

The India Doctrine

M. B. I. Munshi



Bangladesh Research Forum

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In this book, Barrister MBI Munshi details the doctrine-driven policy of India which has had an overt and covert impact on its neighbours. From the Bangladesh perspective, India's mindset has been seen as hegemonic and highly motivated by its self-centered interests. Leaving no holes barred, Mr. Munshi deliberates on the motives behind India's support for Bangladesh's Liberation War, on Indian involvement in various phases of Bangladesh's history as well as its questionable role in the insurgency which disrupted peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Rather than a volume of India-bashing essays, the writer has offered very logical arguments, each point backed up with documented evidence and reliable references. The book sets things into perspective where India's role in the region is concerned and will help the reader gain clarity amidst the propensity to promote the Indophile view in a section of the media.

Also in this volume are commendable write-ups by Khodeza Begum and Brig. Gen. Sakhawat Hussain (retd.) of Bangladesh; Nischal Basnyat, Madan Prasad Khanal, Sanjay Upadhya and Dr. Shastra Dutta Pant of Nepal; as well as Rohan Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya of Sri Lanka.

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Edited by
M.B.I. Munshi

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By M.B.I. Munshi

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FOREWORD

In the past few decades, much has been written and talked about India's role as a hegemonic power in the region of South Asia and perception of smaller states of a perpetual threat, overt and covert, from India. There has been specific emphasis on Indian doctrine that regards South Asia as a single strategic unit to be controlled and managed according to Indian order of things. While India might have its own rationale for framing its regional policy compatible with its national interests, the fact remains that constant apprehensions, mistrust and tensions between India and the smaller neighbors including Bangladesh had its negative effects on any meaningful cooperation and security in the region. This negative wave continues even today as the states of the region are witnessing waves of globalization and new security imperatives that bind them all.

It is in this context, I find this book of Barrister MBI Munshi very refreshing, informative and insightful. The book brings out clearly the possible motives and hardcore interests that underpin Indian doctrine and how they relate specifically to Bangladesh case. From the War of Liberation of 1971 to the current phase of India's ambitious defence and foreign policy, the author traces in a very persuasive manner how India perceives and operates in the neighboring states, particularly Bangladesh. The author has been largely successful in showing the various mechanisms through which India tries to impose its will and dominance over Bangladesh, and creates uncertainties in the country.

One may differ with author's views, but he argues so forcefully armed with authoritative information and data that it is very difficult to take different views.

Barrister Munshi's historical analysis tracing the Indian involvement at different phases of Bangladesh's evolution as a nation is full of facts and strong references that provides an alternative perspective why India supported our War of Liberation. Indeed, the independence of Bangladesh symbolized the victory of India against its arch rival Pakistan and enabled her 'to be counted in the league of big power nations'. There is a widespread accusation from India that Bangladesh is not grateful to India, but the author forcefully tries to prove that it was no less of India's interests and often Bangladesh was "betrayed". The author specifically brings out the case of CHT insurgency and

brings out how India's state apparatus and intelligence agencies operated in the region against the interests of Bangladesh. The author's historical and operational analysis of CHT insurgency is remarkable. He did a painstaking research to prove his main contentions.

The author Barrister Munshi depicted how Indian intelligence agencies and media are continuously engaged in a 'propaganda war' against Bangladesh in order to malign and project negative image of Bangladesh abroad. He referred numerous instances where India's design to transform Bangladesh as a fundamentalist and regressive state was revealed. The author talked about India's dream of "Akhand Bharat" and its strategies to pursue that goal in relation to the neighbors. While these may sound 'far-fetched', India needs to break out of its archaic India Doctrine and see her national interests in a more enlightened way and within a broader regional perspective where fears and concerns of small neighbors are addressed with more empathy and understanding.

The author's analysis of recent events that seemed to open a new chapter in India-US relations is very realistic. He seems to be concerned with this new US policy shift in the South Asian region, where smaller states may be marginalized. The author is also concerned with India's next moves in regard to Bangladesh as it tries to consolidate its democratic governance. I think the present context is a natural and logical corollary of the author's previous discourse and arguments – how India tries to influence the domestic policy dynamics of the neighboring countries. To my mind, the author's writing is so lucid, clear and insightful as well as provocative that it deserves wider reading. The readers will enjoy the essays thoroughly to come to their own conclusions.

These initial chapters of the book are complemented by the contributions produced by Khodeza Begum and Brig. Gen. (Retd.) Sakhawat Hossain. In the former case, a survey of the propagation for a United Bengal is investigated from an intelligence and propaganda perspective and the latter author concentrates on the geo-strategic implications of a more assertive India. In both these regards, it is unfortunate that so little research work is being done in Bangladesh on these issues which are imperative to a better understanding of the region and the security implications for the country. If the book was confined to the situation prevailing only in Bangladesh it could be faulted for being highly partial and selective.

It is a boon for the reader that we are also offered views from Sri Lanka and Nepal by respected and prominent authors and political commentators of

these countries. Both of those nations have been involved in a low intensity conflict which has on occasion developed into a full blown war with large civilian casualties and destruction of property and infrastructure. In the case of Nepal the conflict appears ideological in nature and in the Sri Lankan case there is a definite ethnic component to the hostilities between the government and the LTTE guerillas. It is in respect of the Indian interventions, whether direct or otherwise, in the internal dimensions of these conflicts that should be of particular interest to the reader. This aspect of the two 'insurgencies' have often been ignored or overlooked in what appears an unnecessary exercise of political correctness that tries to avoid offending Indian sentiments.

This book is unique in its attempt to bring India into the picture of South Asian affairs. Except in the case of Pakistan where foreign policy analysis has reflected the realities of an aggressive India this has largely been absent in public discussions in Bangladesh. The book provides an opportunity to reverse this trend and to encourage a more holistic perspective to the Bangladesh-India relations that will hopefully spawn new and original research on these issues.

This book is a valuable addition to existing political and security literature and will add a new dimension to debates and discourse in South Asian context.

M. Ataur Rahman, MA, Ph.D. (Chicago)

Professor of Political Science, University of Dhaka

President, Bangladesh Political Science Association

INTRODUCTION

'The India Doctrine' on its publication will have now gone through its third transformation. Its original release on the internet occurred in 2001 and was then updated in 2003 (both under different titles) and became a very popular reference point on the subject of Indian hegemonic designs. The present essay, in a new and greatly expanded form, relates to events that have affected Bangladesh but also includes references to other nations in South Asia that have had similar unpleasant experiences with India and its drive to dominate the region.

It was with this view in mind that several respected and renowned authors of South Asia were requested to contribute to this book. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that without the support of these contributors this book may never have been published. I would like to give a special thanks to Brigadier General (Retd.) Sakhawat Hossain, Khodeza Begum, Nishchal Basnyat, Dr. Shastra Dutta Pant, Madan Prasad Khanal, Sanjay Upadhyya, Dr Rohan Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya for their commendable efforts on this project and also for their generous and valuable contributions to it.

Lastly, I must mention my wife, Mahmuda Islam, who helped me with the translations of several books from Bangla to English and whose patience and understanding was a great asset to the final completion of this work.

M.B.I. Munshi

Bar-at-Law & Advocate (Supreme Court)

Dhaka , Bangladesh

mimunshi@yahoo.co.uk

MBIMunshi@gmail.com

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THE INDIA DOCTRINE - PREFACE

M.B.I. MUNSHI

This essay was originally written and published on the internet about six years ago (during the last Awami League regime) without an effective response or counter argument to rebut my original charges against the Indian government past, present and possibly future – especially if their inclinations towards Bangladesh and other South Asian nations continue along the same stream. This paper was written as a rejoinder to a gentleman in London (probably of Indian extraction, as far as I could surmise from his name and political inclinations) who challenged my assertion that India had hegemonic and imperialistic designs for the subcontinent or in other words a pretension to an *Akhand Bharat* ¹(i.e. Unified India).

The subject of this essay primarily relates to events that have affected Bangladesh but also includes references to other nations in South Asia that have had similar experiences with Indian expansionism. It was claimed by the responder in London that India had never publicly proposed such a policy and so we should not jump to such unsubstantiated and far-fetched conclusions that India indeed has such a policy or has ever followed such a policy in the past - a very twisted logic considering the dynamics prevailing in South Asia for the last fifty years. In this regard, there is also now the increased possibility that India will take advantage of any war in the Middle East or in Korea to harass and victimise Bangladesh and even resort to armed aggression in an effort to reduce or even confine our population which is considered a vital matter for India's present ruling elites and their perceived national security interests.²

During the second edition of this article written in 2003 there had been widespread speculation that the present government in Bangladesh (an alliance of the BNP and Jamaat-i-Islami Party with two smaller factions of nationalist and Islamic representations) will be toppled and replaced with an administration that is more India centric and pliable to their domineering and expansionist tendencies. All these attempts had fortunately failed but with the 2007 parliamentary elections before us there appears a renewed effort to impose an authority structure that would be sympathetic to the Indian demand for transit rights and export of gas. Both of these demands are unacceptable to Bangladesh as they would compromise our national integrity and security as well as drain one of our most precious natural resources with

no actual benefit to the country since the price proposed by Indian companies (such as Tata who claim to want to use the gas solely to power their own industries inside Bangladesh once their investments have been approved by the government but there is no guarantee they will not exert pressure on a future administration to export gas to India at discounted rates) for the purchase of natural gas is well below international market values and the terms proposed for an agreement will have negative economic implications for the country but in an election year 'informal' deals could be made by the present government or the opposition parties to ensure a victory with India's blessing.³ It would appear then, that goodwill to our large neighbour requires the sacrifice of Bangladesh's own national interests to the larger requirements and demands of the Indian consumer and final submission to the security requirements and considerations of their armed forces and civilian government and anything less is simply not good enough – there is no longer even a pretence to reciprocity.⁴

For these reasons, it has been suggested to me that my article 'Akhand Hindustan' should be republished in book form considering the more intense and aggressive posturing of the Indian government after the fall of the Awami League from power and the success of the BNP in the October 2001 elections in Bangladesh. With the possibility of a BNP-Islamic combine again achieving success at the polls in 2007 there is an increased likelihood of interference not only from India and its Awami League ally and stooge (since it is essentially through this party that India operates but it does have many other front organisations functioning in Bangladesh)⁵ but also from the Europeans and Americans through the vehicle of the Tuesday Group and human rights and donor institutions.⁶

The European Union members have been the worst offenders in this regard anointing themselves the sole experts and legitimate spokesmen on the state of Bangladesh democracy and political affairs and drawing the country closer to confrontation and disharmony with their ill-advised pronouncements that distinctly favour the pro-Indian agendas of certain political parties. With this diplomatic inducement the Awami League is rejecting the constitutional process for selecting and appointing the Chief Advisor to the Caretaker government and pressing on with its insistence on the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner. In this latter case, however, the CEC has made some controversial decisions in regard to the electoral roll that has brought widespread condemnation from different quarters but it remains unclear whether this has more to do with internal conflict and dissension within the

Election Commission itself or is in fact a reasonable attempt at inclusion of new voters for the forthcoming elections in very trying circumstances. In either case, it will probably have no effect on the acceptability of the CEC to the opposition Awami League or any new appointee that does not fit the AL profile and will provide further opportunities and incentives for India try to influence the election outcome.

These incidents are merely the political and diplomatic signs indicative of what we can expect in the coming months if not in the years ahead which has necessitated the updating of this paper into its present form and context to provide an interpretation of events at this critical juncture in the nation's history. For those readers familiar with this essay I have decided to keep the original form of the article published in 2001 except for a few alterations and a preface and of course the change in the title which essentially incorporates the notions of an 'Akhand Hindustan' or an 'Akhand Bharat' and retains the connotations that these two concepts intend to imply but most importantly the idea of an 'India Doctrine' of expansionism and hegemony in South Asia would be more readily understood in the West. The updated narrative of this story will now include contemporary materials and documents relating to events and incidents that occurred after the writing of the 2003 edition of this paper and which also now comprises several additional topics incorporated into three completely new parts.

INDIAN REACTION

It would seem even the Indian High Commission has now become aware of this essay and is immensely concerned by the political import and popularity of this series which was implied in the manner of departure of the former Indian High Commissioner Mani Lal Tripathi in 2003. At the farewell dinner prepared in his honour by the Awami League on 24 October 2003 he said,

"There is, however, a feeling in India that even parties and leaders here, who have a pragmatic appreciation of the importance of good relations with India, are reluctant to acknowledge and advocate it in public. It is as if the India-friendly tag is something to be embarrassed about, something to be shunned. Baseless accusations of subservience to India, hurled at one another, seems to have become a popular pastime in the domestic political arena here. This is a matter of much disappointment.

God has been kind in blessing our country with adequate territory. We do not covet even a square inch of the land in our neighbourhood. We pose no threat to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Bangladesh.

Our people were therefore pained when some one in the Government here publicly commented that India still believes in 'Akhand Bharat' (undivided India), annexing territories from the Khyber Pass to Chittagong and from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean. Such comments are irresponsible. Such talk is reprehensible."

That His Excellency was able to make such a speech in Bangladesh at a gathering organized by a political party in his honour with the numerous accusations he leveled against this country I do not share his surprise that people in Bangladesh are suspicious of India. With continuing deceptions over India's River Linking Project and pressure over transit rights and gas exports, with still outstanding disputes on the Tin Bigha Corridor, Muhuri Char and Talpatty Island and - the ultimate symbol of India's complete disregard for Bangladesh concerns - the Farraka Barrage construction, there appears little scope for India to endear itself towards Bangladesh, at least in this century.⁷

THE PROPAGANDA WAR

The onslaught carried on against Bangladesh and other countries in the region by the Indian press and media assisted by the international news networks only added support to my view of Indian domination and control of South Asia. The visit of Sheikh Hasina (in November 2002) to India and her reception there along with the vicious comments of L.K. Advani and India's foreign minister Yashwant Sinha about Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh and terrorist dens confirmed my suspicions of a conspiracy. These reprehensible remarks by the senior Indian ministers were tolerated by the former prime minister who did not raise any protest or cut short her sojourn which gives the impression of complicity and even tacit approval to these polemics and diatribes. This interpretation of the Indian criticisms of Bangladesh (that of a planned and concerted design to influence political events in the country) was also supported to some extent by prominent journalists in Bangladesh:

"...a section of the Indian press, presumably prompted by a quiet Indian RAW agenda, built up a propaganda dossier about Al-Qaeda activity in Bangladesh by planted reports from time to time. Contributors to the Western media clandestinely visited Bangladesh to confirm those reports and made sensational headlines by stories published in Time, Far Eastern Economic Review, Wall Street Journal, etc. A contractor for Channel Four TV in the United Kingdom sent a clandestine team to film staged scenes of Al-Qaeda

agitation in Bangladesh. That team's intent has been foiled by police intervention, the foreign members of which have now been expelled from the country after due process of law. They were reportedly found to be guided by Indians, Bombay-based, as well as by Sheikh Hasina's connections, Dhaka based."⁸

It should be noted that Sheikh Hasina again visited India in September 2005 essentially to workout ways and means to ensure the victory of the AL and its allies in the next national elections to be held in 2007. It is assumed that Sheikh Hasina was briefed about Indian strategy and advised on the methods of exploiting the BNP government's problems with a resurgent JMB (Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh) and their failure to apprehend the members of this terrorist organization which they had miserably failed to do after almost two years of prompting.⁹ The conferring of the Mother Teresa Award¹⁰ on Sheikh Hasina has again afforded a new opportunity for the Indians to initiate further consultations with the former Prime Minister on a coordinated plan for the 2007 elections and to try to make relations between the two countries appear more acceptable to Bangladeshis which now seems a forlorn ambition and also utterly hopeless.¹¹ They may also presumably discuss the issue of unrest and violence in the RMG sector,¹² which was rumoured to have been orchestrated by a foreign hand - for use in the forthcoming election campaign by the Awami League party - and possibly to ignite further unrest in case the AL is again defeated at the polls or even prior to such an eventuality.

That India is now in the process of implementing its strategy is revealed by the unrest in the RMG sector that was preceded by a commentary in the Washington Times by Arnaud de Borchgrave who uncritically parrots the propaganda line of the Indian government. It should, however, be of real concern since the article discloses an alignment between India and the US neoconservatives and Israeli intelligence which has broad implications for South Asia and the Muslim world. If Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave had simply accused Bangladesh of the stale accusations of Islamic militancy there would be no reason for apprehension but he continues.

"In a well-planned demonstration of trans-Atlantic solidarity, a high-level European Union delegation timed its visit to coincide with Mrs. Rocca's -- and gave Bangladeshi leaders the same message: Stick to fair elections in October of this year or face some unpleasant though unspecified music. The opposition Awami League said the Election Commission and provisions for a caretaker government have already been gerrymandered to favor the ruling BNP and its Islamist props.

Suicide bombings and grenade assassinations are more common in Bangladesh than in Israel, Gaza or the West Bank. But they seldom are reported. Time magazine's South Asian bureau chief was banned from the country after a 2002 article exposed the government's lackadaisical response to a buildup of Islamist terrorists with links to al Qaeda."¹³

Now that the leadership of the JMB has been apprehended and the dismantling of their command structure is nearly complete¹⁴ an apology from the Washington Times and Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave is long overdue. What is particularly noteworthy about this episode is the assertiveness of a Bangladeshi diplomat in the United States, who responded to the above commentary in a prompt and crisp manner with the following statement,

"Bangladesh has contained and eliminated extremists from a sense of its own deep commitment to this objective and to ensure social harmony. This was clearly demonstrated at the recent Conference on Interfaith Harmony in Dhaka.

The Bangladesh government's action in fighting terrorism, both through domestic measures and by joining all international efforts, has been widely recognized. President Bush has said as much in a recent letter to Bangladesh Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, delivered personally by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca.

Thus, for Mr. Borchgrave to say the U.S. assistant secretary of state flew to Dhaka at the end of January to convey U.S. alarm to government leaders coupled with a stern warning" of "sanctions under the U.S. Terrorist Financing Act" is nothing but sheer fantasy, specially when he himself was not physically present in Bangladesh. Not only did the U.S. assistant secretary convey her government's appreciation, she described Bangladesh "as a shining example of one of the few Muslim democracies," adding "Bangladesh stands out as a model in this part of the world."¹⁵

Now that the government has finally made a concerted effort to dismantle the JMB terrorist structure in Bangladesh the Awami League has again refocused the debate onto the election process and there has been little or no commendation from India on the arrest of the top leaders of the JMB. The Tuesday Group has also turned away from the issue of Islamic terrorism to the holding of free and fair elections, although, their intervention can be said to exceed their diplomatic mandate and authority as already detailed above.

NEW ALIGNMENTS

Since the writing of the original Akhand Hindustan article in 2001 the geopolitical strategic scenario in South Asia has dramatically shifted in favour of

India. With Presidents Bush's visit to India in early March 2006 and the signing of the nuclear agreement between the two countries it would appear that Bangladesh is now at a distinct disadvantage.

The manner in which President Bush is pushing for this deal demonstrates certain desperation on America's part, especially considering that, "India is one of only four countries that have refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—a treaty endorsed by 188 nations. Thumbing its nose at the world, India has conducted nuclear tests and has developed what experts believe to be 50 to 100 nuclear weapons. Under the terms of the NPT, the export of nuclear technology is banned to nations that don't accept international inspections of their nuclear programs. In addition, U.S. law prohibits the transfer of nuclear technology to a country that rejects full international safeguards. U.S. law also bans such technology transfer to a non-NPT country that has conducted nuclear test explosions."¹⁶

This exceptional favouritism shown to India necessarily undermines America's case against Iran and the agreement has already been criticised for its apparent impairing of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as shown above. Pakistan has been the most vociferous opponent to the deal claiming that it would lead to regional destabilisation initiating a costly arms race and that Pakistan should also have been provided with the same facility given to India.¹⁷ Within the United States there has been apprehension that the deal would have negative implications for nuclear non-proliferation efforts on a global scale. According to one expert the deal would not require India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty nor would it commit India to an early cessation of the nuclear arms race, as Article Six of the NPT requires other recognized nuclear states. Others have commented that by treating India as an acceptable nuclear partner and continuing to treat Pakistan, Iran and North Korea as 'nuclear pariahs' has the potential of creating a very insecure and unstable world.¹⁸

The specific terms of the agreement are of little importance for this essay but in brief it may be mentioned that the deal commits India to separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards, and signing an Additional Protocol.¹⁹ According to one analyst, the deal allows India to build as many nuclear weapons as it wishes with its own nuclear supplies and operate un-safeguarded facilities for producing and stockpiling unlimited amounts of fissile material for its weapons program.²⁰

This has been confirmed by the Council on Foreign Affairs (CFR) in a Council Special Report (CSR) which contends that India has not excluded the 'possibility of testing its own weapons should other states test theirs first. India has agreed to submit fourteen of its twenty-two nuclear reactors to international inspections, but it has kept the remaining eight potentially available for producing nuclear weapons material, has made no definite commitments whether future reactors will be inspected or used for weapons production, and has made no promises to end its production of nuclear weapons material. In contrast, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China, the officially recognized nuclear weapons states under international law, have stopped producing nuclear weapons material.'²¹

Many Indian commentators have already described this as a boon for India's budding nuclear industry and without any real drawbacks to its future development which seems to be the conclusion of the CSR also.²² The agreement signifies a sea change in relations between India and the United States and has been touted as a strategic partnership intended to thwart China's growing political and military influence in Asia.²³ The powerful and highly influential Council of Foreign Affairs in another report authored by Esther Pan acquaints us with the motivating factors behind this deal,

"China's rise in the region is prompting the United States to seek a strategic relationship with India. 'The United States is trying to cement its relationship with the world's largest democracy in order to counterbalance China,' Ferguson says. The Bush administration is 'hoping that latching onto India as the rising star of Asia could help them handle China,' Sokolski says. But other experts say the growing economic relationship between China and India is so critical to New Delhi that its interests in China cannot be threatened or replaced by any agreement with the United States. Indians "have no interest whatsoever in trying to contain China because they believe this could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, and their whole policy is to seek the best possible relationship with China," Robert Blackwill, a former U.S. ambassador to India, said at a Council meeting February 23. Other experts worry U.S. nuclear aid to India could foster a dangerous nuclear rivalry between India and China. Though India has a strong interest in building economic relations with China, New Delhi is still wary of China's military rise in the region."²⁴

This apparent marriage of convenience between America's neo-conservative policy makers and India's Brahmin elite²⁵, principally in order to curtail and contain China's might, has the added potential to incite India's Nehruvian ambition to push ahead with its program for an *Akhand Bharat* in South Asia.²⁶

Although the Nehruvian vision saw a socialist ideology tagged on to this design the change in economic outlook of India today augments the concept of *Akhand Bharat* with a capitalist industrial-military machinery to further facilitate this goal. That India could exploit the contradictions in the US National Security Strategy (NSS) and Defence Department's Quadrennial Defense Review (Q.D.R.) to advance its projected vision of an *Akhand Bharat* was made glaringly obvious by Washington's decision to invite India to appoint military officers to liaison posts in the US Strategic Command (Stratcom).²⁷

Probably more ominous for Muslims in South Asia is the highly secretive military cooperation between India and Israel which has direct bearings on India's attitude to its own Muslim population and that of Pakistan and Bangladesh. With India establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992 and staging a red carpet reception for the then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2003²⁸ demonstrates the depth of understanding of the two nations which probably also derives from the Zionist quest for a greater Israel and India's cherished dream of an *Akhand Bharat*.²⁹

It may just be coincidence but both nations are democracies that have both employed an overtly racist and chauvinist policy towards their Muslim inhabitants involving not only forcible seizure of land but also a violent and often brutal subjugation of their dispossessed populace. Similarly, they both effectively project the image of being the wronged party in their disputes with their Muslim population and conveniently label them terrorists when they have the audacity and courage to protest.³⁰

A Few Remarks on U.S. – India Nuclear Diplomacy

There are still some commentators in both India and the United States who question the assumptions on which the nuclear agreement is based. If the deal were to fall through by a rejection in the US Congress the primary reason would certainly be mutual distrust which has already shown signs of resurfacing after Russia proposed to sell nuclear fuel to India³¹ and doubts have also been raised over the country's relations with Iran³² which has now become the most recent target of American hawks vying for another war in the Middle East. These seem to be the principal factors in the stalling of the nuclear agreement in the US Congress and this delay in the approval process could last until early next year (2007).³³

It should also be pointed out that Congressional approval is only one of the hurdles that have to be met before the deal is officially completed and

finalized. A formal nuclear cooperation agreement (or implementing agreement) will have to be negotiated providing a legal framework for nuclear commerce between the two countries and the US administration must then convince the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that it should relax their rules which now prevent most types of nuclear trade with India.³⁴ Both of these obstacles could introduce further objections and grounds for suspicion within the US (and in India) as to the terms of these arrangements and how far it satisfies American security interests in Asia and their concerns about nuclear proliferation globally.

On the Indian side doubts have been raised by a provision in the implementing agreement that confers to the United States the legal right to halt nuclear cooperation if India tests a nuclear weapon. India wants assurances that the flow of technology, including reactors and fuel, will not be interrupted³⁵ which would require the deletion of this particular clause. A few analysts on the political left in India have also predictably and irrelevantly objected to the driving forces behind contemporary US foreign policy in attempting to aggressively reshape the world by military force rather than by persuasion. Another concern in some intellectual circles in India has been that America would loath to compromise on its preeminence as an industrial military power and therefore try to prevent the emergence of a potential rival or alternative power centre³⁶ and the agreement has merely provided a convenient pretext for America's control on India's superpower potentiality and ambitions.

What all of these theories and analysis fails to grasp is that India's political elites have already bought into the Neo-conservative program and see the opportunity for its extension in South Asia in the form of *Akhand Bharat* where India can exercise full-spectrum dominance over its immediate neighbours in all relevant strategic areas. That America will retain overall control on developments in South Asia can be implied from the expected US application for observer status of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation³⁷ but it can be safely assumed that India will be allowed wide discretionary powers in dealing with its neighbours and ultimately bringing them within the neoconservative fold.

This alignment of purpose and of ideologies between the US and India was explicitly admitted to in the CSR (mentioned above) where the authors of the report identify China as being the common threat to both democracies and more importantly that any suspicions that may still exist between the two countries would, 'not only weaken overall relations with India, but also

prompt the fall of India's pro-American, minority government, which recently suffered significant defeats at the hands of its anti-American left-wing rival in state elections, and hence lead to the demise of the nuclear deal.³⁸ In all likelihood the US Congress will, therefore, approve (in an amended form) the nuclear deal and precipitate a new and more dangerous phase in South Asian affairs³⁹ that has the potential to engulf the rest of Asia and probably the world in a conflict of ideologies and interests.

The only thing standing in the way of such a calamity is a radical shift in India's attitude towards the US and an unforeseen realignment of forces and interests in Asia with India relinquishing its ambitions to be the preeminent power in the region (i.e. making way for the other Asian giant) which seems at this point highly unlikely. This impression is underscored by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's absence from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit held in June of 2006 as, 'New Delhi has been improving its relationship with Washington, and believes Russia and China want to use the SCO mainly as a platform from which to launch diplomatic attacks against the United States.'⁴⁰ This only further confirms the belief that the destinies of both the US and India are now inextricably linked with South Asia as the new playground for both these major powers with the latter taking on a policing and regulatory role but certainly not surrendering its vision for the establishment of an *Akhand Bharat* unifying the area under its control and domination.

THE UNITED STATES POLICY SHIFT

The policy shift towards India came as a palpable shock to Bangladesh with the United States decision to put it and four other countries under more stringent immigration rules that were being enforced after the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. This was a humiliating dénouement for Bangladesh caused by India's repeated allegations of Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements in the government and terrorist training camps within our territory.

India with a population of 1 billion which includes a sizable 200 million Muslim minority had been excluded from this registration process while Pakistan and Bangladesh found itself targeted. This should make policy makers in these countries ponder whether the United States is encouraging India to further its territorial designs as there does not appear to be any other reason for such discriminatory practises especially with India's track record in Kashmir and Gujarat. From another perspective, it may be suggested that the

United States does not consider India a threat due to its successful subjugation of its Muslim population mentioned already.⁴¹

With this clear abetment by the Bush administration in India's rough handling of Muslims there is an incentive for the Congress led government to become increasingly aggressive and expansionist as it has already enthusiastically taken on the mantle of neo-conservatism in South Asia. The implication of this trend can be found in a review of Moudud Ahmed's book 'Crisis of Development – The Case of Bangladesh', by Prof. Emajuddin Ahmed (Former Vice-Chancellor of Dhaka University) who has laid out the dilemma that now faces South Asian nations,

"Moudud knows it very well that this is an age old story of the Indian society. One may recollect what an eminent RSS leader Madhav Sadashiv Golwalker said when the BJP was not even born: "Hindustan is the land of the Hindus and is the *terra firma* for the Hindu nation alone to flourish ... Today India's vision has gone past South Asia; its aim is now to have "Predominance" established and the Indian Ocean rim. For having this end achieved it does not need cooperation; rather India needs its neighbouring countries as its extended frontiers so that the depth of its offensive and defensive exercises become stable."⁴²

Unless these warnings are taken seriously by the military strategists and policy makers in Bangladesh the country may find itself in the same position as Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka who have all become the latest victims of a joint Indo-US effort to restructure their internal political make-up and organisation and which will probably not be in the national interests of these target countries or even meet the hopes of their people. In some cases even the territorial integrity of these countries have come in for reappraisal through the inciting of ethnic, religious or regional divisions to promote groups that they view as more favourable and sympathetic to their geo-strategic designs for South Asia.

In the case of Pakistan, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has found sufficient evidence to accuse Washington and NATO, 'of turning a blind eye to alleged Indian efforts to stoke an insurgency in Baluchistan. New Delhi denies meddling in Baluchistan. ISI officials are also convinced that US and Afghan officials are allowing Indian spy agencies unparalleled access and influence among the Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan, from where they supposedly are conducting operations designed to destabilize Pakistan."⁴³ To prepare for such a similar eventuality in Bangladesh (which could happen in relation to the CHT) the political leaders should act in conformity with the

suggestion made by Maj. Gen. Syed Ahmed in the Bangladesh Army Journal and reproduced in part by Probe magazine,

"Our geo-strategic realities demand that we take into consideration the balance of power situation of South Asia and prepare accordingly. To stand against a formidable enemy, a small state cannot afford to renounce the possibility of making alliance with other larger states. Enemy's enemy is a friend: such wisdom remained the basis of military alliances and the balance of power game through the history of warfare. In the struggle for survival, Bangladesh will definitely exploit all the available opportunities; in that the possibility of alliance also remains open."⁴⁴

This approach has become crucial to Bangladesh's survival in light of the Indo-US nuclear deal and military cooperation between India and Israel which places all nations within the South Asia region in an existential dilemma. The sensible approach for Bangladesh would be to exploit its strategic advantage and geographical location to attract friends that have a mutual interest in seeing the peace and security of South Asia maintained against an expansionist ideology that threatens to engulf the entire region in an endless war for supremacy and reunification that bears similarities in its passion and zeal to Hitler's quest for lebensraum.

END NOTES & REFERENCES

1 Akhand Bharat for the western reader is basically the policy for reunification of the subcontinent according to the pre-1947 borders that would include the entire geographical area of Pakistan and Bangladesh. For some, Akhand Bharat refers to an even earlier period in Indian history that would encompass an area that also includes Afghanistan and parts of present day Myanmar. All these territories would come under the suzerainty of New Delhi. Akhand Bharat also has political connotations that bears similarities to western imperialism and envisions India's political control over all the countries mentioned above and also Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives.

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THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 1

THE EMERGENCE OF INDIA AND THE POLICY OF REUNIFICATION

“Who so writes the history of his own
time must expect to be attacked for
everything he has said, and for everything
he has not said; but those little draw backs
should not discourage a man who loves truth
and liberty, expects nothing, fears nothing, asks nothing,
and limits his ambition to the cultivation of letters”
(Voltaire)

Introduction

India has made no official statement to the effect that it would pursue a policy seeking reunification or what in some knowledgeable and specialist circles have called an 'Akhand-Bharat' or a United India based on the pre-1947 borders that had constituted the area under the jurisdiction of the British Raj. According to some experts the concept of an Akhand Bharat may extend even further to the territorial limits corresponding to ancient Buddhist and Hindu empires that are now only reminisced about in modern Indian literature and in some historical and religious texts.¹ Such a controversial policy for the implementation of an Akhand Bharat would certainly not be so explicitly stated or formulated² in the same manner as was suggested by this author (in his previous remarks on the subject and which had been published in several articles written during 2000-2001). An Akhand Bharat nevertheless remains the basis for an unofficial Indian government policy towards its neighbours and this has been the case since 1947.

For all practical purposes what is being offered now is near enough in content to the author's original proposition that many readers had found so incredulous and unbelievable. What had appeared so astonishing at the time was the reaction to a single paragraph in an article of 2001 where the author claimed that there was a concerted and planned domination and encroachment by India on its neighbours. The constant skirmishing between the BSF and BDR and the continuous killing of Bangladeshi civilians³ along

the border area between India and Bangladesh is only a single instance of this aggressive expansionist policy which has shown no sign of abating and is an example of India's non-acceptance of the realities of a post-1947 South Asia. This attitude has been particularly pronounced in the unrest in Nepal, Sri Lanka⁴ and in the Balochistan province of Pakistan in the first half of 2006 and the signs of a similar policy of destabilization was being felt in Bangladesh in the run up to the 2007 General Elections.

Two Nation Theory

It is unfortunate that so many people are still ignorant of the fact that India has never accepted the concept of the Two-Nation theory which resulted in the break up of India into two separate parts in 1947. It is well known that they employ stooges and quislings in all the countries of the sub-continent promoting the view that the Two Nations theory based on religion was a mistake. This author would agree with that assessment but not in an attempt to distract from India's own fissiparous and centrifugal forces⁵ or in a cheap attempt to break up Pakistan further but to promote a more realistic evaluation and appraisal of India's conduct to its neighbours which depends largely on the ideological imperatives of an *Akhand Bharat*.

Two quite extraordinary books revealing the lack of commonality between the two parts of Pakistan and the inherent cultural anomalies within East Pakistan sheds light on why a Two Nation Theory could not be a solution to Jinnah's fear of Hindu domination. The whole notion of Two Nations based on religion was far too simplistic to begin with:

"If there were two religious 'nations' in India, there were many more cultural and linguistic 'nations'. Certainly what was true of the U.P. Muslims was not so of their co-religionists in eastern India, notwithstanding the fact that they professed the same faith. The dominant culture of the former was based on the Mughal heritage with Urdu as its nucleus, while the latter were integrated more with the local Bengali culture than with any heritage of Muslim rule in India. The former looked upon Kurta and pajama as the proper dress for a Muslim, the latter wore a modest lungi, if not a dhoti like their Hindu neighbors; one looked upon Urdu as the appropriate language of Muslims in India, the latter hardly knew any word of it."⁶

The events of 1971 had substantially resolved this dichotomy but there still remains good reasons for minorities and Moslems in both Pakistan and Bangladesh to be apprehensive about current trends in India as the Congress Government and the Indian intelligence service (RAW) have taken a more

hostile approach towards these countries which has involved creating unrest in Balochistan⁷ and violence in the industrial sectors of Bangladesh prior to the 2007 elections. These incidents have been further incited by the constant goading of the BJP and RSS that have taken on distinctly communal overtones which had been the original justification for the Muslim League's demand for partition in 1947:

"...the growth of extreme Hindu nationalism with symbols repugnant to Muslims caused great uneasiness in their minds. A familiar idiom of nationalist Hindu militancy was the anti-Muslim rhetoric, which traced historically the Hindus fall from grace to the tyranny of the 'alien' rule. Muslims were contemptuously referred to as yavanas, melechchas, katchakholas and the like in the nationalist literature and exclusive Hindu symbols introduced as sources of Indian nationalism."⁸

In the authors opinion, it should not have been a Two-Nation theory but a 'Several Nation Theory' that could have been implemented in the 1947 partition program had there been the necessary will and foresight. That this would have been the far better solution to the communal and cultural divisions within India was subsequently shown in the several wars fought with Pakistan, the rise of Hindu fanaticism, the civil war in the Seven Sisters and the Indian governments brazen and obtrusive policy of domination and interference in the entire South Asian region that has been the cause of untold misery for the areas inhabitants.

It is unfortunate that from this perspective Viceroy Louis Mountbatten became so enamored with a unified India (or was it with Nehru's idea and concept of India that must have been retold to him in their many private conversations together) that he failed to appreciate the autonomous tendencies within India itself, particularly in Kashmir and the Northeast region. It is likely that Mountbatten was unduly influenced by Jawaharlal Nehru since there is evidence that he had seriously considered a 'Three Nation Theory' that was originally cited in Collins and Lapierre – *Freedom at Midnight* (1982) but later conveniently forgotten or deliberately ignored by historians of both Pakistan and India,

"If the implications in the plan that [Mountbatten] had sent to London were fully realized, the great Indian subcontinent would be divided into three independent nations, not two. Mountbatten had inserted in his plan a clause that would allow the sixty-five million Hindus and Moslems of Bengal to join into one viable country, with the great seaport of Calcutta as their capital.

A sudden inspiration struck Mountbatten. He would reassure himself privately, informally, with the Indian leader, whom to the distress of his staff,

he had invited to vacation with him in Simla ... To show the plan to Nehru without exposing it to Jinnah would be a complete breach of faith with the Moslem leader. If he discovered it, Mountbatten's whole position would be destroyed.

That night, Mountbatten invited Nehru to his study for a glass of port. Casually, he passed the Congress leader a copy of the plan. Jawaharlal Nehru began to scrutinize the text designed to chart his country's future. He was horrified by what he read. The vision of the India that emerged from the plan's pages was a nightmare, an India divided, not into two parts but fragmented into a dozen pieces ... The plan he believed, would exacerbate all India's fissiparous tendencies of dialect, culture and race to the point at which the subcontinent would risk exploding into a mosaic of weak hostile states."⁹

The consequences of this original Mountbatten plan of May 1947 would have seen the creation of another independent nation state separate from the Pakistan and Indian entities which might have been called the United States of Bengal or even Bangladesh. It would certainly have been unacceptable to both Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League who would then have had difficulty in justifying a unified Pakistan if the plan had actually been put forward. This was also a concern shared by Jawaharlal Nehru whose real fear was that if the idea had gained ground other regions of India would clamour for separation on ethnic or religious grounds without the option of reuniting them later on into an *Akhand Bharat* with a strong Indian centre. If the May 1947 plan had in fact come to fruition and if contrary to Nehru's predictions there was no further fragmentation of India the post-1947 Congress government would probably have invaded the new Bengal state not allowing it to survive beyond its first few months. This would have brought the Muslims of 'East Bengal' into the Indian Union and to an even worse fate than befell them within a moth eaten Pakistan but without the possibility of independence.

A far better solution which oddly did not present itself to Mountbatten was to have formed a loose Confederation of Bengal States separate, distinct and independent from India (similar to what was envisaged in the 1905 division of Bengal) which would have been a viable entity since the Seven Sisters have no real affinity to India as recent autonomy demands have suggested. Nevertheless, many commentators in Bangladesh are now saying a similar thing concerning the unity of Bengal states but the difference is that according to their vision if put into effect, Bangladesh would merely become another province within the India Union with limited autonomy if any at all.

However, this is not the subject of this present section but the question of a unified Bengal or an Akhand Bangla will be taken up in Parts 3 and 5 of this essay. It is India's territorial and hegemonic ambitions that will be the subject of this part which will be further developed in part 2 where India's intentions behind the military assistance it provided to East Pakistan in 1971 will be viewed from an international perspective.¹⁰ The remainder of the essay (parts 3-5) will be concerned with specific instances of Indian interference in Bangladesh that will involve an extensive and detailed survey of our history from 1947 to the present.

Jawaharlal Nehru – India's ideologue

As it is impossible to understand Hitler's Germany without reading *Mein Kampf*, the same applies to India in reference to Jawaharlal Nehru's compositions and publications. This is, however, not an attempt at a comparison between these two men and their policies or outlook which differs in many fundamental respects but merely the offering of an illustration for ease of understanding - although the past BJP government would suitably fit such a comparison with Nazi Germany.¹¹ On the other hand, it would not be an exaggeration to compare the ideological assumptions and imperatives of the Congress government and the Bush administration as they now have many shared interests with the nuclear deal and both have an affinity with neo-conservatism, political elitism and imperial expansionism driven by economic necessity.

Returning now to the question of India's Foreign Policy objectives and designs. These matters were in embryonic form in Jawaharlal Nehru's, 'The Discovery of India' (First edition-1946) from which I now quote at length:

"If India is split up into two or more parts and can no longer function as a political and economic unit, her progress will be seriously affected. The much worse will be the inner psychological conflict between those who wish to reunite her and those who oppose this ... Unity is always better than disunity, but an enforced unity is a sham and dangerous affair, full of explosive possibilities. Unity must be of the mind and heart, a sense of the belonging together and of facing together those who attack it. I am convinced that there is that basic unity in India, but it has been overlaid and hidden to some extent by other forces. These latter may be temporary and artificial and may pass off, but they count today and no man can ignore them... Yet the fact remains that considerable numbers of Moslems have become sentimentally attached to this idea of separation without giving thought to its consequences ... I think

this sentiment has been artificially created and has no roots in the Moslem mind ... It may be that some division of India is enforced, with some tenuous bond joining the divided parts. Even if this happens, I am convinced that the basic feeling of unity and world developments will later bring the divided parts nearer to each other and result in a real unity. It is obvious that whatever may be the future of India, and even if there is a regular partition, the different parts will have to co-operate with each other and in a hundred different ways. Even independent nations have to co-operate with each other and must hang together or deteriorate, disintegrate and loose their freedom...

Thus we arrive at the inevitable and ineluctable conclusion that, whether Pakistan comes or not, a number of important and basic functions of the state must be exercised on all-India basis if India is to survive as a free state and progress. The alternative is stagnation, decay and disintegration, leading to a loss of political and economic freedom, both for India as a whole and its various separated parts. As has been said by an eminent authority: 'The inexorable logic of the age presents the country with radically different alternatives: union plus independence or disunion plus dependence.' ... There is grave danger in a possibility of partition and division to begin with. For such an attempt might well scotch the very beginnings of freedom and the formation of a free national state ... Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any free state emerging from such a turmoil, and if something does emerge, it will be a pitiful caricature full of contradictions and insoluble problems."¹²

This is the program for an *Akhand Bharat* which has been the central foreign policy goal of all the Indian political administrations since 1947 and remains the primary theme in relations with its neighbours in South Asia. The primary drawback to the whole United India agenda as formulated by Jawaharlal Nehru is the fact that 'a state called India never existed before August 15, 1947, when British colonial rule ended in the subcontinent'.¹³ This reality has, nevertheless, not prevented Indian policy makers since the time of partition to recreate the concept of an *Akhand Bharat* to fit their 'Grand Strategy' for the South Asian region which views the divisions of 1947 as an aberration in their mythologized view of the historical past.

Historical Intentions

India's views on partition have not fundamentally diverged from the original standpoint and impression of a united India but may have become even more extreme in recent decades. Jawaharlal Nehru, was the Prime Minister of India from 1947-1964, having tremendous and pervasive influence and clout on

subsequent generations of foreign policy makers in that country. This is an observation that is unlikely to be questioned or open to contradiction nor is it a particularly contentious observation in view of the continuation of his political dynasty through his daughter, grandson and great-grand-children who have all worked along the same lines within the Congress party.

These expressions of Prime Minister Nehru have also translated into action in attempts to enfeeble and demoralize its neighbors. Take for example, India's and Pakistan's agreement on the division of financial and material assets of the British Raj. Pakistan had already received 200 million rupees as advance and was to receive a further additional 550 million rupees as balance of her share. The Indians argued that the money would be used to purchase arms to kill Indian soldiers, so India refused to pay the sum until the Kashmir problem was resolved. Consequently, a cheque issued by the Pakistan Government to the British Overseas Airways Corporation bounced because of insufficient funds. This policy was sponsored by Sardar Patel and was endorsed by Jawaharlal Nehru and the whole cabinet although Mountbatten had gone to great lengths to finalize this comprehensive 'package deal'. Mountbatten described India's conduct as 'unstatesmanlike', 'unwise' and 'dishonourable'. The money was finally released to Pakistan after intervention of Mahatma Gandhi when he threatened to fast until death if India did not take the honourable course.¹⁴

India's attitude to partition and Pakistan was highlighted by Pandit Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi at a public meeting on November 30, 1970 where she stated, "India has never reconciled with the existence of Pakistan. Indian leaders always believed that Pakistan should not have been created and that Pakistan nation has no right to exist."¹⁵ This by implication would include Bangladesh though no one in this country would admit it in so many words. India's role in the 1971 war was naturally, therefore, an extension of its own policy considerations and ideological compulsions based on the idea of an *Akhand Bharat*:

"India's support for Bangladesh basically emanated from its negative approach towards Pakistan. For political, historical, and economic reasons, it was India's natural desire to see that her rival power structure in the subcontinent is weakened. It was not so much love for democracy or sense of brotherhood for the people of Bangladesh that Indira Gandhi decided to support the Bengalis in their war to achieve independence. The then Government of India acted on its own calculations in order to achieve its own national and international objectives. Once India got involved she became greatly interested in seeing the struggle the Bengalis remain in its complete

control. The Indian Government wanted to ensure that following the removal of the west Pakistani authority and effective government of its own liking was established in Bangladesh.”¹⁶

The extent to which the Indian government was prepared to go to achieve this and the efforts it would employ will become apparent in Parts 3-5 of this essay that deals with the relevant period from a national perspective.

The Nehru Doctrine and India's Forward Policy

The big brotherly attitude of India which the above narrative provides only a tiny glimpse in relation to the events in 1971 and which other nations in South Asia have also found overbearing and an irritant is a predictable culmination of the thinking of Pandit Nehru and India's Forward Policy. An example of this Forward Policy, not surprisingly, is found in what has been called the Nehru Doctrine. Its focus has been directed at Nepal but has meaning and resonance for all of India's neighbours. Pandit Nehru on 17th March, 1950 in Parliament expressed it thus, "apart from any kind of alliance the fact remains that we can't tolerate any foreign invasion from any foreign country in any part of the Indian sub-continent. Any possible invasion of Nepal will inevitably involve the safety of India."

As was witnessed over the first several months of 2006 the political turmoil in both Nepal and Sri Lanka may indicate that India has given a very wide meaning and interpretation to the term invasion. It would seem that in an exaggerated sense of its own vulnerability India is prepared to actively intervene at the slightest intimation of foreign interest in a neighbouring country – in both the Nepal and Sri Lankan case the Chinese (and to a lesser extent the Americans) were making impressive and enormous strides in fostering relations with these countries which was in turn making the Indian government increasingly anxious about its now diminished military and strategic supremacy in South Asia in the face of a formidable and far more popular competitor(s) – this is strangely the consequences of what has been called the Gujral Doctrine but for most nations in the region it is merely an extension of the Nehru Doctrine - as was the case with the Indira Doctrine¹⁷ - framed in diplomatic niceties.¹⁸

To provide a more specific and contextual setting to the Nehru Doctrine one may compare the situation in Nepal during early 2006 with a parallel scenario that occurred in Sikkim in 1973-75 and which is still probably the best exemplar of the Nehru Doctrine in practice. The political turmoil in Nepal bears a marked resemblance to the sequence of events in the Sikkim incident

which saw the abolishment of the monarchy in that country through the indirect intervention of the Indian government. In the similar case of King Gayenendra of Nepal his defiant attitude to India and the dissolution of Parliament and proclamation of a State of Emergency twice, led to street protests in Katmandu and his eventual deposing from power.

This series of events in Nepal had been in large part due to the successful interjection of the Indian government that had maintained contacts with the pro-democratic forces as well as the Maoist insurgents¹⁹ and was therefore able to exert pressure for the Kings removal. India will now probably expect Nepali politics, 'to function as that of a union territory in all but formal status'²⁰ thus severely curtailing the country's sovereign rights and independent decision making processes. This had been the exact outcome in Sikkim but the trigger for India's intercession there was a belief that the Chogyal (Dharma Raja or righteous king) was intending to set up an independent kingdom with a flag of its own and a separate national anthem which would have been in contravention of an understanding between the Indian government and a Sikkim delegation that agreed to designate the country a protectorate of India in March 1950²¹ but which had no binding force and could be amended by either of the parties unilaterally.

The Indians claim to have had evidence that the CIA was encouraging the Chogyal to seek independence so they instructed their own external intelligence agency RAW to stir up trouble. It seems likely that RAW concocted a plot implicating the Chogyal in a conspiracy to assassinate top leaders and civil servants which galvanized the population against their ruler and brought public resentment out on to the streets. This became a perfect cover for the Indian army to intervene in April 1973 on the grounds that it was protecting the Chogyal. The army was really brought in to intimidate the Chogyal into submission which he promptly did by agreeing to popular government and a legislature to be elected every four years and on April 10th the Sikkim Assembly was able to say that, "the institution of Chogyal is hereby abolished and Sikkim shall henceforth be a constituent unit of India."²² India's justification was superficially based on the idea of democracy and human rights but its true motivations were derived from the precepts of the Nehru Doctrine and the Forward Policy which was brought into play by the perceived US interest in Sikkim,

"India could least afford an unstable Sikkim or allow interference of any foreign country in Sikkim affairs ... It was also obvious that an unstable neighbour would become a grave threat to India's national security ... [So in] response to [the Sikkim Assembly] resolution, the Constitution (Thirty-Eighth

Amendment] Act was passed by Parliament, making Sikkim the 22nd State of the Indian Union on April 26, 1975. RAW had helped in the bloodless transformation of a princely state into a democratic state of India. How far the Chogyal had personally masterminded the plot, to annihilate popular leaders and assume absolute power over Sikkim, remains a mystery.

Four years later, RAW was still moping up loose ends. There were still a few people who had to be paid off for services rendered. Payments had been delayed ... Fresh authority for funds to be released had to be sanctioned. These never came through."²³

One may also recall India's strong opposition to any military pact between the United States and Bangladesh during the BJP administration as well as recent suspicions about Bangladesh's growing relations with China. The doctrine may, therefore, be said to encompass the preventing of any alliances which could necessarily be construed as a threat to India's supremacy in the region which it is prepared to defend jealously through the force of arms but more often by internal pressures such as sabotage and state sponsored terrorism. From these few examples given above it should be clear that the Nehru Doctrine flagrantly infringes upon the independent sovereign rights of nations and interferes in their internal decision making processes. If control is not *de jure*, it is certainly *de facto* but this has not prevented India from binding its neighbours to legal agreements and instruments that subvert the sovereignty of the weaker and smaller nations who are usually forced to acquiesce.

India will, therefore, continue to assign the right to interpret the word 'invasions' according to its own wisdom and thought processes regardless of international opinion which can be so easily manipulated through the press and media. As was observed by Secretary of State Kissinger, "I did not find in Indian history or in Indian conduct towards its own people or its neighbours a unique moral sensitivity."²⁴ This judgment coming from a man who oversaw American policy during the Vietnam War and has been accused of a fair amount of moral insensitivity himself but this should not be taken as hypocrisy but the insight of a statesman whose views are not tainted by illusions and sentimentality and which offers the reader a clearer analysis on Indian ambitions in the subcontinent.

Much closer to home, the Forward Policy and the Nehru Doctrine were at play during the Liberation War of 1971, as explained by Secretary of State Kissinger, "Despite Yahya's proclamation of an amnesty India made the return of refugees to East Pakistan depend on a political settlement there. But India reserved the right to define what constituted an acceptable political settlement

on the sovereign territory of its neighbour."²⁵ There is no reason to assume that this policy has fundamentally changed over the last 35 years even with the absence of the Congress party from government which could have provided an opportunity for other parties to change the nation's foreign policy direction but this rarely ever happened in practice.

It might be confidently stated that under all previous governments in India the attitude of the political and intelligence elite has been consistently the same and with only the methods changing according to circumstances and particular political inclinations.²⁶ The political and religious forms that this may take in the future was demonstrated by the strongest proponents of the *Akhand Bharat* ideal (and may well have been applauded by Nehru had he been alive to see their fanatical zeal for his vision) in a commentary for the Hindu magazine in 2005 where it states,

"The RSS has never reconciled to Partition and has always been a proponent of the ideal of *Akhand Bharat* (unified India), which would also be a Hindu *Rashtra* (Hindu Nation). The only "common enemy" that the RSS has ever recognised is Pakistan and Islam. The rejection of Partition was clearly spelt out by the founding fathers of the RSS. In his 'Bunch of Thoughts', Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar says: "Our leaders who were a party to the creation of Pakistan may try to whitewash the tragedy by saying that it was a brotherly division of the country and so on. But the naked fact remains that an aggressive Muslim State has been carved out of our own motherland. From the day the so-called Pakistan came into being, we in the Sangh have been declaring that it is a clear case of continued Muslim aggression." Elsewhere in the book, Golwalkar calls Pakistan a "self-declared theocratic Islamic State".

The clearest statement against recognising Pakistan as a sovereign nation comes from a statement issued by the RSS in 1965, which states: "So long as Pakistan exists as at present, she will continue to be hostile and aggressive towards *Bharat*. Pakistan was born in hatred of *Bharat*. It was carved out artificially by disrupting the natural, national integrity of *Bharat*. The K.K.M (Kendriya Karyakari Mandal or central working committee) is, therefore, of the firm opinion that peace and normalcy are inconceivable without the establishment of *Akhand Bharat*."²⁷

Some may argue that the RSS and Sangh Parivar were a mere aberration in Indian politics that did not substantially vitiate the secular ideals of the constitution. This is probably missing the point as the concept of *Akhand Bharat* has been a mainstay of Indian political culture since 1947 but has never been so explicitly stated in intellectual discourse inside India or elsewhere in South Asia. Instead the concept has been camouflaged by policy prescriptions such

as the Forward Policy discussed in this section or under the guise of military tactics and operations such as occurred in Baraibari, Roumari upazila, Sylhet on April 18, 2001 which led to an uprising by ordinary villagers in Bangladesh against the intruders. Unfortunately the brave BDR personnel that lost their lives in this confrontation have never been properly honoured for their sacrifice.²⁸

Akhand Bharat and the Implications for Bangladesh

In light of the above discussion Bangladesh's suspicion of India can appear only natural and healthy reflecting an instinctive will to survive. Historical evidence has shown that India did not have Bangladesh's best interests in mind after 1971 and if given half the chance would probably have tried to strangle the new nation at birth. It was only for the international condemnation, criticism and the likelihood of sanctions being imposed that dissuaded India from taking such an overtly aggressive course. But as shall be seen in Parts 2 to 5 of this essay the policy of undermining Bangladesh has continued without respite since 1971. The vision of an *Akhand Bharat* has remained a significant component of India's foreign policy objectives in the South Asia region and is reflected in its treatment of its near neighbours and Bangladesh has been particularly affected by this attitude.

The Bangladesh-India relationship from 1971 onwards can be most appropriately described as somewhat akin to absentee landlordism especially when the Awami League has taken occupation as the democratically elected tenants with extensive support and lobbying by New Delhi. Any of the other political parties coming to power in Bangladesh are considered mere squatters by India and are therefore in adverse possession of what our large neighbour views as their personal real estate. It is in this perspective of an improvised and imagined *Akhand Bharat* that we should interpret the comments, in an otherwise, fulsome description of Indo-Bangladesh relations provided by Indian External Affairs Secretary Rajiv Sikri,

"Bangladesh is the most important neighbour and regional partner for India. In fact, I would say Bangladesh is special and unique for India because the Indian state of West Bengal, Bangladesh and the northeastern region of India had historically constituted an integrated space."²⁹

This is, of course, is a complete misrepresentation of the history and culture of the region which was originally expressed by Mahatma Gandhi who believed that the two Bengal's possessed a common culture as embodied in the writings of Rabindranath Tagore and has its roots in the philosophy of the

Upanishads which was also, according to him, common to the whole of India. This is again another subtle expression of the *Akhand Bharat* that propagates the myth of a homogeneous and culturally unified 'Mother' India. Although there may be many similarities between Bengali Hindus and Bengali Muslims in respect of 'customs, habits, dress and food but as far as culture is concerned when the Muslims gave up idolatry and accepted Islam as a philosophy of life' they disassociated themselves from all cultural aspects based on Hindu idol worship and the Upanishads.³⁰

Apart from these religious or cultural differences there are many other good academic and theoretical reasons why nations that share borders with India should be wary of its ideological intent especially when there have already been overt acts of encroachment as has happened in the Talpatty islands and most recently in the Bay of Bengal where India unilaterally included 19, 000 sq km of Bangladesh territory within its own bidding blocks for proposed international gas exploration.³¹ The purpose and motivation behind such activities has been explained by a German mercantilist writer, von Hornigk, who observed that, "Whether a nation be mighty today and rich or not depends not on the abundance or security of its power and riches, but principally on whether its neighbours have more or less of it."³²

This acquisitiveness when wedded to the concept of an *Akhand Bharat* necessarily entails a beggar thy neighbour attitude which India has striven to achieve throughout the 35 years of Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan and which was viewed by New Delhi as simplifying the task of subverting the sovereignty of its new and callow neighbour in order to aggrandize itself at the latter's expense. The consequence to Bangladesh of such economic imperialism and hegemonic designs can be found in the attempted destruction of the industrial and commercial infrastructure of the country and the damaging of trade relations with third countries that had started with the looting by Indian soldiers occupying Dhaka and other towns after the defeat of the Pakistan military forces in 1971.³³

This was also the actual motivation behind the appalling acts of carnage and waste witnessed in May 2006 when almost 300 garment factories and other unrelated industries came under attack from unidentified miscreants most likely in the payroll of India. An allegation predictably denied by some pro-Indian columnists writing in newspapers and magazines operating in Bangladesh who have consistently and loyally represented the interests and views of a foreign power that has since 1947 proven its inimical intentions towards the country.³⁴ These incidents are the unfortunate consequences of

the last Awami League government's foreign policy objective of least resistance to India and the party's attitude of servile obedience in its relations with New Delhi. This neatly complemented the domineering and exploitative tendencies of India's political, intelligence and business elites and also allowed them the opportunity to infiltrate all sectors of Bangladesh society to carry out their nefarious activities even if their party of choice was defeated in national elections.

As a consequence it has become an unsatisfactory explanation to accord sole blame for this sorry state of affairs on the Indian government alone but to apportion some of the fault with the responsible and educated stratum of civil society for not being more judicious in their choice of leaders and also for their total lack of loyalty to the ideals of the liberation war. If the nation is incapable of competing because the conscious and educated segments of the citizenry prefer to be indolent, opportunistic or just simply too materialistic with hardly any feeling of patriotism then we can only expect that India will take advantage of this situation at its neighbours cost, as is the norm in international relations even amongst close and friendly States:

"... the power of a nation-state by no means consists only in its armed forces, but also in its economic and technological resources; in the dexterity, foresight and resolution with which its foreign policy is conducted; in the efficiency of its social and political organization. It consists most of all in the nation itself, the people; their skills, energy, ambition, discipline, initiative; their beliefs, myths and illusions. And it consists, further, in the way all these factors are related to one another. Moreover national power has to be considered not only in itself, in its absolute extent, but relative to the state's foreign or imperial obligations; it has to be considered relative to the power of other states."³⁵

What had not been evident when this essay was originally written as a short article for the internet in 2001 was that if Bangladesh even attempts at an independent foreign policy the Indian government would directly intervene militarily to bring the Bangladesh government into line. This explains the recent allegations of terrorist bases in Bangladesh which have been repeated in the international media but charges that still remain unproved and the ethnic cleansing taking place in West Bengal and bordering states against Muslims which is a possible ruse for military conflict if political circumstances in Bangladesh are not to India's liking. Even with such hostile actions Bangladesh should resist such provocations and also persist in developing an independent thought process that can be utilized in the best interests of the nation.

END NOTES & REFERENCES

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2 See Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 9

3 See Staff Correspondent – Murder of Bangladeshis by BSF goes on unabated: Odhikar (New Age – May 10, 2006); Asraful Huq – 387 Bangladeshis killed by BSF since 2000 (The Independent – June 1, 2006); UNB – BDR, BSF exchange heavy fire (The Independent – June 11, 2006); Amanur Aman – BSF kills 10 in ten days on southwestern border (The Daily Star – June 13, 2006); UNB- Gunfight with BDR in Satkhira: BSF among 3 Indian killed (The New Nation – June 13, 2006); UNB – 293 Bangladeshis killed by BSF since Oct 2001 (The Daily Star – June 15, 2006); Editorial – Unnecessary border tension (The New Nation – June 18, 2006); Star Report – Four Bangladeshis killed in BSF firing (The Daily Star – June 24, 2006); Staff Correspondent – BSF kills three Bangladeshis (New Age – June 24, 2006)

4 TamilNet – RAW aiding paramilitary recruitment in India – report (June 25, 2006)

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6 Rafiuddin Ahmed – "The Bengal Muslims 1871 – 1906 A Quest for Identity" (Second Edition 1988) Preface to the First Edition pg. x; see also Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (Holiday – May 26, 2006); Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 12

7 See RAW analysis in B. Raman – Chinese presence in Balochistan & northern areas (SAAG – May 24, 2006); see also Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 29

8 Rafiuddin Ahmed pg. 188; a must read is Muhammed Mohar Ali's book, "History of the Muslims of Bengal (First Edition 1985); see also Rounaq Jahan – "Pakistan Failure in National Integration" (Second Impression 1977); Prof. K. Ali – "Bangladesh a New Nation"; Rick Fountain's 'Bangladesh War Secrets Revealed' 1 January 2003)

9 Collins and Lapierre pp. 146-148

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THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 2A

THE 1971 WAR OF LIBERATION AND AFTER

"The Athenians, it seems to me, may think a man to be clever without paying him much attention. So long as they do not think that he teaches his wisdom to others. But as soon as they think that he makes other people clever, they get angry whether it be from jealousy, ... or from some other reason" (Socrates)

"... I shall prove that I am not a clever speaker in any way at all: unless, indeed, by a clever speaker they mean a man who speaks the truth" (Socrates)

Henry Kissinger and the Indian Dilemma

The only senior diplomat and analyst that played an important role in the 1971 War in terms of the geo-strategic implications of the conflict was the former US National Security Adviser and Secretary of State,¹ Henry Kissinger who seems to have realized that India's cooperation to the East Pakistanis was motivated purely by self-interest guided by the dream of claiming all the territory ruled by the former British colonial power.² The creation of Bangladesh had brought with it untold difficulties for India as well as a long-term policy dilemma that was recognized by only a few perceptive individuals in Washington amongst whom the former Secretary of State was the most perceptive and in some of his pronouncements almost prophetic. Recently a Pakistani analyst has entered the debate with a sardonic appraisal of the present Indo-Bangladesh relations which is a reflection of the inherent contradictions of Indian policy during the 1971 war,

"Sovereign Bangladesh presently has seven well trained infantry divisions, two independent infantry brigades and an armour brigade. Given that nearly 90% of its borders are shared with India (only 10% or less with Burma), one may well ask, against whom do the Bangladeshis need this firepower? Whenever a Bangladeshi gun is fired in anger, the bullet will hit an Indian ... We have now again come a full circle, the State of Bangladesh having many more problems with India than Pakistan ever did when Bangladesh was 'East Pakistan'."³

The complications that an independent Bangladesh would create for India was a price that Indira Gandhi was prepared to pay for the disintegration of

her country's arch-rival Pakistan but being an astute politician as she was she managed to extract written assurances from the Awami League leadership residing in Kolkata on the deference that would be expected to be paid by a post-war Bangladesh government to the administration in New Delhi. It was only after she had this written document in her hands did she embark on the road to war in the apparent defence of the East Pakistanis. Bangladesh was only able to release itself from many of these obligations and commitments after the events of 15th August 1975 which took the country on a drastically different course than was originally envisaged by Indira Gandhi and which also brought the pre-war concerns identified by Henry Kissinger to the fore. To understand the breadth, scope and complexity of the issues involved it is necessary to quote from Kissinger at some length:

"The inevitable emergence of Bangladesh - which we postulated - presented India with fierce long-term problems. For Bangladesh was in effect East Bengal. Separated only by religion from India's most fractious and most separatist state, West Bengal. They shared language, tradition, culture, and above all, a volatile national character. Whether, it turned nationalistic or radical, Bangladesh would overtime accentuate India's centrifugal tendencies. It might be a precedent for the creation of other Moslem states, carved this time out of India. Once it was independent, its Moslem heritage might eventually lead to a rapprochement with Pakistan. All of this dictated to the unsentimental planners in New Delhi that its birth had to be accompanied by a dramatic demonstration of Indian predominance on the sub-continent ... Mrs. Gandhi was going to war not because she was convinced of our failure but because she feared our success [in negotiations].

Ignoring the issues that had produced the crisis, she gave a little lecture on the history of Pakistan. She denied that she was opposed to its existence, but her analysis did little to sustain her disclaimer. Her father, she averred, had been blamed for accepting partition. And there was an element of truth, she said, in the often heard charge that India had been brought into being by leaders of an indigenous independence movement while Pakistan had been formed by British collaborators who, as soon as they became 'independent' proceeded to imprison the authentic fighters for independence. Pakistan was a jerry-built structure held together by its hatred for India, which was being stoked by each new generation of Pakistani leaders. Conditions in East Pakistan reflected tendencies applicable to all of Pakistan. Neither Baluchistan nor the Northwest Frontier properly belonged to Pakistan; they too wanted and deserved greater autonomy: they should never have been part of the original settlement.

This history lesson was hardly calculated to calm anxiety about Indian intentions. It was at best irrelevant to the issues and at worst a threat to cohesion of even West Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi stressed the congenital defects of Pakistan so insistently that she implied that confining her demands to the secession of East Pakistan amounted to Indian restraint, the continued existence of West Pakistan reflected Indian forbearance...

...what had caused the war, in Nixon's view and mine, went beyond the refugee problem; it was India's determination to use the crisis to establish its preeminence on the subcontinent...

I remain convinced to this day that Mrs. Gandhi was not motivated primarily by conditions in East Pakistan; many solutions to its inevitable autonomy existed, several suggested by us...

We had no national interest to prevent self-determination for East Pakistan – indeed, we had put several schemes to bring it about – but we had a stake in the process by which it occurred. We wanted it to be achieved by evolution, not by a traumatic shock to a country in whose survival the United States, China, and the world community (as shown in repeated UN votes) did feel a stake, or by a plain violation of the rules by which the world must conduct itself if it is to survive. India struck in late November; by the timetable that we induced Yahya to accept, martial law would have ended and a civilian government would have taken power at the end of December. This would almost surely have led to the autonomy and independence of East Pakistan – probably without the excesses of brutality, including public bayoneting, in which the Indian – trained guerillas, the Mukti Bahini, engaged when they in turn terrorized Dacca."⁴

This last point was also revisited by Ms. Sarmila Bose whose paper on the 1971 war was released in 2005 and is the subject of Part 2A of this paper.

State Department Report Focuses on 1971 India-Pakistan War

Also in 2005 State Department declassified a volume documenting the policy of the Nixon administration towards South Asia from 1969-72. The contents of the documents provide a clearer insight into the thinking of the Nixon administration during the 1971 crisis and how it was framed within the wider concerns of the Cold War. Behind the Nixon administrations support of Pakistan during the war was the anxiety in some circles that 'peace and stability in South Asia could be maintained by aiding Pakistan against a stronger India that was receiving military aid from the Soviet Union.'⁵ In addition to this was the role played by Pakistan in US rapprochement with

China which eventually led to the communist split and rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao for control of international communist ideology and support.

If properly interpreted, India's diplomatic maneuvers with the two superpowers and China was intended to make war more likely with Pakistan and was confirmed by the signing of the twenty-five year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation which called on the signatories (India and the USSR) to refrain from giving assistance to any third country taking part in an armed conflict with the other, and committed each side to consult immediately with a view toward taking 'appropriate effective measures' in case either party was attacked or threatened with attack. In other words, the treaty removed one of the principal obstacles to a military conflict which according to Indian military planners had been the possible disapproval to a war by the Soviet Union and the likely consequence this would have on the US and Chinese positions if India attacked Pakistan.⁶ The only remaining barrier to India's intervening in East Pakistan was the Awami League leadership who were required to sign a 7- point agreement that ensured to India the continued support of Bangladesh within New Delhi's sphere of influence after the conflict was over.

Predictably the Indians have ignored this aspect of the drama and now generally concentrate on the human rights aspect of the war, especially in the East Pakistan campaign which again became an issue on the declassification of documents released by the State Department in 2002.⁷ This may have appeared beneficial to the East Pakistanis at the time but had pernicious implications after the war since it presented India with a monopoly on how the war should be viewed not only in India but also in Bangladesh and the rest of the world.⁸ This inevitably left no room for interpretation of the war from a Bangladeshi perspective and the only views permissible in Bangladesh are those that fit the Indian angle and standpoint on the conflict.⁹

Insights into India's Reunification Policy

This geopolitical analysis and the statement of facts in both the Kissinger book and State Department documents does not wholly square with the Indian interpretation as seen above in their concentration on the human rights aspect of the war in exclusion of all other issues. In fact, Kissinger seems to completely contradict Indian opinion on all the relevant points but appears more convincing and authentic than his opponents, at least in relation to the 1971 war. Present authorship in India has single mindedly attempted to

demolish all the arguments and explanations made in Mr. Kissinger's book but has thoroughly failed in this respect. A case in point is 'Liberation and Beyond' by J.N. Dixit, a career diplomat and prior to his expiry in 2005 the head of Indian intelligence.

Whereas Kissinger has attempted a global analysis of the 1971 conflict fitting it into a framework of international politics, Dixit has confined himself into dealing with it as if it were an episode solely happening in India's backyard and therefore a local matter of no interest to the international community or of wider interests in the region.¹⁰ Even if sufficient credence is given to Kissinger's alleged bias or partiality, it does not explain the gulf between the two books in their portrayal of events before and during the 1971 war. Apart from the fact that Mr. Dixit has extensively used quoted paragraphs from Mr. Kissinger's book and completely taken those out of context by not detailing what preceded the quoted section nor what it was intended to explain is damaging of itself. At least Mr. Kissinger had enough sense to be denigrating of the Pakistani's too, whereas Mr. Dixit clearly shows us his pro-India bias.

The major discrepancies between the two books reside in their interpretation and explanation of specific facts and circumstances that reflect the different preoccupations of the American administration and India government during the war. A pertinent example can be found in 'Liberation and Beyond' where the author unsuccessfully tries to defend what many in Bangladesh still consider a slight to their sovereignty and the sacrifices made by the freedom fighters during the liberation struggle. Though military operations had been conducted under a Joint Command Structure with General Osmani as the counterpart of General Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Osmani was not present at the surrender ceremony of Pakistani Forces in Dhaka. Dixit describes this as a 'major political mistake' and that the circumstances of General Osmani's omission created 'widespread suspicion' amongst the Bangladeshis. He describes the Indian 'formal excuse' as leading to an 'unfortunate aberration' in the Bangladeshi belief that India wished to highlight its role in the war at the expense of Bangladesh, which India could have apparently avoided.¹¹

This section in Dixit's book is representative of much of Indian writing on the war as it merely states the problem but provides no answer to the question posed. If it was in India's power to ensure General Osmani's attendance then why did they not do so? Why a long-winded and ultimately confusing explanation that leads the reader to conclude that there is more here than meets the eye. These prevarications and equivocations on the details of the 1971 war give the impression that India considers Bangladesh as a mere vassal

state and that it was merely recovering a piece of its territory from the Pakistanis. Dixit says on several occasions that, "India would not liberate Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." This is an interesting choice of words and reveals a more honest and truthful expression of Indian attitudes to its Muslim neighbour that could also have implications for Bangladesh.¹²

At the end of the chapter, the author provides a number of press releases emanating from the 1971 war that discloses atrocities committed by West Pakistan forces in East Pakistan. Ninety per cent of the newspaper cuttings are of Indian origin. This could mean that the propaganda effort on behalf of the Bangladeshi Government was carried out by India or that the author's research was very limited or he wishes to emphasize the support that India provided to Bangladesh. I would assume that it would be in India's interest to make Pakistan look exceedingly ugly regardless of what happened in the Eastern theatre of operations. I am not denying that the Pakistani military committed heinous acts of aggression and brutality upon the East Pakistanis but recent research also shows that the Mukti Bahini and Mujib Bahini's were also susceptible to such acts of violence and cruelty.¹³

The manner in which the author has constructed his chapters on the war puts India in good stead but there is a disturbing inconsistency in the chronology of events from that found in 'The White House Years.' I would tend to believe Mr. Kissinger's account, as it is more logical in its lay out and description. In 'Liberation and Beyond' there is also a tendency to overplay the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the military sequence of events. Bhutto only appeared when the Pakistan military debacle became evident and he exploited this to eventually oust Yahya. Bhutto was certainly responsible for the break up of Pakistan and much disliked amongst many of his own people but according to a number of books he was unware of the military option that was being adopted by Yahya Khan. Kissinger virtually ignores Bhutto for most part and concentrates on the deeds of Yahya Khan.¹⁴

There is one section of the book where Mr. Kissinger praises the brilliance and sophistication of Bhutto but this was balanced by an immoderate, vindictive and emotionally unstable side that was probably hidden from the then US National Security Adviser:

"Zulfi suspected and feared collusion between Yahya and Mujib, and between Yahya and the fundamentalist Islamic parties of the West ... Zulfi felt neglected by Yahya, offended by that little general to whom he had extended much hospitality in Larkana and had been especially moderate, thanks to Peerzada's adroit diplomacy, never attacking him as mercilessly as he had

attacked Ayub Khan. Soon Yahya's turn would come, however, for he had the temerity to speak of Mujib as "prime minister."¹⁵

The central themes and arguments which appear to contradict in totality the narratives of Henry Kissinger and Stanley Wolpert may be summarized from 'Liberation and Beyond' as follows: According to J.N. Dixit it was Pakistan that conspired to create a situation against East Pakistan so as to find an excuse to make an assault upon India and its national integrity. In other words, it was Pakistan that desired a break up of India. India did not want a neighbouring country to be fragmented and destroyed but due to the humanitarian concern for East Pakistan, it could not stand by under such naked aggression of the Pakistanis against the East Pakistan populace. India tried its utmost to seek a diplomatic and negotiated settlement to the dispute but due to Pakistani intransigence, this was not possible. The United States was uncooperative by not pressuring Pakistan to adopt a more conciliatory stance and continued to supply military hardware to Pakistan even after an arms embargo was proclaimed. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was considered an important factor in the dispute implying that Pakistan wished to carry out his dream of eliminating India. India did not want a reversal of partition nor a reunification of those parts but was deeply convinced that religion alone did not make a nation. A non-hostile Bangladesh would be far more preferable than a hostile East Pakistan and a positive response to the Bangladesh movement would reduce chances of other states in India seeking autonomy. That the might of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan was so strong that the liberation struggle would eventually peter out without active support from India.¹⁶

There was much more I could have included in this summary but this will suffice to illustrate my point. The whole of the above paragraph is in complete conflict with Kissinger's perspective on the historical and political implications of the 1971 war and also certain parts of Wolpert's biography on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. I would also add that much of it does not accord with common sense or reality but these are not the considerations of an Indian elite bent on overturning the 1947 arrangement that saw India's partition and which substantially guides its foreign policy goals in South Asia.

The purpose of this exercise is to show how false history can be induced into our national psyche which has effectively been the case since Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan. This is not to suggest that Mr. Kissinger's account is not tainted with national loyalties or personal considerations of his own but until a history is written by us we will continue to be mystified about our recent past. My argument goes further and to be understood clearly

requires a survey of more recent events in Bangladesh which will hopefully show that history written by Indians about 1971 and propagated in Bangladesh has an objective and purpose directly related to the scheme of an *Akhand Bharat* which the entire discussion above only provides an elliptical sense of a much larger whole.

Reminders of 1971 Polarities and Post 9/11 Realities

It has been my argument in this part and will also be the subject in other sections of this essay that since 1971 India has constantly pummeled us with propaganda so that we are constantly at our own necks and are rendered incapable of developing an independent national identity that may eventually influence us in directions undesirable to India. The most recent of these attempts to instill confusion has been the stories concerning the growth of indigenous Islamic terrorism in Bangladesh aided in part by ISI agents roaming around Bangladesh creating havoc with the assistance of Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists.¹⁷

This approach has conveniently melded the Indian perspective of 1971 (as discussed above) as a war against the realities of partition and the Two Nation theory that bestowed sovereign rights to Pakistan (and then Bangladesh after its independence) and the events in America on September 11, 2001. By creating fear within Bangladesh and outside, of the specter of Islamic terrorism within the country, it is hoped that the public may turn away from Islam and the actualities of 1947 and adopt the secular mantra propagated by the Awami League and its foreign backers to more easily accommodate Indian requirements in the region and also to undermine the nations armed forces to render Bangladesh a defenseless entity through a distorted view of recent historical events. That this is the real purpose and aspiration behind Awami League politics was readily admitted to by Sheikh Hasina in her April 3, 2006 interview with Time Magazine,

“How much of this conflict stems from unhealed wounds dating back to Bangladesh's war of independence, when the country was split between nationalists and pro-Pakistan Muslims?”

Hasina: It goes back to 1971, or even 1947 [when the territory now known as Bangladesh became East Pakistan during India's bloody Partition]. It's an ideological split. We believe in secular politics. We're very liberal. We struggle for the common people. Their only aim is to make money, remain in power and exploit people, that's all. They never think about people. The question is: should this country be ruled by a military dictatorship, or by them, or by the people?”¹⁸

It would be reasonable to inquire how much of Sheikh Hasina's speeches and interviews are influenced by RAW money since we already know the Indian intelligence agency regularly allots large sums to the Awami League for electioneering purposes and with such largesse conditions for its utilization including following India's ideological line is an obvious expectation.¹⁹ That the Sheikh Hasina interview does fall in line with the Indian objectives for Bangladesh was hinted to in official circles and quietly released to the Indian press again in April of 2006,

"The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh," close defence exchanges and nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan, and left-wing radicalism are major security concerns for India.

On Bangladesh, the annual report of the ministry of defence for 2005-06 states that "the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as well as the increasing incidents of terrorism and political violence, with their attendant repercussions on the security of India, are being monitored". India's concerns have been articulated at the highest political level with Bangladesh and the latter's stable, prosperous, democratic and secular polity is important for both countries, the report said."²⁰

This propaganda campaign has conclusively been shown to be a complete charade engineered by the Indian media and backed by India's political and intellectual elite,

"Contrary to Indian claim and the orchestrated blames heaped on Bangladesh, a researcher of the United States Institute of Peace dismissed that Bangladesh citizens were in any way involved in international terrorism.

Dr Christine Fair, a US professor, said she had been told by the Indians that Bangladeshi citizens were involved in terrorism she did not find enough evidence to support the hypothesis.

'The entire blame-game was built around the premise of one Bangladeshi among the Guantanamo detainees and the deduction was sought to be made that there were many other Bangladeshis actively engaged in the terrorist training activities in Afghanistan,' said Fair when speaking at a seminar on 'Demand and Supply Side of International Terrorism' at the National Press Club."²¹

With the arrest of Sheikh Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai as well as the dismantling of the (Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh) JMB command structure more light will be shed over the coming years of the assistance provided to these groups by Indian intelligence especially in the form of arms and explosives much of which has been recovered and bear Indian ordinance

markings. There had also been several previous arrests immediately after the Mymensingh theater bombings where low ranking army personnel were apprehended carrying detailed documents on military matters intended to be passed on to Indian intelligence across the border. Since the two leaders of the JMB have confessed to being involved in that attack surely a link can be established with the earlier arrests.

I am also dismissive of the information now being procured through interrogation of Sheikh Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai. I doubt the truth behind their activities will be available for at least a few years and I am sure that they have been instructed to initially provide misleading information to divert the investigators from their actual support base. Many of the pro-Indian newspapers are concentrating on the revelations from Sheikh Abdur Rahman's interrogation that suits their assumptions and prejudices on the issue without being critical of the contents of the report and then completely ignoring those confessional admissions that are highly contradictory to their established positions on Islamic terrorist networks operating in Bangladesh. It is, however, revealing that Sheikh Abdur Rahman has disclosed to his interrogators to having sympathies for *Akhand Bharat* and apparently little interest in the insurgents of Kashmir²² which would seem to indicate Indian loyalties rather than pan-Islamic ones.²³

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THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 2B

THE 1971 WAR OF LIBERATION AND AFTER

The Propaganda Offensive

Ever since the independence of Bangladesh the Indian government and its intelligence agency RAW has taken on a propaganda offensive by flooding our markets with books that support Indian contentions of what happened during the liberation war but the literature is so inherently flawed that any intelligent reader could see them for what they really are. Apart from 'Liberation and Beyond', books published in India and Bangladesh have included Maj. Gen. Lachman Singh - Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan, Lt. Gen J.K.R. Jacob,, - 'Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation' (Dhaka 1997), Jyoti Sen Gupta - History of Freedom Movement in Bangladesh, 1943-1973, Maj. Gen. Sukhwant Singh - The Liberation of Bangladesh, Brig. H.S. Sodhi - Operation Windfall: Emergence of Bangladesh, Capt. S.K. Garg - Spotlight: Freedom Fighter's of Bangladesh, Chandrika J. Gulati - Bangladesh Liberation to Fundamentalism, S.A. Karim - Sheikh Mujib Triumph and Tragedy (2005) and very recently Major General ATM Abdul Wahab's 'Mukti Bahini Wins Victory'(December 2005) all of which have contributed a partial and consistently India centric view of the war.¹ The most self-serving and politically motivated of the recent books on the 1971 war has to be Enayetur and Joyce Rahim's 'Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971' (February 2000) which is again another example of this trend of tendentious, fragmentary and partial historical writing that does not even pretend to objectivity.

It is very likely that a whole new series of books and political literature will now appear prior to the 2007 parliamentary elections to undermine parties and public sentiment that may have a capacity to limit Indian influence over Bangladesh affairs. There are also numerous other books written by Bangladeshis in Bangladesh that support the Indian line but the authors can be safely described as mere intellectual brokers for India who are paid large amounts of money to write such contrived and hackneyed histories. Organizations such as the Muktiujudder Chetona Bastobaion O Ekatturer Ghatok Dalal Nirmul Jatio Somannay Committee have also participated and contributed to this spreading of falsified history. To substantiate my point and

extend the analogy to journalism and contemporary reportage I may usefully refer to an embarrassing revelation in August 2005 where the New Age daily reported that Indian journalists had been paid 'handsome money' to write articles against Bangladesh and two other neighbouring countries. The report continues,

"Arun Rajnath, New Delhi correspondent of the Washington-based online newspaper South Asian Tribune, said he was offered Rs 10,000 per month to write a story against Bangladesh, Pakistan or Nepal. Rajnath's revelation was published in a special report of the newspaper headlined 'Indian Officials Harassing South Asia Tribune New Delhi Correspondent' on July 27.

The report, which had detailed description of the Indian intelligence agencies' clout on Indian journalists, captures glimpses of the harassment towards journalists who refuse to comply with official directives.

After refusing to be on the payroll of an intelligence agency, Rajnath, who writes on the Indian army and Kashmir, was refused accreditation by the external affairs ministry, and he became the target of frequent intimidating phone calls from the intelligence men.

The correspondent claimed that many top Indian journalists covering news relating external affairs, home, and defence were on the payroll of the security agencies or the ministries concerned, and regularly receive 'handsome compensation packages'.

Commenting on the report, a Bangladeshi intelligence expert said they have reports that not only Indian journalists, but also a number of Bangladeshi writers are on the payroll of Indian sources.

Mentioning a lack of resources and motivation on the part of Bangladesh's intelligence agencies, he said, 'Very little can be done in the existing situation.'²

As mentioned above Enayetur and Joyce Rahim's 'Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971' is a good example of how blatant some of these writings and commentaries can be. The writers claim that the primary objective of their work is to provide verbatim documentation to the Nixon administrations policy, and involvement in the conflict. This could not be further from the truth and their praise for India ad infinitum is quite nauseating. The first part of their book claims to derive its materials from newspaper articles. At a closer inspection, the entire first part is made up of articles from one newspaper "The Independent" and from write-ups from 26th February 1999 to 28th May 1999 which is stretching the claim to contemporaneity with the events of 1971 a little too far. To make matters worse all the articles in the first part have been written by the authors themselves in

"The Independent" of Dhaka, so while proclaiming their objectivity they are publishing writings by themselves that are so slanted and biased to make the most prejudiced commentator wince but somehow receives favourable reviews from .

The timing of these write-ups³ and circumstances of their authorship would make anyone harbour doubts about the sincerity and objectivity of the writers. From reading the Preface to the book one is thrown back by how twisted and unbalanced the whole project is. They do not attempt to hide their prejudice or from what angle they are writing. One can only conclude that this was supported with the tacit if not explicit support of the Awami League and the Indian Government. One should not be surprised that "The Independent" had also serialized the J.N. Dixit book.

It is becoming increasingly offensive to many Bangladeshis that the so-called educated elite in this country have not been able to see through this game and continue to propound a version of history that is partial, fabricated and purposely defensive of India's grand design and strategy for the region. This is demonstrated by the lack of enthusiasm for the subject of history and its limited reading by a literate few that is continuing its long and steady decline and being superseded by the writers of pulp fiction and light romantic dramas of no intellectual significance. Because of this mindset Bangladesh has so far been only able to produce personalized histories of the Liberation War that generally swallows the Indian version of events and avers any introspective doubts or questioning of the writer's own basic assumptions and which generally conveys a shallow jaundiced perspective of the war.⁴

It is time that historians and commentators of the 1971 war moved on to a more mature and well-researched analysis of the nation's recent history - a history written by Bangladeshis, for Bangladeshis, and without political interference or foreign motivation influencing the tenor of the work. In some respects, this is a project for a nationalist ideal that had been discarded soon after the liberation war to cater to Indian plans for domination over Bangladesh and any attempt at introducing a different perspective has so far led only to accusations of treachery and revisionism that is anathema to certain power elites in India and Bangladesh as was similarly the case in communist countries such as the Soviet Union under Stalin and in China under Chairman Mao.

The first accusation of treachery is certainly not true and the last (revisionism) may be accurate but only in that much of the history written on the 1971 war had already been distorted through a bias in perspective without any attempt at scholarly detachment or objectivity which was probably

impossible so soon after the war and now requires a thorough rewrite for just that reason. In this regard, a noted historian and expert on the Mughal era reminds his readers that, "As time reworks us, we rework history. 'All works of history are interim reports,' says American historian John Noble Wilford. 'What people did in the past is not preserved in amber ... immutable through the ages. Each generation looks back and, drawing from its own experience, presumes to find patterns that illuminate both past and present.' No particular representation of the past has therefore any absolute validity..."⁵ This would be in line with the current trends in historical writing and thinking that was originally expressed by R.G. Collingwood in 'The Idea of History' which should be the guiding influence for undergraduate study in Bangladesh and the challenge for this new generation of writers would be to cast away the inhibitions that have prevented imaginative reflections on the 1971 war and open the floodgates of intellectual inquiry in all areas if serious study in our universities and academies.

Another War of Independence?

It is due to the policy of reunification or *Akhand Bharat* that was originally given expression to by Jawaharlal Nehru that after the Liberation War in 1971, with the tacit complicity of some in the Awami League leadership, the nation was only able to change its masters and to a certain degree the quality of enslavement but not the situation or position of enslavement. This status still prevails for Bangladesh and its people today. Certainly the East Pakistanis were exploited and racially discriminated against by the West Pakistani military junta but that is still something Bangladeshis have to live with in the present - now that we are under different overseers, namely, the Indian government and international financial and media institutions that assist it.

Bangladeshis may no longer be physically in fetters but our intellectual processes are still entangled and weighed down by a ball and chain. Outside forces encourage the Bengali penchant for dispute and argumentation that leads to factionalism and disharmony which is the latter day policy of 'divide and rule'. We are constantly reminded of our weaknesses and deficiencies in face of a giant like neighbor and so discouraged from any form of independent thinking that is patently reflected by the state and standard of our educational institutions where very little if any original research is now conducted. In some respects reviewing the events of the 1971 war has become a prohibited area of investigation and study and so no new information has become available on the subject unless it is of Indian origin and even then many of

these books are unavailable in Bangladesh due to their highly sensitive nature of their contents that would necessarily undermine our own view of the war.

Some may be astonished at this form of psychological warfare conducted by adherents of a docile religion called Hinduism but unfortunately, they are assisted by persons bearing Muslim names and possessing Bangladesh identity, who have often been described as Fifth Columnists by nationalistic commentators within Bangladesh such as Col. Sayyed Farook Rahman who originally coined the term against the sycophants surrounding Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his books 'Alaron' and the 'Road to Freedom'. Notable examples of these Fifth Columnist elements today include the leadership of the Awami League, Shariar Kabir, Taslima Nasreen⁶, Muntasir Mamun, Zafar Sobhan and the most significant of them all (at least from a historical perspective) Abdul Gaffar Chowdhury who now resides and writes out of London but still conveys the aura of being closely in touch with events and public sentiments inside Bangladesh but manages to warp these to suit his own ideas and agendas – which appears to be a similar trait of the other writers as well.

All these writers, journalists and academics have promoted the concept of an *Akhand Bharat* whether explicitly or implicitly. The last mentioned journalist has gone so far as to admonish the followers of the USA branch of the Hindu-Buddha-Christian United Council (Oikya Parishad) to take up arms to establish their rights in Bangladesh as the USA and India will not help them to do so. Praising the activities of the council he said, leaders of the Parishad have to go back to Bangladesh and start fighting against the present Taliban government. Gaffar Chowdhury threatened, 'Is there anybody in Bangladesh to resist if India provides logistic support to declare an independent Hindu region taking three districts of Bangladesh. Bangladesh will not exist without Hindus.' He further added, "...the promoters of Pakistani purposes are now being treated as patriotic in Bangladesh."⁷

Bearing this provocative statement in mind and the image that it wishes to convey of a treacherous clique holding government power in Bangladesh and the exhortation to armed conflict one may recall that after the bomb blasts in Mymensingh district in 2003 several national newspapers reported that a junior commissioned officer of the army, a former lance corporal and a civilian had been arrested on a charge of spying for an Indian intelligence agency. One of the accused was charged with having supplied maps, designs, employment files of important army officials, directories of various formation training manuals, load table, move plan, permanent addresses of officers of different units, organizational structure of different units, list of arms and manpower, abbreviation books and resolutions of important meetings and other

information. This particular accused sold off confidential documents to India for a large sum of money. None of the above mentioned writers would describe this as an act of treason since they obviously view India and Bangladesh as one and the same nation divided only by an inconvenient episode in our history.

This particular incident of Indian intelligence gathering is only one small part of a grand strategy to acquire sensitive information about our armed forces and similar cases of espionage are occurring in every sector of our society and economy in order to keep Indian policy makers and military planners up-to-date about Bangladesh if they ever deem it necessary for armed intervention. This confirms the author's own predilections concerning the need for a new war of independence and the manner in which it will be fought and the means by which it shall be won since these are matters that our military forces and intelligence agencies should be primarily occupied as India has not yet given up the Nehruvian vision of an *Akhand Bharat*. If Abdul Gaffar Chowdhury can exhort Hindus to take up arms in Bangladesh against Muslims then Muslims should retain the right to defend themselves even against India. That none of this is far fetched or exaggerative will become obvious in Parts 3, 4 and 5 of this essay where we will review the extremist writings of inter alia Dr. Kalidas Baidya who is the arch inspiration for the above writers.

It is fortunate for Bangladesh that occasionally due to the excesses committed by these writers they are susceptible to self-inflicted harm and an interesting example of the damage such authors have done to their own cause was recently revealed at a State Department conference on the 1971 South Asia Crisis held in June 2005. In a revised version of a paper presented by Sarmila Bose and publicized in Bangladesh and Pakistan her findings on the events of 1971 show a contrasting vision of the liberation war. Apart from fundamentally revising the established myths about the conflict she provides in her analysis a portrayal of events far removed from the black and white, good and evil distinctions made by writers and intellectuals who use the war as a vehicle for Indian political designs in Bangladesh. The following excerpt from the Daily Times report is worth quoting at length,

"According to Ms Bose, while the Bangladeshis are more voluble about the birth of their country, they have done less well at systematic historical record-keeping. She also found a cultivation of "an unhealthy 'victim culture' by some of the pro-liberationists" as people are instigated at the national level to "engage in a ghoulish competition with six million Jews in order to gain

international attention". These tendencies, she points out, hamper the systematic study of the conflict of 1971 and hinder a true understanding of a "cataclysmic restructuring in modern South Asian history". She writes that the 1971 civil war was fought between those who believed they were fighting for a united Pakistan and those who believed their chance for justice and progress lay in an independent Bangladesh. "Both are legitimate political positions. All parties in the conflict embraced violence as a means to the end, all committed acts of brutality outside accepted norms of warfare, and all had their share of humanity. These attributes make the 1971 conflict suitable for efforts towards reconciliation, rather than recrimination that has so far been its hallmark," she adds."⁸

Whether one agrees with any particular or specific finding in the paper Bangladeshis still have to view the nation's past in a more critical and elaborate manner and not merely accept the words of a few self appointed experts who have in reality been waging an intellectual war on the country's independence and sovereignty for almost three decades without challenge. Their ultimate goal still remains that of an *Akhand Bharat* and all their activities are geared towards the attainment of Indian reunification that had been originally conceived and devised by Jawaharlal Nehru in several books authored by him and which has been the subject of this part.

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON 1971 AND AFTER

During the six years that this essay has been in circulation there has not been a single rational or coherent rebuttal to my contention of Indian domination over Bangladesh most clearly exemplified by the idea and vision of an *Akhand Bharat*. Instead Bangladesh has to contend with a barrage of outsourced journalism produced by the likes of Alex Perry and Arvind Adiga for Time magazine and other articles and publications that have appeared over the last five years in foreign journals, magazines and on international news networks.⁹ In a repetitive cycle of accusations on Islamic militancy and the highlighting of extreme poverty Bangladesh has entered a vicious cycle of denunciation followed by international rebuke with India as the accuser, victim and frustrated big brother all rolled into one. Rarely is there any attempt at accuracy or critical reappraisal of outdated assumptions and prejudices about Bangladesh.

With this steady trickle of anti-Bangladesh propaganda and Indian interference in the political culture and dynamics of the nation which looks unlikely to abate, at least, for the foreseeable future there will most certainly

have to be another edition of this essay in 2009 when the next update will be due. But long before then Bangladesh will have to become accustomed to not just important personalities moulding and influencing history but also that of the Indian intelligence agency, (RAW – Research & Analysis Wing) which will play a leading role in the next three parts of this essay.

The deficiency in academic research which has not yet started investigating the relationship between historical events and the interference of foreign intelligence agencies is not unique to Bangladesh and can be rectified with a refocusing of the debate to include the involvement of RAW in the storyline or narrative, where there is sufficient evidence of its sway or influence on political, military or on other national actors or in the incidents of sabotage, espionage or terrorism orchestrated and planned behind the scenes and away from public view. As Christopher Andrews, a leading intelligence scholar, noted in relation to the KGB in his book, 'The Mitrokhin Archive,'

"Mitrochin's archive contains much information which the KGB and its successors have tried to conceal or suppress. He is undoubtedly right to insist, however, that it is in the public interest that it should be revealed. The activities of the KGB both at home and abroad are an essential part of the history not only of the Soviet Union and its foreign relations but also of the states against which it conducted hostile operations. Without access to KGB files those activities cannot be adequately understood."¹⁰

Most academic historians have been slow to recognize the role of intelligence communities in the international relations and political history of the twentieth century. Though such aberrations by leading historians are due partly to the over-classification of intelligence archives they derive at root from what psychologists call 'cognitive dissonance' - the difficulty all of us have in grasping new concepts which disturb our existing view of the world. For many twentieth-century historians, political scientists and international relations specialists, secret intelligence has been just such a concept. As a new century dawns the traditional academic disregard for intelligence is in serious, if not yet terminal decline. A new generation of scholars has begun to emerge, less disorientated than most of their predecessors by the role of intelligence and its use (or abuse) by policymakers. A vast research agenda awaits them."¹¹

In reference to the activities of RAW in Bangladesh it is unnecessary to wait for such an archive to appear as there have been numerous leaks in the Indian press and media and in Bangladesh of what these intrigues and conspiracies consist of but with several decades of this experience we still suffer from what psychologists call cognitive dissonance but which appears in our context as

deliberate censorship.¹² There also exists a penchant amongst retired RAW officers of disclosing state secrets in their memoirs which makes the gathering of vital information on threats to Bangladesh security that much easier. However, this is not a satisfactory alternative to having an intelligence agency specifically set up to look into external exigencies that may pose a danger or menace to the nation's security and interests.

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4 Rafiq-ul-Islam – "A Tale of Millions" (October 1981)

5 Abraham Eraly – Emperors of the Peacock Throne (Penguin – 2000) pg. iii

6 Sadeq Khan – SAARC drifting on undercurrent of tension (January 28, 2005) – In his article Sadeq Khan makes the following reference to a meeting held in Calcutta, "On the same day, Bangladeshi newspapers published reports from their Kolkata correspondents that demands to punish Bangladesh were voiced by Indian speakers and some Bangladeshi expatriate non-Muslim delegates in an 'international' conference

attended by a French journalist and briefly by Taslima Nasreen, the self-exiled Bangladeshi writer. The demands included economic blockade of Bangladesh by India, other (military?) forms of Indian pressure to be brought upon Bangladesh to accommodate 'two crore' fugitives of Bangladeshi origin in India in a chunk of territory to be ceded for that purpose. The coincidence of the three-pronged propaganda drives must be deliberate."

7 The Independent – Tuesday 11 February 2003

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10 In the Foreword to Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin – The Mitrokhin Archives (2000)

11 pg. 707-708 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin – The Mitrokhin Archives (2000)

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PART 3

THE CIRCLE OF HISTORY

It is often said that history comes full circle and it would be true in the case of this essay which has tried to recount a certain part of our history that spans from 1947 to the present. But the narrative has primarily concerned itself with the events from the 1971 war that created an independent Bangladesh but has so far failed to take account of the events preceding this period when the Indian government and intelligence were most active in trying to create an *Akhand Bharat* on the subcontinent.

It has been my opinion from my first attempts at writing this essay in 2001 that the story would be incomplete if left within the confining time frame of 1971 and after. The purpose now would be to look at 1971 and before but from a specifically East Pakistani standpoint as we then were. I have covered elements of the post 1947 period as an introduction to the *Akhand Bharat* vision envisaged by Jawaharlal Nehru and taken account of the Two Nation Theory espoused by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The latter became a practical reality while the former is still in its drawing board stage awaiting its imminent realization if circumstance and opportunity permit. Although the active measures taken by India and its propaganda network have been thoroughly covered during the post-1971 period what has been lacking in my thesis is a similar coverage of the pre-1971 era when it could be said that India came one step closer to achieving its dream for an *Akhand Bharat*.

It is not to be supposed that this is another attempt to undermine the efforts of our martyrs who fought for liberation and the author has no interest or attraction to see a reunited Pakistan. More accurately this is a study of contrasts and comparisons between the ideals that inspired many of our youth to give up their lives and the motivations that guided India and its troops which was altogether different and far reaching. I do not think it would be an exaggeration to suggest that India's assistance in the creation of Bangladesh was only a step to its eventual destruction and the reformation of a United Bengal within the larger entity of an *Akhand Bharat*.¹

This part will deal with three books in particular and hopefully in later editions to expand with the inclusion of other documents and materials as they become available to the author. The three books under discussion are (1)

Faiz Ahmed – Agartala Mamla: Sheikh Mujib O Banglar Bidroho (1997 edition); (2) Asoka Raina - Inside RAW the story of India's Secret Service (1981) and (3) Major General S.S. Uban - Phantoms of Chittagong: The "Fifth Army" in Bangladesh (1985). All the books mentioned have become authorities in the areas they cover but have not been given wide prominence in Bangladesh due to their content and historical disclosures made within their pages. I hope that a reading of the text and analysis of perspectives will shed light on India's role prior to the 1971 war and its objectives for a newly independent Bangladesh and how this all fits in with the grand design for an *Akhand Bharat*.

For any credence to be given to this theory a link has to be established between the principal agents behind the idea of an *Akhand Bharat* and Indian involvement with the principal leaders of the nascent autonomy movement in East Pakistan who probably had different notions from that willed by the Indian political elite. In other words, it is necessary to show that India's purpose in undermining central authority in East Pakistan was to further their goal in dividing the two halves of Pakistan with eventual secession² of one half and then to bring the newly independent nation under the control and influence of India to realize at least a partial *Akhand Bharat* until all regions of the pre-1947 partition arrangement comes within its dominion.

THE AGARTALA CONSPIRACY CASE

The first intimation of any link between the Nehru administration (or the Indira Gandhi government from 1966) and leaders of the Awami League of Bangladesh begins with the 1968 sedition case of the State vs. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and others (popularly known as the Agartala Shorojontro Mamla or the Agartala conspiracy case). The allegations brought by the Ayub Khan government against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman appears to be that he had conspired with P.N. Ojha, the First Secretary to the Indian High Commission, to seek secession from Pakistan with supplies of weapons from India via the district of Agartala in Tripura state.³ The formal charge in part reads that the accused persons had conspired 'to deprive Pakistan of a part of its territories, mainly the province of East Pakistan, by an armed revolt with weapons, ammunition and funds provided by India and to establish therein an independent government recognised by India.'⁴ It has also been subsequently claimed that Mujib's wife had been used as a courier in communications between the Indian diplomat and Mujib.⁵

This particular point has generally been ignored by supporters of Sheikh Mujib (as no formal charges were laid against Mujib's wife presumably due to

the negative impact that this would have on East Pakistani opinion) who have also dismissed the charges against him as trumped up. Indian commentators have pointed out that although Sheikh Mujib did cross into India in 1965 New Delhi was never party to his leaving Pakistan and on their discovery of his presence in India he was requested to return.⁶ According to legal and political analysts the case was brought in order to tarnish Sheikh Mujib's reputation in East Pakistan and arouse public wrath against him for his alleged collusion with Indian agents.⁷ This attempt at discrediting Sheikh Mujib abysmally failed and led to wider protest movements in East Pakistan organised by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani through his Gono Obhyutthan, the All Parties Student Resistance Council and the Central Students Action Committee. Passions were further enflamed after Sheikh Mujib's statement to the tribunal where he denied the allegations and then went on to deliver a political speech against the central authorities.⁸

The West Pakistanis were sure that a conspiracy emanating from Agartala and involving senior Awami Leaguers had existed but its decision to prosecute and score political points against India was in part clouded by their unjustified over reaction to the six point formula put forward by Sheikh Mujib which merely sought to address the disparities between West Pakistan and East Pakistan caused by the economic exploitation of the latter by the former and the negligence and indifference of the central government towards the defence of East Pakistan.⁹ The six point formula had put forward the following demands:

(1) The character of the government shall be federal and parliamentary and on the basis of universal adult franchise. (2) The federal government shall be responsible only for the defense and foreign affairs (3) There shall be two separate currencies mutually of freely convertible in each wing for each region, or in the alternative a single currency, subject to the establishment of a federal reserve system in which there will be regional Federal Reserve banks, which shall devise measures to prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region to another. (4) Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units. (5) Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate accounts to be maintained of the foreign exchange earnings of each of the federating units, under the control of the respective governments of the federating units. (6) The governments of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain militia or paramilitary force having Naval Headquarter in East Pakistan in order to contribute effectively towards national security.

For the central authorities in West Pakistan this was considered the first step towards a call to secessionism.¹⁰ Whether there were any substantive grounds for such a belief will only become clearer as more information and documentation becomes available. However, what was known to the Pakistan government about a parallel conspiracy would have put the central authorities on alert but probably did not amount to sufficient or adequate evidence to implicate Sheikh Mujibur Rahman himself. It did, nevertheless, demonstrate the extensiveness of the Indian network operating in East Pakistan and the various channels that were potentially open to the senior leaders of the Awami League who could now easily gain access to the Indian government and intelligence agencies through their operatives in Dhaka.

According to Masudul Haq in his book *Bangladesher Shadinhata Juddesh RAW Abong CIA* (Bangladesh Independence War: RAW and CIA) the Pakistan Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) knew by 1962 that at a house (probably Sunny Villa) located in Kolkata, Bhabhanipur area, an operational headquarter of the Indian Central Intelligence Agency had set up an association called the Shadin Bangla Biplobi Parishad (Independent Bengal Revolutionary Council) whose purpose was to secede the eastern part of Pakistan in order to create a new country. The DIB also knew that Chittaranjan Sutar and Kalidas Baidya, who were both Pakistani citizens, had a connection with this secret organization.¹¹ The Shadin Bangla Biplobi Parishad (SBBP) in 1964 infiltrated the student community through the leadership of Shirajul Alam Khan (Chattra League General Secretary) along with Abdur Razzak (Chattra League Assistant General Secretary) and Kazi Aref who were to become the central cell of the student chapter of the organization. Abdur Razzak was to maintain links with Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League on behalf of the SBBP.¹²

It was only after the publication of the 6 point demand that the SBBP were able to focus their operations on the real objective of secession¹³ which was probably the trigger that set alarm bells ringing in West Pakistan. The SBBP wanted to use Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's populist image to further their own goals but it was realized that he would not approve of such an overt alignment so the three student leaders of the SBBP carried on their work in secrecy and no one came to know of the council's existence¹⁴ or its program to dismember Pakistan. It is, however, apparent that by 1971 there was a real fear in the West (US and Britain) not just of secessionism but that India would eventually try to take Pakistani territory by force and also seek the break-up of West Pakistan in the case of armed conflict.¹⁵ This would certainly have been the final culmination of many years of planning and conspiring but was in the end probably prevented by U.S. intervention through the activation of its Seventh

Fleet during the 1971 war and the widespread fear within India that a major escalation involving the Americans may also bring in the Chinese and Russian military forces.¹⁶ This would have doubtless overturned any short term gains that may have been achieved by the Indian military through a conflict limited by the objectives of expediting the secession of East Pakistan and the weakening of the West Pakistan armed forces in direct combat. The purpose was, therefore, not the total disintegration of the Pakistan army which would have required a prolonged war involving the participation of global players who had a whole set of different and conflicting agendas and policy imperatives that were likely detrimental to India's vision of an *Akhand Bharat*.

This plan for secessionism developed by the SBBP would gain credibility if there had indeed been a conspiracy in 1968 or earlier between India and the senior Awami League leadership in East Pakistan that was centered on Agartala and could be connected to Sheikh Mujib as well. One is, therefore, instantly alerted to the confusion amongst commentators on the Agartala Conspiracy Case as to whether they are defending Sheikh Mujib against a conspiracy that was alleged to have occurred in Agartala or in Dhaka or in both places at different times. The only documentary evidence that is strongly suggestive of a conspiracy involving Sheikh Mujib is the written statement made to Mr. Mafidul Haq in 1991 by the former Chief Minister of Tripura and published in Faiz Ahmed's book in Bangla on the very last page. A rough and literal translation of the statement is as follows:

Sheikh Mujib's relation with Agartala Chief Minister of Tripura

In 1963 my brother Sri Omesh Lal Singh along with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 10 others at Tripura, Palom District, through subdivision Khoai, Agartala, arrived at my Agartala Bungalow at 12.00 am. After the preliminary discussions Sheikh Sahib came to my sister Hemangini Devi's residence one and half miles away from my bungalow where food and lodgings had been managed. Afterwards, according to Mujibur bhai's previous proposal, I met with our Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and accompanying me was Sri Sri Raman, Chief Secretary. I left him (Sri Raman) in Foreign Secretary Sri Bhanderia's room while I met with the Prime Minister. He [Nehru] did not accept that Mujibur Rahman should be left publicly in Tripura because after the conflict with China he did not want to take such a big risk. So after 15 days he [Sheikh Mujib] left Tripura. Sonamura, a subdivision of West Tripura, attached to Comilla. It was

promised to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that all forms of assistance would be provided to him.

Sri Shachindra Lal Singha
Chief Minister Tripura

According to Mafidul Haq, the former Chief Minister when writing this statement was in weak health and suffered from poor eyesight which would explain the obvious mistakes in his memory and disjointed expression and train of thought. However, there is no question that Sri Shachindra Lal Singh was indeed the Chief Minister of Tripura from 1963-1971 and who passed away in the year 2000. The former Chief Minister's recollection of this particular incident does not square with the official Indian position on the Agartala case nor with Sheikh Mujib's defence team. What is astonishing about this affair is that no attempt has been made to rebut this statement and even if we were to discount it on grounds of plausibility or authenticity there should be some official record of disapproval and rejection but there is none. The implausibility lies not in the truth or otherwise of the above statement but in the fact that RAW's involvement in the 1971 war was instantaneous and without any prior engagement with the top leadership of the Awami League. To have been effective at such a critical juncture there must have been some long standing relationship, understanding and cooperation between Indian authorities and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other leaders of the independence movement at least by 1965 if not much earlier.

The emphasis on Sheikh Mujib as the chief protagonist in the Agartala conspiracy case has over shadowed the involvement of the other accused persons in the case and their clandestine dealings with the Indian High Commission in Dhaka. The principal accused that sought and obtained confidential contacts with P.N. Ojha, the First Secretary, include Lt. Col. Moazzam Hossain (accused No. 2) and Manik Chowdhury (accused No. 12) and from the allegations contained in the charge sheet¹⁷ they were merely following a course that had already been set by Sheikh Mujib in 1963 or 1965 in his trip to Agartala. It would have been fatal to the defence case if any link could have been established between Lt. Col. Moazzam Hossain and Sheikh Mujib as Moazzam was actively engaged in a revolutionary organization working for the independence of East Pakistan as early as 1967.¹⁸ If the trial had continued it is more than likely that evidence would have been produced showing India's collusion with at least some of the accused but whether their objectives were confined to simply carving up Pakistan is debatable.

That India had other ulterior motives or agendas and viewed the creation of Bangladesh as only one step to their ultimate aim of establishing an *Akhand Bharat* may not have been in the contemplation of the leaders of the Awami League or the revolutionaries but we will probably never know their true intentions or the answers to the many questions that have been left unanswered by the fortuitous closing of the Agartala conspiracy case.

RAW AND THE MUKTI BAHINI

Much has already been written about RAW's active role in assisting in the liberation war of 1971 but that it may have had an objective of its own and used the freedom fighters as mere agents in pursuit of this wider ambition is only now being researched and discussed.¹⁹ Unfortunately, no in-depth textual analysis is available from where we can draw conclusions about RAW's intervention before and during the war and how they used this preexisting network to infiltrate (and where necessary plant) the political, military and intellectual classes into official power in Bangladesh and how this all fits into their wider plans for an *Akhand Bharat*.

It is my contention that India sought out political and student leaders in East Pakistan during the 1960's to groom them for leadership once Pakistan had been successfully vivisected²⁰ and the 1947 political geography rewritten in India's preponderant favour. This section will attempt to show that RAW, soon after its establishment as India's external intelligence agency in 1968, was involved in East Pakistan and actively participated in the war as advisers and coordinators to the guerilla forces. This cooperation merely reflected a continuing relationship between the Indian military and political authorities with Sheikh Mujib and other political figures of the Awami League and student fronts that probably predated the alleged contacts in Agartala in 1963 or 1965.

That my thesis has been confirmed in several respects in Asoka Raina's book of 1981 has yet to filter into the Bangladesh mainstream media and the only omission from the book is a direct enunciation or elaboration of India's broader goals in the subcontinent. It should be mentioned that Asoka Raina presents India's assistance to East Pakistan as one of benevolence to a people long oppressed by an arrogant and distant ruler and that RAW and the Indian military were forced into play through humanitarian considerations caused by the neglect and repression of the central authority but he only hints at India's own expansionist interests in this unfolding tragedy. To appreciate the significance and historical context of Raina's account it is necessary to

extensively quote and paraphrase²¹ from Chapter 6 of the book entitled, 'Special Operations: Bangla Desh':

"The Bangla Desh Operation possibly began a year before the actual operation was underway. Even when the world did get a whiff of it in shape of the Mukti Bahani, many remained unaware of RAW's involvement. By then Phase one of the operation was already completed. Phase two saw the Indian Armed Forces poised for the liberation of Bangla Desh. RAW, along with Mukti Bahani, when they developed into a formidable force, provided information to the Indian forces.

In order to present a clear synopsis of the events that finally brought RAW into the Bangladesh ops, one must review the intelligence activities that started soon after its formation in 1968. **But by then Indian operatives had already been in contact with the "pro-Mujib" faction. A meeting convened in Agartala during 1962-63, between the IB foreign desk operatives and the Mujib faction.**

The meeting in Agartala had indicated to "Colonel" Menon (which in fact was Sankaran Nair's *nom de guerre*), the main liaison man between the Mujib faction and the Indian intelligence, that the 'group' was eager to escalate their movement. "Colonel Menon" had warned them that in his opinion it was far too early for them to take any positive action. The plans they had presented were half baked, and would not work. As Colonel Menon rightly put it ... "they jumped the gun." They raided the armoury of the East Bengal Rifles in Dacca but this initial movement failed. In fact, it was a total disaster, just as Colonel Menon had anticipated. A few months later, on January 6, 1968, the Pakistan government announced that 28 persons would be prosecuted for conspiring to bring about the secession of East Pakistan, with India's help. Mujib was implicated twelve days later as an accused. This was known as the Agartala Conspiracy Case."

This should have finally and definitively rested the case about a conspiracy back in 1981 when the book was originally published but for some reason this disclosure from an authentic and reliable Indian source has hardly ever been alluded to amongst Bangladeshi historians, journalists or political analysts or commentators.²² It would be useful to investigate the reasons behind this quite evident conspiracy of silence amongst those who would be expected to be most vocal about redressing the errors in our historical understanding of an important stage in our independence struggle and also in preventing Bangladesh's incorporation into an *Akhand Bharat* that this might entail if our leaders were not sufficiently cautious.

The remaining pages of Chapter 6 are no less surprising in the unearthing of factual and historical truths that are still considered controversial subjects as the narrative takes us next to the advent of war in 1971 -

“RAW Steps up its Activities – Efforts were stepped up to help establish an underground network in East Pakistan. The year of “a hundred spies” had begun. RAW cells were set up all along the border ... Colonel Menon’s ... tours helped in the selection of local cell chiefs. Of the more prominent ones, led by Colonel M.A.G. Osmani were Major Khaled Musharaff, Major Saifullah and Abdul Kader Siddiqi, nicknamed “Tiger Siddiqi”, who later became the contact man between the Mukti Bahani and the RAW operatives.

Assessment of RAW – RAW agents were reported to have infiltrated almost every nook and corner of East Pakistan by that time [December 1970]. The number of double agents working for RAW ... were in or near the helm of affairs. A senior Pakistani officer, who had stayed in Dacca till the emergence of Bangla Desh, provided invaluable information to the RAW operative, and was pulled out one day before Dacca fell.

[A] few hours before the crackdown, Mujib agreed to a few of the members leaving for India. They were Tajuddin Ahmed ... along with a few others who were to travel overnight with the RAW operatives, to Mujib Nagar ... and to establish the Bangla Desh government in exile. The others who accompanied Tajuddin were Nazrul Islam, Mushtaq Ahmed, Syleht Azad and four student leaders – Fazlul Haq Moni, Tufal Ahmed, Abdul Razakar and Shiraz-ul Alam Khan.

The events had drifted well into March and Tikka Khan struck with all his might on 25th March. April 12, 1971, saw the establishment of the Bangla Desh provincial²³ government in Calcutta.

Mukti Bahani – RAW sanctuaries all along the Indo-East Pakistan border provided adequate cover and the vast border made it difficult for Pakistani security forces to ferret out the Mukti Fauj. The Mukti Fauj was known as the Mukti Bahani two months after its formation on the night of March 25, 1971 ... the role of RAW in helping the Mukti Bahani to become an effective fighting force has yet to be written.”

This last sentence even after more than twenty years has still not been the subject of serious study and writers have tended to avoid this entire episode of the war. What this portion from the book illustrates is the close and personal relationship that prevailed from the early sixties right to the start of conflict between the Indian authorities, military and intelligence representatives in East Pakistan with Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League clan. That it continued after independence is tersely admitted to by Asoka Raina as RAW

agents were said to have kept an eye on developments in the newly born country which the occupying Indian army were later very reluctant to leave.²⁴

FORMATION OF THE MUJIB BAHINI

It would be a grave omission to leave this section without mentioning the name of the chief architect and mastermind in this phase of RAW's 'blueprint' for East Pakistan and whose later machinations in Bangladesh set the stage of increased bitterness and suspicion between the two nations when the country turned nationalist and constitutionally Islamic from 1975 onwards and less dependant on Indian tutelage and guidance - the more important factors in India's calculations for an *Akhand Bharat*. His name was Rameshwar Nath Kao, the head of both RAW and the Directorate General of Security, and specially appointed for these posts by Indira Gandhi and who was in turn influenced by her father Jawaharlal Nehru who knew Kao personally.²⁵ Presumably he was also considered the ideal person to implement the vision for an *Akhand Bharat* which may initially have brought him to the attention of the two Prime Ministers.²⁶

It was essentially through Kao that a special relationship developed between the Indian operatives in East Pakistan and the future leaders of Bangladesh who were diligently fostered for that purpose by RAW. Asoka Raina provides a useful overview of this relationship but it fails to convey the warmth and personal bonds that developed between the Awami League leadership and the Indian military and intelligence. That this almost familial association has often been represented in Indian intellectual circles as of a big brother towards a wayward and at times reckless sibling or a master to his loyal dog or slave is scrupulously avoided in Bangladesh but its repercussions are felt today in the troubled relations of the two countries.

Through the divisive policies advocated by Kao before and during the war suspicion and intrigue immediately dominated the post independence political landscape in Bangladesh. It was Kao that accorded special status to certain youth leaders of the Awami League who then formed themselves into the Mujib Bahini and were felt to be the only ones 'who could deliver the goods'. The most prominent and favoured of these youth leaders were Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni, Tufail Ahmed, Shirazul Alam Khan and Abdur Razzak. It was because of their stauncher loyalties and closeness to Sheikh Mujib that they preferred to be named Mujib Bahini rather than be associated with the Mukti Bahini who were said to include amongst their number many of their political enemies. The Mujib Bahini was trained and organized separately

under the supervision of Major General S.S. Uban who later wrote a revealing book on his daring exploits with these specially selected 'commandos' in the 1971 war.²⁷ It is due to this special treatment of Mujib loyalists by RAW that provided the grounds for distrust and misgivings soon after independence as they soon transformed themselves into the much reviled and detested Rakkhi Bahini.²⁸

Although Major General Uban nowhere mentions that he was working as a RAW operative and he misleadingly describes his superior, Mr. R.N. Kao, as a mere Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, we are now fully aware of their real designations within the Indian intelligence apparatus and their true motives in the war.²⁹ The fact that, the decision to create the Mujib Bahini was made at the house of Chittaranjan Sutar in the presence of Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni, Tufail Ahmed, Shirazul Alam Khan and Abdur Razzak at the end of May 1971 with Major General Uban in attendance³⁰ unmistakably imprints all those at the meeting as under RAW supervision and control which was later definitively confirmed by Dr. Kalidas Baidya³¹ and other experts on Indian intelligence. The key RAW figure at these meetings was undoubtedly Chittaranjan Sutar, who had been appointed Sheikh Mujib's representative in India and had direct access to the Indian Prime Minister and other senior officials of the government. He was later assigned the important task of making Bangladesh a part of India³² of which the Mujib Bahini may come to have played a crucial role until events escalated out of their control in 1975.

It is, however, clear that during the 1971 war Kao had no intention of giving the Mujib Bahini a free hand in important policy decision making and sought to enflame jealousies and rivalries between different factions of the Awami League and with the other political parties so as to keep all the sides disunited and seeking Indian patronage and support. None of this is overtly mentioned within the pages of Major General Uban's book but the implications and results of these policies are all there for the inquiring historian and general reader of political and historical events. It was also at this time that the political and military chain of command was severely disrupted as the Mujib Bahini did not accept the orders of Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed or come within the control structure headed by Colonel Osmany and General Aurora.

That Kao chose to juggle with the different political personalities and groups reflected Indian uncertainties over Sheikh Mujib's whereabouts and whether he was alive or dead. On his release by Pakistan after the war the Indian government provided full support to him and his acolytes in the Awami League and accepted with alacrity his generous offer to have Major General Uban as his Personal Advisor.³³ One can only speculate on how influential

Major General Uban was in formulating the ideology of Mujibism that visualized democracy based on socialism and secularism that was foisted upon Bangladesh with the attendant atrocities committed under its name by what came to be known as BAKSAL (one party rule with Sheikh Mujib as President for life) and enforced by the Rakkhi Bahini both of which are glossed over in Uban's account. His objective in writing the book can be surmised from the epilogue where he provides a hagiographic and almost surreal portrayal of Sheikh Mujib in order to promote the Indian ideals that distort the political, religious and geographical outcome of 1947.³⁴

Sheikh Mujib's blind and sentimental attachment to India heavily tinged with his unlimited and at times irrational ambition led to the eventual and inevitable betrayal of Bangladesh as liberation only brought the dream of *Akhand Bharat* that much closer as the safeguards to Bangladesh's independence were gradually removed until 1975 when they were again reemployed. This was not the ideal for which millions struggled, fought and sacrificed in 1971. A more independent and self-interested philosophy for Bangladesh could have saved the nation from the coming catastrophes wrought by Indian interference and domination in the internal affairs of the country.

APOLOGISTS FOR SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN

In an earlier part of this essay I dealt with several books that presented contradictory viewpoints on the 1971 war³⁵ in this section I will try a similar approach on a single biography of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by drawing in relevant points from the analysis and discussion given above. It is hoped that the reader will appreciate the manner and consistency in which India has managed to distort our history in order to fit their requirements for Bangladesh and how our local authors have enthusiastically propagated this slant and been willing parties to the deliberate falsification of historical record and national recollection.

It has in recent years become a fashion for authors to ingratiate themselves to populist sentiment and presumably Indian interests to author books that glamorize the life of Sheikh Mujib and portray him in mythical terms unsullied by conspiracy or personal ambition.³⁶ One such example presents itself in the form of S.A. Karim's, 'Sheikh Mujib Triumph and Tragedy' (2005) which attempts to cover the most significant events that contributed in forming the personality of the Sheikh and the 'East Bengalis' and the social, religious and political pressures that led to the independence of Bangladesh.

For most writers this would be an endeavour of immense magnitude and for many beyond their limited capabilities. One is therefore left disappointed by the efforts of Mr. S.A. Karim who should have talent in abundance since he is a graduate of the Universities of Calcutta and Dhaka and the London School of Economics as well as being a member of the Foreign Service of Pakistan and Bangladesh since 1950.

It is only necessary to refer to one chapter of the book to demonstrate the fabrications adopted to save Sheikh Mujib from controversy and the resultant public obloquy and denigration that would have followed. In Chapter 34 on the Mukti Bahini the author makes the following astounding and thoroughly discreditable statement,

“One reason for the dilution of quality of the Mukti Bahini was the siphoning off of the more promising youth to form a parallel force: Mujib Bahini. This was a product of the underhand maneuvers of Sheikh Moni. Since his arrival in India Sheikh Moni had developed a good working relationship with RAW, the Indian intelligence service, through Chittaranjan Sutar. It was Moni who persuaded Kaw [Kao], the RAW chief, that it would be a good thing to have a separate force outside the control of the provisional government. Major General (Retd.) Uban of the Indian Army, who had overseen the formation of guerilla groups of Tibetan refugees, was put in charge of training the Mujib Bahini. Mujib Bahini did not play any active role in the liberation war. It was kept as a force-in-being for possible use after liberation.”

We know from Asoka Raina and Major General S.S. Uban that RAW was involved in organizing, training and equipping the Mukti Bahini and the Mujib Bahini. It is also untrue that the Mujib Bahini did not see action during the war as Uban details certain operations in which the Mujib Bahini took part in the Chittagong and Dhaka zones. The purpose of this falsehood would seem to be the exoneration of India and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from the subsequent debacles and catastrophes that befell Bangladesh after independence and put the blame squarely on the shoulders of Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni and his band of followers. Although the author names Uban directly he does not provide any reference to where he collected his information on the Mukti and Mujib Bahini and their connections with RAW which could only have come from Uban's and Raina's books. Such an omission is universally considered a lack of integrity and honesty amongst writers and intellectuals the world over especially by those engaged in serious scholarly study.

To draw too fine a distinction, as Mr. S.A. Karim does, between RAW's nurturing of Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni and their utilization of Sheikh Mujibur

Rahman before and after the war leads one to logical and historical absurdities and is not consistent with the data now available. Prior to the 1971 war Moni supported Sheikh Mujib on the issue of the 6 point demand against those who favoured a one point demand for an independent socialist state. This fitted in with RAW's program of creating a compliant bahini that would be used to eliminate communists, socialists and others of the leftist persuasion that were viewed as a threat to India. This was particularly so, in the case of the Mukti Bahini who were believed to have a large section of members sympathetic to the leftist cause and who may not tolerate Indian interference in a post-war government in Bangladesh. The purpose behind the creation of the Mujib Bahini was not to fight the Pakistan Army but to liquidate the perceived enemies of India such as the Mizos and the communists and socialists.

In reference to the latter two groups this policy of eradication was to be achieved through the secret assassination of known activists (many of the murders were subsequently blamed on the Razzakers or collaborators to the Pakistan Army who did commit acts of isolated atrocities but not on the scale that has been assumed). These operations began in August 1971 with the entry of the Mujib Bahini into the then East Pakistan theatre of war and their activities involved the betrayal of leftist sympathizers to the Pakistan Army such as Swapon Chowdhury who was the first to propose an independent socialist state for Bangladesh. On the instructions of RAW the Moni faction did not spare freedom fighters or even members of the Mujib Bahini who were felt to have leftist leanings.³⁷

After independence these operations against the communists, socialists and leftist thinkers became a matter of personal ambition and self-gratification for Moni who formed a private army called the Awami Jubo League to continue this process of selective killings which on occasion became very random and indiscriminate. These sentiments of distrust against the leftists were also shared by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who it is claimed had proudly expressed the opinion that the leftists in East Pakistan would be soon eliminated.³⁸ Sheikh Mujib later used the Rakkhi Bahini, of which Moni was one of the key figures, to exterminate all his opponents³⁹ who tended to be on the left wing of the politics spectrum and who were also opposed to Indian domination. This was to be the lowest ebb of Sheikh Mujib's rule and was partly brought about by the signing of the Twenty-Five Year Treaty 1972 with India which provided for the formation of a paramilitary group to take on the responsibilities of the army and which also shackled Bangladesh to the security and strategic arrangements imposed by New Delhi,

"When Mujib signed this treaty with India, Maulana Bhashani opposed and criticized Mujib for having traded 'the political and economic sovereignty' of Bangladesh to India. Sirajul Alam Khan, the guide of the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal or JSD (Jalil-Rab), also expressed the same view and incited anti-Mujib anti-Indian agitation. And that influenced ordinary people significantly."⁴⁰

It is clear that S.A. Karim has not made the necessary connections between Indian expansionist designs and the complementary gestures made by both Moni and Sheikh Mujib to facilitate their project in East Pakistan and later in Bangladesh. Ultimately Sheikh Mujib became distant and emotionally divorced from the people who made the greatest sacrifices for freedom during the liberation war. This was revealed by a close associate, Ruhul Quddus, who - as a former CSP, Agartala conspiracy case co-accused and drafter of the 6 point demand - was able to acquire first hand knowledge of the Sheikh's personality. According to Quddus, Sheikh Mujib was reluctant to accept the contributions of others in the bringing of independence to Bangladesh. He could not believe that Bangladesh achieved independence in his absence and he never asked those who did the actual fighting about their experiences or suffering.⁴¹ In contrast, S.A. Karim presents Sheikh Mujib in this period, soon after his return from Pakistan (via London), as a man befuddled by long confinement and easily misled by Moni and to some extent the Indian government but generally ignores the deeper threads interwoven in this story and especially the dark side of Mujib's personality which he glosses over with euphemisms.

Similar inconsistencies, contradictions and fallacies as narrated in Chapter 34, 39 and 40 of S.A. Karim's book appear through out the volume but are most egregious in Chapter 35 on the 'Impact on India'; Chapter 42 on 'Domestic Affairs' but is really a defence of the Rakkhi Bahini; Chapter 50 on 'Mending Fences with India' which merely absolves India of blame on border disputes, the enclaves issue and the Farraka Barrage; Chapter 54 on 'Mujib's Second Revolution' that papers over the unconscionable assault on democracy through BAKSAL; Chapter 55 on 'Siraj Sikder' which unconvincingly searches for an excuse and an alibi to Sheikh Mujib's involvement in the leftist leaders murder; and in Chapter 57 on 'End of the Mujib Regime' which details the plot behind the Sheikhs assassination on 15th August 1975 and ultimately blames Moni for everything that went wrong during the preceding 3 years. Moni has effectively been used as a device to cover up the misdeeds of RAW and the Indian government who are kept well away from the real drama and their voices are represented through the persona of Moni.

Basically the book tries to divert our attention away from the real issue of India's schemes and stratagems that were employed in East Pakistan and Bangladesh for their more distant vision of an *Akhand Bharat* which seems to be the whole purpose of the introductory chapters of S.A. Karim's book which reminisces over a United Bengal.⁴²

END NOTES & REFERENCES

1 Khodeja Bejum – Historical illumination on attempts to create a United Bengal and Akhand Bharat (Dainik Ajkal Khobor – November 24, 2003): This is an excellent introduction into how India has made active attempts to reunite Bengal and thereby bring Bangladesh within the larger Indian union. It provides a detailed summation of most of the relevant events, documents and authorities that have engaged in this endeavor.

2 See Rick Fountain – Bangladesh War Secrets Revealed (BBC News World Edition – January 1, 2003)

3 Kuldeep Nayar - Facts, not fiction, about Pakistan's debacle in Bangladesh (Indian Express – January 24, 2001); Moudud Ahmed – Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy (1991)

4 Moudud Ahmed – Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy (1991) Ch. 6

5 Salman Akhter - 1971 (<http://faculty.babson.edu/ahussain/Papers/popper.pdf>)

6 Kuldeep Nayar - Facts, not fiction, about Pakistan's debacle in Bangladesh (Indian Express – January 24, 2001)

7 Kuldeep Nayar - Facts, not fiction, about Pakistan's debacle in Bangladesh (Indian Express – January 24, 2001); Moudud Ahmed – Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy (1991); Banglapedia – Agartala Conspiracy Case

(http://banglapedia.org/HT/A_0059.HTM)

8 This now appears deceitful and discomfiting in light of the new evidence of his rapport with India.

9 Banglapedia – Six-point Programme (http://banglapedia.org/HT/S_0426.HTM)

10 Moudud Ahmed Ch. 6; Syed Badrul Ahsan – 7 June 1966: Revisiting the Six Points (The Daily Star – June 7, 2006); M. Waheeduzaman Manik – The Significance of the Six-Point Movement and its Impact on Bangladesh's Struggle for Freedom and Self-determination (NFB – June 8, 2006)

11 Masudul Haq - Bangladesher Shadinhata Juddesh RAW Abong CIA (Bangladesh Independence War: RAW and CIA) (1990) pg. 10-12

12 Masudul Haq pp. 31-32

13 Masudul Haq pg. 35

14 Masudul Haq pg. 44

15 Rick Fountain – Bangladesh War Secrets Revealed (BBC News World Edition – January 1, 2003); After 30 years and a new warming of relations between the United

States and India there is less concern in America if Pakistan were to disintegrate and already eulogies are being written: Michael F. Scheuer - A Back of the Hand (The Washington Times – April 7, 2006)

16 Manjeet Singh Pardesi – Deducing India's Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005) pg. 29

17 Moudud Ahmed Ch. 6; Faiz Ahmed – Agartala Mamla: Sheikh Mujib O Banglar Bidroho (1997 edition)

18 Moudud Ahmed Ch. 6; This outfit has many similarities to the JMB of 35 years later.

19 Md. Zainul Abedin – RAW and Bangladesh (1995)

20 Praveen Swami – Covert Contestation (Frontline Magazine - Volume 22 - Issue 19, Sep 10 - 23, 2005); B. Raman - 'We should leave Pakistan to stew in her own juice' (January 18, 2003); Dr. Shireen M. Mazari – India's Unconventional War Strategy (Defence Journal – Vol 3 No. 1 January 1999)

21 I have generally ignored Asoka Raina's paragraph structure which I think is idiosyncratic and have freely adapted it for the ease of reading and comprehension.

22 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin – The Mitrokhin Archives II (2005) – On page 347 the authors state, "By the late 1960s the Kremlin seems to have come to the conclusion that the separation of Pakistan's western and eastern wings would be in Soviet, as well as Indian, interests. The KGB therefore set out to cultivate the leader of the autonomist Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman ('Mujib'). Though Mujib was unaware of the cultivation, the KGB claimed that it succeeded in persuading him that the United States had been responsible for his arrest in January 1968, when he had been charged with leading the so-called 'Agartala conspiracy', hatched during meetings with Indian officials at the border town of Agartala to bring about the secession of East Pakistan with Indian help. Through an intermediary, Mujib was told in September 1969 that the names of all the conspirators had been personally passed to Ayub by the US Ambassador. According to a KGB report, Mujib was completely taken in by the disinformation and concluded that there must have been a leak to the Americans from someone in his entourage." (pg. 347)

23 Author's emphasis. What is actually being implied by the term provincial unless he was confusing the word with provisional which I doubt? A Freudian slip perhaps?

24 ... and when they did they left with much of our military equipment, tables and chairs right down to the water faucets and taps. (see Mohammed Zainul Abedin – No room to pay homage to Aurora (NFB – March 27, 2006)

25 B. Raman – 'We should leave Pakistan to stew in her own juice' (rediff.com – January 18, 2003)

26 It should not be surprising that many of the intelligence heads appointed in India have shared similar opinions about the 1971 war and after and in this respect J.N. Dixit, the subject of Part 2A of this article, was the intelligence chief appointed by the Congress party that attained power in the 2004 national elections.

27 S.S. Uban – Phantoms of Chittagong: The "Fifth Army" in Bangladesh (1985)

28 Mahmud Hasan – Mujib Bahini Vs. Mukti Bahini (Holiday – November 11, 2004)

29 It is only in Chapter 16 of Uban's book that a hint is made of Kao's responsibility as external intelligence chief but this is so obscurely stated that a reader may actually miss its implications.

30 Masudul Haq pp. 68, 97, 176

31 In his book 'Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib' to be discussed in the next part

32 Sutar's importance to Indian designs, of which the Mujib Bahini were to play an important part, were revealed in an interview of Humayan Rashed Chowdhury, a former diplomat to the UN and India and a former speaker of Parliament, where it had been disclosed to him that Chittaranjan Sutar had been instructed by Indira Gandhi on 28 December, 1971 to make Bangladesh a part of India (Masudul Haq pg. 162)

33 S.S. Uban was only one of many advisers that were sent to Dhaka on secession of hostilities. See Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1983) and Lt. Gen. JFR Jacob – Surrender at Dhaka (UPL – 1997) pg. 149

34 See page 2 and Chapter 15 of the same book to get a clear appreciation of Uban's views on the Two Nation Theory; See also Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 26-27

35 See part 2B

36 However, recent research does seem to indicate that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was not as gullible as the Indians had hoped or wished nor was he as ideologically committed as some of his supporters seem to think (see Tuhin Reza - Mujib, 7 March 71 Speech and Call for Independence (NFB – April 3, 2006). This theory would suggest that at heart Sheikh Mujib was no more than an opportunist who craved power above all else and probably would have settled for a lot less than independence if a power sharing arrangement had been finalized with Yahya Khan. To elaborate on this theory it was due to the arrogance and a lack of perspicacity of the Pakistani central authorities Sheikh Mujib's hand was forced and events moved beyond his control while he was incarcerated on the charges brought against him in the Agartala Conspiracy Case (and on an earlier charge based on the Six Point Demand). Once the students and Awami League leaders were psychologically geared towards independence it was too late for him to back out without losing face so he burned all his bridges and opted wholly for the Indian cause. The only problem with this thesis is that we would be expected to believe that for two decades Sheikh Mujib had been playing the Indians and Pakistanis against each other and simply miscalculated at the last moment! (See also Tuhin Reza – Father of the Nation Controversy: My Comments (NFB - May 25, 2006)

37 Masudul Haq pp. 50, 96, 124, 127, 203, 204; see also Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 121

38 G.W. Choudhury – The Last Days of United Pakistan pg. 119 cited in Masudul Haq pg. 65

39 Masudul Haq pp. 131, 155,

40 Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (part 1) (Holiday – May 26, 2006)

41 Masudul Haq pp. 136, 169-170

42 Abu Al Sayyid – Shatcholisher Akhand Bangla Andalon (1999); Dr. Kalidas Baidya - Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib (2005)

THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 4

THE BETRAYAL OF BANGLADESH

Sheikh Mujibir Rahman was confident in the knowledge that India had practically installed him into power through almost two decades of nurturing and cooperation and then direct military intervention in 1971. India could therefore be said to have had a huge investment in his continued occupation of the post of Prime Minister and leader of Bangladesh. This hubris probably started him on his precipitous decline into megalomania, dictatorship and political intimidation. This phase in the country's history has been thoroughly documented by numerous authors of varying quality, depth and bias but what has generally been omitted from these narratives, is the role played by India, in implanting the contradictory premises and ambitions of the different political characters and personalities within the polity of the new nation.¹

As we have already seen the creation of the Mujib Bahini was essentially a policy initiative of RAW. That other groups were also courted by Indian intelligence and military officials indicates that they were not prepared to put all their eggs in one basket but also primarily to ensure that the competing political factions sought out only Indian assistance in 'impartially' adjudicating their internal disputes. The main consequence of this approach was that a combination of these parties could never become a united entity that may one day turn against their supposed benefactors and adopt an independent line from New Delhi.

This is illustrated by the fact that India had no real affection or fondness for Sheikh Mujib who they saw merely as a pawn in their wider political chess game in creating an *Akhand Bharat* and is expressed in the crudest and coarsest terms by Dr. Kalidas Baidya in his book, 'Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib' published in 2005. It is likely that Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League were aware that they were only tolerated by India for the services that they could render to that country in exchange for the power that would be conferred upon them through Indian arms once Bangladesh achieved independence. It was also probably for this reason that Sheikh Mujib was resistant to declaring independence until the very last moment (Dr. Kalidas Baidya has argued that the Sheikh never actually declared independence) since he correctly realized that a bargain with the West Pakistanis would be better than a pact with the devil. However, once the decision was taken

irrevocably out of his hands due to his voluntary confinement in Pakistan he opted completely for the Indian cause on his return to a now independent Bangladesh. Dr. Kalidas Baidya would probably discount Sheikh Mujib's reliability after he took control of power but his subsequent decisions only increased India's stranglehold on Bangladesh which was reversed only after his death by President Ziaur Rahman.

It is more than likely that Dr. Baidya is still aggrieved that Sheikh Mujib did not go even further in accommodating Indian interests but it ignores the ground realities in Bangladesh and the sentiments of the people who would not have tolerated further encroachment which may have encouraged a counter-revolution. One should also not make the mistake to think that Dr. Baidya is an impartial and objective observer with no axes to grind or political agendas to fulfill through the falsification and manipulation of facts and opinion. In this same respect, one will not find a consistent and ideologically committed Sheikh Mujib as he was never truly in control of events and was prepared to prevaricate and bargain when it suited him and his ego.

BANGLADESH OR EAST BENGAL

An extensive review of 'Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib' will help to provide insights that will clarify the ambiguities that may be in the readers mind between the independence struggle and India's aim of an *Akhand Bharat* which was intended to be the logical consequence to an Indian liberated East Pakistan. It will also shed light on the subsequent calamitous decisions made by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that were to substantially impair the nation's sovereignty and posed a risk to its territorial integrity. Although the term *Akhand Bharat* does not appear in 'Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib' it is an unspoken aspiration hidden beneath another no less threatening agenda of an independent 'East Bengal' which if successful would lead inexorably to the ultimate prize for India - reunification.

It should be mentioned at the outset of this discussion on 'Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib' that Dr. Kalidas Baidya is the head of the Bangla Sena, an organization outlawed by Bangladesh and which operates from Kolkata. Official requests by the Bangladesh government have been made to the Indian government to halt the activities of this group but to no avail. This, of course enhances Dr. Kalidas Baidya credentials as a spokesman for Indian designs on Bangladesh and which is further reinforced in the introduction to the book written by Pabitra Kumar Ghosh, a journalist and advisor to the Dainik Bartaman, who assures us that Dr. Baidya had been

working for East Pakistan's freedom soon after Pakistan's establishment in 1947. He was also a close associate of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and took on onerous responsibilities which allowed him to witness the changes in this historical period from the vantage point of an insider. He had become acquainted with Sheikh Mujib from the time of the 1952 Language Movement. The information provided in the book, according to Kumar Ghosh, can have only come from Dr. Baidya who has publicized matters that have never before been disclosed about these historical upheavals. In the final analysis, it is for the reader to determine how much of what has been written in the book is factual, truthful, authentic and reliable and which parts are influenced by the desire to confuse, deceive and manipulate opinion.

It is necessary to adopt a critical approach to the text as under the section titled 'Writers Words' the author makes his viewpoint clear and that the remainder of the book will be tainted with this outlook and perspective. According, to Dr. Baidya it was due to the [alleged]² oppression of Hindu's in Pakistan that animated him into seeking Pakistan's break up. Once Pakistan had been shorn of its eastern half this separated segment would be enthused by Bengali nationalism that would bring an independent 'East Bengal' into existence. On this premise he devised a plan for 'East Bengal's' actualization but to his great disappointment after Pakistan was divided by the 1971 war no 'East Bengal' appeared. This he blames on Sheikh Muibur Rahman who he claims promoted Islamic nationalism and this remains a sore point for him but the author fails to mention that his own conception of an 'East Bengal' would advance Hindu nationalism at the expense of the majority Muslims in Bangladesh.

In the first chapter of the book, 'Our Work Begins in Dhaka' we are told that the author, Chittaranjan Sutar and Nirod Majumder entered Dhaka at the end of 1951. As we already know from 'Sheikh Mujib Triumph and Tragedy' (2005)³ Chittaranjan Sutar was a RAW operative and so the author unwittingly discloses his own identity as a RAW agent. While Kalidas (Dr. Baidya) gets admitted as a student at Dhaka Medical College to engage with the student community the other two engage themselves in social welfare and start a public relations drive. We are informed that it was behind a curtain of secrecy that the three worked. It is in the chapter on 'Sheikh Mujibur Rahman' that the author expresses his animus towards Sheikh Mujib whose affiliation to H.S. Suhrawardy and his active participation in the infamous 1946 Kolkata riots indelibly marks him out as suspect and a communalist. It was, however, long before the 1964 Kolkata riots that Chittaranjan Sutar (Chittababu) and Kalidas gave Sheikh Mujib the assurance that all the Hindu's of East Bengal would

accept him as their leader and under him support the movement for self-rule of 'East Bengal'. This crucial piece of information fits in very well with the narratives in Faiz Ahmed and Asoka Raina's book providing a third link to a conspiracy involving Sheikh Mujib.

This connection is further strengthened in the following two chapters, 'Understanding with Sheikh Mujib' and 'Six Point base for self-rule demand' but receives its strongest endorsement in the chapter specifically on the 'Agartala Conspiracy'. Both Sheikh Mujib and Chittababu were held as prisoners in Dhaka Central jail where Kalidas' father-in-law was office head assistant to the Dhaka IG (Prisons) and who arranged meetings between the two. Whatever was discussed was passed on from Chittababu to Kalidas who was acting as his physician. If it was necessary for Sheikh Mujib to get out emergency information this would be informed to Kalidas who would then transmit it to the designated persons. In this way secret communications were distributed through Kalidas. This chapter not only provides a link between RAW and Sheikh Mujib but also its *modus operandi* during the period when the conspiracy was meant to have taken place (1963-1967) and also during the pendency of the trial when surveillance would have been at its highest.

It is in the chapter on the 'Peoples Freedom Party'⁴ that an *Akhand Bharat* is alluded to and for which a political party was formed in 1970 whose hidden agenda was an independent East Bengal. On the coming of Bangladesh and its renaming from East Pakistan, Kalidas absurdly states that his party took possession of West Bengal. It was at this time, that Kalidas discovered a lack of political consciousness of the Hindu's. By naming itself Bangladesh it became the rightful owner of the Bangla language and therefore has an unrestrained and unhindered right over it, which was not protested by West Bengal or India. By not discerning this obvious danger, India through its recognition of Bangladesh has accepted a small part as if it considered it as the whole but a part can never be a whole but this was not in the comprehension or understanding of the Indian political leaders at that time, according to Kalidas.

In its convoluted way this chapter presents a political program that advocates the creation of an 'East Bengal' to be amalgamated or absorbed into an *Akhand Bharat*. It was for this reason that Kalidas and Chittababu's primary objective was for Sheikh Mujib to issue a declaration for the independence of 'East Bengal'. It was agreed that Chittababu would become Sheikh Mujib's representative in Kolkata and would work secretly there for the establishment of an East Bengal.⁵ The manner in which this campaign was presented to the

people had to be carefully orchestrated so that if Sheikh Mujib did betray them in end the movement could not be stopped and it would continue of its own momentum.

Suspensions were aroused when Sheikh Mujib voluntarily sought detention with the Pakistan Army after the start of the military crackdown when he could have easily escaped along with the other Awami League leaders to India. Kalidas raises the questions as to why Sheikh Mujib did not give a written declaration of independence to his party members who were allowed to flee across the border with RAW's cooperation.⁶ It was due to this omission on Sheikh Mujib's part that Major Ziaur Rahman had to declare independence in his stead - this issue still remains controversial and Kalidas is probably the first Indian to discuss this matter so openly. The reason for Sheikh Mujib's behaviour could be that he wanted to negotiate further with the Pakistanis while in captivity but he would be at a serious disadvantage without access to the outside world. The more plausible answer which fits his character⁷ best was that he did not want to take the risks associated with war as he was on the verge of achieving personal victory. He did not want to make a final decision on independence until he was sure of the outcome and most importantly he was not confident enough to decide between an independent Bangladesh that may antagonize his Hindu/RAW supporters or an East Bengal that may turn the entire nation against him. The best policy for him was to remain silent until power was handed to him either through a Pakistan power sharing compromise⁸ or an Indian military victory bringing in an independent Bangladesh or an East Bengal which would be conveniently decided without him.

From this point onwards Kalidas follows a similar course to other writers that have covered this subject from a RAW/India standpoint. He identifies Shirazul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzak, Sheikh Moni and Tofail Ahmed as having the greatest contribution to Mujib's rise. In Kolkata these four student leaders and Chittababu had regular meetings along with Abdur Rab Serniabat and then later Sheikh Kamal and Jamal. In the chapter, 'Movement starts in Kolkata' Kalidas digresses back to his favourite bugbear about the renaming of East Pakistan to Bangladesh but he adds an ominous twist to his argument. He states that the Hindu refugees now in India will create a homeland and reside there. Once Bangladesh becomes independent it will be necessary to raise the issue of a homeland but this will be publicized very cautiously and in extreme secrecy. According to Kalidas the Indian government gave its approval for this secret campaign for a Hindu homeland to commence.

This could only mean that Bangladesh would be carved up to furnish an enclave or an adjoining area to India so that Hindu's could have their so-called homeland which would be based on an analogy with the state of Israel which is not acknowledged directly by Kalidas but this is evident in his pattern of thinking. In many ways there does exist a similarity of contention made by the Zionists for Palestinian land but in the case of a Hindu homeland India would not settle for less than the entire landmass of Bangladesh which would be the natural progression if only a small portion was to be made available due to the economic repercussions for the country. As an *Akhand Bharat* cannot be achieved directly it must be attained by a more circuitous route through demands for an East Bengal or a Hindu Homeland.

In the same way that Hitler used false accusations and charges against Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria of oppressing their ethnic German population before invading those countries,⁹ Kalidas adopts the same methods as an excuse to interfere in East Pakistan/Bangladesh internal affairs. Staged acts of cruelty against Hindu's were (and are being) used to promote the idea of a Hindu Homeland and to constitute a defense force for their protection. It was for this reason that secret training was to be administered to Hindu youth and to another elite force separate from the Mukti Bahini. This new bahini would be 'non-communal' in character and after independence would take on the main responsibilities normally carried out by an institutionalized army. The members of the bahini would also be involved in and control the executive running of state and would help diminish the power and strength of the 'communalist' Mukti Bahini. Chittababu proposed the name of Mujib Bahini that would be led by the student leaders listed above.

The student leaders, themselves believed, that if the Indian government gave permission for the activation of the Mujib Bahini and if they were able to work along the lines discussed above then the political and military power would automatically devolve into their hands. As a result, the new government could never be capable of asserting a different course from that desired by New Delhi. Chittababu and Kalidas were of the opinion that the two Bahini's would continue to be plagued by ill feeling and jealousy which would be exacerbated with contradictions that would emerge later on with the Bangladesh government itself.¹⁰ If it was possible to set up a separate Hindu Bahini then this would act as a balance between the competing groups and ultimately would have the final say in the decision making process. The training for the Hindu Bahini would be completely secret and covert with only the Indian Prime Minister and the Army Chief knowing anything about it. Obviously, the Bangladesh government and its Army Chief could not be taken

into confidence on this RAW initiative. The proposal for a Hindu Bahini was immediately accepted by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and training for the Mujib Bahini was started under the guidance of Major General S.S. Uban.

The most damning indictment against the Awami League leadership and the student leaders holed up in Kolkata comes at the end of the book in the chapter entitled, 'Pakistan-India war preparations and war'. During the final phase of the conflict or at least very soon after the 1971 war (Kalidas does not specify a date)¹¹ an agreement was signed between the Bangladesh government in exile by Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam (Sheikh Mujib had not been released by Pakistan by this time) and the Indian government which contained the following seven points:

1. Those who actively participated as Freedom Fighters and were recognized as such would according to ability, run the state administration of Bangladesh and the others would be removed from their employment and service.

2. The Indian and Bangladesh armies would be made into a joint or combined army whose head would be the Indian Army Chief. Only on his command could war be waged.

3. Bangladesh will not have its own military force.

4. Instead a paramilitary force would be established to take care of the internal law and order situation.

5. There will be an open market between the two countries but from time to time through mutual discussions the principles of trade would be settled.

6. The Indian Army will remain in Bangladesh for an indefinite period.

7. India and Bangladesh would have the same foreign policy based on discussions between the two countries.

After this agreement was signed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took steps for war with Pakistan.¹² On the 16th of December 1971 the Indian Army is said by Kalidas to have taken 'possession' of Bangladesh. In the surrender and sovereignty power document which was signed by General Niazi on behalf of the defeated Pakistan Army and handed over to General Aurora it was nowhere mentioned whether this document was then passed on to the Bangladesh government later on. Kalidas seems to be implying that with the possession of this document still in Indian hands 'legal title' to the sovereignty of Bangladesh remains with India. Kalidas adds that up to this time neither government, separately or jointly, has ever cancelled the 7 point agreement.

It may be useful to note that at the time of signing of the 7 point agreement there did not exist an internationally recognized Bangladesh government with its own territory, army or any of the other recognized symbols of statehood.

There were no legitimate representation of the Bangladeshi people, as there was no Bangladesh state for them to be citizens of or represented by, at the signing of this document as the Mujibnagar government was based in Kolkata and was generally understood to be a transitional authority. Doubly detrimental to the agreements significance is that if all its provisions were scrupulously followed a Bangladesh state or government could not have come into existence to implement them since they would be perceived as mere puppets carrying out the dictates of the central authority in New Delhi which would negate the fundamental attributes of statehood. The lack of a date to the agreement is therefore a deliberate ploy by Kalidas to avoid these uncomfortable facts and a pretence to entrench in the Indian public's mind the erroneous belief in the legal status and enforceability of the agreement which would by pen and paper have written in 'East Bengal as another province of a still incomplete *Akhand Bharat*.¹³

The supposed agreement (of which we have no proof) has no legal validity for the reasons just stipulated and is therefore not binding on the successor administration to the East Pakistan government. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was said to have denounced its provisions when he came to know of it from Tajuddin Ahmad, although, this may have been for public consumption because at least in one respect (point 4) he did see the agreement through to its tragic end when he gave tacit approval for the creation of the Rakkhi Bahini.¹⁴ As for the remainder of the agreement the provisions were given legal validity and effect by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman when he signed the 25 year Friendship Treaty with India. The Treaty came about as a result of growing international disquiet at the Indian army's continued presence in Bangladesh and who appeared to be an occupying force rather a liberating one. Their extended stay was also breeding hostility amongst Bangladeshis because the Indian army was seen taking away, 'the arms, ammunitions, equipments, machineries and even furniture and household goods in convoy of trucks across the border.'¹⁵ For Sheikh Mujib the major cause of concern was that many countries were still withholding recognition because of the Indian army's continuing presence in Bangladesh after the end of hostilities.¹⁶ For these reasons Sheikh Mujib was forced to submit to this Faustian bargain of which the relevant article are –

ARTICLE 4 - The High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both States, through meetings and exchanges of views at all levels;

ARTICLE 5 - The High Contracting Parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their mutually advantageous and all-round cooperation in the economic, scientific and technical fields. The two countries shall develop

mutual cooperation in the fields of trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and the most favoured nation principle.

ARTICLE 8 – In accordance with the ties of friendship existing between the two countries each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from any aggression against the other Party and shall not allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage to or constitute a threat to the security of the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 9 – Each of the Contracting Parties shall refrain from giving any assistance to any third Party taking part in an armed conflict against the other party. In case either Party is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take appropriate effective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their countries.

ARTICLE 10 – Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not undertake any commitment, secret or open, toward one or more states which may be incompatible with the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 11 – The present Treaty is signed for a term of twenty-five years and shall be subject to renewal by mutual agreement on the High Contracting Parties.

The Treaty shall come into force with immediate effect from the date of its signature.

In a prearranged agreement between the two governments the Indian Army was withdrawn on March 12, 1972 and in return, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi paid a short visit to Bangladesh and signed a Joint Declaration along with the Friendship Treaty on March 19, 1972.¹⁷ As can be seen, the 7 point demand was virtually incorporated in nearly all its respects into the four articles reproduced above except for point 6 which was amended to take into account the new international realities. But the adapted formulation in articles 8-10 has had an equally pernicious effect on the country's sovereignty and national integrity because while Bangladesh was held strictly to the terms of the agreement India followed it more in its breach. India never intended that the Treaty would apply to it and so disregarded any pretense at a meticulous or faithful observance of its letter or spirit. India's interpretation of the agreement has given the words friendship and amity a novel and different meaning to that found in any dictionary since its lack of sincerity is far

removed from the real sentiments behind these words - as shall be seen in Part 5 of this essay – which has resulted in the gradual diminishing of Bangladesh prestige and respect on the world stage during the Treaty's existence and validity which expired in 1997 and has not been renewed.

It may be useful to note in this regard that the terms of the Treaty were very similar to the version India signed with the USSR (The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation, 9 August 1971) but with an important difference contained in Article 11 of that agreement which stated the duration of the Treaty to be of twenty years which could be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either party declared a desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other party twelve months prior to the Treaty's expiration. The Treaty would also be subject to ratification and come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification within one month of the signing of the Treaty. These provisions guaranteed the sovereign rights of both countries and respected each nation's internal ratification procedures. Neither of these provisions was included in the Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty which in effect empowered Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to unilaterally enter into an agreement that gave away the nation's sovereign rights without the possibility of termination for a period of twenty five years.

In order to accommodate the Treaty into the constitutional framework of the country Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in another act of national infamy and disgrace amended Article 63 of the constitution in 1973 and this amendment is now the last remaining remnant of the invalid 7 point agreement and the defunct 25 year Friendship Treaty. The original Article 63 had read as follows–

(1) War shall not be declared and the Republic shall not participate in any war except with the assent of Parliament.

(2) In case of actual or imminent invasion of Bangladesh by land, sea or air, the President may take whatever steps he considers necessary for the protection and defence of Bangladesh, and Parliament if not sitting shall be summoned forthwith.

(3) Nothing in this Constitution shall invalidate any law enacted by Parliament which is expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and preservation of the State in time of war, invasion or armed rebellion.

By the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act of 1973 clauses (2) and (3) were omitted while providing for preventive detention and conferring power on Parliament and the executive to deal with emergency situations.¹⁸ In other words, without Parliament's assent it would be impossible for Bangladesh to wage war even a defensive one in the face of military attack by a foreign power. This would mean that if Indian troops were to enter Bangladesh in an

act of hostile and aggressive intent the country would have to wait for Parliament to convene, debate the threat and then assent or reject the proposal for reprisals, retaliation or war. In the context of Bangladesh's parliamentary politics this would take several weeks to accomplish and by which time the Indian officers would be sitting inside parliament ordering the terms for surrender. Prior to 15 August 1975 this type of walk-over victory would have been much easier for the Indian troops to have achieved as they already a well equipped and trained fifth column awaiting their instructions inside Bangladesh and who were named ominously the Rakkhi Bahini.

THE RAKKHI BAHINI AND THE DECLINE INTO DICTATORSHIP

As we have just seen in Part 3 and in the above discussion India had taken elaborate measures to prevent Bangladesh ever coming out of its grasp and this was assisted by a number of initiatives of Sheikh Mujib on assuming power in 1972. The most far reaching and pernicious was the formation of the Rakkhi Bahini under the pretext that the law and order situation was out of control due to the decimation of the police force and the inadequacy of the Bangladesh Rifles after the events of 1971. With the Mukti Bahini apparently running amok and the availability of arms left in the hands of thousands of people who fought in the war it was felt that something needed to be done.

The intervention of the Bangladesh army was ruled out on the lame excuse that it was still disorganized and that it would appear politically imprudent to seek its assistance in civilian matters. The Awami League also believed that the country would do better without an institutional Army which according to Moudud Ahmed suited the plan of the Indian authorities, "Now that Bangladesh had a friendly relationship with India it was not necessary for her to have a regimental army' It was said that India could be depended upon to stand by Bangladesh in case of external aggression.¹⁹ It was never made clear what would happen if India became the aggressor.

The Rakkhi Bahini soon outgrew its law and order responsibilities and became a tool of political repression not merely to those opposed to Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League but also to the blatant Indian interference in Bangladesh. That the Rakkhi Bahini was essentially a RAW inspired phenomenon appears in the writings of the Pakistani defence specialist Ikram Sehgal who claims that the Indian intelligence agency had raised the parallel military organization to be a loyal force to the Awami League and India. The Rakkhi Bahini was headed by Brig. Nurruzzaman who had, as Captain in the

Pakistan Army, been tried for treason in the famous Agartala Conspiracy Case²⁰ which would then connect him with the revolutionary organization that maintained contacts with the Indian High Commission in Dhaka already mentioned in Part 3.

This contention has only found limited support in Bangladesh²¹ but with our knowledge of RAW's role in supervising, training and organizing the membership of the exclusive and elite Mujib Bahini we can for a number of valid reasons come to a similar conclusion to that of Ikram Sehgal especially since Major General S.S. Uban also assisted with the training and equipping of the Rakkhi Bahini.²² We also know that amongst the Indian trainers of the Mujib Bahini there included a Major Malhotra who also went on to train the Rakkhi Bahini.²³

The admission (probably inadvertent) by an Indian analyst who has attempted to address the question of why the Rakkhi Bahini was regarded as an extension of India's authority in Bangladesh (even before we were aware of the secretive organization called RAW), finds a clue in the fact that military equipment was supplied to this paramilitary force by India, as per the request of the Bangladesh government and that they also used an identical uniform to that worn by the Border Security Force²⁴ - all allegations that were originally raised by Moudud Ahmed in his book, 'Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman' (1983). The Indian writer nowhere makes a categorical denial of these factual assertions but instead feebly opines, "The service provided by the Indian bureaucrats, at the request of Bangladesh government, was considered as interference and the looting - the 'spoils of war' - is a much overstated incident".

This partial acknowledgment and concession to the truth by an Indian author simply raises further doubts on the received wisdom from self-appointed experts on the actual genesis of the Rakkhi Bahini. These experts have uniformly viewed the formation of this group as an internal requirement of Sheikh Mujib without any outside input or contribution. The falsity of this claim is countered by the fact that soon after independence a contingent of Indian 'advisers' comprising civil servants and technical experts entered Dhaka to restart the civil administration²⁵ and as we already know Major General S.S. Uban was appointed as Personal Advisor to Sheikh Mujib so that any request for arms for the Rakkhi Bahini would be in reality akin to any provincial government within the Union of India asking for a similar consignment of weapons from central authorities to quell public unrest or violence.

That after the fall of the Sheikh Mujib government the Rakkhi Bahini sought sanctuary in India to carry out terrorist raids into Bangladesh²⁶ also further confirms our opinion of a RAW link with the setting up and organization of the paramilitary force. According to Moudud Ahmed the idea of introducing the Rakkhi Bahini into Bangladesh was originally conceived by the government in exile at Kolkata and the conceptual underpinning of the new force was politically motivated for the specific purpose of creating a counter-balance to the Army which would be in the interests of both Sheikh Mujib and the Indian government. This correlation of interests had horrendous effects on the discipline and morale of the Rakkhi Bahini once it became an operational force since its unstated and naturally undeclared function was to carry out extra-judicial killings of opposition groups that had sprung up against the Awami League. It was widely perceived that the party had increasingly displayed a subservient and slavish attitude to India and this was resented by Bangladeshis who must have felt betrayed by the broken promises of independence.²⁷

The legal framework for the Rakkhi Bahini was only promulgated with retrospective effect after training and recruitment were complete and actual operations had started. The language adopted in the Rakkhi Bahini Order provided little legal structure or restraints on the activities of the Rakkhi Bahini as there seemed to be no specific object or scheme contained within its provisions, which merely stated that, 'it [the Rakkhi Bahini] would be employed for the purpose of assisting the civil authority in the maintenance of internal security when required and it would perform such function as the government would direct.'²⁸ With the minimal of legal constrictions the Rakkhi Bahini commenced on a rampage through out the length and breadth of the country that involved killing, looting and even raping. One author relates the example of a 17 year old boy who was found to have 'disappeared' after four days of torture and the Supreme Court when it finally intervened severely castigated the Rakkhi Bahini for operating outside the law. The court found that the Rakkhi Bahini had no code of conduct, no rules of procedure and no register of arrests and interrogation. Instead of reining in the outfit, Sheikh Mujib in his now characteristic manner stripped the court of its powers to intervene in such matters.²⁹

The Indian government was prepared to tolerate many of the excesses committed by Sheikh Mujib, the Awami League and the Rakkhi Bahini simply because everything was done with India's connivance and it was crucial to its strategy that this man, this party and these thugs retained power in Bangladesh at whatever cost. These sentiments are reflected in the propaganda

output of two authors who have worked for Indian intelligence during some period in their long and illustrious careers. In the case of J.N. Dixit his principal regret was that Sheikh Mujib did not heed the advice of the commander of the Rakkhi Bahini, Brig. Nurruzzaman, to issue the paramilitary force with tanks and armoured personnel carriers.³⁰ One can only imagine the efficiency and speed with which the Rakkhi Bahini could have accomplished their task of murder and loot with these military vehicles at their disposal. Mr. Dixit never alludes to the atrocities committed by the Rakkhi Bahini and the other writer under review Major General S.S. Uban glorifies their patriotism, independence and fearless character which now seems particularly deceitful and duplicitous in light of what we now know about the Rakkhi Bahini and the help provided by him in training and equipping them for their 'duties' as law enforcers.³¹

From the above discussion and analysis it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had been working hand in glove with the Indians to secure his position as unrivalled leader of the independence movement and then as Prime Minister of Bangladesh while at the same time protecting India's interest in having a quiescent and submissive eastern neighbour. But once this realization dawned on the people of Bangladesh civil unrest and sporadic uprisings occurred throughout the country especially where the disastrous economic policies of the Awami League were hardest felt. To subdue this growing despondency and potentially revolutionary situation more extreme and draconian measures were introduced that complemented the barbarities committed by the Rakkhi Bahini.

In quick succession several new laws and constitutional amendments were passed of which the most controversial were the President Order 50, Constitution Second Amendment Act 1973, Printing Press and Publications (Declaration and Registration) Ordinance, Special Powers Act 1974, Proclamation of Emergency Order 1974 and the Newspaper (Annulment of Declaration) Ordinance. These all were intended to stamp out dissent with ruthless vigour but the most destructive of democratic principles was the Fourth Amendment to the constitution that brought in the BAKSAL governing system. The implications of the Fourth Amendment were explained by the leading authority on constitutional law Senior Advocate Mahmudul Islam,

"In January, 1975 the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975 was passed transforming the Constitution beyond any resemblance with the original. Part VIA was incorporated prescribing that there would be only one political party in the State, thereby rendering a severe blow to the democratic set up of the Constitution. Art. 102(1) which conferred power on the High

Court Division to enforce the fundamental rights was repealed. The parliamentary form of government was replaced by a form of government which was an apology of a presidential form as the normal checks and balances of a presidential form of government were not incorporated. The President became the repository of the executive power of the Republic which he would exercise with the assistance of ministers selected by him. The President was empowered to appoint the Prime Minister and other ministers. The Judges of the Supreme Court were made removable by the President on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity. The system introduced was a mishmash of parliamentary and presidential forms of government and the upshot was that the President emerged as the all-powerful authority in the Republic.³²

It therefore came as no surprise to Bangladeshis that in the early hours of 15th August 1975 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his entire family (excepting two daughters then in Europe) were killed along with Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, Abdur Rab Serniabat and some of their family members.

END NOTES & REFERENCES

1 Mahmud Hasan – Mujib Bahini Vs. Mukti Bahini (Holiday – November 11, 2004)

2 In the text where I have included brackets with a comment enclosed it is to signify my own opinion and not that of Dr. Baidya.

3 See Part 3; Abu Rushd- Raw in Bangladesh (2005) also has the same information. It is likely that Mr. S.A. Karim copied from this book but did not provide a reference to the original text which would constitute plagiarism.

4 This issue was again referred to in a later chapter 'Movement Starts in Kolkata' and in 'Movement Starts in Kolkata'

5 S.A. Karim in his book phrases it slightly differently, 'Sheikh Mujib Triumph and Tragedy' (2005), 'He [Chittaranjan Sutar] was a Hindu Awami Leaguer from Barisal who had been asked by Mujib in the late 1960's to settle in Kolkata in maintain contact with the Indian authorities in case any help was needed from them.'

6 Major General S.S. Uban - Phantoms of Chittagong: The "Fifth Army" in Bangladesh (1985); Tuhin Reza – Father of the Nation Controversy: My Comments (NFB - May 25, 2006)

7 It has been said that he could be two faced and in a RAW assessment he was not trusted by the US, USSR or even India who only allowed to remain in power because there was not alternative then available. (Masudul Haq - Bangladesher Shadinhata Judder RAW Abong CIA (Bangladesh Independence War: RAW and CIA) (1990) pp. 138, 142)

8 Tuhin Reza - Mujib, 7 March 71 Speech and Call for Independence (NFB – April 3, 2006)

9 William L. Shirer – The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960)

10 Mahmud Hasan – Mujib Bahini Vs. Mukti Bahini (Holiday – November 11, 2004)
 11 Muhammed Zainal Abedin asserts the date October 1971 in his book 'The Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Victim of Indian interference' (2003) on page 117 but it is not clear where he got this information. He does make reference to an interview of Mr. Humayun Rashid Chowdhury (Masudul Hoque – RAW and CIA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh (1991)) but he does not specify whether he got the date from this source or somewhere else.

12 Masudul Haq pp. 92-93

13 It would still lack its Western portion constituting today's Pakistan.

14 Masudul Haq pg. 140

15 Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman pg 183; Lt. Gen. JFR Jacob – Surrender at Dhaka (UPL – 1997) pg. 150

16 Moudud Ahmed pg. 185; Masudul Haq pg. 165; Lt. Gen. JFR Jacob pg. 150-151

17 Moudud Ahmed pg. 186; see also Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (Holiday – May 26, 2006)

18 Mahmudul Islam – Constitutional Law of Bangladesh (Second Edition – 2002)

19 Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1983)

20 Ikram Sehgal – India and State Terrorism (Globe – August 1999)

21 CAF Dowlah - Crossfire extravaganza: Mindless playing with fire? (New Age – January 31, 2005)

22 Major General S.S. Uban - Phantoms of Chittagong: The "Fifth Army" in Bangladesh (1985); Dr. Kalidas Baidya - 'Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib' (2005)

23 Masudul Haq pg. 99

24 Smruti S Pattanaik – Internal Political Dynamics and Bangladesh's Foreign Policy Towards India (Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis – Strategic Analysis Vol. 29, No. 3, Jul-Sep 2005)

25 Moudud Ahmed pg. 2

26 Smruti S Pattanaik – Internal Political Dynamics and Bangladesh's Foreign Policy Towards India (Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis – Strategic Analysis Vol. 29, No. 3, Jul-Sep 2005)

27 A.K. Faezul Huq – When 'crossfire' crosses limits (The Independent – October 23, 2004); CAF Dowlah - Crossfire extravaganza: Mindless playing with fire? (New Age – January 31, 2005); Enayetullah Khan – The Limits of Power (November 11, 2004); Pratirodh Durbar', Abdul Awal Thakur, Itihash Parishad, Dhaka, 1993 (Pages:102,186,203-4, 258-9); 'Bideshi Sangbadikder Dristitey Sheikh Mujibur Bangladesh', Hasnat Karim, Society for National Studies, Dhaka, 1979 (Pages:63, 70-8, 83-6); 'Ja Dekhechi Ja Buihechi Ja Korechi, Lt Col Shariful Haq Dalim, Nabajagaron Prakashani, Dhaka, 2001 (Pages:371-400)

28 Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1983)

29 Anthony Mascarenhas – Bangladesh – A Legacy of Blood (1986); Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1983) – the Rakkhi Bahini was subsequently given indemnity by conferring retrospective legality on some of their actions.

30 J.N. Dixit – 'Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations' (First Published 1999)

31 Major General S.S. Uban - Phantoms of Chittagong: The "Fifth Army" in Bangladesh (1985)

32 Mahmudul Islam – Constitutional Law of Bangladesh (Second Edition – 2002)

THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 5A

THE AFTERMATH

The death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was felt more acutely in India than it was in Bangladesh where there was quiet rejoicing at the fall of the tyrant, the disbanding of the Rakkhi Bahini and the repeal of his hated and maligned laws and constitutional amendments. India's quest for its idealized *Akhand Bharat* also suffered a near fatal setback on the morning of 15th August 1975 but this did not deter them from pursuing their objectives with added zeal now that Bangladesh was finding its own voice distinct from that of India. Many in Bangladesh would lose their lives for this audacity¹ but the nation was on an irreversible course that could only be disrupted through sabotage, terrorism and propaganda but the indomitable courage and determination of the people would not compromise on their new found freedom.

India's plans in dissecting Pakistan and then undermining the sovereignty of Bangladesh would in their view hopefully lead to a reunification of the subcontinent was distressingly expressed by one of India's most distinguished and highly regarded defence historians and analysts Ravi Rikhye,

"My belief is that India should, at the earliest opportunity, incorporate Pakistan into the Republic, followed by all the territories that composed the India before independence.

It is my contention that if India does not expand to fill its natural borders, then the centrifugal tendencies inherent in the situation get the upper hand and the country starts disintegrating inwards.

The chaos engulfing us today is no accident: once India was partitioned, then the process of disintegration began and will continue till reversed.

The natural boundaries of India encompass the present-day states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Our geo-strategical imperatives requires a subordinate Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal and Bhutan, and a buffer Tibet and Afghanistan. It demands that the Indian Ocean be just that, an Indian ocean.

No matter what the cost, we must start the process of reintegration. The later we put it off, the more the eventual cost.

Because Pakistan is second only to India in terms of wealth and power, the reintegration process must start with that country. Once Pakistan returns to

the fold, the combination of the two countries is such that the other states will return at a fraction of the cost and effort.

Reintegration can be conducted either peacefully or by war.”²

There was a third course of action other than peaceful or aggressive reintegration which Ravi Rikhye failed to mention that would be to foment subversion within the country to be reintegrated. This method would gradually wear away the control of government authority and paralyze the state machinery which would force the country to seek accommodation with India. This has been the preferred method in the case of Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan, Maldives and Bhutan where Indian intelligence has infiltrated all sectors of government, political opposition, print and satellite media, cultural circles and the bureaucracy and state machinery. India is therefore freely able to conduct acts of propaganda, sabotage and terrorism without any risk to itself and also conveniently from within the territory of the target nation.³

It is also interesting that Rikhye's notion of *Akhand Bharat* includes so many countries that were independent of its suzerainty during the British Raj or even that of the Mughal Empire when Hindu, Buddhist, Tamil or tribal kingdoms and principalities were out of its reach or were allowed to continue on terms. It is likely that Rikhye is harking back to a much earlier period in India's ancient history that can only be sensibly referring to the rule of Ashoka the Great who was the third emperor of the Maurya Empire from approximately 273 BC – 232 BC. His empire encompassed much of present-day South Asia and was even further inclusive of territories and domains from Afghanistan to Bengal to Mysore.⁴ It was a Mauryan belief that expansion – an offensive action – was a defensive response and the empires survival depended on the exploitation and annexation of its neighbours and their divisions.⁵

The period that constituted the Mauryan Empire also saw the emergence of a statecraft that was to influence Ashoka's expansionism and was adopted wholesale by the Indian government and its military strategists, diplomats and intelligence agencies of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. It was through the writings of Kautilya (or Chanakya), the author of the *Arthashastra* and the Chief Minister of Chandragupta (approx 321 B.C.E.), that the Mauryan rulers, '... sanctioned the use of covert actions, spies, assassinations, sowing discord among enemy leaders, spread of disinformation, making and breaking treaties as and when they suited national interests, in addition to a host of other 'hyper-realist' stratagems to subdue and subjugate the enemy. According to him, the enemy must be dominated/accommodated or defeated by clever stratagems. However,

Kautilya was very aware that stratagems would work only when backed by credible military power.”⁶

These methods worked profitably for Chandragupta and his successors including Ashoka and were subsequently used by the Indian intelligence agency RAW to great success in destabilizing neighbouring countries and disintegrating independent states through the practice of the Chanakyan principles of deceit and guile.⁷ It is, therefore, of some significance that on January 26, 1950 the Indian government also adopted the Sarnath Lion Capital and Chakra of Ashoka as its National Symbol and which appears on nearly all government seals and official documents as well as on its national flag. On how the Ashoka Empire can again be reunited is the subject of Rikhye's piece and the matter of Bangladesh reappears often within his pages,

“In 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was assassinated. Though Mrs. Indira Gandhi first considered intervention and though the Army alerted three divisions, in the end the Government hesitated and the moment passed. The result: our chance to keep Bangladesh in our camp vanished. India would have been fully justified in intervening under the same doctrine that lets the Soviet Union intervene in Poland and Afghanistan and the Americans, intervene in Nicaragua and Grenada.”

It was not a moment of hesitation that restrained India from direct military intervention in Bangladesh but simply that Indira Gandhi had called a state of emergency on June 26, 1975 in relation to incidents that were taking place inside her country and the timing would have been extremely inopportune for such adventurism as proposed by Rikhye.⁸ After several months had gone by and the turmoil subsided in India the new government could then give its uninterrupted attention to an armed assault on Bangladesh but it would certainly have caused an international outcry and attracted widespread condemnation. There still remained the possibility of arming insurgent groups operating from India and striking into Bangladesh when it would be least expected and causing the most damage to property and life provoking rebellion or inciting revolution.

In an act of despicable treachery Tiger (Kader) Siddique was prepared to offer his services to India to wage a guerilla war or insurgency on Bangladesh. This perfidious proposal was made on the pretext that he [Kader Siddique] was determined to keep alive the memory of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and with that purpose in mind brought 2000 of his followers into India for sanctuary against alleged reprisals in Bangladesh and also to receive unofficial support and funds to regroup themselves for armed combat against the

Bangladesh government. According to Asoka Raina the Indian government acceded to these demands but on the condition that it fight within the borders of Bangladesh and for the limited objective of reviving the aspirations of Mujib.⁹ If the authorities in Bangladesh were ever to discover the source of Kader Siddique's support base the Indians would falsely accuse the Bangladesh government of harbouring Mizo rebels and allowing China to train them inside their territory. This can be reasonably implied from Asoka Raina's phrasing of this imputation and one could also justifiably interpret Kader Siddique's motivation as being entirely self-serving probably reflecting his ambition to become the heir to Sheikh Mujib's political legacy since both of Mujib's sons were killed on 15 August 1975.¹⁰

It was fortunate that the Desai government in India did not look at all favourably on the activities of RAW and reduced its manpower and funding and even went so far as to hand over suspected terrorists wanted in Bangladesh.¹¹ It was due to this internal conflict between the Indian government and its intelligence agency that Kader Siddique's plans came to naught. It was, however, not long before a more propitious atmosphere returned in New Delhi and a more benevolent attitude to RAW's foreign intrigues allowed it to stir up trouble in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

INSURGENCY IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS

After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the disbanding of the Rakkhi Bahini the main theatre of operations for RAW was the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) where ample opportunity lay for it to engineer a secessionist plot that was intended to undermine the integrity and unity of the state leading to the scenario outlined above by Ravi Rikhye for an *Akhand Bharat* in South Asia. It will be shown in this section that the claims of the secessionists are entirely unjustifiable and that they are aided and abetted by RAW with the concealed motive not for independence but instead a covert amalgamation with India.

The conflict in the CHT is so densely overlaid with historical inaccuracies, deliberate distortions and emotive nonsense that a comprehensive survey of the subject becomes necessary to fully understand and appreciate the complex dynamics that are at play in this region of Bangladesh. The differing contentions that have become a feature of the CHT issue predates nearly all the historical materials that have been discussed in this essay and relate to matters that are beyond living memory but with some textual analysis and analytical research it is possible to tweeze out the false claims and demands made by the tribal peoples (especially the Chakmas), who are being sponsored

and manipulated by RAW, to secede the CHT from Bangladesh by force of arms. The more justifiable stand has been taken by President Ziaur Rahman, H.M. Ershad and Prime Minister Khaleda Zia whose policies have been to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation and reject outright the attempts at secession by the tribal insurgents and terrorists.

Inhabitants of the CHT

The basis of this section will be a point-by-point refutation of a paper written by Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa¹² (Dictaan) entitled, 'In Search for Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh' published by the UNDP in 2004. As Dictaan correctly points out the area of the CHT is approximately 5, 093 square miles¹³ but according to some writers the size of the district had originally been 6, 796 square miles but was reduced twice in the last century in 1901 and again in 1947 by the British colonial authorities to its present approximation,¹⁴ and which now constitutes one-tenth of the total land mass of Bangladesh. It should be pointed out that these diminutions in CHT's total geographical area have come at the cost to Bangladesh's own natural and historical territorial boundaries as the CHT is an integral and inseparable part of the country and any reduction in its size is a corresponding reduction to that of Bangladesh and any further attempts at truncating the CHT would be an intolerable threat to the nations integrity which would justifiably lead to war for its defence.

From this partially accurate beginning Dictaan soon falls into a common error by accepting uncritically the notion that the CHT has been inhabited by several indigenous peoples 'since time immemorial' who are known to have been living there for centuries, with their own forms of governance and sociopolitical institutions - all these statements are highly dubious and not based on facts, historical record or recent anthropological research. The several indigenous peoples or tribes that Dictaan refers to are the Bawm, Chak, Chakma, Khumi, Khyang, Lushai, Marma, Mro (Mru), Pankhua, Tanchangya and the Tripura, none of whom can be remotely described as indigenous to the region of CHT and as Bushra Hasina Chowdhury points out, are of Sino-Tibetan descent, but then in the face of conclusive evidence to the contrary, absurdly describes them as the original inhabitants of this area.¹⁵

Several Indian writers cited in Mohammed Zainul Abedin's book, 'The Chittagong Hill Tracts - A Victim of Indian Intervention' (2003) and in 'Human Rights Violation in CHT: Myth and Reality' (2005) provide an unbiased and objective assessment of the origins of these tribal peoples. According to BG Verghese, "The tribes live in CHT are of Tibeto-Burman/Mon Khmer stock

similar to that found in India's North-east ... The CHT tribes migrated into the area between the 16th and 19th century with Bengali settlements along the Chittagong coastal plain."¹⁶ It is interesting to note that Bushra Hasina Chowdhury (Bushra) makes no mention of the BG Verghese book but provides an unsupported and unreferenced preposition indirectly challenging his findings. According to her, the early Bengali settlement in the CHT took place during the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and the first half of the twentieth centuries for various unspecified reasons¹⁷ - BG Verghese puts Bengali settlements at least a full century earlier implying that on arrival of the tribal peoples in the CHT region it had already been inhabited by the native Bengalis.

In reference to the more numerous Chakma migrants Biroj Mohon Dewan states categorically that, "It is crystal clear that the Chakmas are not the sons of the soil of CHT ... The Chakma's are not the original dwellers of this district (CHT) and they entered Bengal [in the] 14th century having the favour of the Sultan", and the reason for their migration was that they were, "... [being] attacked by the Burmese imperial power the Chakmas became weak and achieved the approval and assistance of the Subadar of Bengal on humanitarian ground to be settled down for the first time on the bank of the river Toinchari to protect their mere existence."¹⁸ Even though the Chakmas are stated to have entered the CHT in the 14th Century their numbers must have been so small that 700 years later the Chakma population would never have exceeded 280, 000 persons¹⁹ as attested to in the 1991 census which showed an even lower figure. It is also worth pointing out that the data provided by Biroj Mohon Dewan confirms that a Mughal administration was operating in the CHT in the 14th Century presumably assisted by Bengali bureaucrats and settlers.

Certain intellectuals identified by Zainul Abedin in 'The Chittagong Hill Tracts - A Victim of Indian Intervention' have tried to establish that a Chakma civilization, culture, literature and language that was distinct from that of the Bengalis existed but their efforts being spurious and contrived have been decisively dismissed by Biroj Mohon Dewan and Ashok Kumar Dewan²⁰ and many other writers. Bushra Hasina Chowdhury, an active proponent of the Chakma demands for autonomy has also had to admit that, "The Chakmas speak a dialect close to "Chittagonian," a dialect that is spoken by the local people of Chittagong, which is a deviation of the Bangla language. They also have a script resembling Burmese, but they seldom use the script. Significantly, Bangla, the state language of Bangladesh, is the lingua franca for inter-tribal communication and is understood by most tribes."²¹

It is apparent from the above discussion that the tribals are not indigenous to the CHT and may appropriately be described as nomads, refugees and asylum seekers who have no distinguishable cultural characteristics (apart from certain ritual and culinary differences) that would separate them from the native Bengalis, which is an expected outcome from centuries of assimilation with the local people (i.e. the Bengalis).

Muslim Influence in the CHT Region

This of course, does not fit the interpretation presented by Dictaan and Bushra and many Bangladeshi writers, who have rather concentrated on the alleged oppression, perpetrated by Muslim leaders such as the Sultans under the Mughal Empire. They claim that the Sultans were fiercely resisted by the Chakma kings who adopted Muslim names to appease the rulers they were fighting²², which seems a singular and peculiar way of expressing defiance and antagonism to the authorities one is aggressively subverting. However, Dictaan suggests unconvincingly, that the Mughal's were never able to subdue the tribal inhabitants and failed to impose its authority in the CHT area. The only concession that the tribal leaders made to the Mughal emperors was an annual payment of cotton bales as a mark of suzerainty (Treaty of 1713) but Dictaan insists that the CHT remained outside their jurisdiction.

As we have already seen, this has been disproved by Biroj Mohon Dewan whose research has confirmed that a Mughal administration existed in the CHT in the 14th Century and also by Bushra Hasina Chowdhury who narrates the story of the Chakma chief Jalal Khan, who refused to pay tribute to the Mughal administrator in Chittagong,

“Consequently he was attacked by the Mogul *dewan*, or state minister, Kishan Chand, and fled to Arakan, where he died afterwards. By 1737, Chief Shermust Khan yielded to the Mogul authority. Under the influence of the Moguls a new administrative post designated as *dewan* was introduced in the Chakma tribal administration, and continued up to 1900.”

It was not uncommon for uprisings to occur under Mughal rule but the true test of allegiance and fealty is the inscription on the coins issued by Chakma Kings. Numismatic research has discovered coins that bear the names of the Sultan or Emperor and even the term 'Allah-hu Rabbi' were sometimes inscribed upon them as a show of subservience.²³ Whether any of this could be described as oppression by the Mughal emperors is debatable since we would be implanting 20th century European ideas to an 18th century Muslim society that would not have understood these concepts. Intrinsically they

behaved as they did, to maintain their empire and to keep order amongst their subjects - thoughts and considerations also playing upon the minds of Europe's monarchs and their powerful advisers and ministers who oversaw the administration of the imperial possessions and colonies. It was also necessary for the European imperial administrators to ensure that their colonial trade was not disrupted by rebellious natives in far away lands who had originally been subjugated to their rule by force – a distinguishing feature of colonialism that is not comparable to Muslim rule in Bengal and the CHT where Islam gained ground through the teachings of holy men, Arab traders and merchants and not as commonly thought by the sword or the scimitar which came much later.²⁴

In the many papers, articles and books written on this subject there has been little or no in-depth study of the Islamic influence in the area which would incontrovertibly establish that the Muslims (whether Arab traders, Mughal Generals or Bengali settlers) were the first to inhabit and settle in the CHT region and that Bangladesh is the rightful heir to this history and tract of land that is so closely associated with it. It is necessary, therefore, to explore the literature on the issue of Muslim settlements in the CHT region and come to a conclusion on the strength of their numbers and control and authority of the rulers over this area. According to Dr. Muhammad Enamul Haq, the Arab Muslim settlers in the Chittagong region had gradually grown to be a compact and influential community at around 951-957 A.C.E.²⁵ and 'had in the course of time organized an independent principality of their own comprising the coastal belt of Chittagong and Noakhali districts, and that the ruler of this Muslim principality bore the title of Sultan.'²⁶ The title of Sultan most certainly does not refer to the Mughal emperors or any central authority based in Delhi but it can be inferred that an organized and cohesive community existed in the Chittagong long before the arrival of the Muslim armies. Mohammed Mohar Ali in his magnificent and authoritative book, 'History of the Muslims of Bengal' explains the importance of this initial Muslim settlement in Chittagong,

"It may be noted in this connection that the Muslims first established their political authority in the west and northwest Bengal in the opening years of the thirteenth century A.C... Yet, Arabian influences generally are very thin in this area, whereas these are the most pronounced and extensive in the districts of Chittagong and Noakhali, the very areas which were the last to come under the Muslims' political domination. The only explanation of this peculiar development is that this locality had been exposed to Islamic Arab influences

for a long time before its conquest by the Muslim generals coming from the side of northern India²⁷

It was not until Muhammad Tughlaq succeeded to the Delhi throne (March 1325 A.C.E.) that the Muslim dominium under the political authority of the Sultanate was extended from Sunargaon to the east-south-east up to Chittagong.²⁸ Under Sultan Fakh al-Din, Muslim rule was consolidated over the entire eastern Bengal area up to Chittagong which was said to be well under his control and it was during this period that he proclaimed independence from the Delhi Sultanate and ruled Bengal till his death in 1349 when his son took over but who was then ousted by one Haji Ilyas who founded the Ilyas Shahi dynasty.²⁹ We next hear of a Sultan Jalal al-Din who acceded to power in 1415 who was a Muslim convert and whose father was a influential and mighty Hindu King named Raja Ganesh. Sultan Jalal al-Din issued coins from Chittagong in 1420 which seems to point to a 'dramatic reassertion of the sultanate's authority through out the delta'³⁰ but this does not seem to have lasted very long and either the Arakanese or Tippera forces under the rule of the Tripura King Dhanya Manikya occupied the area of Chittagong, less than a century later, from around 1509-1516. It was not until 1516 that Crown Prince Nusrat Shah, or as a Persian history would have it, 'King or prince of Bengal', conquered the territory of Chittagong and made it a Dar-al-Islam.³¹

It is at this point that the Mughals come into the picture with the entry of Zahir al-Din Muhammad Babur and his son Humayun but they did not interfere with the Bengal Sultanate under Nusrat Shah who remained on the throne till he was assassinated by Firuz Shah who was himself ousted from power by Mahmud Shah who reigned as the Sultan of Bengal from 1533-1538.³² It was on the death of Mahmud Shah that the Afghan leader Sher Khan took over power in 1538 and started what became known as the Afghan kingship that lasted till the death of the last king Daud Shah in 1576. Still Bengal did not come under the Mughal sway due to pockets of resistance from Afghan warlords and it was during this troublesome period that the Arakanese ruler Meng Khamaung extended his authority up to Chittagong where he built a fort and stationed a strong naval garrison.³³

The conquest of Chittagong was undertaken by Emperor Aurangzeb's maternal uncle Shaista Khan and in a naval battle with the Arakanese fleet on January 26, 1666 defeated the enemy navy and effectively brought the whole of northern Chittagong under Mughal control.³⁴ The suzerainty of the Mughals was extended through out the CHT region in the coming decades

and the only threat to their authority came from the British, after King James II while renewing the charter of the East India Company, specifically empowered them to make war and peace and to enter into alliances with the Indian rulers.³⁵ So from the period of Muhammad Tughlaq to the defeat of Siraj-ud-Daulah in 1757 the only forces that opposed Mughal rule were the Arakanese (allied with the Portuguese) and then later the British commercial interests but nowhere is it mentioned that tribes in the CHT ever stood against their rulers. In fact the only people that have been described as indigenous to the region share no physical or cultural similarities to the tribes mentioned by Dictaan above and as Richard Eaton's description of their social practices suggest they either died out or converted to Islam,

"The Chittagong interior was at the time [1666] inhabited by indigenous peoples described as having dark skin and little or no beard. And their religion, wrote Abu'l-fazl, 'is said to be different to that of the Hindus and Muhammedans. Sisters may marry their own twin brothers, and they refrain only from marriage between a son and his mother.' The material culture of these people was based on jhum, or shifting cultivation."³⁶

Dictaan claims that the tribes she describes in her paper are the Jumma People – a word derived from jhum – but this is clearly a mistake since they do not resemble in any conceivable way the indigenous inhabitants described in the quotation above. It is likely that the original inhabitants simply became extinct through their obnoxious social practices or converted to Islam because soon after the Mughal conquest of 1666, 'mosques and shrines began proliferating throughout the Chittagong hinterland' which was the outcome of a grants system provided for an emerging religious gentry who built hundreds of mosques and shrines dedicated to Muslim holy men. They also converted forest lands into rice fields and the indigenous inhabitants became rice-cultivating peasants, 'at once both the economic and the religious clients of a new gentry.'³⁷

This method of gradual conversion and the initial settlements of the Arab traders and merchants in Chittagong afford a reliable explanation to the results of the first official census of 1872 which showed Muslims totaling 70 percent and more in the Chittagong, Noakhali, Pabna and Rajshahi districts.³⁸ This corresponds to 2, 323, 008 Muslim inhabitants in Chittagong alone (and of these 5, 025 claimed foreign ancestry) which easily outnumbers all the tribal people's identified by Dictaan several times over.³⁹ It is my contention that these tribal peoples never amounted to a significant proportion of the population of the CHT at least until 1900 and the majority that now inhabits

that region probably migrated there during the better part of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries with only a tiny minority that can trace their roots to the fourteenth century when the Muslim Subadar permitted a few Chakmas to settle in the area on humanitarian grounds in their flight from the Burmese King.

END NOTES & REFERENCES

1 Zainul Abedin in his book 'Raw and Bangladesh' makes the following statement in Chapter 30, "A noted Indian parliamentarian Mr. Subramaniam Swamy, provided important insight about RAW's plan to assassinate Ziaur Rahman. He stated in an interview given to the weekly magazine 'Sunday', 'RAW had plotted the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman with 'approval from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Mr. R.N. Kao, the RAW Chief and Shankaran Nair, a senior official of RAW had plotted to kill General Ziaur Rahman. The scheme was already at an advanced stage with Mrs. Gandhi's approval. But the Congress government fell and Mr. Morarji Desai became Prime Minister. Mr. Desai was appalled to learn about assassination plan. He called halt to the murder plot. The RAW warned the Prime Minister that it was too late to back out now and that many RAW assets would be endangered if the plan was aborted at this stage. However, Desai remained adamant and finally RAW abandoned the assassination.' Mr. Subramaniam Swamy commented, 'Zia was assassinated after Indira Gandhi returned to power but India said that she was not involved.'" See also Abu Rushd – RAW in Bangladesh (2005) Chapter 7 pp. 68-71

2 Ravi Rikhye – The War That Never Was (Chanakya Publications (1988));

3 A method that was expertly devised by the KGB as disclosed in 'The Mitrokhin Archive' by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin (2000)

4 Ashoka (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashoka>); Vincent A. Smith – The Early History of India (1962) pp. 169-171

5 Manjeet Singh Pradesh – Deducing India's Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005) pg. 32

6 Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg 20; see also Majumder, Raychaudhuri & Datta - An Advanced History of India (Second Edition -1950); Vincent A. Smith – The Early History of India (Fourth Edition – 1964)

7 Gp Capt SM Hali – RAW at War – Genesis of Secret Agencies in Ancient India (Defence Journal – Feb/Mar 1999)

8 The reasons behind Indira Gandhi's decision to call a State of Emergency which virtually paralyzed Indian decision making on Bangladesh after 15th August 1975 and prevented an immediate military response can be gleaned from 'The Mitrokhin Archive II' by Christopher Andrews and Vasili Mitrokhin.

9 Asoka Raina - Inside RAW the story of India's Secret Service (1981); see also Abdul

Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (Holiday – May 26, 2006)

10 Dr. Kalidas Baidya - Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib (2005)

11 Asoka Raina - Inside RAW the story of India's Secret Service (1981)

12 Who writes for Tebtebba (Indigenous Peoples International Centre for Policy Research and Education), Baguio City, Philippines

13 Dr. S. Kharat gives the figure of 5, 138 sq. miles in his research paper 'From Internal Displacement to Refugees: The Trauma of Chakma's in Bangladesh (2003); While reading through the paper I was amazed at the number of inaccuracies and imprecise data contained within its pages.

14 Mohammed Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention (2003). Since the writer provides no reference it is not clear where he got these figures but one can assume they came from the British land records. Also see S. Mahmud Ali- The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia (1993) also cited in Abedin's book.

15 In Part 1 of Bushra Hasina Chowdhury – Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (ACDIS Occasional Paper - 2002); This is a point that even Amnesty International has chosen to accept without any real investigation into the history of the region (Bangladesh – Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Amnesty International – February 2000) pg. 2); Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri - Ethnicity, Human Rights Violation and Colonial Legacies in Bangladesh: The Post-colonial Trajectory of the Jummaland Movement (2003) pg 3-4

16 BG Verghese – North East Resurgent Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development (1996); Quoted on pg. 53 of Zainul Abedin's book The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention.; Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri - Ethnicity, Human Rights Violation and Colonial Legacies in Bangladesh: The Post-colonial Trajectory of the Jummaland Movement (2003) pg. 3-4

17 Part 1 of Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (see note 11)

18 Biroj Mohon Dewan – The Chronicle of the Chakma Nation (1969); Quoted on page 8-9 of 'Human Rights Violation in CHT: Myth and Reality' (2005) by Zainul Abedin.; Global IDP Project – Profile of Internal Displacement: Bangladesh (January 21, 2005) pg 20; Dr. Hasanuzzaman Chowdhury & Dr. Mohammed Abdur Rab – Parbata Chattagram Bhu-Ragniti O Biponno Sharbovhumoto (Chittagong Hill Tracts Geo-Politics and Endangered Sovereignty (1997)) pg 7-10

19 This is even after we take account of the 40 000 or so Chakmas that migrated to India during the 1960's.

20 Ashok Kumar Dewan – An investigation into the history of the Chakma Nation (1991)

21 Part 1 of Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (see note 11); but see Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri - Ethnicity, Human Rights Violation and Colonial Legacies in Bangladesh: The Post-colonial Trajectory of the Jummaland Movement (2003) who completely ignores these findings.

22 Dr. Mizanur Rahman Shelly - The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: the

Untold Story (Centre for Development Research - 1992)

23 Mohammed Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention (2003) pg. 62; Richard M. Eaton – The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204-1760 (OUP 1997) pp. 53, 54

24 Richard M. Eaton – The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204-1760 (OUP 1997)

25 A.C.E. stands for 'After the Common or Christian Era' and B.C.E. refers to 'Before the Common Era' which has replaced AD and BC as acceptable historical terms for the periods they refer to.

26 Muhammad Mohar Ali – History of the Muslims of Bengal (1985) pp.37-38; Dr. Muhammad Enamul Haq – Purva Pakistane Islam (1948) pg 17

27 Mohar Ali pg. 40

28 Mohar Ali pg. 117

29 Mohar Ali pg. 122-123, 126

30 Eaton pg. 54

31 Mohar Ali pg. 201, Eaton pg. 237; Majumder, Raychaudhuri and Datta – An Advanced History of India (1961)

32 Mohar Ali pp. 217-231

33 Mohar Ali pp. 235-348

34 Mohar Ali pp. 433-442; Majumder, Raychaudhuri and Datta pg. 493

35 Mohar Ali pg. 507

36 Eaton pg. 236

37 Eaton pg. 239

38 Eaton pg. 119

39 Rafiuddin Ahmed – The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906 (OUP 1988) pg. 17

THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 5B

Causes of the CHT Insurgency

With Shaista Khan's victory over the Arakanese fleet in 1666 and his appointment as Viceroy of Bengal by the Mughal Emperor Aurengzeb, disagreements started almost immediately with the English traders represented by the East India Company and were aggravated further under diwan and naib-subahdar of Bengal Murshid Quli Khan who remained in this post from 1713-1727. This state of affairs continued until the defeat of Siraj-ud-Daulah in 1757 through a conspiracy involving the British and members of his own administration such as Mir Jafar, Amir Beg, Yar Latuf Khan, Khadim Husain Khan, Jagat Seth, Nanda Kumar, Mir Madan and Sri Babu as well as powerful Hindu interests represented by Govinda Ram Mitra, Manik Chand, Rai Durlabh Ram and Umichand.¹

As a consequence of this defeat the CHT region was ceded to the East India Company in 1760 by Qasim Ali Khan, the deputy governor, of Bengal and in 1860 it was annexed to the province of Bengal (Act No. XXII of 1860) in retaliation for raids on the British 'carried out by the people living in Mizoram, farther to the east'² but reportedly not by the Chakma tribesmen or other inhabitants of the CHT. Dictaan, however, claims that in 1776, the CHT peoples waged a war of resistance against the British East India Company and that the CHT remained relatively autonomous from British control until 1860. This is the first time that the tribal peoples of the CHT makes a significant and noteworthy appearance in the historical records relating to the Mughal and British periods and is only referred to by Dictaan and Bashra without any further supporting evidence from where we could test its authenticity. According to Bashra, Chief Sherdaulat Khan (of the Chakma tribe) having stopped payment of taxes to the East India Company in 1777 brought instant retaliation from the company which resulted in intermittent wars between the two groups which lasted till 1785 when Jan Baksh Khan, the son of Sherdaulat, finally submitted to Warren Hastings.³

Apart from the wide discrepancies between Dictaan and Bashra one may also question why this episode appears in no other reputable and authoritative publication. A far more plausible explanation about the unrest is that it was in fact the Mizos of present day Mizoram in India that posed the greatest threat

to the British in the CHT during the late eighteenth century and not the Chakmas who seemed to have remained relatively docile after their initial confrontation in 1777. Modern writers have deliberately confused the two tribes to give some authenticity to their claims that there was continual resistance by the inhabitants of the CHT to foreign or external authority and control. As Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri has pointed out, it was to fend off Mizo attacks from the east that the British stationed troops on the eastern borders of the CHT.⁴ It may at the very least be stated that a minor incident involving the Chakmas was enlarged upon and exploited by the British as a pretext to occupy the CHT in gradual phases and to prevent further Muslim immigration and settlement in the area.

The myth of Chakma resistance was later propagated by the British authorities against the Muslim settlers and Jan Baksh Khan seems to have been used as a mere conduit or mouth piece for future policy initiatives, as he is said to have precipitated the crisis with the British due to his prohibition of the plains people (Bengali Muslims) from entering the CHT.⁵ This interdiction was subsequently incorporated into Regulation 1 of 1900 (popularly known as the 1900 Regulation or Manual) which gave the British the authority to impose restrictions on Bengali immigration and land ownership and later amendments clearly enunciated the intent behind these arbitrary powers,

"No person other than a Chakma, Mogh or a member of any hill tribe indigenous to [the] Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Lusai Hills, the Arakan Hill Tracts or the state of Tripura shall enter or reside within the Chittagong Hill Tracts unless he is in possession of a permit granted by the Deputy Commissioner at his discretion."⁶

Under Rule 51 of the Regulations the District Commissioner was also empowered to expel non-tribal people from the area and was enforced through the Chittagong Hill Tracts Frontier Police Regulation of 1881 which determined that the police force would be manned by the tribal peoples and likely led to intimidation and threats to the Muslim settlers who now found themselves disempowered and at the mercy of the hostile client tribes of the British.

The motive behind the introduction of these discriminatory provisions was to reverse the results of the 1872 census which showed an overwhelming number of Muslim's in the CHT region⁷ who could have posed a serious threat to British operations in the area and also in their use of the port facility especially in a time of crisis or rebellion as occurred in 1857. The 1900 Regulation also had the intentional effect of favouring certain tribes over

others through the division of the CHT into three revenue circles, each headed by a Rajah. The three circles were known as the Chakma, the Mong and the Bohmang which was essentially given jurisdiction over the other ten tribes in the CHT. This privileged position was enhanced when the CHT was accorded special status as a 'Totally Excluded Area' as provided by the Government of India Act 1935, 'which meant relative autonomy for the CHT under the jurisdiction of their traditional chieftains, with direct administration by the central government.'⁸ Put together these changes were a classic example of the 'indirect rule' and 'divide and conquer' strategies of the British Raj,⁹ which in this particular case rendered the rightful owners and inhabitants of the CHT (the Muslims) mere second class 'subjects' in their own lands, while hypocritically claiming to 'preserve minority tribal culture and heritage'.¹⁰

The contradictions in this policy became more pronounced during the negotiations on the Partition of India in 1947 and the decision on whether to include Calcutta and Chittagong in East Pakistan which would have been the most appropriate course as both regions possessed a Muslim character, history and population. The burden of drawing the new boundaries in Bengal fell upon Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a strange choice considering that he knew nothing about India and had 'never written about it or become involved in any of the complex legal problems. Indeed, [he] had never set foot on the subcontinent'.¹¹ He was, however, assisted by expert Boundary Commissions that were to demarcate boundaries on the 'basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, and in doing so to take into account also other factors'¹² that were never specified. Due to the deep divisions between the different members on the Partition Council a public statement was issued pledging its members to accept the awards of the Boundary Commissions whatever they might be and to enforce them impartially.¹³

The unfairness in the demarcations made by the Boundary Commission especially in regard to Calcutta which was basically traded off for the CHT is a direct consequence of the 1900 Regulations and the promotion of certain newly discovered tribal groups against the much larger Muslim population that inhabited the Chittagong region. This was reflected in the stilted phrasing of certain basic questions that Sir Cyril considered to be important in making his awards in Bengal,

1. To which of the two States [Pakistan or India] was the City of Calcutta to be assigned, or was it possible to divide the City between them?
2. If Calcutta as a whole must be assigned to one State, what were the latter's indispensable claims to territory such as adjacent river systems on which the life of the city and port depended?

3. Who was to have the Chittagong Hill Tracts, with their small Muslim minority but their intimate physical and economic association with East Bengal?¹⁴

It was quite disingenuous to lump all the tribal groups into one block as it was only the Chakma tribe that sought autonomy and the Muslims only became a minority due to the 1900 Regulations that restricted their settlement in the CHT. If the actual demographic calculations were to be made the Muslim population and the ten tribes other than the Chakmas would have constituted an absolute majority but the questions were framed in such a way to as to leave open the door for a deal on Calcutta (which also had a large Muslim population) that was to be given to India, however, unjust this would be to East Pakistan. Even with such a favorable outcome for India their contingent never accepted these boundaries and there reaction to the CHT/Calcutta formula devised by Sir Cyril is significant in that it was sign of what was to come in the following decades.

In a letter sent by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (a Congress leader) to Mountbatten about a deputation of the Chittagong Hill tribes¹⁵ (probably only the Chakmas since none of the other tribes cooperated with India after 1947) who had expressed to him their 'grave' fear that their area was to be included in Pakistan made the following remarks related in H.V Hodson's, 'The Great Divide',

"I have told them," wrote Sardar Patel, 'that the proposition was so monstrous that if it should happen they would be justified in resisting to the utmost of their power and count on our maximum support in such resistance.' The Chittagong Hill Tracts were in fact awarded to Pakistan. No reason was given by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, but according to the Governor of Bengal, in advice to the Viceroy, the whole economic life of the people of the Hill Tracts depended upon East Bengal."

This may have been a belated attempt at redressing the wrongs committed by the British in the CHT against the Muslims since the passing of the 1900 Regulations or it could be simply trying to make the loss of Calcutta appear more palatable to the Bengali Muslims. Either way the Congress Party's representations in favour of the Chakmas were a mere ruse to keep the province of Bengal united and under Hindu control and influence. It was with the backing of these communal interests that some Chakma groups in an act of pure opportunism raised the Indian flag on August 15, 1947 in the CHT. The pro-Indian Chakmas had even called for an armed struggle which was quickly abandoned as they soon accepted the inevitable when the Baluch regiment of

the Pakistan army took control of the region.¹⁶ In the case of the Congress Party and the powerful Hindu interests in Calcutta the partition of Bengal was only grudgingly accepted with the hope of a retrieval of the lost portion at some point in the future. They continued to raise murmurs against what they considered an unfair distribution in favour of the Muslims who they had thus far become accustomed to discriminate against educationally, economically and politically and which was aptly demonstrated in their condescending attitude to a proposal by the British authorities for a university in Dhaka since the, 'Muslims of Eastern Bengal were in large majority cultivators and they would benefit in no way by the foundation of a university'.¹⁷

The Congress Party had already expressed many of these same anxieties and sentiments in their opposition to the proposed administrative division of Bengal in 1905 by the British Viceroy Lord Curzon. The original proposal of 1902 put forward by Andrew Frazer, later lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, had been to enlarge the province of Assam with the addition of the eastern districts of Bengal (to be separated from the administrative structure of West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa) that was reportedly favoured by local opinion in Chittagong¹⁸ but was vociferously opposed by the Congress Party and West Bengal's powerful Hindu business and political elites. David Gilmore in his biography on Lord Curzon notes that, 'While no one in the area wanted to belong to Assam, the Muslim inhabitants, who formed seventy per cent of the population, would be happy with a new province based at Dacca to which Assam could be united'.¹⁹ This amended proposal was anathema to the Hindus in West Bengal whose protestations formed the basis for their subsequent petitions to the British in 1947 during the consultations on the findings of the Boundary Commission reports and the heated negotiations within the Partition Council.

This obdurate stand on a United Bengal (i.e. an *Akhand Bangla*) that animated Hindu opinion in 1905 had clouded the views of many in India and West Bengal and was to sour relations with its Muslim neighbour for many decades to come. These same political, social and religious circles now desired to see the entire region reunified along the pre-1947 partition boundaries of an *Akhand Bharat*. This is abundantly clear from the writings of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar and Dr. Kalidas Baidya who later contested East Pakistan's right to the CHT and objected to the 'infiltration' of Muslims into the region during the era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The award of Chittagong to East Pakistan has, therefore, remained a particularly sore point and the depth of feeling as illustrated in the context of 1905, is

articulated in a book by Abu Al-Sayeed entitled, 'Shat Cholisher Akhand Bangla Andalon: Purbo Pakistan theke Bangladesh' (47 United Bengal Movement: East Pakistan to Bangladesh). Sayeed argues that after the division of Bengal in 1905 when Dhaka became the capital of East Bengal, Kolkata had been grievously insulted and the greatest harm was inflicted upon the Kolkata seaport. It was feared that Kolkata's importance would be reduced by a vibrant and successful Chittagong port and there would be economic repercussions for all of West Bengal's Hindu society especially the business and merchant classes.²⁰

It was, therefore, with some relief in the Bengali Hindu community that the partition of Bengal was revoked by George V at the Delhi Durbar in 1911. However, after the partition of 1947 India's Bengali Hindus again reverted back to the 1905 position and sought the recovery of the CHT and the Chittagong Port facility through the use of secessionist movements or by negotiation and inducements as was offered in one case by former Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, at a seminar in Dhaka, organized by the Centre for Policy Dialogue in 1998. He had proposed the floatation of a sub-regional economic zone comprising the CHT and Chittagong with Tripura and Mizoram states of India²¹ that would have resulted in the virtual annexation of the CHT and the Chittagong port from the rest of Bangladesh²² and embroiled the country in the disputes surrounding the insurgency afflicted regions of the Indian North-East.

With such communal and ethnic divisions prevailing in India the situation of the CHT since 1947 may be viewed quite favorably when compared to the condition of the once independent states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam,²³ Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura which were annexed by the British and ceded to India after 1947. They were never before dependent on New Delhi and were free from its suzerainty since time immemorial and they have a distinct culture and history separate from the Indian peoples. Tripura, Meghalaya and Manipur only became a state of India in 1972, Nagaland in 1963, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh achieved this status in 1987 and in all of these cases there is an insurgency brewing with regular outbreaks of violence and unrest.²⁴ The CHT as we have seen is in direct contrast, an integral, dependant and an inseparable part of the Bangladesh main land for the best part of 800 years when the first Muslim settlers arrived on Chittagong's shores and Bengali settlements started in the region during the rule of the Bengal Sultanate and the recent insurgency by the Chakmas is merely a consequence of India's interference to redress the dispensation of 1947.

The CHT from 1947-1971 – The Pakistan Period

During the Pakistan period the special status and immigration restrictions imposed by the 1900 Regulations were repealed and in 1964²⁵ its designation as a 'Totally Excluded Area' was constitutionally abolished reestablishing Muslim authority over the CHT region. It was due to this legal, political and constitutional change in the CHT's status that a sudden reversal of the discriminatory effects of the 1900 Regulations was witnessed with the CHT's lowland population increasing by about five times from 26, 000 to 119, 000 between 1951 and 1961.²⁶ If the natural rate of population growth and demographic progression was allowed to continue unimpeded from 1900 then one can only imagine the improvements that would have come from large scale habitation and land use in the intervening fifty years but instead the area was allowed to remain stagnant, uncompetitive and monopolized by British commercial and trade interests.

In an effort to modernize and develop the CHT region the Pakistan government approved the Kaptai Hydro-Electric Project (1959-63) funded by the United States Agency for International Development. Other important investments were made in the area through the setting up of the Karnaphuli Paper Mills which utilized the dense forests in the CHT hinterland where different varieties of timber were introduced and there was already an abundance of teak and bamboo to facilitate the production of paper pulp.²⁷ However, in the construction of the Kaptai Hydro-Electric Project (hereafter referred to as Kaptai Dam) it is estimated that 54,000 acres²⁸ or 40% of the total cultivable land was inundated and that almost 100, 000 tribal peoples (mostly from amongst the Chakma tribe²⁹) were rendered homeless.³⁰ One may cogently argue that this is the inevitable and acceptable costs of progress for the greater good of the nation provided that all precautions and necessary measures have been taken for the rehabilitation and resettlement of those affected by the dramatic changes in their environment and adequate compensatory packages are made available to those affected.

Amongst the many writers, commentators and experts on the CHT issue there appears a sharp divergence of opinion as regards the compensation and rehabilitation measures undertaken by the Pakistan government, as the figures on the actual assistance package differs very widely³¹ but overall it does appear to have been grossly inadequate. This became a cause of continuing resentment amongst the Chakmas in particular, who were the worst affected by the project, but their protests seem to have been quire subdued and never turned violent or militant at least during the Pakistan period. This maybe

explained by the fact that Raja Tridib Roy, 'Chief as well as symbol of integrity and cohesion of the Chakma tribe, was pro-Pakistani in his political outlook. When Bangladesh came into being in 1971, he remained in and subsequently opted for Pakistan, leaving the Chakma tribe without a chief until 1978.'³² This demonstrates that even within the Chakma tribe there were many who were naturally inclined to the Muslim rulers but the problem of the displaced peoples provided India with the opportunity to interfere in the CHT as they had always promised to do since the partition of 1947.

It is estimated that almost 40,000³³ displaced peoples (predominantly Chakma) voluntarily migrated to India after the construction of the Kaptai Dam which had caused their displacement and for which insufficient funds and assistance had been provided by the government. But this was also a problem that all Bengali Muslims had to face in regard to the much needed input and investment in all sectors of the East Pakistani economy that was reportedly being diverted to West Pakistan to build their capital city. Many of these refugees went to the sparsely inhabited areas of Mizoram, Tripura, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh in India and in the last of these states their initial attempts at getting Indian citizenship failed. Only when reports surfaced that the government might be seeking to evict them that the Supreme Court of India ruled that the Chakma people living in Arunachal Pradesh were Indian citizens³⁴ but the government allegedly continued with the evictions in violation of the court order.³⁵ This is symptomatic of India's treatment of all displaced peoples under its own river linking, irrigation and dam projects and the Sardar Sarovar reservoir instantly comes to mind, as well as the 3600 other dams that India has commissioned since Independence and which Arundhati Roy has roughly calculated to have displaced 33, 000, 000 - 50, 000, 000 people for which no provision or assistance was rarely or ever provided.³⁶

With this background it is obvious the manifold grievances, misunderstandings and outright hostility that India could exploit and manufacture for its own advantage in order to redress what it perceived as an unjust award of the CHT to East Pakistan in 1947 as well as entirely rewrite the Partition program to bring in an *Akhand Bharat*. A strong believer in this idea was Major General S.S. Uban, who we have already met in parts 3 and 4, and whose operations in the CHT during 1971 was to become the precursor to future militant insurgency movements in the area in the following three decades after Bangladesh independence.

In his book, 'Phantoms of Chittagong' he dedicates an entire chapter to the Mizo tribe that were the indigenous inhabitants of Mizoram. To include an

entire chapter on a tribe that was irrelevant to the outcome of the 1971 war and the military operations undertaken in Chittagong, there is a certain incongruity in its inclusion in the book unless one looks back at the overall British policy on the CHT and its relation to the tribal groups in Mizoram, Tripura and Myanmar. As we have already seen the 1900 Regulations stated that no person other than a Chakma, Mogh or a member of any hill tribe indigenous to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Lusai Hills, the Arakan Hill Tracts or the state of Tripura could enter or reside within the Chittagong Hill Tracts unless he was in possession of a permit granted by the Deputy Commissioner at his discretion.

The Arakan Hill Tracts is located in present day Myanmar and the Lusai Hills now constitutes the separate state of Mizoram in India which seems to suggest that through the fiat of the 1900 Regulations the British were forging an alliance with the disparate tribal groups that inhabited this area and to create an autonomous zone encompassing all the geographically contiguous regions bordering and including the CHT. The British soon came to realize that the CHT could not be equated with Mizoram or Tripura since the latter regions had a long history of independence and self-government and whose inhabitants were predominantly tribal in character and outlook not tainted by exposure to foreign ways and thinking until the arrival of the Europeans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the case of Tripura the tribal kings had ruled for hundreds of years without interruption and in Mizoram the Mizo tribe who had originally arrived from China at around the 5th Century A.C.E. still now accounts for almost two thirds of the entire population.³⁷ Mizoram was appropriately designated a 'Totally Excluded Area' in 1935 alongside Assam which helped in enflaming their sentiments and passions for freedom and liberty inculcated by the British that led to demands for independence soon after their incorporation into India. The involvement of the British in sowing the seeds for future instability has drawn the ire of Major. General S.S Uban and the establishment that authorized him to eliminate the Mizo threat during the 1971 war,

"The British Government banned any kind of political organization in these sensitive border areas, but British missionaries were given full facilities to convert these simple tribes into Christians and spread Western education and culture into these areas as much as they could absorb.

Mr. Macdonald, the British Political Officer, played the notorious villain's role and wrote pamphlet after pamphlet to educate people in what he called their self-determination. He used the Church leaders and Missionaries to warn

Mizos about their cultural and religious exploitation by India and the impending danger of their complete Indianisation and losing the recently acquired Western tastes. He went to the extent of threatening *Mizo Union* leaders with dire consequences if they did not stop towing the line of the Indian National Congress, the majority freedom party of India. He told them, "You would be treated as traitors and the future generation would dig your very bones out of the graves and scatter them in muck."³⁸

It is indicative that the British took a completely different line with the tribal people of the CHT and did not try to proselytize them into their way of thinking and rejected outright the idea of a confederation with India which had been put to the Congress Leadership by the Hillman Association that had been formed by some traditional Chieftains of the area in 1946. On the other hand, the situation of the Mizo tribes was substantively different in terms of both history and culture so that calls for liberty and freedom could not be simplistically attributed to the teachings of British missionaries and diplomats alone. On 22 October 1961, a political party was formed in *Mizoram* that named itself the Mizo National Front (MNF) led by its President Mr. Laldenga³⁹ who had expressed the desire for an Independent Mizoram State and who is said to have authorized the creation of insurgent bands⁴⁰ to violently realize this dream if necessary.

It was the duty of Major General Uban to infiltrate and then crush the Mizo tribe in his guerrilla operations in the CHT during the 1971 war and a useful pretext for these actions was to scapegoat the Pakistani and Chinese militaries⁴¹ and divert attention of his Special Frontier Force into attacking Mizo strongholds in the region where many had sought refuge. What Uban fails to have mentioned is that on the commencement of hostilities with the Pakistan Army it was well within their rights to assist freedom movements in Mizoram and cooperate with the Mizo tribal insurgency in combined operations against the Indian military. In most cases, however, it seems the Pakistanis and Mizos were acting defensively and it was the SSF that was the aggressing party as can be surmised from Uban's retelling of his exploits in 'Operation Eagle'.⁴²

Another aspect of Uban's mission can be gleaned from chapter 9 of his book in which he provides detailed descriptions of the geography and topographical features of the CHT area that bear the hallmarks of a typical military surveying and reconnoiter of the region for possible future use. This information was probably of invaluable assistance in RAW's coordinating the Chakma secessionist insurgents, the Shanti Bahini, from the 1970's onwards.

Uban tacitly indicates that this cooperation started during the 1971 war with the inducement that the SFF would be used to destroy the Kaptai Dam⁴³ (a plan that was subsequently abandoned presumably on the premise that the Indians would need it when they were able to wrench away control of the CHT from Bangladesh) but their instructions were eventually confined to the more limited but no less important objective of securing the Chittagong Port facility.

It is Uban's open admission of Mr. Rameshwar Nath Kao's⁴⁴ full support in all 'legitimate action' for the SFF that leads us inexorably to the RAW historian Asoka Raina who expressly admits to a link between the Indian intelligence agency and the Shanti Bahini,

"Towards the extreme end of Bangla Desh in the eastern borders, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Chakma guerillas operated, who like the Mukti Bahini, had closely assisted RAW operatives and the Indian Army during the liberation of Bangla Desh. The features of the Chakma tribesmen were no different from the Mizo rebels, who were also equipped with arms to be used for prolonging the insurgency in India's North-East. The Chakmas offered to lose themselves in the Chittagong hill tracts and infiltrate among the Mizo rebels, and pass on information to the Indian government, in lieu of asylum to their families. This offer was accepted."⁴⁵

This was the prelude to the sustaining and deepening ties between RAW and the Shanti Bahini that was renewed after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. In a more contemporary setting the above discussion also helps explain India's eagerness for transit rights⁴⁶ that would dissect Bangladesh offering a direct route to the fractious North-East states and indirectly assist in the prolongation of the secessionist insurgency in the CHT which could be then more easily controlled and integrated to the wider scheme for an *Akhand Bharat* as we shall see in the next part.

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THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 5C

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the CHT

On the independence of Bangladesh on December 16, 1971 and the installation of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as Prime Minister the new nation was instilled with the combined ideals of nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism and a national character that emphasized the 'exclusive primacy of Bengali culture, heritage, language, and the sacrifices made by the Bengalis in the liberation struggle'¹ being the emotive sentiments expressed by the PM during the debate on the draft constitution. Apart from raising certain ambiguities in our relations with the majority culture and population of West Bengal additional vagueness was introduced in the original constitutional provisions of Article 3 which declared the state language to be Bengali and the related Article 6 that made the citizens of Bangladesh to be henceforth known confusingly as Bengalis.

This all demonstrated a lack of understanding in the leadership of Bangladesh between the concepts of culture, language, history and ethnicity with that of citizenship and the rights that such legal status accords to the holders of that entitlement and privilege whether by birth or naturalization. As a result or at least as an excuse, Manabendra Narayan Larma, the Chakma leader and a member of the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly in 1970 and a prominent figure in the politics of the CHT², 'refused to endorse the constitution, since it did not recognize the existence of other national communities or sub-national identities.'³ During the constitution making process and in the very early years of nation building, a delegation led by the Mong King Mongfru Shine,⁴ which also included M.N. Larma amongst the delegates, met with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1972 and submitted a four-point manifesto that could be interpreted as the beginnings of their secessionist designs:

(1) Autonomy for the Chittagong Hill tracts, including its own legislature; (2) retention of Regulation 1900 in the Constitution of Bangladesh; (3) continuation of the tribal chiefs' offices ; and (4) a constitutional provision restricting the amendment of Regulation 1900 and imposition of a ban on the influx of the non-tribal people into CHT.⁵

Sheikh Mujib rejected the document in a furious rage and urged the indigenous peoples to embrace Bengali nationalism and assimilate into the

majority culture.⁶ With the benefit of hindsight and our knowledge of the ensuing secessionist insurgency this was probably the worst approach to take with the Chakma leaders and an alternative appeal based on citizenship obligations and duties could have been offered to the delegates citing the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order, 1972 and the Citizenship Act 1951 which was just then being amended by Sheikh Mujib's legal experts.

Sheikh Mujib should have pointed out the rights and duties associated with citizenship and explained to the delegates the meaning of the legal expression 'permanent resident' which could be altered by simply leaving the country with the intention of never returning and adopting a new domicile of choice as the Chakmas had originally done when they settled in the CHT in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries and again when 40,000 of their tribe left permanently for India after the building of the Kaptai Dam. It is glaringly obvious that 1, 2 and 4 of the delegations demands were inherently contradictory to the territorial integrity of Bangladesh and therefore contrary to the acquiring of citizenship in the new nation which they were entirely free to vacate as they had no other rights that could be enforced - since they were clearly not indigenous to the CHT region. It may be redundant to mention that the 1972 Constitution made no provision for special status for the CHT and the demands that could have been accepted (see note 5 below) were ultimately rejected due to the inclusion of the demands on autonomy and retention of the 1900 Regulation which were the principal reasons for the manifestos submission.

As a consequence or in anticipation of this failed meeting with Sheikh Mujib the Rangamati Communist Party was secretly formed by M.N. Larma on May 16, 1972. The Chittagong Hill Tracts People's Solidarity Association (PCJSS - The Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti) was also launched as a mass contact organization for this party in the same year, although, it appears to have been formed some months earlier to the Rangamati Communist Party.⁷ The main purpose of the PCJSS was to campaign for the autonomy of the CHT and was based on the Panchayat system⁸, with members supposedly elected by the village members but was in reality a dictatorial and highly selective body consisting of Chakma tribesmen who were the predominant force in its make up and operations. The Shanti Bahini was the next to be unleashed on the CHT region forming the armed wing of the PCJSS and the group most responsible for human rights abuses in the area. Their introduction on the scene in January 7, 1973 was separated by less than 8 months from the floating of the PCJSS which shows a well prepared plan and program of action.

The two constitutional principles that held together the nation and defeated the arguments for autonomy or secessionism were virtually obliterated by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in another of his ill conceived and servile decisions that gave an added incentive to the PCJSS and the Shanti Bahini to engage in a low intensity war with the Bangladesh government in the CHT. The provision for a unitary state in Article 1 and the territorial integrity of Bangladesh contained in Article 2 were both gravely undermined when Bangladesh entered into the Land Boundary Agreement signed by Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in May of 1974. Article 1.14 of the agreement stated,

"India will retain the southern half of South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves, measuring an area of 2.64 square miles approximately, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves. India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 metres x 85 metres near 'Tin Bigha' to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) of Bangladesh."

In compliance with the agreement Bangladesh ceded Berubari and even passed the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1974 to achieve this but India has not reciprocated by leasing the Tin Bigha corridor to allow access to Dahagram and Angorpota which was agreed through an Exchange of Letters on October 7, 1982 between the Foreign Minister of India Narasimha Rao and Mr. A. R. Shams-ud-Doha, the then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh. Both the Calcutta High Court and the Supreme Court of India ruled that the lease of the Tin Bigha was completely lawful but the Indian government still procrastinates after more than 32 years of the signing of the 1974 agreement.⁹ This surely can be described as another example of the ubiquitous *Akhand Bharat* phenomenon in Indian statecraft and politics which is also singularly a vision shared by some of the Chakma insurgents¹⁰ and any cessation of land can only provide encouragement to such groups especially when so carelessly given away.

It was only with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that dealings with India rigidified and the government's attitude to the PCJSS and the Shanti Bahini became far less tolerant or lenient. The general public's outlook was also increasingly guided by the nation's self interest and in maintaining its territorial integrity and any type of encroachment in any vicinity of Bangladesh was fiercely repelled with the help of the army or BDR even when the country's political will became fearfully hesitant or was entirely absent as happened during the last Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina

(e.g. incursion into Baraibari, Roumari upazila, Sylhet on April 18, 2001) which contributed to her parties landslide defeat in the 2001 elections.

The Situation from 1975-1981

After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman direct military intervention by India had been considered but was eventually dismissed as being prohibitively risky with the political turmoil created by the State of Emergency (called by Indira Gandhi on June 26, 1975) the situation could have taken a more serious turn bringing international condemnation and censure if the Indian government had taken armed recourse in response to the events inside Bangladesh. Alternative modes of interference were, therefore, adopted and RAW was instructed to actively seek out, communicate and engage with the Shanti Bahini developing upon a prior relationship with the Chakmas during the 1971 war.¹¹

RAW began training the members of the Shanti Bahini to carry out subversive activities to destabilize the CHT region¹² and their collaborative network was further reinforced with the setting up of terrorist camps on Indian territory in direct violation of the terms of the 25 year India-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty,

"In 1975, the RAW was instructed to assist the Chakma rebels with arms, supplies, bases and training. Training was conducted in the border camps in Tripura but specialized training was imparted at Chakrata near Dehra Doon. Shantu Larma's Shanti Bahini members were flown to Chakrata and then sent back to Tripura to infiltrate into Chittagong Hill Tracts. A RAW office and its operatives at Agartala monitored the progress of the trainees. In 1976, the Shanti Bahini launched its first attack on the Bangladesh force. A new insurgency had been born and India's secret war in the hills of Bangladesh had begun."¹³

This low intensity war started taking a serious toll in human lives and property from 1977 onwards when the Shanti Bahini initiated attacks on the Bangladesh military and paramilitary personnel and their bases in the CHT, as well as against non-tribal settlers, 'resulting in hundreds of deaths and the abduction of foreign nationals for ransom money.'¹⁴ These incidents of kidnapping and extortion convinced multinational companies like Shell to withdraw their investments in the area and abandon their oil exploration projects to the detriment of the entire Bangladesh economy which could have benefited hugely from any hydrocarbon deposits found in the region.¹⁵

On assuming power in 1975, President Ziaur Rahman took several decisive and proactive steps to rein in the insurgency and rectify the imbalance created by the 1900 Regulations in the demographic make up of the CHT area that was originally embarked on by the Pakistan authorities and by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman but both in a limited and negative fashion simply continuing the policy of unrestrained movement into the region as prescribed by Article 36 of the Constitution that guarantees to every citizen the right to move freely throughout Bangladesh and to reside and settle in any place therein.

Taken alongside Article 42 that accords to every citizen the right to acquire, hold, transfer or otherwise dispose of property the only bar to entry into the CHT would be the personal considerations of safety and socioeconomic advancement. Sheikh Mujib did not inspire much confidence in his abilities to secure a safe environment for new settlers and his sycophantic administration was lacking in inspiration and also in new policy measures and the guidance provided by the necessary bold initiatives of a great leader. All these defects are reflected in the small number of internal migrants (from other parts of Bangladesh) to the CHT, at around a mere 50,000 individuals (which is likely to be an exaggerated figure) from 16 December 1971 to 15 August 1975.¹⁶

Even this small number was considered a serious threat by Dr. Kalidas Baidya who blames the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman administration for 'artificially' increasing the Muslim population in the CHT and antagonizing the Chakmas who took up arms in response to these intrusions. According to Kalidas the Muslims were infiltrated into the CHT to try to transform the region from a Dar-al-Harb to a Dar-al-Islam¹⁷ which would probably be the biggest obstacle to his program of an *Akhand Bharat* and RAW's attempts at secession of the CHT. He has, however, failed to mention that Crown Prince Nusrat Shah had already proclaimed the CHT area a land of Islam as long ago as 1516 A.C.E. This could not, therefore, be the real cause of Chakma resentment on which the premises for conflict has been based but on an altogether different supposition related to a determination made by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman early in his career as Prime Minister.

If, therefore, the true cause of the Chakmas frustration that had been implanted by Sheikh Mujib could be removed then the will to fight might be sufficiently pacified to allow for compromise and discussion and secure the entry for Bengali migrants into the CHT region. President Ziaur Rahman by Proclamation Order 1 of 1977 wisely amended Article 6 of the constitution which now prescribed that all citizens of Bangladesh would henceforth be known as Bangladeshis denoting an inclusive and non-discriminatory

entitlement and equal representation for all ethnic, cultural and religious groups within the states jurisdiction. This, however, did not mollify the Chakma rebels who now wanted unreasonably to impose the provisions of the 1900 Regulation on the CHT by coercing the government to stop settlements by Bengalis from the plain lands. President Ziaur Rahman ignoring these unjustifiable demands took active measures to encourage settlers to move into the area and with the assistance of USAID, the Government of Sweden, the World Health Organization and UNICEF he was able to provide the migrants with 'transportation, money, a six month food supply, and 2.5 to 5 acres of land for each family'.¹⁸

This consequently became a contentious and politicized issue with RAW sponsoring several highly prejudicial conference reports and book publications disclosing inflated and inconsistent figures for the numbers of Bengali settlers moving into the region that ranged from 441, 000 Muslim individuals during the period of 16 December 1971 to 24 March 1982 onwards¹⁹ or 400, 000 Bengalis up to 1985²⁰ and in another estimate the same number in the short space of 1979-1984²¹ and regardless of which approximation is adopted the government managed only to bring the number of Bengalis residing in the CHT to 473, 301 as recorded in the 1991 census report.

That the RAW sponsored figures and the corresponding aggregates are fabricated and can be proven to be logically irrational is patently evident if one considers that during 1951-1961 the lowland population of the CHT increased from 29, 000-119,000 so if a similar number entered the area from 1961-1971 the Bengali settlers would exceed 200,000 which only allows for a further 200,000 settling in the period between 1971-1991²². The manipulation of these statistics was intended to legitimize Chakma violence by artificially inventing new causes for unrest that was meant to conjure up comparisons with the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but which has no basis in the factual situation on the ground nor in the historical backdrop to the CHT region which had been under Muslim control for the better part of 800 years.

President Ziaur Rahman continued to promote immigration into the CHT from other parts of Bangladesh by creating opportunities for social and economic advancement in the area by setting up the Chittagong Hill Tracts Board and an Export Processing Zone. A Multisectoral Development Program was also undertaken with a view to create the 'necessary conditions for the longer-term socioeconomic development of the region'²³ but it was mainly due to the intransigence of the PCJSS and the Shanti Bahini under the

guidance and supervision of RAW that prevented a more sustained economic take off in the area.

With the 1977 ambush of an army convoy by the Shanti Bahini the CHT region was brought under the GOC of the Twenty-Fourth Division²⁴ of the Bangladesh Army and counter-insurgency operations were started which involved in some cases the relocation of a few tribal peoples to cluster villages aiming at the isolation of the militant Shanti Bahini cadres²⁵ and also the creation of the Village Defence Police to allow the Bengali settlers to resist their attacks.²⁶ Due to the upsurge in violence instigated by the Shanti Bahini in 1977 several thousand Chakma tribe's people left for the Indian state of Tripura. It actually became incumbent upon them to go there if they could not live peaceably as citizens of Bangladesh or suffered a conflict of loyalties in that regard - in the end they clearly preferred being stateless refugees living in squalor and deprivation in India.

Midway into his presidency Ziaur Rahman had appointed Rajmata (the mother of the Chakma King) Benita Roy as his advisor, later to be replaced by A.S. Prue Choudhury to reassure the Chakma tribe of his good will and sincerity towards them and his commitment to resolving the issues plaguing the region but 'the political move did not produce the intended results, as both advisors belonged to the royal family and the insurgents did not have much confidence in their efficacy.'²⁷ In a further attempt at consensus building the President set up a Tribal Convention on 2 July 1977²⁸ to mediate between the government and the PCJSS but was also subsequently rejected by them as internal dissension within that organization escalated as many Chakmas must have felt that doing RAW's bidding was no longer in their interests. With the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman in 1981 - who was rumoured to have been killed in a conspiracy organized by RAW - negotiations with the PCJSS were temporarily stalled.

Negotiations with the PCJSS & The Final Betrayal

Opportunities for negotiations again opened up after Lt. General H.M. Ershad seized control of the Government in a coup on 24 March 1982 ousting an ineffectual Justice Abdus Sattar and appointing himself President. Internal infighting between the PCJSS and the members of their militant wing resulted, 'in the killing of all thirty members of the Shanti Bahini and injuring twenty-two others. Manabendra Narayan Larma, the leader of Shanti Bahini was also killed on 10 November 1983'.²⁹ This civil war within the PCJSS split the organization into two factions, one led by the brother of the slain leader,

Jyotindra Narayan Larma (widely known as Shantu Larma), and Priti Kumar Chakma. The Priti faction reached agreement with General Ershad in 1985 and 300 fighters of this breakaway group accepted a rehabilitation package offered by the government but which was rejected by the main body of the PCJSS now headed by Shantu Larma.³⁰

Ershad achieved this breakthrough by following the policies adopted by President Ziaur Rahman that included continuing the counter-insurgency operations, taking steps to develop socioeconomic structures and pursuing initiatives to ensure a comprehensive political settlement.³¹ Nevertheless, the situation in the CHT deteriorated in 1986 after the Shanti Bahini massacred 38 Bengalis and injured 24 in the northern villages of the CHT in Tainting, Tanakkopara, Sentilla and Assalong and in response, Bengali communities took swift and violent reprisal on the local tribal communities which led to an organized exodus³² of 50, 000 Chakmas to five refugee camps situated at Kathalchhari, Karbook, Pancharampara, Silachhari and Takumbari in the Indian state of Tripura.³³

Dialogue between the government and the PCJSS was revived under the auspices of the National Committee of the CHT and in the second of these dialogues held on 17-18 December, 1987, the Chakma delegation put forward a five-point demand that unequivocally set out a proposal for autonomy and if implemented even partially would have eventually led to secession. The five demands were subdivided into 47 sub-demands³⁴ which called for devolved authority to the CHT under a Regional Council that would have limited executive powers and but the ability to approve its own annual budget independently from the central government in Dhaka.

The salient points of the demands as set out by Dictaan were: 1. Removal of non-indigenous peoples settled in the CHT after 1947; 2. Withdrawal of all Bangladeshi armed forces from the CHT including non-indigenous police force; 3. Retention of the CHT regulations of 1900 and a constitutional provision restricting its amendment; 4. Autonomy for the CHT with its own legislature and recognition of Jumma nation's right to self-determination; and 5. Deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force and implementation of these measures under the auspices of the UN.³⁵ These demands were rejected by the government as being incompatible with the constitution and six further dialogues were held between the National Committee and the PCJSS but all culminated in failure.

With no further tangible progress in the talks the government unilaterally changed the administrative structure of the CHT and devolved certain powers

to newly created region councils. The Bangladesh Parliament in 1989 enacted the Rangamati Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, the Khagrachari Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, the Bandarban Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, and the Hill District (Repeal and Enforcement of Law and Special Provision) Act of 1989. The Special Affairs Ministry was constituted by the government in July 1990 to look after the affairs of the CHT.³⁶ These Acts created three district councils in Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban each composed of a two-thirds tribal majority with a tribal chairperson. This allowed for the smaller tribes to be involved in the political process which had been dominated by the Chakmas, the Marmas and the Tripuris.³⁷ The Councils were given limited administrative and supervisory authority over a number of government departments including Fisheries, Agriculture, Small Cottage Industries, Public Health and Primary Education.³⁸

The PCJSS and the Shanti Bahini managed to find excuses to reject these changes principally at the instigation of RAW as it did not go far enough in meeting the Indian demands which would require a framework that could lead to final secession of the CHT region. This decision was unpopular amongst many Chakmas who were fighting a cause they no longer believed in and which was amply demonstrated when 2,294 insurgents and 30,390 tribals returned from camps across the border.³⁹ It was for this reason that the PCJSS boycotted the elections held in 1989 anticipating a protest vote from their own community against their destructive activities and inflexible negotiating positions.

Discussion were again dogged by mutual suspicions between the Khaleda Zia government and her Indian counterparts over the repatriation of Chakma tribal peoples staying in camps in Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh during the election campaign period of 1995-1996 when the opposition Awami League staged mass anti-government protests and called nationwide strikes which inflicted huge damage on the national economy. It was later discovered that RAW had been paying enormous sums to the leaders of the Awami League during this period and had been a reliable source of funds for journalists, cultural activists and politicians working against the interests of Bangladesh.⁴⁰

It was, therefore, no surprise that the Awami League won the elections in 1996 with the prodigious support of the Indian government and intelligence agencies and other front organizations. The Indian government could now extract a handsome return on its clandestine investments in Bangladesh and

the form this took was revealed by Motiur Rahman Rentu in his book, 'Amar Fashi Chai'.⁴¹ In the book, Rentu describes a visit to Bangladesh in late 1996 of the Chief Minister of West Bengal Jyoti Basu who in a personal meeting with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at Ganabhaban, advised her to sign a treaty with the tribal people of the CHT which would allow them to collect their own taxes and assess their own revenue and the government could do nothing in the region without their permission.

Jyoti Basu instructed her to name the accord a peace treaty and informed her that he had already assured the Indian Prime Minister, Home Minister, Defence Minister and the tribal leaders of the CHT that her government would implement this plan. She should publicize the agreement as bringing peace to the CHT region after many years of conflict and bloodshed and that she may even be awarded the Nobel Prize for this initiative. He also wanted her to accept transit facilities for India and also to hand over control of the Chittagong Port which along with the CHT Treaty had already been promised by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to the Indians during his premiership.

These concessions would have reversed the 1947 partition of 'East Bengal' and bring an *Akhand Bharat* several steps closer to realization but this does not seem to have been of much consequence to Sheikh Hasina who followed to the letter Basu's instructions on forming a Committee on the Chittagong Hill Tracts (NCCHT) with Abul Hasnat Abdullah (son of Abdur Rab Serniabat) the Chief Whip, as its Chairman. After a number of meetings held in Dhaka between the NCCHT and the PCJSS a CHT Peace Accord was signed by Abul Hasnat Abdullah and Shantu Larma on 2nd December 1997 in the presence of the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina but the accord did not, as its terms of reference cynically suggest, find a 'permanent political solution within the framework of the state sovereignty of Bangladesh'.

The agreement could not technically be called a Treaty as the signatories were not two different countries but the Bangladesh Government and a small section of its own citizenry. It is for this reason that the accord is inherently defective because as long as the Indian government is not bound by the terms of a treaty and its obligations supervised by an independent body there will remain the threat from insurgents based in India attacking Bangladesh on the orders of RAW. It was for this exact reason that Article 8 and 9 was included in the 25 year Friendship Treaty but this has not restrained the Indian government from training, organizing and equipping insurgent outfits operating from its territory as a hostile gesture to Bangladesh. With the devolution of power to unaccountable and unrepresentative bodies and with

officials answerable to only themselves this accord if fully implemented would have given India a prime opportunity for interference in the CHT but on a grander scale and helpfully financed by the Bangladesh taxpayers and businesses. For these reasons the most objectionable provisions of the 1997 Peace Accord include the following which have been taken from Part 4 of Bushra's article –

General

1. Both sides, considering the CHT as a "Tribal Populated Region," recognized the necessity of protecting the character of the region while making provisions for its overall development.

Hill District Local Government Council/Hill District Councils

Both sides agreed to change, amend, add, and repeal the Hill District Local Government Council Acts of 1989, and the various sections described in the accord, such as:

2. The name of the Hill District Local Government Council shall be amended and this council shall be renamed as the Hill District Council.

3. "Non-tribal permanent resident" shall mean a person who is not a tribal and who has lands of lawful entitlement in the hill districts, and who generally lives in the hill district at a specific address.

4. (d) The following sub-section shall be added to section 4:

"Whether a person is a non-tribal or not and, if so, which community he is a member of, shall be determined, subject to his producing a certificate from the concerned Mouza Headman/Union Council Chairman/ Municipality Chairman, by the Circle Chief concerned; without a certificate in this connection being received from the Circle Chief, no person shall be eligible as a non-tribal to be a candidate for the post of a non-tribal member."

24. (a) Sub-section 1 of section 62 shall be amended as follows:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, sub-inspectors and all members of ranks subordinate thereto of the hill district police shall be appointed by the council as per regulations and prescribed procedure, and the council shall be competent to transfer them and take punitive action against them in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the regulations, provided that the tribal of the district shall have preference in case of the said appointment."

26. Section 64 shall be amended and enacted as follows:

"(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no land and premises, including the leasable Khas lands, within the territorial limits of the Hill Districts shall be transferable by Ijara (leasing),

settlement, purchase, or sale except with the prior permission of the council, provided that this provision shall not be applicable in respect to the area of Reserved Forest, Kaptai Hydroelectric Project, Betbungia Satellite Station, state-owned industries and factories, and the lands recorded in the name of the government."

"(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no land, hill forest under the control and within the jurisdiction of the council shall be acquired or transferred by the government without consultation with, or the consent of, the council."

27. Section 65 shall be amended and formulated as follows:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the responsibility of collecting the Land Development Tax of the district shall rest in the hands of the council and the collected tax of the district shall be deposited in the fund of the council."

Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council

1. Subject to the amendment and addition of the various sections in the Parbattya Zilla Sthanio Sarkar Parishad Ayin, 1989 (Hill District Local Government Council Act XIX, XX, and XXI of 1989) for the purpose of making the Hill District Council more powerful and effective, a Regional Council will be formed comprising the local government councils of three Hill Districts.

9. (a) The council shall coordinate all of the development activities carried out by the three Hill District Councils, and shall also superintend and harmonize all affairs of, and affairs assigned to, the three Hill District Councils. In the event of lack of harmony or any inconsistency being found in the discharge of responsibilities given to the three Hill District Councils, the decision of the Regional Council shall be final.

(c) The council shall coordinate and supervise the three Hill Districts in matters of general administration, law and order, and development.

10. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board shall discharge the assigned duties under the general and overall supervision of the council. The government shall give preference to the eligible tribal candidates in appointing the chairman of the Development Board.

Rehabilitation, General Amnesty, and Other Matters

In order to restore normalcy in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region and, to that end, with respect to the works and matters of rehabilitation, general amnesty, and allied issues, both parties have arrived at the following consensus and agreed to undertake programs as follows:

4. A Land Commission shall be constituted under the leadership of a retired justice for settlement of disputes regarding lands and premises. This commission shall, in addition to early disposal of land disputes of the rehabilitated refugees, having full authority to annul the rights of ownership of those hills and lands which have been illegally settled and in respect of which have been illegally settled and in respect of which illegal dispossession has taken place. No appeal shall be maintainable against the judgment of this commission and the decision of this commission shall be deemed to be final. This provision shall be applicable in the case of fringe-lands.

8. Land allocation for rubber and other plantations: out of the lands allocated to non-tribal and non-local persons for rubber and other plantations, the lease (allocation) with respect to the lands of those who did not undertake any project during the last ten years or did not properly utilize the lands shall be cancelled.

17. (a) After the signing and execution of the agreement between the government and the Jana Samhiti Samiti, and immediately after the return of the members of the Jana Samhiti Samiti to normal life, all temporary camps of the army, the Ansars and the Village Defence Party (VDP), excepting the Border Security Force (BDR) and permanent army establishments (consisting of those three at the district headquarters and those at Alikadam, Ruma and Dighinala), shall be taken back in phases from the Chittagong Hill Tracts to permanent cantonments and a time limit shall be fixed for this purpose. In cases of the deterioration of law and order in the region, in times of normal calamities, and for similar other purposes, the armed forces may be deployed under the authority of the civil administration in adherence to law and rules as are applicable to all the other parts of the country. In this respect, the Regional Council may, in order to get the required or timely help, make requests to the appropriate authority.

(b) The abandoned lands of military and paramilitary forces and cantonments shall be transferred to their original owners or to the Hill District Council.

18. Permanent residents of the CHT, on a priority basis for the tribal, shall be appointed to all posts of officers and employees at all levels of government, semi-government, council offices, and autonomous bodies in the CHT. The government may assign a deputy for a term of a certain period, provided that qualified candidates among the permanent residents of the CHT are not available for a particular post.

Taken together these provisions if fully implemented would overturn 800 years of Muslim history in the region and leave Bangladesh virtually

defenseless against a new insurgency in the CHT or a military incursion by Indian troops into the area. The accord also tries to re-impose the discriminatory and inequitable rules of the 1900 Regulations with many of the policy making and administrative bodies created under the agreement to be composed overwhelmingly with tribal people from amongst the Chakmas and Marmas and there is also a provision effectively reintroducing the iniquitous Chittagong Hill Tracts Frontier Police Regulations of 1881.

It is with some relief, therefore, that the 1900 Regulations have now come under challenge, after 150 years of its original enactment and almost a decade after the signing of the Peace Accords, in the High Court of Bangladesh through the petition of a private individual under the Writ Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but which is now facing stiff opposition from certain vested quarters.⁴² There is, however, some suspicion that this challenge is a provocative act to highlight the claims of certain tribal groups before the 2007 elections to incite a new round of violence and unrest or it may just be an electioneering ploy by either of the main political parties. Nevertheless, neither of these explanations should undermine the innate justice in having the Regulations invalidated and nullified *in toto* as being contrary to the provisions of the constitution and against the rights of the people of Bangladesh. If the challenge is successful this would require several amendments to the accord which may also become subject to the requirements of the constitution and whole provisions of the agreement may have to be rewritten. Even if the case were to eventually collapse the door to further legal challenges has finally been opened and cannot now be shut.

India and the CHT Peace Accord

Since this essay is primarily concerned with the issue of Indian expansionism the criticisms leveled at the present BNP government for non-implementation of the accord and the matter of rehabilitation of tribals now residing in India becomes totally irrelevant in the face of threats to the nations integrity and sovereignty.⁴³ As long as India maintains terrorist camps on its territory the question of removing Bangladesh military and paramilitary forces from the CHT does not arise and there cannot be any compromise on this issue. With the chance of fresh violence in the region possibly inspired by RAW, Article 17 (a) on removal of military forces from the area is a non-issue for Bangladesh and the accord itself stipulates no time limit on withdrawal. That the PCJSS has not given up its violent ways and is still merely a front for RAW operations was revealed in Dictaan's paper which contains an interview with the

Chairman of the Liaison Committee between the Bangladesh government and the PCJSS, Mr. Hangsadhvaj Chakma,

"If the government is not going to show sincerity on the peace agreement, then it is not giving the people any other choice but to launch another movement – whether armed or unarmed."⁴⁴

It is the lack of sincerity on the part of some of the Chakma tribal leaders that is really in doubt with their consorting with a foreign intelligence agency and furthering the Indian agenda for an *Akhand Bharat* which is discernible from the rejection of the accord by the *Pahari Gano Parishad* (PGP or Hill Peoples Council), *Pahari Chattra Parishad* (PCP or Hill Students Council) and Hill Women Federation (HWF) who argue that it does not go far enough in meeting the aspirations of the tribal peoples for full autonomy (read independence).⁴⁵ This repudiation of the accord has been backed up by insurgent groups such as the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF)⁴⁶ and the Jhum Liberation Army (JLA).

Moral support has been extended to these groups by some western human rights agencies who often receive distorted and prejudicial information from local non-governmental organizations that overplay the alleged human rights abuses of the Bangladesh army and the Bengali inhabitants in order to seek their removal from the CHT.⁴⁷ Nearly all the human rights organizations support the accord but do not explain why if it is so essential to peace in the region the Indian government does not sign a similar agreement with the freedom fighters in Assam, Tripura, Mizoram and the other Seven Sister states.⁴⁸ They do not even acknowledge that the legal framework applied to the CHT is no where near as oppressive as in the Seven Sisters where the Indian government has imposed draconian laws such as the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, Defense of Indian Rules 1962, Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971, National Security Act 1980, Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Act 1985, Essential Services Maintenance Act 1980, Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 and Disturbed Areas Act (Assam) 1980.⁴⁹

The main perpetrator of human rights abuses in the CHT is not the Bangladesh Army who has an unblemished record in international peacekeeping operations but the insurgent groups such as the Shanti Bahini, UPDF and the JLA who have resorted to robbery, torture, extortion, kidnapping, murder, rape and arson amongst other less serious crimes.⁵⁰ The purpose behind this propaganda campaign that emphasizes perceived human rights abuses of the Bangladesh Army but then tries to legitimize the conduct of the Shanti Bahini and other Chakma terrorist groups is to have the military

forces removed from the CHT. This would render the area defenseless against Indian aggression which would be aided by certain tribes that have shown themselves to be more opportunistic than ideologically committed and probably do not appreciate the logic of an *Akhand Bharat* that will leave no one free from Indian hegemony and control.

COMMUNALIST SECESSIONIST CONSPIRACIES

In tandem with the secessionist conspiracies in the CHT the Indian intelligence agencies have engineered new communalist movements in Bangladesh based on the ideas of Dr. Kalidas Baidya discussed in Part 4 of this essay in relation to the creation of an East Bengal and the 1971 war. These groups also seem to derive inspiration from Hindu fanatical leaders like Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, the father of the RSS, who had been the most active proponent of the *Akhand Bharat* ideal after Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. The principal objective of Kalidas has been to set up a Hindu Homeland by carving out a large portion of Bangladesh that would include the districts of greater Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal and Patuakhali. Kalidas has sought the return of the Hindus that migrated to India during 1947 and in 1971 to a Hindu Homeland that is to be called Bangabhumi or 'Swadin Bangabhumi' as it was officially declared on 24 March, 1982.⁵¹

The Bangabhumi Movement started its operations on August 15, 1977 under the name of 'Nikhil Banga Nagarik Sangha (All Bengal Citizen's Organization)' with Dr. Kalidas Baidya as its General Secretary.⁵² Another of the key figures in this movement is Chittarangan Sutar who as a RAW operative maintained close links with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and had established himself in Bangladesh during the 1950's. Like the PCJSS in the CHT the NBNS set up its own armed wing called the 'Banga Sena' with Dr. Kalidas Baidya as its commander. Over the years the Bangabhumi Movement has tried different methods of infiltration into Bangladesh under various guises with front organizations providing publicity and coordination which have included the Bangladesh Refugee Welfare Organization, the Mohajir Sangha and the Hindu-Buddha-Christian Oikya Parishad⁵³ and there are numerous others that could have been mentioned but these have had less success in their nefarious activities. The ultimate aim of all these endeavors is the creation of an *Akhand Bharat* which was the candid and honest admission of Dr. Kalidas Baidya in an interview with the Dhaka Courier in May 1989 where he was asked by the interviewer, "Well, tell me, what may be the alternative to Bangabhumi movement?" Kalidas immediately replied, "[The] alternative is

only one – Bangladesh may accept submission and become a part of India. The Bangabhumii movement may be stopped if it [Bangladesh] accept (sic) total submission.”⁵⁴

The latest manifestation of the Bangabhumii Movement has appeared in the form of the Human Rights Congress on Bangladeshi Minorities (HRCBM) that has highlighted fabricated cases of Hindu oppression in Bangladesh and gained international sympathy for their cause. The HRCBM and its subsidiary cyber group, the UnitedMinority, is an exclusively Hindu organization which intends to create communal violence in various parts of Bangladesh to force Hindus to relocate in border districts of the country and then force India to annex these districts into the larger Indian State (i.e. the program for an *Akhand Bharat*).⁵⁵

This outrageous plan for the balkanization of Bangladesh was disclosed by two patriotic Bangladeshis who joined HRCBM in a brilliant and quite uncommon example of intelligence work and investigative journalism and has been reported by Alochona eForce⁵⁶ (an internet based group) in, 'HRCBM – An Enemy of the State'. Their findings are based on emails exchanged between the leaders and supporters of HRCBM and so is a personalized record of the inner workings of the group and their motivations in Bangladesh. The author of this essay is familiar with one of the leading personalities behind HRCBM, Advocate Rabindra Ghosh, and can testify to the veracity of the report. In the preface to the report the tactics and strategies of the group are detailed which include –

- portraying Bangladesh internationally as a Talibanised country
- encouraging the boycott of Bangladesh made products
- expounding that Islam is the cause of evils
- seeking support from extremist Hindus worldwide
- damaging relations between Bangladesh and the UN and other countries
- inciting India to be actively hostile against Bangladesh
- creating social unrest within Bangladesh

Although the report nowhere mentions the vision of an *Akhand Bharat* there can no longer be any doubt that the guidelines above are intended to try to achieve this impossible Nehruvian goal. The conclusion to the report lays out the specific allegations against the HRCBM –

“HRCBM is an Enemy of Nation States

HRCBM has sought to exploit the post-election violence in Bangladesh by seeking an easily identifiable social grouping and acquiring the trappings of a cause that carries much currency in the post September 11 world.

The activities and motives of HRCBM as exposed in this report indicate irrefutably that it poses a serious threat to the security, sovereignty and long term socio-economic development of Bangladesh.

The HRCBM agenda is one of religious extremism disguised as human rights and secular principles and as such also constitutes a threat to the security, sovereignty and social stability of **any** nation state where there is a significant Hindu community.

HRCBM, its allies and collaborators, its sponsoring and supporting organizations (e.g. RSS, VHP) represent an **axis of sedition** against Bangladesh and Bangladeshis everywhere, irrespective of class, sex or religion."

If the HRCBM organization had been able to continue its activities unimpeded a serious calamity would have certainly befallen Bangladesh. It was only through the bravery and foresight of two Bangladeshis that any untoward incidents did not occur as a consequence of HRCBM conspiracies. It is clear that many people still believe that it is worth defending Bangladesh against the machinations of the Indian government and its intelligence agencies which was at its most threatening during the period prior to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's death and then again during the insurgency in the CHT.

This essay is merely a reminder that the subversive plots against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bangladesh is ongoing and there will be no respite from this onslaught. Agents of India are located in every sector of our society that includes an array of personalities and characters involved in politics, the bureaucracy and administration, press and media, academia, cultural organizations, judiciary and the legal profession⁵⁷, Non-Governmental Organizations and human rights groups (such as the HRCBM but may also include less vocal entities posing as secularists or feminists) all of whom individually or in combination help to undermine the proper functioning of the state and which leads to dislocation and inefficiency in the administration of the country and demoralization amongst the people. The true motivating factor behind these extensive networks and collaborations is to assist in the realization of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's dream for a unified India or an *Akhand Bharat*.

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5 Syed Aziz-Al Ahsan and Chakma Bhumitra - Problem of National Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Asian Survey, (Berkeley), Vol. xxix, No. 10, October 1989, pp. 959-970. and cited in Dr. S. Kharat pg. 7; In addition to this it was also demanded that there should be payment of compensation to tribal families uprooted by the Kaptai Dam and the fixation of the water level of the dam at 90 feet (S.P. Talukdar - Chakmas : An Embattled Tribe (1994) cited in Dr. S. Kharat pg. 7)

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13 Binalaksmi Nepram - South Asia's Fractured Frontier, (Mittal Publishers - New Delhi, 2002) pp-153; See also Chowdhury and Rab pp 12, 38-49, 54-55

14 Amnesty International (2000) section 2 and pg. 24; Global IDP Project – Profile of Internal Displacement: Bangladesh (January 21, 2005) pg. 22; Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri - Ethnicity, Human Rights Violation and Colonial Legacies in Bangladesh: The Post-colonial Trajectory of the Jummaland Movement (2003) pg. 22

15 This policy appears also to have been guided by Indian political and business interests that have consistently created obstacles to the exploration for natural resources by other countries in the CHT in line with the Nehru Doctrine and Forward Policy discussed in part 1. To many Bangladeshis it smacks of gross insincerity and moral duplicity for the likes of Shantu Larma to complain about projects in other sectors of the economy on the grounds of environmental damage or the protection of indigenous rights of which he was least concerned as head of the Shanti Bahini. (A correspondent – Indigenous people rally against open pit mining plan (The Daily Star – May 1, 2006))

16 P.K. Debbarma, and George Sudhir Jacob – The Chakma Refugees in Tripura (1993) and cited in Dr. S. Kharat pg. 9.

17 Dr. Kalidas Baidya - 'Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib' (2005) pg. 189

18 Global IDP Project pg 24

19 Dr. S. Kharat pg. 9; But see Chowdhury and Rab Chapter 8

20 Global IDP Project pg 24; But see Chowdhury and Rab Chapter 8

21 Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa - 'In Search for Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh' published by the UNDP in 2004; But see Chowdhury and Rab Chapter 8

22 If one also takes into account the births and deaths in this 20 year time frame

- 23 Bushra Part 3
- 24 Bushra Part 2
- 25 Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa - 'In Search for Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh' published by the UNDP in 2004
- 26 Amnesty International pg. 5
- 27 Bushra Part 3
- 28 Bushra Part 3
- 29 Dr. S. Kharat pg. 10
- 30 Amnesty International pg. 5
- 31 Bushra Part 3
- 32 Far Eastern Economic Review (March 23, 1989) and cited in Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts pg. 129
- 33 Debbarma and Jacob pg. 50 cited in Dr. S. Kharat pg. 10
- 34 As reproduced in Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts pg. 162-168
- 35 C. Nicholas & R. Singh – 'Indigenous People of Asia: Many People, One Struggle (1996) cited in Dictaan
- 36 Bushra Part 3
- 37 Bushra Part 3
- 38 Amnesty International pg. 5
- 39 Bushra Part 3
- 40 Inqilaab Correspondent – RAW provides four and a half crore rupee to a defeated party (Dainik Inqilaab – April 30, 1992); Abu Rushd – Raw in Bangladesh (Chapter 8 - English Edition 2005) pg 110-112; STAFF CORRESPONDENT - 'Indian agencies offer money to write against Bangladesh' (New Age – August 8, 2005); Salauddin Chowdhury – Bangladesh-India Relation: Truth must be told (The New Nation – 19 December, 1996)
- 41 Motiur Rahman Rentu - Amar Fashi Chai (1999) pp. 209-211 ; see also Chowdhury and Rab pp 18, 21-22
- 42 BDNews – CHT Manual Act challenged (The New Nation – June 9, 2006)
- 43 See Chowdhury and Rab Chapter 6; Staff Correspondent – EU for full implementation of CHT accord (New Age – June 13, 2006); Diplomatic Correspondent – EU concerned over slow implementation of CHT accord (The Daily Star - June 13, 2006); Staff Correspondent – AL hill district leaders want implementation of CHT peace accord (New Age – June 20, 2006)
- 44 Raja Devashish Roy – 'Salient Features of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997' in *The Road to a lasting Peace* (2000) pg 62; DS Correspondent – Implement peace accord, PCJSS demands (The Daily Star – May 17, 2006)
- 45 See Editorial – The Bangladesh Observer (September 9, 2003); See also Chowdhury and Rab pp 26, 35; R. Ramasubramanian – Elusive Peace in the

Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Backgrounder (SAAG – September 15, 2005)

46 Abul Kalam Azad – Vested groups out to disrupt peace in CHT (New Age – April 23, 2006)

47 Mohammed Zainul Abedin – Human Rights Violations in CHT: Myth & Reality (2005); Staff Correspondent – Ethnic minorities for withdrawal of army from CHT (New Age – May 12, 2006); Staff Correspondent – Recover lands grabbed by Bengali settlers (The Daily Star – May 12, 2006); Ofiul Hasnat Ruhin – BNP MP accuses NGO's in CHT of patronizing terrorists (New Age – May 29, 2006); R. Ramasubramanian – Elusive Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Backgrounder (SAAG – September 15, 2005); Staff Correspondent – Rights activists demand action against culprits (The Daily Star – June 2, 2006)

48 See Sanjay Kumar – Overview: Problems and Solutions (Hindustan Times – October 17, 2005)

49 Zainul Abedin – Human Rights Violations in CHT pg 37; Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray – Militancy in India's Northeast (PINR- May 16, 2006)

50 Zainul Abedin – Human Rights Violations in CHT pg 53-64; See also Chowdhury and Rab Chapter 4; Abul Kalam Azad – Vested groups out to disrupt peace in CHT (New Age – April 23, 2006)

51 Abu Rushd – RAW in Bangladesh (2001) pg. 71

52 Zainul Abedin – RAW and Bangladesh (1995) Chapter 24

53 See Shamsuddin Ahmed – Are 500 Hindus leaving Bangladesh every day? (The New Nation – April 24, 2006)

54 Reproduced in Abu Rushd pg. 75 citing Sheikh Nurul Islam – *Tathakathita Bangabhumii Andalon: Bartaman Tatparata O'Tar Nepthaya Kahini* (Inside story of so-called Bangabhumii Movement (Daily Dinkal – December 4, 1993)

55 Indian Low Intensity War in Bangladesh – Case study of HRCBM (Bangladesh Research Forum)

56 The author of the report is Alochona e-Force. Alochona is a cyber forum where Bangladeshis meet and discuss issues of importance to Bangladesh. e-Force is a cyber task force that investigates issues of importance to the welfare of Bangladesh and Bangladeshis.

57 See BDNews – Lawyers boycott SC protesting injunction on 'Dhaka siege' (Bangladesh Observer – June 12, 2006); Staff Reporter – SCBA boycotts court protesting HC ban on 'Dhaka siege' (The Independent – June 12, 2006); Staff correspondent – SC halts as angry lawyers stage sit-in (The Daily Star – June 12, 2006); Sadeq Khan – Opposition gains no electoral capital (Holiday – June 16, 2006); Faisal Rahim – Judiciary under fresh attack (Holiday – June 16, 2006); Editorial – Honour of Judiciary: How can lawyers disparage the sanctified institution? (Holiday – June 16, 2006)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

M.B.I. Munshi

He was born on 5 August, 1972 in the town of Kaliganj in Greater Jessore (now Jhenidah). In July 1973 Mr. M.B.I. Munshi was taken to England as his father decided to pursue postgraduate studies leading to a FRCS degree. The entire family remained there together for another 24 years until Mr. Munshi returned to Bangladesh in November 1996. During his stay in London he completed his education including a postgraduate degree in law from the London School of Economics (1994) and then qualified as a Barrister passing his examinations in 1996 (Lincolns Inn – Called 1997). His family still resides in England where his father now practices orthopedic surgery as an Associate Specialist at the Queen Elizabeth II hospital in Hertfordshire. On his return to Bangladesh he obtained his license to practice as an advocate of the High Court in 1998 and is a junior to eminent lawyer Advocate Khan Saifur Rahman. He also teaches law at the London College of Legal Studies in Dhaka as well as at other institutions providing the London University LLB external course. His articles have been published nationally and internationally and he has been a frequent contributor to several internet discussion groups over the last seven years. He has also been involved with numerous social, welfare and legal organizations in Bangladesh and elsewhere.

Indian move to establish United India through United Bengal

Khodeza Begum

Certain activities prejudicial to the national independence and territorial integrity of Bangladesh has drawn the attention of all conscious persons in and outside the country. A demand has been raised to re-establish an undivided subcontinent which was forcefully asserted at a press conference held in a restaurant in Dhaka on December 29, 1991 on this topic. 'Upamahadesh Punorujjibon Andolon' (movement for revival of the sub-continent) is the name of the outfit behind the organisation of this event. In a party later held on 31 December, 1991 and hosted by this same group, a speech was delivered by a Congress party scholar, especially brought in from India, who inaccurately suggested that none but Muhammad Ali Jinnah was responsible for the partition of India in 1947. The speech was intended to imbibe new thoughts into Bangladesh and South Asia seeking the rejection of the two-nation theory.

Afterwards a cover story was published in the weekly Bichinta magazine regarding the establishment of a social and political movement for the revival of a united subcontinent. In an interview, given by a leader of the UPA, it was indicated that their desire was to go back to the pre August-1947 scenario of a united India. It may be usefully mentioned here that a brochure published under the title of 'Ashamprodaik Upamohadesher Ishtehar' (communiqué of non-communal subcontinent) proposed to place defence, currency and some other state responsibilities under the disposal and coordination of the centre (presumably New Delhi). A map of India was printed on the cover page of this booklet where the surrounding countries were not clearly shown and were therefore not obviously discernible.

A similar seminar, arranged by the World Peace Council and its Bangladesh chapter, was later held in Dhaka under the slogan for a 'new urge in the field of South Asian regional co-operation'. The political elites of the country participated in the seminar in which it had been earlier decided that the agenda of the discussion will be focussed principally on South Asian regional co-operation. Nevertheless, a Congress party leader, Mayaram Surgeon and others dwelled in their speeches on the proposal for a united India. Mayaram said, 'Why can't we establish a united state of the pre-1947 configuration? We did not want separation. We were separated by the British design on the basis

of religion. But now it is proved that division on the basis of religion can not exist. We want to return to pre-partition India'.

It would have been very difficult to hold a seminar explicitly in the name of a 'New urge to establish an undivided India', which was in reality the main theme of the seminar. With such an agenda, so expressly and overtly stated, it would have been near impossible to have obtained the assurance of the participation of the political leaders of the country. Discussion was, therefore, primarily concentrated on the issue of regional co-operation. Here it may be pertinent to mention a few things about the World Peace Council which was formed by the patronisation of the erstwhile Soviet Union and was basically a Soviet intelligence initiative (*The daily Telegraph*, 02 March, 1992).

Visiting Indian artistes, litterateurs, journalists and intellectuals to Bangladesh have taken part in various meetings and seminars and have been prone to giving extensive and wide ranging sermons and are now making unwarranted comments on the desirability of a reunited India and a reunited Bengal, which in the final analysis, amounts to very much the same thing. Some time back, Shib Narayan Ray, an Indian intellectual, spoke enthusiastically for an undivided Bengal. In an interview with a weekly he stated that both the parts of Bengal would be inevitably reunited. But he did not clarify on how both the parts of Bengal would be merged, nor did he say whether Indian administered Bengal will be freed from Indian subjugation to be united with Bangladesh or Bangladesh will be merged with an Indian ruled and administered West Bengal. Needless to say there is no difference in the slogans 'unification of West Bengal and Bangladesh', 'united Bengal', or 'revival of the sub-continent or an undivided India'.

Let us now analyse these developments from a historical point of view and perspective. The exponents of a united Bengal, undivided Bengal or an undivided India have blamed Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League for India's partition but historical research has shown that Nehru and the Congress party were solely responsible for the partition of 1947. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has stated that the nationalistic spirit of the Congress party could not defy communal considerations in the selection of leaders which should have been on the basis of merit but instead they had to submit to the majority and minority sentiments of the people. Sardar Patel said that partition of India has to be accepted since it was the inevitable solution to this predicament. It was better to be separated on these lines than to quarrel each and everyday. (*India Wins Freedom*, Orient Longman, 1959, pages 19-20, 185 & 197). Many of these considerations are also found in the writings of Bikramaditya who

discloses that Nehru agreed to accept the partition of India considering it as a proposal for an amicable settlement. Nehru and Congress had a deep-rooted conviction that the existence of Pakistan would be for a very short period of time. They thought that Pakistan will not be able to exist due to political, economic and social weakness. (**Shadhinotar Ojana Katha, preface: page-10**).

It was for this reason that Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru and the Congress party did not accept an undivided and sovereign Bengal as demanded under the Suhrawardy-Hashim-Sharat Bose plan. They made the division of Bengal an inevitable fact of history. Nehru in a letter written to Ashraf Chowdhury indicated that 'Bengal and Punjab will have to be divided if division of India becomes indisputable. Because only by making this division, we shall be able to establish undivided India again within the shortest possible time' (**Jinnah and Gandhi - Sree R Majumder**). The British hypocrisy was also an important factor in this context. When Mountbatten realised that India could not be kept united by any means, he chalked-out the plan of partition in such a way that the confronting parts may later be merged together again (**Mountbatten and the Partition of India-by Larry Collins & Dominique Lapier, Page 92-93**).

This was why Sikkim had to be annexed and Indian soldiers were sent to Sri Lanka with Nepal and Bhutan also being destabilised. The assistance provided by India in the Bangladesh liberation war is a historical truth. But we also need to consider the intention of the Indian leaders. On 05 April, 1971, the chairman of India's Institute of Defence Strategic Analysis, Sree Subramanian, who had a close relationship with the Nehru family, wrote in the daily National Herald: 'The crisis of East Bengal has brought such an opportunity to India which will never come in thousand years'. It was also necessary for India to neutralize Bengal for the interest of the strife-torn North-East India (**War and Secession by Richard Sison & Leo Rose, page-207**). During the liberation war, both the governments of India and Bangladesh signed a seven-point secret agreement in order to make Bangladesh dependent on India in all respects. (**RAW and CIA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, Masudul Haq, page:-92-93**).

In clause three of the treaty it was enunciated that Bangladesh will have no army of its own. When the valiant freedom fighters were fighting with the marauding Pakistanis risking their lives, RAW formed a special force called the, 'Mujib Bahini' under General Sujon Singh Uban at Dehradun without any intimation to the exiled Bangladesh government in Kolkata (**RAW and CIA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, Masudul Haq, page, 96-97**). In his book "**Phantoms of Chittagong**" General Uban has also clearly illustrated the

motives behind the creation of the Mujib Bahini. Many quarters opine that the now-defunct 25 year Friendship Treaty was nothing but a revised edition of that 7 point treaty. Clauses 08, 09 and 10 of this treaty indicate that the concept of defence system of Bangladesh and India are codified in one string. It means that defence policy of India and Bangladesh are reciprocal and complimentary. Similar attitude was echoed in the writings of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. She said both India and Bangladesh are complimentary to each other in terms of culture and economy. **(Aspects of our Foreign Policy, page-100).**

To be precise, India has a number of objectives in Bangladesh. These are:

- * Detering the gradual emergence of Bangladeshi nationalism and to maintain India's control over her economy and culture.

- * Destroying the defence capability of Bangladesh due to its proximity to Marxist-ruled and Bengali-speaking West Bengal, Tripura and the secessionist northeast region.

- * Obtaining transit through Bangladesh territory for direct access to the war torn northeast, use of the facilities of Chittagong port to reduce pressure on Calcutta and Haldia ports and free trade and import of gas.

- * Installing a puppet government in Bangladesh and eventually launching an invasion to merge Bangladesh with India. The aggressive attitude of India was ventilated in the writings of Nehru, the prophet of India's expansionism. In his book *'Discovery of India'* he wrote: ***"India will inevitably exercise an important influence. India will also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area. The small national state is doomed. It may survive as a culturally autonomous area but not as an independent political unit"***.

The same theory was echoed in the writings of Rabi Rikhi, India's renowned defence analyst. In his book, *'The War That Never Was'* he writes: ***"India should at the earliest opportunity incorporate Pakistan into the Republic followed by all the territories that composed India before independence. The natural boundaries of India encompass the present-day states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Our geo-strategic imperative requires a subordinate Sri Lanka, Burma and Bhutan, and a buffer Tibet and Afghanistan. No matter what the cost, we must start the process of reintegration. The later we put it off, the more the eventual cost. Once Pakistan returns to the fold, the other states will return at a fraction of the cost and effort. Reintegration can be conducted either peacefully or by war. In 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated. Though Mrs. Indira Gandhi first considered intervention and Army alerted three divisions, in the end the***

government hesitated and the moment passed. The result: our chance to keep Bangladesh in our camp vanished. India would have been fully justified in intervening under the same doctrine that lets the Soviet Union intervene in Poland and Afghanistan and the Americans in Nicaragua and Grenada". Later after the general election of 1991 in Bangladesh, the *Ananda Bazar Patrika* of 2 March 1991 commented that the people of Bangladesh should raise the demand to merge with India.

India undertook the following strategies to achieve her goal:

* Extensive intelligence activities of 'RAW' within Bangladesh in order to weaken and erode the independence and sovereignty of the nation. RAW's activities in Bangladesh have now reached a terrifying stage. It was alleged by an Indian leader Subramaniam Swamy (Janata Dal) that RAW was involved in the assassination of late President Ziaur Rahman (*Sunday, 18-24 September, 1988*). RAW has been deeply involved in the Chittagong Hill Tracts:

'The Chakma guerrillas closely assisted RAW operatives. They were assisted during and after the Liberation War. The Chakmas, after the change of government in 1975, contacted RAW. The Chakmas offered to infiltrate among the Mizo rebels and pass on information to the Indian Government in lieu of asylum. This offer was accepted (*Inside RAW: The Story of India's Secret Service, Asoka Raina, Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, 1981, pp.86-87*).

'In 1975, RAW was instructed to assist the Chakma rebels with arms, supplies, bases and training. Training was conducted in the border camps in Tripura but specialized training was imparted at Chakrata near Dehra Doon. Shantu Larma's Shanti Bahini members were flown to Chakrata and then sent back to Tripura to infiltrate into Chittagong Hill Tracts. A RAW office and its operatives at Agartala monitored the progress of the trainees. In 1976, the Shanti Bahini launched its first attack on the Bangladesh force. A new insurgency had been born and India's secret war in the hills of Bangladesh had begun (*South Asia's Fractured Frontier, Binalaksmi Nepram, Mittal Publishers, New Delhi, 2002, pp-153*).

'RAW was involved in training rebels of Chakma tribes and Shanti Bahini to carry out subversive activities in Bangladesh (*RAW's role in Furthering India's Foreign Policy, The New Nation, Dhaka, 31 August 1994*).

The Indian intelligence had collaborated with the armed rebels of Chittagong Hill Tracts to destabilize the region (*Indo-Bangladesh Relation, Motiur Rahman, Editor, Daily Prothom Alo, 10 December 2002*).

India wants to encourage a pro-Indian culture in Bangladesh. The Indians are working very tactfully in different walks of life, including political,

administrative, cultural arenas, journalists, students and the intellectuals. It should be mentioned here that an Indian daily (**The Indian Express**, 28 April 1992) in a report said: India's intelligence agency provided about Rs.5 crore to a Bangladeshi political party through the Calcutta office of RAW for election purposes. A former student leader who is known as a mysterious personality in the politics of Bangladesh, attended a seminar titled 'Political trend of South Asia' where he pledged to unite all the Bengali speaking people of Bangladesh, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura (**Weekly Khoborer Kagoj**, 23 May, 1991). India has also been trying to confuse the political consciousness of the rising middle class. India has launched a media campaign and cultural aggression through her satellite channels, video and print media against Bangladesh.

Analysing the foregoing we can say that united Bengal or greater Bengal will not, in any way, be an independent or sovereign entity rather it will be merely a province under India. United Bengal or greater Bengal is just another face of the revival of the sub-continent or united India dream. Now the question arises, if there is no border between Bangladesh and India or a pre-47 undivided India is established, then what was the necessity of the Bangladesh liberation war? All patriotic forces of Bangladesh will have to be more vigilant against any evil design prejudicial to our national independence and territorial integrity.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Khodeza Begum

Khodeza Begum has done Masters in political science from the University of Dhaka. She is an assistant professor, Girls Ideal Laboratory Institute, Dhaka. She is a freelance writer and her contributions have appeared in national dailies and web magazines.

CHINA-INDIA-US STRATEGIC TANGLE - CHALLENGE FOR BANGLADESH

Brigadier General M. Sakhawat Hussain (retd)

Introduction

For last three decades there have been continuous geo-strategic environmental changes in South and South East Asian regions. These changes have not only put weaker and smaller countries of the region in enormous difficulties to choose between development and defence. These changes had and still are proving to be most reckonable factors in determining intra and extra-regional relationship. These factors are now proven to be one of the reasons for internal strife. Sri Lanka is a case in point and now Nepal could provide such example in given time. One is not yet sure how ultimate events in Nepal would affect the entire region. In the current geo-strategic setting Nepal's future may have a cataclysmic effect in the region, may bring two of Nepal's neighbouring giants i.e. China in the north and India in the south may bring into collision. Complete monarchical system collapse in Himalayan Kingdom could have dominion affect as far as Maoist movement on eastern part of South Asia. Emerging Nepali political situation may initiate a new dimension in Indo-Chinese relation which is already not so palatable in terms of even tactical relationship. Though relationship between two Asian neighbouring giants is better then ever before yet territorial disputes remain unresolved those could be causes of concern. China in occupation of large chunk of Indian territories in Aksai Chin and lays claim on the entire northern territory of Bramhaputra valley and these disputes would have lingering effect on any relation that may emerge on economic ground. In fact it is Sino-Indian strategic rivalry in South Asia and Indian Ocean its tributaries – Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal in particular- producing seismic effect on many littorals. This South Asian tangle also proving to be a huge factor for internal political dynamics and often proves to be a major regional factor for geo-political shift within and outside the region.

However, the fact is this tectonic shift in South Asian geo-politics and geo-strategy goes back to 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation which made India - the sole power of the region defeating arch rival Pakistan desecrating its strategically located eastern province, now Bangladesh. Since then India never looked back to or romanticised with its *Nehruvian* non-aligned policy. By 1974

India demonstrated her will to shun *Gandhian* philosophy of *Ahimsha*, harbingered nuclear race in South Asia. Pakistan followed suit. By 1998 South Asia's geo-strategic environment had substantially changed with the mushroom that was created with explosions both the neighbour Indian and Pakistan had successfully conducted. These were defining moments that South Asian perilously observed. Since those events and at the back drop of 9/11 one could aghast to observe the strategic arms race in the region and that continues till date. India to be in the league of the big powers and to thwart the Chinese predominance in the Indian Oceanic region -- that India's new breed of strategists consider to be the back water- broke ranks with non-aligned countries to forge strategic relationship with USA.

For long India desired to dominate the region but well appreciated that it cannot achieve its desired aim all by itself-at least in near future – Delhi would need substantial cooperation from USA and now that it found world's only super power only too willing to share the Indian strategic perception. USA readily agreed to augment the Delhi's military prowess to stand between Chinese intrusions in Indian Ocean through the backyards i.e. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and now perhaps through Nepal if monarchy is totally done away with or monarch capitulates under pressure. All these countries have stronger ties with China in two cases strategic ties i.e. Pakistan, Myanmar and in case of Bangladesh relations little over tactical level. Three, out of four countries under discussion, i.e. Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan, shares common boundary with both of these Asian Giants, China and India. Note that in recent development Nepal has re-established old road link with China, a 50 NM (Nautical Mile) distance from Kathmandu to Tibet (China) border.

China Factor in Indian Ocean

With the Chinese visible intrusion into the Indian Ocean both in the West and in the East, India perceives that Chinese endeavour is to envelope India and keep the Northern thrust open as the changed Nepal situation unfurls. From that predicament India's strategic frontier has been drawn. India feels - rather claims - that historically Indian Ocean has been the back pool for Indian navy to keep the intruders at bay. Yet India could hardly stop Chinese presence in the Ocean as this is considered to be the Chinese oil route from the Gulf through Malacca to Chinese Far East, life line for China. The ever increasing energy demand at home made China make huge investment in that sector in Afro Asian countries though many of such countries are now going through either internal conflict or some kind of semi-colonialism. Point to note that

80% of total oil import is from the Gulf region and rest from Africa transported through the sea lane of Indian Ocean. Therefore, both Hormuz and Malacca Strait falls within the critical path of Chinese Sea Lane of Communications (SLOC). For long China has been working to shorten this distance and as well as took steps to establish much safer route from Gulf to main land China.

China perceives possible disruption in its sea lane of communication with intensified anti China Indo-US rhetoric. With the recent turn of world events, i.e. 9/11, USA found a natural ally in India. And ever since growth of strategic synergy between two, is viewed by Chinese analysts as growth of a proxy power to check perceptive Chinese military and strategic ingress in the region. In that realm Mr. Zhang Lijun, a member of China Institute of International Studies, expresses in his recent column written at the backdrop of US President's South Asia visit in March, " — most importantly, India is the best bet to restrict a future strong China, as per US regional strategy in Asia. The American media has said Bush's India visit is as important as that of Richard Nixon's trip to China in 1972. Nixon was then trying to get China to resist the Soviet Union. Today, Bush is using the same strategy to resist China" (Beijing Review: Vol. 49 No.11 March 16, 2006).

Sino-Pak Strategic Cooperation- 'Energy Corridor'

In continuation to the above context let us then analyse the Sino-Pak strategic relationships that according to both the countries, 'withstood the test of the time'. Sino-Pak strategic relations earlier did take deep root with the opening of Kara-Koram Highway (KKH), connecting Chinese South Western province of Xinjiang, Uighur Autonomous Province and Arabian Sea through Pakistani port of Karachi and now with exclusive port of Gwadar, Baluchistan. In fact almost five decade old relation now deepens to an extent of strategic convolution with the commissioning of Gwadar port, approximately 300 km from world's most contested water channel, Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf.(old name but easier to identify). Well laid KKH now connecting Gwadar, makes it most secured and convenient energy route for Beijing. In fact in Chinese terms this strategic opening as "Chinese energy corridor". Gwadar is designed with refinery and oil and gas terminal. KKH also provides defined 'pipe line route' from Gwadar and possible gas pipeline from Iran via Pakistan to China. As a matter of fact, report suggests that a refinery has been setup to refine Middle Eastern crude for China and to be transported by tankers and pipeline. China had had huge investment in Iraq whose future is uncertain. Point also to note that china is the second largest investor in Iran. However,

the energy corridor in discussion i.e. all along KKH, will not only transport Middle Eastern oil but this will facilitate oil from Africa as well. China is one of the largest investors in West and North African energy sector. In one estimate it is said that this route would be 20,000 km shorter than the route via Cape of Good Hope. Fact is that in case of African oil transportation this route would reduce 25 percent transport fees and time would reduce by over one month.

According to Chinese analysts, once fully operational, Gwadar would reinvigorate Chinese economy but the most important task would be to secure this crucial energy route which would prove to be a life line for China in due course of time. Therefore, it would be of paramount importance for Beijing to keep its national interest protected with growing influence and developing strategic relationship with countries of the region. Stating the importance of Sino-Pak strategic growing synergy Mr. Ni Yanshuo writes, "for long time, energy security remains a large headache to China because of the fragile security environment in the Strait of Malacca ". It is evident that Sino-Pak strategic relationship now is more important to Beijing than Islamabad as Pakistan would be important link to 'Chinese Energy Security'. Mr. Ni also writes about the importance of Sino-Pak strategic relationship, " to China, Pakistan's role is far beyond the energy corridor. It is also the sea channel connection between China and the Indian Ocean and land channel connecting China and Iran. Its unique geographical position connecting East Asia and West Asia and joining Indian Ocean and the hinterland of Asia also supplies a new channel for Chinese enterprises to go global" (Beijing Review: March 30, 2006 Vol: 49 No: 13). In fact the route is considered to be vital to Chinese national interest and no doubt that China then would like to protect its "corridor" from any kind of disruption and that would include sea lane to and from Gwadar that may include a Chinese naval presence in the region. Already US strategic analysts perceives that China has acquired a foothold in the region and Gwadar provides an excellent observation post. Thus Chinese presence within the striking distance of Hormuz makes both India and US sceptical of Chinese intention in any given conflict in the Middle East. It is worth noting Chinese stand on growing Iran-US impasse over nuclear issue. China is not in favour of imposing any sanction on Iran as that would amount to disruption flow of Iranian oil for China.

Pakistan's Naval Build up in the Arabian Sea and in the Gulf

Pakistan - strategically located closer to Hormuz region world's key oil route- attaches more importance to its sea lane of communications to and from

Middle East and beyond. Pakistan's strategic interest lies more in the west than east beyond Bangladesh. Thus Islamabad's commitment to the East of Bangladesh and beyond is bare minimum baring aside the economic ties with Japan, though Musharraf had taken what can best be termed as a half hearted look East policy much to emulate Indian endeavour. Therefore, it is but natural that Pakistan's strategic do not include Malacca nor it has the capacity to reach beyond its EEZ. What Pakistan has endeavoured in last decades to increase its influence in parts of Central Asia but that too suffered considerable reversal with the collapse of Taliban regime in Kabul.

However, Islamabad's ostensible existing ties with Central Asia are also under challenge from India, evidently more so with the growing row between Kabul and Islamabad on security issues. India figures prominently in Afghan reconstruction apart from NATO countries. Delhi is engaged in infrastructural development and provided grant around six million US dollar. Amount may be meagre in terms of Afghanistan's requirement but it indicates Delhi's resolve to remain engaged in Central Asia through Afghanistan. On the other hand Indo-Iran relation is considered to be the key to India's access to Central Asia. India has huge investment in Iranian energy sector. India's energy demand has grown many folds and it depends on the Gulf and to some extent Iranian energy source. In fact proposed Iran-Pakistan- India pipeline was and still is dream project for boosting Indian economy.

On the contrary, Islamabad's relation with Iran has been lukewarm since the Iranian revolution followed by Afghan Jihad. Iran was isolated during Afghan Jihad though Tehran hosted eight Mujahideen groups - commonly known as Tehran eight- who were fighting Soviet occupation without much of US help. Since then Islamabad's land route access to Suez or to Red Sea or to Mediterranean could hardly develop through Iran, though such cooperation existed for brief period of Pakistan's first military ruler Ayub Khan. Ayub had initiated RCD (Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) at the height of cold war to keep Soviets out of the region. It did not workout as was desired, Shah of Iran distanced himself from Kashmiri dispute blown into full-fledged war of 1965. Nevertheless, Pakistan's quest for alternative route continued till Soviet collapse in Kabul but for brief period. 9/11 changed that strategic equation.

Pakistan - Central Asian communication - developed after Soviet withdrawal from Kabul - remains disrupted due to instable Afghanistan. It is therefore, Pakistan's compulsion to keep its vital sea lane open and secured, particularly being with the outer perimeter of epi-centre i.e. Gulf region. With that aim in view Pakistan has also embark upon developing its naval power to face the challenge that principally from arch rival India.

Be it as it may, in current global scenario Pakistan do figure as key frontline state to global 'war on terror' with the fuss over Pakistan's involvement in proliferation of nuclear technology, USA still finds Pakistan's usefulness in confronting Islamists in the region and elsewhere in the world. Islamabad has taken the strategic advantage of its usefulness in US militarised foreign policy – now under sever reversal in Iraq. It is reported that Pakistan's navy had taken up key role in Gulf as part of Coalition Maritime Security Campaign (CMSC). Pakistan navy has assumed the command. "Pakistan is the first country outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to lead such a cooperative effort against terrorism. Considering that the Pakistani naval forces are bound to receive more international attention because of this high-profile Mission" writes Fedrico Bordonaro in Asia Times on Line (28 April 06). The writer also high lights the recent development of Pakistan navy in cooperation with China. He writes in his article titled 'Pakistan takes steps to strengthen its navy' that in collaboration with China and France Islamabad is strengthening its navy with offensive power by adding submarine with technology transfer for home production yet Chinese collaboration remains vital in this sector. Mr. Fedrico Bordonaro further explains," The Sino-Pakistani deal is significant both from a political and a strategic point of view. Politically, it marks a new stage in a long-standing strategic partnership, whereby the two Asian powers recently signed a "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good-Neighbourly Relations". The deal includes the joint production of the multi-role JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft for the air force and also acquisition of a guided-missile attack craft based on a Chinese design. In addition, it foresees cooperation in nuclear-power generation, as well as strategic infrastructure projects, such as the widening of the Karakorum Highway".

Mr. Federico Bordonaro substantiates earlier discussed analysis on Pakistan's predicament of its close association with US in the hunt of al-Qaida and Taliban in its own soil. He concludes, "Islamabad finds itself in a difficult strategic environment. The endurance of the Islamist radicalism and al-Qaeda's presence in the regions bordering Afghanistan is causing tension with Washington and is forcing the administration of President General Pervez Musharraf to reassess its national-security strategy. At the same time, India's rise as a great power means Pakistan cannot abandon its classical security priority, that is, to maintain a regional balance of power with New Delhi. Therefore, strategic cooperation with China and France to boost its own

maritime power will continue to be in Islamabad's best interests" ('Federico Bordonaro Asia Times Apr 28, 2006).

No doubt Pakistan's cooperation both with US and China would remain vital but out of the two Pakistanis are more comfortable with China being next door neighbours to some extent sceptical of India's rising power. As the situation in Iraq deteriorates, Afghanistan remains unstable and Iran issue complicates in given time Pakistan would pushed take hard look at strategic relation with China and not so strategic relationship with USA. In all probability, Arabian Sea would witness a flurry of strategic environmental changes in coming year and beyond.

Indian Ocean-Indian Naval Build-up

We have already discussed emergence of India the dominating power in South Asia in the backdrop of the historical military victory against arch rival enemy Pakistan in 1971 and since then India never looked back. Indian political leadership maintained its clearly stated aim to 'be counted in league of big power nation's. In fact it became national obsession. While ascending to the 'Rajib doctrine' then prim-minister late Rajib Gandhi had said that India is a power who should naturally dominate the Indian Ocean that is regarded as back water of India. His doctrine called for 'blue water navy' to dominate from Malacca in the East to *Hormuz* and beyond. Rajib doctrine is one of the fundamental that Indian power projection tool i.e. navy is being built up as prim strategic force.

Be it as it may, before proceeding further one may to look at the current strategic thinking as was defined by then prime minister Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee on November 1, 2003 while addressing 'Combined Commanders Conference'. He said, "as we grow in international stature, our defence strategies should naturally reflect our political, economic and security concerns, extending well beyond the geographical confines of South Asia". He further said and -- which indicates India's willingness to work as US proxy in the region as both nations interest convolutes-- "our security environment ranges from the Persian Gulf to Strait of Malacca across the Indian Ocean, includes Central Asia and Afghanistan in the North West, China in the North east and South East Asia. Our strategic thinking has also to extent to these horizons".

Keeping the changed strategic ambiance and geo-strategic goal set, within given strategic frontier concept, Indian Armed Forces are under the process of restructuring to graduate from tactical to strategic force. In that Indian navy -

one of the largest in the world - has planned to have minimum three aircraft carrier-based task forces with three to five marine expeditionary forces with added surveillance and logistic system. Though the restructuring may take number of years but weapon induction mainly from Israel, Russia and now from USA and improvement of logistic/base facilities have taken priority. In that the first and the biggest inclusive naval base – INS Kadamba, west coast 100 km south of Goa, been commissioned. The base within the first phase modernisation plan estimated cost US\$ 8.13 billion. Situated at Karwar of Karnataka, Kadamba 'is being described as the biggest base of its kind in this side of the Suez canal'. It is also considered to be the Asia's largest base which would be able to handle 22 ships including 44,000 –ton aircraft carrier 'Admiral Gorshkov' (*INS Vikramaditya-also known as Chndra Gupta II, had ruled and influence over large part of South Asia*), as well as locally built nuclear powered submarine. This would be the exclusive base purely under naval control unlike Mumbai in the west and Viskapatnam in the south east. It is said that this base would facilitate Indian navy to enhance its maritime surveillance capability, especially naval traffic. It may also be noted that north Arabian Sea is one of the densest maritime traffic area in the world with civil and naval traffic almost jamming Hormuz.

The fact is that an exclusive base *Kadamba*, away from immediate Pakistani attack in a conflict scenario, would also facilitate monitor Chinese naval presence in region and *Gawadar*-as has been stated elsewhere. Prominent Indian maritime pundits hold similar view. While discussing the strategic benefits, one of the prominent analysts Professor Lawrence Prabhakar of Madras Christian College and research fellow of maritime security at Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, said, " China's submarine, especially its nuclear attack submarines, would frequent *Gwadar* province of Baluchistan, (*which is being described as China's listening post in the Persian Gulf*) in near future. Besides monitoring Chinese naval movements in these waters, India will have to keep an eye on Pakistan's deployment of its newest submarines-the new Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines, like French *Scorpene*". With Karwar base in operation Indian naval Western Command might be shifted out of Mumbai. Shifting of the strategic command with nuclear assets is also a probability. Number of other analysts feels that complete project of the naval up lift plan would put 'impetus on naval development on acquiring blue water capabilities'. Though India is yet to acquire the distinction of Blue water navy yet it has the capability of monitor Malacca Strait as much as like Hormuz. One should not lose the sight of the fact is that it was Rajib Gandhi

who not only was the proponent of India's power projection within the Ocean through its naval prowess as per his doctrine but he demonstrated with deploying rapid Action Force supported by navy in Maldives crisis in late 89's. He initiated reinvigorating Indian navy to dominate Indian Ocean as professed by Kotilya (Chananya) and Admiral Mahan.

Convergence of Indo-US strategic Interest

It is common knowledge that in recent years Indo-US relation has graduated into a full blown strategic partnership. US does not, at this stage, consider India inimical to its national or global interest. India is now viewed as a power that can compliment US effort to maintain US interest particularly in the Indian Ocean and Central Asian region. In fact this relationship certainly developed at the backdrop of growing Sino-US strategic discord in Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean region. While measuring Indo-US strategic relationship, one has to take note of Indo-US 'civilian' nuclear treaty - though yet to be ratified by US congress-as and when ratified by the US Congress, India could be the only country out of non-NPT signatory countries recipient of required nuclear fuel and other facilities - ostensibly for civilian use. In that case India would be first to receive such help even being one among three nations who are not the signatories of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty). It is said that out of 22 Indian nuclear establishment (as reported) 8 are known to be military facility those would remain out of the preview of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspection. Analysts suggests fuel received under treaty from NSG (Nuclear Supply Group) would ease pressure from India's uranium stock which then could be stockpiled and be used exclusively for military facility.

However, to summarise, it is not only that India has started receiving help from US to upgrade its tactical and strategic weapon capability but with Washington's approval Israel has almost replace Soviet Union in supplying hi-tech military hardware of US technology. These include both tactical and strategic weapon and surveillance system. Though there are little political opposition to Indo-US-Israel relation yet a significant section of Indian left leaning politicians are sceptical of Indo-US-Israel card which could be used against communist China. Many Indian views US policy world over is too hegemonic for a democracy like India to have strategic relationship but present governments intentions - to be more then a willing partner- were made clear with two recent joint air exercises in Bagdogra air base, West Bengal separately with USAF (US Air Force) and IAF (Israeli Air Force) without any resistance from Left Front, flag bearers of 'non-aligned

movement. Bagdogra, 6.7 nm (nautical mile) from Bangladesh border town, Tetulia, 266 nm from Lasha, Tibet (China) military town and 1,858 nm from Beijing is considered to be one of the most strategic bases to monitor southern China. These exercises did send strong signal to China of the perceptive Indo-US strategic convergence and the aim of such union. Aim was to demonstrate US's willingness to help India grow into bigger then a regional power to stand up to China if need be.

Be it as it may, on the positives of much needed Indo-US relationship for India to be counted as world power, one of the leading security analysts, Dr. Subhash Kapila writes, " it is imperative that all shades of political opinion in India and 'the non-aligned Delusionists' of India's journalist and academic fraternity realise that (a) India's national security interests demands that a US-India strategic partnership is imperative (b) India's aspiration to be a key global player cannot be facilitated by non-aligned or attempts to create a multi-polar world (Chinese approach) (c) India's aspirations to be a key global player can be facilitated only by the United States". He further writes, "Domestic opposition in India to India's commitment of troops to Iraq was an illogical reaction of our 'Non-alignment Delusionists'. The Indian prime-minister himself (Vajpayee) averred to this aspect in his conference by asserting that 'many in our country are still caught in a Cold War time wrap and strategic assumptions of an earlier era" (India Defines Her Strategic Frontier-An Analysis : Dr. Subhash Kapila : SAAG Dated 4 November 2003). One may not need to go in detail of Indian urge to correct the historical mistake that was committed by *Neheruvian* policy of Non-alignment prior to 1962 Sino-Indian clash, the traumatic wound that India still licks.

Sino-India-US Tangle in Bay of Bengal

Having discussed the efficacy of Indo-US strategic convergence and Indian interests in the Gulf and Arabian Sea, one needs to analyse emerging pattern of triangular power projection in Bay of Bengal Region and its effect on the regional countries, particularly on Bangladesh and Myanmar. To a great extent Indian strategic interest in Bay of Bengal littoral, is perceived to be much of strategic value then Arabian Sea. Reportedly, Indian Eastern Naval Command, now located in Visakhapatnam, has been in aggressive posture since 9/11 particularly to guard the Malacca Strait from perceived 'marine terrorism' by Islamic Militant of South and South East Asia. But at the backdrop it is Chinese presence in Bay of Bengal through Myanmar and possible collusion with

Bangladesh that Indian security experts and policy makers are concerned of. Growing Indian naval activities in the eastern Indian Ocean could not go unnoticed as Indian naval doctrine suggests a secured Malacca strait is significantly important for India as life line to its economy. Having analysed stated extent of Indian strategic frontier, it is significant to watch over the military growth in Bay of Bengal.

In that above context, it would be interesting to note that prominent Indian maritime security experts suggest on Bangladesh's geo-strategic location *vis a vis* Indian Naval Strategy in the region " the first step of defence planning is to determine the most likely nations which may wage a war against our nation. In India's case, these are Pakistan, China and Bangladesh in descending order. Of these Pakistan and Bangladesh have adjacent maritime boundaries. Bangladesh navy is mainly coast guard with a few frigates with no submarines. Thus our aging carrier Viraat (*which is supposed to be replaced*) and a few frigates with small reconnaissance and anti-ship warfare capable air-arm and two submarine would suffice to blockade and have complete domination over the waters of Bay of Bengal. Air and naval bases at Vishakhapatnam and Andaman island (*was damaged during Asian Tsunami*) could be expanded and modernized to fulfil that role. A war with Bangladesh is remote possibility, but it is best to be prepared for a coming world, where oil (ENERGY) and water are likely to be reasons for future wars". It is also essential to note how much important role that Bay of Bengal's strategic value would play in the quest of Indian power projection vis a vis China. Indian analysts emphasising the interest in bay of Bengal explains, " India has no territorial ambitions is currently interested in being a regional power with no present intentions beyond the Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean (*we discussed*) and sea lanes from Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, through which traverse its own energy supplies and those of its potential allies (*less China*) opponents (*Could it be China? China it is. Note Italics in brackets are mine*). These analysts further suggests, " ---- unlikely though the scenario may be, in the event of a war with China, there must be sufficient naval power and assets to blockade the Strait of Malacca, the bottle neck of oil transit to China" (SAAG Paper 1436 Dated 31.06.05). One should also note that it is submarine with surface ship that either can lay a blockade or break it. . Point to note that distance between Vishakhapatnam and Port Blair, Andaman 772 NM and Chittagong to Vishakhapatnam 660 and to port Blair 300 miles, Sittwe, Myanmar is 166 NM (old Akyab).

US Presence in Indian Ocean

As far as the US is concerned it is highly unlikely that Washington, at any stage would downgrade the significance of the Indian Ocean. Rather it has reinforced its presence in Diego Garcia archipelago- ex British territory handed over to US military since 1971. Diego Garcia, which multiplies US logistic stamina for navy as well for strategic bombers, was utilised during the invasion of Afghanistan to launch massive air raids in support of operation 'Enduring Freedom' against Taliban al-Qaida positions.

The unique geographic location of the archipelago - 1,105 NM south west of Colombo, Sri-Lanka - is within striking distance the current epi-centre i.e. Hormuz which lies at 2613 NM north. Not only Hormuz, Diego Garcia enhances US strategic strike capability to all the major ports of the Arabian Sea in any given conflict situation and eases complex logistic supply in sustained operation. Geo-strategic location facilitates US to monitor Chinese oil route to and from west and central Africa passing around Cape of Good Hope. Point to note that Gwadar port, which would increasingly become strategic staging post for both Pakistan and China, is about 2,325 NM to the north and so is Iranian ports and most of the southern oil and nuclear facilities.

There has been in the past century concerted movements in South Asia in particular and non-align countries in general against the permanent US presence in that archipelago and indiscriminate removal of indigenous inhabitants. India was exponent of such move but all that changed since non-aligned movement died its own death. All along the cold war India had demanded ouster of all external forces from Indian Ocean and Sri-Lanka had been prim mover of the demand to establish nuclear free zone in Indian Ocean but that was not to be the case. Since then nuclearised India is breathing on the Sri-Lankan neck and India landed as the most important significant natural strategic ally of Washington. On the contrary, US to-day, has under its occupation Iraq with largest one time concentration of troops after Vietnam, aiming to have permanent foothold in the Middle East, its tactical presence in Pakistan, Afghanistan and strategic presence in Central Asia, makes Diego Garcia more important logistic and strategic support base away from continental USA. Now that both India, Pakistan are part of US strategic alliance for war against global terrorism and Sri-Lanka bleeding within, it is hardly unlikely that any of these South Asian countries are in any position to oppose US perpetual presence in Indian Ocean. It would rather be interesting to note that USA has desired for observer status in SAARC ever since there

was a move to include China in that organisation. This would be a significant move for future and would rather be – for worse or for good - significant strategic twist for the region.

Sino-Myanmar Strategic Cooperation

As we have seen Chinese interest in Arabian Sea predominated by the energy security but in case of south and East Asia its' economic, energy security and old territorial disputes makes Bay of Bengal region if not more but equally important to long standing strategic requirement. For decades China has developed a long tested strategic relationship with Myanmar. Myanmar is viewed by the security experts of Beijing as part of China's soft belly. Myanmar provides easier access to Yangon through recently up graded Mandalay-Yangon road connecting Shewli, Myanmar border town to Kunming, capital of Yunnan province. This would also connect Sittwe (Akyab) in the West Coast. One may note that Bangladesh had planned to linkup to Kunming through Myanmar and strongly suggests passage of proposed Asian Highway through Myanmar which would also facilitate shorter and direct connection with Kunming, Yunnan province of China.

China has developed, as part of upgrading Myanmar naval facilities both at Yangon and Sittwe- which could be used by frequent port calling Chinese navy though it is reported that China has at will access to both the ports and developed observation posts for signal intelligence (SIGINT) in Coco Island off the cost of Sittwe, 30 NM from India's Andaman Island. Reportedly China built up this facility to monitor its missile testing. A deep sea port is under construction off Rakhain (Arakan) coast north of Andaman Island with Chinese assistance. On 18 April 2005 AFP reported that 'China's planning ministry had approved an oil pipeline linking Myanmar's deep-water port of Sittwe to Kunming in the landlocked south-western Chinese province of Yunnan. The National Development and Reform Commission gave the green light to the project at the beginning of April.' The long-expected pipeline would provide an alternative route for China's crude imports from the Middle East and Africa and help reduce its dependence on traffic through the Strait of Malacca. Construction is slated to begin this year. It could also serve as a conduit to transport crude to China's populous inland provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan and the Chongqing municipality. These developments are quite significance from the regional geo-political point of view.

Above development signifies the fact that Bay of Bengal has been well under Chinese consideration its shorter conduit to the south eastern states currently

witnessing an economical transformation. It is therefore, beyond any doubt that Chinese policy makers are keen to dominate this region with their presence with the cooperation of the littoral countries i.e. mainly with cooperation from Bangladesh and Myanmar. For China relation with both these countries would be crucial in coming decade. Sino- US tangle is likely to increase in the region particularly over the energy issue and its transportation through countries-which according to the past record- has not given space to democratic practice and remained nonchalant on human right issue. US blame increasing Chinese huge energy appetite that chiefly driving the oil market upward. And to acquire its needed fuel from around the world China is supporting 'rough countries' encouraging these countries to continue violating human rights. Beijing considers US rhetoric is to lower Chinese image in Afro-Asian-Latino countries. However, in common Chinese perception is that it is US which is out slow china's economic growth by denying or creating artificial crises in easy access to energy sources. Chinese security analysts do realise that to obviate both Indo-US and Indian naval growth, probable disruption of oil routes, Beijing needs to accelerate formation of 'blue water navy' by the end of first decade of twenty first century.

On the other hand, India has an air and small naval base with listening post much down south in Car-Nicobar Island. Nicobar Island provides shorter distance to Malacca strait at 950 NM. On the contrary India is also developing deep sea port East of Andaman in Andaman Sea south of Sittwe ostensibly for shortening land route distance up to Hanoi as part of Delhi's aggressive look East foreign policy. this move is seen largely to monitor Chinese 'intrusion' within the Indian sphere of influence which, according to Indian analysts is Chinese aggressive policy adoption to remain present in the Bay like that of Arabian Sea.

According to available reports, apart from earlier road linkage, China had proposed another road link to connect Sinkham for access to Irrawaddy River flowing through Yangon to Andaman Sea. If materialised it would ease Chinese goods to move through River barges on and off from Chinese ships. Important to note that as long as Chinese fear of the blockade of Malacca Strait would remain and final status of Taiwan is not determined tension between China and US would grow in Bay of Bengal region. Apart from Taiwan, China has maritime boundary dispute with Japan in East China Sea and with South Korea in South China Sea. US presence in all these strategically important areas makes China jumpy about the future of the Malacca Strait status. As of to-day Malacca strait as important lifeline for China as for rest of East Asian

countries, therefore, to obviate discerning strategic set back China is compelled to develop alternative route as much it needs to its presence felt in the Bay of Bengal.

However, it is needless to suggest that due to the economic sanction on Myanmar's military junta, China has been the main source and power to develop infrastructure, economic stat and military. Chinese investment in Myanmar's energy sector has been huge, particularly in natural gas sectors. Over the years being single source country China enjoyed monopolistic upper-hand hand in Yangon. But with the twist of world events, Chinese influence in Myanmar now seriously being challenged by India as Delhi has been getting closer with the military junta dropping the vociferous support for democratic movement in that country. In recent presidential visit to Myanmar no protocol was extended to NLD (national League for Democracy) leader Aung Sung Su Ki, who once was considered to be icon of democratic struggle and used to be espoused by Indian government. It is also important to note India is second largest investor in Myanmar's energy sector in spite of US led western sanction to force democratic reform.

Be it as it may, like in the west i.e. Arabian Sea, Indian strategists feel that having completed the development Sino-Myanmar strategically important infrastructures, China would be in a position to encircle India from the East as well, as it has done in the west. It would be interesting to note what an Indian analyst Rahul Bedi wrote on this issue, "Pakistan and China were among the few countries to defy international opinion and forge close military ties with Yangon's junta in 1988, cleverly complementing their strategy of encircling of India". Based on this particular perception, Delhi views Sino-Bangladesh relation yet another step towards augmenting that Chinese strategic encirclement. Yet what writers like Rahul Bedi overlooks is the Indian deceitful foreign policy when it comes to countering Chinese growth in the region vis-à-vis US endeavour to keep its dominance through proxy.

Sino-Bangladesh Relation- Indian Perception

In Indian view unlike Myanmar Sino-Bangla relation is yet to forge at strategic level but it has the potential to convert present 'tactical relationship' into strategic one which would definitely have serious influence on Indo-Bangla relations. Be it as it may, existing Sino-Bangla military relationship – fact that this is tactical level relation- is viewed by Delhi as a sign of Chinese intrusion in Indian back water and closer shores of Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh provides alternative and shortest route to Kunming through Chittagong port.

Bangladeshi proposal for Asian Highway via Chittagong through Myanmar, passing closer to Yunnan, is viewed to be as a strategic move by Bangladeshi incumbent government (2006) to bypass India. One has to look at the Indian proposal in that prism. Indian proposal of traversing the Highway through Indian North east then to Myanmar not only suggests a long and uncertain route for Bangladesh to adopt - which would for large portion would remain under Indian control - but that would allow Delhi to isolate and monitor Bangladesh's China overture.

India feels that Bangladesh is already been China biased even in the field of commerce and trade. India feels that Chinese have already gained foothold in Bangladesh through close cooperation with military especially with Bangladesh navy. Delhi is also sceptical of bi-partisan approach towards Sino-Bangla relation. Delhi viewed Khaleda's last visit to China - which had military cooperation as top agenda - with lots of scepticism. In Indian view of so called Sino-Bangla Defence Cooperation Agreement was 'Chinese foothold as most intrusive external power in South Asia. In a long analysis Dr. Subhash Kapila writes that Sino-Bangla renewed military cooperation has provided China with (a) –strategic toe-hold on India's Eastern Flank in Bangladesh (b) China's strategic encirclement of India is complete (c) soon one would witness Chinese plan to develop Chittagong naval base on lines of Gwadar in Pakistan (*now that Bangladesh proposes a deep sea port and shifting existing naval base from the port India's concern would increase in many fold*) (d) China could get naval facility in Bangladesh.

In that same paper, mentioned above, Dr. Kapila spells out strategic implication for India of such developing relationship, (1) "China's intrusiveness in South Asia gets further reinforced (2) Bangladesh's enhanced military profile will have to be factored in India's future military plans (3) India will now have to factor in a fourth strategic concern in its operational plans, namely China-Pakistan-Bangladesh military collusion in the context of any Indo-Pak or Sino-Indian conflict (4) China's naval intrusions are facilitated by Bangladesh into the Bay of Bengal area (5) India's north-east regions vulnerabilities (especially the lines of communication) become more complicated (6) India's IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) deployments in North east against China will now need more securing. Dr. Kapila emphasises " all above (*these*) concerns are realistic and one cannot be dismissive about them as conclusions of overactive imagination".

In the above context, one must not lose sight that territorial dispute between India and China over the north of Bramhaputra valley, now part of Arunachal

Pradesh, remains unresolved and North East India provides shortest route to put Beijing under Indian IRBM threat. Indian North East would be the key battle ground should Sino-India conflict breaks out in any given time. In that case North Bay of Bengal, closer to Bangladesh, would be the base for Indian SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic missiles) targeting Chinese Missile Facilities.

It would not be out of place to mention that if one makes a deep sense of Indian perception of Chinese influence in the region, particularly in case of Bangladesh—seems to be geo-strategic nightmare for India—one would fathom the geo-strategic importance of a corridor or transit through Bangladesh. Implication of such passage through would be of huge military significance to Indian ambition and search for alternative to much constrained only access through northern **JolpaiGuri - Shiliguri** corridor. Transit through Bangladesh would facilitate India to segregate military and civilian passage in emergent situation or in a conflict situation with China as one understands the sublime menaing of Dr. Kapila's dilemma. However, transit remains most important of the few Indian strategic requirements, particularly to counter Chinese influence within the region and in Bangladesh on particular. The strategic Indian requirements also include the demand for the use of Chittagong port.

Bangladesh in North East Indian Tangle

This brief paper would not be complete if North East India's (NEI) six-decades old conflict and its geo-strategic implication for Indian Ocean littoral in general and Bangladesh in particular is not understood. In fact the core of Indo-Bangla relation is much depended on India's success or failure to pacify and integrate NEI where about 145 groups of separatists organisations are engaged in fight with India's central authority. Much of Delhi's failure to resolve what is essentially political issues, by employing force only in most cases, is blamed on its neighbours in Eastern periphery, particularly Bangladesh needs to be discussed. More so this discussion is essential as Dr. Subhash Kapila puts it in the context of Sino Bangla relation, "India's north-east regions vulnerabilities (especially the lines of communication) become more complicated".

Be it as it may, to fathom the NEI tangle and its ongoing socio-politico-military complexity I would refer to a paper that was prepared by one of the renowned NEI expert Dr. Sanjay Hazarika. His paper was presented in South Asian seminar that we shared in Islamabad in February 2006. As of my initial

remark Mr. Sanjoy's paper interested me the most for few reasons. **Firstly**, the paper had reference of Bangladesh; **secondly**, paper in its entirety dealt with NEI current issues that some how Indian authority feels Bangladesh is involved in it. We are concerned with development in NEI as it touches our own security. **Thirdly**, for the reason that the subject was straight from a speaker whose credential as NEI expert is beyond any doubt and a local NE Indian therefore, the paper was not only diligent as authentic as it could be. He is an internationally acclaimed researcher currently involved in Delhi based 'Centre for Policy Research' at the same times he is columnist of The Statesman' and former member of Indian Security Council. Fourthly, his paper preceded mine titled 'Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia: in Bangladeshi Perspective' that also had the reference of continuous insinuation against Bangladesh by Delhi. Delhi particularly blames Bangladesh for perceptive allegations like sheltering NEI separatists and endeavouring to create religious extremism in Asom's five Muslim majority districts.

Many prominent Indian 'think tanks', supported by the government, continuously chastises government of Bangladesh for fomenting unrest in these districts with the help of illegal Bangladeshi Muslim settlers in collusion with Pakistan's ISI with an ultimate aim of annexing or establishing separate Muslim state in the strategically important real estate. A mind boggling and self contradictory accusations that at times crosses parameter of logic. Bangladesh is not a power of any measure that it can support such luxurious mischief against a neighbour as giant as India is. On the contrary bombs had been falling on Bangladeshis and suicide squads threatened its own stability. Surprisingly most raw materials used by these terrorists were of Indian origin passed through impregnable Indian borders. These particular quarters of 'think tank' continuously propagate both within and outside India that Bangladesh is in unison with Pakistani intelligence ISI to unstable NEI ultimate aim to annex as part of it to realize greater Bangladesh. A perception could be as illogical and fallacious as it could be. These rhetoric changes gear with the change of ruling party in Dhaka. It is not so true for changes in Delhi. That sets out wrong signal to the Bangladeshis who happened to be divided in line with conflicting political ideology. In fact these few districts of Asom, those are mentioned again and again adjacent of Bangladesh had been Muslim majority area much before partition of India in 1947. Historically, Asom or Assam had been part of colonial Indian Bengal administration for long time and large migration did take place much before Assam was separated Bengal administration.

In that above context, though Mr. Sanjoy's paper neither blamed Bangladesh directly nor for the increase in Muslim population in those areas as Mr. Jaideep Saikia and others did but he mentioned the contention of the Indian claim both for illegal migration and sheltering separatists. Interestingly, Mr. Sanjoy's paper acknowledged the deep rooted insurgency in NEI mentioning them 'separatists' and separatists organizations instead of 'terrorist' or 'terrorist organization' as other Indian analysts would put it. He candidly admitted that the separatist movement in NEI is the oldest in the region and much more complicated than much hyped Kashmir issue. According to his paper, not only that NEI has divergent ethnical mix but almost every state is infested with small and large insurgents groups fighting Indian authority for decades. According to him there are 30 large groups in existence but as per Indian intelligence review there are 130 large and small groups are in operation. Some of these represent larger section of people who remains socio-politically deprived within the Indian Union. However, it is not number of organization that is of any paramount importance but the fact is almost every state is besieged with separatist elements challenging the presence of hundreds of thousands of security forces operating with impunity that violation of human right is rationalized as operational expediency.

Howsoever, Mr. Sanjoy projects the historical evidence that oldest and one of the longest fought separatist movement of South Asia is the 'Nagalim Movement' which still remains unresolved. In fact Naga movement is considered to be the mother of all insurgency in South Asia. Though the movement has gone through radical changes and transformation but still remains a prim concern of India as the movement has husbanded all other separatist organisation within that region. Naga Movement that started in 1929 for a separate homeland led by Dr. Angami Zapu Phizo and his NNC (Naga National Council) still continues. Currently it is Nationalist Socialist Council for Nagaland [NSCN (I-M)] led by Mr. Isak Chishi and T. Muhiva are the present forerunner of the fight though the other faction out of original organization, NSCN (Khaplan), a pro agreement group has become less significant. It is in this ambit that expert like Sanjoy also agrees that Naga Movement is the mother of all separatist movements in NEI. Therefore, one is tempted to suggest that brief background of the Naga struggle is to be comprehended if one has to understand North East Indian tangle in which, for all geo-political reasons directly or indirectly, Bangladesh remains to be a factor. Indian historian and strategists while discussing Bangladesh's liberation war categorically mentions that the very geo-strategic location of

Bangladesh vis-à-vis NEI was one of the prim factor for India's strategic decision to help liberate people of the then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.

Naga rebellion started with the termination of World War I when the British authority made their intention clear that independent Naga Hills could be the integral part of colonial India. It was in 1929 that Naga's first resented the administrative reform in which Nagalim (Greater Nagaland) was to be integrated violating 1845 accord. Naga leaders sent their appeal to 'Simon Commission' but that was ignored. Nagas living with the Hills rebelled under the leadership of Dr. Angami Zapu Phizo and established NNC (Naga National Council). Dr. Phizo took up arms against British rule demanding independence and placed their long cherished demand of separate homeland as Nagas claimed to be have never been part of mainstream India in any spectre of life. But Cabinet commission, charged with partition of India, ignored the demand. It is alleged that cabinet commission was under the influence of Indian congress set aside Naga plea. On 19 May 1946 NNC modified their demand asking for ten years moratorium to settle the issue of independence through plebiscite, decision was kept pending for independent Indian government to dispose. It is said that though Mr. Gandhi considered Hill peoples demand but the post colonial Indian cabinet refused to concede Naga's demand of independent homeland rather stationed troops to deal with possible insurrection. Humiliated and twice betrayed NNC established Naga National Army, Dr. Phizo as chief to continue armed struggle for national emancipation. Not only that Nagas were fighting the central authority but established an underground Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) to administer Naga Hills.

However, the Naga freedom movement got new impetus after 1962 Sino-Indian war. Chinese communist party extended all possible help to NNC and NNA (Naga National Army). On the other hand the then East Pakistan's South Eastern region of Chittagong Hill Tracts became the hub of not only Naga but Mizo revolt who took to the arms in similar fashion to fight Indian authority. Mizo revolt was then led by Mr. Laldenga who followed the path of Phizo. It was common knowledge that then Dacca (now Dhaka) turned to be the point of ingress and egress for these rebels for outside contact.

The scenario changed after 1971 with the emergence of newly independent Bangladesh as then government flashed out these elements from the soil of new country and that had cataclysmic effect on the much hyped Naga and Mizo revolt. Phizo was arrested for a brief period but then released but he fled through then Dacca after the political change in 1975 in Bangladesh. Phizo

stayed in Britain under political asylum and died in 1991. He never took the citizenship of India so did Isak-Muhiva faction leaders. On the other hand Mizo leader Laldenga also fled India settled in Britain. Mizo's continued their fight till 1986 and settled for separate statehood within Indian union in 1987.

Though Mizo's settled with Indian central government but Naga's continued to fight notwithstanding 1975 Shillong accord which resulted into the split of NNC into NSCN (Khaplan) and NSCN (I-M) as discussed earlier. Currently NSCN (I-M) is considered to be the most powerful of all insurgent group those are actively fighting the Indian authority in the NEI. As of today, NSCN (I-M) holding on to ceasefire with Indian troops and opened the door of negotiations with central authority for a possible political settlement. Many Indian analysts opine that pressure was brought onto Muhiva for settlement through dialogue by Christian Baptist Mission as they continue to have religious influence in the region. Coincidentally, because if the Christian Missions access to the region in 18th century, aboriginal Nagas', were converted to the faith of the rulers i.e. Christianity. So did Mizos. To day both Mizoram and Nagaland are preponderantly Christian dominated states.

Nevertheless, the fact is that long drawn Naga revolt had catalytic effect in other part of the NEI. Almost every state is now under intense insurgency particularly that of Asom and Naga movement is considered to be the mother of all insurgency in NEI as stated earlier too. It is now alleged by Indian policy makers that in same manner as that of pre-1971, these insurgents are finding refuge in Bangladesh and Dhaka is back in its old role providing window to the world for much of the Indian separatist leaders. In fact it is alleged that south eastern Bangladesh has become the corridor for armed smuggling into NEI and elsewhere. Two main insurgent groups, NSCN (I-M) and ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) are alleged to be involved these smugglings with the help of Bangladeshi illegal immigrants. Bangladesh remains as prime suspect of providing safe heaven to these insurgent groups, especially ULFA, a charge that the government in Dhaka had been persistent in denial. On the other hand except exasperated rhetoric, Indian authority could neither substantiate the claim nor availed any offer extended by the government of Bangladesh for open inspection of the alleged camp sites.

As stated earlier, though Mr. Sanjoy did not squarely blame Bangladesh for unabated insurgency he rather called for sustained negotiation with all warring parties in NEI and to reduce tension. As matter of fact that NEI to-day is under indirect military rule which operates under Special Power Act (Military) with all possible impunity. Yet Indian government has been unable to have complete control over the situation.

The problem of the NEI is very much India's own internal issue stemmed out from decades of neglect and failed to integrate with the mainstream India. But many of the Indian analysts would blame outsiders including neighbours particularly Bangladesh for multiple reasons. One such analyst is Mr. R. Upadhyay. In his latest article North Eastern Violence An Overall View he writes "The unique geo-political situation of Northeast with long international border is vulnerable from the security point of view. Moreover, instigating hand of foreign enemies further complicated its problem. The British granted political asylum to Z. A. Phizo, the legendary Naga rebel and extended helping hand to Mizo insurgent Laldenga. Pakistan, China and Bangladesh on the other hand were supplying arms to various insurgent groups regularly. Baptist Christian Missionaries like Michel Scott meddled in tribal politics. These known misdeeds of foreign forces are enough proof to suggest that had the Indian establishment countered the evil designs of foreign adversaries effectively, the on going insurgency would not have persisted. Forced migration of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan reduced the aboriginal natives of Tripura to minority and Assamese also became scared of similar fate due to the politics of Muslim infiltration. Despite these developments the national leadership remained contended and paid little attention to study the problem dispassionately". Mr. Upadhyay's last suggestion that of Muslim infiltration into Asom, is orchestration of persistent Indian propaganda against a small neighbouring country like Bangladesh. Many others like Mr. Upadhyay would squarely blame failure of economic integration of NEI with rest of India on alleged illegal immigration from Bangladesh who are considered to be the chief source of discerning growth of fundamentalism.

On the contrary to Mr. Upadhyay and other analysts what local expert like Mr. Hazarika opines, that provides more to real perspective of the issue, particularly of Assamese Muslim minority. He writes in 'The Little Magazine-vol III issue 5&6' article titled 'Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society in Northeast', "one cannot reflect on the issues before the Northeast without referring to briefly to the illegal migration and growth of fundamentalism. One is not talking about the sprouting growth of *madrassas*, but about the less visible radicalization of young men and women in marginal regions, untouched by development and what little economic growth is seen elsewhere in Assam. Shut out of the system, they are desperate for jobs and work and embittered by the failure of the governance. These people are Indians, along with some Bangladeshis. And it is in these areas, the soft underbelly of eastern India where thousands of Bangladeshis move in and out every year, where the breeding of

the irresponsible right wing of the other religious persuasion cannot be ruled out in the Assam Valley". He then continues, "The sensitive issue whether al-Qaida camps exists in Bangladesh or not is no longer the point. The question is whether the Northeast can remain untouched by radicalism of ethnical kind. It cannot and not, especially given the high rates of immigration as well as seeming growth of the fundamentalist phenomenon". Mr. Sanjoy then suggests, "to meet these challenges three things are essential: the restoration of governance at its best fundamental and basic level, the creation of confidence that indigenous groups will not be reduced to a minority, and bringing antagonistic groups together in the process of peace-building through strong civil society movements".

One perhaps cannot deny the fact that open border such as Indo-Bangla neither inviolable nor violated by illegal economic migrants but that cannot be the excuse for India's failure in integration of NEI. But what one is alarmed is that Indian authority's importunate denial of the fact that the ongoing NEI problem is stemmed out of decades of neglect and indifferent attitude of the succeeding governments in Delhi, who in all evidence, considers being the successor of colonial Indian ruler. It is therefore important issue in the context of geo-strategic environmental changes in Bay of Bengal.

Sino-Bangla relation US predicament as seen by Indian analyst

We have analysed in brief the China factor in South Asian geo-politics and Beijing effects in changing geo-strategic environment but analysis would remain incomplete unless viewed in the province of 'Indo-US strategic partnership' compass. Dr. Subhash Kapila makes a strong critical analysis perhaps for US policy maker's attention. He argues that (1) China had earlier outflanked United States strategic interests in the Gulf region by its strategic nexus with Pakistan (2) China can now outflank United States strategic interests in South east Asia by reinforcing the defence cooperation with Bangladesh into a strategic nexus (3) China adds Bangladesh as an additional pressure point against US in South Asia in addition to Pakistan (4) China's containment by US at some future date becomes complex with Pakistan and Bangladesh in a strategic nexus with China.

Dr. Kapila then urges, "The US needs to re-evaluate its strategic concerns in south Asia". Meanwhile having taken note of Chinese growing influence in the region RAND Corporation's 2001 report suggested, "finally given proximity of this region (Bangladesh and Myanmar) to China, these countries would likely to be reluctant to become too closely aligned with US, in that

event of heightened tensions". But the reality is US has since reviewed its South Asia policy in which Bangladesh is in the watch list. US's increasing presence in Bangladesh and its small but significant investment in energy sector and in energy exploration in Bay of Bengal and elsewhere, could be seen as some effort to counter Chinese 'intrusion'. One must not lose sight that US companies are still interested in developing Chittagong second container and deep sea port. Though there is no substantial US military cooperation but of late US indicated its overriding interest in developing 'anti-terror capability'. Recent emergence of so-called Islamists terrorism provides plethora of reasons to be present in some form or other. These are indicative of increased US interest in Bangladesh if not in strategic then in tactical significance.

Conclusion

I have tried to provide an overview of the strategic environmental changes in Indian Ocean –particularly in reference to Sino-India and Sino-US rivalry in which India is growing as a 'proxy' to US in the region. It was amply demonstrated very recently when for the first time that Indian navy escorted US commercial ship through Malacca Strait. Because of strategic location of Andaman and Nicobar isle and proximity with Malacca, India- but natural – considers to have legitimate right to watch over the development in that most important choke point connecting Indian and Pacific Ocean and for obvious reasons. The international sea lane – as claimed by India- overlaps Indian EEZ, thus Delhi legitimises its concern for Indian Ocean, eastern part on particular. In that for reasons discussed, China would be drawn in so would US being present in the Pacific should any conflict grow either out of maritime terrorism or tension between China and Taiwan which invariably involve USA. Nevertheless, what it seems from the Indian naval doctrine and development, that India is more concern with eastern part of the Indian Ocean i.e. Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea than Arabian Sea in the west.

With the changed geo-strategic equilibrium in nuclearised South Asia, Bangladesh plays a significant part in India's regional geo-political ascendancy. Bangladesh is considered to be a wedge between volatile North East and rest of India. Dhaka's growing relation with China is cause of concern to Indian analysts. These analysts argue that present military cooperation between two countries termed as to be in 'a consolidation phase' but has the 'inbuilt potential of serious strategic implications' and that Indians would like to make US believe that this potentiality would not be only concern for India but for US as well.

Therefore, Indian policy makers would consider taking all the measure both economically and diplomatically, to dissuade Dhaka from developing any strategic relation with Beijing. I would quote here what Rahul Bedi wrote in his article 'India and China: Neighbourhood problem' as concluding remark published in Asia Times January 17, 2003. He concludes, " to neutralise China's influence in Yangon, India was also in persuading Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand about five years ago to form an economic-cooperation group (*Is it BIMSTEC?*). But little of significance has emerged from this condition". BIMSTEC has taken some shape since then. From the brief study it is evident that Bay of Bengal is turning into an arena of rivalry between three principal contenders i.e. US and India apparently in one end and China in opposite end.

Bangladesh's relationship with China is proven to be most important both in terms of economic and defence cooperation. On the other hand India being the immediate neighbour, one cannot ignore India's scepticism but need to foster most friendly relation but that is not being the case. Indo-Bangla relation is dependent on resolving India's strategic compulsion attached with the geo-strategic location of Bangladesh. Indian policy makers have to take into account of the sensitivity of Bangladesh and *vice versa*.

On the other hand growing Indo-US strategic relationship provides later with platform over the development in the region, directly or through proxy. From the past experience and the futuristic US policy, one cannot assume with certainty that Washington would fully trust India to handle China and that would rather complicate inter and extra regional relationship. Factual conclusion is US policy makers are as sceptical of rising Indian military myth as mindful as of China. In that the discerning situation that is likely to emerge in coming decade, Bangladesh would be faced with tough choice to format her strategic relations with regional and extra regional powers. In fact coming decade would be a testing time for Bangladesh, only country located on the top of the vortex of Bay of Bengal.

In conclusion I would like to recommend:

- a. Bangladesh should develop a strategic relationship with China, both in economic and defence, keeping in view of national interest.
- b. Must have a dynamic relation with USA and \not contradictory to the principal of Bangladeshi national core value.
- c. Should have much more pro-active engagement with India being the most important neighbour.

d. Our relation with Myanmar is vital for national interest. Relation between has the scope to develop on strategic ground. We need to improve present level of relation and enhance level of cooperation.

e. Must maintain stronger relationship with rest of the SAARC countries.

f. It is evident that in any given conflict within the region Bangladesh would remain at the mercy of Indian naval blockade. In that eventuality, to maintain own interest in Bay of Bengal Bangladesh needs to improve its naval facility and modernise and equip navy for partial breakout in case of a blockade. Navy essentially needs to be equipped with submarine and support surface ships to keep sea lane open as far as possible.

g. Bangladesh must not be sucked into the perceptive conflict which may develop in or around Bay of Bengal region.

h. Need to consider far reaching affect on national interest, internal and external security before conceding any strategic concession made to neighbouring countries.

Note: *Italics* as appears in bracket are mine.

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HIMALAYAN REVOLUTION- TESTING TIME FOR NEPAL

Brigadier General M. Sakhawat Hussain (retd)

I was in Katmandu, Nepal to attend Annual General Meeting (AGM) of South Asian Small Arms (Anti-proliferation) Net – an organization is who working to raise public awareness against the ill effects of the criminal use of small arms - both legal and illegal- by terrorists of all description. The organization is built to create a public pressure group to be brought on both manufacturer and user and on to the governments to ensure the accountability of both export and import to rein in the illegal proliferation in the society. Bangladesh has a chapter known as NSAF (National Small Arms Forum) , an organization in its nascent stage – part of global movement against illegal trading of small arms and its effect on the society. It may be pointed out here that in a recent joint survey by Indian government and OXFAM it is estimated that out of known 74 million illegal small arms in the world about 40 million are within Sub-continent, particularly in India..

However, subject AGM was held on 22-23 May 06 which gave an opportunity to visit Katmandu at a time when one of the important SAARC member countries is passing through most crucial times of its history. Though my article would deal with the recent events of Nepal i.e. democratic movement - in which Maoist movement is considered as catalyst- yet I would like to talk a bit about the anti-proliferation organization as the article progresses.

The AGM also provided me a golden occasion of my second visit to Nepal, one of our important and closest neighbours, and opportunity to meet large section of Nepali civil society and had chance to meet couple of my old friends in the army, both serving as well retired from high posts. Nepal is not only our neighbour but could prove to be most important strategic partner. My opinion may prove to be understatement if one looks at the map of South Asia and the geographic location of both Bangladesh and Nepal vis-à-vis India and the other Asian giant China. It is worth noting that Tetulia to Katmandu Nepal's capital- is 262 NM (nautical mile). There is a well laid out strategic road that links Nepal with Tibet (China) Katmandu to Kodari off Nepal. Kodari is at a distance of 542 NM from northern tip of Bangladesh. Bangladesh would have easier and shorter access into China should India provides a corridor through Jalpaiguri salient.

My visit to Nepal was in a critical time when king Gyanendra caved in with peoples' upsurge opposing autocratic rule of the monarch. For 19 days otherwise serene Katmandu erupted with bullets, teargas canisters and with death and destruction in favour of restoration of democracy and reinstallation of parliament that he dismissed in 2003. It was not first time that Katmandu witnessed political upheaval against the king in Nepal's history yet monarchy survived with full authority making cosmic concession to the people as much as was needed to cool of the heat. So did co-exist kind of elected parliament - which could pass as part of royal reward to the agitating people - for last few decades but without power enact laws to challenge palace decree. But it was different ball game in April 2006 spring thanks to decade old armed upsurge by once remotely known CPN(M), commonly known as Maoists. Maoist and its supreme leader Mr. Puspa Kamal Dhal alias Parchanda to day rides the tide of popularity that had shaken the present SPA (Seven Party Alliance) government headed by aging and seriously sick leader Girija Parashad Koirala. SPA was formed and parliament was made sovereign by king's decree on 24th April 2006 much to avoid physical removal of king as result of the street violence generated by 'Ganoandolan'. It was primarily Maoist movement that prevailed upon the leaders now in power as Maoist guerrillas were holding and administering 80% of the territory of Nepal leaving the valley of Katmandu. Though 19 days virulent anti-monarch upsurge ended with 24th palace proclamation, seen as the victory of political parties but it is Maoist who feels vindicated as they were outlawed by Nepali government and is in the terrorist list of USA, yet the atmosphere of mistrust between two faction i.e. SPA and CPN(M) remains to be the most worrying factor for common Nepalis. Some of the CPN (M) top leaders are still in custody both in India and China as member of terrorist gang. That tag has already been removed in Nepal but yet to be removed from US list. Maoist still doubted by the Americans who had played significant part in bringing the settlement.

The Seven Party alliance, now given charge to prepare an election for establishing constituent assembly to draw a new democratic constitution and to form a national government to oversee the administration till ultimate elections held under the new constitution. But immediate essential reforms were forced by the people and largely by the Maoists to strip the king of his executive power including command of the army. King has been reduced to figurehead as per peoples demand –but not supported by the present constitution. Yet the Maoist were not satisfied and continued to pressure SPA government to bring about state structural change as soon as possible. SPA

government capitulated fast under pressure. Ministry of defence has been now placed under the civil government, prime-minister holding the defence ministry, and decision to convert Nepal into a secular state from 'kingdom of Hindu State' has already been approved on principle but lots of skepticism exists whether country with 80% Hindus would easily give up their distinct identity, especially the upper class Hindus. Nevertheless, King has been stripped of his title as the 'Supreme Commander' and Royal Nepali Army – which has been renamed as 'Nepali Army' – a major decision that made the king powerless. To-day king Ganendra holds no executive power.

There has been opposition and still growing against the decision for changing Nepal's Hindu identity. Biswa Hindu Parishad, Nepal, in a very recent statement proclaimed that if there could be 56 Christian and 42 Islamic countries can exist in the world then why not one Hindu state? But Maoist has its own agenda. Since king Mahendra, once Nepal declared Hindu Kingdom, Nepali society echeloned as per the Hindu practice of cast system. It prevails. Entire Maoist movement has defied the social barrier and in last one decade CPN (M) succeeded in crushing that barrier to put together a force mainly consists of lower cast and Dalits.

Above discussed changes could be listed as major reform but not only limited to a few common changes that all parties would accept. But CPN (M) would push through their major demands. However, much under pressure from Maoist, Nepal is witnessing rapid transformation from kingdom to republic. Yet Maoist are insisting to full fill the entire array of demands that they have been fighting for. Most important among all is the demand of declaring Nepal as republic before next elections are held i.e. abolishing the institution of monarchy and replaced by president who should also be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Apparently Maoists, sensing the success of their decade long campaign, now is on the political offensive to increase their supremacy in future Nepal. Though three months ceasefire exists between the government forces and Maoist but report suggests that Maoists are gaining strength and recruiting new members in PLA (Peoples Liberation Army). Earlier SPA had entered into 12 point agreement with Maoist and according to the principle of 12 points accord important one pertained to freezing further recruitment of both sides fighting strength. This is also as per cease fire agreement. But apparently that is not holding, each one accusing other of the violation of the given understanding.

Meanwhile SPA government has suspended many government high officials who said to have been harsh in dealing with demonstrator that led to

dozen dead. But that did not satisfy the Maoist. In their demand Maoist now insists on for the change in army structure, removal of top commanders including the Chief of Staff as per the recommendation of Raimajhi commission and appointment of new Chief –acceptable to them. The other major and most sensitive demand is the restructuring of the army to a greater extent PLA line absorbing PLA members. That would overnight change the cast system in the army. Presently 80% officers and NCO corps are from high cast Hindu-mostly Barahmin and Khaitra. PLA has drawn its members from backward cast with rural background. The idea has not gone well with Nepali army.

Though all these demands are known to have been in the Maoist agenda but SPA government now finds it stranded with less option but to capitulate under the pressure prior to the peace and settlement talks which has just opened. The other issue is that is of de-arming regime (DDR) before elections are held and that may prove to be trickiest yet. Maoist insists that de-arming must be complete, simultaneous with existing army but not before election. Many politicians opine that SPA may seek UN help to monitor and affect the DDR if Maosits agrees as and when peace talks progresses.

However, whatever could be the outcome of the peace talk it goes without saying that most difficult part that SPA government is going to face on the question of restructuring the army-which seems to be non-negotiable as far as Maoists are concerned- and imposing secularism in extremely devout Hindu and king is considered to be reincarnation of 'Bishnu' since reintroduced by late King Mahendra. These would definitely be the issues which may act as catalyst for virulent social upheaval in Nepal, as many puts it that it may happen in few months of time. On the other hand crack between two political forces i.e. SPA and CPN (M) seem to have started on various issues. Immediate removal of the CAS Chief of Army Staff) General Pyar Jung Thapa and his deputy Lt. General Rupmanga Katuwal as per commission recommendation, would not be easy for SPA government. This action taken in any hurry could well be interpreted as complete capitulation to the wishes of Maoists. That would not make SPA parties electioneering any easier. Similarly, restructuring army and sudden change of class composition with the inclusion of PLA members, would be most crucial to Nepal's stability and survival of nascent democracy. Leaders hardly have experience of running a parliamentary democracy. This may prove to be biggest handicap in dealing with sensitive issues like restructuring Nepal Army. Other thorny issue would be the future of institution of king. Maoist would not compromise lees then republic and

one confirm report suggests that Koirala has been approached by CPN(M) to be the first president should monarchy is abolished immediately - as much Maoist would like to see the palace turned into tourist destination -parallel to 'Forbidden City in Beijing' as one young Maoist conferred with me. Be it as it may, observers point out that removing present Chief at this critical stage and replacing with some one that CPN (M) would suggest, would be playing into the hands of Maoist much before that power is consolidated by the old guard politicians.

Meanwhile CPN (M) had formed a three member team to engage in negotiation with the government consisting Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Dev Gurung and Dina Nath Sharma. The team had arrived Katmandu for the first time since they initiated the revolt. They have also formed a so-called 'speaker team' to go around the country side to propagate their policy for future of Nepal. What apparently visible is that CPN (M) is well ahead of SPA in planning and working out their priority. Talks have since started in Katmandu to prepare stage for summit meeting with Girija Prashad Koirala and once outlawed Pusdpa Kamal Dhal better known as Parchanda.

However the future seems to be not as easy as politicians are presuming. Handling Maoists would not be easy as they seem to be would hardly deviate from their stated goal to achieve that they fought and died for last one decade. Politically Maoist has acquired ascendancy over corruption ridden political parties whom most Nepalis do not trust. To the schedule cast Nepalis previous governments including kings have served upper class Brahmins only. And they find SPA no exception to that. It is Maoist movement which has successfully exploited the social discrimination breaking down the layers in their parallel administration. CPN (M) not only broke the social barrier it made untouchable and lower cast women as powerful as men are considered in male dominated Nepali society. This is a new phenomenon in Nepal. As stated earlier that PLA's 40% fighters are women from lower cast so is the rest of male members.

Having stated the present conditions and what I could read and analyze from the views of prominent people, of the various discussions and available reports- is that the bigger test cases for SPA government would be in two particular areas, apart from constitutional future position of king as institution. These are, one, restructuring of the army, second, successful DDR before elections. Maoist would not like to surrender weapon but gives assurances of allowing observation. Maoists are not interested to join interim government after this government ids dissolve.

With all stated above it is highly likely that Nepal may witness virulent days ahead and the restructuring method of the army may prove to be catalyst in that realm. Century old hold of army by upper cast may not be easy to be diluted in that way Maoists have contemplated. DDR, if agreed, would pose enormous challenges unless otherwise it is regulated by international body. It seems that difficult days are ahead in Nepal unless both parties work out a middle course and move forward to take the Himalayan country into the path of democracy for which Nepalis have fought for decades.

Nepal being our near neighbour, we need to observe and analyze the future character of Nepal's state structure. Nepal is not only our neighbour but economic partners in SAARC and BIMSTEC. The land locked country would be much keen to develop strategic relations with other South and South East Asian countries especially with Bangladesh. Being sandwiched between two Asian giant Nepal has been used and being considered by India the buffer between China and India. Nepal's geo-strategic location puts great importance in determining Bangladesh's geo-political frontier. It is important for its land route connection with China which could provide shorter trade route with China for Bangladesh.

Many would suggest that rise of Maos or Maoist take over in Nepal may not be palatable to Indian policy makers nor would easily be acceptable to the USA. On the other hand, large Pakistani presence in Nepal is also seen as party to regional geo-political great game that seems to have been initiated. Nepal has always been a contested region between 'empires' and left it as it is. It may remain so but total Maoist take over – which they may- may not auger well for neighbouring countries, especially for India where over hundred districts are within the fold of Maoist movement and supported by 'peoples' war group'. We also fall within the CRZ established in our periphery particularly northern zone.

However, what I could foresee, that Nepal has to brave the possible social upheaval. While experiencing unprecedented social structural changes it would not be easier for large section of Nepalis to adjust with that change due to lack of experience of transformation. They would need help and compassion from world community to affect a peaceful restructuring their political and social life. We as good friend of Nepal, not being bogged down with strategic predicament, can and should offer to share our experiences both in terms of effective DDR through UN if needed by the people of Nepal and our experience in rural development and micro financing. What I would recommend that we should develop a pro-active policy with Nepal then

prevailing reactive policy with immediate effect. In conclusion we wish that Nepal would be able to pullout of the difficult situation that might come in their way to establish a true democratic equitable society that they have longed for. A peaceful progressive Nepal would be one of the keys for transforming South Asia into peaceful region.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Brigadier General M. Sakhawat Hussain (retd)

His background is very impressive –

Commissioned in Pakistan Army 1966 from Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul

Joined Bangladesh Army in 1972

Commanded a sector of Bangladesh Rifles.

Attended and graduated from United States Command & Staff College (USACGSC) Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, USA-1981-1982.

-Commanded Brigade and served as Director in Army Headquarters.

-Attended and obtained Masters in Strategic Studies (MSS) from Qaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad and qualified from National Defence College, Pakistan obtained symbol ndc.

-Commanded two Infantry and Artillery brigades, served as Director in various capacity in the Army Headquarters, Dhaka.

-Served in Chittagong Hill Tracts as Brigade Commander.

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1. Bangladesh: Raktakta Adhay- 1975-81
2. Janaganer Raj Kumari Diana:
3. Antarjatik Shantrasher Iti Katha: Afghanistan Hote America
4. Tel Gas Nabya Upnibeshbad: Kabul Hote Baghdad.
5. Dakkhin Asia o Bangladesher Nirapatta
6. Madhya Pracchay Shanghat: Bartaman o Bhabishat.

Nepal: The Himalayan chaos & the unsung Indian involvement

Nishchal M.S. Basnyat

The Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal has once again found itself entangled in a political disaster. The present situation is reminiscent of the 1990 pro-democracy movement, which aimed to strip the power out of the hands of Late King Birendra's autocratic Panchayat system. However, after a decade of "democracy" post 1990, Nepal only found itself with a grossly mismanaged government, unprecedented levels of corruption and an intensifying civil war. The situation has only worsened since. A once small and ill-equipped Maoist movement now controls a large part of rural Nepal, despite having a history of mass murder. Nepal is seeking change once again and this tension has already led to many historic changes. On February 1st 2005, King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah, who had come into power amid the Royal Massacre controversy, dissolved the parliament and set himself a three year timeline to get the country back on track. His lofty ambitions were challenged by a "people's movement" which forced him to step down from power, reinstate the parliament and let his fate be determined by the same group of politicians whom he had once accused of incompetence. Now this unique nation with a history of monarchy, an urge for democracy and an ever-growing thirst for communism is at a major fork on the road and must find the right chemistry to insure that this once peaceful and thriving country doesn't become a failed state.

Among the obvious set of problems lies the unappreciated and unnoticed glitches in the Nepali system that has left the country in the state it is today. The long-term problems that this country has are not only causing the social and political instability but are also impeding on the chances for future prosperity. We are so caught up in trying to solve the day-to-day troubles in the nation that we have forgotten to plan ahead.

The Indian threat: We cannot fail to foresee the intensions of our so-called "bigger brother". India, the major super-power in the region, indirectly dictates what happens in countries close by, and even a small change in policy can greatly stir and shake a fragile and small country like Nepal. With such sheer strength, this powerhouse has utilized its dominance to keep itself politically and economically dominant over others around it. Here, the role of

India in Nepal will be looked at microscopically focusing on five main Indian threats to Nepal and the reader will be left to make the final judgment on India's influence on this delicate nation.

Maoism and the Indian hand

“So, we went to Lucknow to meet the Maoist leaders. We walked and talked with them, openly. We strolled through the crowded streets and stepped into a small teashop, talked some more, and then we went back to their place. I was surprised to see that they weren't worried the slightest about who they were and how much they were wanted by the Nepalese people”. These were the startling words from a late night conversation in Brussels with one of Nepal's most prominent politicians. He was recalling how he met both leaders of the Nepalese Maoist Movement, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai and Prachanda, in India.

The answer to Nepal's internal strife is so obvious we don't see it. Albeit an overdone patriotic adage, India does hold the key to Nepal's future, not only in terms of mainstream politics, but also with regards to the intensifying Maoist peril. While acknowledging the fact that the Nepalese Maoist movement is a deep-rooted, homegrown revolution that will take years to overcome, we must also confront ourselves with the palpable fact that India hasn't stopped sprinkling salt on Nepal's political wound.

There are significant ways India is indirectly aiding the revolution in Nepal. First, India is a safe haven for Nepalese Maoist Leaders. It is an irrefutable fact that India is harboring Nepal's terrorists. The Royal Nepalese Government, including the Royal Nepalese Army, has repeatedly urged India to incarcerate the Maoist leaders. While India plays politics by promising to hunt down Nepal's terrorists, Indian politicians and government officials meet secretly with high-ranking Maoists like Dr. Bhattarai (an incident that was highly publicized). The recent meeting in New Delhi between the political leaders and the Maoists, and also the meetings going on right now between NC, UML and Maoists in India, is yet another example of India purposely refusing to arrest Maoist Leaders.

Second, it is not difficult to track down and capture Maoist leaders. If our brilliant politicians like Girija Koirala and Madav Kumar Nepal can approach them with such ease, if our journalists and media houses have contacts with them, and if even foreign journalists have an effortless time finding them, are we to understand that an intelligence agency belonging to an emerging super power cannot hunt down Nepal's Maoist leaders? Even a privately funded “bounty-hunting” team could track down the Maoist leaders in India. So, why

not do so with a highly coordinated and well-funded intelligence service, such as that of India?

Third, where are the arms coming from? We would have to be too naïve to think that all of the weapons that the Maoists hold come from the post-battle lootings with the Royal Nepalese Army or Nepalese Police. They certainly don't come from Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan or Tibet. The long border we have with India is an "ammunition pump" for Nepal's terrorist movement. We are not talking about smuggling minute amounts of pistols and bullets. These are massive amounts of weapons, large enough to equip thousands of Maoist foot soldiers. And then you might ponder over the question of who is selling them. The Indian Maoists and other such groups that are supporting Nepal's Maoist revolution are far too weak to possess such resources. Think about, however, what happens to antiquated Indian army weapons. They are expensive to destroy and expensive to store, while profit can be made from selling these unwanted weapons. Consequently, I lean towards the idea that corrupt generals from notorious surrounding states like Bihar are secretly selling antediluvian and unusable arms to Nepalese Maoists. Previous research done by Nepalese journalists with the help of ex-Gorkha soldiers from India has revealed the astonishing link between splinter groups of the Indian army and Nepal's Maoist movement. It even claims that factions of retired Indian Army officers are providing 3 to 4 day training "capsules" to Nepalese Maoist recruits.

Fourth, most of Nepal's Maoist leaders are Indian-educated. How can we ever gauge the connections that a leader like Dr. Bhattarai must have garnered in the campuses of Jawaharlal Nehru University during his PHD years? How can we measure the amount of acquaintances that Chairman Prachanda had with groups like The People's War Group (PWG), the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) even before Nepal's so-called "People's War"? Today Nepal's Maoist movement has joined the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) and is being provided aid, security and arms by pro-Maoist parties in India. There are Indian fingerprints on Nepal's insurgency since its very infancy.

Fifth, even after requests from the Nepalese government, India hasn't handed Nepal many of the Maoist leaders arrested in India. The most shocking news came after the arrest of Mohan Vaidya alias 'Kiran' (one of the top five Nepalese Maoist leaders). He was granted the status of a 'political prisoner' by an Indian court, which will provide him leeway and facilities that other normal prisoners will not receive. How can Nepalese Maoist leaders,

who have so much blood on their hands and are acknowledged by India as 'terrorists', still receive such flexibility in punishment?

Sixth, the Nepali population in India is adding fuel to this Maoist fire. The major organizations close to the Maoists that are active in India are the All India Nepali Unity Society, the All India Nepali Students' Association, the All India Nepali Youth Association and the All India Ethnic Society. Even the once neutral Akhil Bharatiya Nepal Ekta Samaj (ABNES), established for the unity and betterment of the Nepali community in India, has been delving into dissident revolutionary activities. While the Indian government assures Nepal that it is doing its best to help, it turns a blind eye on open Maoist activities throughout the country. In the words of Prachanda during his speech for the Second National Conference of CPN (M) in February 2001, "...the success of the Nepalese People's War and revolution cannot be imagined if Nepalese dwelling in India are separated from it..."

Seven, Indian Maoists have already infiltrated the Nepalese "People's War". During the Muga/Dhankuta attacks in 2004 where several high level Royal Nepalese Army Officers were killed, there were reports that Indian women were behind the beheadings. The Terai region has become a safe haven for Indian Maoists, similar to how Nepalese Maoists have found a safe haven in India.

So, now you must be wondering how India would benefit from perpetual turmoil in Nepal. Just think of the economic benefits. Remember companies like Kodak that moved their factories from Nepal to India? They did this primarily because Nepal was too unstable. Think about the divergence of tourism from Nepal to India, or the hindrance of tourists that have already traveled to India and who wished to visit Nepal. Think about Nepalese businessmen going to India for investment opportunities or poor Nepalese laborers that migrate to India looking for work. Think about the Multinationals that utilize cheap labor, for whom India is a far better business investment than Nepal because of the insurgency. Like it or not, India is cashing in on Nepal's agony.

We must get past the "big brother, small brother" mentality we have regarding India, however, we must also recognize to what extent India has cheated us. While we burn tires on the streets of Kathmandu and parade for the name of democracy at home, we overlook the fact that India holds Nepal's cure to terrorism. While a brother kills a brother at home, India facilitates those responsible for mass murder and heartless torture. It is true that, at home, we

don't even have a democracy. But in today's Nepal, where guns speak louder than words, we have to think about the safety and security of the nation before we start protesting for democracy. This is not a call to divert blame from one faction to another. However, we are directing our anguish and aggravation towards the wrong path, and by doing so we are simply hurting ourselves and impeding any sort of development in the country.

At a time when we're being cornered and attacked from all sides by the Maoists, it is important to keep in mind that it is still possible to win this war. However, we must be willing to confront our "big brother". It is about time we grasp the extent to which India is crippling our nation.

While China and Pakistan feed the Royal Nepalese Army with fresh ammunition from one side, the Maoists are being fed by India from the other side. How long are we going to protest against ourselves? How long are we going to close down our own schools and our own shops?

While our "astute" Nepali Politicians journey to India for political blessings from the Indian government, Dr.Bhattarai will be giving his interview to the BBC Nepali Service from the comfort of Indian soil. While we read the grotesque news of more brothers being killed at home, we will switch on the TV and see Krishna Bahadur Mahara, the Maoist Spokesman, giving an interview to CNN, comfortably strolling through a University Park in India. How long are we going to be blind to the obvious? It's time to put the clues together. The solution to Nepal's grave difficulty is not with the King, nor is it with the political parties. In fact the answer doesn't lie in the country at all. The true pragmatic solution to our misery lies somewhere across the border, in India.

Caste Politics

Being a predominantly Hindu society, Nepal as a country has suffered from its deep-rooted reliance on the caste system. Regardless of cheap political rhetoric promising to uplift those of lower and even untouchable castes the country has always been ruled by two major castes, both of which are the highest in Hinduism.

The Brahmins, known as the priests and teachers in a Hindu society have had the strongest influence in politics and bureaucracy. Most of the bureaucrats in the highest positions and the most influential political leaders are still predominantly Brahmin. As the late great Ganesh Man Singh, one of the democracy freedom fighters for Nepal, said "Democracy has brought nothing to the country but Brahmanism". Even the Maoist party, whose

philosophy is to bring such social change by putting those of lower caste in power are ironically ruled by Brahmins.

The Chettris, known as the warriors and emperors in a Hindu society, have always been the “rulers” in Nepali society. From the Kings of Nepal (the Shahs), the line of commander-in-chiefs (“Kazis”; predominantly Thapas and Basnets), to the Rana Regime that lasted 104 years, the chettris have rule the country with an iron fist. This caste is also dominant in the Army, so much so that only those of the highest Chettri clan have been the commander-in-chiefs of the army, which is the strongest organization in the country.

India's strong Hindu based society has also led it to have a dominant caste based system. Like most Rajputs and maharajas were Chettris in India, the progression into politics was led by predominantly Brahmin families like the Nehrus and Gandhis. The Rajputs of India still have very strong connections with the Royal family in Nepal, especially the families of Jaipur and Gwalior. Similarly, the Congress parties of India and Nepal not only share the same political point of view but are also dominated by the same castes; Brahmin.

Although never mentioned in the media, it is about time the Nepali population realizes the strong caste influence that India plays in Nepal. It is about time the politicians and the so-called social reformists face the challenging task of integrating the entire Nepali population and not failing to bring about change once they achieve power. At the end it is crucial to remember that the country belongs to every single Nepali and not just those who are from the social elite. Without every brick in the house doing its job, the house will eventually collapse.

India's influence in Nepal's Businesses

The Marwaris of Nepal are the major business tycoons in the country. From the largest five star hotels to the smallest jewelry shops, their influence in Nepali business is deep-rooted. In fact, the richest businessman and arguably the richest man in Nepal, Mohan Gopal Khetan, is also of direct Indian decent and like many other Marwaris, migrated to Nepal for business. While we must give them the utmost credit for helping the Nepali economy and guiding Nepali businesses through times of economic turmoil, we must also acknowledge the enormous influence of the Marwaris and other Indian businessmen in Nepal. Because of their economic clout, this group of businessmen also hold political punch, a power they can easily utilize for Indian interests.

Religion: A political strategy

There are 900 million Hindus around the world and most of them reside in India. The fact that Nepal was the only Hindu kingdom on earth (which changed after parliamentary decisions on May, 2006) and the King of Nepal is the only Hindu king makes matters between India and Nepal more convoluted than meets the eye. In a country that, for the past few years, seems to be headed more and more towards a republic, Nepal's royal family and those that support the institution of Monarchy seem to be using the religion card to safeguard this 237 year old institution. Hardcore religious groups in India and Hindu political parties, such as the BJP, claim that the King of Nepal, as the only Hindu king, is in fact the reincarnation of Lord Vishnu, as popular mythology dictates. This has created a strong attachment between such parties and the royalists of Nepal, who might see such religious Indian factions as a buffer against a republic. Parties like the BJP along with several Hindu organizations still want the King in power in Nepal for religious reasons, because of which the royalists in Nepal want parties like the BJP to gain power in India. Such selfish need from both sides of the boarder fosters a reciprocal relationship, where the pro-monarchy faction in Nepal is ready to take measures that favor those groups in India and vise-versa. Although the media has not explored such a treat yet, we cannot disregard even the most unpredictable options.

Humanitarian Blackmail

Nepal is a third-world country that cannot survive without foreign aid. While American aid makes up the greatest part of Nepal's foreign aid revenue, India's aid to Nepal is also very significant. India contributes to Nepal via direct monetary aid and also through military aid. Such aid is vital to Nepal and without this monetary assistance from superpowers like India Nepal would crumble within months. Along with the philanthropic feeling of giving, India also gains political clout over Nepal, which it has utilized a handful of times. When King Mahendra, the current King's father, took over power in the early 1960s India stopped any monetary assistance to Nepal. In 1990, in the height of pro-democracy movements India implemented a blockade and reduced aid to force King Birendra, this King's brother, to give up power. Similarly, on 1st February 2005, India took away aid after King Gyanendra took over power, stating that Nepal must follow a road of multi-party democracy and that monarchy was not the answer. The idea that India stood

up for the democratic rights of the people of Nepal is laudable. However, in an impoverished country like Nepal, India can demand that Nepal be governed a certain way, and could threaten the country with the removal of aid. The aid coming from India, which is meant for the unfortunate, and poor in Nepal is vital regardless of whatever government is in power. Who is India to say what kind of government Nepal should have? Whether it is a monarchy, democracy or a communist state, the poor will remain poor. In this way political agendas can easily be hidden in the form of humanitarian aid, which India may utilize to blackmail a delicate country like Nepal for political purposes.

Domestic challenges: Nepal also faces three great-unnoticed challenges that are beyond the reach of India. Rather these problems have to be addressed by Nepal itself to upkeep its sovereignty and strength in the region.

Decentralize!

Geographic decentralization of resources is vital if this country is to achieve any prosperity in the long term. Nepal is a perfect example of what can go wrong when all the emphasis is given to one location, in this case the capital Kathmandu, and all other regions are forgotten. It is quite troublesome the fact that Kathmandu has not only the basic necessities but also all the luxuries that one could ask for even in a developed nation. Walking around certain areas of Kathmandu, one can see the privileged elite roaming around in their luxury cars, shopping in designer stores and carrying all the latest audio gear and posh accessories. Such is the reality of this third world country, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening. While the fortunate enjoy it all, a fifty-mile trip outside the capital will display the bleak realities of what state Nepal is really in. With no proper electricity, health services or educational institutions, the fundamental institutions needed are long overdue. Still, little thought has gone into improving the lives of those most in need. This is precisely the strength of the Maoist movement, which claims that the poor have been forgotten and left behind by the social elite in Nepal. And the incompetence and lack of care in this issue has caused a great deal of frustration and is the fuel behind the revolutionary Maoist fire.

Such decentralization of resources has caused two major problems in the country. First, there is a great imbalance in the educated population. Without educational institutions, the young village population is forced to look towards the cities for a proper education. Without legitimate workplaces, the job-minded group of youngsters is compelled to look towards the cities for any kind of work they can find. Such overwhelming internal migration from

the villages towards Kathmandu leaves no hope for long term and balanced development in the country. Then there are those unable to migrate to the city for economic and other personal reasons. For generations this group will not be able to give their own kids the proper education required to earn a decent living, and the next generation will be the same and so on. In this way, those who were not fortunate or capable enough to leave the bleakness of their villages are victim to the 'great cycle of endless poverty'.

For a country to prosper, there has to be equal development of the entire country, not just one city. With this in mind it is crucial for the government of Nepal to take this long overdue task of trying to diversify its resources for the long-term betterment of the country itself.

The brain drain and the great divide

As Nepal's youth lines up along the passport lines and security checks at Tribhuvan International Airport with the hopes of living the cinematic "American dream", they leave behind a country tattered and torn in political pandemonium. With heavyhearted patriotism they depart and ritualistically hang their Nepali flags in their college dorm rooms. Yet, the ambition of going back to Nepal and taking charge of their beloved homeland becomes only a distant priority once they taste the freedom, democracy, and hamburgers of the materialistically satisfying life abroad. Such is the perilous future of the nation; even with the Maoist insurgency, political turmoil, and economic crises resolved, the country faces another monumental obstacle: patriotic hypocrites.

As the trend of educating children outside the country increases, what happens if this minute population of youngsters who are wealthy, bright, and fortunate enough to go overseas doesn't return? The result: something I like to call "the great divide". A country where the educated elite are ready to point fingers at the government, but none of whom are ready to work for it. A nation where all the sophisticated citizens seem to know the solution to the country's troubles, but no one is intrepid enough to return and work for five or six thousand rupees per month. What happened to all the patriotism? What happened to all the "Jai Nepal" rhetoric? In the face of self-satisfaction, a country's cry seems trivial. The Nepalis that go abroad usually do so with a one-way ticket, only to return for brief visits. Unfortunately, these are also the same people that seem to have the loudest voices and seem to know all the answers to Nepal's political friction.

Such brain drain will impair Nepal in ways unimaginable to us now. Think about our future government. No matter how many shrewd businessmen,

erudite journalists, “well-informed” NGO-workers or caring human rights activists Nepal might have, for a country to prosper, we will need a strong government. For a strong government we need the best to actually work for the government. Who will be the future bureaucrats of the country? The era in the later half of the 20th century for Nepal when the best and the brightest were enthusiastic about a post in the government is over. The educated, capable and accomplished are no longer willing to work for the government for such nominal salaries. Instead, those who were unable to get jobs elsewhere or those who were the least competent will be running the show, further widening “the great divide” between the privileged few and the government and giving birth to an intellectual civil war in the near future.

As I make this case I often hear counter-arguments from nationalistic charlatans who claim that a flood of brainpower from Nepal to other countries will not affect Nepal. Some claim that in countries like India and China, where millions have gone abroad for work and study, there is not only development but these nations are already emerging super powers. Although it is easy to get carried away in such romantic optimism, pragmatically speaking, we cannot compare ourselves with these two giants simply because we share borders. Likewise, we cannot compare Nepal's “human capital flight” with that of India or China. If millions of Indians go overseas for education and employment, millions who are equally as educated and capable will stay back home. As much competition as there is to get into the best American and European Universities, there is even greater competition to enter educational institutions like Beijing University or IIT. Such conditions foster motivation to stay at home, which Nepal lacks. India and China also enjoy a geographically decentralized reservoir of brainpower, whereas in Nepal only those from Kathmandu and a handful from other cities are privileged enough to receive the appropriate amount of education to go outside the country. Therefore, with every Nepali youngster that leaves the country, Nepal slides further into difficulty.

Of course there are those that do return to the country and much praise should go their way. But this is a minuscule number. Even for the nominal amount of bold youngsters that return with the readiness to work for their government, passing the primitive and strictly Nepali-based ‘lokseba’ government exams is an insurmountable task. The overwhelming population is made up of those with the determination and patriotism to return, but lack the initial step.

Although taking a complete U-turn from a brain drain is an evolutionary process and not revolutionary, there are two main approaches we can still take

to head towards the right direction. As I criticize the young educated elite for not being true to their country, I also acknowledge the government's errors. First, the archaic lokseba exams will have to be reformed and made less of a daunting task to those who were educated under the English based system. This is an effective way of reaching out to those that are actually willing to work for the government. Second, we must now adopt what is referred to as the 'Taiwan method'. A couple of decades ago, Taiwan, in the midst of economic and political instability, called back a handful of Taiwanese Princeton University graduates and promised them the post of political and economic advisors. With full gusto they implemented novel yet pragmatic policies that were highly successful and helped to catapult Taiwan to what it is today. Nepal has far too many brilliant and determined youngsters for the country to be suffering like it is today.

The 'Singapore method' is another approach Nepal can adopt to lure in the country's best while simultaneously reducing corruption in higher offices of power. In Singapore, at the height of corruption, the country implemented a unique strategy of paying its government workers, especially those in higher posts, very large salaries. This will not only provide a strong incentive for the best to join the government, but it will also alleviate the need for corruption within the government. Such innovative approaches are key, not only in enticing the young, but also in long-term development of the nation.

Regardless of government efforts, ultimately the choice belongs to this particular age group of twenty and thirty-year olds that can make the difference. This next generation has the toilsome task of repairing and renovating a country that was raped and dishonored by the self-satisfying generation that came before it. The next generation will be no different if it forgets its duty towards the troubled native soil. We might be poor, yet we have been blessed with a part of this world that is rich in a myriad of resources, natural, and now also intellectual. Both these resources must be utilized if the country is to get back up on its feet. There is only one thing that can set this country on a long-term path to prosperity: selflessness of the young. Most of these youngsters left the nation with the promise of returning, and as the nation dies a slow death, many have already forgotten their promise.

Separation of Bureaucracy and Politics

There are few countries in the world where bureaucracy is so intertwined with politics. A political change in the country will dictate which bureaucrats

get appointed, which bureaucrats get promoted and which ones directly or indirectly get the boot. Before 1990, in the autocratic Panchayat ("royal") government, bureaucrats that demanded democracy or bureaucrats that were anti-royalist were subject to expulsion from the government, demotions or were never promoted. The people of Nepal who hoped that after the democracy movement of 1990, this would change were utterly disappointed. Nepotism and favoritism mushroomed like never before, and democracy came not for the people but for the politicians and their families.

The example of the contrary that I always offer is that of India. Indian politicians might be unreliable and arguably some of the most corrupt in the world. Yet, India has managed to keep bureaucracy separated from politics, and although not fully successful, India has displayed that a country can prosper if bureaucracy is left to operate and grow on its own. In doing so India has managed to run a country with a billion people, unaffected by day-to-day political changes.

Nepal has always fallen behind because political changes have such a stronghold on bureaucracy. In a country like Nepal where the Prime Minister changes every six months, how far will we get if we have to reinvent the bureaucracy every time the government changes? We have already separated the Army from the King; the next logical step is to separate bureaucracy from politics.

A step forward

Today Nepal is at a crucial point in its history. The country has gone from a full-on Monarchy to a nation that is under the complete influence of political leaders and Maoists. We must be optimistic that things can get better, yet at the same time there is the ever-present danger that the situation will take a turn for the worst. Regardless of what short-term solutions the leaders choose to please the crowds on the streets, without long-term commitment to resolve the ills of Nepali society this country is bound to remain diseased forever. Along with the renovation of the nation, we must also think ahead so that the future generations of this troubled country do not suffer from the consequences of this generation's lack of planning. Being in such a fragile state, Nepal is vulnerable to the manipulation of politically and economically stronger neighbors like India. Although we must work with this new great world super power and except the helping hand that it offers, we must move with caution and act in favor of our own national interests. We must remember that a strong

Nepal will not only ensure the sovereignty of the country and prosperity for generations to come, but a strong Nepal will ultimately give strength to the entire sub-continent of South Asia.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Nishchal Basnyat

As the son of a career diplomat, **Nishchal M.S. Basnyat**, a native of Nepal, was raised in New York City, Kathmandu, Hong Kong and Paris. He is currently studying in La Sorbonne (Paris) but is a full time undergraduate student of economics at Harvard University. He is a Senior Editor for the Harvard South Asian Journal and is a founding member, Vice President and Political Chair for the Harvard Nepali Association. His articles have been published in national newspapers like Nepali Times and Nepalnews.com.

MAOIST INSURGENCY

India's Incendiary Device In Nepal

Madan Prasad Khanal

The defining – albeit unwritten – feature of India's relations with Nepal is the refusal of the policy-making elite in New Delhi to treat the tiny landlocked northern neighbor as an independent and sovereign nation. Over the past six decades, this psychology has taken various forms such as direct political intervention, economic strangulation, meddling in internal security affairs, direct media manipulation and condescending assertions of cultural affinity. Some senior Indian leaders still regret that independent India's first Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru failed to incorporate Nepal into the union.¹

For Nepal, India's embrace has been stifling. The imperative of avoiding a damaging drift into India's orbit has always been pressing for the Nepalese political class. India has responded with disparate tools of destabilization in the guise of promoting democracy. Pitting the major power centers of the day against one another, New Delhi has been exploiting the resulting political instability to advance its economic and security interests in the kingdom.² During the height of Nepal's democratic experience between 1990 and 2002, it was certainly not for lack of political maturity that the kingdom averaged one prime minister a year.³

Despite their adversarial posturing at home, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), the two largest parties in the democratic mainstream, became conduits for Indian manipulation.⁴ By the mid-1990s, it became clear to policymakers in New Delhi that Nepal's multiparty system could not go against the fierce nationalism of the people. India, searching for another instrument to perpetuate its agenda, did not have to wait too long. Maoist rebels, aiming to replace Nepal's constitutional monarchy and multiparty parliamentary system with communist totalitarianism, launched a “people's war” in 1996.

Nepal's deep-seated economic and social inequalities, together with a succession of corrupt and ineffective governments in Kathmandu, helped the Maoists expand rapidly. The state's brutal security crackdowns encouraged popular sympathy for the rebels. The Maoists' message (empowering the poor and backward people) and method (massive and indiscriminate violence against the people and development infrastructure) were perfectly consistent

with the agenda of those who wished to see a permanently weak and subservient Nepal.

A Sordid Saga of Subversion

This sordid saga of subversion began with India's independence in 1947. The departure of British colonialists inspired Nepalese students, mostly centered in Calcutta and Varanasi, to overthrow the autocratic hereditary rule of the Rana prime ministers, who had seized power from the monarchy a century earlier. As the conflict climaxed in 1951, Nehru brokered an agreement under which the monarchy regained political powers. In a bizarre arrangement, the Ranas and the Nepali Congress revolutionaries, still sworn enemies, formed a coalition government. The absurdity of the alliance and the iniquitous motivations of its originators were easily apparent. When some patriotic Nepalese rose up against the "Delhi Compromise," they were brutally suppressed, sometimes with the direct intervention of Indian security forces. For the next nine years, Indian advisers became the real sources of power as the political players were locked in bitter rivalries. Indian diplomats sat in on cabinet and other crucial government meetings. Nepalese politicians, for their part, obliged New Delhi by rushing there to resolve the most minor internal disputes.

When Nepal got its first elected government in 1959, Prime Minister B.P. Koirala sought to dispel the pro-India tag he had acquired. New Delhi was annoyed by the independence with which he was directing Nepal's foreign policy, particularly toward building ties with China and the West. However, few in Koirala's Nepali Congress party could see themselves as anything but appendages of the Indian political class. Although King Mahendra's desire to exercise absolute political power is often blamed for his dismissal of the Koirala government in December 1960 and the subsequent scrapping of parliamentary democracy, the deposed premier himself later wrote of conspiracies hatched closer to home.⁵

Essentially, King Mahendra's takeover was a reaction to India's tightening stranglehold. As a counterweight, he sought to expand Nepal's international ties. When efforts to encourage reconciliation between Mahendra and Koirala, through western mediation, were thwarted, the imprisoned ex-premier clearly blamed machinations by Nepal's southern neighbor.⁶ King Mahendra's efforts to strengthen political and economic ties with the kingdom's northern neighbor were criticized as a meaningless brandishing of the "China card". India conveniently concealed its own "democracy" card vis-à-vis the royal

regime. Whenever the palace sought to pursue policies India considered were against its interests, New Delhi armed and mobilized Nepali Congress exiles against the royal government. These exiles, for their part, were frustrated by the abruptness with which the Indian government forced them to suspend their operations – a clear indication to them that New Delhi was bargaining with Kathmandu.⁷

After India annexed the Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim in 1974, Mahendra's son and successor, King Birendra, sought to secure Nepal's independence by, among other things, proposing the kingdom be declared a Zone of Peace (ZOP). The Nepalese had closely observed how New Delhi manipulated political events in the neighboring Buddhist kingdom to end its sovereign existence.⁸ Sikkim had become a British protectorate in 1835, a status India inherited with independence. However, control of foreign policy and defense was not enough for Indian rulers, who used Nepalese settlers to plan the overthrow of the Choygal, the monarch. In April 1974, Indian troops surrounded the palace and placed the Choygal under surveillance. The assembly unanimously abolished the monarchy and declared Sikkim a constituent unit of India. A referendum, held under the watchful eyes of Indian troops, supported the assembly's resolution. Parliament in New Delhi accepted the Sikkimese "request" of merger, transforming it into India's 22nd state.

King Birendra's ZOP proposal would go on to receive the support of 116 nations. New Delhi, however, considered this a scheme to break from India's security grip.⁹ In early 1990, when Nepal was gripped by pro-democracy protests, India submitted to the palace an 80-page draft treaty that sought to impose stricter limits on Nepalese sovereignty and independence. The palace rejected it. The first victim of the restoration of multiparty democracy was the ZOP proposal. Even before proper deliberations had begun on the structure of the new polity, the new democratic leaders, in their rush to please India, had decided to scrap the proposal. The interim government, for its part, was stunned when New Delhi put forth a summary of the 80-page draft the palace had rejected weeks earlier.¹⁰

Democracy produced its own dynamics in Nepal. Despite the global disrepute of communism, the ideology was on the rise in Nepal. Factional fighting in the Nepali Congress forced Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala to dissolve parliament and call fresh elections in 1994. The UML emerged as the largest party in a hung parliament and formed a minority government. Many Nepalese communist leaders, like their Nepali Congress colleagues, had

studied and lived in exile in India. Some, like the new Prime Minister Manmohan Adhikary, had taken part in India's independence movement. Despite this affinity, New Delhi was worried by the UML's growing ties with the communist front ruling the state of West Bengal. The Congress Party, at the helm in New Delhi, feared a UML-led Nepal could help spread communism in the poor and backward bordering states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar states. Indian policy on Nepal needed some alteration.

Insurgency As An Incendiary Instrument

The calculations were clear. The Maoists' hard-core ideology would attract UML cadres disenchanted by the dilution of their own party's revolutionary fervor. Erosion of the UML base would relegate the party to the margins of Nepalese politics. The net beneficiary would be the pro-Indian Nepali Congress. As factions within parties battled for supremacy, governments rose and fell with disturbing frequency. After the Nepali Congress won a majority in the 1999 elections, hopes for stability soared. But they were short-lived. As the ruling party was mired in internal squabbles, the opposition grew more radicalized inside parliament and on the streets. Amid an escalation of Maoist violence, the Nepalese confronted an unimaginable tragedy on the night of June 1, 2001. Crown Prince Dipendra opened fire at a palace gathering, killing King Birendra, Queen Aishwarya and nine other members of the royal family. An official probe concluded that a drugs-and-drinks-dazed Dipendra, enraged by his parents' refusal to let him marry his longtime lover, murdered his family before turning the gun on himself. Maoist ideologue Dr. Baburam Bhattarai accused India, in collusion with the United States, of masterminding the assassination as part of a policy to eventually "Sikkimize Nepal."¹¹ In the ensuing chaos, the Maoist insurgency entered a deadlier phase.

Considering the source of their ideology, there was a common misconception in the West – one that persists to this day -- that the Maoists were sponsored by China. India has benefited the most from this fallacy. The ease with which the Maoist rebels found sanctuary on Indian soil always baffled ordinary Nepalis. New Delhi sought to establish its dissociation with the Maoists by declaring them terrorists before Kathmandu did. Indian officials occasionally arrested junior Maoist functionaries and extradited them to Nepal. However, senior rebel leaders, such as Mohan Baidya and Chandra Prakash Gajurel, who might be familiar with the extent of New Delhi's influence in the organization, remained in Indian custody. In the media, Indian security agencies tried to project links between the Maoists and the ISI.¹²

Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal ("Prachanda"), chief ideologue Dr. Bhattarai, and spokesman Krishna Bahadur Mahara regularly appeared for interviews with western media organization from undisclosed Indian locations.

After the Nepalese government deployed the military against the Maoists in late 2001, following the collapse of peace talks, the rebels toned down and eventually ended their criticism of India. In January 2003, three months after King Gyanendra dismissed Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's elected government for failing to hold elections on schedule, the Maoists joined peace talks with the palace-appointed government. The failure of those talks later in the year unleashed a deadlier spiral of violence. India continued to loom large over the rebels. Senior leaders differed on whether to designate the monarchy or India as their principal adversary.¹³ An August 2004 plenum identified India as the primary enemy, which the Maoist believed might interfere militarily or sabotage their talks with the king. Dr. Bhattarai, educated at New Delhi's Jawahar Lal Nehru University, had proposed an alliance with India. In mid-2005, a few months after King Gyanendra seized full political powers, differences between Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai, including those on India, became public. Prachanda stripped Dr. Bhattarai of his key positions, pushing the party toward a split.

In an audiotape released by the RNA, Prachanda was heard claiming that the Indian government had invited him for talks. Prachanda said India was about to agree on the release of Baidya and Gajurel in exchange for the withdrawal of the party's disciplinary action against Dr. Bhattarai. The Indian government issued a strong denial. Prachanda, while criticizing the RNA for releasing an old tape, did not dispute the contents. It then emerged that Dr. Bhattarai had been meeting leading Indian politicians in an effort to forge a common front with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) against King Gyanendra's direct rule. Prachanda mysteriously withdrew the disciplinary action against Dr. Bhattarai and officially designated him to hold talks in New Delhi. A section of the Indian media reported that Dr. Bhattarai was being "chaperoned" by Indian intelligence agents.¹⁴

The Maoist patch-up came at a convenient time for New Delhi. King Gyanendra, after steadily building ties with China, led a successful effort to secure China's admission as an observer to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation as a condition for Afghanistan's full membership. New Delhi, which had been campaigning to induct Kabul ever since the fall of the Taleban government in 2001, was confounded by the way Bangladesh and Sri

Lanka, together with Pakistan, backed Nepal's initiative. The royal takeover had marginalized the mainstream parties, diminishing New Delhi's room for maneuver. A broader anti-palace alliance was needed. Thus the SPA-Maoist accord was born in New Delhi. It was no coincidence that the monarchy and the military – the last remaining pivots of Nepalese sovereignty and independence -- became the common targets of India, the SPA and the Maoists.

Bumpy Road Ahead

By the end of April 2006, India regained the upper hand in Nepal in the guise of restoring democracy. The SPA, having regained power on the waves of massive pro-democracy protests, has drastically slashed the king's powers and prerogatives. The SPA and the Maoists are in consultations over holding a constituent assembly, which would, among other things, determine the future of the monarchy. However, New Delhi may not find the road ahead that easy.

The Maoist rebels have strong ties with their Indian counterparts, known as Naxalites. The merger of once-bitter foes, the People's War Group and the Maoist Coordination Center, into the Communist Party of India (Maoist) is partly credited to the Nepalese rebels. Although Prachanda has tried to disassociate his organization with Naxalites, the latter still claim they receive training from the Nepalese allies.¹⁵ There are full-fledged Maoist insurgencies in at least 13 out of India's 28 states, some bordering Nepal. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described Naxalite violence as the single greatest threat to India's internal stability and democratic culture.¹⁶ The Indian military and internal security apparatus have long believed that a Maoist takeover of Nepal could embolden Naxalites to step up their own war against the Indian state and goad them toward their larger goal of creating a South Asian revolutionary zone.

The restoration of the democratic process in Nepal has raised hopes of mainstreaming the Maoists. However, few Maoist cadres would be satisfied with anything less than a full-fledged republic. Even if India were to accept the abolition of the monarchy – either through a resumption of violent street protests or the verdict of a constituent assembly – little suggests that the rebels would continue to share power with the mainstream. Few Maoists have forgotten that the mainstream parties, together with the palace, had unleashed the full force of the state against the insurgency during its early years. Also unclear is the influence the Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), an alliance of Maoist parties around the world, wields among the Nepalese rebels. For RIM, Nepal is on the cusp of proving that the collapse of

communism was a U.S.-driven myth. There is a possibility of a hard-line splinter group of Nepalese Maoists denouncing any peace plan as a sellout, especially if the Nepalese vote in favor of retaining a ceremonial monarchy. This splinter group could join hands with Indian allies to keep their utopia alive.

India's motivations in seeing a permanent vassal state in Nepal is now increasingly being acknowledged in the West.¹⁷ India might not annex Nepal in the way of Sikkim, especially since the former kingdom had already been an Indian protectorate. A Bhutan-style relationship might not be on the cards either, considering the independent international profile Nepal has built as well as the strong strain of anti-Indianism among ordinary Nepalese. A Republic of Nepal, in view of the country's 1990-2002 democratic experience, would be vulnerable to perpetual conflicts between the president and prime minister. Endless stalemates in parliament and the radicalization of the streets would deepen instability. Indian strategic analysts and policymakers recognize the possibility of another disgruntled group – from the right or left – taking up arms to advance its political cause. Democracy, after all, will continue to offer India immense possibilities for destabilizing Nepal without drawing criticism for brazen interference.

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2 Marich Man Singh Shrestha, the prime minister during the 1990 protests, is quite explicit in narrating his experience with Indian manipulations. See Hoftun, Martin, Raeper, William and Whelpton, John. *People, Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal*. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point, 1999 Pp.276-277

3 It is interesting to note that whenever a government encouraged third-country investment in Nepal's vast hydroelectricity sector, which India covets as its exclusive preserve, a vote of no-confidence would invariably bring down the prime minister.

4 Although the UML launched massive street protests against the Nepali Congress government's "sellout" of Nepal's water resources to India through the Tanakpur Agreement in the early 1990s, the communists, once in power, agreed to a much broader water accord with New Delhi in the Mahakali Treaty.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Madan Prasad Khanal

He has an MBA from Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu and divides his time between Nepal and the United States on project work as a writer/researcher. His contributions have appeared in People's Review weekly published from Kathmandu and a few Web magazines like Scoop and News from Bangladesh.

India's Policy Tenet In Nepal

Triangulation From Atop Two Pillars

Sanjay Upadhyaya

For all the complexities gripping Nepal-India relations, there is a glaring paradox. Because of strong cultural, religious, linguistic and countless other links, buttressed by a vast and open border, Nepal's interactions with India have been closer than those with its northern neighbor, China. Without an outlet to the sea, moreover, Nepal remains entirely dependent on India for international trade and transit facilities. Geography-induced economic links have become stronger with India's rapid economic growth over the last decade.

This apparent semi-colonization¹ is juxtaposed with the historical reality that Nepal is the only South Asian nation never to have formally come under the British Raj. As such the Nepalese have always been acutely aware of their vulnerability as a small landlocked nation wedged between the two Asian giants. Despite their growing economic complementarities in recent years, Sino-Indian relations remain influenced by their divergent political systems and their competing ambitions to assert their regional and global roles. For Nepal, the imperative of maintaining good relations with both neighbors is mirrored in the dictum of its founder, King Prithvi Narayan Shah, who over two centuries ago described the country as “a yam between two boulders”.²

For almost 43 years after independence, India broadly defined its Nepal policy within the parameters of “special relations.” The multifaceted ties between the two nations, the benign argument went, offered a multiplicity of opportunities for mutual benefit. For Nepal, however, “special relations” also contained a sinister connotation, one directly linked to a controversial peace and friendship treaty signed with India in 1950. That year, Chinese communist forces invaded Tibet, which New Delhi regarded as a buffer zone shielding the subcontinent from real or potential Chinese incursions. India swung into action. The 1950 treaty, at least from Nepal's perspective, was premised on New Delhi's perception that South Asia constituted an integral security unit in which India played the lead role. Many Nepalese resented this interpretation and accused India of being insensitive to their independence.³ New Delhi had virtually forced the pact on a tottering feudalistic Rana regime, long backed by the British colonialists, in exchange for continued support. Moreover, the

letters exchanged with the treaty were made public only a decade later. The 1950 treaty, an accord in perpetuity, continues to bedevil Nepal-India relations.

The restoration of multiparty democracy in Nepal in 1990, through overt Indian support⁴ offered New Delhi an opportunity to fine-tune its policy articulation. Under the new "twin-pillar" doctrine, successive governments in New Delhi, cutting across party lines, emphasized that constitutional monarchy and political parties underpinned peace and stability in Nepal and were the best guarantors of a productive bilateral relationship. In reality, though, India has espoused a tri-polar policy that has allowed it to remain the principal external player in the kingdom.

Historical Balancing Act

The balancing act propounded by King Prithvi Narayan Shah fell to the wayside after his death in 1775. His son and successor, Pratap Singh Shah, died two years later, paving the way for factional power struggles precipitated by child or weak monarchs. To avoid military interference in court affairs, generals were granted the autonomy to pursue ever-larger conquests. Nepal's campaign of territorial expansion pitted the kingdom against the British colonial rulers in the subcontinent. Nepal's defeat in the 1814-16 war with British India battered the national psyche as well. Hemmed in to the south, east and the west by British India and by the Chinese to north, Nepal looked inwards to ensure its survival as a nation.⁵ The halt in military conquests resulted in deeper factionalism in the royal court, which paved the way for the rise of the Rana aristocracy in 1846. The precise role of British India in the rise of Jang Bahadur Rana, a junior army officer, continues to be hotly debated.⁶ More certain were the efforts Jang Bahadur and his successors put in availing of their services to the British rulers.⁷ With the advent of Rana rule, the perception that power could not be attained or maintained without the blessings of the dominant external player of the day became deeply etched in the psyche of aspirants.⁸

A century later, Britain's departure from the subcontinent left the Ranas insecure. Specifically, they feared the young Nepalese revolutionaries, many of whom had participated in the Indian independence movement and enjoyed close ideological and personal ties with the new leadership in New Delhi. The Ranas tried to open channels with the United States and China, with limited success. In 1949, Nepal attempted to join the United Nations. Its application was opposed by the Soviet Union, which argued that Nepal's dependence on British India meant it was not a fully sovereign state.⁹

When King Tribhuvan, exasperated by the Ranas' high-handedness, led his family into exile in New Delhi, the prime minister enthroned Tribhuvan's toddler grandson Gyanendra, the only heir still in Kathmandu. Nehru, intent on preventing Washington or London from intervening in Nepal, drew up a peace plan as a Nepali Congress-led democracy movement spread across the kingdom. Under the plan, Tribhuvan was restored to the throne and the monarchy regained the powers it had lost to the Ranas 104 years earlier. Although they remained avowed adversaries, the Ranas and the Nepali Congress formed a coalition government, which barely lasted nine months. After they lost power, the Ranas began dissolving into the palace camp, with some joining the Nepali Congress. The Nepali Congress expected to fill the political vacuum under its charismatic leader B.P. Koirala. For New Delhi, by then, Nepal's communist and fringe parties had become more attractive. Instead of inviting B.P. to form the new government, King Tribhuvan named his half-brother and party rival Matrika Prasad Koirala as premier.

India helped Nepal reorganize its armed forces, drastically cutting numbers and revamping training and organization along Indian lines. Indian advisers played key roles in training the civil service and police. There were close political consultations between Kathmandu and New Delhi, a practice that offended many Nepalese.¹⁰ After Tribhuvan's death, Indian influence began to diminish under his son, Mahendra. Having finally won U.N. membership in 1955, Nepal became an active member of its specialized agencies.

In 1959, the Nepali Congress won a two-thirds majority in the kingdom's first democratic elections. The palace and communists/fringe groups had already emerged as two distinct poles. Prime Minister B.P. Koirala, who enjoyed close ties with Nehru and other Indian leaders, did not see Nepal's "special relations" with India as an impediment to broadening the kingdom's international identity.¹¹ Less than two years later, King Mahendra dismissed the Koirala government and abrogated parliamentary democracy. The royal takeover impaired Nepal-India ties until Sino-India border tensions erupted into war in 1962. Although Nepal did not become involved, the war underscored the country's precarious position. Nehru, who needed a friendly buffer between China, recognized his limits vis-à-vis the palace.

After India's defeat in the war, King Mahendra set out to institutionalize a partyless regime based on village councils called Panchayat. Quietly, the royal regime acceded to some of India's security concerns. It agreed to purchase arms from India and to import them from Britain and the United States only if New Delhi was unable to supply them. In a quid pro quo, New Delhi

restrained exiled anti-palace insurgents. In public, the palace continued to maintain a hard posture. The Indian military was forced to close down checkpoints along Nepal's northern border. Kathmandu continued to broaden its international profile by, among other things, getting elected to the U.N. Security Council as a non-permanent member for 1968-1970.

Under King Mahendra, Nepal saw stronger ties with China as a way of rolling back Indian influence. The policy continued under King Birendra, who ascended to the throne in 1972. Three years later, he proposed that Nepal be declared a Zone of Peace (ZOP), which New Delhi considered an attempt to circumvent the special relations.¹² Bilateral ties hit a new low in 1988 when Nepal purchased air defense artillery from China. India protested that the deal had violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1950 treaty. Although the weapons hardly represented a threat, India considered it a dangerous infraction that could not go unpunished.

As tensions mounted, India added a litany of complaints. When the trade and transit agreement came up for renewal in March 1989, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi pressed the palace to meet New Delhi's security concerns first. Both sides dug in their heels and India allowed the agreement to lapse. Thirteen of the 15 border check posts regulating most of Nepal's third-country trade were closed. The economic impact on Nepal was severe.¹³ New Delhi was anxious not to let King Birendra to use the embargo to rally the people behind the palace. The Nepali Congress and the assortment of communist factions banned by the palace offered India with two levers against the king. With overt Indian blessings, the two forces forged a democratic alliance against the palace-led regime. Bowing to weeks of mass protests, King Birendra restored multiparty democracy in April 1990.

Democratic Deficit

Under the new leadership, Nepal-India relations began improving – at least in public. Kathmandu agreed not to purchase arms abroad without consulting New Delhi. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Nepal in February 1991, the first Indian head of government to do so in 14 years. New treaties on trade, transit and control of unauthorized trade were signed. As Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala used his control of the government to strengthen his grip on the ruling Nepali Congress, India revived a baffling interest in the palace. On substantive issues, Rao's delegation would attach greater importance to the “quiet dinner” scheduled with King Birendra than to formal sessions with his real host.¹⁴ Throughout the first half of the 1990s,

the Nepali Congress and Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML) remained bitter rivals inside parliament and on the streets. For New Delhi, they had fused into the same pole: the parliamentary mainstream. The Maoist insurgents would soon emerge to occupy the third pole.

The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)'s rise to power in the late 1990s was expected to herald a new phase in India's ties with the world's only Hindu kingdom. Instead, relations nosedived. A leading Indian newsmagazine leaked an official report that portrayed Nepal as a den of anti-Indianism.¹⁵ In New Delhi's view, Nepal was aiding and abetting Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to foment trouble across India. On December 24, 1999, an Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu to New Delhi was hijacked. The plane landed in the Indian city of Amritsar before departing on a circuitous journey that would ultimately end in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Indian media first blamed lax security at Kathmandu airport before setting out to chronicle how the ISI had virtually bought the airport security apparatus. One Indian TV channel accused a Nepalese businessman on the flight of being a hijacker. A Nepalese newspaper brought up another interesting angle – involving the Kathmandu station chief of the Indian spy agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, who was on the flight – largely ignored by the rest of the media.¹⁶

In August 2000, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala visited New Delhi offering assurances that Kathmandu would not let Pakistani intelligence agencies use its soil for anti-India activities. By this time, Indian media had begun detailing how the ISI was funding the Maoists rebels. In December, Kathmandu erupted in violence amid rumors that India film star Hrithik Roshan had slandered Nepal in a TV interview. The actor denied having made any such remark and no one to this day has claimed to have seen the interview. At least three lives were lost, dozens of people injured and millions of rupees worth of property damaged. Some Indian commentators described the riots as a reflection of popular anger at India's "big-brotherly attitude". Indian leaders saw the ISI's hand.¹⁷

Amid growing political instability and an intensification of Maoist violence, there was speculation that King Birendra was contemplating some drastic intervention. Instead, on the night of June 1, 2001, Birendra's whole family, along with half a dozen other royals, died in a palace massacre. According to the official probe, Crown Prince Dipendra, frustrated by his parents' disapproval of the woman he wanted to marry, opened fire on his family before turning the gun on himself. Dipendra, who was fighting for his life at a

military hospital, was crowned king the following morning. When the new monarch died two days later, his uncle, Gyanendra, ascended to the throne. In one of its first acts, the Nepalese government blocked some Indian satellite TV channels because of the inflammatory content of their coverage.

Over a year later, when King Gyanendra dismissed the elected government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba for failing to hold elections on schedule, New Delhi, like Washington and London, offered mild criticism. Significantly, the king had met K.V. Rajan and M.S. Rasgotra -- both former ambassadors in Kathmandu -- along with the American and Chinese ambassadors before going on national radio and TV to announce his intervention. Whatever may have transpired in those private deliberations, New Delhi reaffirmed its twin-pillar doctrine in public.

Following the collapse of a second round of peace talks with the Maoist rebels and the failure of palace-appointed governments to hold parliamentary elections, King Gyanendra took direct control on February 1, 2005. This time, India's response was sharp and swift. New Delhi suspended counterinsurgency assistance to the Royal Nepalese Army. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pulled out of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Dhaka, ostensibly to avoid legitimizing the king. Indian media reported that New Delhi had advised the king against assuming direct powers.¹⁸ Something was certainly amiss. In the preceding months, Kathmandu and New Delhi had been unable to schedule a visit by King Gyanendra to India. Some Indian analysts accused their own government of stonewalling.¹⁹

When a formal announcement was made, King Gyanendra's itinerary included four of the five Indian states bordering Nepal. The monarch was explicit about his intentions in an interview with a leading Indian newspaper, saying he expected to "speak my mind when in India and get to know India's perspectives on [the Maoist] insurgency in Nepal."²⁰ On December 23, 2004, however, the monarch called off the visit at the last minute following the death of former Indian premier Rao. There has been some speculation on whether New Delhi might have acquiesced in the royal takeover had King Gyanendra named an India-friendly politician as chairman of a multiparty council of ministers.²¹

New Delhi spent the first half of 2005 mocking King Gyanendra's effort to play the "China card".²² While much of the world had criticized the royal takeover, China, like Pakistan and Russia, considered it an internal matter.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao skipped Nepal during his South Asia tour, but Foreign Minister Li arrived in Kathmandu as part of 50th anniversary celebrations of diplomatic relations. At the rescheduled SAARC summit in Dhaka in November, Nepal led a successful campaign linking Afghanistan's full membership with China's inclusion as an observer. Weeks after Nepal's army chief returned from Beijing, China delivered truckloads of military supplies to Nepal. Indian interest in Nepal's "China card" grew into a serious inquiry into Beijing's motives in South Asia. Some Indian analysts appeared ready to tolerate a one-time Chinese replenishment of Nepal's armory.²³ Leading Indian newspapers, however, carried editorials urging their government to use all possible means to teach the recalcitrant royal regime a fitting lesson.²⁴

The Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and Maoist rebels were already in regular consultations in New Delhi through the good offices of leftist groups backing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's coalition government. Transforming Nepal's tripolar conflict into a bipolar one – in appearance, if not in content – now seemed to have acquired official urgency. The SPA and Maoists came out with a 12-point understanding to achieve "total democracy". However, there were serious ambiguities on such key issues as the monarchy, disarming of the rebels and external monitoring. Although it had failed to tame the palace, New Delhi did not exactly lose from the accord. It extracted a public undertaking from Maoist supremo Prachanda that his revolution was confined to Nepal. That statement came a day after he had joined Ganapathy, the leader of India's Maoists, in vowing "to fight unitedly till the entire conspiracies hatched by the imperialists and reactionaries are crushed and the people's cause of socialism and communism are established in Nepal, India and all over the world."²⁵

Backyard Wide Open Again

As the triangular conflict deepened, the United Nations, Switzerland and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, among others, began taking serious interest in a peace settlement. China consistently opposed third-party intervention in Nepal, while India considered itself the most qualified intermediary. A U.S. congressional delegation led by House of Representatives Speaker Dennis Hastert was scheduled to visit Kathmandu in early April followed by Carter in May. The SPA went ahead with a previously announced do-or-die showdown with the palace, while the Maoist rebels tightened the noose through transportation blockades. The royal regime, claiming that the Maoists had taken over the protests, ordered a massive security crackdown.

Amid the escalating violence, the Hastert delegation and Carter cancelled their visits, leaving the field wide open for India. Prime Minister Singh sent Karan Singh, a senior member of his Congress Party and son of Kashmir's last Maharaja, to Kathmandu. Karan Singh, related to the Nepalese royal family through marriage, emerged from a meeting with King Gyanendra satisfied but non-committal.²⁶ Two days later the monarch went on radio and television to invite the SPA to name a prime minister, a move India, along with the United States and European nations, instantly welcomed. This enraged the street protesters, consisting in large part of Maoist cadres, who began raising slogans against India. Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, a former ambassador to Nepal, hastily revised New Delhi's official position, dropping references to constitutional monarchy.

After another round of hectic diplomatic initiatives – driven by India – King Gyanendra reinstated the House of Representatives dissolved by Prime Minister Deuba in 2002. This met a principal demand of the SPA. Nepali Congress President Girija Prasad Koirala is back as prime minister promising to hold elections to a constituent assembly that would, among other things, determine the future of the monarchy – a central Maoist demand. All this has brought a semblance of order in Nepal, but little certainty. From New Delhi's tri-polar perspective, though, the palace, mainstream parties and the Maoist rebels remain the principal protagonists.

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2 Quoted by Rishikesh Shaha from Yogi Narahari Nath and Babu Ram Acharya (eds.), 'Rastapita Shri Panch Bada Maharaj Prithivinarayan Shah ko Divyopadesh', in *Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect* (Oxford University Press, 1978) p. 104.

3 Although not a formal military alliance, the 1950 treaty required both parties to consult and "devise effective countermeasures" in the event of a security threat to either country. Nepal's inclusion in the Indian defense perimeter was made explicit by the exchange of secret letters that accompanied the treaty. To assuage Nepalese fears of Indian domination, the treaty also stipulated that Indian forces could be introduced into the country only at the invitation of the Nepalese government.

4 Important Indian MPs, including Janata Dal president and future prime minister Chandrasekhar, representing most political parties pledged their support for the movement at an opposition conference in Kathmandu.

5 Stiller, Ludwig F. *Nepal: Growth of a Nation*. Kathmandu: Human Resources Development Research Centre, 1993 Pp.62-63

6 Amid intrigue and infighting among royal competitors, Jang Bahadur Rana, a military commander, seized power and established a dynasty of prime ministers that would rule until 1951. The Rana dynasty essentially became almost a parallel monarchy in which the preeminent authority was the prime minister, a hereditary position with unclear rules of succession.

7 During the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, Jang Bahadur Rana offered military support to British Governor-General Lord Canning. Jang Bahadur himself led 14,000 troops to put down the uprising by several rajas and nawabs. Rana, Pramode Shamshere. *Rana Intrigues*. Kathmandu: R. Rana, 1995. Pp.38-39

8 "The Making Of A Nation." By Basanta Lohani, *The Kathmandu Post*. 15 January 2002

9 Editorial, *The New York Times*, 24 May 1949

10 The first major dispute between BP Koirala and Matrika Prasad Koirala required the personal mediation of Indian leaders like Jai Prakash Narain. Sharma, Jagadish. *Nepal: Struggle for Existence*. Kathmandu: Communications Incorporated, 1986 P.58

11 Hoftun, Martin, Raeper, William and Whelpton, John. *People, Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal*. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point, 1999 P.261

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13 "Nepal's Economy Is Gasping as India, a Huge Neighbor, Squeezes It Hard." *The New York Times*: April 11, 1989; "India Shows Its Muscle To Nepal; New Delhi Employs Economic Weapons." *The Washington Post*: April 13, 1989.

14 Sharma, Jan. *Democracy Without Roots*. New Delhi: Book Faith India, 1998 P.190

15 "Terrorism: The Kathmandu Nexus" *India Today*. 12 June 2000

16 *People's Review*: Kathmandu. 6-12 January 2000. Quoting the Indian Airlines passenger manifest, *People's Review* identified SBS Tomar, First Secretary (Political), at the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, as a passenger on IA Flight 814. "The screaming silence of the Indian media in reporting that Tomar was a passenger assumes great and obvious significance."

17 "India Paying Dearly For Its Bully Image." By B. Gautam. *The Japan Times*. 12 January 2001.

18 "India Tried To Dissuade Gyanendra A Few Weeks Ago." *Indian Express*. 2 February 2005

19 "Himalayan Blunder?" By Swapan Dasgupta. *The Pioneer*: New Delhi. 5 December 2004. Referring to the unending delays in the royal visit, Dasgupta wrote: "India, it would appear, has chosen to send out a terse message of displeasure to the Narayanhiti Palace. It has, in effect, endorsed the assertion that the war against Maoist insurgency is suffering on account of the King's determination to hold on to his Emergency powers. By hosting Prime Minister Deuba in September and the Royal Nepalese Army

chief last month, Delhi has indicated that it values the political class and military above the monarchy. The message is clear: The King must take a backseat."

20 *The Times of India*. 18 December 2004

21 Before the takeover, Nepalese tabloids floated the name of Surya Bahadur Thapa, widely believed to enjoy close ties with India's Congress Party. In the event, King Gyanendra appointed two known India critics, former premiers Dr. Tulsi Giri and Kirti Nidhi Bista, as his deputies.

22 The term was in wide use in India – mostly pejoratively – during the reign of King Mahendra, father of King Gyanendra, who set out to strengthen ties with the People's Republic of China.

23 "Prevent Chinese, Pakistani Arms Supplies To Nepal". *Indo-Asian News Service*. 20 December 2005

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sanjay Upadhyaya

Sanjay Upadhyaya is a freelance journalist and writer from Kathmandu with two decades' experience in the field. A Fulbright Scholar who earned an MA in journalism from New York University, Mr. Upadhyaya has worked as an editorial writer for Khaleej Times in Dubai and The Rising Nepal in Kathmandu. In addition, he has worked for The Times of London as Nepal correspondent and for Inter Press Service as Gulf analyst. Mr. Upadhyaya has contributed the chapter on Nepalese politics "State of Nepal," published in 2002 by Himal Books in Kathmandu. He has appeared on BBC radio and television as guest analyst. Currently based in Michigan, USA, where his wife is studying, Mr. Upadhyaya is working on a book on Nepal's troubled experience with democracy between 1990 and 2002. He frequently appears on BBC Radio's Nepali Service as a commentator on U.S. affairs and has been writing for publications in Nepal.

The Untold Pains of Nepal

Dr. Shastra Dutta Pant

Introduction

Both India and Nepal are independent and sovereign countries. The unique relationship between these two countries is based not only on diplomatic and political levels but also on the level of common people. The geographical proximity holds a unique significance as Nepal lies to the southern slope of the Himalayas and all the rivers from Nepal flow towards India. Thus, it is customary to have more transaction on industry and trade sectors because of geographical structure.

India is Nepal's closer neighboring friend. Nepal is one of the most beautiful nations located on the southern sunny lap of Himalayas, stretching from east to west. It is sandwiched between the Tibetan autonomous region of the People's Republic China in the north and the Republic of India in the south, east and west. Nepal is only the Hindu kingdom in the world having equal respect to all religions, traditions and cultures.

Though India is a good friend, Nepal feels dominated in several issues. The issues in brief are stated below. The issues that Nepalis are facing are untold stories of Nepal that any government in power does not venture to express to the fellow friends of the world. Even NGOs, journalists, civil societies and community development organizations do not dare to express openly and freely due to many reasons. When Nepal is in a weak and fragile state it is exploited ruthlessly. For example when Nepal in these days is in a monarchical rule, extreme conflicts and terrorisms a road, is being constructed by Indian BSF in Nepali territory in Susta area in central Nepal. So were grabbed Nepal's water resources and many other things during critical political and administrative situations.

Territorial issues

1. Open border

The peace and amity treaty of 1950 proposes open borders system between two countries. Because of the open border, the citizen travels from one country to another without visa, and without any record in spite of the problems created by open border; India is not ready to resolve it. India is willing to

continue open border even at the cost of its loss. It is India's vested and vile interest.

The open border has resulted in various problems. Social evils are enlarging day by day. Let me trace some of them in brief. Nepal has been the centre for various kinds of Indian criminals (smugglers, embezzlers and dacoits), who frequently break law and order by creating turmoil. They taking shelter in border area intensify theft, robbery, killing, and looting in Nepal. Such criminal activities cause harm to every national and local election and thus weakening democratic practices in Nepal. The BSF gives security to the criminals, who freely carry out their activities and give trouble to Nepalis. The month long mass rape in several VDCs, including Biratnagar Municipality, in 2005 can be taken as glaring example. When internal terrorism is in high the same ratio is covered by the Indian criminals of all types.

Since BSF built border road, the border area has turned into the dwelling place for Indian criminals, who freely enter Nepal and create havoc by looting and killing. Therefore, Nepalis don't want to live near the border areas. The land thus becomes easy to encroach. Indian citizens, taking the advantage of security forces, are involved in border encroachment, construction of houses in the No Man's Land and agricultural activities.¹

Indians steal domestic animals, smuggle timber and wild animals, rob personal property, and misbehave Nepali women. These criminals do get indirect support from the Indian officials. Open border has been one of main causes of the destruction of forest, firewood, and the smuggling of natural resources such as timber, herbs, rare animal, and birds.

In India, in every five minutes a female is tortured, kidnapped, or raped. In every four minutes, a female is burnt to death. Such criminal activities have grown by 37 percent. However, the concerned authorities show apathy in these cases.² Every year, 3 to 5 thousands lives are killed, including the known and unknown. Moreover, Indian criminals commit murder in India and throw the dead bodies into Nepal's territory.³

Many Indian frauds come to Nepal and cheat people with the temptation of changing brass into gold and a hundred rupee note into thousand and much more. Fake Indian doctors, Indian teachers with fake certificates, the jyotishis (fortune tellers) cheat simple and ordinary honest Nepali every day. Nepali youth with the temptation of sending them to America are cheated and looted.⁴ Indian on the name of films, trickster, conjuror, fortune-teller and saints frequently cheat Nepali. Fake Indian Finance Companies⁵ cheat people. Indians engaging in the collection of waste materials promote theft.

Smuggling of drugs, weapons, counterfeit currency, trafficking of children and women are rampant. Indian smugglers are more equipped and stronger than police force. Thus, rascals, smugglers and criminals control over border areas.⁶ Because of open border, thousands of Nepalis young children are sold in different brothels and circuses of India for prostitution and child abuses. Nepal has become the centre of large number of lower middle class Indian smugglers after 1990. They help produce hemp in Nepal. Drug smuggling has deprived the character of some Nepalese youths.

While importing and exporting goods from third countries, Nepali businessmen suffer from the frequent attack of Indian robbers. Black marketing also occurs in a higher level.⁷ Goods disappear without a slight break on the seal of the container or the keys. The theft is committed so aptly that by doing cutting welding and painting so that the goods owner can't claim insurance companies. Resultantly, Nepalis businessmen have to bear the loss of millions of rupees, and thus become bankrupt. It is estimated that 35, 00,000 Indians do job permanently, and 10 to 15 lakh seasonal labours enter every year. They are involved in the activities like smuggling, adulteration, production of low quality goods, theft, cheat, sale of contaminated foods and other useless materials.

Indians mix sand with cement, stones with rice, inedible materials with ripening fruits, sell venomous vegetables, curd, milk, and butter and put ISI mark on unqualitative hardware materials. Adulterate tobacco items and wine, poisonous mustard oil, causing jaundice, goitre, and effects on kidney and lungs.⁸ The unequal treaty of June 10, 1990 between India and Nepal allowed Indians vehicles to come to Nepal freely, whereas restricted Nepali vehicles, and thus resulting black marketing. Supplies of low quality goods including medicines, pesticides fertilizer have caused great harm to agricultural products. Thus, people's lives are at high risk because of adulteration.

The rejected venomous oil, mixed with agrimona causing dropsy in India was allowed to sell in Nepal. Similarly Paper Money / Cash Smuggling and Counterfeit Currency in Nepal are common business by Indians. They print and sale the fake note of hard foreign currency.⁹ Nepal has become secured place for the smugglers to label and export Indian banned products into third countries. India has more than 100,000 institutions from primary to university level to make fake academic certificates. More than 100 people enter Nepal every day illegally for those fake actions.¹⁰

India produces illegal weapons and exports in Nepal easily.¹¹ Maoist could flourish due to this reason. The smuggler, supply home made and

sophisticated arms, explosives as well.¹² Some of the hired hoodlums, especially from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh of India, make frequent explosion in Nepal.¹³ They bomb¹⁴ capture booths in the general elections and damage public properties in time of bandh, strike or strife. Therefore, Nepal prefers settlement on border problems as was done with China. As in accordance with the agreement, similar treaty can be made with India. India even does not like to talk about this issue.

2. Encroachments

In one way or other, the problem of border encroachment lies on almost all the places that are linked with India. However, so far the encroachments are noted in 85 places in 21 districts. The Indian side has uninterruptedly conducted the activities like moving or breaking the pillars, smashing, ruining, transgressing and encroaching in settlements. Border pillar is the guard of national integrity, evidence of frontier. If the inanimate evidence based on truth is destroyed by deceitful living being, there enters injustice, immorality, wrong principle of the primitive age that "might is right". This theory goes against and has been used against the meaning of the words like individual freedom, human right, democracy, liberalism, globalisation, liberty and so on.

Border pillars are constructed in the presence of both countries but are destroyed unilaterally and secretly. Rather, rivers change their courses occasionally and create problems, but pillars are the signs that are free from all these troubles. No change of such signs could be made unilaterally. Besides, encroachments of the No-Man's Land by the Indian side have been intensified in different places these days. The Indian armed police involve to removing the concrete structures built in the No-Man's Land. The border has been encroached through tacit understanding between the Indian officials and police personnel. The civil officials have also provided security to them. The Indian Government has built a consulate and a customs office in the No Man's Land. India erects overnight artificial pillars, bent on creating the third No-Man's Land in several places inside Nepal. One who goes there for study may find himself in confusion.

Such incidents occur more in the remote places of which the common people remain uniformed. Signs erase when no news comes for years. This is such a burning example of India's vile tendency. The border pillars are moved, removed, changed, and uprooted. Many pillars are destroyed without leaving any traces of them¹⁵ e.g. Indians have relocated the border pillars 3.5 km north of the Indian Territory into Nepal at Susta. The Indian border security forces also remove the border pillar No. 33 from the Sirsiya. The joint team has

already met 25 times, but the encroachments remain as it is. A decision made on July 6, 1966 to avert border encroachment by making settlement free zone up to three kilometres on both sides of the border, India is ignoring. If the things as they stand now continue to exist, there will be no meaning of erecting and updating border pillars in the days to come.

3. Water Loggings

The large and long rivers like Koshi, Gandaki, Karnali, Mahakali, which come from the Himalayans, are logged by the central government of India and protects its property, people, land, and settlements in its territory by making afflux bund from the both corners of river. Because of the afflux bund constructed without consulting Nepal on the Indian side, Nepalis areas are water logged and flooded. Millions of property is ravaged. If India does not construct afflux bunds, the water can flow freely in natural form and Nepal does not have to become flood-affected area.

The second types of rivers emerging from the Mahabharat Mountains of Nepal enter India passing through the Terai region of Nepal piercing Chure hills are dammed by the state governments of India. They tamed for irrigation by constructing dams near the border of Nepal on the side of India. The third types of rivers originating from the Chure hills having sufficient water during monsoon are taped by the local /district committee, Gaun Panchayast, consumers of India. This has assisted in swamping Nepal and irrigating India.

The wave of the river not only erodes the both edges of the river but also floods and swamps Nepali lands. The river erosion, for example, the dam of Bagmati alone affects 37 VDC/Municipalities. So are the hundred of cases in the southern bordering areas. Water logging turns all the settlement areas and agricultural lands into sandy bank. People are forced to lead a life of refugee, losing their homes and villages. Many people and domestic animals die, and food grains become useless. Because of the water loggings approximately parallel to the borders, the river's water turns into pool and the pool further erodes Nepali land. The river ascends more and more, and that area becomes swamped. Thousands of hectares of crops are under water. It becomes difficult to cross the river. It also swamps houses and farming lands. The Nepalis people living in the border area spend miserable life during monsoon.

4. Greater Nepal

The Nepali territory prior to the Sugauli Treaty (called the border problem of greater Nepal) had to be returned to Nepal. Because of the Sugauli Treaty of 1815/16, Nepal had to condense its larger territory to a smaller one. It was

extended up to Tista River on the East, to Kangara across Sutlej River in the west, to the confluence of Ganga and Jumuna River in the south, touching the present day Bangladesh in the east. The area of the Bishal Nepal is reduced from 2, 04,917 to 1, 47,141 square kilometres. India yet has to return 57,776 sq. km. to Nepal after 1950 treaty of friendship.

Nepal contributed a lot in the World Wars to make the English an empire. However, the British constantly betrayed Nepali people. They sliced a greater part of Nepal and annexed it in India. They also insincerely and treacherously departed without returning Nepali land to Nepal. The Sugauli Treaty of the time of the British is the only base for determining border which the 1950 treaties with India and Britain cancels all prior agreements including Sugauli Treaty. It means Nepal has right to occupy all areas before Sugauli treaty. It is not a begging but a legal right, if an understanding is made between the three countries, the real Nepal before Sugauli Treaty, is the real Nepal. As soon India knew the practices of Four Finger Theory,¹⁶ it absorbed Sikkim against the norms and values of treaty, agreement, Act, morality and good neighborhood.

Hence, it is necessary to reanalyze and interpret the Sugauli Treaty of 1815 ratified in 1816 and 1950's Amity Treaty to get lost territory back from the grip of India. India as in the case of Kalapani to these days absorbed the Bagdogra – Galgalia lying between Nepal and Bangladesh by deploying its troop, fearing that Nepal will take back. Nepali Congress Government rejected Ghising's proposal of greater Gurkha Empire, instead, Nepal's Counselor General in Kolkotta conveyed statement to West Bengal's Government.¹⁷

Land has been kept haughtily by India as done by Iraq to the case of Kuwait calling it its 19th state. One needs to analyse the history of Nepal and India and the treaties and understandings held between the two countries to understand how the above- mentioned land absorbed by India belongs to Nepal. Nepal has abundant historical evidences to claim greater Nepal. For instance, in 1959, Mr. Nehru, the former Prime Minister of India, paid his visit to Nepal and agreed to amend trade treaty of 1950. He also agreed to remove Indian check post from Nepal. Nehru quotes, "Dehradun, Kumau and Nainital, Simla are the territories of Nepal which were once captured by the British." Author E.C. Kojl in "Brief Dictionary of Darjeeling" writes, "All these territories belonged to Nepal."¹⁸

British-India forced Nepal to sign the Sugauli Treaty, fearing that hill area war trained Nepali troops would expand their kingdom from the Brahmaputra River in the east to Pamir in the west. The objective of the Sugauli Treaty was to discourage Nepalis to make war so that they could not

expand their kingdom the east of Tista and the west of Satlaj. The Section 8 of the 1950 treaty has cancelled all the treaties, letters, and letter of agreement before the Sugauli Treaty. The dismissal of this treaty suggests that the territory before the Sugauli Treaty customarily belongs to Nepal.

The British signed the Sugauli Treaty evasively to prevent Nepal from galvanizing Sikkim, Assam and other states. The section 6 shows that the eastern border of Nepal is the Tista River before or after the agreement on the Sugauli Treaty. The Section 6 was included in the treaty to preserve Sikkim from the encroachment of Nepal.

The Titaliya Treaty between East India Company and Sikkim, the letters of treaty between British-India and Nepal regarding the return of the western Terai have justified that Darjeeling is inseparable area of Nepal. Similarly, the treaty held between East India Company and Bhutan on April 4, 1779 and the latest treaty of August 8, 1849 also justify that the territory from Mechi to Tisti lies in Nepal. Hence, Indian in accordance with the Article 1 (3) (C) of its constitution had not included this area including Darjeeling in India. The 1947's Darjeeling Committee of the then Unified Indian Communist Party (ICP) had provided the Indian Constitutional Assembly with the decision of constituting independent 'Gorkhasthan Nation' by integrating Darjeeling, and Sikkim in Nepal. This document elucidates the article 1 and 8 of the above-mentioned 1950 Peace Treaty.

The Section 2 of the treaty India should have gradually returned the lost territory to Nepal. The section says, "The British Government declares that the whole low lands lying between Gorakhpur district and the Rapti River, and the whole low lands lying between the Kali and the Rapti river belonging to the Rajahs of Nepal prior to the Sugauli treaty and later to the British Government will be returned to be the sovereignty of the Royal of Nepal". India had made decision to return the territories to Nepal on November 1, 1860. The Sugauli Treaty was not ratified even after the ratification of the treaty with Sikkim. Without the ratification of the understandings and treaties, held are naturally invalid. India's not giving validity to every treaty without ratification but the Sugawli Treaty is itself paradoxical.

The Section (8) of 1950 amity and peace treaty nullified the Sugauli Treaty. Therefore, Nepal has right over Darjeeling and other lost territories before the Sugauli Treaty whether there had been the Section 8 of 1950's treaty or the treaty itself. The lost territories of Nepal were on lease as to the case of Britain, which as had taken Hong Kong on lease with China. The phrase 'in perpetuity' was mentioned in the Hong Kong Treaty signed between Britain and China.

The term 'in perpetuity' is also included in the Sugauli Treaty. It gives the sense of the expiry of the treaty between two agreed countries after one hundred years.

Company Government had promised to pay yearly tributes of two lakh rupees in return for the land taken on lease in accordance with the Section (4) of the Treaty. According to the section 9 of the same treaty, India in perpetuity gave the possession of its Praganna district (Now called Vijayapur district) to Nepal; India took back the territory, taken under the same provision. The chief motive of signing treaty between Nepal and UK on October 30, 1950 A.D. was to give back the Nepali territory annexed into India. It is written on the preface that the Kathmandu Treaty of December 21, 1823 is not applicable because of the recent establishment of the two independent states India and Pakistan. Both Nepal and Britain signed new treaty and agreed on the following section.¹⁹

Therefore, the proposal of the restoration of greater Nepal is neither new nor unusual nor against international laws, treaties and agreements. In addition, the undecided question of greater Nepal is necessary to analyze and identify the absurdities created by open border.

The attitude issues

India wants to keep the immediate neighbouring countries under its influence and lordship to show that it is a powerful nation. It wants the neighbouring countries to vote on behalf of India in every international forum and organization, including UN. But Nepal wants to free itself from the lordship, suppression and neo-colonial domination of India, and to consolidate its sovereignty, and to restore position existed before the Sugauli Treaty. India also wants to keep Nepal under its military nexus and defence strategy. But Nepal denies remaining under that shade and strategy. Nepal wills to protect and formulate its own defence strategy.

Like Nepal, the present India is the unification of dozens of small free and independent kingdoms and principalities. The English people, having entered India founded a greater India by integrating those small kingdoms and principalities. In this sense, India is highly indebted to the British. Besides, the British-India, frequently waged war to absorb Nepal. However, they had to bear defeat in every war. India even after the abandonment of the British did not abdicate its colonial activities. Consequently, Goa, Daman, Dyuk, Hyderabad, Jammu, Kashmir and Sikkim were annexed in India. Fortunately, Bangladesh became an independent nation. Bhutan has been semi-colonized. Because of India's colonial trend, it views Nepal negatively.

India, born in 1947, quite younger to Nepal intends to treat Nepal as a big brother, treat Nepal as its handmaid and tame Nepal by imposing blockade unilaterally so on so forth. Indian behavior shows Nepal as the tributary state of India. Nepal totally denies and hates this bureaucratic attitude of India. India wants to sympathize Nepal, whereas Nepal wants to establish its right. Nepal wants to keep India and China in equal distance, and to treat both the countries equally. India wants to keep an uneven distance with Nepal that is special proximity.

Bhutan, though, is an independent, sovereign and monarchical country; the people in there who demanded their democratic rights had to tolerate subjugation, oppression, exploitation and torture. When the Bhutanese Nepali found their lives in risk, they entered India for political refuge. However, India drove them towards Nepal in trucks. Autocracy Bhutan is getting protection from India. Because of strong stand of Nepal, it deployed force to quell it. In fact, Nepal has made better democratic exercise than Bhutan.²⁰ India, by driving two lakh Bhutanese refugees (one on and one off the record) into Nepal, India did justice neither to Nepal nor to the Bhutanese refugees. Analysts view that Bhutan is next to Sikkim in the Indian grand design. Nepal denies such injustices.

India learned the art of colonization from Britain and it has been practicing the same old technique. India transports cheap literature and films to Nepal that corrupt the habits of people, degrade morality and displace its own culture. Such things that come to Nepal freely not only degrade Nepali people but also transfer their wealth to India. These practices have been given encouragement by some Dorjians and protected by the Indian embassy.²¹ India wants to transfer its citizens to other SAARC countries in order to take relief from its over-population burden. It also wants to transport the homeless poor, illiterate and beggars to its neighboring nations. When there is no place to transfer Indian population, India puts electric barbed wire fence in its borders, and where there is still possibility of intrusion like in Nepal denies.

India suffering from colonial trend has got its Slave Mentality wants to impose upon Nepal. Because of such colonial trend, Nepal does not have back its lost territory from its grip so far. India usually dishonours the sovereignty of Nepal and imposes its decisions on Nepal. India decides unilaterally be a matter of blockade, the deployment of military force or armed police or the arrest of any special persons in Nepal, border disputes, water loggings, barrages and dams construction can be taken as examples. India, taking the advantage of sincere behaviour of Nepalis, misbehaves frequently. However, Nepali always views India as fellow nation.

Nepal Government gave some land on lease to India to construct Koshi Barrage at Sunsari district. But India did not return it even after the decades of expiry of lease date. Neither India closed the project office, nor did it return the land. Neither had it signed any agreement, nor did it get the project renewed. India built the Koshi, Gandaki, and Mahakali Barrages only for its benefit. If the dams had been constructed inside foothills of Nepal sufficient electricity would have been produced. Moreover, the arable land of the Terai belt of Nepal would have been irrigated and Nepal would have controlled the main grid.

Because of its ill-will attitude only Indian encroach Nepali territory. It is one of the harassing factors to Nepal. While people were protesting against the encroachment of India by the bank of Mahakali River in the west, Indian surveyors erected border pillars in Bhadrapur Municipality in the east to harass. Thus, unlike China, India has not shown gentleness and positive attitude to its neighbouring countries. Though the Central government may not be involved directly in activities such as disappearing border pillar, encroachment of territories, inundation, water logging, and many other offences, but it never takes any effective step to stop these activities. Nepal wanted to implement the system of work permit to its citizen India went against of that.²²

The Bhutanese democratic leader Rongthong Kinley Dorjee, relating to Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, reached Delhi to make political compromise under the mediation of India. Meanwhile, the India Government apprehended and put him to jail against the norm of democracy and human rights dishonestly. While terrorist declared Maoists were mediated and asked them to treat as democratic political forces. Weaker should tolerate the injustices? Nepalis have to bear India's domination because it is smaller in size and weaker in power. Mechi and Mahakali people do not have place even for their last rites and for their pilgrimage. India has created turmoil all around borders. Every Nepali should be ready to dedicate their lives to prevent Nepal from the encroachment of India. Thus, India has hurt the self-respect of Nepali people.

The issue of Interferences

1. Continuous Interference

Nepal has been subjected to the incessant interference of India right after the 1950's amity treaty between these two countries. It will be impossible for

Nepalis people to have their economic and social prosperity, make their own plans and decisions themselves by preserving their sovereignty. India had already blocked the border for two times in the past. A political change was imposed into Nepal. The agreement made on the 10th June of 1990, interim government grabs economic, employment powers. An assault on Chinese technician in 1998, and the Baneshwor episode illustrate the direct interferences of India in Nepal.

Nepal intends to establish its own distinct identity by thriving national integrity and prosperity. On the contrary, India wants to assimilate Nepal in its rituals and culture. In this way, it puts many obstacles to deprive Nepal from being united. Nepal wants to prosper its democratic culture. But India remains remission to it. That democratic system of India is to keep Nepal under its grip. For India, Bhutan is a democratic country having human rights and freedom of press (where no private press is registered) while Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan has not, because India says so.

Nepal believes that the responsibility of a country with seaport facility is to provide landlocked country with easy access to the nearest seacoast. Unfortunately, India stands against it. Nepal wants to trade the needed arms and ammunitions as other miscellaneous objects. But India expresses repugnance against this strategy. Nepal is the country having various castes, complexions, religions and cultures. The amalgamation of all has constructed the Nepali nationality under the aegis of crown. Nepal is happy under its own condition but India is trying to give rise of communal tension by instigating the people of different regions and ethnic groups.

India shows its domineering behaviour to all its immediate neighbouring countries. For instance, during the informal visit of the Chief of Indian Army Shree Bipinchandra Joshi to Bangladesh, two aircrafts of Indian army had illegally and forcibly entered in the Lal Munighat area of Bangladesh.²³ Likewise, Indian army had also forcibly entered in Sri Lanka and Maldives, and not to mention about Sikkim.

2. Political game plan (Interference)

RAW has taken its roots in Nepal by taking advantage of open border. The activity of this organization can be seen in Nepali politics and administration. Nepal's political leaders think that they cannot reach power without the support the RAW. Because of open border, Indians freely enter Nepal and acquire citizenship. This situation will result in minority of Nepali people in near future. While Sitaram Yachury/other Indian nationals were welcome as

the head of the nation in Nepal's decade old non-elected parliament in April 2006, at the same time the so-called SPA had prohibited the MPs of the same category to enter the parliament because India said so. So was done by Mr. Chandra Shekhar and Swami Subramanyam in the 1990 political change.

India citizens in some cases should take prior permission to move from one state to another. However, Indian police and army men in uniform and armaments forcibly enter Nepal, violating the norms of a sovereign nation. Bullying and harassing are being done everywhere. The buffalo entering into the pond by breaking the peace of freely swimming frogs does not realize how risky it is for them to preserve their lives from its intrusion. Does the buffalo know how many frogs are trapped, and crushed? Whenever the frogs raise their voices for their fundamental rights and security at their disposal, "might is right" principle will be applied against them.

On 1976, Nepal proposed to declare it as the peace zone nation having seven responsibilities and approving by 116 countries of the world, India's disapproval till now signifies that India does not want to free Nepal from its defence policy. Nepal is under total influence of India after the restoration of multi party democracy. The more a country has influence of another country, the further its basic right, independence and democracy wane. India intends a conspiracy to keep Nepal under its control in terms of trade and military influence.²⁴

3. Interference on Economics

Nepal takes trade and transit as two different entities. Transit is a fundamental right of Nepal, whereas trade depends on bilateral understanding. When India denied agreeing on two treaties, Nepal decided to sign only the transit treaty. Again, after seven years in 2001 and 2006, Nepal was forced to merge the two different treaties into one. It also forced Nepal to include the issues of defence and water-resource unnecessarily.

By every means, India wants to solely establish its monopoly of its low quality products in Nepali market. Indians also prevent Nepali products from entering India, thus making always trade deficit. On the contrary, Nepal desires to select the quality products from world market freely. Nepal denies becoming the part of India's self-vested protection strategy. Nepal aims to extend its trade freely all over the world. Nepal wants to diversify its trade in full-fledged. Nepal wants to practice its trade as the Most Favoured Nation (MFN). Nepal wants a complete abolishment of Indian monopoly. Being a landlocked country, Nepal wants to freely use the land route up to the

seacoast, wills to make the use of Nepal railway, sea route and roadway according to the international law. It also intends to make the use of alternative way. Nepal takes transit and transportation as its right, whereas India as its blessing.

Penetration of Indian citizen in Nepal is very high. For them Nepal is like going to Hong Kong or USA. India wants to freely thrust its millions low level population into Nepal. Further, it intends to encumber Nepal. The amendments were made on foreign employment policy, Citizenship Act and Labour Act on Indian pressure. This tendency ultimately serves to open avenue in order to send its citizens to Nepal. In 1961 A.D., 3,24,159 Indian dwelt²⁵ in Nepal. After twenty years, in 1980, the population reached to 38,00,000 (as per P.V. Narsingh Rao). Among them, 23,87,973 have already received the Nepali citizenship.²⁶ In that condition, Indians will occupy majority in the parliament if Nepal could not be alert. Nepal has foiled non-Nepalis from purchasing fixed property. If Nepal concedes on this issue, whole of hills of Nepal will turn into a Summer Palace for rich Indians, politicians and industrialists within 20 years from now. As a result, Nepalis will be displaced in their own home country. India's strategy to keep Nepal always under destitution has resulted from its long-term vision.

If trade diversification is a one leg for a sovereign country, its other leg will be the internal economic and political freedom. Hence, Nepal feels the main cause for Nepal's underdevelopment is India. When Nepal starts some projects to be done through global tenders India objects (e.g. Birganj dry port, Mahendra High way) resulting delays for a decade. And spoiling relationship with other countries.²⁷ Smuggling and black market of India has been great hindrance for the economic prosperity of Nepal.

4. Interference on Natural resources

Nepal has the largest water-resource in Asia and second largest in the world. Nepal takes more than 6000 rivers as a reliable and continuous source for its future generations. Nepal wants to possess this resource permanently as its treasure. India wants to appropriate this resource into its possession before Nepal becomes able to produce, utilize and sell it. India's main reason of falling an evil eye on Nepal's defence is its water resource. Nepal wants to preserve its water resource from any possible harm.

After 50 years from now India's problem of energy and foodstuff will heighten. India has to increase its food grain capacity from 1633 hundred thousand tons to 3750 hundred thousand tons. For this purpose, irrigation is

necessary. Out of 1333 hundred hectare land, only 862 hundred thousand land around the Ganges River is possible for irrigation. Only Nepal's water resource can fulfil the need. And Nepal will agree only if India becomes ready to buy water and electricity.²⁸

Conclusion

1. Smashing and grabbing

Transit facilities that a land locked country should get is limited. Therefore, Nepal has undergone a complex situation both in industry and business sectors. If it gets facilities as per the international norms, Nepali trade/industry will boost up. India should not try to make Nepal dependent on India by imposing conditions on Nepal. Albania is also surviving like other nations even without keeping relations with rest of the world. Israel is a small country, which has been involved in war for 200 years and is surrounded by enemies on all sides. However, it has been successful in living with dignity. Maldives does not promote tourism but still it has found a way to survive.²⁹ Japan has developed tremendously without having natural resources and fertile land. Why cannot Nepal be a prosperous country in the world?

It has become easy to import Indian goods in Nepal by evading custom tax³⁰ from several custom points in all the places of border areas. Telling a lie is a crime. Creating havoc in the economic life of Nepali people, keeping such clumsy attitude and telling one lie after another doesn't suit to a large and prosperous nation like India. 4. Nepal has to be free from economic trap of India by adopting most favoured trade policy; using Chitgaon, Hong Kong and Karachi seaports through connecting underground road to Bangladesh and Tibet railroad and supplying cheap hydroelectricity to it; making Chitgaoun seaport simple and effective. India is a Hindrance in the growth of Nepal's Economy. Because of India Kankai high dam, Karnali hydro project, Sikta project, Arun three, West Seti, Budhi Gandaki projects were failed. Had these projects been completed, there would have been no shortage of electricity for two decades, and the economic standard would have been doubled.

Nepali industries and trade are ruined because of India's monopoly market. Nepalis are deprived of consuming quality products at moderate price and of dealing with competitive business in the world market, resulting in the poverty of Nepal. Thus, Nepal can never progress unless an open economy is established and dependency on India is avoided. If the price of goods goes

down in Nepali market, Indians, like ants, carry goods on bicycle/heads and make shortage in Nepal, if the price goes high, becomes vice versa; thus failing Nepali industry and commerce.

2. Weaknesses of Nepal: the Dorjian attitudes:

Nepali leaders suffer from poor mentality that they cannot have access to the power if they disappoint India. They are dumfounded and tacit even by witnessing the interference of India over Nepali economy, nationality and territory as if a python is swallowing its prey. His Majesty's Government of Nepal never shows its firm stand for the preservations of nation and has failed to study deeply border area and analyze the problems resulted from it.

Nowadays, political parties give the subjective interpretation of the nationality, not taking it from objective point of view. Their vested interest is higher than the national ones. Fractions in parties, political instability, political liquidity and conflicts are due to Indian interests. The roles exposed in 1st April 1990 by S.K. Singh and on April 20, 2006 by Shyam Saran are the glaring example as intended by the South Block. Therefore, Nepali bureaucrats and political leaders must learn nationalism from Indians despite being bland followers of them.

Now, we must avoid geo-constraints proverb; impart knowledge to be a Patriotic Nepali learning nationalism from Indians that non-nationalistic be supposed uncivilized, rudeness and undemocratic characteristics. Open border System be discontinued; the encroachments be controlled; administrators be alert and dedicated to nation's interest; do always democratic practices; apply equal-distance & equal behavior policy to neighbors. Develop a Shade Free Development; avoid Indian Political Interests in the internal matters of Nepal; Pressurize to change Indian attitude; deal perfectly for the returnable territory and above all realize 'United we stand divided we fall'. Now, start telling untold stories to the remaining world. Let them share our troubles and gain sympathies as well.

Arrange to get Transit Facilities from different ports of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and People's Republic of China. Conduct air-cargo services between Nepal's Bhadrapur to the border of Bangladesh/Chatgaun. Nepal, the country of Buddha, must be turned into peace centre by the approval of India to the peace zone proposal of it, already accepted by 116 countries. India should have compulsorily compensated the flood-affected area of Nepal and stop for further detritions. RAW nullifies every scheme of Nepal that intends to raise economic growth, exploit natural resources and uplift lifestyles of Nepali

people. But straight forwarders and honesty are beneficial for the development of our country. Nepal expects change in attitude of dividing Nepali into places, castes, languages, gender, religion and property by using every trick through 'RAW'. All Nepalese people too should unite in the matter of nationality.

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MAOISTS AND INDIA

Dr. Shastra Dutta Pant

India takes care of everything on Nepal. Politics is the number one issue of its concern. The Maoists' insurgency, the seven party alliance (SPA), His Majesty the king (HM) and the government in power are its areas of political concern to these days. SPA and Maoist in New Delhi in November 1, and they again on March 11, 2005 met and finalized the draft of the 12-Point Agreement and issued a joint statement. On March 19, the Maoists and SPA signed a second statement reiterating their commitment to the agreement. The US State Department condemned the Agreement and warned the SPA against any dealings with the Maoist. Now, after the successful land of Indian plan of the foregone strategic events the evaluation of the actions and to draw further plan, a seminar was conducted in New Delhi on Monday, 22 May 2006 (Annapurnapost May, 20)

The Royal Government stepped up its regressive actions against the SPA and warned of, "Maoist infiltration" in the planned April 6-9, SPA pro-democracy demonstrations and Nepal *bandh* (general strike). Against this background, the Maoist announced a "truce" in Kathmandu Valley and the Pro-Democracy protests began and spread across the kingdom. (D. Michael Van De Veer- Freelance Journalist www.kkcr.org 18 April 2006). According to Sobia Nisar Indian, reporters allege to Pakistan for terrorist act, in reality India has carried out insurgent activities in Bangladesh and Nepal. To create destabilization among its neighboring countries is India's priority to achieve its hegemonic designs in the region. After Bangladesh and Sri Lanka RAW inter to Sikkim now Nepal is in hot list.

RAW is playing with Maoist guerillas in Nepal through Indian Maoist Communist Center (MCC), Peoples War Group (PWG). The MCC and PWG are instrumental in providing Nepali Maoists with training facilities, arms, ammunition, logistical support and safe sanctuaries to take refuge. India through its militant organizations is promoting terrorism in Nepal. Maoists were being suspected as agents of law enforcing agencies.

RAW became successful to force the king to take unconstitutional decision of restoration of the already dead parliament. At present the Nepali army has become weak commanderless and fragile. In such case, Indian army may easily intervene into Nepal. India has already deployed a large number BSF in the Nepal-India border areas. It is learned that air force also is in alert position.

Unlike Bangladesh, it was to move saying in security of the Indian citizen in Nepal. The SPA was fully supported by the Nepali Maoists and both by fund and work force. Thousands Indian nationals were in Nepali streets of which many were injured and some dead. The SPA provided them Nepali citizenship, money and was honored as martyrs. Despite the bullet order to participate in the procession, at least one person from one house each had received Rs. 500 a day and one thousand to the drivers/ teachers etc. This also proves when the SPA commander publicly requested to the transport companies to compensate them in full the loss in *bandh* when they are in power. The SPA government is considered as the Indian puppet. As Chandra Shekhar in 1990, Sitaram Yachuri, the left leader of India, having strong connection with Nepali Maoists, took this time the lead. His team was highly welcome more than the head of the nation in the unconstitutionally revived parliament of Nepal; on the other hand, same parliament had rejected parliamentarians those opposing them. If some one has the idea of the history of annexing Sikkim, the same plan has now been being implemented in Nepal. By bringing the two forces the SPA and the unconstitutional rebel forces, RAW now has been successful to bring Nepal into her security umbrella. The proposal submitted by foreign secretary SK Sing in 1989, rejected by King Birendra, saying, instead of handing over national sovereignty to India choose to empower own citizen, now has been accepted under compulsion through the other door.

Another interesting thing is that America is now peeping at Nepal through the Indian window; instead, India is arranging to resume Dalai Lama's office in Nepal. Though, it may develop cold relation China is unwillingly remain mom, for it has to dissatisfied to the first largest business partner the USA and the second largest India. That is why they are over aggressive over Nepal. On the whole when the USA rejects elected Hamaj government and accepts Nepali terrorists as the political force and helps to Indian plan to bring unconstitutional rebellions with the constitutional forces of Nepal. If India and USA are in favor of democracy, she would not have supported the autocratic rule of Bhutan instead suppressed the constitutional monarchy of Nepal. These countries are not working for the democracy but for their stakes.

It is because of the mass media, human rights, lawyers and other professional organizations/NGOs that are run under the western money. Money matters. About 80 percent newspapers of Nepal are being funded by India. Majority of Nepali people are against the Indian hegemony. They oppose Indian interventions and against of any other foreign interventions.

They are now under such strong interventions that since May 2006, their fundamental rights of expression and oppose have now been completely curtailed. Mob but not the idea has rule. Any issue that has been questioned/opposed must be ratified through referendum. Why referendum has been denied? Denial of referendum is the denial of the 97 percent of the remaining people. Havoc and sentiments cannot rule for generations. Each generation will repeat the same mistake and political instability will never end. It will benefit to the directors of the drama and not to the actors.

Because of the undue munificence of India towards Nepal's Maoists, they are safely receding into their hideouts in India. Nepali politicians claim to this state as extreme Indian interference. Nepal handed over a list of 35 renown Maoists believed to be hiding around Darjeeling. When Nepal is seeking help in controlling Maoists attacks in Nepal, India holds the key of controlling Maoist insurgency along with the SPA through Nepali Congress (NC.) The Maoists have become the best weapon for India to achieve its Nepal-game-plan. India is envious of Royal Nepal Army (RNA)'s glory in peace keeping in the world and may use Maoist insurgency to check and shade back them and remains mum when Maoists cadres of Nepal are being trained in India by the LTTE training experts. India also objected participating in the UN Peace keeping force several time.

For the sake of destabilization in Nepal and liquidating its politics, the problems are cobwebbed i.e. the SPA and SPAM 12 point agreements, the Bhutani ethnic crisis residing in Nepal as refugees so on and so forth. There is no reason as to why the international community should not overview on the Indian nexus with Maoists insurgents in Nepal and destabilizing smaller neighboring countries. Maoists in Nepal were born against the bad administration of the NC/CPN-UML not to the kingship. NC several times had claimed that they were supported by the palace against them. How now they became good friend. It is because of the game plan.

Let Nepali decide for their destitute by themselves through referendum in matters of disagreements to be conducted by a fair and neutral cabinet. All major political parties are under the grip of Indians. The reasons are that Nepal India share open border and free trafficking; about 4.8 million Indians have already received Nepali citizenship and about same ratio are in pipeline. The amendment of the citizenship act will add one million Indians to obtain Nepali citizenship each year, thus Nepali putting in minority in the specific /stipulated time. The sovereignty now vested upon Nepali people has now been transferred to the parliament recently through what they call *jana-*

andolan. For, the history says the parliamentarians are sellable. India can purchase each member to an amount of 10 million. Besides, the constituent assembly polls as proposed, will create division among the different communities and finally create a division of the country to the *biese* and *chaubise*, which is in the interest of India. It is a grand and interesting game. For, India played a key role in 1990 to instill multiparty and constitutional monarchy and implant corrupted people which could sold out the rivers and lands during last one and half decade. Spinal of Nepal's economics was cracked.

Terrorism/ communism

Before we come to the Indian role, let me present Maoism / terrorism and the democratic current of the day to day affairs. Since India started playing three forces of Nepal has started calling Maoists not as terrorist but insurgents or Nepal-rebels. Nepal's dispute is not for democracy it is but for nationality. The main agenda is being isolated.

Terrorism is the murder of innocents, i.e., non-military, non-police, and non-politicians. The Maoists e.g., Peru, Columbia, Nepal, have practice terrorism. Here, I do not like associating the former Russian and East European brands of communism with terrorism. The separatists in Ireland and Spain are terrorists, but not communists. Radical terrorists are not communists, generally. Why communism meant in practice bloody terrorism and forced labor? There is no theoretical reason for communism to be associated with authoritarianism, but in fact, it is and has always been that way. Democratic-communistic societies have always been very small and very short-lived.

They are the same Maoists in Nepal who were declare terrorists by the then government lead by the SPA, (mainly NC & CPN-UML) had applied the red corner notice and were tagged the price of each head of the Maoists. That was promptly copied and declared by India, USA and many capitalistic countries. When the SPA were out of the power because of their internal party conflicts created due to personal stakes of grabbing the chair of power and earn money, are now co-partner of democracy and shamelessly the support the alliance by India, USA and EU as well. They all withdrew their logistic supports to the government and indirectly through and by means of Indian intelligences and Maoist. At the same time trucks of such arms and ammunitions along with the sophisticated weapons even those, which RNA does not, posses were imported by the terrorist declared Maoist. Why could not the USA and EU analyze the interest of India supporting Maoists, supporting SPA so that

Nepali politics and economics be liquidated and create such situations that Nepal's defense mechanism could be grabbed.

It is said that the combined strength of the Maoists in this region is gradually increasing, and they are trying to raise armies in Bangladesh and Bhutan. At present, there are about 16,000 Combatants, 32,000 Militia, 14,000 Cadres, 70,000 hardcore followers and 600,000 Sympathizers. They have also united more than a dozen ethnic and regional classes. They also met some of the world communist leaders for their support and help. Though not reconciling with the extremist approach, yet they have sympathies and have the same goal of 'salvation of the masses'. The organizing and hideout center is Indian territories to these days.

The entire operation was kept top secret with the West Bengal police. The Bhutan Army had destroyed 20 militant camps of the three groups. Let us watch inside India. At least 165 districts in 14 States, out of 602 districts of India, are affected and underplaying by the Maoist threats. Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir affects 12 districts. The Total Fatalities in J&K and Maoist Violence between 2002 to 2005 was 3146. (Maoists: The Truth Will not Go Away, Ajai Sahni, Editor, SAIR) The situation in 12 other affected States was by and large under control' The 'hijacking' of a train, the murder of Member of the Legislative Assembly, number of attacks on Police Stations and Security Forces transports in various States are the problems, India is facing. Recently India has also realized that the control over terrorism is out of the strength of state government.

The national average of 123 police personnel per 100,000 populations, and some peaceful states with ratios between 760/100,000 to 56/100,000. (<http://www.satribune.com/>) is considered inadequate. The Constitution's Article 355 to empower the Central Government to generate the adequate and permanent mechanisms for a coordinated counter-terrorism offensive is now on action. This way, several states of India are affected by the Maoists' terrorist activities.

Let me put the communistic scenario of international terrorism and the approach of the capitalistic countries. The Maoists of Asia project as American imperialism, Chinese revisionism and Indian comprador capitalism & expansionisms. They confront with the betrayal of socialism and the restoration of capitalism in China. In a joint statement disseminated through the Internet to mark the 50th anniversary, the Communist Party of India (Maoist), the Communist Parties of the Philippines, Turkey (Marxist-Leninist)

and Indonesia (communist League) have strongly criticized the post-Mao Chinese leadership for betraying the ideology of Mao and for taking China on the road to capitalism. They think that the dictatorship of the proletariat, monopoly capitalism headed by US imperialism has been able to launch the worst attacks against the proletariat and the oppressed peoples, such as “free market” globalization, racism, repression and wars of aggression. It also accuses the Manmohan Singh Government of inviting American counter-insurgency experts to train officers of the security forces of India in order to make their operations against the Maoists more effective.

SPAM and India

SPAM, to these days, is an eight party alliance. The SPA must understand that after the communists took over power by destroying democracy and monarchy. Due to same mistake Cambodia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan became weak both economically and politically. Nepal has to learn from these countries. Now, the situation in Cambodia is getting better because the Cambodian people brought back multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by ousting the Maoist Khmer Rouge.

Twenty-nine years after the communist took over the power in Ethiopia became poorest country in the world. When the King, Jahir Shah, was sent out of Afghanistan, the people have been suffering immensely there. Over six million Ukrainians, two million Cambodians, millions of North Koreans, Zimbabweans and Yugoslavian are starving to death these days. The total population of Cambodia, Turkey, Iran, or Argentina had to lose their life or suffer from starvation, malnutrition and undiagnosed or mistreated illnesses. Millions are uncouncted for incarcerated and have starved to death or died due to exposure.

The radical communists are supposed to make richer to poor but not poor to rich. They believed that Marxism would bring about the greatest human welfare and power must be used to tear down the feudal or capitalist order but in practice, this system did not improve the lot of the average person, instead it usually made their living conditions worse. Do we sacrifice lives to be captive of ideas and live in poor condition?

It is sad to know that some 100 million people worldwide lost their lives to the ideological scourge of communism after 1917. The victims of Stalin's terror; the Chinese Cultural Revolution; the Cambodian genocide; the Latin American wars, Cuban civil wars; East and Central Europeans dying in the

uprisings of 1953, 1956 and 1968 Communists 'committed genocides are some major examples. The killing of people because of their ethnicity, race, religion, or language is considered as slaughtering of chickens in the slaughterhouse. Creating a utopian nation where everyone would be equal but while the results all over the world is found dying of starvation and disease.

The Khmer Rouge soldiers and the communist party members were able to choose any woman or man they wanted to marry. In addition to limitless food, they were also crazy about gold, jewelry, perfume, imported watches, western medicine, cars, motorcycles, and bicycles, silk, and other imported goods. The cruelty beyond the limit how one woman in Cambodia was forced to cook her husband's liver, cut out while he was still alive. Women were raped before execution. In fact, every day, every minute the communists step on the rights of people, debase their values and restrict their freedoms. Communism and terrorism have a mutual aim.

Khmer Rouge killed some 2 million Cambodians. The Soviet Union killed nearly 61,000,000 people, Stalin himself killed almost 43,000,000. Most of the deaths, perhaps around 39,000,000 were due to lethal and forced labor. Therefore, to these days, the most communist governments underwent increasing liberalization and a loosening of centralized powers sharply.

Double standard role of India

Through its double standard roles and functions, India is trying to establish disorder and anarchy among the Nepali people. There is also a suspicion that India has a big hand behind the rise of Maoists. Nepal abhors India's misdeed and immoral act against Sri Lanka and Sikkim respectively. Therefore, it has tried to become aware of these facts. Nepal's Kingship has maintained the national unity in a country having multi-lingual and multi-caste, multi religion and cultured society. India takes monarchy as a great hindrance to fulfill its stakes. Therefore, India is putting its whole effort to spread hate crimes with unrestrained rumor regarding royal institution. After understanding this situation, Nepalis to these days are being united. This is the very reason that in Nepal there is the increment of anti-India population. Now, there are 140 thousand BSF troops in Nepali border i.e. 75 per km. Even, Nepali border police and administrators are suppressed. They have become ritual and have achieved nothing. The Indian border security force may at any time bans the import of goods towards Nepal except major custom offices.¹ A road parallel to No Man's Land for the purpose of military vehicle is

constructed, and the Indian security force equipped with modern means use this road.

Indeed, the Maoists Calling America the "biggest terrorist of the world" also takes a personal swipe e.g. Ambassador Moriarty whom he accuses of "exaggerating" things while referring to Maoists. The Maoist claim is America's continuing support for the government of Nepal, indeed, lashes out on virtually every front against America, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chile, Vietnam and the Philippines. At the same time, Maoists do not criticize Indian dealings and behaviors. They think if it is successful in Nepal it will have a direct impact on one billion people of India, and it will also spill over into China. When it affects two or two and a half billion people, it means it will have impact all over the world. This has not been analysed by the Americans, EU, & India, and above all SPA. For, they will be in the first list to finish.

Both Maoist rebels and opposition political parties have said they will intensify their campaigns. The protesters want the end of the direct rule imposed by HM the King some months ago. There is very much many folded vested Interest of India to support and unite SPA and Maoists, but I wonder why the capitalistic provocateurs and supporters' mass media such as BBC (Charles Havilland in Kathmandu.), CNN, and others are supporting the dirty alliance and fueling along with the Indian run newspapers and media in Nepal. Quisling is will ultimately finish themselves and then nation.

In a statement signed by the top two leaders, Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, clearly state that they backed the nationwide strike conducted by SPA. They announced that they would join the SPA strike and they would take control of the country's roads and destroy all royal statues, and all signboards saying 'His Majesty's Government' and action would be taken against those paying taxes to the government. The reality was that the protesters were collected by means of bullets and the participants were claimed as the supporters of the SPA to whom people were condemning/ignoring for their misdeeds during last one and half decade. It was more move and less protesting procession. For, they were the main nucleus of all-troublesome.

The king took power some months ago, aiming to correct the situation run out of the track of democracy. Accusing political parties of failing to quell a Maoist insurgency and holding general election made unnecessarily negative impacts over Hindu state, royal palace and royal Nepali army. His democratic steps were misinterpreted. For, this would spoil the strategic plan of RAW/South Block. If supported king's step election would have hold and all constitutional doors would have open and the outer penetration to liquidate, Nepal's politics also would have ended. Thus, Maoist backing would one day

harm India. Lastly on April 24, HM revived the parliament of Nepal that was dissolved by the Prime minister and justified by the Supreme Court. Besides, the date over parliament, even then, it was revived, instead of conducting election. It is principally a monocracy and practically an Indian penetration into Nepali politics. This time this was a good chance to show US that it should deal through Indian window in all matters concerning Nepal. It is US, UK and EU to withdraw military aid to free Nepal from terrorism because of India. The big nations, now favor more to the power and less to the justice. Nepal is denied of justice.

According to Arun Rajnath (<http://peacejournalism.com/>) over 165 Maoist cadres were being trained in Bhutan, as Bhutan has been included in the future Maoist country, 'Dandkaranya Desam'. The ULFA and KLO are imparting the training. The training capsules were being provided to the Maoist on recruits in guerilla warfare, bomb-manufacturing techniques and arms training. The militiamen of the ULFA and KLO are imparting the training. It is said that the next meeting of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) is likely to be held in Bangladesh by the end of this year to chalk out the future strategy. Most probably, the Maoists of the Purba Bangla Sarbhara Party (PBSP) of Bangladesh are coordinating. Knowing that, India conducted army operation there and ended the problem within a week. It had initiated cleaning up operations and destroyed the training camps. India can do same thing to Nepal, but does not like to do so. Similarly, India can solve the Bhutani refugees' problem in Nepal in less than one week but does not like to solve it. For, solving all such problems they would like to make Nepal on Bhutani status, which Nepal would never accept.

Maoists, who were out to uproot or put on surer test of constituent assembly to the monarchy in Nepal, at the same time it was to protect the king of Bhutan. For, as it is, Bhutan largely relies on India. It is said that more than 2000 refugees have joined the Maoist outfits of Nepal. The ill-wily protected Maoists' terrorism around its border will some time a great problem of India and a challenge to USA and EU. While the authorities of India decide that there would be no talks with any Maoist group, state unit or faction, unless they unambiguously give up arms (Ajai Sahni) on the other side Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran build pressures (The Annpurna Post Apr.4, 2006) to Nepal's Maoist's protest as the protest of the people (SPA) and asks to held talks with the armed Maoists and fulfill their demand of the constitutional assembly/revive the 10 year old/expired parliament on the

unconstitutional demand of the SPA. That SPA is on the Indian advice, guide and support as usual.

India, according to Dr. Thomas A. Mark, has selected a "win/win" course. For them, RNA is the one real obstacle remaining in the quest for power. So caught up is the SPA in its short-term effort to remain relevant that it is oblivious to long-term peril. India first mediated to compromise the two fractions between Prachand and Bhattarai. Then they invited SPA in New Delhi and succeeded to hold joint struggle against the king through 12 point pact. People denied SPA's call for 2 years, because of their misdeeds. Lastly, as per 12-point agreement people were driven from suburban and rural areas through terrorist barrel and the SPA claim successful. Behind both forces, and strategy was Indian hand which any conscious person can easily understand through their dramatic actions.

New Delhi senses an opportunity to finally create of Nepal a dependency that will do as it is told. As per the strategic plan just like the visit of S.K. Sing on April 1st, 1990, Dr. Karan Sing was posted to visit Nepal as special envoy when there was tense in the SPA's bandh people driven by the Maoists with gun fear. It can once again be its strategic miscalculation. For, a sense of nationalism in Nepal is alarming. They feel that the SPA work force on the streets can overwhelm whatever the police and APF at the backup can put on the playing field. When Maoists /SPAs are crushing democracy India calls it democracy when king tries to protect democracy through election provokes "as democracy is crushed." Thus, India's role remains to be untangled, as in Sri Lanka in 1987. It looks the startling similarities tempted to mobilize Indian Peace Keeping Force in Nepal (IPKF). From the time of importing thousand of KGB advisers the mind since that moment shares with the present is the astonishingly bad "intelligence" that drove Indian policymaking bodies will some day harm its own country.

The US-India interest in Nepal is now being matter of everybody's concern. It is the growing amicability of India and the US, which has served as the strategic cover for New Delhi to bring Kathmandu to heel. Nepali sources have either become blunt or deaf hearing in the same manner as the Sri Lankans had done years ago. The Indian ties to Nepali violence become clearer. When India, a pro Soviet Union during cold war, has now becoming an American friend, US seem ready to accept what India says. They are now peeping Nepal through Indian windows. They do not seem in favor of justice and truth but in favor of the power. They do not see the stakes of India on Nepal and their double standard. They see human rights and democracy in

Bhutan but not in Nepal, because India says so. When they get new friend forget the old one. They have habit of seeing everything superficially.

J.N. Dixit continued to claim, that India's information on America's intentions was completely reliable. Indeed, Indian participants in panels held in Washington, DC, such as S.D. Muni, have distinguished themselves as willful ignorance of SPAM pronouncements and motives. The Indians continue to claim SPAM is willing to negotiate for itself a role in a parliamentary framework headed by a constitutional monarchy with some conditions. The condition was to grab water resource and defense system of Nepal that king has to accept. The king did not accept, he was weakened.

Dr. Madhukar S.J.B. Rana, former minister of finance hit the nail squarely on the head when he wrote, "India is playing a dangerous game of pure real politic where it seeks to intervene in Nepal militarily by using the Maoist as proxy under the unbelievable propaganda 'to secure peace and democracy for the Nepalese people and to arrest the impending refugee inflow into its own territory'. In-depth studies are done and strategic plan is prepared by the India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The political instability and triangular conflicts are being made believed by the RAW. Since the US has suspended arms supplies to the RNA, post-Feb 1, 2005 when India did so. Terrorism/democracy was a fake story for them.

The US & India on Nepal's Crisis

The US role in Nepali politics is always vague and unclear. Ultimately US supported what it calls terrorism against the kingship and Hinduism, a dharma that respects all religions/thoughts and preaches moral education to end crimes and terrorisms of all type. On the other hand, it supports religious rulers such as Dalai Lama/Pope. America has small interest whereas India has big interests. Peeping Nepal through India's big interest window is neither democratic nor just. How can democracy last long where bullet-driven 5 percent people's demonstration demands are accepted against the will of the 95 percent people. How can US imagine that over 90 percent Hindu Nepali people are in favor of secular state? So are the EU countries. Let America /EU understand that in democracy every citizen has full right to express and write freely his/her views without any hindrances. In addition, those views whoever put in the mass must be ratified through referendum. The protestors driven by bullet and the unconstitutional government created by them have no right to declare any thing unless ratified by the referendum. Moreover, that

referendum cannot be held unless the rebellions are completely armless and out of terrorist activities and the government is completely neutral.

Profound mistrust

What is tragic is that very little would seem to separate the sides at the moment, save profound mistrust. The king agrees that parliamentary democracy should be restored with a constitutional monarch. The Maoists claim they will accept of whatever sort is decided by a constitutional assembly. SPA claims that there should be a real constitutional one. SPAM as a whole claims to desire a "ceremonial monarch and RNA would become a true "national" army. The mistrust was created due to Nepal Game Plan Strategy.

It is NC, the root cause of all the problems created due to its leaders' individualistic stakes. The Maoists went underground when there was not hearing of its 40 point complaint to NC government. Koirala pulled two of its MPs in his side sufficient to pass vote of no confidence to collapse its own party government. Deuba dissolve the parliament and declared fresh election. The five parties asked him to postpone election for one year beyond the provision of constitution, compelled His Majesty to activate the 127 article of the constitution, which was to be applied in time of unavoidable circumstances. Thus, great deals of the problems are the leaders of SPAM. RAW had played the game behind the curtain by supporting all three aspects the SPA, Maoist and the government directly and indirectly.

According to Kanchan Gupta (India) Maoist ceasefire in Nepal after talks in India says that the Maoists' so-called cease-fire that was clearly used, as suspected all along, to rebuild, recruit, rearm and replenish as demonstrated by their actions the 12-point SPAM pact formalized in New Delhi and unveiled shortly thereafter on 22 November 2005. As per them a constituent assembly in which the "people may say we want an active monarch." The SPA contributes to their People's Army and then have all three forces amalgamated into one big, happy family. Surprisingly, there is no mention about the municipal election and the "people's war" that has claimed over 15,000 lives were taken.

Prachanda who had said he would not dialogue with the parties but with the King, but he did a neat somersault downplaying with the Indian nexus. Given the situation on he was grounded with India's transparent multi-faceted role in the Maoist insurgency, including that in patching up differences with the Maoist leadership and in facilitating the anti-Monarchy SPAM pact, that

lacuna stands out, to use the cliché, like a sore thumb. Thus, HM King was put in a tough spot to face global pressure to initiate a dialogue with the banned Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). The declaration follows the joint statement signed by Prachanda and Ganapathy, general secretary of CPI (M), announcing their decision to "fight together and establish socialism and communism" in Nepal and India. The joint statement commits the Nepalese and Indian Maoists to fight "united" to crush "conspiracies hatched by imperialists and reactionaries" and set up a Pol Pot-type regime in the two countries. Their strategy for this last stage will be to fuse urban insurrection to protracted People's War.

The Nepali Maoists expect Indian attempts to crush them if they rise to power, India cannot afford to let Nepal become a base for revolution. Beijing would not be enthusiastic about Indian forces intervening in the Himalayan nation that separates Tibet from India. What is also of concern is that the so-called truce declaration urges Nepal's political parties to drop their demand for restoration of Parliament and call for elections to write a new Constitution in which the monarchy will find no place. Therefore, India mediated them so that the monarch wills compel to invite Indian force.

NC and the CPN-UML deleted the word "monarchy" from the parties' constitution to be nearing to Maoist. The parties having no long vision that they will be the first target after Maoist come to power, had welcome the ceasefire which clearly aimed at seeking the support of political parties. Their support would be to extinguish their existence. Maoists of Nepal collaborating with CPI (Maoist), knowing that would had an adverse impact on India's internal security, however, mediated between to end the internal confronts and between SPA and Maoist. Because of this, the Home and Foreign Ministries of India are divided over how to deal with the Maoists in Nepal. According to Mr. Gupta, "The Ministry of External Affairs has been pushing for a pro-Maoist, anti-monarchy line while the Ministry of Home Affairs has been advocating a tough approach against Prachand (Maoist)" "Those who believe that the Maoists in Nepal can be drawn into legitimate politics through a deal-induced truce are grossly mistaken. For, they used the truce to regroup, re-arm and re-launch their attack. There are several such instances in India as well. India well understands it.

Tamil Tigers run training camps mostly in the districts of Narkatiaganj and Ghorasahan in India. Ghorasahan is located between Sitamarhi and Champaran near Nepal borders in Bihar. They have promoted forming Human Bomb called Dalams (squads). Dalams of young boys and dalams of

women to the extend of the Suicidal Squads have been formed. Indian and Nepalese Maoists are being jointly trained in this camp. Mr. Arun Rajnath writes, "It is interesting to note that Indian sensitive agencies are entirely unable to cope with the situation despite having immense resources. The sensitive agencies are yet busy to malign these forces by propagating false information to the media about defections and divisions within the Indian Maoist forces." However, the fact is that all Maoist rebels and parties, including PWG, MCC merged into CPI-M on October 15, 2004. They have agreed to develop a Red Zone (RZ) from Nepal to Sri Lanka. The decision to assist the Maoist rebels of Nepal was taken at a secret meeting of the Maoist activists of eight countries held in Kolkata.

The Maoists of Peru, Netherlands, Norway, France, Germany, Sri Lanka, Nepal and India. ULFA & LTTE also participated. The meeting of CCOMPOSA was held last year. The Friends of Indian Revolution (FOIR) was formed. Arun Rajnath writes "It was decided in the meeting that the LTTE would provide full support to the Indian and Nepalese Maoists and Indian Maoists would provide shelter and training camps to the Maoist rebels of Nepal. Indian knows all about these activities. "French trainers are providing training to Nepalese rebels in the hilly terrain of Uttaranchal. Such training camps are being run in Indian districts near Nepal border, such as Tanakpur, Pithoragarh, Bageshwar, etc. These camps are solely for the Maoist rebels of Nepal that are being supervised by Indian sympathizers." The Red Zone and a safe corridor is being made by the rebels that starts from Nepal, and covers all of the Northern hilly area of Uttaranchal, East Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, South Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh up to Sri Lanka.

There have been two ceasefires since the People's War began in 1996--- from June to November 2001 and January to June 2003. However, these were declared by both sides, and accompanied by peace talks with the regime. The seven political parties whose members constituted 190 out of 205 representatives in the dissolved National Assembly have formed an alliance against King Gyanendra. They had not challenged the monarchy. They have expressed interest in holding talks with the Maoists in order to coordinate opposition to the dictatorship. "Hurled bricks and security forces retaliated by firing teargas shells and charging the crowd with batons." Perhaps these were Maoists in the crowd. Now, King Gyanendra's worst fear is a united front of the Maoists and the mainstream parties. For him Maoists consider pointless. Communism being "dead" and all--- this prospect is now acknowledged even by the increasingly shrill U.S. ambassador. The Maoists believe they are now

in the last phase. The Bolshevik strategy entailed the political organization of urban workers, and resulted in the October Revolution in 1917, the storming of the Winter Palace, and the overthrow of the czar.

According to Ashok K Mehta, The situation in Kathmandu was extremely fluid and uncertain. The countdown to seal the fate of monarchy had started. It seems certain that the King will have to drop his plan for the restoration of absolute monarchy. Thus carrying wrong concept such as him helped students, teachers, doctors, and civil servants to out on the streets. By announcing a third unilateral ceasefire, the Maoists have renewed their commitment to joining the political mainstream.

India has played a key role in facilitating an alliance between Maoists and political parties, making a tri polar fight into bipolar. India is no longer parroting the twin-pillar policy of constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy. It has discreetly dropped reference to monarchy but still calls for reconciliation between the King and the political parties. He (King) was forced into direct rule due to the inefficiency and corruption of politicians and in order to save Nepal from becoming a failed state and requesting the king to form government under article 127 of the constitution. China, Pakistan and Russia played no mean part in providing moral and material assistance to Kings. The King had only options to revive the constitutional process through elections.

According to B. Raman (Maoists Gain Momentum in India) the late Mao Zedong and his Thoughts have been responsible for more deaths of innocent civilians in acts of terrorism. The Zero-point tendency of the NC/ CPN-UML led the nation in turmoil. The reasons to be so in this region are: the economic and social backwardness, injustice, poor governance, insensitive to the grievances of the deprived sections, inadequately performing law and order machinery, indiscriminate killing of civilians through the use of land-mines and improvised explosive devices and targeted assassinations of political appropriate to describe it as a mix of insurgency and terrorism. Baader-Meinhof and the Red Army Faction of the then West Germany, the Red Brigade of Italy, the Action Directe of France, the Carlos' groups of International Revolutionaries etc are also behind the curtain. In the same way, in South America and in the Philippines, India and Nepal in Asia the violent Marxist/Maoist movement whether one calls it political violence, insurgency, terrorism or a mix of insurgency and terrorism. Hence, It is bounded duty of capitalist's allies to support the government of Nepal without any other question.

The CPN (Maoist), will more actively stand by the side of the Nepali people vehemently opposing the Indian expansionists and US imperialists from intervening in Nepal with their military might as the outer face. The enemies of the revolution are imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucrat capitalism. The immediate basic programme to tell people are to overthrow the semi-colonial, semi-feudal rule of the big landlord-comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie classes, and imperialism but they are never done when in power.

In this process, the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) will advance and develop into a full-fledged People's Liberation Army (PLA) while the guerrilla zones will transform into Base Areas. The Maoists were not worried that the development of tourism would improve the standard of living of the poor people and thereby prevent the flow of unemployed youth. Only the *Byabasthitbasti Model* can educate to all citizens in equal standard and provide with full employment opportunities distributing public services equally in any political system².

Conclusively, the law and order approach can be effective only if the political class is prepared to give the necessary powers and capability to the security forces and does not follow a policy of on again, off again, based on a national consensus and a national determination to deal with this problem before it becomes uncontrollable as it has in Nepal. It can, if we can wake up in time and act accurately. The democratic countries of the world should understand that a nation as an individual should get democratic rights first before their citizens get it. Hence, a pressure is made to India to adopt a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries. If only India be honest, democrat peace in the region is sure and soon. The Maoists of Nepal should understand the game of India. So, do all Maoists of all nations. They should suppress their views rather they should learn how to swim in the democratic current of the modern world. Now, many Nepalese want peace at any price. The real power does not come from the barrel of guns but from winning the hearts of the people.

Conclusively the whole gamut of the game whether call it SPA's armless protest or armful terrorists' demands are fully backed by India. America and EU have no idea about Nepal just have supported blandly on Indian say. The liberal economy based business has dominated the truth, justice and democracy. The wrong concept that the smaller and weaker nations have no right to survive as sovereign and independent nation is itself undemocratic. They are supporting terrorism/monocracy in the name of democracy. All

declarations are implemented only when they are ratified by the referendum. And the government is neutral accepted by all sectors. The constitutional assembly cannot be held under the bullets and or fake arms down. Even the emotional and sentimental situation cannot give the right verdicts.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Shastra Dutta Pant

Dr. S.D. Pant is a prolific writer and has several books to his credit. He is also involved with many social and educational organizations operating in Nepal.

Amongst his many books two of particular note are -

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India's Role in the Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka

Rohan Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya

Introduction

End of the cold war and the spread of democratic forms of governance worldwide notwithstanding, the countries in South Asia remain embroiled in continuing cycles of tension, fear, and mutual suspicion. Foreign policy choices by these countries continue to be dominated by concerns of mutual antagonism and rivalry, which in recent years has taken diverse, forms and content. This is not to say that geopolitical changes with increasing economic interdependence, liberalization and world trading system do not have any impact on the nature of inter-state relations in the region. Economic upturn in much of Asia in areas of trade, investment and domestic growth-rates and new forms of global governance through multilateral trade agencies have facilitated dynamic cooperation among the countries in the region.

Despite the changing perceptions, countries in the region continue to be deeply suspicious about each other on issues related to sponsoring terrorism in another state. Both Pakistan and India accuse each other for what they call 'cross border terrorism' through Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) respectively. New Delhi accuses Dhaka for its failure to interdict terrorist training camps and safe havens in its territory. Even though Kathmandu depends much on New Delhi's security assistance, there are instances when it has accused India of encouraging terrorism through its external intelligence agency. Bhutan has long been a sanctuary for insurgents from India's northeast. India's involvement in Sri Lankan ethnic imbroglio has been one of the most controversial, ironic as well as tragic aspects of New Delhi's foreign policy.¹

It is to be noted that conflicts in many parts of South Asia have become embedded in complex web of interrelated issues. There is a competition for acquisition or control over territory as in the case with India and Pakistan over Kashmir, India's border dispute with China and Bangladesh, and in Sri Lanka's North-east. Most conflicts have cross-border dimensions as well as having links to transnational criminal issues such as narcotics, proliferation of small arms and cross-border movement of terrorists for operations, training and sanctuary. With a shared sense of history, religion, language and culture,

it is almost difficult to isolate the impact of a conflict to a particular geographical area in South Asia.

India and the regional order in South Asia

Because of its size in terms of territory and population as well as the size of its economy India is the largest and the most important country in South Asia. However, in the international system, India continues to be labeled as a regional power.² Despite that New Delhi's policies have significant implications for the countries and the people in South Asia and beyond. India had a long history of nonaggression and never displayed any expansionist or revisionist tendencies outside the subcontinent.³ But some of New Delhi's policies betray aspirations to become the undisputed 'regional hegemon' and 'security manager' in South Asia. By definition, a regional hegemon implies a single great power in a distinct geographical area, with no other state having the military wherewithal to challenge its supremacy.⁴ Historically, India has sought to establish its hegemony with tough and uncompromising attitude toward its neighbors and preventing these states from pursuing security, economic, diplomatic policies, which are perceived to be inimical to its interests.

At the same time, India has attempted with varying measures of success, to resist external powers from having any influence in the region.⁵ This, New Delhi has sought to achieve with a range of instruments including regional cooperation, political transformation and coercion.⁶ New Delhi, in the past, lent its support to secessionist and separatists movements in its immediate neighborhood including in Tibet, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.⁷ For example, it was alleged that New Delhi supported the Tamils' demand for separate state in Sri Lanka by training the members of Tamil separatist groups especially the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in India. With interventions in Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and disputes with Nepal over trade issues, New Delhi earned the dubious sobriquet of being a 'regional bully' capable to effectively alter an established regional order.⁸

However, it would be unfair to interpret India's behavior with its neighbors entirely in terms of hegemony. Apart from 'national interest' argument, New Delhi's policies towards its neighbors could also be explained otherwise. For example, even though India's intervention in erstwhile 'East Bengal' did not have the support of the international community, this was largely necessitated by humanitarian concerns arising from a very large inflow of refugees into the country. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, India's concerns stemmed from two factors.

Firstly, conflict involving Tamil minority in Sri Lanka inevitably had a spill over effect due to the presence of a large Tamil population very close to each other in both the countries. Historically, South Asian Tamils are a transnational community. The Sri Lankan Tamils are only divided from their ethnic kin in India by a narrow 22 miles-wide Strait separating the northern province of Sri Lanka and the Tamils living in southern India especially in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Right since independence, India was actively engaged in dialogues with Sri Lanka in respect of issues involving citizenship and rights of the Tamils of Indian origin. New Delhi watched with concern the growing alienation of the Sri Lankan Tamil community and erosion in their social and political status since 1956 under the Sinhalese dominated central government in Sri Lanka. India also observed the inability or unwillingness of successive governments since 1956 to check this alienation through effective political and administrative measures.⁹ Due to ethnic affinity, it was but natural for Indian Tamils to take up the cause of their ethnic brethrens across the straits and put pressure on the political leadership whether at the provincial or at the central level to do something about it. This was exploited by groups like LTTE to the fullest extent. For example, LTTE exploited the Tamil empathy to develop beneficial political relations with Indian Tamil political organizations. These groups became the lobbyists on behalf of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, influencing New Delhi's policies towards Colombo. Often, these groups put pressure on the government in New Delhi to intervene in Sri Lanka. .

Secondly, from a strategic perspective, Sri Lanka's geographical location is important from the point of view of India's security. Even though Sri Lanka was a member of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), Colombo was drifting towards the Western bloc too closely for New Delhi's comfort. There were also the geopolitical fears about the extra-regionalization of the conflict from India's perspective. Sri Lanka had good relations with Pakistan and China, two countries that had fought border wars with India. During the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, these countries were in the process of stepping up military assistance to Colombo. Opening Sri Lankan ports for US warships, attempting to get military support, training and hardware from the West as well as Colombo's cordial relationship with Islamabad were matters of serious concern for India.¹⁰ India was also concerned over the presence of Western intelligence and security personnel in Sri Lanka. The purchase of European and Chinese military hardware and the presence of ex-SAS elite troops, Israeli security and intelligence personnel, South African mercenaries and Pakistani commandos to combat Tamil militancy were perceived as a heavy anti - Indian

build up at her vulnerable southern flank.¹¹ According to J. N. Dixit, the former High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, "Tamil militancy received support both from Tamil Nadu and from the Central Government, not only as a response to the Sri Lankan Government's military assertiveness against Sri Lankan Tamils, but also as a response to Colombo's concrete and expanded military and intelligence cooperation with the United States, Israel and Pakistan. ...The assessment was that the presence of these extra-regional agencies and those from Pakistan would pose a strategic threat to India given India's experience regarding their policies in relation to Kashmir and the Punjab...." These would encourage fissiparous movements in the southern states of India.¹²

Thus, India's response to the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka was dictated by social and political/strategic considerations. One was in consistent with its support to the Tamils in their fight against the Sinhalese. Second is to pin Colombo down in its own internal conflicts, so that in foreign policy affairs it would cease to be a matter of concern to India. This aspect of India's policy has been interpreted as a manifestation of India's hegemony in the region.¹³ At the same time however, New Delhi did not want the emergence of a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka as it would re-ignite Tamil separatist movement in Tamil Nadu. India had two options by which to achieve these goals - either to act as a mediator or intervene militarily.¹⁴

It is in this context that we examine India's meddling with the conflict in Sri Lanka.

Overview of the Conflict in Sri Lanka

The demographic profile in Sri Lanka is as complex as most of the other countries in South Asia. Of a population of more than twenty million, Sinhalese comprise 73%; Sri Lankan Tamils 11%; Plantation Tamils¹⁵ 8%; Moors and Malays (Muslims) 7%; Dutch and Portuguese Burghurs 1%.¹⁶ In terms of religious composition, 69% of the total population are Buddhists (all Sinhalese), 15% Hindus (mostly Tamils), 8% Muslims (Moors and Malays), and 7% Christians (all Burghurs, some Sinhalese and Tamils).¹⁷ In terms of geographic divides, the north of Sri Lanka is mono-ethnic (populated mainly by Tamils), the east is multi-ethnic (all ethnic groups represented); Plantation Tamils populate the central highlands; and the south is predominantly Sinhalese (with the exception of the capital Colombo, which is multi-ethnic).

At the core of the ethnic imbroglio in Sri Lanka are the political and social vestiges from Sri Lanka's colonial past. Prior to independence in 1948, the

Tamil minority was perceived as holding undue influence under the British administered bureaucracy. Following the accession to power of a Sinhalese-majority government in 1956, measures were taken to expunge civil society from the colonial past, particularly the excessive control of the Tamil minority. This caused grave unrest between the Tamil and the Sinhalese populations on the island.

The emergence of acute Tamil nationalism was the result of ethnic tensions between the Tamil and the Sinhalese communities.¹⁸ A number of Tamil nationalist parties emerged to protect the ethnic interests of their constituents. They accused the Sinhalese-dominated authorities in Colombo of actively discriminating against the Tamil minority. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in particular, criticized the government for disallowing the introduction of a federal system of governance in Sri Lanka. In 1976, the TULF launched a political campaign for independence on the basis of the Tamil's national right to self-determination.¹⁹

The persistent refusal of the Colombo authorities to acknowledge TULF's grievances led to the formation of various Tamil militant groups. The most prominent among them was the LTTE, initially named the Tamil New Tigers (TNT).²⁰ The group drew its support from economically deprived Tamil agricultural workers whose families lost their livelihood due to economic reforms in the late 1970s, as well as unemployed urban Tamil youth who faced economic and social discrimination stemming from the monopolization of power by the Sinhalese majority. LTTE demanded the secession of the Tamil-dominated areas of north and east Sri Lanka and the formation of a sovereign political unit, the state of Tamil Eelam. Capitalizing on the politicisation of the Tamil public by the TULF and the existing support for independence, the LTTE launched an armed campaign in 1983.

Although initially the group targeted Tamil political and administrative figures affiliated with the government, in time LTTE's small-scale sparrow operations of hit and run tactics developed into a large-scale open confrontation with Sri Lanka's military establishment. By eliminating co-ethnic competitors and successfully engaging the Sri Lankan armed forces, the LTTE prevented the government from gaining access to and control of the northeast provinces of the country. By 1987, the LTTE effectively ruled the northern peninsula – levying taxes, implementing its own policing, and providing civil services such as transport and education.²¹

The Colombo authorities were unable to subdue the LTTE insurgency during its formative phase due to several reasons. First, Sri Lankan troops

were largely trained to perform ceremonial functions and were incapable of suppressing military threats. By the time the armed forces had effectively upgraded into a professional militia, the LTTE had already escalated into advanced guerrilla warfare. Second, the Sri Lankan government could not exercise effective control over the northern peninsula or disrupt the command centers of the group.

Thirdly, despite denials, India had begun arming and training LTTE cadres on its soil between 1983 and 1984. However, the initial contact between the Tamil Nadu government and Sri Lankan Tamil activists was established in 1972. A delegation from the Tamil Manavi Peravi, a group of Tamil students committed to secure independence of Tamils from Sri Lanka through the armed struggle, traveled to Madras and met E.V.R. Periya, the then Tamil Nadu leader. Periya told the four-man delegation that if the Tamils are unhappy in Sri Lanka, they could come to South India. "We will give you enough land to cultivate."²² During the 1970s, Tamil youth activists used Tamil Nadu as a sanctuary to evade arrest from the Sri Lanka police.

From the late 1970s, the LTTE developed links with a number of Tamil Nadu political groups. The most significant of them were Dravida Kazhagam headed by Veramani, the Kamraj Congress headed by Nedumaran and the Pure Tamil Movement headed by Perinchintanarayanan. Veeramani called a meeting of all his key party organizers throughout Tamil Nadu and asked them to support the LTTE. Perinchintanarayanan gave his property for the use of the LTTE. Thereafter, the LTTE developed excellent relations with M.G. Ramachandran and M. Karunanidhi, who succeeded each other as chief ministers.²³

Although Tamil insurgents had established a few training camps in Tamil Nadu in 1982, there was no official assistance from the Central Government of India prior to August 1983. The July 1983 riots fueled the sentiments of the Indian Tamil population to such an extent that the state government of Tamil Nadu decided to extend humanitarian assistance to Sri Lankan refugees which unfortunately included insurgents fleeing the conflict zone. In this way, Tamil Nadu became the essential "outside base" for the insurgency in Sri Lanka, logistically ideal for supplying the militant's arsenal, and sanctuary for the Tamil insurgents from Sri Lanka. This gave opportunity to the Tamil groups to grow in number, strength and operational capability and capacity.

By mid 1987, over 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents had been provided sanctuary, finance, training and weapons either by the central Indian government, state government of Tamil Nadu or by the insurgent groups

themselves.²⁴ While most of the initial training was confined to Indian military and paramilitary camps in Uttara Pradesh, specialized training were imparted by the Indian instructors attached to RAW to Sri Lankan insurgents in New Delhi, Bombay and Vishakhapatnam. The most secretive training was conducted in Chakrata, north of Dehra Dun, India's premier military academy for training service personnel, where RAW had also imparted training to Bangladesh, Pakistan and Tibetan dissidents.²⁵ During that period, LTTE also set up its operational headquarters in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Its leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran remained there until 1986, when the political climate in India convinced him to return to Sri Lanka.

India's sponsorship was crucial for building LTTE's capability to engage the Sri Lankan military decisively. LTTE's fighting capability was amply demonstrated during IPKF-LTTE engagement during 1987-1990. For example, Depinder Singh, who was an Indian army general and commander of the IPKF, expressed surprise with the level of sophistication in training imparted to the LTTE Sea Tigers.²⁶ In addition to gaining guerrilla training and a modernized weapon arsenal, the LTTE was able to set up communication facilities and to move freely between India and Sri Lanka.²⁷

India's political mediation and successive attempts to bring the rival parties together to find a negotiated solution to the ethnic problem failed. Both the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government were unprepared for a political settlement to the conflict. As a result, violence escalated with each side seeking military advantage over its competitor. The LTTE attempted to weaken the central government's authority and restrict the movement of its security forces by staging ambushes and mine attacks. The Sri Lankan security forces – adopting the principle that terrorism is a military problem that requires a military solution – implemented search-and-destroy operations, aimed at destroying both LTTE's regular rank-and-file and Tamil civilians suspected of offering logistical support to the insurgents. As a conventional armed force engaged with a non-conventional adversary in a densely populated civilian area, the Sri Lankan military caused considerable turmoil and destruction in the northeast of the country.

The riots of July 1983 further polarized ethnic passions and became a watershed in the history of the country. Although the disturbances originally erupted in response to the ambush and killing of 13 Sinhalese soldiers by the LTTE, the innocent casualties suffered by the Tamil population at the hands of looting Sinhalese mobs caused mass-scale displacement, property damage, and death. The riots were interpreted as genocide, pogrom or ethnic cleansing

of the Tamils. It was not an organized attempt by the state or by the security forces. The government however, did not do its best to prevent the violence. When the rioting began, several miscreants rapidly organized themselves and systematically attacked Tamil households and business establishments. Groups of shortsighted chauvinist Sinhalese believed that the departure of the Tamils from the Sinhalese areas was a victory for them. Sadly, none of them understood that the victims who left overseas would form the economic backbone of the terrorist campaign.

Following the riots, Sri Lanka became a *de facto* geographically ethicized country, with certain communities inhabiting some parts of the country but not others. Such developments resulted in the crystallization of distinct identities for the Tamil and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. All Sinhalese residing in the north – estimated at about 5,000 – left the Jaffna peninsula for the south of the country.²⁸ At least 50% of Tamils living outside the Jaffna peninsula either returned to the northeast, or sought refuge overseas, mostly in India.²⁹

At the height of this cross-ocean exodus, approximately 225,000 Sri Lankan Tamils resided as exiles in refugee camps in Tamil Nadu or with friends and relatives there. The influx of large number of militants and refugees began to create serious law and order problems in India.³⁰ There was also significant upsurge in public sentiment in Tamil Nadu, in support of the Sri Lankan Tamils, calling for military intervention by India in Sri Lanka.³¹ While the plight of the Tamil refugees became a delicate issue domestically, New Delhi was also in a strategic predicament. India was constrained to do anything that would amount to interference in Sri Lanka's domestic affairs. At the same time, the deteriorating security situation had the potential to warrant the involvement of extra-regional powers in the conflict in Sri Lanka. The then Indian Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi, while assuring Colombo that India was not interested to interfere in its internal affairs, emphasized New Delhi's concern about Sri Lanka seeking military assistance from the United States, Britain, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, to meet the crisis. From India's perspective "any external involvement would complicate matters for both the countries."³²

During the height of the conflict, India sent an emissary – G. Parthasarathy, to persuade Sri Lankan leaders to politically resolve the conflict. A series of diplomatic exchanges and a summit meeting between the leaders of both the countries enhanced the prospects for a peaceful solution to the conflict. But India- Sri Lanka relations deteriorated as hard-line Singhalese leaders began a diatribe against India's involvement in the crisis especially what they

perceived as India harboring Tamil "terrorists" in its soil. There was also media speculation that India was planning to intervene militarily. At the same time, the Sri Lankan government was not really enthusiastic about the Indian involvement in its ethnic crisis. This was reflected in President Jayewardene's remarks that Sri Lanka envisaged "no role" for India in settling the Tamil problem, that the Tamil issue was Sri Lanka's internal matter and that he had no need for India's good offices.³³ President Jayewardene also stressed that Sri Lanka would seek assistance from the United States, Britain, and like-minded powers to ward off New Delhi's pressure tactics.³⁴

However, there was no positive response from the Western powers to get involved in Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis. In fact, Washington was rather appreciative of New Delhi's mediation. New Delhi seized upon this to enunciate 'Indira Doctrine' - the Indian equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine. According to this doctrine, while India was not interested to interfere in the domestic affairs of any states in the region unless requested to do so, it would not tolerate such intervention by an outside power. New Delhi emphasized that "if external assistance is needed to meet an internal crisis, states should first look within the region for help."³⁵

During this time New Delhi made a number of attempts to bring both sides to the negotiations and agree to a political solution. During the initiative under India's Minister for Internal Security P. Chidambaram, Indian government made sustained efforts to restrain the Tamil militants from jeopardizing the negotiating process. However, LTTE rejected the Colombo proposals on provincial councils, insisting that "for any meaningful political settlement, the acceptance by the Sri Lankan government of an indivisible single region as the homeland of the Tamils is basic."³⁶ At the same time, a plan for a federal devolution of power submitted by the moderate TULF was rejected by the government. Beginning 1986, the Tamils and the Sri Lankan forces were engaged in fierce fighting and the prospects for a political solution appeared quite remote. At this time Colombo again appealed to Washington to come to the aid of the government.³⁷

By the end of 1986, the mediation efforts by New Delhi notwithstanding, Sri Lankan ethnic crisis began to worsen, with both sides engaged in military confrontation. There was no development on the 'December 19th proposals' agreed upon by New Delhi and Colombo.³⁸ In response to LTTE's attempts to take over the civil administration in the north, which was perceived as a "unilateral declaration of Independence," Colombo initiated another major military offensive along with economic blockade.³⁹ New Delhi demanded that

Colombo end its economic blockade, which was creating a huge humanitarian crisis. New Delhi also asked the Tamil militants to give up violence and resume the peace process. However, there was no success, as both the sides remained rigid in their respective positions. On 10 April 1987, the Sri Lankan government declared a ten-day unilateral ceasefire under sustained persuasion from New Delhi. However, full-scale military offensive resumed with aerial attacks in Jaffna following violation of the ceasefire by Tamil militants. President Jayewardene declared that his government is determined to fight the militants until "either they win or we win," and that his government would accept "help from the devil himself, if necessary to fight terrorism" by Tamil militants.⁴⁰

Towards mid-1987, India became increasingly concerned that the Sri Lankan conflict was affecting its own domestic security. About 22 small Indian Tamil political and militant groups campaigned for the establishment of Dravidistan, or an independent Tamil state in India.⁴¹ Under pressure, New Delhi sent relief supplies to Jaffna and when Colombo blocked the Indian flotilla's entry into Lankan territorial waters, Indian Air Force planes entered Sri Lanka's airspace and airdropped relief supplies in and around Jaffna.⁴² This act was condemned by Colombo as an "unwarranted assault on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

However, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was genuinely interested to sort out India's long-running ethnic and religious conflicts. Already burdened with terrorism in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Assam, and under threat from externally assisted terrorism in its own soil, Rajiv Gandhi realized the costs of supporting violent secessionism in another country. He signed peace accords with the Sikhs in Punjab and agitators in Assam. He was also interested to get the Sri Lankan ethnic imbroglio sorted out.

As the civil war in Sri Lanka continued escalating, India decided to seek other alternatives, though, direct military intervention was out of question. New Delhi obtained a window of opportunity to intervene through a peace deal. On 29 May 1987, an Indo-Lankan Peace accord was signed between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene.⁴³ Its purpose was to devolve greater autonomy to the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka and to preserve India's geopolitical and strategic interests in the region. The treaty entailed the deployment of 100,000 Indian troops – the so-called Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) – to maintain peace between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil insurgents. As a result of the political negotiations, many Tamil nationalist and militant groups joined the political

mainstream. The LTTE, however, continued resisting and after three months of uneasy peace, Prabhakaran, declared war on the IPKF. Defending its decision, LTTE said that, the "Indo-Sri Lanka Accord fails to situate the essence and mode of our struggle as a liberation struggle, as a struggle for self-determination. Instead, the Accord places our national struggle entirely on a fallacious promise reducing it to a simple problem of a discriminated minority group in a pluralistic social formation."⁴⁴ Even under overwhelming military pressure Prabhakaran was unwilling to compromise his position. This was because of the organizational culture of LTTE. Unlike the bulk of the terrorist groups that developed from a political organization, LTTE was an armed group from its inception. Very often the core thinking of such groups remain unaltered constraining their transition from militancy to politics.

For two years, the battle-hardened LTTE checkmated a much larger, resourceful and formally trained military. It appeared that Indians seriously underestimated LTTE's capabilities, both in terms of guerilla tactics and urban warfare skills. This could be the result of the previous affinity between the two organizations. As a result, the Indian army was not prepared for the task at hand. Operating out of their jungle bases, LTTE's fighting machine - using deceptive strategies and unanticipated terror methods - inflicted nearly 5000 casualties on the Indian army. Despite a joint naval blockade, aerial surveillance and coastal observation posts, the LTTE traffic between south of India and northern Sri Lanka continued. LTTE boats transported injured cadres to Tamil Nadu for treatment and returned with military supplies. Improvised explosive devices from innovative anti-personnel mines to closely guarded Black Tiger suicide land and sea operations dented the morale of the Indian army. The frustration and growing sense of purposelessness among the Indian soldiers - who were not used to fighting guerrilla war and suffered heavy casualties as a result - was demonstrated by their senseless retaliation against Tamil civilians, including rape and torture.

There was another unexpected consequence from the military intervention by India. The JVP responsible for an abortive insurrection in 1971 spearheaded a campaign against Indian expansionism and whipped up the wounded patriotism. They denounced the IPKF as an army of occupation, and accused the government of compromising the sovereignty of the nation. Their subsequent insurrection, entailing widespread terror tactics and a painstakingly orchestrated fear psychosis operation, brought the country to near anarchy.

The Sri Lankan political leadership, displaying typical shortsightedness, decided to make political use of fears among the Sinhalese population about

IPKF becoming more than just a peacekeeping force. There was also a manifest desire to pay India back for its perceived wrongs against Sri Lanka in the previous decade. This would explain why, Jayewardene's successor, President Ranasinghe Premadasa, "struck a deal with LTTE and covertly financed and armed LTTE to fight the IPKF which was in the island state to help the government weed out Tamil insurgents".⁴⁵ By this time LTTE had weakened considerably. Even with heavy casualties, the Indian troops had managed to isolate LTTE, confining a bulk of its cadres to the northern and eastern jungles with Indian Special Forces conducting raids deep into LTTE territory. Unfortunately, Premadasa, failed to understand LTTE, was unduly more suspicious of Indian designs and was determined to neutralize the JVP's rhetoric against Indian "imperialism" for short-term political gains. This would cost him seriously later, as after the IPKF returned, it was the same weapons that LTTE used, to eliminate rival Tamil rebels and then, to fight the government forces.

On 24 March 1990, President Premadasa, oversaw the withdrawal of the IPKF, after a prolonged IPKF-LTTE military stalemate. Even though the Indian troops left an Indian-trained proxy army to continue military operations in the northeast of the country, this force was quickly and easily decimated by the LTTE. LTTE regained control of the Jaffna peninsula and established a quasi-administration for five years. Within three months of the 1990 treaty, LTTE declared war on the Colombo government, killing 400 policemen, who had surrendered to the organization on a promise that they would be set free. The LTTE declaration of war on the government confirmed the widely held belief that LTTE used bouts of peace for tactical as well as strategic gains. They ranged from assassinating leaders, evading imminent threats, gaining international recognition, disseminating propaganda, generating funds, procuring supplies, gathering intelligence, regrouping, retraining and recruiting. The civil war continued unabated. Thus Premadasa's ill-fated help to LTTE in order to undercut the IPKF demonstrates how short-term tactical alliances could be self-defeating.

Why the Indian initiative failed?

In his book, *Assignment Colombo*, J. N. Dixit, India's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka during that period, attributes "overoptimism on the part of the Indians regarding President Jayawardene's 'change of mind' and "lack of 'reasonableness' among the Sri Lankan Tamils" as the reasons for the failure of New Delhi's initiative. Dixit also acknowledges New Delhi's underestimation of LTTE's resolve, its error in believing that LTTE could be 'isolated from the

Sri Lankan Tamils' and the 'xenophobic' mindset of the Sri Lanka Government.⁴⁶ However, according to other analysts, the Sri Lankan fiasco was due as much to New Delhi's failure to carry the Tigers along with the peace deal as to the compromise of its leverage to influence events in the Island because of its decision to intervene on behalf of the government of Sri Lanka.⁴⁷ Similarly, others argue that India failed to take the political force and mass appeal of Tamil nationalism seriously "If the violence and perfidy of the Sri Lankan State had given rise to Tamil nationalism in the first place, the popular commitment to Eelam was cemented and solidified by the Tamils bitter experience with the Indian State."⁴⁸

The manner of negotiation of the peace deal also demonstrates how New Delhi was trying to take advantage of insecurity in Sri Lanka to advance its own strategic interests. As J. N. Dixit himself admitted, during the negotiations, Sri Lanka was specifically asked to reduce and phase out the military and intelligence personnel from the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa in Sri Lanka, reduce its involvement with USA, Pakistan, China, Israel and South Africa and give some assurances to India that its seaports and airports would not be utilized by foreign powers, among others. This was perceived to be highly excessive by the Sri Lankan leadership and even though these did not form part of the accord, a feeling of distrust with New Delhi's initiative prevailed.⁴⁹

Consequences of Indian Intervention

Intervening in others' affairs typically ends one being on a very slippery slope. That was what happened to India, thus displaying the foolhardiness of meddling in a situation with chaotic and rapidly fluctuating parameters. The Indian intervention had several consequences. India's efforts to find a political solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis led the conflict into a more dangerous impasse.⁵⁰ Its support to the Tamil rebels and provision of training and military hardware made LTTE one of the most ruthless terrorist organizations. This was demonstrated amply, when the group killed Rajiv Gandhi - independent India's one of the most dynamic leaders.

The role of the IPKF in Sri Lanka also became a politically sensitive issue. During the IPKF phase, there was massive displacement in Sri Lanka. Approximately 100,000 families or 500,000 people – about 50% of the peninsular population – suffered damages to their dwellings.⁵¹ Instead of blaming the LTTE for these developments, the Tamil community directed its anger against the IPKF, branding the once warmly welcomed forces as the

"Innocent People Killing Force (IPKF)." As the Guardian noted, "within three months, the Indians had changed from garlanded heroes of the hour to the hated tormentors of the Tamil people they had come to rescue."⁵² Many overseas Tamils detested the IPKF - LTTE confrontation because India had been a traditional ally of Sri Lankan Tamils. However, IPKF civilian killings highlighted by the LTTE international propaganda machinery generated resentment against India as a result that segments of the Tamil Diaspora supported LTTE against the IPKF.

Even after the IPKF returned, LTTE continued to maintain its good relations with Tamil Nadu politicians. This undermined the domestic security to a great extent. When LTTE hit teams under Jack Sivarasan assassinated the anti-LTTE EPRLF leader Padmanabha and his colleagues in Tamil Nadu, chief minister Karunanidhi asked the Tamil Nadu police and the state agencies to turn a blind eye. A few months later, LTTE used the very same infrastructure in Tamil Nadu to kill Rajiv Gandhi. The LTTE penetration of the Tamil Nadu polity was so good that a decision reached at a high level meeting comprising intelligence agencies in New Delhi about anti-LTTE operations was conveyed to the group within 24 hours.

Besides, the average Sri Lankan became very suspicious of Indian designs. New Delhi's inability to discourage organized militant activity conducted from its soil did not help convince Sri Lanka of India's sincerity as an honest broker. "The establishment of Tamil Eelam offices in India and the constant barrage of Eelam propaganda from south India conditioned the Sinhala reflexes."⁵³

The IPKF experience was traumatic for the Indian public. It was not easily forgotten either. Its costs in terms of military reverses, loss of human life and the bitterness that led to the senseless murder of a great leader, induced a sense of paralysis into the strategic thinking of its political leadership. This 'Vietnam syndrome' was demonstrated when New Delhi categorically refused to get itself involved after President Kumartunge sought Indian intervention in 2000. In May 2000, amidst the possibility of Jaffna falling into the hands of the LTTE and its troops facing a possibility of bloody massacre, Colombo asked New Delhi for help. This distress call, seeking full-scale Indian military involvement was supported by a wide cross section of Sri Lankan public, including the groups which were most vocal in their protest against the presence of the IPKF during 1987-1990. But the political leadership in India was no longer in favour of any direct - military intervention in the Sri Lankan crisis. According to official sources, there was simply no question of Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka.⁵⁴ This reluctance however undermined

India's regional supremacy. India's reluctance gave scope for countries like Pakistan and Israel to get involved in the crisis and encouraged the Sri Lankans to have closer ties with countries hostile to India.⁵⁵ However, India offered to play an 'honest broker's role,' and to provide humanitarian assistance.

Conclusion

The geopolitical scenario in South Asia has changed considerably since the 1980s. The cold war is over. India no longer perceives strategic developments in the region through the lens of superpower rivalry. September 11 incidents have also helped countries to shed their ambivalence about terrorists and the freedom fighters. In the domestic context, the war on terror also changed the nature of response to terrorism by the countries in South Asia. The same incidents have put LTTE and its cause out of the receiving end of international empathy.

Transnational terrorism also introduced new security challenges to the nations in the region. September 11 and the 'war on terror' established the foundations for the emergence of the US as a major regional player in South Asia.⁵⁶ An altered security role for the United States contributed to a large extent in lessening of tensions and intensity of rivalry among the countries in the region as manifested in gradual easing of tensions between India and Pakistan.

Besides, India has opened up its economy to world trade and investment, and now actively collaborates with the West in both economic and military spheres. There has been a gradual re-conceptualization of India's long-term strategic role towards peacekeeping and peacemaking, rather than toward a hegemonic projection of force. This has made New Delhi interfere less and less in the affairs of its neighbors. Thus India is no longer interested in Sri Lanka in an antagonistic capacity. The Indian perspective has changed significantly from a patron-cum-mediator and an active participant, to that of a keen observer.⁵⁷ This means an almost complete termination of all covert support for the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents fighting for Tamil Elam.

At present, in view of renewed hostilities between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka, there is a domestic expectation in Sri Lanka for another intervention – from diplomatic offensive to passive military assistance to the Sri Lankan armed forces - by India.⁵⁸ This New Delhi must deal with caution so as not to repeat the mistakes of the past. The countries in the region would do well if they steer clear of zero sum games and stay away from exploiting self-serving conflagrations that ultimately hurts them all.⁵⁹

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr Rohan Gunaratna & Arabinda Acharya

ROHAN GUNARATNA is an Associate Professor and Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore; Senior Fellow at the

Combating Terrorism Center at the US Military Academy at West Point. Previously, he was Principal Investigator, UN Terrorism Prevention Branch; Co-Director, UN University Project on Managing Contemporary Insurgencies; and Principal Investigator, Qinetiq Project on Terrorist Information Operations, Ministry of Defence, UK. Gunaratna co-chairs the NATO-PfP Working group on Combating Terrorism since 2002 and serves on the Steering Committee of the George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute since 2004

He is a consultant to the World Terrorism Encyclopedia; author of over 100 papers and reports on terrorism; and the author of eight books including an international bestseller *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (Columbia University Press, New York, 2002). A Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, Dr Gunaratna holds a Masters degree in international peace studies from Notre Dame, US, and a Doctorate in international relations from St Andrews, UK.

ARABINDA ACHARYA is a Visiting Associate and Manager, Strategic Projects at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. Arabinda was External Research Associate, York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies University of Toronto and a Visiting Research Fellow, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Arabinda has published a number of articles and reviews in journals such as South Asia in the Nuclear Era, Asian Defence and Diplomacy (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 7, No. 12, (December 2000), Human Security In Asia Pacific: Puzzle, Panacea or Peril ?, CANCAPS Bulletin No. 27, November 2000, Shadow Over the Subcontinent: South Asia Goes Nuclear- a Look at Security, George Town Journal of International Affairs; Vol. II, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 2001), Engaging China In South Asia Harvard Asia Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 3, (Summer 2001), "Promoting Human Security in South Asia Through Multilateral Cooperation," Dipankar Banerjee, (ed), SAARC in the 21st Century: Towards a Cooperative Future, "Terrorism and Regional Security: Deconstructing the War on Terror in Asia," in Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Counter Measures, The Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 2006, "Countering the Global Islamist Terrorist Threat," The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2006, and co-author of Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, Marshall Cavandish Academic, Singapore, 2005

Map of South Asia



Resolution of the Indian Parliament 31 March 1971

Moved by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India

This House expresses its deep anguish and grave concern at the recent developments in East Bengal. A massive attack by armed forces, dispatched from West Pakistan, has been unleashed against the entire people of East Bengal with a view to suppressing their urges and aspirations.

Instead of respecting the will of the people so unmistakably expressed through the election in Pakistan in December 1970, the Government of Pakistan has chosen to flout the mandate of the people.

The Government of Pakistan has not only refused to transfer power to legally elected representatives but has arbitrarily prevented the National Assembly from assuming its rightful and sovereign role. The people of East Bengal are being sought to be suppressed by the naked use of force, by bayonets, machine guns, tanks, artillery and aircraft.

The Government and people of India have always desired and worked for peaceful, normal and fraternal relations with Pakistan. However, situated as India is and bound as the people of the sub-continent are by centuries-old ties of history, culture and tradition, this House cannot remain indifferent to the macabre tragedy being enacted so close to our border. Throughout the length and breadth of our land, our people have condemned, in unmistakable terms, the atrocities now being perpetrated on an unprecedented scale upon an armed and innocent people.

This House expresses its profound sympathy for and solidarity with the people of East Bengal in their struggle for a democratic way of life.

Bearing in mind the permanent interests which India has in peace, and committed as we are to uphold and defend human rights, this House demands immediate cessation of the use of force and the massacre of defenseless people. This House calls upon all peoples and Governments of the world to take urgent and constructive steps to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan to put an end immediately to the systematic decimation of people which amounts to genocide.

This House records its profound conviction that the historic upsurge of the 75 million people of East Bengal will triumph. The House wishes to assure them that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the wholehearted sympathy and support of the people of India.

Source: *Bangla Desh Documents* p. 672 and in *Lt Gen JFR Jacob – Birth of a Nation* (1997) pg. 208

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND PEACE BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA

Inspired by common ideals of peace, secularism democracy, socialism and nationalism.

Having struggled together for the realization of these ideals and cemented ties of friendship through blood and sacrifices which led to the triumphant emergence of a free, sovereign and independent Bangladesh,

Determined to maintain fraternal and good neighbourly relations and transform their border of eternal peace and friendship,

Adhering firmly to the basic tenets of non-alignment, peaceful co-existence, mutual cooperation, non-interference, in internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,

Determined to safeguard peace, stability and security and to promote progress of their respective countries through all possible avenues of mutual cooperation,

Determined further to expand and strengthen the existing relations of friendship between them.

Convinced that the further development of friendship and cooperation meets the national interests of both States as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world,

Resolved to contribute to strengthening world peace and security and to make efforts to bring about a relaxation of international tension and the final elimination of vestiges of colonialism, and imperialism,

Convinced that in the present-day world international problems can be solved only through cooperation and not through conflict or confrontation,

The People's Republic of Bangladesh, on the one hand, and the Republic of India, on the other, have decided to conclude the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 1 – The High Contracting Parties inspired by the ideals for which their respective peoples struggled and made sacrifices together, solemnly declare that there shall be lasting peace and friendship between their two countries and their peoples. Each side shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other side.

The High Contracting Parties shall further develop and strengthen the relations of friendship, good-neighbourliness and all round cooperation

existing between them, on the basis of the above-mentioned principles as well the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE 2 – Being guided by their devotion to the principles of equality of all people and states, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all their forms and manifestations and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other states in achieving these aims and support the just aspirations of peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination and for their national liberation.

ARTICLE 3 – The High Contracting Parties reaffirm their faith in the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, as important factors for easing tension in the world, maintaining international peace and security and strengthening national sovereignty and independence.

ARTICLE 4 - The High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both States, through meetings and exchanges of views at all levels;

ARTICLE 5 - The High Contracting Parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their mutually advantageous and all-round cooperation in the economic, scientific and technical fields. The two countries shall develop mutual cooperation in the fields of trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and the most favoured nation principle.

ARTICLE 6 – The High Contracting Parties further agree to make joint studies and take joint action in the fields of flood control, river basin development and the development of hydro-electric power and irrigation.

ARTICLE 7 – The High Contracting Parties shall promote relations in the fields of art, literature, education, culture, sports and health.

ARTICLE 8 – In accordance with the ties of friendship existing between the two countries each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from any aggression against the other Party and shall not allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage to or constitute a threat to the security of the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 9 – Each of the Contracting Parties shall refrain from giving any assistance to any third Party taking part in an armed conflict against the other party. In case either Party is attacked or threatened with attack, the High

Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take appropriate effective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their countries.

ARTICLE 10 – Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not undertake any commitment, secret or open, toward one or more states which may be incompatible with the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 11 – The present Treaty is signed for a term of twenty-five years and shall be subject to renewal by mutual agreement on the High Contracting Parties.

The Treaty shall come into force with immediate effect from the date of its signature.

ARTICLE 12 – Any differences in interpreting any article or articles of the present Treaty that may arise between the High Contracting Parties shall be settled on a bilateral basis by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

Done in Dacca on the Nineteenth Day of March, Nineteen Hundred and Seventy-two.

SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN

Prime Minister

For the People's Republic of Bangladesh

INDIRA GANDHI

Prime Minister

For the Republic of India



M.B.I. Munshi

He was born on 5 August, 1972 in the town of Kaliganj in Greater Jessore (now Jhenidah). In July 1973 Mr. M.B.I. Munshi was taken to England as his father decided to pursue postgraduate studies leading to a FRCS degree. The entire family remained there together for another 24 years until Mr. Munshi returned to Bangladesh in November 1996. During his stay in London he completed his education including a postgraduate degree in law from the London School of Economics (1994) and then qualified as a Barrister passing his examinations in 1996 (Lincolns Inn – Called 1997). His family still resides in England where his father now practices orthopedic surgery as an Associate Specialist at the Queen Elizabeth II hospital in Hertfordshire. On his return to Bangladesh he obtained his license to practice as an advocate of the High Court in 1998 and is a junior to eminent lawyer Advocate Khan Saifur Rahman. He also teaches law at the London College of Legal Studies in Dhaka as well as at other institutions providing the London University LLB external course. His articles have been published nationally and internationally and he has been a frequent contributor to several internet discussion groups over the last seven years. He has also been involved with numerous social, welfare and legal organizations in Bangladesh and elsewhere.

