/political* function;
4. to provide means for constructive physical and emotional therapy—the *medical/psychological* function;
5. to enhance the learning of other subjects—the *general education* function;
6. to provide products and activities conducive to social interaction in the society, thus developing constructive citizenship and group understanding—the *societal* function.¹¹

II. Trends in the Arts Disciplines

It is impossible within the scope of a single article to discuss or even enumerate all the trends that have affected the arts discipline in recent decades or centuries. The following section of this paper should therefore be regarded as a brief statement of some of the most important shifts in emphasis and viewpoint affecting the subdivisions of the field.

A. *Expansion and Consolidation of the Discipline.*

There is a general trend in the arts discipline for greater inclusiveness and interrelation. This is a triple-faceted trend. First of all, there is the move to consolidate the various related subdivisions or categories into one comprehensive field. This trend is represented by Thomas Munro, who speaks of a “science” of aesthetics or “scientific aesthetics,” which would study all knowledge concerned with the arts and with their creation, description, appreciation, and use.¹² Such a comprehensive and integrated discipline would include the subdivisions of aesthetics, analysis of content and form, art history,

and art criticism, as well as art education.

Second, the greater inclusiveness called for in recent studies seeks to integrate an interdisciplinary approach in the study of the arts. Particularly prominent in this aspect of the expansion and consolidation of the arts discipline is the increased interest in the social sciences and religion as materials relevant to the study of the arts. This trend has been affecting research and education in many fields.

The blossoming of the academic study of religions, in conjunction with the development of the social sciences in this century, has encouraged scholars involved in the arts disciplines to be concerned about the sociological and religious matters affecting the art of any people, place, or time. This has occasioned a shift from an almost total concentration, in earlier times, on descriptive studies and philosophical concern with standards of beauty, to a wide interest in the experiential, behavioral, and spiritual factors related to the creation and experiencing of the arts. For example, present researchers are concerned with the psychological motivations and personality of the artist, as well as with individual and group responses to art; with measurement through psychological testing of such factors as perception of space and forms, tonal and rhythmical variation, and visual and aural memory.¹³ Social contexts for the experiencing of art are studied as are the status in society of the artist and his patrons, the social roles of the arts, and the methods of transmission of its skills.¹⁴ In cooperation with the discipline of political science, the new scholar of the arts has become concerned with the use of art in political control and indoctrination.¹⁵ Anthropologists have discovered the meaning and functions of art in numerous cultures throughout the world, and are describing them in their cultural setting rather than as dead items for a museum collection, divorced from their normal context and environment.¹⁶ Even economic factors—for example, financial or other rewards for the artists in a society, government versus private support for the arts, patrons and patronage, economic strata and their relation to interest and appreciation of the arts—have all been researched by scholars of the arts disciplines in recent decades.¹⁷ In addition, religion has been recognized as an important ideological determinant of artistic expression which often provides context as well as stimulus for artistic creativity.¹⁸

Responding to the widening of cultural horizons in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, study of the arts also moved toward greater international and intercultural interests and inclusion. This second aspect of the move toward inclusiveness, however, still has a long way to go in fulfillment of the professed goal of interpreting each art in terms of those values that are inherent in its own cultural environment.

A third facet of the expansion of the arts discipline is that which recognizes the interrelationships among the various arts themselves. Advocates of this

trend recognize that the arts are but differing “languages” or “media” that convey a common cultural message. This trend is represented by a number of works dealing with the arts of the Western world.¹⁹

A fourth aspect of the expansion and consolidation of the arts discipline involves a fairly recent interest by Western scholars in studying and understanding the non-Western arts. In the main, this developed after political colonialism subsided and the disparity in political and economic status between ruler and ruled was alleviated. Only then could a more sincere interest in the artistic traditions of the subject peoples develop. Though it has been difficult for Westerners to suppress their own cultural biases in such studies,²⁰ there has been a recent emphasis on the need to view those art traditions from the stance of their creators and appreciators rather than from a cultural view that is alien and perhaps even antagonistic to them.

B. *Scientific Method.*

Another recent trend involves certain changes of methodology in the arts disciplines. Responding to an emphasis that has permeated Western thinking since the Industrial Revolution, study of the arts, in all its categories, has experienced an increasing interest in the use of the scientific method. This implies the careful and controlled observation of artistic and aesthetically associated data, the comparison and classification of the facts, the formulation of hypotheses, as well as the testing of those hypotheses in order to discover general truths and establish laws. Whereas studies of the arts have previously tended to be speculative, analytical of content and form, historical, or representative of human reactions to the arts, a scientific approach to the arts has now become important in the discipline. A pioneer in this respect was Gustave Fechner, who called for a science of art that would involve both observation and induction in order to arrive at general principles.²¹ Somewhat later, Max Dessoir called for a new approach to the study of art—*allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* (general science of art).²² One of the scholars representing this trend in our time is Thomas Munro, whose numerous works have argued and demonstrated that the study of the arts should be treated as a full-fledged science and not as a field opposed to science and the scientific method.²³

C. *Secularization of the Arts Disciplines.*

A third trend within the arts disciplines has had an early birth and a long and gradual evolution. The ancient Greeks and the early Christian writers certainly defined art and aesthetic expression in metaphysical and ethical terms. Plato even condemned art in his *Republic* because of what he considered its adverse effects on the conduct and morals of the citizenry. The medieval Christians, in their turn, produced art—in architecture, painting, sculpture, book illustration—chiefly for religious purposes or inspired by religious zeal. Since

the Renaissance, however, there has been a gradual tendency to regard art as something outside the realm of religion and morality. Whereas medieval European writers had judged art on the success of its expression of Christian values, later writers became more and more interested in its purely aesthetic characteristics. By the nineteenth century, a veritable revolt against "art for moral ends" took place. This move, which took nourishment from Romanticism, resulted among its exaggerators in the ridiculous and impossible call for an "art for art's sake."²⁴ Although this distortion seems no longer to attract wide support, it is evident that art is generally regarded in the West today as neutral and value-free. Relativism in philosophy brought a rejection of any standards or universals for judging or assessing works of art. The various subdivisions of the arts discipline in the West lost their normative connotations as the natural world and the emotions and feelings of man were raised to new dimensions of importance. One can, of course, find exceptions to this general trend. No one should ignore the contributions of figures like Titus Burckhardt, Ananda Coomaraswamy, J. Maritain, L. Callahan, and C. R. Morey. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that this is a prominent characteristic of the arts discipline in the twentieth century.

Evaluative Section

Muslims interested in studying the Islamic arts or in Islamizing the comparable discipline, which we shall call *ilm al funūn*, within their own cultural environment can learn much from the Western arts disciplines. Some features could be adopted and utilized with little or no alteration; other features of the study of the arts as evolved by Western scholars are incongruous or, at best, of little help to the Muslim student or practitioner of the arts. In order to bring out the important Western contributions as well as to warn against the wholesale adoption of Western methods, we shall retrace the steps made in the descriptive portion of this paper. But this time, instead of describing the categories and trends as they have evolved in Western culture, we shall be concerned, as Muslims, with reacting to and evaluating those categories and trends. We shall be estimating the positive or negative effects on the growth of an indigenous Islamic discipline dealing with knowledge pertinent to the arts.

I. Breakdown of Categories

A. *Aesthetics, or Philosophy of Art (Falsafah al Funūn).*

As in Western philosophy before the eighteenth century, the field of aesthetics, or philosophy of art, has never been accorded a separate existence

in Islamic philosophy and thought. This does not mean that there are no materials on the arts in Islamic literature. There is, in fact, a wealth of suggestive and pertinent materials to be found in the Qur'ān, the *Hadīth* literature, and the *Shari'ah* as well as in the writings of such giants of Islamic thought as al Mas'ūdī, al Fārābī, al Khwārizmī, Ibn Sīnā, al Ghazālī, Ibn Khaldūn, Ibn Baṭṭūṭah, and Ibn Taymīyah, to name but a few. These materials must all be researched in fulfillment of steps 3, 4, and 5 of the work plan as proposed in *The Islamization of Knowledge*.²⁵ Despite the wealth of materials to be found in the Islamic legacy, it is only in recent times that calls are being made for scholars to deal systematically with the questions posed by the discipline of *falsafah al funūn*, and to try to answer them Islamically, that is, as Muslims and as they pertain specifically to the Islamic arts.

This fact should not deter us from encouraging the development of such a field or such a category within the arts discipline. Since Islam is a religion that professes to be determining of all aspects of human thought, word, production, activity, and behavior, its relevance to the arts, as to any other branch of human knowledge and achievement, should not fail to be appreciated. It can be demonstrated that the Islamic arts have indeed been molded and infused by Islamic ideas and ideals throughout the centuries. An understanding of the interrelationships between *Islamic art* (not *any art*) and the religion of *tawhīd* should be the goal of all those who produce, describe, or appreciate the Islamic arts. *Falsafah al funūn* is the sub-division of *'ilm al funūn* that would deal with these relationships, probing their depths, as well as describing and explaining them to Muslims and to the whole world.

While little has been done in this field, what has been done in recent years has often viewed Islamic art as inadequate and even inept in comparison with the creations of Western artists.²⁶ Even the methods of interpretation—for example, the concern for the arts of representation, the importance of naturalism and portrayal of individual human character in the descriptions, the assignment of literal symbols to the art of a culture that has been consistently symbolic, the explanation of artistic characteristics as resultant from climate, societal organization, or economic pursuits—these and many other ideas revealed in recent writings by non-Muslims (and even by brainwashed Muslims!) show the deep penetration that aesthetic principles from an alien tradition have reached in the near vacuum of Islamic ideas that presently prevails in our Islamic *falsafah al funūn*. The appropriation and Islamization of this category of the arts discipline by Muslim scholars is certainly long overdue.

B. *Analysis of Content and Form (Tahlīl al Ma'nā wa'l Mabnā)*.

The second category of *'ilm al funūn*, or that overall discipline of studies related to the arts, is equal in importance to *falsafat al funūn*. It is in this branch of the arts discipline that an empirical study of the art works of the Muslim peoples can be pursued with the goal of understanding and appreciating

the aesthetic heritage of the past fourteen centuries and of stimulating a continuation and revival of that heritage which would bring glory to the Muslims peoples in this and succeeding centuries.

Any art tradition includes culturally relevant and acceptable combinations of the two components of any artistic endeavor, that is, of content and form. But for the Islamic arts, these components must be in-formed by the ideology of *tawhīd* and modeled in accordance with the aesthetic characteristics of content and form found in the Qur'ān itself. As has been explained in an earlier presentation,²⁷ the Islamic arts are "Qur'ānic arts"; for they derive their characteristics of content and form from that "first work of art in Islam."²⁸ It is only by discovering these characteristics in the arts and understanding their relationship to the ideology of *tawhīd* that our aesthetic legacy can be properly understood. It is not enough for us to philosophize about the arts in abstraction. Islamization of *ilm al funūn* entails a penetrating study of the art works themselves and a detailed analysis of their content and form. There is much work to be done in this field.

C. History of Art (*Tārīkh al Funūn*).

Tārīkh al funūn is the Arabic literal equivalent for that subdivision of the arts discipline known as history of art. *Tārīkh al funūn*, or history of art, as it has been developed in recent decades, is a category of *ilm al funūn* that is affected by a special problem. Here we find no dearth of materials, as in the case of *falsafat al funūn* and *tahlīl al ma'nā wal mabnā*. Western art historians have not only filled the libraries with data on the arts of the Western world, they have also contributed prolifically since the nineteenth century to the documentation of historical facts pertaining to the Islamic arts. The output has indeed been vast and impressive.²⁹ A number of capable Muslim scholars trained in the Western discipline of art history have begun to spin out their own stream of contributions related to the arts.

We, as Muslim scholars interested in Islamizing the disciplines, cannot but feel intensely grateful for the wealth of historical research that has been done in this field by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. These works represent a scholarly legacy that is both exacting and detailed in its research, and extensive in its coverage. Its materials will certainly be of great assistance to those who endeavor to Islamize *ilm al funūn*. Unfortunately, however, researchers in the field have been almost totally unconcerned with the religio-cultural features of the arts. Art historians have been interested in tabulating physical data on the works of art, but they have failed to realize that it is the impact of the art work itself, its successful or unsuccessful expression of our ideology, its relevance or not to *tawhīd*, that concerns us as Muslims. An alarming chasm separates the traditional art historian from his or her religion, culture, and people; for that scholar has made of Islamic art a corpse to be dissected and viewed under the microscope rather than a living, breathing art. Such an im-

personal and spiritually detached study of the arts, one in which Islam is utterly irrelevant, can never satisfy us as Muslim scholars. We cannot but feel sad when reading the dissertations and conference papers of those young Muslim art historians who have received their training at the hands of Western specialists in art history. These bright young minds have been so indoctrinated through their training that they have lost their Islamic religious, social, and cultural awareness. They are often even more Western, more alien to their own tradition, more concerned with the less consequential data, than their Western teachers. All this is pursued, we are told, in an effort to be “objective” and “scientific.”

In order to Islamize this category within the arts disciplines, we must train a new type of scholar who realize fully the Islamic principle that knowledge cannot be successfully pursued for the sake of data alone. Knowledge must be pursued for the sake of higher goals—for Allah (SWT). It must be (*ʿilmun nāfiʿun*) beneficial knowledge). Whenever its goal is other than this—whether that alternative be financial gain, power, prestige, or mere fascination with the collection of facts—true knowledge proves to be elusive and unattainable. Even Western scholars have come to criticize their own art historians for being pedantic and overly concerned with minutiae and unimportant details.³⁰ Surely Muslim scholars should be even more conscious of such a problem.

D. Art Criticism (*ʿIlm Naqd al Fann*).

Art criticism might be called *ʿilm naqd al fann* by Muslim scholars of the arts. It implies an evaluating (*naqd*) of the art work (*fann*) as well as a scholarly approach (*ʿilm*) to that evaluating process. This division of the arts discipline deals with the effect of an art performance, activity, or object on the critic or viewer. It normally takes the form of a verbal or written communication meant to analyze and evaluate the art for the instruction and/or entertainment of others. In Western scholarship, this category has been concerned with the individualistic response to the art in question rather than its effect on the cultural whole. Therefore, in order to Islamize this category, an increased social, religious, and cultural responsibility must be achieved. The concern in an Islamized *ʿilm naqd al fann* must be for criticism and interpretation that would serve Islam and the Muslim *ummah* rather than merely record the emotive response of the individual. Islamized art criticism would not be interested in the subjective personal feelings of the precipient so much as in an objective and critical analysis of the artistic expression. It would concentrate on the works of art themselves and their success or failure as expression of *tawhīd*. For this purpose, the discipline would move hand-in-hand with, and would in fact be determined by, the other branches of *ʿilm al funūn*, that is, by *falsafah al funūn taḥlīl al maʿnā wal mabnā* (analysis of content and form), and *tārīkh al funūn* (history of art).

E. Art Education (al *Tarbīyah al Fannīyah*).

Tarbīyah fannīyah is the expression that has been chosen to refer to that category of *ilm al funūn* known as art education. It provides a close approximation in the Arabic language to the English designation. As far as is known, it has never been used before as identification of this category of knowledge and academic research. In reviewing the goals that pertain to the Western field of art education, it is evident that they offer a large measure of relevance for use in an Islamized *tarbīyah fannīyah* as well. In fact, none of the goals enumerated above seems inimical to Islamization and adoption by Muslims. This notwithstanding, the content of art education as prescribed for the Muslim student must be quite different from that imparted to the Western student. Equally, the types of art emphasized and the manner of teaching would vary considerably.

In regard to the aesthetic functions of art education,³¹ the development of God-given talents and capabilities is surely to be encouraged by the Islāmized discipline. There should, however, be an added proviso that this development always be directed toward endeavors that are physically, morally, and spiritually beneficial to humanity. An Islamized art education would also fulfill the second aesthetic function listed earlier. That is, the function of contributing to a society whose members are confident of themselves as contributors to civilization.; It should also generate pride in, and understanding of, the national and cultural heritage. If an ongoing artistic contribution of the Muslim peoples is to be maintained and encouraged, new practitioners of the arts must be trained. This is the fourth aesthetic function demanded of an Islamized *tarbīyah fannīyah*. How sad it is to find our talented young Muslims in every corner of the Muslim world, forced to leave their homelands and their cultural environment in order to receive an education and training in art under the tutelage of those who know little or nothing of our aesthetic traditions and goals. Such an education isolates those students from their own national and Islamic heritage. By depriving those youth who are endowed by their Creator with talent in this field of respectable educative possibilities in their homelands or in other Muslim environments, we are doing no less than cutting the umbilical cord that joins these offspring to the *ummah*. It is only the power of Islam, the commitment to family and society, and their own strength of character that has caused a pitiful few to return to Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, or Nigeria. There they brave the reprobation of an unsympathetic society. In the long run, they must reeducate themselves and adapt the unsuitable, alien education they have received in order to make a viable contribution in their homelands. Unfortunately, few of them are able to accomplish all that this entails. Allah has created humans not only in physical perfection but also with the wonderful human capacities for perception, imagination, and profound feelings which are trained through art education. It

is our duty to safeguard and develop our bodies to better serve Allah (S.W.T.) It is equally important for us as Muslims to develop the aspects of our beings. Its assistance in this endeavor constitutes the fifth aesthetic function of art education. All five of the aesthetic functions, therefore, can be regarded as important for an Islamized *tarbiyah fanniyah*.

The nonaesthetic functions of *tarbiyah fanniyah* are no less important in a developed and flourishing Islamic society.³² Probably the most striking contrast in an Islamized art education would be its increased concentration on the first nonaesthetic function of the field, namely, the reinforcement of the religio-cultural ideology, and the understanding of *tawhid*, which *tabiyah fanniyah* could and should provide. The importance of this aim has been much diminished in Western education by the recent trend toward secularization of the arts. As for the recreational function of art education, the Islamized discipline, in contrast to its Western counterpart, would not regard or project art primarily as a means for secularly oriented entertainment. Its crucial emphasis would be placed on its being one of the main avenues for the expression of ideals, and for the direction of human intellects, emotions, and activities—its religious function. This, however, would not preclude its satisfying of the human need for innocent means of relaxation and amusement. These too must be satisfied in the fully developed Islamic society.³³

Throughout Islamic history, the arts have fulfilled the military/political function of stimulating feelings of patriotism and valor. For this purpose, vocal as well as instrumental music was used at the time of the Prophet (SAAS), as well as in his presence. The *Shari'ah* documents its legitimacy for this and other legitimate purposes in unequivocal terms.³⁴ Muslims were also one of the first to make use of the arts for physical and psychic therapy—its medical/psychological function. Such breakthroughs in the sciences of healing were later copied by the West, and their influence is now returning, as re-exported ideas, to the Islamic world.

An Islamized art education would not ignore the importance of the last two functions outlined in the descriptive section of this chapter, general education and societal functions. The former is that of enhancing textbooks, materials, and teaching methods in the various disciplines by providing Islamically suitable graphics and art work. Poetry and song, pattern and image, movement and film could all be mobilized to serve the goal of more effective education in language and literature, history and geography, mathematics and science. Wherever such Islamized materials and techniques are used, the interest of the students and the retention of the material itself would be enhanced.

As for the societal function of art education, the Islamized *tarbiyah fanniyah* would stimulate the development of new forms of social interaction that are Islamically acceptable, as well as encourage the existent forms and their occasions. In addition to the annual Qur'an-reading contest with which

the Malaysian people and government have distinguished themselves, contests encouraging the development of literary skills could be held at all levels. Schools and government or private institutions could provide incentives for the advancement of calligraphy and Islamic design as expressions of Islamic ideology. Film and television are immensely popular new techniques which could be used artistically to enhance Islamic identity.

What have we done as Muslims to Islamize these media of expression? The answer is unmitigatedly embarrassing to all of us, whether we live in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or one of the Western nations. And yet, these technological tools could be put to use for the aesthetic expression of *tawhīd*, if we would but demand it of our film and television artists and producers. After all, those creative persons usually respond to what they think we as viewers want. Let us make it clear to them that, as awakened Muslims, we will not patronize or tolerate the old examples of alien and culturally debilitating programming.

II. Future Directions in the Arts

A. *Expansion of the Coverage.*

The expansion of coverage that is evidenced in the Western arts discipline is also desirable in the Islamized one. In fact, we would advocate that the new concept of *ilm al funūn* comprise all of the categories associated with the arts. The information studied and discussed in any of the five categories of the arts discipline are interrelated and mutually affective. Each one supports and is reinforced by the others. This interpenetration and interrelation is certainly even more pronounced in an Islamic context than in the Western situation, for the former is governed by a cultural and spiritual unity that is nowhere to be found in the relativistic climate of contemporary Western culture. All the more reason, therefore, for our Islamized *ilm al funūn* to be a discipline that recognizes the overlap and interaction among the arts as well as among the disciplinary subdivisions of the field. In addition, Islamization would welcome interaction of aesthetic materials with those derived from other, non-art disciplines, since *tawhīd* emphasizes the integration and oneness of all learning rather than its fragmentations into numerous isolated segments. An Islamized *ilm al funūn* would base its many-faceted inclusiveness on *tawhīd*'s influence and relevance for all components within the cultural whole.

All categories of art should therefore be included as materials for investigation by arts disciplinarians. This does not mean that arts that reject *tawhīd* are to be emphasized or studied. Instead, it implies that, in an Islamic context, an aesthetically satisfying object produced primarily for secular use might be as representative of Islam as that made for a religious purpose. Islamic

art is an art that permeates all aspects of our lives as Muslims. We should be verbally, visually, and aurally reminded of *tawhīd* in our kitchens and bedrooms as surely as we are verbally, visually, and aurally surrounded with it when we visit the mosque.

B. *The Scientific Method.*

The precision, the observation, the hypothesizing, and the reexamination that are the criteria of the scientific method are principles to be respected and supported by any Islamized discipline. We would certainly advocate that this trend in the Western study of the arts be maintained in the research and study of all categories of the Islamized arts discipline.

C. *Secularization of the Arts Disciplines.*

The trend toward secularization and the relativization of aesthetic values in the Western study of the arts runs in diametrical opposition to *ilm al funūn*. It could never be advocated in the research and publications of the Islamized discipline. In Islam there is no activity or idea that is not influenced by, or feels no input from, the basic premises of the religion of *tawhīd*. The five pillars of *shahādah*, *ṣalāh*, *ṣiyām*, *zakāh* and *hajj* are not the only religiously relevant acts in Islamic society. Just as relevant are the economic practices and the social structures, specified and reinforced by the Qur'ān itself. The idea of an Islamic state was a creation of the Prophet (ṢAAS). Even the protection of the rights of neighbors and the manners, greetings, and social customs of citizens are prescribed by the *Sunnah* (example) of the Prophet (ṢAAS) or inscribed in the *Sharī'ah*. Nothing is excluded from this all-covering "blanket" of religious relevance. Secularization and the denial of an Islamic standard of aesthetic value, therefore, would be an anachronism in the Islamized discipline of *ilm al funūn*.

Some of our Muslim brothers and sisters would counter the ideas presented here, arguing that the arts are a superfluous aspects of culture meant only for base entertainment and pleasure. Thus, their argument, that, the arts have little or no value or consequence. Such a view fails to notice the powerful influences that the alien arts—whether those of literature, the visual arts, architecture, music, or the cinema—have on our fellow Muslims. By denying the importance of the arts and leaving their production, encouragement, and distribution to non-Islamic and even anti-Islamic forces within and outside our societies, we have opened the door to a flood of alien spiritual and educative forces, the effect and damage of which we seem not to have fully realized as yet.

Blind to the effective influence that the arts can exert on the *ummah*, we have abdicated our role as definers and directors of that force. History teaches that the arts have been one of the most powerful instruments of influence used by religious, social, and political institutions. The arts have been manipulated by totalitarian states to imbue their citizens with loyalty to nation and ruler,

and by modern capitalism and its advertising agencies to enhance sales and increase earnings regardless of the potential harm or benefit of the product. The arts have been used by educators to direct the mental development of students, by doctors and psychiatrists to correct mental and nervous disorders, by religious movements to induce spiritual intensity. Art, therefore, like other commodities, practices, and ideas, can be put to good or to evil use. In the hands of clever but misguided manipulators, the control of the arts can be a dangerous enemy; if directed by responsible forces, it can be a powerful means for Islamic development of the individual and of the society.

It is our duty as Muslims, therefore, to call a halt to that head-in-the-sand attitude that pretends the arts do not exist for us as Muslims or that they can only be viewed as a harmful element that Allah put in creation to tempt mankind. It is this position that has left artistic thought and expression in the hands of the adversaries of Islam or in the hands of those who are ignorant of and unconcerned for Islam. As examples of the resultant artistic expressions have been pushed further and further from the Islamic core, the vicious cycle has perpetuated and strengthened itself. Bad art; un-Islamic art; art that is religiously, morally, and ideologically debilitating for the Muslim *ummah*—all must be resisted and even vigorously combated. But we will never resist and combat it successfully by creating an Islamic art vacuum. In the long run, this will only lead Muslims to accept the un-Islamic art products and activities that they find available in the world. They would have no religio-cultural protection in an Islamic art alternative, one that could be pitted against the alien art forms. Unfortunately, this state of affairs is prevalent in most Muslim societies today.

Some Muslims have argued that we must isolate ourselves from all artistic trends coming to us from the West—whether in literature, in music, in the visual arts and architecture, or in clothing and furniture designed for everyday use. This may have been possible in an earlier period of history when transportation and communication facilities prevented all but the privileged few from leaving their isolated village or regional environment. But this state of affairs no longer exists. The mobility of Muslims as well as non-Muslims in our contemporary world is such that those who can avoid contact with the non-Islamic arts are rare individuals indeed. The book shops are filled with literary materials from Europe and America. Cassette tapes and the transistor radio bring the latest “hits” of New York and London to the most remote regions of Africa and Asia within hours of their performance in the capitals of the West. The cinemas provide daily contact with Western ideas and dramatic forms. Even the museums of the Muslim countries often seem more concerned with Western or Westernized works of art than with exhibiting their own cultural heritage and thereby aesthetically informing and training the *ummah*.³⁵ Even in Jeddah, a so-called *tajmil* (“beautification”) program involving untold wealth

of the Muslim peoples is filling parks and gardens with some of the most shockingly un-Islamic artistic creations that could come out of the minds and spirits of Western artists and their Muslim protégés.³⁶

We must not be complacent, nor should we put on blinders that will prevent us from seeing what is happening around us. Whether we like it or not, we are being affected by the arts. And unfortunately, because we have not been concerned with the preservation and renewal of our own Islamic artistic legacy, the arts around us are often those that may sap the very roots of our religion and culture, rather than nourish and support, Islamic *nahḍah* (“awakening”) and development.

Notes

- ¹ Isma'īl Rājī al Fārūqī, *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Workplan* (Washington, D.C.: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982), p. 39.
- ² The *trivium* included grammar, logic, and rhetoric; the *quadrivium* consisted of arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy.
- ³ A. R. Chandler, *Beauty and Human Nature: Elements of Psychological Aesthetics* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1934), pp. 9ff.
- ⁴ The five senses are those of sight (the visual), hearing (the auditory), touch (the tactile), smell (the olfactory), and taste.
- ⁵ Though these criteria of art are not precisely those of Thomas Munro in his *The Arts and Their Interrelations* (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1969), we feel indebted to his extensive and intensive discussion of the term "art" in that and other works.
- ⁶ The Earl of Listowel, *A Critical History of Modern Aesthetics* (London, 1933), p. 210.
- ⁷ See, for example, the works of Thomas Munro: *Scientific Method in Aesthetics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1928); *Toward Science in Aesthetics: Selected Essays* (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956); *The Arts and Their Interrelations*.
- ⁸ In French, the comparable term is *esthétique*. In German, terms that have been used are *Kunswissenschaft* (science of art) or *Kunstgeschichte* (history of art).
- ⁹ Exceptions to this generality can be found: J. Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism* (New York, 1930); Ananda Coomaraswamy, *The Transformation of Nature in Art* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934); C. R. Morey, *Christian Art* (New York, 1935); etc.
- ¹⁰ Clive Bell, *Art* (New York: F. A. Stokes, 1914).
- ¹¹ For this list of aesthetic and nonaesthetic aims of art education, many ideas have been drawn from Thomas Munro, *Art Education: Its Philosophy and Psychology* (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956).
- ¹² See Munro, *Toward Science*, and *The Arts and Their Interrelations*.
- ¹³ J. L. Mursell, *The Psychology of Music* (New York, 1937); William Phillips, *Art and Psychoanalysis* (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1963); D. Schneider, *Psychoanalysis and the Artist* (New York, 1950); V. Lowenfeld, *The Nature of Creative Activity* (New York, 1939); R. M. Ogden, *The Psychology of Art* (New York, 1938); H. E. Rees, *A Psychology of Artistic Creation* (New York, 1942); Thomas Munro, "Methods in the Psychology of Art," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 6, 3 (March 1948), pp. 225-235; J. Weiss, "A Psychological Theory of Formal Beauty," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 16 (1947); Rudolf Arnheim, *Toward a Psychology of Art* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); etc.
- ¹⁴ Alan P. Merriam, *The Anthropology of Music* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964), chap. 7; Alan Lomax, "Song Structure and Social Structure," *Ethnology*, 1 (1962), pp. 425-451; D. W. Gotshalk, *Art and the Social Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947); Robert N. Wilson, ed., *The Arts in Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Arnold Hauser, *The Social History of Art* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), 4 vols.; V. M. Kavalis, *Artistic Expression: A Sociological Analysis* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968); etc.
- ¹⁵ Willard Rhodes, "Music as an Agent of Political Expression," *African Studies Bulletin* 5 (May 1962), pp. 14-22; Henry A. Millon and Linda Nochlin, eds., *Art and Architecture in the Service of Politics* (Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1978); James A. Leith, *The Idea of Art as Propaganda in France, 1750-1799: A Study in the History of Art* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965); etc.

- ¹⁶ Alan P. Merriam, *African Music in Perspective* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1982); Alan P. Merriam, *The Anthropology of Music*; Franz Boas, *Primitive Art* (New York: Dover, 1955); Ruth Benedict, "Anthropology and the Humanities," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 50, pp. 585-593; Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, 1934); R. Linton and P. S. Wingert, *Arts of the South Seas* (New York, 1946); M. Mead, "The Role of the Arts in a Culture," *Eastern Arts Association Yearbook* (Kutztown, Pa., 1950); Charlotte M. Otten, ed., *Anthropology and Art: Readings in Cross-Cultural Aesthetics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1971); etc.
- ¹⁷ Alan P. Merriam, *The Anthropology of Music*, pp. 124-130; Melville J. Herskovits, *Economic Anthropology* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952); etc.
- ¹⁸ David P. McAllester, *Enemy Way Music: A Study of Social and Esthetic Values as Seen in Navaho Music* (Cambridge, Mass.: Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, 1954), 41, 3, Reports of the Rimrock Project, Value Ser. 3; Albert Edward Bailey, ed., *The Arts and Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1944); Roger Hazelton, *A Theological Approach to Art* (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1967); David Bailey Harned, *Theology and the Arts* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966); Diane Apostolos-Cappadona, ed., *Art, Creativity, and the Sacred* (New York: Crossroad, 1984); David Bowlam and James L. Henderson, *Art and Belief* (New York: Schocken Books, 1970); etc.
- ¹⁹ For example, Curt Sachs, *The Commonwealth of Art: Style in the Fine Arts, Music and the Dance* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1946); William Fleming, *Arts and Ideas* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974); Titus Burckhardt, *Sacred Art in East and West: Its Principles and Methods*, Lord Northbourne (London: Perennial Books, 1967); Lois Lamyā al Fārūqī, *Islam and Art* (Islamabad, Pakistan, 1984).
- ²⁰ See numerous instances reported in Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978).
- ²¹ Gustave T. Fechner, *Vorschule der Aesthetik* (Leipzig, 1876).
- ²² M. Dessoir, "The Fundamental Questions of Aesthetics," tr. Ethel Puffer, *Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis 1904* (Boston, 1905), pp. 434-447; "Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art in Contemporary Germany," *Monist*, 36 (1926), pp. 299-310; and *Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* (Stuttgart: Enke, 1906, 1923).
- ²³ Munro, *Towards Science*.
- ²⁴ See Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present: A Short History* (University of Alabama Press, 1982, first pub. 1966), pp. 284-290.
- ²⁵ Ismā'īl R. al Fārūqī, *Islamization of Knowledge*, pp. 39-41.
- ²⁶ See Ismā'īl R. al Fārūqī, "Misconceptions of the Nature of Islamic Art," *Islam and the Modern Age*, 1, 1 (1970), pp. 29-49.
- ²⁷ Working paper delivered by L. al Fārūqī at seminar on Islam and Culture, National Archives, Kuala Lumpur, December 1983.
- ²⁸ Ismā'īl R. al Fārūqī, "Islam and Art," *Studia Islamica*, 37 (1973), p. 95.
- ²⁹ A bibliography of these materials is in preparation and will be published by the International Institute of Islamic Thought.
- ³⁰ "It [history of art] seeks to ascertain the facts rather than to appreciate them" (Thomas Munro, *Toward Science*, p. 143).
- ³¹ The numbers in this paragraph correspond to the numbering of the Aesthetic Functions of Art Education listed earlier, and should be read as such.
- ³² The numbering in the following passage corresponds to that of the earlier list of General or Non-Aesthetic Functions of Art Education, Section I, E *supra* and should be read

as such so that the parallelism may not be missed.

- ³³ See Maḥmūd Shaltūt, *Al Fatāwā* (Cairo: Dār al Shurūq, 1960), p. 359; also Qur'ān 7:32-33.
- ³⁴ See Lois Lamyā 'al Fārūqī, "The Sharī'ah on Music and Musicians," *Islamic Thought and Culture*, Ismā'īl R. al Fārūqī ed. (Washington, D.C.: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982), pp. 27-52.
- ³⁵ The recent Islamic exhibitions in the National Museum and National Gallery in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, are important exceptions to the general rule.
- ³⁶ Dick Hobson, "Tajmil and Jiddah," *Aramco World Magazine*, 35, (March-April 1984), pp. 4-15.

Islamization of the Visual Arts

Aminah Sayyid Muhammad

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Animah Sayyid Muhammad

This paper presents the Islamization of the field of art and design. I will try and identify, albeit briefly, some of the major problems and failings of the current situation and will discuss why this area of human activity urgently needs to be restored to its proper role and status in society. I will then propose a number of measures that could be taken toward achieving this.

The Status Quo

Looking at the arts around us, in particular that produced by Muslims (which, however, often cannot be distinguished from that of non-Muslims), we become aware that the status quo in this field is far from satisfactory. Hardly any of the art works reflect Islam except in a superficial way, and the roots of contemporary Muslim art are firmly planted in Western art rather than in traditional Islamic art. The values thus promoted by it are Western, and, as such, they are often in conflict with Islam.

It is not difficult to find the main reason for this phenomenon. As the Muslim countries' power and vitality eroded, they became easy prey to Western powers, who proceeded to colonize not only the Muslims' land and natural wealth but also their culture, their philosophy, their values. One of the chief vehicles for this spiritual/intellectual colonization was the institution of the mission school, which pushed Islam and its teachings to the sidelines, and forced it to abdicate its proper role as the central principle of, and complete guide for, all human endeavor. In its place, "modern" knowledge reigned supreme.

Perhaps one of the most damaging results, besides that of implanting a whole set of conflicting values, has been that of relegating Islam, as knowledge, to the status of a mere field of specialization. As with a branch of science, or economics, or literature, only those especially inclined toward religious studies are expected to study Islam in any depth, and anything beyond the

basic principles and practices has to be referred to such a specialist. These specialists are often, as it were, locked into their esoteric world of *fiqh*, *tafsir*, and so on, while the *ummah* as a whole lives a life largely devoid of the vital guiding spirit of Islam. Furthermore, with the presumption that one needs to be “specialized” in this area of knowledge, the right, indeed, the bounden duty, of every Muslim to learn and think for himself about his religion has been automatically surrendered to the specialists. Just as a non-economics-specialist is expected to defer to an economics specialist on matters of economics, a nonspecialist in Islamic knowledge usually now defers to a specialist on any question pertaining to Islam. To compound the problem further, the ordinary Muslim-in-the-street is doubly afraid of making mistakes about religion, since he does at least quite rightly feel that Islam is something “different”—no less than the word of Allah. Unfortunately, this reverence does not provoke him to study and think further but merely to be afraid to express any opinion or to question the meaning of anything to do with Islam. How much more so among artists, whose activities are usually deemed by the specialists to be at least frivolous if not downright sinful (based on present products, this judgment is perhaps understandable).

Overdependence on the *‘ulama* and religious teachers has also led to frequent overemphasis on black-and-white sorts of judgments—people want to know whether a certain action is allowable or not allowable; there is often no attempt, nor even a desire, to think of the whys and the wherefores, or to discuss the implications of the question or act in a broader context. Thus each little problem tends to be seen in isolation, and the overall spirit of Islam is often obscured. Such an attitude also leads toward negativism—avoiding the bad rather than constructing on the basis of the good, a cutting away instead of a building up.

Let us identify some of the basic concepts inherited from the West that are at variance with Islam.

1. Fine art is virtually separate from design. Despite using the same basic vocabulary of line, form, color, etc., they do not share the same aims, creative processes, or status.

2. Art is for art’s sake, divorced from its proper role in society. It has become obscure and is increasingly directed toward the initiated few.

3. Design is often primarily commercial, and involves problem-solving on a purely practical level. It is not usually expected to fulfill any spiritual need of man, except on a very basic level; aesthetic values are often incorporated, but their aim is to give pleasure and rarely go as far as to convey any higher meaning.

4. The fine artist is basically egoistic, creating works to fulfill himself.

5. The fine artist is a revered being superior to others. He is allowed to be totally selfish, even thoroughly antisocial in his behavior and actions,

simply because he is an artist.

6. There is no concept of what constitutes art. The spirit of non-art or anti-art still effectively prevails, since no one apparently ever dares to say, "that is not art." Even when an artist's ideas are so weak or garbled as to need lengthy verbal explanations to elucidate the art work that is supposed to express them, his work is still taken seriously, and he is even sometimes given a monetary award to develop his ideas further. Western art is groping blindly without any specific direction or unity.

7. Human thought or inspiration is supreme as the basis of all art.

8. Serious art must always seek new or different forms. Yesterday's art quickly becomes outdated and irrelevant.

The Benefits of Islamization of the Visual Arts

It is of course not possible to work magic and create and implement a perfectly Islamic field of art and design overnight. Even if we were able to determine its form in so short a time, it would not be feasible in an as yet imperfect Islamic society. Such an attempt would, in fact, create new problems: there would be a lack of adequately knowledgeable personnel to implement it, and teachers who do not themselves yet understand Islamization would surely do a lot of damage trying to teach it to their students. Second, too sudden and too drastic a change would confuse artists and designers and also might pose problems in terms of employment opportunities. It would also probably create feelings of anxiety and doubt among the general public, many of whom are still not fully sympathetic toward Islamization (due to ignorance of its true nature and import). This is an especially sensitive problem in countries whose populations are not 100 percent Muslim.

Having sounded a note of caution, let us go on to note some of the great benefits to be gleaned from Islamization in the visual arts.

Contrary to what some people might fear, it is inconceivable that Islam could ever limit knowledge or creative activity. The only possible limiting factor is the extent of man's own knowledge and understanding of Islam. Following Islamic principles might mean forgoing certain approaches and forms, but this sacrifice is only to make it possible for men to achieve something much higher than would have been possible through these approaches or forms. In other words, far from limiting the artist, the Islamic concept strives to remove limitations.

In terms of what both the artist or designer and the general public who see the art works stand to gain, the promise is indeed great.

Islamic art aims to express the universal concepts of Islam, as understood by the individual artist. The meaning of the art or design work is thus far

broader and more fulfilling than any fruit of purely human inspiration could ever be. Islamic concepts also appeal to the complete human consciousness. They appeal through his visual sense to his intellect as well as to his heart, whereas many Western-type works appeal to only part of man's consciousness—just to the heart (as in Expressionism), or just to the intellect, or just to titillate the senses. In this case neither message nor perception of meaning is completely satisfying; man's true nature is not properly fulfilled.

The artist himself, far from having his right to think and create usurped, would be greatly enriched. He would harness his powers of thinking and his special sensitivities to the interpretation of universal and eternal truths which have been sent to mankind by Allah (SWT). He would offer to his fellow creatures the fruits of this understanding through his unique artistic skills and creativity. Surely this is not a belittling of the individual but a tremendous uplifting. A true Islamic artist rightly considers the God-given gift of artistic talent an extraordinary honor, a privilege.

When other fields of knowledge are also Islamized, all of them, including art, will be directed toward the same goal, namely, knowledge of Allah (SWT). It should thus be much easier for them to interrelate, to communicate as they should do, since they will all, as it were, be on the same wavelength.

Thus, if the art and design field is Islamized, we can expect it to play its proper role in man's life and to have a coherent and unified direction or purpose. It would be far more fulfilling both to the artist and to the general public who are touched by it.

Finally, Islamic art could become the most useful tool for the propagation and enhancement of man's understanding of Islamic concepts, for the benefit of both Muslims and non-Muslims. As a form of presentation or expression that is both enjoyable and readily understood by anyone, it has enormous advantages. First, the basic meaning of works of visual art can be grasped in a moment, whereas musical performances, books, or lectures take some time to be presented and to make their meanings clear. Second, in common with other arts, the meaning is presently in such a pleasing way that even the least intellectual and the least educated people are attracted. Without their realizing it, eternal truths, vital to all mankind, are subtly directed to their hearts and minds through the pleasurable experience of admiring a work of art. And with art there is no problem of illiteracy or difference of language. A work of art can convey its meaning to a person from any part of the world, since its language is a universal one; neither does it require any education nor training to understand it.

Even though it is true, as mentioned earlier, that a totally Islamized art cannot be thrust suddenly onto an as yet imperfectly Islamic society, truly Islamic art can itself be used as an aid in the overall Islamization of society. Through its subtle and pleasing expression of Islamic concepts, it can gradually

influence society to desire a more completely Islamic way of life.

Imagine the man-made world, in harmony with nature (Allah's creation), fulfilling the true needs, both physical and spiritual, of the *ummah* and everywhere reverberating with beautiful expressions of eternal truths: a beautiful vision, and *in shā' Allah*, not impossible to achieve.

Toward the Islamization of Art and Design (Broad Outline of a Five-Year plan)

I. Identification of the Proper Roles of Art (one year)

Before any other action is taken, it is imperative that the proper roles of art in society—that is, according to Islam—be discussed and identified, not only the general, unchanging roles, which are perhaps easier to define, but more urgently the new roles art must assume in our contemporary world. Islam is suitable for all times, and therefore a reinterpretation, or a more fully developed understanding of it, is called for at each phase in man's history. Precisely because of these changes, the roles of art in the past cannot simply be adopted wholesale.

The roles of art, once identified, will be the basis of all thinking and planning concerning what are the acceptable or desirable forms of art, and also concerning the suitable curriculum for training artists and designers. If the roles are not identified and in principle agreed upon first, the subsequent planning will lack unified direction, and may become very confusing. The two most basic roles of art might be identified as follows:

1. *To worship Allah (SWT)*. Since it is stated in the Qur'ān (51:56) that this is the sole purpose for which Allah created both *jinn* and men, it follows that man's activities should be directed toward this end.
2. *To benefit the ummah*, that is, to contribute toward its real needs, both physical and spiritual.

In terms of physical needs, the fields of architecture and design should aim to improve man's standard of living, to make his environment more comfortable, and more efficient, more convenient. The designer should also give attention to groups who have special needs—children, the elderly, the sick, and the handicapped. With its physical needs taken care of, the *ummah* will have more opportunity to work for its spiritual development. The physical environment should also, of course, be designed and organized in such a way

as to facilitate a truly Islamic way of life.

While the physical needs are catered to especially by the fields of design and architecture, *all* fields of the visual arts should aim to fulfill the spiritual needs of man.

One of the basic spiritual needs of man is the need for beauty, which, in the Islamic view, can be equated with perfection or truth. In the case of art, physical beauty, perceptible by the sense of sight, will be used as a vehicle to afford the viewer an intuition of the divine perfection and truth. It is not, therefore, mere physical beauty, that the artist should aim at, but a reflection of divine beauty.

Another spiritual need of man, which art can help to fulfill, is the need to understand and to grow closer to Allah (SWT). The Qur'ān has been sent to all mankind as a complete explanation, guide, and reference, and the artist should use his art as a means to express the truths and principles contained therein. He will try to give his fellow men a deeper understanding of these truths, and in this way help them to love Allah more perfectly. His works will, in addition, be a constant reminder of Allah, and thus also of the viewer's true purpose in this earthy life.

An artist should aim to channel the benefits offered by his art works to the maximum number of his fellow men. Art should not be exclusive. Its expression, for instance, should not be so obscure as to be comprehensible to only a few—the Qur'ān is remarkable for its exquisite aesthetic value, yet it is still a clear message for all mankind.

On the physical level, design products meant for the affluent minority, which encourage that minority to take pride in their exclusivity, are clearly un-Islamic. The designer should rather aim to uplift those people who have a lower standard of living in order to support the Islamic ideal of equality.

The roles of art could thus be summed up as being for the good of the *ummah*, for the sake of Allah.

Discussion of the roles of art needs, perhaps, to be complemented by mention of the desirable characteristics of an artist, according to Islam. What sort of person could create works that would fulfill these roles? What personal qualities and what knowledge would he need to possess?

First of all, it is obvious that the artist must possess a reasonably thorough knowledge of Islam. If he is going to express Islamic concepts in his works, he must obviously first understand them himself. He will also have to try and follow an Islamic way of life as perfectly as possible, to be a pious person, otherwise he cannot hope to be blessed with intuitive understanding. As an artist he will also need to equip himself with the skills relevant to his field of specialization. A sufficiently high level of skill is equally crucial here, since without it he will not be able to give adequate expression to his understanding of the universal concepts.

The artist must also be in close touch with the *ummah* in order to understand its true needs, both the general ones and those that are particular to his own community and his own time. He will not succeed as an artist if he makes himself "elite," or, even worse, lives as a recluse.

One might further note three general Islamic principles which, while not exclusive to art, are surely nonetheless relevant and are perhaps in the present day often notable for their absence:

1. To do one's best at all times, according to one's ability and to opportunities available.
2. To be honest and sincere, not only with regard to selling one's works, but also in terms of the actual creation of works—why, what, and how one creates.
3. To practice moderation; in art this concerns not only choice of materials but also the style or character of the works produced.

II. Reeducation of the Educators (five years)

In taking steps toward the Islamization of the arts, it is obvious that priority must also be given to properly preparing the people who will be responsible for disseminating the Islamized concepts of art, and for guiding the artists and designers in their quest for suitable forms to express these ideas and to fulfill the needs of contemporary man. The most efficient (in terms of numbers of people who can be reached) and least expensive way is through distribution of printed material, although as many ways as possible should be employed in a combined effort. Other means include seminars, workshops, and talks; programs for the exchange of slides and films between different nations and communities; study visits; and interpersonal contacts among Muslim scholars and professionals. There needs to be periodic assessment of progress, in order to adjust the plans where necessary. There is also a need for informal, small-group contact and exchange of ideas, besides the more formally organized projects. Emphasis should be on as wide as possible a sharing of ideas, especially between different professional groups and different countries. Ideally there should also be a single main channel of communication and dissemination for each country or large community, to act as a coordinator of activities. From time to time it would be beneficial to arrange for cross-field interaction (visual arts with literature, music, or the sciences, for instance), in order to keep things in their true perspective and to gain strength from awareness of common goals and ideas.

These should all be part of continuous effort, starting immediately, a constant flow to sustain the momentum. The educators to be trained will be those teaching the prospective professionals, but it is hoped that these people, as consultants to the education ministries in their respective countries, can also help to filter some of the relevant ideas down into the primary and secondary school curricula. Perhaps the first concrete step should be to make an inventory of all the institutions in Muslim countries that offer courses to train professionals in the field of the visual arts, and make efforts to gain their interest in, and commitment to, Islamization.

III. Revision of Present Art and Design Curriculum (stage 1: two years; stage 2: five years)

Stage 1 refers to changes that can be effected almost immediately without destroying or endangering the integrity of the courses. For example, emphases can be subtly shifted, studies in art/design history and appreciation can be adapted to give more emphasis to Islamic arts. Within reason, new subjects could also be introduced. A great deal could be achieved through a liberal sprinkling of relevant comments and observations during the course of normal teaching.

Stage 2 entails a much more radical rethinking of the whole rationale and objectives of the courses, and the curricula themselves would then have to be constructed anew based on this thinking. The people involved in this second stage especially will have to consist of experts in all the fields of knowledge relevant to Islam and to art—theorists (in Islam and in art), educators, practicing professionals, and so on; but they must also share one thing in common: a total commitment to the broader “cause,” namely, the overall Islamization of the arts.

The main phases of such a rethinking and reconstruction should be:

1. Identification of common goals of present visual arts curricula.
2. Identification of needs of the various visual arts professions as they are now practiced, and their current role in society.
3. Rethinking of the desirable goals of art education (professional training), based on Islamic concepts and in keeping with contemporary needs.
4. Construction of a new basic curriculum to fulfill these goals and needs, which can be adapted to suit the particular needs of individual groups.
5. Production of necessary textbooks.

It should also be emphasized here that the burden of Islamization, especially with relation to the training of educators and new curricula, must be shared

by as many people as possible (ideally by all concerned in art and design education). It should not be presumed that one or two lecturers can be asked to provide the Islamic inputs while all the others carry on their teaching in the same old way. Islamization has to be integrated, not added on top (or at the side). For this reason it is essential that the dissemination of ideas and knowledge concerning Islam and the arts reaches as many people as possible, not just the handful who are keen or lucky enough to attend seminars. Besides feeding information, we must also feed motivation, and build up confidence and a sense of responsibility in each and every lecturer concerned.

IV. Compilation of Qur'an Verses and Hadīths Relevant to Art

This is essential reference material for building up truly Islamic art and design. The compilation would include such "indirect" verses as those expressing the broad principles of Islam that are relevant to all human activities, and therefore also to art—such as the exhortations to be honest, to be moderate, to help one's fellow human beings, and so on. These are equally important, since art is not exclusive or different but is only one of man's myriad activities.

V. Compilation of Existing Important Interpretations and Commentaries on the Relevant Qur'anic Verses and Hadīths

It is important to see how the relevant Qur'anic verses and ḥadīths have been interpreted over the centuries to be suitable to the needs of each period without sacrificing the eternal truths and principles, and also to see the range of interpretations so far put forward.

VI. Reassessment of Existing Interpretations and New Thinking or Interpretation

Since our age has faced tremendous changes, there is a need to reassess existing interpretations and seek new ones wherever it is deemed expedient. It is also necessary for Islam to remain a vital, active force in the arts, as in other activities.

Besides these, as it were, one-off tasks, which, at least at a basic level, can be achieved within a certain time-frame, other activities should be carried out on a periodic or continuous basis, as a vital back-up to the former.

1. There must be concrete efforts to establish and ensure the

continuation of communication between all parties who can contribute to the healthy development of Islamic art. It is desirable, even essential, to gather and to air as many opinions from as many different viewpoints as possible, so that the overall view is as complete and as balanced as possible. There should be a constant reappraisal of achievements to date and a sharing of new ideas.

2. The general public must also be educated about the true role and value of art in an Islamic society, so that it is not pushed to the sidelines as something unimportant, a mere luxury.
3. The production of good art and design works, which aim to be truly Islamic and relevant to the needs of the modern age, must be vigorously promoted. In the final count, the art works themselves will be the most effective “advertisement” for Islamic art.
4. There is an urgent need to preserve whatever relevant *traditional crafts* still exist in the Islamic world. They are the vital links with the past and as such should constitute a major source of inspiration to our contemporary artists and designers. Efforts must also be made to document the training methods and creative processes employed by these crafts.

Conclusion

As can be seen from this brief appraisal of the present situation and the equally brief suggestions for a plan of action, the task is complex and somewhat daunting. In terms of manpower, given the growing momentum of the overall Islamic revival, it is fairly possible that enough individuals can be found who are willing to dedicate their time, their knowledge, their powers of thought, their ideas, and their efforts toward the realization of this vision. What is perhaps most important is organization: not to control but to initiate, inspire, coordinate, and to propagate.

We pray that Allah (SWT) will help us, as He has, in His bounty, always helped mankind since the beginning of time.

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Islam and Urban Development

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From its beginnings, Islam never foresaw nor prescribed formal architectural features or physical urban patterns to be applied. Yet, in contrast to other religions, concerned with only spiritual realities, it has established a complete and homogeneous way of life that covers the temporary domain of man in conjunction with more eternal matters. The Qur'anic message and the exemplary actions of the Prophet have been strong shaping forces, intended to structure and transform the life of the individual *and* the community. Therefore, the social and urban dimension has been essential to the development of Islam.

By providing exemplary and meaningful patterns of life, followed by thousands and hundreds of thousands of believers, each one according to his own capacities, Islam has established a unique type of social order. The cohesion within this social order was the main reason why Islamic societies, over the centuries, succeeded in creating homogeneous urban environments. Shared values, commonly accepted modes of human behavior, and the natural correlation between individual actions produced a strong social network resulting in coherent urban patterns. The integrated or "implicit" implementation of these general rules proved to be a much stronger agent in the production of a unified and harmonious architectural language than specific and much more "explicit" building codes and prescriptions could ever be. The rules of the *Sunnah* were directing and controlling formal physical expressions from *within*, as it were, and they were based on legitimate spiritual foundations, as opposed to abstract man-made laws and rules, which have to be imposed or enforced from *outside* by political authorities of dubious legitimacy. Acting like seeds in the body of human beings, they were able to produce a lively, organically grown unity, quite different from the sterile and monotonous uniformity produced by mechanical application of formal laws or modules.

It has often been remarked that Islamic cities in the Middle East are characterized by a variety of regional building traditions. With the develop-

ment of Islam in time and space, different architectural heritages together with the available craftsmanship had to be absorbed, changing climatic conditions had to be met, and different building materials had to be used. Yet the way in which these potentials and constraints were employed and adapted to comply with the needs of the Muslim community shows the strength of the unifying forces of Islam. While adopting a variety of architectural elements, Islamic architecture in different periods and countries still reflects common patterns of use and close affinities in organizing, subdividing, and articulating spaces. One could, therefore, argue that the unity of Islamic architecture is not primarily materialized in physical shapes but rather in the concepts behind the actual forms. These conceptual forces, which contain the real factors of unity, reveal themselves in how formal elements are used, how they interrelate, and how they are aggregated into more comprehensive urban patterns.

Seen from this perspective, unity and variety by no means contradict each other: The variegation of common themes and principles in the media of different architectural elements is the very way of materializing the essential unity, by producing a lively variety of forms and shapes, all correlated to one another. Unity without a variety of expressions could hardly be apprehended for its very lack of differentiation, which would suppress the chain of analogies needed for grasping the unity behind manifold physical forms. Variety without an underlying principle of unity would result in chaos, and the lack of interrelation between architectural elements would deprive the man-made world of its meaning and inner coherence.

Islam has no fixed metaphysical image of the city such as that of "Holy Jerusalem" in Christian architecture, which was implied in the construction of medieval cathedrals. In its descriptions of Paradise, the Qur'ān uses the metaphor of the oasis and the irrigated garden rather than that of built structures. In addition, orthodox Islam does not invest rulers with religious power or with the function of representing God on earth. Their urban settlements and places are, therefore, usually deprived of sacred character. This attitude is reflected in the fact that the city is considered merely as a useful convenience to support the needs of the believers, as a caravansary on the terrestrial journey, to quote an expression by al Ghazālī. Even religious buildings, such as mosques and madrasahs, although they may have developed into great works of art, were not originally conceived as sacred spaces in the sense of the religious monuments of many other civilizations. According to a saying of the Prophet, the whole world is a place for prayer; therefore, any place can be bestowed with a temporary sacred character, by establishing its ritual purity, by orienting it to the Ka'ba, and by performing the act of prayer. Thus, mosques possess a sacred quality in themselves not by the "magic" of their architecture but by virtue of projecting the mind of the believer to the spiritual center of the Islamic universe.

The reluctance of directly investing buildings, or actually any man-made structure, with divine reality is rooted in the Islamic rejection of idolatry and in the deep concern for avoiding any kind of action in which man would compete or interfere with the sole Creator, whose essence is beyond material figuration and whose acts are inimitable and unforeseeable. This attitude had far-reaching implications with regard to architecture and to the arts, inasmuch as the goal could not be to directly represent the qualities of God and his universe in artistic works. The only legitimate representation is that of the word of God, the letters and words of the Arabic language, which constitute the verses and rhythms of the Qur'ān. The active commemoration of these words through daily, recitation, prayer, or works of art provide human existence with guidance and meaning.

Within this coherent cultural context, the function of architecture and the arts is to remind, to evoke, and to praise the omnipresence of the Creator, without subjecting the Divine to the limitations of the human perspective. The most tangible visual evocation is given by the means of calligraphy, the noblest of arts in Islam, because it directly transmits the Qur'ānic message. It is, therefore, natural that calligraphy acquired supreme importance in Islamic architectural decoration, taking the place reserved for mural paintings or sculpture in other civilizations. Together with calligraphy, abstract floral and geometrical patterns were developed to evoke the structuring forces of creation, to provide a sense of infinity through variation and repetition of the interfaced forms and to highlight the principles of unity through integration of individual elements into an all-encompassing total pattern.

These artistic modes of expression were the most congenial to Islam and were developed to perfection with many regional variations. They became inseparable from architecture and were prime factors in establishing a coherent and meaningful urban environment, not only in major public buildings but also in the domestic sphere, in fact in any crafted object of daily use. Thus they imprinted the specific atmosphere of the Islamic city, as it were, with their sense of both modesty and exclusiveness, realism and spirituality.

Looking at the urban development of Islam in history, we face a paradoxical situations. On the one hand, Islam by constitution was not dependent on certain types of buildings or urban settlements, and in fact the nomadic and tribal element was instrumental in the expansion of Islam not only in its early stages but also in later periods. On the other hand, the spread of Islam around large parts of the Mediterranean did by no means destroy the surviving urban civilization of the late Roman-Hellenistic period, as was the case in large parts of Europe, where the invasion from the east disrupted the continuity of urban life for several centuries. In fact, the Arab invasion led to an almost miraculous revival of that urban heritage under new spiritual prerogatives, due to the integrative forces of Islam and its capacity of absorb-

ing, assimilating, and transforming the pre-existing cultural heritage.

To Ibn Khaldun, the balance of forces between the nomadic life and urban culture and their mutual impact was a basic feature of Islamic culture. According to his *Muqaddimah*, urban florescence is the goal of civilization, for it is only in a sedentary way of life that culture can fully materialize through the steady development of the arts, the sciences, and trade. However, the sheltered life of urban society contains the seed of its own destruction, which grows stronger as higher stages of civilization and greater wealth are attained. But eventually stagnation and decay call for the influx of fresh forces capable of inducing order and cohesion. According to Ibn Khaldun, these qualities are inherent in the desert people, as the tribal organization, developed under the constraints of severe exterior conditions, contains all the essential ingredients of urban organization in nuclear form.

Consequently, to Ibn Khaldun the Bedouins not only are at the opposite pole from the world of the city, but they are its origin and prerequisite, for they represent the forces on which cities depend without being able to produce them: pure faith, proud codes of honor, social ties, and vital strength—all qualities that succumb within a few generations, once their owners take up a sedentary life. In its often violent contacts with cities, nomadism ensures the reinvigoration of urban culture and the necessary changes in the ruling dynasties. It provokes periodic destruction of worn-out structures as well as political and spiritual renewal.

This cyclic renewal has proven to be a recurrent factor in the urban development of Islam, for even after its establishment the Arab-Islamic empires were repeatedly invaded by tribal and nomadic societies such as the Turkomans and the Berbers. Many of these new dynasties founded their own new settlements or palatial cities; in some cases they adopted existing cities as their capital. Sometimes existing cities were left to decay and the seat of the government shifted to other places, underlining the temporary and transient character of these foundations.

Ibn Khaldūn also pointed out that the latent shaping forces of nomadic societies gained their maximum momentum only when directed by the uniting religious creed of Islam, which superseded tribal rivalries and the untrammelled life of the desert. Enormous energies otherwise lost in interior conflicts were made subservient to the achievement of a common goal, as was the case with the Prophet's community in Madīnah.

It is important to note that by overcoming tribal divisions the Prophet established the basis for the supranational character of Islam which eventually effected tribal and racial distinctions, much in contrast to Judaism, where the message is reserved to a "chosen people." This fact was one of the reasons for the success of Islam, for its embrace by a large number of races and nations, and for the rapid development of urban civilization in the centers of

ancient cultures. It is also the reason why it is possible to speak of a certain type of “Islamic city,” which is characterized by patterns of community structure and lifestyle shared by different regions and by populations of different racial origin.

In comparing Islamic urban development with the formation of European cities (which began only in the late Middle Ages), one finds a striking difference. In Europe, the dynamic forces behind the sudden growth of new towns were due to political factors, such as the struggle for new rights, liberties, and privileges, which resulted in the establishment of an urban bourgeoisie independent from the clergy and the nobility. In Islam, this type of class struggle had very little or no importance because of the greater balance established by its social order. The fact that Islam had no institutional clergy and that it provided a very specific model of daily life based on the *Sunnah* and the social order established by the Prophet (SAAS) in Madīnah, meant that there was from the outset an intangible body of right and rules protecting the individual and the community from the potential arrogance of misled rulers.

The eventuality of infringements did of course exist, and as Ibn Khaldūn points out, it had to be accepted as an unavoidable evil in the necessary imperfection of wordly existence; the laws of gravity, as it were, could not forever be suspended, as during the “period of miracles” in the Prophet’s (SAAS) time. However, abuse was limited due to the fact that the Qur’ān and the *Sunnah* and the laws derived from them were the sole constitutional elements of the Islamic state, and rulers had no other base of legitimacy for their actions.

Embedded as it was in the *ummah*—the supranational community of the followers of the Prophet—the Islamic city never laid claim to communal or sovereign independence as European towns did in the late Middle Ages and afterward. The inhabitant of the Islamic town consequently did not feel as a townsman or citizen in the Western sense, but as a member of the *ummah*, which gave him a basis beyond his clan and which promised him both temporal comfort and eternal salvation. The attachment to the *ummah* is more than a mere figurative idea: it had a very concrete meaning and validity as long as the world of Islam obeyed its own laws. Every Muslim was thus free to move about within the community in its widest sense, to settle wherever he wanted, and to engage in trade, teach, and learn. Provided he had the necessary personal integrity and knowledge, all functions were open to him in Islamic society—even the very highest such as that of a judge or a minister.

The spirit prevailing in the *ummah* meant that the importance of the individual town was assessed soberly: a simple living-space allocated to its inhabitants. For precisely the fact that the town had no significance in itself made it possible to establish urban life as part of a more comprehensive, a more universal concept of human life. Since temporary facilities and institutions, seen against the background of timeless existence, were not considered

absolute values, the idea of the town did not absorb too much of human concerns. Spiritual energies were reserved for the only object worthy of worship and full engagement: *Lā ilāha illa Allāh*. This attitude prevented Muslims from the utopian search for perfection in man-made institutions. It also provided the urban community with strong social cohesion, derived from the common direction of human acts and thoughts toward a higher goal.

The awareness of the transience and ultimate inadequacy of earthly institutions and the distrust shown toward abstract organizations and their autonomous development has a double aspect: what is denied to institutions is expected all the more from human beings as responsible agents of higher purposes. In the traditional Islamic town most administrative services (which have taken on such menacing proportions in modern Western society) are performed by way of direct personal connections and mutual obligations within the various social groups. Human relations and all forms of personal agreements, contracts, and understandings are thus of vital importance for the existence of Islamic towns.

For the Muslim there is above all an implicit contract between Allāh as the Creator and Supreme Ruler of the universe and the seed of Adam, who have committed themselves to lead a life of obedience to Him!¹ It was also a pact that united the Prophet (SAAS) with his first followers in Madīnah. Likewise, the allegiance of any community to its ruler was thought of as a contract, one that was normally renewed and confirmed week by week by including the ruler's name in the Friday prayers. For his part, the ruler made agreements with the men he chose to assist him, for these were not considered permanent officials but personal holders and executors of a temporary commission.

Mutual obligations were also created by the close neighborhood connections stressed by the *Sunnah*, as well as by the old tribal feelings that survived in the town and produced, through the formation of "houses" and quarters, effective nuclei of communal life. Similar bonds were implied by the association of craftsmen and tradesmen in professional organizations, a typical urban phenomenon for which a nomadic past offered no parallels. Such unions hardly had the same political and social objectives as the later European guilds, but they had ethical standards of their own, effective social welfare systems, and often esoteric traditions. A comparable role was played by the Sūfī brotherhoods, which in some cases constituted the supporting spiritual structure of a single corporation, in other cases extended through many different trades and social classes.

Each of these groups was able to act as a self-contained and self-regulating

¹ Louis Gardet draws special attention to the importance of the pact in his *La Cité Musulmane* (1954).

organism. The tribal leader, the chief of the clan, or the *amir* commanded unchallenged authority in his circle, as did the head *Šūfi*. Most of the professional associations had their own recognized courts to settle internal disputes, while the fraternities were pledged by their own objectives to avoid conflicts. This again helps to explain the striking limitation of central civil power and the absence of highly developed administrative systems in the structure of the Islamic city.

In the foregoing, I have deliberately avoided discussing specific physical features of the Islamic city, as this would imply an extended analysis which is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I have concentrated on the normative social and cultural framework, and on the attitudes that were largely responsible for generating the patterns of historic Islamic cities such as Dimashq, Aleppo, Fās, or Baghdād. These urban structures are widely admired for the coherence and the human character of their environmental qualities, which modern cities have so far failed to provide. However, they are considered by most as part of a past that is gone forever and not as a living heritage. Accordingly, the usual approach in dealing with these historical cities is an archeologically minded conservation and not a creative search for continuity under changed conditions. Here we come to the crucial issue of today's situation in urban developments. There may be some individual new buildings here and there in which Islamic principles are perpetuated, but there is no complete modern urban environment that reflects the Islamic way of life. Ironically, some of the most orthodox Arabic countries have developed the most abrupt contradiction between total adherence to Islamic moral codes, on the one hand, and replacement of the traditional environment by Western-type cities, on the other. It is only in the last few years, after the inadequacy of imported models became evident, that new attempts toward re-establishing some sort of local tradition have been made.

The problem of the cultural gap is, however, an immense one, and the factors that led to that situation are well known: the sudden break of continuity since colonial times, sometimes followed by an even stronger culture dependence on the West after political autonomy; new technologies and modes of production which no longer allowed for restricted local markets; the demographic explosion during the last few decades; an overwhelming dominance of Western ideologies in education and information; and corresponding major changes in lifestyle. In view of the tremendous impact of these factors the question arises whether anything worthy of the name "Islamic city"

² For a discussion of physical planning principles, see the author's "Stadtplanung in Islamischen Ländern." ETH, ORL-Publications, 44, Zurich, 1980, and "Traditional Muslim Cities and Western Planning Ideology," in the Symposium volume, "The Arab City," Riyadh, 1982.

will be able to survive or develop anew, and whether the traditional interaction between a specific culturally and religiously determined lifestyle and a corresponding urban environment can be restored. For without the existence of a decisive spiritual shaping force structuring the life of the community and without its appropriate reflection in the built form, no coherent urban civilization can be established.

It would be far too simple to assume that the problems pointed out above can be resolved by the sole intervention of architects, well intentioned as they may be. These are issues involving the collective responsibility of society as a whole. They cannot be tackled from the “periphery,” as it were, but only from the center, by regenerating the vital forces of the community. It is only by making use of these inner forces that a society will be able to respond to outside challenges, to absorb, adapt, and transform the achievements of foreign civilizations without losing its own identity. Establishing a new cultural synthesis through selective and meaningful use of the “raw material” of today’s modern civilization is indeed the major challenge Islamic societies face today. In importance, this challenge is comparable to the situation during the early days of Islam, when the community was confronted with the wealth of Greco-Roman civilization and had to forge an unmistakably Islamic culture under its own spiritual premises.

Western Architecture: A Critical Assessment

Hussein M. Ateshin

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Setting the Scene

The Royal Institute of British Architects is one of the bastions guarding over the profession of architecture in the Western world and providing it with regal authority as the main spokesman for the discipline's professional content, its educational efforts, and the direction it should take in the course of the discipline's historical progression. The monthly journal of this august body captioned the front page of its November 1983 issue with the following statement: EDUCATION IN CRISIS. The issue quoted different teachers of architecture commenting on a recent conference called by the Institute to discuss the educational crisis:¹

The profession is currently faced with the debate concerning the future of architecture following the *demise* of the Modern Movement.

Clearly, the practice of architecture—the quintessentially social art—does not rest solely with the architects; designers must be exposed to the *guidance* of the every day users of buildings.

The 25 years of architecture after the Second World War are a *national diaster*.

There is a constant conflict between academic authority and professional control of architectural education . . . resulting in *failure to earn respect* for architecture as an academic discipline.

Another respected institution of the discipline, the weekly organ of the profession's rank and file, *The Architects Journal*, echoed sentiments in the same

key in its January 18, 1984, issue²:

Every practioner knows that the students he interviews now are often almost *totally uneducated* in the simplest skills—spelling, hand writing and drafting—let alone elementary building construction.

In effect these works often castigate and pillory the architect as part of a *corrupt oligarchy* which has managed to foist an unsatisfactory environment on society.

In the past forty years architects have been party to the deliberate *deskilling* of a great industry. Although new skills have been created in a few technologies, there has been consistent pressure for the industrialization and consequent automation of production. That production depends on quantity. Quality might be achieved, *but variety, individuality and invention* will not, and those are the qualities that we desperately need.

These are the concerned opinions of architectural educators in the West who have the courage to voice their concern at the pinnacle of a muted majority, bored to silence with the environment they have been provided with to live in. Having allowed the West to introduce its kind of architecture, we have to record, albeit with bitterness, that architectural education, along with so many social institutions, is an imported and well sought-after commodity in Muslim lands.

Schools of architecture in the Muslim world are modeled after the present-day schools of America or Europe. An example may suffice to serve the point. Appendix I lists the subjects taken by undergraduate students of Egypt's Cairo University, Faculty of Engineering, to obtain a bachelor's degree in architecture. The list was taken from a 1974 catalogue that was still current in 1984.³

As with most other architectural curricula, the content of this one can be divided in very general terms into four areas of concern. They are:

1. Design studios, which emulate the drawing office of an architect, where the practical realization of graphic representations are attempted as solutions to given problems.
2. Humanity-related courses, comprising in the main theory/history subjects but also psychology/sociology-oriented subjects and economics.
3. Technology courses, comprising subjects pertaining to strength/properties of materials and their safe and appropriate application in built form.
4. Professional skills, composed of subjects dealing with the ex-

education, administration, and management of the design/construction process.

The last two areas of concern are non-contential and are taught only as they relate to the other two areas.

The first area of concern, the design studio, is a unique vehicle for acquiring a skill/knowledge base, the equivalent of which does not exist in any other discipline in the intensity of emotional, mental, and physical involvement of the student. This vehicle of skill/knowledge acquisition, because of its centrality to the teaching of the discipline of architecture, needs specific and concerned attention, which will not be attempted in this overview.

The second area of concern is the most critical aspect of the “subject” curriculum. To identify its importance in any review of the curriculum, the relevant course descriptions from the same catalogue of Cairo University are listed below.⁴

Second Year Architectural Engineering

History of Architecture: 2 hrs of lecture.

General study of influences, architectural character, examples, and comparative analysis of the following: Egyptian architecture; West Asiatic architecture (Babylonian, Assyrian, and Persian); Greek architecture; Roman architecture; Early Christian architecture; Byzantine architecture; Romanesque architecture in Europe: Italian Romanesque, French Romanesque, German Romanesque.

. . . Planning: 2 hrs of lecture

A study of the evolution of the city through history (starting from ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, Roman Empire, Middle Ages, Renaissance); the Industrial Revolution and its effect on pattern of the city; trends and theory of city planning. . .

Third Year Architecture Engineering

Theories and History of Architecture and History of Art: 3 hrs of lecture

Theories of architecture, roots of contemporary architecture, Revivalism, romanticism, classicism; revolutionary architects in France; development in France, England, U.S.A., and Germany. Gothic Revival: England, Germany, & U.S.A.; Picturesque: Renaissance, revival; Eclecticism: Philosophy, 2nd Empire, France,

U.S.A., Higher Victorian. Structural Logic: Development of iron, steel and reinforced concrete; writings of Viollet-le-Duc, Chicago school. Functional logic: Biological analogy, Wright, mechanical analogy, Le Corbusier, Bauhaus school Formal development: Effect of art, Cubism, purism, De Stijl, picturesque tendencies.

History of architecture: General study of influences, architectural character, examples, and comparative analysis of the following: Gothic architecture in Europe, English medieval architecture, French Gothic, German Gothic, Italian Gothic.

Renaissance architecture in Europe: Italian Renaissance, French Renaissance, English Renaissance; Islamic architecture: early Muslim architecture, the Omayyad dynasty, the Abbasid dynasty, Muslim architecture of Egypt.

History of Art: General study of influences, architectural character, examples, and comparative analysis of the following: Prehistoric Egyptian art, art in Chaldea and Persia, Aegean, Minoan, Mycenaean art, Greek art, Etruscan & Roman art, the birth of modern painting, the French Revolution, the influence of the Far East, Realism and Impressionism in France. . .

Fourth Year Architectural Engineering

Theories and History of architecture: 2 hrs lecture

Principles and directions of contemporary architecture: Pre-international architecture, international style-expressionism, architecture between two world wars, technical advances of the fifties, thermonistic architecture of the sixties.

Reading these course descriptions, one becomes disconcertingly aware of the degree of detail with which aspects of Western life and architectural concerns are taught to Egyptian students. The awareness becomes more painful when under further investigation it is found that even the Western schools that were the models of Cairo University progressed much further ahead both in content and in methodology of delivery than those frozen forms of descriptive statistical information implied in the above extracts.

One wonders what academic gain is made by students going through a comparative study of "Gothic Architecture in Europe: English Medieval Architecture, French Gothic, German Gothic, Italian Gothic." At what point is the urbanization concern as developed and implemented by different Muslim communities brought to the notice of the students? Is a fraction of our own ar-

chitecture taught at Western schools, while their architecture holds a near monopoly in history courses in our universities?

A more comprehensive view of architectural history would set for itself three aims. These are:

1. *The practical*, which establishes what was built, when it was built, and who was instrumental in its building. This is also presumed to be the concern of the "history of architecture."
2. *The historical*, which attempts to discover why the building was built. It may demand considerable religious, cultural, and sociological knowledge, because the precise function of a building may not be obvious.
3. *The aesthetic*, which attempts to account for the visual or stylistic differences.

Whether or not this is an acceptable and relevant set of aims to be considered as aims for Islam's own concept of history, it is important to bear in mind the advice given by E. H. Carr in his *What Is History?* (1962):

Before you study the history, study the historian. . . . Before you study the historian, study his historical and social environment. The historian, being an individual, is also a product of history and society; and it is in this twofold light that the student of history must learn to regard him.

This is the considered advice of a Western scholar to Western intelligentsia. The Muslim would not need such advice, for the criteria of how to study history are laid down in his canonical sources. How he should study and apply history is spelled out for him. How little we know about our own heritage in this regard, too.

Below a review of Western architectural history will be attempted without any specific methodological treatment of the subject from the standpoint of Islam. The aim will be to indicate, in general outline, matters that have been accepted as constituting the courses in history, as taught in architectural schools. An attempt will be made only to bring a relevant dimension to the whole sequence of chronological events in Western historiography.⁵ It is hoped that in due course this will lead to a more thorough investigation of the subject from the standpoint of Islam so that the subject is finally grasped in its overt as well as covert format.

Development of Styles and Schools in the West— A Sequence of Reactions in Disgust

In attempting a review of the development of styles and of the schools that educated students with regards to their attitudes toward these styles, I will omit the ancient and the classical periods up to and including Romanesque. In a final evaluation they will have to be taken into consideration to complete the overview in order to define Islam's attitude to their possible value. I therefore propose to begin with the Gothic era in our endeavor to chart the course that the shaping of the environment took until it reached the present post-Modernist fad.

In doing so we will see that "styles" and attitudes toward styles in the West are a series of reactions in disgust that managed to change likes and dislikes of whole generations and countries from one extreme to the other. What was introduced with glowing praises as the final solution to the ills the "built" environment was supposed to have generated began, after a period of time, to be deprecated and rejected as being vile and antisocial. In doing so a "new" style was introduced as the solution, a style very often similar to the one the previous style replaced. The series of rejections and acclaims accorded to these styles has generated a body of scholarship under the generic title of "architectural history" in the West that defies any rational analysis as to its worth or use.⁶ It will also be seen that the time span of these sequential reactions become shorter and shorter, dissatisfaction always setting in less time than in the previous cycle.

I propose that a thorough analysis of these oscillations should be made in relation to specific criteria and points of reference as defined in the body of Islamic sciences pertaining to the shaping of the "built" environment and thus bring the Western architectural experience to the proper size, to be dealt with in no less or more time than it deserves. Having defined the criteria and points of reference, one can then introduce a meaningful study of the history of the "built" environment in our schools, without blunting young minds with either encyclopedic information or irrelevant discourses on one disgusted reaction after another.

The Gothic Style—The Age of Faith (1100–1400 A.C.)

Medieval culture of Western Europe was built upon the political, moral, economic, and military collapse of the Roman Empire, which had reached its irreversible decline by the fifth century A.C. The expansion of Islam during the seventh century also affected the European political structure adversely, as a result of which its urban civilization started degenerating. In Christianized

Europe, down to the eleventh century, monasteries served as the main cultural and economic centers and, like feudal castles, gave rise to new settlements. From the eleventh century on, as a result of a considerable growth in population under improving security and stability, a general process of urbanization took place in Western and Central Europe. In this development, the emerging religion, Christianity, was providing a set of new, universally binding principles that denied all the values of the Romanized peoples and their classicist culture. The Church was assuming a universality, and its influence and power forced even the mightiest ruler to his knees under its threats of eternal punishment. In doing so, the Church steered post-Roman societies, which lived in a state of chaos, terror, poverty, and ignorance, toward a new, comparatively enlightened culture, which reigned over most of Europe for 300 years. The Church, as the reflection of a towering spirit, stood at the center of a culture reinforced by the different institutions of society developed through the concern and interests of the Church.

For the vast majority of twelfth-century Europeans, having lived through desperate and insecure times, this system was providing the blessed symmetry of peace, comfort, stability, assurance, and mercy. The institution of the Church was the center for the spirit but it was also the center for learning, for the arts, for caring for the sick and the poor, and finally for economic growth. The transition from the heritage of pagan cultures to the development of Christian cultures was eased and helped by the disciplined monastic orders, which provided nuclei for the formation of medieval towns and institutions. It was in these monasteries that source of the great moral authorities of the Christian world appeared, as personified by St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. Principles of medieval art were also developed in these places. In principle, the Church, in those days, was skeptical about the merits of the arts for their own sake; nevertheless, they laid down some principles of beauty. The difference that came to symbolize Gothic uniqueness in the arts was the forceful emphasis on the servant role of art, that is, art was in the service of the public good. Instead of being for the rich and the powerful, art had to reflect medieval belief and the moral structure of society.

Treatises on art were scarce during medieval times. They were considered secular, recalling too strongly the hated Rome. Unlike the later Renaissance writers, scholars writing about art appeared less interested in theory and more in-activity. Gothic art was not the fruit of a single master who happened to stumble across a style. The goals that were formulated by the Church required an artistic formulation, and as a consequence it arose without historical precedent as a pure formulation of the mind. In this framework Romanesque seems to have been rejected because it clung too fast to the traditions of despised Rome although the style evolved in the formative years of Christianity. By the eleventh century, the time seemed to have been ripe for the conception

of a new art of absolute originality and uniqueness, not based upon any historical precedent, and providing a universal framework that would be applied throughout the Christian Western hemisphere. During the 300 years of Gothic triumph, Europeans built more buildings than any culture before or after. A review of some example will serve to illustrate the age, its style, and the physical expression of its understanding as regards a suitable environment for man to live in. The architects of Gothic times were able to use their new engineering knowledge to express the aims, emotions, and outlook peculiar to their age.

In the theological arguments of the time the importance given to light opened the way for the emergence of church architecture; it downplayed the role of walls, replacing it with a plastic skeleton of piers; increased strength with buttresses and flying buttresses (on the outside) so that space inside remained free; emphasized verticality as a striving toward heaven and gave light a supernatural quality through the use of stained glass. We see these in the cathedrals at Chartres, Reims, and other places.

Similarly cities, though externally not exhibiting any order, had a hierarchical and circular composition. They had in common basic properties: enclosure, density, intimacy, and functional differentiation. The city wall built for protection, at the same time served as a symbol of order. In general, medieval towns exhibited the structure of a living organism. Sienna, in Italy, is a good example.

For a clearer understanding of the era it is necessary to introduce the medieval architect and his training. It is fascinating to discover how high a social standing he enjoyed, which echoed, in some respects, the position of his counterpart in the Muslim world.

Many were from influential and wealthy families. It was in the spirit of medieval tradition to follow the same profession through several generations without interruption. This also contributed to the establishment and stabilization of the architectural profession. The title of "master" that builders earned is proof of their high social significance. This title began to be applied in the middle of the twelfth century and was later transferred to the universities to denote professional rank. But the fact that it originated with professionals rather than in academia holds great symbolism and indicates the practical inclinations of the medieval mind. The "practicing master" was valued more than the "theorizing master." In fact, the method of learning architectural art was particularly professional. The only method that existed was through an apprenticeship, which also provided formal education. The training usually began at the age of thirteen and ended at the age of twenty or twenty-one. After this a period of three years was needed to "improve" skills. This was usually a time of extensive traveling for young students, allowing them to acquaint themselves with numerous examples of the "built" environment. Medieval ar-

chitects had extensive knowledge of the buildings of other regions and countries.

During their period of apprenticeship, besides the art of construction, apprentices studied the art of geometry and the laws of architectural composition. Unlike later architects whose education featured compartmentalization and specialization of knowledge, the medieval architects were learning in broad terms. The architects simultaneously learned engineering skills, the laws of art and geometry, and finally literature and theological canons. Their complex and organic understanding of science, such as mathematical formulae and geometrical principles, and of philosophy and poetry was truly outstanding. The use of drafting tools, T-squares, and drafting boards—some of which had specially shaped forms to help draw to scale or to yield certain proportions—was a standard practice in those times. By the age of twenty-three the students were ready for independent work. On the one hand, they possessed the spirit of humility typical of the times and characteristic of those possessed with a mission they profoundly believed in and put ahead of their own personal egos; on the other hand, they received high pay for their services, occasionally sat at the table with kings, and—most remarkable—they did not belong to the clerical ranks. They were members of the civil ranks serving both the state and the Church, united in pursuit of the mutual goal of building a new society. In the endeavor architects enjoyed the unlimited support of the civic and ecclesiastic authorities. They can indeed be the envy of every modern architect.

After 300 years of universal currency the era came to a close, victim of the recurring cycles of reactionary styles. How did this moment arise? The moment came when the accumulation of material wealth was so enormous that it created within the Church and citizenry obvious divisions into classes of rich and poor, exploiters and exploited, influential and meaningless. This in turn weakened the people's faith and stressed the importance of the individual as a creative genius. Wealth encouraged love of luxury and then lust for power and dominance. Rome and the papacy themselves set the precedents. The old moral fabric loosened and the gates for individual excess stood wide open. The Renaissance proclaimed the art of this epoch, the art of dark spirits, of irrational impulses acted upon by crude, uneducated fanatics. It (the renaissance) replaced simple dreams, initiative, brute force, struggle, spontaneity, compassion, pain, and true joy with elegant treatises, elegant words, elegant acting, and elegant arts.

Renaissance/Electicism/Humanism (1400–1600 A.C.)

A vast literary and philosophical movement originated in Italy in the second half of the fourteenth century and later diffused into the rest of Europe,

coming to constitute one of the cornerstones of Western culture. This movement is referred to as humanism and has as one of its protagonists Leone Battista Alberti, born in 1404 as the illegitimate son of a Genoese merchant father. *Humanism* is the philosophy that recognizes humans as the center of the universe and makes them the measure of all things and activities. Humanists, in their ignorance, believe that they are providing the human being with more importance and power than religious cultures are willing to do. The Renaissance humanists emphasized intellect, and consequently promoted the sciences at the expense of emotions, with which they connected the earlier, rural medieval cultures. They sought in this way to liberate themselves from the limitations of the Gothic era. In the arts the humanists submerged themselves into a search of dogmatic rules and principles. Their goal was to establish – after three centuries of “barbarian,” obscure, capricious, “uncivilized” Gothic – the principles of a clear style, which would stand for the triumph of clarity and elegance. Alberti was not an architect in the sense of master builder. He was foremost a scholar interested in aspects of culture, of which architecture constituted an essential part. His conception of architecture was exclusively aesthetic; one of his misconceptions was his misunderstanding of the load-bearing role of the columns in Greek and early Roman architecture. His study of the Roman ruins convinced him that the role of the columns should be mainly decorative and plastic, while heavy walls should be used for structural purposes. From this misconception he derived his system of ornamental orders, applied according to mathematical proportional systems to the façades of his famous buildings, such as Sant’ Andrea at Mantua (1472–1514) and S. Maria Novella at Florence (1456). The classicist space became an enclosure formed by walls and the rhythm of the elements of walls. It was a solid space, mathematically divided, and accessible along constructional approaches.

His own self-imposed duty was to help conceive a new form for a new rational Italian style that would glorify Italians’ own achievements and at the same time symbolize aspirations of the new age. In order to achieve this aim Alberti wrote his famous treaties on art and architecture, presenting a set of rules to govern architectural design.⁷ He can be considered as the father of the architectural theory of Renaissance. In developing his theories as related to church design, in contrast to medieval practice, he called for designing them as free-standing monuments, without any buildings on the sides. Therefore, a plaza around or in front of the church was called for. The front façade of the church was all important and nothing appeared more suitable to this task than to transplant the old Roman, “pagan” triumphal arch to structure such a façade. Thus Alberti was the first great theoretician who opted for intellectual staticism of form, which could be precisely defined by means of geometrical and mathematical certainties. He looked upon architecture as the science of ideal form, detached from life, from humans and their com-

plex functioning, and so imposed upon architecture the rational aspect that until today was the manifestation of universal humanism. Another example of this architectural style is the Pazzi chapel in Florence (1430–1461) by Filippo Brunelleschi.

Renaissance architectural theory was concerned mostly with building. The city planning theory came much later. The influential and rich wished only to promote their own well-being instead of the communal good. Thus architecture of the Renaissance is the architecture of the single pieces built into the fabric of the existing environment, with only mild restructuring. Paintings of street scenes by Francesco di Giorgio during this period exhibit clearly this attitude.

Andrea Palladio, another pacesetter of the Renaissance, marked the same path, expounding his rigid classicist principles in his famous *Four Books of Architecture*.⁸ He transformed the Roman temple into the Renaissance villa, committing himself to the same mistaken interpretation of history as Alberti did in case of Greek and Roman columns. Villa Rotonda in Vicenza (1566) by him is one such example.

Renaissance culture was the outcome of ruthless material exploitation achieved at the expense of many for the sake of a few. It was a classic capitalist culture. It replaced medieval spiritualism with the domination of financial oligarchies. It left no room for morality and compassion. Renaissance was the voice of an aristocracy that isolated itself from the society and employed its financial means and the genius of the Renaissance artist primarily for its own benefit. Pope Leo X of the Medicis, who became a cardinal at the age of fourteen and developed into the most famous patron of the arts, was the man under whom classical Greece and Rome were reconciled with Christianity by subduing Christianity to pagan expression in the arts and giving state-sponsored status to classical revivals. The switch to “pagan” reforms was one of the factors that resulted in the pious revolt in northern lands led by Martin Luther. The reformist movement denouncing Renaissance corruption and materialism spread all over Europe. Eventually all that Renaissance culture stood for was denounced and ridiculed. This led to an anti-Renaissance turn in which Germany, France, and England led the way. It also resulted in Italy’s political and cultural downfall.

Baroque/Rococo (1600–1750 A.C.)

Toward the end of the sixteenth century people began to grow tired of the individualistic mannerism of the Renaissance. The seventeenth century started with a longing for individual security, which was sought in the restoration of the absolute authority of the Roman Church. Centralized religion joined

hands with centralized monarchies and turned its back to the ideal of individualism. It instigated a new order in which each and everyone was assigned a role in the social hierarchy. Within this hierarchy people found the security that they were desperately seeking.

The seventeenth century can be considered as a unified epoch achieved through the new self-assurance that the Church acquired through the Counter-Reformation movement, implemented under the guidance of Christian dogmaticism. This was the Baroque Age. Renaissance centralization had a static and enclosed character. The system never extended beyond clearly defined limits, and the elements as single pieces of architecture remained isolated in the landscape, exclaiming to passers-by their individuality. During the Baroque age the harmony of this static space was broken, and there arose a strong interest in movement and contrast, as well as in new relationships between the exterior and the interior space. The isolated objects of the past were unified to form continuous urban networks. In the Baroque city the single building lost its plastic individuality and became part of a superior system. The dynamic and extroverted character of this new conception was expressed in wide and straight streets ending in or radiating from several foci, one of which was dominant. These are seen in the works of Francesco Borromini (1599–1667), Guarino Guarini (1624–1683), Johann Balthasar Neumann (1687–1753), and Gian Lorenzo Bernini (1598–1680).

The age of Baroque was obsessed with great ceremonial assemblies, theatrical vistas, violent contrasts, and emphasis on the importance of foci and a highly centralized hierarchy. The classical orders, expressed as endless rows of columns, colonnades, and arches or rows of trees, served to form continuous backgrounds for long spatial sequences meant to contain and direct the flow of human movement toward predetermined specific points of interest. It was an architecture of collective manners within which individuals had to obey the laws of authority. There was not much room for dissention or individualism. Examples are the oval place of St. Peters in Rome (1651) by Bernini, and the gardens of Versailles (1661) by André le Nôtre.

Though reaction against the state of affairs, true to the nature of Western plays with the built environment, was bound to set in, there were not so many such voices in Italy. Carlo Lodoli stands out among the critics, although his contribution remains that of a writer rather than an implementer of ideas in brick and mortar. Lodoli felt that classicist architecture, especially in its baroque phase, went almost mad in its research of purely plastic effects, and he attacked its representative architects, especially Andrea Palladio, whom he considered a narrow-minded formalist. He maintained that Palladio's architecture represented the height of formalist evil, which had to be firmly routed. We have to go to France for the next stage of the reactionary progression of Western styles, although the decadence or high-water mark of Baroque will

also be reached there.

Louis XIV, after reigning for seventy-two years, died in 1715 leaving the five-year-old Louis XV not in a position to assume the leadership of his country. Philippe II, Duc d'Orléans, was voted the regent of France. History attests to his sophistication of taste, brilliance of administrative skills, and promotion of the arts and liberal philosophies. History also attests to his appetite for easy life, heavy drinking, spending, and lack of morals. It was due to him that state and artistic affairs passed under immense female influence and female participation, affecting the taste and direction of artistic achievement of this epoch. Rococo art corresponded directly to the intimate nature of male-female relationships of this time and therefore developed a specific sensibility depicted in sinuous, irregular, soft, delicate curves, a general abundance of ornamentation, and intimacy of architectural spaces. The Rococo art discarded the classical rules in its decorative attempts on the interior and in a way sensed the forthcoming Art Nouveau style. But there should be one swing backward before arriving there yet! It is interesting to note that painting, sculpture, and furniture-making followed the trends instigated by the realm, but architecture continued along traditional classicist lines and almost ignored Rococo.

The education of architects, as a consequence of changing social demands, underwent a transformation. The apprentice system as practiced in the medieval period continued to be the system through which architects were trained until, because of pressure to increase the supply of architects, the system had to be changed. The demand for more architects arose due to an expansion in princely construction which strained the capacity of the apprentice system. In accordance with changing ideas regarding the shape of the desirable environment and the supply of designers academies of art were developed during the Renaissance period. In France, the Académie Royale d'Architecture was established in 1671, and with it the first school of architecture came into being and the first architectural professor was appointed. It enjoyed great prestige and was the guardian of the French classical tradition.

In the seventeenth century, whatever the connotations the word academy may now have, such establishments were centers of intellectual ferment and loci of radical thought. The exposure to new ideas produced architects who introduced innovation in French architectural thought up to the end of the eighteenth century. One reason for the establishment of academies was to introduce some form of streamlined education, by centralizing those aspects of architecture that could be taught in lecture classes. The lecture syllabus of the Academy in 1770 covered arithmetic, geometry, perspective, stereometry, mechanics, architectural theory, economics, hydraulics, military architecture, and fortifications. Students were assigned to the ateliers of different academicians where they learned design. However, attendance at lecture classes was low. Furthermore, the humanist tradition of the Académie and the school at-

tached to it made it unsuitable for the teaching of those who were inclined toward a purely technical role. Now it had become possible, even desirable, that buildings be designed by someone who was not a craftsman. The architect's education became theoretical and antiquarian rather than practical, and what he gained in intellectualism he lost in alienation from the building process itself and from its roots in common society.

Enlightenment/Rationalism/Romanticism (1750–1870 A.C.)

Until the eighteenth century the theory of architecture, the practice of architecture, and the social task of architecture remained in organic accord. The chief concerns of architecture until that time had been the formation of symbolic and aesthetic criteria, for the simple reason that architecture was concerned only with religious and monumental public and private edifices. Architecture was an elitist profession, for the realm of public habitation and city planning remained untouched by architectural theory. The division between the architect-designed world and the world of vernacular activities remained sharp, reflecting prevailing social inequalities and producing phenomenal contrasts in physical terms. It was not until the eighteenth century that the interests of architects suddenly broadened and included other than strictly aesthetic concerns.

This new attitude began to take shape in France. Demands for functionalism, for a respect for construction and for building materials, the need for a rational approach to building beyond the traditional formalist attitudes, condemnation of “useless” ornamentation which obscured the true goal of constructive architecture—these were truly revolutionary voices coming out of France.

This period coincided with a sudden growth in scientific discovery and accompanying enthusiasm among the intelligentsia. This was the period of Enlightenment. The impact of the natural sciences and their discoveries upon the artistic and architectural world was profound. People set out to scrutinize all traditional institutions in the light of “reason,” resulting in a stricter and more rigorous scrutiny of previous canonical precepts. People now firmly believed that architecture should be based upon science rather than individual and arbitrary ideas, leading toward the favoring of a rational outlook. Thus the term “rationalism” also came to be used for this era. Modern intellect, which replaced God with science, seemed desirous of demonstrating the insignificance of humanity against the immensity of natural phenomena. The change that started to take place was away from totalitarian stylistic formalism and toward usefulness or functionalism, which dictated a rational attitude toward architecture and planning.

Rationalists desired to curb the excesses of decoration, fantasies, and exaggeration of which Rococo was particularly guilty. The reaction against excesses of Rococo led to a new tendency, which could be described as a strong and organic combination of geometry and functionality. The rediscovery of ideal geometrical bodies such as pyramids, spheres, cubes, and cylinders was the most characteristic achievement of this period. The nakedness of the walls, stark simplicity, rigorous geometry, emphasis upon structural integrity, compactness, and above all use of Platonic solids pleased the public as intellectual, clear, sober, and modern. So architects designed their houses, hotels, churches, gateways, prisons, funerary monuments, lighthouses, theaters, and hospitals as cubic masses resulting from the interpenetration of cubes, cylinders, and pyramids. Building plans consisted of intricate combinations of squares, circles, half-circles, triangles, and rectangles. As should be expected of any kind of reaction that does not relate to a relevant, unchanging point of reference for shaping the built environment, scientific rationalism became dangerously formalistic and professionally useless. The works of Etienne Louis Boullée and Claude Nicolas Ledoux are two examples.

Another dimension to the change in attitudes taking place as a result of the revulsion to Baroque or Renaissance was to hark back to a pre-Roman past in order to express the primitive dignity of a world uncorrupted by the Renaissance sophistication of current regimes. The development of archeology from Winckelmann onward⁹ and architectural paintings of ruins by Giovanni Battista Piranesi assisted the rediscovery of primitive classical forms, and neo-classicism set in as a "style." Renaissance was labeled as applying falsified forms of the past in an unscientific manner. If classical Greece was the pure source, then archeological studies would provide more accurate and scientifically defined rules as regards aesthetics. This architectural pilgrimage from the Italianate to the Greek, this continued search for greater primitivism and sublime simplicity, was part of what we now call the Romantic movement, gaining ground all over Europe. In North America, during the period of reconstruction that followed the American Revolution of 1776 architects were called upon to express the spirit of resurgence, and it was virtually demanded that they use the neo-Greek style to avoid any association with the aristocratic British past. Notice this in the works of architect-president Thomas Jefferson and also in the reconstruction of the Italian-style White House into a Greek Ionic mansion. Inherent in the architectural message was a parallel between the new state apparatus and Athenian democracy of the fifth century B.C.

A natural development of interest in pristine stylistic forms in the frozen conventions of a scientifically defined past was to accord the same kind of relevance to other conventional forms of the past. In consequence, the respective revivalist movements in architecture started to penetrate into the environment. Neo-Greek was followed by Neo-Gothic, Neo-Byzantine, even Neo-Arabian!

In one sense the margin of the individual designer's freedom was reduced to nought, as he was asked to design in a revivalist style, while on the other hand it was increased hundredfold as he was free to use the elements of his chosen style in any way he liked as if composing a collage. Critics spoke of "the Harlequin dress of architecture," indicating a disease that is malignant in 1980s as well. A. W. N. Pugin and John Ruskin were Gothic revivalists. So was E. E. Viollet-le-Duc. John Nash with his Brighton Pavilion exhibited an Eastern revival!

A third dimension of the changes in this period was the architecture-versus-engineer conflict. The industrial revolution, as it gradually engulfed the countries of Europe, gave impetus to the spread of technical education in specific fields of engineering and use of steel as a building material. Around 1850 with the iron constructions of the great exhibitions, methods of engineering entered the field of architecture. Crystal Palace of London (1851), the Hall of Machines, Paris (1855), and the exhibition buildings of Paris (1867) are some of these ventures.

In this period a gradual schism took place between the architect of the past and engineer of the present due in the main to the eclectic and dogmatic interest of the architectural schools of the time in formal representations and appearances of objects. Gradually, architects came to be regarded as concerned only with artistic matters, leaving all technical and constructional problems to the engineer. One revolutionary move was that the French Académie of architecture, like those of painting and sculpture, was suppressed after the French Revolution in 1793. Instead, L'Ecole Polytechnique, founded in 1794, was destined to institutionalize science and technology and also deal a blow to L'Ecole des Beaux Arts by teaching architecture. In contrast to previous attitudes it set itself the function of combining theoretical and practical sciences, establishing in a way the long-lost connection between science and life.

Berlin also became a center for this type of education with the founding by David Gilly in 1783 of the celebrated *Bauschule*, known from 1799 onward as the *Bau-Akademie*. The great geo-classicist architect Karl-Friedrich Schinkel (1781-1841) was to teach at this academy. The *Bau-Akademie* and later polytechnic schools of Central Europe focused all teaching of architecture on a core of subjects including design. The 2½-year curriculum at the *Bau-Akademie* included: mathematics: architectural, mechanical, topographical, perspective, and free-hand drawing; the physics of construction; statistics and mechanics; building construction; history of architecture; highway, harbor, and river works: common and monumental buildings; and city planning. Practical experience followed graduation.

In Paris in 1806, L'Ecole des Beaux-Arts was reestablished by Napoleon, in a way revising an institution of the ancient regime. It was administered in such a way that it led to a growing isolation of the arts from conditions

of ordinary life. This was very pronounced during the “reign” of Antoine-Chrysostôme Quatremère-de-Quincy, the secretary of the school from 1816 to 1839. In contrast, J. N. L. Durand, appointed as professor of architecture at the newly created Ecole Polytechnique in 1798, played a different tune. His two-volume work, *Precis et Leçons d'Architecture*, published in 1802, became the most important rationalist theory of architecture. In this work Durand demanded that architects concern themselves exclusively with the function of building and nothing else! Durand was thus discarding for the first time the primacy of aesthetic criteria, maintaining that construction was the only important concept in architecture. However, the rationalist philosophy of such an educator resulted in the other extreme of reducing architecture to the problem of placing elements on the axes of grid lines. In that Durand was very specific: to learn to be an architect, he advised his pupils, one had first to learn to divide up a square into a regular grid.

As a conclusion to the discussion above, a paragraph has to be added about America. Jeffersonian classicism had a countermovement which reached America from England under the banner of Gothic revival or Victorian romantic eclecticism. With the growth of materialism and wealth, the American rich wished to have their names preserved for history by big and splendid buildings. Having no sophisticated urban traditions of their own and failing to see any help in Victorian or Gothic ideals, Americans decided on copying Europe. City-oriented cultural interests found it fashionable to adopt the Beaux-Arts curriculum, as it had civic dignity, strength, and the monumentality so appropriate for the emerging class of the rich. American students started going to Europe to study, mainly to L'Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris, to familiarize themselves with European architectural history. During this time the first American schools of architecture started to be organized. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Illinois had their courses patterned on technical schools. For example, in 1870 M.I.T. had two courses in design but thirteen in construction. However, the complexion of courses changed when architect-academicians from L'Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris started to be imported to consolidate the classicist grip upon young American schools. The instruction in these schools changed in the direction of more design courses, not in the *atelier* but in its intramural version, the design studio. As a result schools started to educate large numbers of architects who assumed the task of the glorification of the American state with many constructions as classicist monuments and bureaucratic fortresses. This continued until the 1930s.

It is interesting to note here that, as attested by one of their leading educationists, the first professional courses in Britain were copied from the American Beaux-Arts—imitation of the Beaux-Arts Curriculum in Paris rather than directly from France.¹⁰

Arts and Crafts Movement/Art Nouveau (1850–1900 A.C.)

With the advent of industrialization, the advancing technology and growing complexity of planning considerations made building activity ever more a specialized task. Economic development made demands for higher buildings, built more quickly and more cheaply. Expansion of towns by influx of labor and rapid urbanization and demanding engineering skills in sanitation, water-works, transportation, started to bring about different social, political, and cultural forces which combined to change the built environment at an unprecedented speed. New techniques such as elevators and cast iron as building material helped to bring about the so-called Chicago School in the United States and made possible other large engineering feats, such as bridges, towers, and glass exhibition halls. Building activity itself, including details of decoration and household goods, was affected by industrialization and mass production, which brought about a decrease in quality of craftsmanship and craftsmen. Even the social ills that industrialization generated were attempted to be solved by the same industrialized technology. Within this general submersion of principles and policies in the successful world of the industrialist and his commercially minded architect, a trend started to take shape known as the Arts and Crafts movement. Cast-iron copies of classic motifs and elements of construction or decoration were looked down upon with revulsion. Dissatisfaction with industrial capitalism was generally artistic, rather than social, taking the form of a search for an architecture of simple informality. In doing so, protagonists of this movement were breaking away from the long-term historicist trends of the past century but still had to be serving progressive but rich clients. The works and treatises of William Morris and Charles Rennie Mackintosh are an example.

All progressive designers in Europe and America gradually began to reject the sterile historicism of the nineteenth century in favor of conscious innovation. The movement became known as *Art Nouveau* in France, *Jugendstil* in Germany *El Modernisme* in Catalonia—all speaking of modernity and novelty or newness. New ideas emerged across the whole spectrum of the arts from architecture to jewelry, painting, the decorative and applied arts, and music, ranging in character from geometric simplicity to curvilinear richness. This variety was symptomatic of the movement, in which a number of contradictory ideas were simultaneously present: attempting to recapture the virtues of honest craftsmanship while making use, for commercial reasons, of modern materials and production techniques; rejecting historicism in favor of “modernity” while readily accepting and specifically turning for inspiration to medieval Japan, Ptolemaic Egypt, Celtic Britain, or the Muslim East. Victor Horta, Charles Rennie Mackintosh, Antoni Gaudi, and Joseph Olbrich were the leading figures of this movement.

The slogan of this period was “art for art’s sake”, indicating a desire not to produce artistic commodities for a society that reduced almost everything else to the level of a commodity. But this concept could not be kept free from man’s selfish interests, and gradually Art Nouveau designers promoted art as a commodity, commercialism becoming fundamental to the movement. Boundaries between the arts were blurred. Mixed-media pieces combined techniques of both artist and craftsman.

Art Nouveau was the first genuinely international movement, the first of the modern age. It belonged in the main to the second-generation industrial countries such as France, Belgium, Germany, and the United States and gradually spread to third-generation ones like Spain, Italy, and Hungary.

The Art Nouveau designer’s emphasis on craftsmanship, conceived as a criticism of the industrial world, brought him commercial success but achieved nothing in social terms. Craftsmanship became at best an end in itself and at worst a commodity rather than a true reflection of a society that respected and encouraged personal freedom. The original hopes of the initiators of the movement stated clearly that it was not material standards that mattered but the character and quality of life.¹¹

Caravan of “Isms” as a Prelude to Modern Movement (1900–1930 A.C.)

European dissatisfaction once more set in, and architectural tastes pivoted in a direction diametrically opposite that of Art Nouveau. Its failure to come to acceptable terms with the methods of industrial capitalism led Adolf Loos (1870–1933) to condemn all hand-craftsmanship and extol the mechanistic aspects of industrial techniques and buildings that adopted such techniques.¹² With others of similar mind he led a crusade against the ornamentalism of Art Nouveau; in a series of articles and books they established themselves as evangelists of the practical and the utilitarian, becoming champions of the structural engineer and the plumber. Their designs became essays in straight lines, rectangular shapes, and cubic volumes.

Reinforced concrete, which came to dominate the “built” environment in the twentieth century, had been in development for over half a century after the discovery of Portland cement in the 1820s, and was gradually being elevated to a viable system of construction. At the turn of the century the present conventional way of using reinforced concrete started to be applied in Paris, together with modest cantilevers. The new material brought new methods of construction and learning of new skills. With the growing complexity of buildings, division of labor within the industry continued to increase, allowing the growth of the assembly-line principle whereby each worker sees only part of the finish-

ed product and often remains unaware of how his contribution fits into the whole. This fragmentation, though inevitable under the circumstances, was felt as undesirable and attempts were made to link various sides of the building industry, such as management, design, manufacture, and marketing. The Deutscher Werkbund, set up by Hermann Muthesius in 1907 as an association of industrialists, designers, architects, and craftsmen, was one such attempt and was destined to affect the shape of things to come.

When twentieth-century artists declared war on the art of the past—Romanticism, neoclassicism, the Impressionists, and Art Nouveau—it was undoubtedly a social comment. In Germany, the Expressionists retreated into highly personal and emotional artistic modes as seen in works of architect Eric Mendelsohn. In France the Cubists sought to create a new artistic language by rejecting the bourgeois use of pictorial art for ideological and political purposes and by moving increasingly toward abstraction as a means of purifying the artistic process. Cubism became a fertile reproductive ground to other “isms”. Purism took cubist rules to more severe lengths. Suprematists were exemplified by their “supreme” restraint of works, as exemplified in Kasimir Malevich’s white rectangle on a white background. Neo-Plasticism, with its straight lines and rectilinear forms, deliberately limited range of colors, and interlocking overlapping planes, and futurism, such as that by A. Sant’Elia, who disdained introspection and rejected the baroque extravagance of Italian Art Nouveau, all submerged themselves in the monumental simplicity of the *Sezession*. All these isms were the result of a fervent sense of the technological dynamism of the modern urban setting and of a lack of universally valid criteria, unblemished by man’s built-in failings, to be used as a point of reference to judge and shape things. Mikhail Larionov, in his Rayonist Manifesto of 1917, declared:

We declare the genius of our times to be: trousers, jackets, shoes, tramways, buses, airplanes, railways, magnificent ships—what an enchantment—what a great epoch unrivaled in world history. We deny that individuality has any value in a work of art. One should only call attention to a work of art and look at it according to the same means and laws by which it was created.

The final destruction of the sick political order by World War I, altering the political power base, and the creation of the world’s first socialist state as a result of the Russian revolution of 1917 was bound to bring things to a high-water mark. An international conference of avant-garde artists held in Dusseldorf in 1922 established another “ism”, that of Constructivism, based on ideas of purity of form and honesty of construction. Russian Constructivists gave unequivocal attention to structure as the starting point for architectural expression, which later became fundamental to modern architecture.

The profusion of these movements, originating in the realm of art but finally engulfing architecture in its convulsions, prepared the ground for the next stage of the reactionary stylistic experiments of the West seeking truth, namely, the Modern movement or the International style.

The Freak of Totalitarianism (Encompassing the periods in between the “isms” and the modern movement)

One has to mention the developments that took place in specific areas against the natural progression that was taking place universally elsewhere in the so-called civilized world. In contrast to actions and activities of a socially conscious and motivated group of designers, some individuals in charge of the destinies of their nations could dictate otherwise. This is another telling tale on how event can affect the shaping of the “built” environment! It was the personal taste of Adolf Hitler that decided in favor of historical classicism at the expense of Bauhaus functionalism; it was the personal taste of Benito Mussolini that decided in favor of Roman grandeur rather than Italian rationalism; and finally it was Joseph Stalin’s personal appeal to Russian historical grandeur that was to be expressed in the monumental classicism that brought death to modern Russian architecture. As these totalitarian states grew in power and influence, their leaders’ desires were to give them architectural forms that had to be monumental and historically proven so as to stimulate people’s confidence and sense of pride. In doing so, the leadership had to attack and reject the current styles. So after a decade of euphoria with various movements dreaming of new horizons, “conservative” forces struck back. Mussolini in Italy attacked the “fifth” of “modern decadence” and appealed to the grandeur of the Italian national spirit. Soviets attacked Constructivists on humanist grounds. The modernists were accused of slavishly promoting “machine architecture,” of appealing to the image of the machine, which, according to the Marxists, is the capitalist tool for oppressing humanity! Bauhaus progressively came to be considered as the cradle of socialism and dangerous liberalism. On this account, Adolf Hitler and his regime looked with distaste at all that Bauhaus stood for and propagated different tastes and ideas about what the national architecture of Germany ought to be. Adolf Speer was the man to give shape to Hitler’s ideas in architecture.

The forms associated with totalitarian regimes were not confined to lands under their hegemony, however. Many an example can be seen on the American continent as well. Even so, the discredited protagonists and revolutionaries of the new ideas emigrated to other countries—the United States being the magnet—and they sowed their seeds there. Thus America became the wind that blew their pollens all over the world.

The Inception of the Modern Movement (1930-1955 A.C.)

Modern architecture began crystallizing as a style after World War I. The period before was beset with social troubles. The war transformed Europe into one colossal turmoil. Everywhere the awakening of a new social consciousness called for radical political and social changes. Architecture could not remain aloof to such transformations. The excitement that entered into all aspects of culture—architecture, painting, sculpture, philosophy, music—temporarily suffered a setback with the advent of totalitarianism, but recovered its breath to hit back in time.

CIAM, the Congrès International del' Architecture Moderne, meeting in 1928 in Switzerland, was one such attempt whose success became apparent after World War II. The exhibition and publication of the *International Style* at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1932 was another institutional booster to the movement, in fact the godfather of the name.

CIAM's stress on Cartesian rationalism and technological standardization produced a murderous uniformity and monotony within the European built environment. These traits are obvious in the projects of Le Corbusier the world over. In addition, despite the improvement in living conditions, social discontent set in. Streetless urban forms contributed to the almost complete sterilization of social interaction.

The disintegration of CIAM was inevitable and became a fact at the Dubrovnik meeting in 1955. A group within CIAM, later to be known as Team X, attacked CIAM for the same reasons the Modern movement had attacked the past, namely, that the movement wished to impose rigid principles and criteria. Despite the disintegration at the center, the style itself, having been adopted by civic and public bureaucracies, continued to hold sway over the whole world, east and west, for some time to come. A modern commentator declared that the death of the Modern movement came on July 15, 1972, when the prize-winning Pruitt-Igoe housing development in St. Louis was blown up as an environment unfit for human beings.

Escapade of Post-Modernism (Somewhere in the immediate past up to sometime in the immediate future)

To finish the review, the final cycle has to be sketched in. A growing disenchantment with the urbanism of the Modern movement started another escapade into the sphere of ever-greater individualism, of "object making," slowly at first but gaining momentum. In this escapade the machine and technology cease to be appropriate motives for architecture, and architects are turning their attention to humanism, history, the modern vernacular, or

finally to individual whims.

Philip Johnson, a historian-turned-architect, is a prophet of this nihilistic escapad. He boldly proclaimed his boredom with modern architecture, and described his direction as eclectic, picking out of history any elements which arouse his present fancy and combining them together hotch-potch.

Early attempts in this last cycle started in 1957 by an Italian firm, BBPR, which designing a pseudo-Gothic tower in Milan. Around the same times, Eero Saarinen built his neo-Gothic dormitories for Yale University. Portoghesi designed a number of baroque fantasies. Yamasaki took a go at a Gothic office building in New York. These earlier attempts were more restrained than the later attempts of Charles Moore, Philip Johnson, A. Ross, or Roberto Venturi.

Postscript on Education

The integral link between schools of architectural education and attitudes of designers as to the shaping of the environment is a well-established fact. The Modern movement defined its own ideals and established its own school, the Bauhaus, at Weimar, Germany, in 1919 under the direction of Walter Gropius.¹³

The most publicized educational experiment of the early twentieth century was, of course, the Bauhaus movement. It completely took over the curricular content of two separate schools, the Weimar School of Arts and Crafts and the Weimar Academy of Fine Arts, replacing their stylistic content with a new one, more industrial and technological in flavor and more reminiscent of the early *Bau-Akademie* core. The laboratory/workshop became the new setting for Bauhaus education. Its famous six-month long *Vorkurs*, the introductory laboratory that aimed to impose a new design sensibility on the students' newly exposed innate abilities, was the progenitor of new first-year teaching experiments in many schools. Following this course, the student spent three years under a master craftsman and an artist, learning about the nature of materials and machine processes. Outside the workshop there were courses only in sociology, history, and some technical fundamentals. The result of this was a journeyman's certificate, similar to a craft guild's completion of apprenticeship. This training was completed after two years of work in architecture and construction in a master's workshop.

The Bauhaus treated architecture as an art of construction, and all the movement that emerged after 1927, except the extremes of Post-Modernism, had some links with this development. Like all previous experiments that lacked historical continuity with one another and in the absence of an established worldview not subject to man's egocentric machinations, this experiment was

destined to founder. The rationalism of the Bauhaus, which attempted to develop architecture on the foundation of materialistic utilitarianism, lacked a socio-cultural base and therefore gradually led to an estranged and coarse attitude to form, and its post-Modern rejection.

A paragraph will have to be added at this point regarding Islamic architectural history. The development of modern Islamic architecture is again one of those bitter pills that we have been fooled to swallow, having been coated craftily with Western chocolate bought by Eastern money!

With a desire to keep and monitor their technical know-how and scholarship so as to keep the wheels of the capitalist world well-oiled with resources from another's soil, Westerners have foisted a fad upon the *ummah's* ignorance and selfish greed. Based on the Western infatuation with formalistic concepts an "Islamization" process was started in the Muslim "built" environment to parallel the "modernization" process of the International style. Domes, arches, and geometric patterns started to be freely distributed on façades at speeds unknown in our history. Western institutions of learning started to tailor courses on the history of Islamic art/architecture for our "knowledge-hungry" prospective professors to fly over and absorb! The contents and methodologies of these courses are all based on Western architectural histories, as can be seen in the examples of two courses given by a respectable and famous scholar, Professor John D. Hoag, University of Colorado. These courses were offered in the spring of 1978. The course on modern architecture, consisting of thirty topics, is given as appendix II, together with a term paper requirement for the same course.

The course on the art of Islam is given as appendix III, together with suggested report topics. A study of the term paper requirements will "let the cat out of the bag." The emphasis here is solely on a descriptive definition, down to the minutest detail, of everything except the purpose of the edifice. There is no information on how that edifice improved the lives of its occupiers and sustained them. Mark the difference between the concept of historical information identified in this term paper requirement and the "historical" aim defined earlier in this chapter as constituting one of the three aims of architectural history.

If we now move to appendix III, we shall see a methodology not far removed from the previous one. The difference here is that the subject is centuries of history rather than the fifty-odd years of modern architecture. What is the relevance of formative, classical, late classical, and postclassical adjectives to the shaping of the "built" environment as achieved by Islam? What makes the Seljuks of Persia and Turkey "classical" and Ottomans "post classical"? How relevant is Moghul post classicism to Ottoman post classicism? If one goes on to the "report topics," the irreverence or irrelevance of the scholar and his scholarship becomes transparent. One fails to see the Islamicity of

the “portraits of Ottoman Sultans” even though they were Muslim, providing leadership to the *ummah*. The interest in the object, the shell, or the periphery, and the disinterest in the nature, the substance, or the formative thoughts and ideas is clear.

This may be the right moment to return to the curriculum of Cairo University. Where are we heading with such curricula? Can we afford to continue defiling our environment, turning it into a place unfit for human beings to live in, slavishly copying the caprices of the Western schools of architecture? Would we have the guts and the means to dynamite our own Pruitt-Igoes, as they did in St. Louis, if and when the realization of their corrupting nature dawns upon us? The question is there for all of us, whether we are practicing architects, academics, or just plain interested intellectuals. The question will remain there as long as we maintain our posture as “architects” playing with “architecture.” The question will be resolved when we realize that there is another conceptual reality to our profession; that of being a *mi'mari*, both in practice and in education.

NOTES

- ¹ *RIBA Journal*, Nov. 1983, pp. 47-50; emphasis added.
- ² Theo Crosby, "Patrons of the Arts." *Architectural Journal*, Jan. 18, 1984. pp. 24-27.
- ³ Faculty of Engineering, *Courses of Study Leading to a Bachelor Degree in Architectural Engineering*, Cairo University, 1974, pp. 3-20.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁵ In developing this section, I have consulted the following three books at length: Wojciech G. Lesnikowsky, *Rationalism and Romanticism in Architecture* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982); Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Meaning in Western Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1980); Bill Risebero, *Modern Architecture and Design* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1983).
- ⁶ A very thorough investigation of the subject was made by David Watkin in his *The Rise of Architectural History* (London: Architectural Press, 1983). It reviews in an outline form the developments and contributions in this field from 1700 to the present. The three aims of "architectural history," stated before as being practical, historical, and aesthetic, are defined by him.
- ⁷ *Ten Books on Architecture (De re Aedificatoria)* written about 1450. An English translation by James Leoni (1729) was reissued in London in 1955 with a foreword and notes by Joseph Rykwert.
- ⁸ Andrea Palladio, *I quattro libri dell'architettura*, 1570; *The Four Books of Architecture*, New York and London, 1965.
- ⁹ Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768), German neoclassicist and father of modern art history. *The History of Ancient Art*, published in German (Dresden, 1764), was later translated into English (Boston, 1880). It was an important treatise for establishing the notion of cultural history in which the art of the period is seen as reflecting the spirit of the age.
- ¹⁰ Robert Maxwell, "The Two Theories of Architecture," *Architectural Education I*, pp. 114.
- ¹¹ William Morris, in a lecture entitled "The Society of the Future" (1887), propagated this ideal in the following words: "Free men, I am sure, must lead simple lives and have simple pleasures: and if we shudder away from that necessity now, it is because we are not free men and have in consequence wrapped our lives in such a complexity of dependence that we have grown feeble and helpless."
- ¹² Adolf Loos in 1908 wrote his famous article, "*Ornament and Crime*," where he put forward the demand for a formal purge: "Cultural evolution means that we have to eliminate any ornament from our artifacts. It shows the greatness of our age that it is unable to produce a new ornament."
- ¹³ There is a well-documented description of the school's aims, objectives, and courses by Walter Gropius himself. See Walter Gropius, "The Bauhaus," *Architectural Education I*, pp. 53-79.

APPENDIX I

Courses of Study Leading to a Bachelor Degree in Architectural Engineering. Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University*

Preparatory Year

- | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Mathematics</i> | 6. <i>Chemistry</i> |
| 2. <i>Mechanics</i> | 7. <i>Threshold of Engineering</i> |
| 3. <i>Physics</i> | 8. <i>Production Technology</i> |
| 4. <i>Descriptive Geometry</i> | 9. <i>Language</i> |
| 5. <i>Engineering Drawing</i> | |

First Year Architectural Engineering

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Architectural Design | 6. Environmental Control |
| 2. Architectural Design Elements | 7. Properties/Strength of Materials |
| 3. Perspective & Sciagraphy | 8. Building Construction |
| 4. Visual Training | 9. Surveying |
| 5. Mathematics | 10. Theory of Structures |

Second Year Architectural Engineering

- | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Architectural Design | 6. Illumination/Acoustics/Air Cond. |
| 2. Theories of Design | 7. Building Construction/Materials |
| 3. Visual Training | 8. Theory of Structures |
| 4. History of Architecture | 9. Planning |
| 5. Statistics | 10. Behavior of Man |

Third Year Architectural Engineering

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Architectural Design | 6. Soil Mechanics and Foundations |
| 2. Theories/History of Architecture/Art | 7. Reinforced Concrete |
| 3. Operation Research | 8. Metallic Construction |
| 4. Technical Insulation for Buildings | 9. Planning and Housing |
| 5. Methods of Construction | |

*Abstracted from the original publication dated 1974.

Fourth Year Architectural Engineering

1. Architectural Design
2. Theory/History of Arch.
3. Systematic Design
Methods
4. Execution Design/
Documents
5. Environmental Design
6. Planning
7. Final Project

APPENDIX II

Lecture Course on Modern Architecture, Given by J.D. Hoag, University of Colorado, Spring 1978

1. List of Lectures

Introduction

Romantic Classicism I—The Sublime

Romantic Classicism II—In Europe

Romantic Classicism III—In America

The Picturesque to c. 1850

New Materials and Programs 1790-1855

The Second Empire and the Renaissance Revival

High Victorian Gothic in England and America

The Crafts Revival in England, William Morris

The Earlier Works of Antoni Gaudi

The Architecture of Henry Hobson Richardson I

The Architecture of Henry Hobson Richardson II

The Art Nouveau I—Victor Horta and Hector Guimard

The Art Nouveau II—The Later Works of Antoni Gaudi

The Architecture of Louis Sullivan I

The Architecture of Louis Sullivan II

The Architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright before 1909

De Stijl and the Bauhaus

Early Modern Architecture, Peter Behrens, Auguste Perret

Expressionism and Visionary Architecture in Holland, Germany and elsewhere

Frank Lloyd Wright—1909-1935

Le Corbusier and the Second Generation of Modern Architects

Frank Lloyd Wright—1935-1959

“Traditional” Architecture in the 20th Century

Architect Engineers and Engineer Architects

The Third Generation of Modern Architects I

The Third Generation of Modern Architects II

Architecture Now

Final Examination

2. Term Paper Requirements

Part I. Historical Information

A. Physical History

1. Original and subsequent owners
2. Date of erection
3. Architect
4. Original plans construction, etc.
5. Alterations and additions
6. Important early views

B. Historical Events Connected with the Structure

C. Sources of Information

Part II. Architectural Information

A. Detailed Description of the Exterior

1. Overall dimensions
2. Materials, foundation, walls, roof
3. Wall construction
4. Porches, doors, windows (type of framing)
5. Shape of roof covering, presence of dormers, etc.

B. Detailed Description of the Interior

1. Floor plan
2. Number of stories, type and materials of stairs
3. Finish of walls, ceilings, etc.
4. Decorative features and trim
5. Notable hardware
6. Lighting
7. Heating

C. Site

1. General setting and orientation
2. Enclosures
3. Landscaping

Part III. Stylistic Analysis of No Less Than 2,000 Words

3. Bibliography

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APPENDIX III.

Lecture Course on the Art of Islam, University of Colorado, Spring 1978

1. List of Lectures

The Heritage of the West, Rome and Byzantium
The Heritage of the East Parthians and Sassanians
Formative Islam I—Umawī Khilāfah—Religious Art
Formative Islam II—Umawī Khilāfah—Secular Art
Formative Islam III—The Abbāsī Khilāfah to c. 915 A.C.
Formative Islam IV—Tulūnī Egypt
Formative Islam V—The Khilāfah of Qurtabah and the Emirate of Zaragoza
Formative Islam VI—Aghlabidīs and Fatimīs in Ifriqiya 969
Formative Islam VII—The Samanīs and Ghaznavīs of Persia
Classic Islam I—Almurābitūn and Al-muwahhidūn in North Africa and Spain
Late Classic Islam I—The Merenīs of N. Africa and Nasrīs of Spain
Classic Islam II—The Fatīms of Egypt
Classic Islam III—Zengīs, Ayyubīs, Bahri, Mamluks of Egypt and Syria
Late Classic Islam II—The Burji Mamluks of Egypt
Classic Islam IV—Saljūg Persia
Classic Islam V—Saljūg Turkey
Classic Islam VI—The Later Abbāsī Khilāfah
Classic Islam VII—Early Islamic Painting
Late Classic Islam III—Ilkhanī Persia
Late Classic Islam IV—Timurī Persia
Late Classic Islam V—India before 1526
Post Classic Islam I—The Uthmānī Empire
Post Classic Islam II—Uthmānī Painting
Post Classic Islam III—The Şafavī Empire
Post Classic Islam IV—Şafavī Painting
Post Classic Islam V—The Moghul Empire
Post Classic Islam VI—Moghul Painting
Final Examination

2. Suggested Report Topics

Ivories of the Cordoban Caliphate
The Pre-al Murābitūn History of the Mosque of al Qarāwiyīn at Fez
Samanī Ceramics

Almuwahhidūn Textiles
 The Merinī Tombs near Rabāṭ
 Fātimīyyūn Rock Crystal Vessels
 Syrian Enameled Glass
 Mamlūk Carpets
 Ceramic Mihrabs in Persia
 Saljūq Carpets of the 13th c. in Turkey
 The Automata of al Jazīrī
 Illustrations Dioscurides *Materia Medica*
 Ilkhanid Ceramics
 What Babur Saw in Samarkand and Herāt
 The Mosques of Jaunpur
 Ulhmanī Ceramics
 Portraits of the Uthmanī Sultans
 Şafavī Carpets
 Figurative Tiles in Secular Şafavī Art
 Moghul Textiles

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XII
Linguistics

Islamization of Linguistics

Sayyid Muhammad Syeed

I. Non-Islamic Linguistics Under Religious Influences

Linguistics has been struggling under the stranglehold of religious beliefs, superstitions, and ethnocentrism for centuries. The role and nature of human languages was perceived through the world views preached by various religions. There have been claims for the divine origins of certain languages, conferring a special status on their speakers. Greeks, for example, believed that their language was superior to all other languages. It was the language spoken by the Olympian gods. Theirs was the only language with regularity, rules, and meaning; all other languages were arbitrary and meaningless (*barbaroi*) whence the modern English word “barbarian.”

In India, where Panini (sixth century B.C.) wrote the first comprehensive grammar of a human language, Sanskrit was believed to be the language of gods and worthy to be studied and used by the high caste of Brahmans only. The low-caste Hindus could not listen to the Sanskrit verses from the holy scriptures, and severe punishments were prescribed for such sacrilegious acts. As late as 1912, the Muslim linguist, Mohammad Shahidullah, was denied admission to the master’s course in Sanskrit at the University of Calcutta. The Hindu professors of Sanskrit were shocked at the possibility that a Muslim could be allowed to read and hence defile the Vedas, the holy scriptures of Hindus. Thus they bitterly opposed his admission.¹

In the Judaeo-Christian world, too, similar unscientific views persisted until recently. Hebrew was God’s own language, the language spoken in the heavens, the first language spoken on the earth and therefore the mother of all languages in the world. Wonderly and Nida, discussing the impact of early Christian beliefs on linguistics, admit:

One of the factors which retarded linguistic progress was the belief among early Christian writers, and persisting well into the Renaissance era, that all languages were derived from Hebrew.²

II. Non-Islamic Linguistic Secularized

It was toward the eighteenth century that linguistics was secularized and freed from religious influences. This process was accelerated when European linguists discovered Sanskrit and their Indo-European roots, both racial and linguistic. The secular linguists, with a new zeal and vigor, introduced precision and scientific methodology to the study of language affinities, tracing proto-Indo-European roots and discovering the linguistic structures of various languages. Hebrew and Sanskrit were no longer studied as the mothers of all languages or as divine languages. This opened a vast area for research and scientific investigation.

The secular tradition, developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has made linguistics a respectable science. But it has been made into a tool to be used by colonialists, politicians, missionaries, and ethnocentric interest groups to promote their ideologies and impose their languages and cultural and religious standards on others. We will restrict ourselves to two such examples.

The most interesting example is the emergence of Marrism under the patronage of Soviet communism. N.J. Marr (1864-1934), a Georgian by birth, dominated Russian linguistic research and this led to what may be called Marrism. This school of linguistics tried to establish the intrinsic superiority of the Russian language and the inherent inadequacies of the other Soviet languages. Languages, according to Marrism, were not national but class phenomena and thus Marrism and Marxism were integrated in the study of languages. This provided a justification for imposing Russian, the "inherently revolutionary language," on the speakers of other languages in the Soviet Union. Robins says that Marrism will be remembered, "as an awful warning of the extent to which modern tyranny can keep fantasy enthroned in defiance of fact."³

The second example is from the 'free world.' The linguistic differences between the English spoken by black Americans and the so-called standard English were noticed by linguists as well as by laymen. But these differences were used as evidence to establish the genetic deficiency of the speakers of black English. Carl Bereister observed, "the language of the culturally deprived children . . . is not merely an underdeveloped version of the standard English, but is basically a non-logical mode of expression."⁴

It was through the forceful assertion of the sociolinguistic studies of Labav that this erroneous claim was refuted and it was established that black English was equally structured, rule governed, and logical.⁵ For example, the deletion of the final *s* in the third person singular in a paradigm like "I write, he write(s)", is rather an overregularity and not a lack of logic.

III. Islamization of Linguistics

A. Speech Faculty: A Divine Gift

Linguistics, as a scientific study of human languages, studies language as an innate faculty common to all humans. The faculty of speech is species-specific and species-uniform to all humans. No matter what society, high or low, advanced or primitive, all the members of all human societies are endowed with this faculty. The Qur'an specifically refers to this gift:

الرَّحْمَنُ ۝ عَلَّمَ الْقُرْآنَ ۝ خَلَقَ الْإِنْسَانَ ۝ عَلَّمَهُ الْبَيَانَ

The beneficent (God) taught the Qur'an. He created man, taught him the mode of speech (Qur'an 55:2-4).

It is clear from this verse that Allah created man with the faculty of speech, not with Greek Hebrew, or Arabic speech. It is not a particular language, but a capacity to learn any particular human language that is innate to human beings. All human languages are worth studying and equally important. It is possible that any language might have been a vehicle of God's message sometime in the history of the speakers of that language.

وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ رَّسُولٍ إِلَّا بِلِسَانِ قَوْمِهِ لِيُبَيِّنَ لَهُمْ

And we have not sent any messenger except with the language of the people, in order that he might make (things) clear to them (Qur'an 14:4).

This concept the possibility of being the medium of divine revelation for all languages is missing in ethnocentrically-oriented ideologies.

The study of even the so-called primitive and most backward languages, such as the Amerindian languages and those spoken by tribes in Africa and Asia, has shown that every language has a sufficiently rich vocabulary for the expression of all the distinctions that are important for the society using it. The primitive languages are no less systematic. The scientific study of human languages has convinced linguists that all languages, and correspondingly all dialects, are equally "good" as linguistic systems. All varieties of a language are structured, complex, rule-governed systems that are wholly adequate for the needs of their speakers.

B. Language Diversity And Islam

The ultimate goal of linguistics is not to study a particular language and discover language-specific rules but to find out the universal features of human languages in general – their structures and behaviors insofar as they help one to understand the innate capacity of human beings to acquire a

language and to produce infinite sentences after being exposed to a limited corpus of that language. The growth and diversification of languages and change in their phonetic, phonological, and syntactic rules is an important field of inquiry. Synchronic and diachronic linguistics, comparative study of different languages and of language varieties, both on geographical and temporal parameters, and changes in language provide an important study of one of the signs of the existence of God. The Qur'an invites us to study and respect the diversity of languages and declares it an important sign of divine power at work in the organization of the universe. The variation in languages is listed alongside other phenomena of nature, such as:

1. The power of Allah to bring the living from the dead and the dead from the living.
2. His power to create human beings from clay.
3. His power to create helpmates among mankind and ordain love and mercy between them.

The text of the particular verse in which the variation of language is mentioned reads:

وَمِنْ آيَاتِهِ خَلْقَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ أَلْسِنَتِكُمْ وَأَلْوَانِكُمْ
إِنَّ فِي ذَلِكَ لآيَاتٍ لِّلْعَالَمِينَ

and among His signs is the creation of the heavens, and the earth, and variation in your languages and your colors, verily in that are signs for those who know (Qur'an 30:22).

Thus a scientific study of language variation is as important as the study of the creation of the earth and the heavens. In the variation of languages lie God's signs, and those who attempt to know them are designated by the Qur'an as *عالمون*, an honorable title conferred by God on linguists who are motivated by this world view.

The variation among languages can be described by definite rules. They vary so systematically and with such regularity that linguists have compared these rules to the "sound laws" of physics. Every time we study a new language, analyze its grammar, and compare its new forms with its old forms or other related dialects and languages, we marvel at the perfect design in its structure and exclaim:

فَتَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ أَحْسَنُ الْخَالِقِينَ

So blessed be Allah the best of creators!

It was with this Islamic understanding and respect for the variation of languages that the early Muslim grammarians set out to investigate correspondences among different languages. Kopf remarks on the contribution of Muslim linguists in the area of comparative linguistics:

They arrived at achievements and applied scientific methods that surpassed those of Western philologists of the 18th century. Until that period it was customary in Europe to establish a foreign origin of words merely on the ground of phonetic resemblances without paying regard to phonetic laws and other linguistic features or historic facts. The Arabs had already reached the point of investigating the phonetic changes which Persian words underwent on their transition into Arabic, and also succeeded, within the narrow limits of their knowledge, in establishing certain phonetic correspondences between Arabic and some Semitic sister tongues.⁶

The Qur'an thus not only recognizes the existence of the diversity of languages as a manifestation of Allah's will but also presents it as a challenge for research and understanding. This is very different from the Tower of Babel theory presented by the Bible. According to the Bible, the diversification of human languages was inflicted as a punishment on mankind in order to "confound their language, that they may not understand one another."

IV. The Language of the People and the Language of Revelation

The general principle for the selection of a language for divine revelation seems to be the adoption of the language of the people for whom the message is intended. Arabic is one such language chosen according to this eternal divine principle. It was chosen as a medium of the last divine message because it happened to be the mother-tongue of the last messenger of Islam and of the language community chosen to establish the word of God on earth under the immediate leadership of the Prophet (SAAS). The words *عَرَبِيّ* ('*Arabi*) and *عَرَبِيَّان* ('*Arabiyyan*) occur eleven times in the Qur'an. This is only to emphasize the fact that the messages of Allah had been revealed in other languages in earlier times, whereas the Qur'an was revealed in Arabic, the language of the people who were the immediate addressees of the message.

In earlier times when language variation and geographical barriers were insurmountable, prophets would be sent to particular linguistic groups, and their role was limited to their particular regions or language communities. But the function of Islam as the final and universal message is to unite all linguistic communities, all nations, and all races. Arabic was the language selected to perform the role of an international Islamic language, the medium of the last divine message addressed to all of mankind:

وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَاكَ إِلَّا كَافَّةً لِّلنَّاسِ بَشِيرًا وَنَذِيرًا

We have not sent you but as a messenger of good tidings and a warner unto all mankind (Qur'an 34:28).

Various small linguistic communities have been merging together in modern times. The frequent contact and large-scale interaction among various nationalities has created a need for a world language. Attempts have been made to devise artificial languages, such as Esperanto. But there is no motivation for learning such languages on a large scale. Besides, their structure is designed on the basis of European languages and thus the speakers of European languages have an advantage over others in mastering them. The vacuum is filled by the languages of the great world powers, English and Russian. People learn these languages because these are the languages of advanced nations. But there can always be a shift from one international language to another depending on the political or material prestige of the speakers of those languages. Thus during the glorious period of the Greeks, other nations learned Greek, and with the rise of the Roman empire there was a shift toward Latin. In recent history many colonial countries have changed from the languages of their erstwhile masters, French, Italian, Dutch, and others, to English.

Since Islam wants to build a stable international community, it has identified one language for the unification of various speech communities. While the Qur'an recognizes the variation of languages as a natural process, it also stresses the importance of preserving the Qur'an as the "Qur'an in the Arabic language," thus encouraging Muslims to learn a common language shared by all as the language used by Allah for revealing His last message.

Arabic is to provide a cementing bond to Muslims belonging to various linguistic groups and nationalities. The ideal Islamic language situation would be one in which the language of the people is allowed to be used as the medium of mutual communication and Arabic is learned as the common language of Muslims of all times and of all linguistic backgrounds.⁷

Every time this Islamic bilingual formula has been violated, it has resulted either in the weakening of the international bonds of the Muslim *um-mah* and in making the original sources of Islamic teachings inaccessible to the common Muslims, or in lowering the understanding of Islam and promoting syncretism and superstitions. The lack of emphasis on Arabic in a particular Muslim linguistic group decreases mutual understanding and appreciation of common Islamic bonds and Islamic cultural heritage. By ignoring the language of the people, the process of Islamization of their language is hampered and the growth of Islamic literature and creative application of Islamic genius to the local tradition is blocked.

Since Muslims believe in the potential capability of every language to

be an effective medium of Islamic communication, there is no justification for imposing an intermediary language between Arabic, the language of the Qur'an, and the language of the people. It would be unwise and Islamically unwarranted, if in the United States, for example, Muslims were to propose to teach Urdu and Persian to their communities under the pretext that English is not Islamized to the extent that Urdu and Persian have been. This would impose an unnecessary language load and relegate Arabic to a secondary position and make Islamic teachings more difficult to understand. The teaching of Arabic and a speedy Islamization of English would be the right answer.⁸

The imposition of intermediary languages, negligence of the languages of the people, and the deemphasizing of Arabic have been some of the linguistic problems of the Muslim world in the past. For example, in India, Islam was introduced by Muslim warriors, scholars, sufis, businessmen, and tourists, the majority of whom used Persian as their medium. Persian stayed as the official language of the Muslim rulers of India and as their language of culture and education. Very little was done to use local languages as the media of Islamic thought. The Qur'an was not translated into Urdu until 1826.⁹ Other major languages with millions of speakers did not have even this much of good luck. Persian, the language of the rulers for more than 600 years, was recognized as the only medium worthy of Islam in a country where less than 1 percent spoke it as their mother tongue. To give it a religious sanction in displacing the local languages, a feeling was created that Persian, too, was a divine language. While regional languages suffered an irreparable loss by this un-Islamic language policy, Arabic fared no better. To give an idea how this must have been achieved, we quote from the Persian dictionary *Burhan-e-Qate'* برهان قاطع written around 1641 AC in Hyderabad, India¹⁰:

و مومن گویند که مدعیان اهل بهشت است در اصل اللغه علم فرموده اند
 و لسان اصل آنست عربی زمان نبی - و ملائکه اند

Some people say that Dari (Persian) is the language of the people of paradise because the Prophet (PBUH) has said that the languages of the people of paradise are Arabic and Persian (Dari).

بعد از عربی زمانی بهتر از عربی نیست . هر دو حادث نیزند که راست
 که حضرت رسالت بنامه و امیر المؤمنین و امیر مصومین صلوات الله علیه
 بر باری شکرشده اند -

After Arabic there is no language that can be considered better than Persian, as is also mentioned in the *Ahadith* that the Prophet (SAAS), *Ameerul Mumineen* and the *Aimmah ma'sun* (May Allah's Peace be on them all) have spoken in Persian.

We have historical evidence that during the reign of the Mughal Emperor

Akbar (1556 – 1605) in India, the propagation of Arabic was discouraged.¹¹ That this language policy blocked the communication of Islamic teachings among the masses is evident from the low percentage of Muslims in India and the lack of literature in the regional language, despite more than 600 years of Muslim rule in India. Soon after the Muslims lost their power, the Persian language also fell from grace, and it is only now that the Indian languages, previously considered unworthy of serious thought, are developing into modern languages with more functional efficiency than the medieval Persian ever had. But what these languages lack, lamentably, is serious Islamic literature, because the patrons of the Persian language did not realize that an intermediary, foreign, transplanted language could not be imposed for long and that the best media for Islamic knowledge were the languages of the people alongside the language of the Qur'an.

In the same manner, Islam was introduced in Albania by Turkish Muslims through the Turkish language. During Turkish rule, the Albanian language was completely banned from schools and official use.¹² No Islamic literature could be produced in this “language of the people” for the five centuries of Turkish Muslim rule. No wonder that the Albanian language, which was condemned as a cursed language during the Muslim period, emerged Islamically bankrupt when it replaced Turkish as the official language.

V. Tasks Ahead for Muslim Linguists

A. Linguistic Survey of the Muslim World

It is time that a linguistic survey of the Muslim world be conducted to study the number of languages and their speakers, the percentage of literacy, the hidden literacy,¹³ the attitudes of the various linguistic groups toward Arabic (which may often be far more positive than what may be reflected in the official language planning of the country), the policies of the different governments toward coining new technical terminology, the possibility of developing a common policy about certain terminology, and the role of minority languages.

B. The Promotion of Arabic as an Effective Medium of Religious, Scientific, and Technical Literature on a Pan-Islamic Basis

We will have to develop standards adequate not only for the requirements of the Arab Muslim world but for the entire Muslim world. Just as Islam has the potential to unite the Muslim world ideologically, Qur'anic

Arabic has the potential to unite the linguistically divided Muslim world. The present academies in the Arab world, with their internal dissensions, mutual conflicts, and inadequate linguistic know-how, and without faith in the role of Arabic beyond the Arabic-speaking world, can play no role in this Islamic-linguistic revolution and unification of the Muslim countries. Their counterparts in most of the non-Arab Muslim countries, engaged in promoting officially patronized dialects as the standard national languages, purifying their languages from the Arabic-Islamic influence, thus inducing an artificial divergence, enjoy no popular support. If the Muslim linguist, equipped with superior linguistic expertise, does not enter the fray at this stage, language differentiation promoted by these academies may make his job next to impossible at a later stage.

C. A Unified Adaptation and Standardization of Arabic Orthography

Arabic orthography has been used for writing various Muslim languages at different periods in history. The alphabet of one language cannot sufficiently represent the sounds of another language without devising appropriate additional symbols. Arabic script has been a great cementing force for Muslims across linguistic and geographical boundaries. Muslims have shown great creativity in inventing additional characters and adopting existing ones to suit the requirements of the non-Arab languages. On the international level, no scientific attempts have been made to devise uniform and consistent symbols for non-Arab Muslim languages. For example, the retroflex *r* sound is found in some non-Arab Muslim languages and the arbitrary way in which the Arabic alphabet has been adopted by them is evident by the different shapes given below:

Kurdish	ر
Pashtu	ر
Sindhi	ر
Urdu	ر

The inadequate and arbitrary graphemes have made this script cumbersome in certain cases. The availability of a scientific analysis of the sound system of Muslim languages and a firm faith in the use of one standard pan-Islamic script to strengthen our cultural ties can help us reform the orthographic systems of the Muslim languages toward a better functional efficiency.

D. Internationally Coordinated Language Convergence Through Borrowing And Language Extension

Modern languages in the world of Islam face a serious challenge in coining new words and technical terminology to discuss new concepts and new objects. Every language has a specific source language from which it draws its new words. Greek and Latin have provided a common source of borrowing and innovation for the European languages. The languages of India have an officially recognized source language in Sanskrit. The technical terminology drawn from Sanskrit is shared by all languages except Kashmiri and Urdu.

Muslim languages will have to look to classical Arabic as a source language for coining new words. But there should be a generally accepted policy for this process so that a uniform standard is achieved universally. Islam has been instrumental in bringing closer together languages of distant parentage and of remote regions by encouraging liberal borrowing from Arabic for religio-cultural terminology and other important concepts and objects. Muslim linguists will be doing a great service if they apply their expertise in exploring better and more efficient ways for planned convergence of Muslim languages.

NOTES

- ¹ Muhammad Enamul Haq, (ed). 1976, *Muhammad Shadidullah Felicitation Volume* (Dacca Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1976), p. xiii.
 - ² William L. Wonderly and Eugene Nida, "Linguistics and Christian Mission," *Antropological Linguistics*, 5:104-44.
 - ³ R.H. Robins, *A Short History of Linguistics* (London: Longman Group Ltd, 1967), p. 225.
 - ⁴ Carl Bereister, "An Academically Oriented Preschool for Culturally Deprived Children," in Fred M. Hechinger (ed.), *Preschool Education Today* (New York: Double Day, 1966).
 - ⁵ William Labav, *The Study of Non-Standard English* (Champaign, Ill.: National Council of English Teachers, 1970).
 - ⁶ L. Kopf, "The Treatment of Foreign Words in Medieval Arabic Lexicography," *Scripta Hieroslymitane*, 1961, 9:197.
 - ⁷ The learning of the languages of non-Muslims was very much encouraged by the Prophet (SAAS). The purpose was to learn the skills and other achievements of the speakers of those languages or to convey the Islamic message to the people in their own language. The learning of foreign languages in order to have access to the scientific and technological literature available in those languages would be an Islamically rewarding act. But this is different from adopting a foreign language to replace the language of a Muslim linguistic group.
 - ⁸ On Islamization of a language, see Allamah 'Abdul Rahman Jalal-ud-Din al-Suyuti, *Al-Muzhir*, vol. 1 chapter 20, discussing early Islamization of Arabic, and this writer, "Psychology of Dialect Differentiation: The Emergence of Muslim English in America," *Islamic Culture* (Oct. 1977), discussing Islamization of English as a contemporary process in a Muslim community in the United States.
 - ⁹ This was done much later than the translation of the Bible by European missionaries.
 - ¹⁰ *Burha-e-Qate'* by Muhammad Hussain bin Khalif Tabrizi (died 1951), Muhammad Mu'in, (ed). Tehran. An idea of the popularity of this book can be had from its wide circulation in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Iran. Its translation into Turkish and a series of books written against and in defense of it over the centuries should give an idea of its impact on the people.
 - ¹¹ *Muntakhib al Tawarih*, Mulla Abdul Qadir Ibn Muluk Shah Badayuni, translated from Persian, 1973, Vol. II, p. 306, 356 and 363. (Patna: Academica Asiatica).
 - ¹² Constantine Chekrenzi, *Albania Past and Present, 1919*.
 - ¹³ Barbara Harrel-Bond, *Local Languages and Literacy in West Africa* (The American Universities Field Staff, 1977)
- Harrel-Bond was surprised to discover the "hidden literacy" of Muslims in West Africa. She found that the people who were officially considered illiterate could in fact write more than one language in Arabic script and maintain proper records.

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ABOUT THIS BOOK

This book, *Toward Islamization of Disciplines*, is a compilation of selected papers presented at the Third International Conference on Islamization of Knowledge, sponsored by the International Institute of Islamic Thought, in cooperation with the Ministry of Youth and Culture of Malaysia, July 26-31 1984 A.C. / 27th *Shawwāl* – 2nd *Dhu al Qi'dah* 1404 A.H.

The Conference, which attracted major leaders, educators and scholars from around the world, confirmed the growing appeal of the concept of "Islamization" among Muslim scholars; moreover it indicated that this concept has spread beyond the bounds of academia and has become the concern of peoples, institutions and governments. The selected papers, reproduced in this book, aptly reflect this historic trend.

Some of the highlights offered in this book include a keynote address by Malaysia's Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Muhammad; a pioneering critique on Western Anthropology, *Toward Islamic Anthropology*, by Akbar Ahmad; a revealing exegesis of Western philosophy, *The Balance Sheet of Western Philosophy in This Century*, by Roger Garoudy; and 'AbdulHamid AbūSulaymān's *Concepts of Reconstruction: Methodology in Contemporary Muslim Thought (in Arabic)*.

In all, twenty-three prominent Muslims scholars share their valuable insights in the selections presented in this book. The disciplines addressed are: Methodology, Anthropology, Economics, Fiqh, Law, Philosophy, Art/Architecture, Linguistics, Psychology and Philosophy of Science.

Both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars and researchers will find a wealth of thought-provoking ideas and concepts among these works.

