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ISLAM: Source and Purpose of Knowledge

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ
وَالصَّلَاةُ وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَى خَاتَمِ النَّبِيَّاتِ وَالرُّسُلِ

*In the Name of Allah,
the Compassionate, the Merciful,
Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Universe,
and Peace and Prayers be upon
His Final Prophet and Messenger.*

**ISLAM:
Source and Purpose of Knowledge**

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**ISLAM:
SOURCE AND PURPOSE
OF KNOWLEDGE**

**PROCEEDINGS AND SELECTED PAPERS OF
SECOND CONFERENCE ON ISLAMIZATION OF
KNOWLEDGE 1402 AH / 1982 AC**

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INTRODUCTION

Toward New Horizons in Research and Cooperation

It is with a great sense of pride and pleasure that we introduce this volume of research papers presented at our Second International Conference on Islamization of Knowledge at Islamabad, Pakistan. The event is significant in contemporary history because the learned participants made a pioneering attempt to define the relevance of Islam to their disciplines.

Concern for the Islamization of Knowledge has grown out of the experience of some of the committed Muslim thinkers, who were responsible for establishing Muslim student organizations in the United Kingdom and later in the United States of America.* The growth and success of the Muslim Students Association of the U.S. and Canada in particular, and on the international level, of The International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth, brought into focus some of the fundamental problems faced by the Muslim *'Ummah*. It became more and more evident that the Muslim *'Ummah* did not lack human and material resources, historical achievements, pride, and confidence in superior spiritual and social values; rather, the backwardness of the *'Ummah* could clearly be traced back to a stagnation in thought and a lack of vision. This stagnation and myopia have blocked creative and healthy approaches to using the immense Muslim wealth of spiritual and material resources for building a dynamic Islamic society. It has become clear that a powerful Muslim civilization, in the face of contemporary challenges, can be rebuilt only if Muslims first reform and update their ways of thinking, and their academic and scientific methodology.

This new approach and understanding was behind the success and the originality in the works and achievements of these student organizations. The youthful Muslim leaders made it their priority to address the reformation of thought and the integration of Western achievements in methodology with Islamic values and beliefs. The founding of the Association of Muslim Social

*The most prominent among them was Dr. 'AbdulHamīd AbūSulaymān who pioneered the establishment of the *AMSS*.

Scientists was a step in this direction. The idea was to sensitize Muslim social scientists, trained in the Western centers of learning, to the Islamic heritage, philosophy, and values. They could then forcefully work to establish the relevance of Islam to the present day social sciences. The Association provided a voluntary platform for Muslim social scientists to come together, think aloud and exchange their creative insights and specific ideas about the best strategies and tactics to pursue the Islamization of Knowledge.

It was soon clear that the drive for Islamization of Knowledge demanded a commitment of vast resources on the international level. In 1397 A.H. / 1977 A.C., the most committed and concerned Islamic scholars were invited to attend the first International Seminar at Lugano, Switzerland, to address the *crisis of thought* faced by the Muslim *Ummah*. There was a general consensus about the need, fundamentally and comprehensively, to reform contemporary Islamic thought, to redefine the intellectual and academic basis for the Islamization of Knowledge, and to establish a research institute to conduct research and provide a platform for all Muslim intellectuals, scholars, and thinkers from all over the world.

At the beginning of the new *Hijrah* century 1401 (1981 A.C.) the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) was incorporated in the United States of America as an Islamic academic and research institute to usher in a new era by serving and working for the sole purpose of achieving the goal of Islamizing knowledge. The Institute immediately planned an international gathering of Muslim scholars, thinkers, and social scientists to deliberate on the intellectual problems in developing Islamic thought and Islamizing knowledge. This came to be called the Second International Conference on the Islamization of Knowledge. The purpose was to mobilize Muslim social scientists internationally and enlist them for the great task of Islamizing their own disciplines. The seminar conference was to provide a world-wide forum for Muslim scholars and thinkers to report their achievements in developing Islamic thought, to exchange their ideas, and to define the foundations of the Islamization of Knowledge concept.

The Conference was jointly sponsored by the National *Hijrah* Centenary Celebration Committee of Pakistan, the International Islamic University of Islamabad, and the International Institute of Islamic Thought and was held at Islamabad, Pakistan, in *Rabi' al Awwal*, 1402 A.H. / January, 1982 A.C.. The participants were scholars and thinkers from all over the world. The President of Pakistan, General Zia al Haq, inaugurated the conference, and the late A.K. Brohi, former Rector of the Islamic University, and many scholars for different universities of Pakistan, in addition to scholars from different parts of the world were in attendance. The conference, *al hamdu Lillah* "praise be to Allah", was a success. It was also a successful beginning for the Institute because it helped to promote a sense of cooperation between the In-

stitute and other Muslim academic and intellectual institutions. The conference brought to Muslim academicians in many parts of the Muslim world an awareness of the causes of the sickness of the *Ummah* and made it possible for them to deliberate on the results of their original thinking and research into its cores. This deliberation focused on the 17 papers reproduced in this volume, four of which looked broadly at “Perspective on Islamization of Knowledge,” seven less broadly on “Perspective on the Islamization of Disciplines,” and the rest still more narrowly on “Islamizing Individual Disciplines.”

One of the major papers presented at the conference was the now highly acclaimed work plan and monograph entitled, *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan*. This work plan became the first major IIIT publication in the series on the Islamization of Knowledge, and summed up a long process of discussion, experiences and insights pooled by the founders of the IIIT over several years. It was developed, written, edited, and presented at the conference by the late Dr. Ismā‘īl Rājī al Fārūqī.

The monograph laid down in clear terms the future plans of the Institute to Islamize knowledge, reform Islamic thought and reorient actions of the Muslim mind in order to meet contemporary challenges. The second revised edition of the monograph, fully revised, edited, updated and approved as a work plan for the Institute, is now available in both Arabic and English.

Another paper, *The Islamization of Knowledge: A New Approach Toward Reform of Contemporary Knowledge*, by ‘AbdulḤamīd A. AbūSulaymān was unquestionably a major contribution to the conference. Offered originally in Arabic, his paper is the first work to explore Islamization of Knowledge by focusing upon the roots of Islamic Legacy and subsequent stages of development. It is a premier effort to reform contemporary Muslim thought and to develop a new approach for Islamic methodology which fulfills the essential imperative of establishing Islamic Social Sciences. His works in this area laid the groundwork for the above mentioned monograph.

Other highlights presented here include the pioneering work in the field of sociology by Muhammad al Mubārak, whose paper, *Naḥwa Şiyāghah Islāmīyah li ‘Ilm al ‘Ijtimā’* (Toward an Islamic reformulation of Sociology) brings a comprehensive in-depth perspective to the subject.

In another work, “Contemporary Sociology: An Islamic Critique,” Ilyas Ba-Yunus presents one of the first critiques of contemporary sociology from an Islamic perspective and provides unique insights to the “applied” vs “pure” and “value” vs “Value-free” controversy in the field.

In yet another paper, *Uşūl al Fiqh: Manhaj Baḥth wa Ma’rifah al Fiqh al Islāmī* (The Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence: Methodology of Research and Study of Islamic law), by Ṭāhā Jābir al ‘Alwānī, the problem of Islamization

of knowledge in the contemporary world and the development of both culture and thought through the uses of *Ijtihād* is highlighted.

Mahmoud Abu Saud, in his work, *Islamic Categorization of Disciplines: An Economic Example*, underscores the proposition that transactional disciplines are only means to the realization of man's ultimate happiness. He uses the economic case to demonstrate that Islamic economics must flow out of the *Sharī'ah*.

Although not presented in this compilation of papers, one of the highlights of the conference was Akbar Ahmed's preliminary paper on Islamization of Anthropology, which was later developed as a complete work and presented at the Third International Conference of Islamization of Knowledge held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 1404 A.H. / 1984 A.C.

Two years after the Seminar in Pakistan, the IIIT organized the Third International Conference above mentioned, which focused on the Islamization of individual disciplines in the social sciences. The fourth conference was held in *Jumādā al Ūlā* 1407 A.H. / January 1987 A.C. in Khartoum, Sudan. By the time this work is in the hand of our readers, we hope that the papers from these subsequent conferences will be available to our reader as further steps toward establishing Islamic foundations for the various fields and components of human knowledge.

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PART I:
Perspectives on
Islamization of Knowledge

**Islamization of Knowledge: A First Step to
Intergrate and Develop the Muslim
Personality and Outlook**

A. K. Brohi

Islamization of Knowledge: A First Step to Intergrate and Develop the Muslim Personality and Outlook

A. K. Brohi

It is hereby necessary for me to emphasize the importance of acquiring knowledge. We should remind ourselves that Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS) is asked in the Qur'ān to pray for an increase in knowledge (*Rabbī zidnī 'ilman*). The Prophet (ṢAAS), himself has emphasized the value of knowledge and highlighted the importance of acquiring knowledge, both for Muslim men and women. He said, "Acquire knowledge from cradle to grave." Indeed he stated further that the acquisition of knowledge is a *duty* imposed on every Muslim man and woman. As a matter of fact, the best life, considered from a Muslim perspective, would thus appear to be the one that is devoted to the acquisition of knowledge, which may be regarded as a sacred religious duty imposed on every Muslim man and woman.

Although this injunction was given 1400 years ago, it has been only in the recent past that the world has begun to realize its importance. Of course the world today believes in knowledge and mankind strives to acquire it, but the all-important question is what is it that may *truly* be called, from the Islamic viewpoint, "knowledge", as opposed to pseudo-knowledge. Knowledge must be of truth and reality or of what the Qur'ān calls *Ḥaqq*. It must be acquired for the purpose of utilizing it in the *service of* life so that life is lived by mankind according to the aims and purpose for which it has been created and the mission which it has been assigned to fulfill. Small wonder that one of the prayers of Prophet Muhammad (ṢAAS) was "O Allah may I see things as they are." This prayer necessarily distinguishes the reality of things from mere appearance of them. After all, much of what appears to man may only be the source of illusion unless by clear perception, reasoning and the criterion of revelation.

The knowledge imparted today in our universities and other academic centers of learning is the product of the contributions that various thinkers, scientists, philosophers and artists have made to man's awareness of who he is, what his relationship is with Nature, his own life and the course of human

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history. At one time, at the base of all knowledge lay the religious intuitions and insights of the masters of human wisdom—the great prophets, sages and saints and such other God-inspired men. These were the men who had expounded truth, from a source higher than the ordinary man's perception, experience or understanding of what goes on inside or around him.

With the passage of time religious consciousness ceased to be recognized as a decisive influence in the growth of human knowledge. Indeed, in the post-Protestant period, and more particularly in the last 300 years or so, religion has fallen into disrepute and has even been “explained” by anthropologists as the source of superstition, or conformity to meaningless ritual and of uncritical acceptance of diverse dogmas which have no relationship with either reality or truth. About the middle of the nineteenth century AC, the most important controversy faced by the protagonists of religion and science was the rival claims of religion and science as sources of knowledge. The relative validity of these twin sources of knowledge became a fashionable topic of discourse and the believers in the institution of religion were more or less put on the defensive by the scientists who, as “philosophers” of science, presented a world-view which supposedly answered all the metaphysical questions which were traditionally understood from a religious perspective. Various disciplines such as epistemology, cosmology and ontology, rational psychology and natural theology took the place of religion. The first of these disciplines, answers the question “Is knowledge possible?” The second, “What is the structure and the principle in terms of which to comprehend the nature of cosmos around us.” The third, “What is the nature of reality.” The fourth, “What is the nature of soul or of human consciousness,” and finally the fifth one, “What is the nature of Divinity and its relation to man.” By answering these questions, the philosophers claim to have done all that religion professes to do for man.

These disciplines co-existed in the pagan era of ancient Greece, but after the advent of science they began to claim that they were the exclusive custodians of ultimate truth. Indeed the time came that God, Who had been accepted as maker of man and the universe and to Whom all things owe their existence and their eventual destination, was declared an illusion and religion labeled the “opium of the people”. Atheism went beyond agnosticism. The latter had only said “We do not know if God exists,” but the former said firmly and loudly that *we know that God does not exist*. The Constitution of the USSR makes the preaching of atheism a constitutional duty—in keeping with Marxist thought. Suffice it to say for the present, that scientific knowledge, by the close of nineteenth century AC in Europe, had begun replacing the religious teachings—the inviolable basis of which could be traced back to the revelation establishing the institution of universal religion for mankind.

The textbooks that are prescribed in the universities today bear the indelible

imprint of outstanding irreligious thinkers like Darwin, Freud, and Karl Marx. Such dubious contribution to contemporary thought is also reflected in the textbooks of sciences like Physics and Chemistry. These thinkers have presented a picture of the universe from which God has, so to speak, been ejected, and all the phenomena in nature and history now explained in terms of mechanical causation.

I shall not include, in this context, pre-Darwinian philosophical controversies because that will take me too far afield. For the present, I shall consider only three thinkers in demonstrating some of the false assumptions on which the edifice of modern knowledge has been raised. The knowledge which they have given to us about life and the mind of man and his social behavior is currently being put forward as though it were an invincible oracle which man has to accept in order to understand his place in the scheme of things. The state of natural, biological, psychological and sociological sciences is unduly influenced by the dominating philosophy of these atheistic and materialist thinkers of the recent past and it is a great tragedy that Muslim students are made to tolerantly study their philosophies about these solemn and grave issues, thus prejudicing their response to life and to the universe.

The natural sciences rely on inductive method for observing unanimities in nature, and set them forth in the form of mathematical formulae. The findings of sciences like physics and chemistry do not necessarily have to depend on the ultimate view of the nature of man and the universe. The theory of matter, and motion or the concept of time and space, or the character of chemical change, such as crystallization etc., do not present any sharp conflicts between the scientific view of reality and the one which is presented by religious approaches to the physical and chemical aspects of matter. In my opinion, the Einsteinian view of the behavior of moving particles—or the ultimate constituents of matter—regarded from Islamic perspective, is false. But I cannot in this address deal with that aspect of my argument because falsity of theory of relativity does not seriously interfere with the views about the nature of life and mind which Islam advances for the benefit of the believers. In this sphere—that is life, mind and social behaviour—difficulties do arise from a false generalization which biologists, psychologists and social scientists put forward when they set out to apply the knowledge they claim to have gained, and suggest that it is to be regulative of life and mind, both pertaining to the nature of the individual and his destiny.

The findings of the modern nuclear physics, of course, have been utilized for the making of thermo-nuclear weapons of destruction. Modern chemistry has been used for promoting the techniques of chemical warfare by perfecting devices for releasing poisonous gases or making available to nation-states other lethal means for destroying life. The pursuit of knowledge in itself is not to be discredited on that account; it is only the use or abuse of that

knowledge which is the point of our concern. Modern man uses the divinely bestowed gift upon man, viz., to know the nature of things, not for the purpose of serving life but for destroying it. This is so because scientific knowledge does not necessarily make us more human. The inductive method is not plainly available for application since the causation at work here is not mechanical so much as it is teleological. The fact that we are made to see by the scientists, the nature of life, mind and man's social behavior as though they subsisted in their own right, outside the framework of religious or revelational criteria, we become subject to error. When we come to tackle the problem of understanding nature of life or nature of the human mind or nature of man's behavior as the member of a social group or when we reflect on the meaning and goal of history, we should keep the above fact in mind.

When Darwin published his book on the *Origin of Species* in 1275 A.H. / 1859 A.C., the patterns of thinking began to be re-formed from the principles of evolutionary biology that he taught. The eighteenth century scientific thought was dominated by the machine, but the later nineteenth century thought came to be dominated by the way living organisms were working and evolving, as theorized by Darwin and his followers. As has so often been remarked by historians of Western thought: "Eighteenth century philosophical mind was concerned with systems of *order* but the nineteenth century thought was concerned with the *patterns of growth*".

In what was alleged to be an "age of enlightenment," it was somehow thought that progress would come through power which man had acquired over the forces of nature and that the knowledge that had been gained by the biologists and social scientists about man's behaviour would enable them to radically change the enterprise of life. Later, when Darwin published his famous book on *The Descent of Man* in which he claimed that man has descended from anthropoids, he virtually questioned what was believed, on the basis of Western religious teachings, concerning the genesis of man viz., that he had been created by God in his own image. To the popular mind, that was the most startling implication of Darwinian theory about the emergence of man. He had virtually challenged the contention of the Bible, that man had been created by God. But the *full* impact of the Darwinian theory could only be evaluated in the light of the classical view that had viewed anything that was fixed, final, and permanent as somehow being *superior* to that which changed and passed away. The end of each form was inherent in it from the very beginning and nothing could be derived from it that was not already existing in the archetypal plan or design. For example when an acorn is planted it grows into an oak. The process is repeated again and again but the end-product, the mature tree, is a thing which somehow always existed in potentiality in the acorn. This was the view of Aristotle and of the medieval thinkers. But when Darwin showed that *species* themselves *move*, he completed the destruction of the

old view. The old worship of the fixed and the permanent, gave way to a new investigation of *change*. The old preoccupation with the *destiny* or *final purpose* gave way to an equally intense preoccupation with the mechanisms of change.

The vision of life and of nature that Darwin had presented was one of a universal battlefield where only those who were able to adapt themselves to the changing environmental conditions survived. The inevitable consequence of this view was that, after Darwin, there was a tendency to accept the state of natural warfare as ultimately beneficent, and the only source of progress.

As any one can see, this approach to life is at war with the teaching of religion which calls upon man to pursue a prescribed path of rectitude, so that he may realise his *destiny* or *final purpose* for which he has been created. Far from engaging himself in a sort of cut-throat competition, he is called upon to *co-operate* with his fellow-men and to co-ordinate his activity with others in order to bring relief and redemption to mankind as a whole. Thus, Darwin and his followers, like Herbert Spencer, paved the way for their disciples to believe in ruthless struggle, for the survival value itself lay in successful competition. As early as 1266 A.H. / 1850 A.C., Herbert Spencer had said that the poor were unfit to survive and should be eliminated. In his words. "The whole effort of nature is to get rid of such, to clear the world of them, and make room for (the) better." Even defects in mental or physical constitution could be properly penalized by extinction. Accordingly, he opposed all devices to help prop-up weakness and enable it to survive—including such things as free education, *poor laws* and state-supported public health. To the same effect were the views of John Stuart Mill, who said: "Every restriction of competition is bad and every extension of it is always an ultimate good". The American economists went much further: "Competition," said Andrew Carnegie, "may be hard for the individual but it is best for the race because it ensures the survival of the fittest in every department." "Millionaires," said William Graham Sumner, "are product of natural selection, acting on the whole body of man to pick out those who can meet the requirements of certain work to be done. . . . If we do not like survival of the fittest we have only one other possible alternative, that is, the survival of the unfittest. The former is the law of civilization and the latter of anti-civilization."

Just as Darwin's theory of evolution reduced life to the interplay of chance and variation, concepts of struggle for existence and successful adaption to environment brought out the survival of the fittest. Also toward the close of nineteenth century AC, a school of psychology was founded by psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud who reduced the mind to a strange storehouse of repressed infantile wishes and desires and all mental diseases were regarded as being the result of the frustration of any tendency that continued to struggle for expression. All this repression, said he, influenced thought and action. The most

casual slips of tongue or onset of pain, the forgetting of familiar names, or all sorts of oddities and blunders that interfere with our deliberate purpose, reflect real but unacknowledged motive. In a subsequent work suppression was described not only as a conflict of present forces but as the most recent manifestation of a history of emotional conflict which goes back to an origin in the sexual maladjustments of a little child. Even the perversions of adult life, e.g. sadism or simply continuations of infantile responses which have never been repressed and even the dominating and submissive tendencies, are regarded as aspects of sexuality. Concepts like auto-eroticism, Oedipus complex, libido or narcissism were trotted out in order to explain the mind away in mechanical term.

The method that Freud evolved for treating these neuroses and other forms of psychotic maladjustments was based on the method of encouraging the patient to allow the ideas, uppermost in his mind, to freely express themselves, thus enabling the sub-conscious layer of the patient's mind to exhume his repressed sexuality. He claimed to cure his patients by bringing to the surface what had been shelved into the dark recesses of their unconscious. Undoubtedly man's sub-conscious does contain dark and demonic forces, but they are kept in check by the supreme presence of heavenly power. But if faith in the divine is demolished, as attempted by the Deist philosophers of the eighteenth century AC, any tampering of the unconscious, could only release those dark forces which ultimately take possession of the soul-life of man and make evil appear good. All the violence which goes on in the world today, and even the permissive character of modern society, is traceable to the impact of the science of psychoanalysis.

The chief grounds of objection to this science have been stated by Prof. Murphy in his famous *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*. He says:

The chief grounds of objection have been, the concept of the unconscious, and the quasi-animistic language which speaks of libido, censorship, and ego, the emphasis upon sex specially infantile sexuality, which is distinctive of Freud's approach and the impossibility of experimental or statistical control of complicated factors unearthed by the intricate and arduous process of psychoanalysis. The "unhappy divisions" existing among practioners have contributed to such distrust. But while so much uncertainty and open hostility attach to these doctrines, and indeed in many quarters (to) the whole movement, terms like "rationalization", "compensation", "defence mechanism" and "projection", are rapidly becoming current. Not only such specific concepts, but the habit of thinking in terms of a struggling personality divided against itself, unaware of many of its own motives, and seeking through devious channels satisfac-

tions which it cannot or will not clearly define, has become a prominent feature in that general transition from structural to functional problems which has already engaged our attention.

After the mind of man was thus mutilated, the philosophy of materialism, at the hands of Karl Marx and company, rejected the autonomy of the human spirit, reduced whole spheres of reality to *matter and motion* and that all changes within society were ascribed to the interplay of the force of economic production and distribution of wealth. Marx maintained that the course of history was pre-determined and that power could not be wrested from the hands of the ruling elite within the state except by force and violence. He elaborated his theory that a revolution would overtake the capitalistic society because, based on the theory of *surplus value*, rich classes will become richer and the poor classes will become poorer—compelling the poor to strike at and dismantle the wielders of power, establishing thereafter a dictatorship of the proletariat which will last until a classless society comes into being. As a result of this view of history, practical application of the social sciences began to be founded on the premises of economic forces which were considered to be decisive in determining the course of history. The category of conscious pursuit of “purpose” which ordinarily seems to influence the behavior of man, was rejected as being totally irrelevant. The state was deified and an apotheosis of the gospel of force was dramatized as providing relief and redemption to the down-trodden toiling millions. The war cry was: “Workers of the world to unite: you have nothing to lose but your chains.”

I have reviewed briefly the impact of *Darwinism*, *Freudism* (science of psychoanalysis) and *Marxism* to be able to argue that principal sectors of human knowledge that deal with *life*, *mind* and *history* are being approached today in terms of premises which are mechanical in character and that certain artificial assumptions do not fit in within the framework of values which Islam upholds. Anyone going to the university necessarily has to look at these branches of human learning, that is, the biological, psychological and social sciences in terms of the approach that has been made by these thinkers whose work I have briefly outlined. I have done so to be able to say that their basic standpoints and findings run completely counter to the view of life, mind and history recommended by Islam, the universal religion of mankind.

It is strange, is it not, that the world of Islam which commenced the fifteenth *Hijrah* century of its own history, is not even cognizant of the contradiction in the lives of the Muslim students who are sent out to study modern knowledge? They are involved in a situation where they have to keep their religious convictions in one part of their being and convictions resulting from their studies in the universities in the other. They cannot possibly appear to

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be one integrated personality, but instead a house divided against itself. The challenging task before Muslim thinkers today therefore is to *rewrite standard textbooks* on principal branches of human learning to make them consistent with the basic principles that are discernible in the Qur'an regarding the nature of human life, mind and its social behavior. This is not the place to attempt any exposition of what these principles are and how radically they differ from those that at present are governing the disciplines to which I have made a reference. I concede that the problem is difficult to resolve, but it is equally clear that it should be speedily dealt with by the *'Ummah*. Our students must have unity of outlook which, with respect to Islam must harmonize with the natural constitution of man and his role in human history.

Much of the dissatisfaction expressed against Islam by modern educated Muslims is a result of the kind of textbooks they have read and so-called scientific thoughts, presented to them in the name of modern knowledge. We, therefore, would like to sponsor a world-wide movement for securing recognition of the paramount need and so reorganize the elements of modern knowledge and to purge it of the deleterious elements, which are currently at war with the sanctity of our religious beliefs and practices and tend to give to the believers a sort of schizophrenic personality, so that when they are in a religious mood they do not unconditionally accept principal contributions of modern knowledge and when they are thinking about modern knowledge, their religious beliefs do not undergo a sort of heretical transmutation.

**Islamization of Knowledge:
Problems, Principles and Prospective**

Ismā'īl Rājī al Fārūqī

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Introduction

This paper is the outcome of two papers on the subject by the president of the board of The International Institute of Islamic Thought, Dr. 'AbdulḤamīd 'A. 'AbūSulaymān, and myself.

The presentation that follows is of grave importance, because taking stock in one's situation, learning from the past, and planning to direct change to desired ends, are absolute necessities for survival and prosperity. The Divine judgment ﴿إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَغَيِّرُ مَا بَقِيَهُ حَتَّىٰ يَغْيُرُوا مَا بَأَنفُسِهِمْ﴾ (الرعد: ١١) "Allah will not change the fate of a people until they change what is in themselves" (Qur'ān 13:11) is an absolute law of history.

This paper contends that the *Ummah* suffers from a threateningly dangerous malaise. It attempts to apply a cure designed to restore to the *Ummah* its health, as well as to nudge it forward on its predestined role of responsible world leadership.

﴿وَكَذٰلِكَ جَعَلْنَاكُمْ اُمَّةً وَّسَطًا لِّتَكُوْنُوْا شٰهَدًا عَلٰى النَّاسِ وَيَكُوْنِ الرَّسُوْلُ عَلَیْكُمْ شٰهِيْدًا﴾ (البقرة: ١٤٢).

(God established the *Ummah* as median among the nations, just as He established the Prophet as median among yourselves, to separate good from evil, right from wrong—Qur'ān 2:143).

These considerations are sufficient to require the most serious attention an Islāmic thinker can give to whet his spiritual appetite, to seek the greatest promise, and to participate in its future actualization.

The last half of the fourteenth century witnessed a great surge in Islāmic awareness worldwide, as well as the many significant strides which segments of the *Ummah* have made toward self-liberation. Despite these advances, the same century witnessed a great setback: a universal rush of Muslims toward imitating other civilizations. This rush never reached its goal in any field.

Instead, it succeeded in de-Islāmizing the top layer of Muslim society and demoralizing the rest. The vision of Islām became clouded by another version which came to us with the colonial invaders. The alien vision survived, and indeed, grew more virulently after the invaders' departure. For many generations, the Muslims have seemed unable to get rid of it. It is evident everywhere—in the imported institutions; in the spread of the English and French languages among them; in the design of their offices, homes, and cities; in the recreational programs; in the economic and political practices they follow and in the very ideas of reality, of nature, of man, and of society that they hold. The prime agent disseminating the alien view has been the educational system, bifurcated, as it is, into two subsystems, one “Modern” and the other “Islāmic”. This bifurcation is the epitome of Muslim decline. Unless it is dealt with and removed, it will continue to subvert every Muslim effort to reconstruct the *Ummah*, and carry forth the *ʿamānah* Allah (SWT) has entrusted to it.

In the past, many great Muslims have attempted to reform Islāmic education by adding to its curricula, subjects constitutive of the alien view. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Muḥammad ʿAbduh were champions of this cause. Their strategy came to fruition in the 1380s A.H. / 1960's A.C., when some of the Islāmic universities were turned into ‘modern’ universities. All their efforts, and those of millions like them, rest on the assumption that the so-called ‘modern’ subjects are harmless and can only lend strength to the Muslims. Little did they realize that the alien humanities, social sciences, and indeed the natural sciences, were facets of an integral view of reality, of life and the world, and of a history that is equally alien to that of Islām. Little did they know of the fine, yet necessary relation which binds the methodologies of these disciplines (their notions of truth and knowledge), to the value system of an alien world. That is why their reforms bore no fruit. On one hand, the stagnant quality of Islāmic learning was left untouched. On the other, the added “new” learning never produced any excellence such as it produced in its own homelands. On the contrary, it made Muslims dependent upon alien research and leadership. By its pompous claim of scientific objectivity, it managed to convince them of its truth over and against the affirmation of Islām, which the votaries of progress called conservative and backward.

It is high time for Islāmic scholars to disown such easy and harmful methods of educational reform. For them the reform of education should be the Islāmization of modern knowledge itself, a task identical in character with, though greater in scope, than that undertaken by our ancestors who digested the knowledge of their time and produced the Islāmic legacy of culture and civilization. As disciplines, the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences must be re-conceived and rebuilt, given a new Islāmic base and assigned new purposes consistent with Islām. Every discipline must be recast so as to embody the principles of Islām in its methodology, in its strategy, in

what it regards as its data, its problems, its objectives, and its aspirations. Every discipline must be remolded to incorporate the relevance of Islām along a triple axis constitutive of *tawhīd*. The first is the unity of knowledge, under which all disciplines must seek rational, objective, critical knowledge of truth. This will lay aside once and for all the claim that some science is *'aqlī* (rational) and some *naqlī* (textual and tradition) and hence irrational; that some disciplines are scientific and absolute and others dogmatic and relative. The second is the unity of life, under which all disciplines must be taken into cognizance and oriented to serve the telic nature of creation. This will disarm the claim that some disciplines are value oriented while others are value-free or neutral. The third is the unity of history, under which all disciplines will acknowledge the *'Ummatic* or societal nature of all human activity, and serve the purposes of the *'Ummah* in history. This will put to rest the division of knowledge into individual and social sciences, making all the disciplines, at once, humanistic and *'Ummatic*.

There can be no doubt that Islām is relevant to all aspects of thinking, of living and of being. This relevance must be articulated unmistakably in each discipline. The textbooks used by the discipline must be rewritten, establishing the discipline as an integral part of the Islāmic vision of reality. Moreover, Muslim teachers have to be trained in the use of the new textbooks and Muslim universities, colleges, and schools transformed in order to resume their pioneering leadership in world history. It was the *madrasah* (educational institution), animated by the vision of Islām, that created its *waqf* (endowment) status, giving it a legal corporate personality and autonomy, which made it serve as a model for the universities of Paris, Oxford and Cologne in the twelfth century. It was this same Islāmic vision that made the *madrasah* the forerunner in every field of human inquiry, the molder of human character and personality, and the projector of the *'Ummah's* splendid achievements in culture and civilization. The *madrasah* observed the schedule of Islām whose day began with *Ṣalāh al al Fajr* (the early morning prayer). Its teaching activity was a live-in process where teacher and student constantly lived and worked together with one objective in view, namely, the articulation of the patterns of Allah in creation. Its pedagogy rested on the impeccable character of the *shaykh* (the mentor) whom the student was to emulate, while its commencement was the investiture of the student by the *shaykh* with his *'immah* (the origin of the cap and gown graduation ceremony) as the symbol of total confidence that the student may now speak with his teacher's authority and on his behalf. The standards of education were at the highest because the requirement of carrying the teacher's honor and reputation in the student's hand was the gravest obligation. This excellence was made possible because, at its base, stood the vision of Islām and the will and dedication to pursue the truth for the sake of Allah alone.

Notwithstanding all this, Muslims find themselves at the start of this fifteenth *Hijrah* century, besieged by a deluge of students without plans for a natural growth of the educational system as well as an explosion of knowledge of all fronts without plans for scholars or institutions to cope with it. The Muslim world keeps sending its youth to the West for education and training in ever increasing numbers and suffering their loss through “brain drain.” To add further to the tragedy, the opening of the fifteenth century A.H. shocked the Muslim conscience with its war between Iraq and Iran, the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan; “Israel’s” invasion of Lebanon, annexation of the Golan Heights and systematic colonization of the whole of Palestine; the continuing wars of the Western Sahara, Eastern Africa, South Arabia, and the Philippines; the continuing occupation and colonization of Kashmir and the persecution of the Muslim community of India (the largest minority in history). Still more Islāmic activists around the globe are the object of prosecution, persecution and misrepresentation. The cause of Islām itself seems to be in peril.

All these phenomena cast darkness and gloom over the *’Ummah*. Nothing is more tragically crucial for its thinkers than to focus their minds on the *’Ummah’s* malaise and seek the countering cure. Never in Islāmic history has the cry of *Allah Akbar* (God is the greatest) **الله أكبر** been more needed on the intellectual level as it is today.

May the thinkers of the *’Ummah* rise to the challenge! May Allah (SWT) be their constant Guide! And may they achieve in this domain, what will please Allah (SWT), His Prophet (SAAS), and all believers.

I. The Problem

A. Malaise of the *’Ummah*

The world *’Ummah* of Islām stands presently on the lowest rung of the ladder of nations. In this century, no other people have been subjected to comparable defeat or humiliation. Muslims have been defeated, massacred, robbed of their land and wealth, of their life and hope. They have been double-crossed, colonized and exploited; proselytized and forcefully or by means of bribes converted to other faiths. They have been moreover secularized, Westernized and de-Islāmicized by internal and external agents of their enemies. All this happened in practically every country and corner of the Muslim World. Victims of injustice and aggression on every count, the Muslims have been nonetheless vilified and denigrated in the representations of all nations. They enjoy the worst possible “image” in the world today. In the present day mass

media, for instance, the “Muslim” is stereotyped as aggressive, destructive, lawless, terrorist, uncivilized, fanatic, fundamentalist, archaic, and anachronistic. He is the object of hatred and contempt on the part of most non-Muslims, whether developed or underdeveloped, capitalist or Marxist, Eastern or Western, civilized or savage. The Muslim World itself is known only for its inner strife and division, its turbulence and self-contradictions, its wars and threat to world peace, its excessive wealth and excessive poverty, its famine and cholera epidemics. In the minds of people everywhere the Muslim World is the “sick man” of the world, and the whole world is led to think that at the root of all these evils stands the religion of Islām. The facts that the *Ummah* counts over a billion, that its territories are the vastest and the richest, that its potential in human, material and geopolitical resources is the greatest, and finally that its faith—Islām—is an integral, beneficial, world-affirming and realistic religion, make the defeat, the humiliation and the misrepresentation of Muslims all the more intolerable.

B. Major Effects of the Malaise

1. *On the Political Front:* The *Ummah* is divided against itself. The colonial powers have successfully fragmented the *Ummah* into some fifty or more nation-states and set them against one another. The boundaries of the Muslim states have been so defined as to create perpetual friction for every state with its neighbors. Political machination by the enemy continually exploits those areas of friction and creates cause of alienation and hostility. Internally, every Muslim nation-state is, in turn, divided against itself, its population being heterogeneous, and one group having been assigned hegemony over the other groups by the colonial masters. No nation-state was given the time, the peace or the resources to integrate its own citizenry in order to make them a greater whole. To make things worse, the enemy has imported *aliens* into the Muslim World in order to guarantee perpetual strife between them and the natives or have converted the natives to Christianity, which necessarily implies their estrangement from their Muslim compatriots, or the infusion into non-Muslim Natives, of a notion of their identity, which sets them in conflict with the Muslims. Finally the enemy has created hostile “foreign” states within the body of the *Ummah* to divert Muslim energy away from reconstruction and to drain it in futile wars, or to serve as bases should the colonists decide to reoccupy the land for the colonial powers’ economic, strategic and political interests. No Muslim state is secure internally and none is secure externally. Every Muslim government spends the greater part of its resources and energy on securing its own power within and integrity without—and yet without avail.

Throughout the Muslim World, except in a few regions where the enemy

found rulers ready to cooperate, the colonial administration destroyed all political institutions in the land. When the time came for the colonial administration to withdraw, power was entrusted to the native elites who had already been subjugated and Westernized. Still the real power lay only in the military which was destined to grab it at the first opportunity. In the majority of cases, Muslims are ruled by the military because they are devoid of political formations capable of operating the government, or of mobilizing the masses for resistance, or leading them into constructive political action, or, more simply, of acting in tandem with one another.

2. *On the Economic Front:* The *Ummah* is non-developed and backward. The overwhelming majority of its members everywhere are illiterate. Their production of goods and services is far below the need which is consequently satisfied by the import of finished goods from the former colonial powers. Even in the strategic necessities of life, the staple foods, clothing, energy and hardware, no Muslim state is self-sufficient. Every state would be exposed to famine if the colonial powers wish for any reason to stop their unfair trade with it. Everywhere, colonial interests have been creating consumeristic desires and demands for colonialist products, while the needs of Muslims for productive hardware go unheeded. In their competition with local Muslim productivity, the colonialists seek, and they often succeed, to knock it out of the market. When some industry is developed with colonialist help, it turns out to be one dependent upon colonialist raw materials or finished components, which they alone supply, thus subjecting the industry to function at their mercy and to subserve their colonialist goals. In most cases, the new Muslim industries are not designed to meet the crucial needs but those tangential needs created by colonialist intensive advertisement. Muslim agricultural self-sufficiency is their first enemy, since, at this stage and for a long time to come, this is a necessary prerequisite of Muslim resistance to any colonialist scheme. Everywhere, through a false promise of better living in the cities, the lure of temporary jobs in a speculative building-construction and consumer-goods industry, and the exploitation by landlords and tax collectors, Muslim farmers are uprooted from their villages. They migrate to the cities to live in shanty towns, dependent upon imported staple foods, and are ready to answer to the call of any demagogue.

Although Allah saw fit to grant to some parts of the Muslim *Ummah* natural and mineral wealth, we find that the *Ummah* has not been able to utilize these resources fully to develop its potential capabilities. One of the main reasons for this, is the lack of political stability and sense of unity. This has made it very difficult for the *Ummah* to channel the surplus resources to the parts where it is needed. This sad situation has lead instead to great loss and a diversion of this surplus of the Muslim financial and economic resources to non-Muslim lands.

3. *On the Religio-Cultural Front*: The centuries of Muslim decay have caused illiteracy, ignorance, and superstition to spread among Muslims. These evils have caused the average Muslim to recoil in the bliss of blind faith, to lean toward literalism and legalism or to surrender his spirit to his “*shaykh*”. All this bred into him no small measure of vulnerability. When the modern world impinged itself upon him, his military, political and economic weakness caused him to panic. He therefore sought half-measures of reform which, he thought, would speedily recapture for him his lost ground. Unwittingly, he took to Westernization, lured by the successful example of the West and prompted by his Western or Westernized advisers. In areas under colonial administration, Westernization was ordered and promoted by every possible means at the rulers’ disposal.

Well-meaning or otherwise, Westernizing Muslim leaders did not know that their programs would sooner or later undermine the Islāmic religion and culture of their subjects. The connection between the manifestations of Western productivity and power and the Western views of God and man, of life, of nature, of the world, and of time and history, was too subtle for them to observe or, in their hurry, to mind. A secular system of education was built which taught Western values and methods. Soon generations of graduates who were ignorant of their Islāmic legacy began to make up our society. Their ignorance was combined with suspicion of the legacy’s guardians, namely the ‘*ulamā*’, who were well-meaning despite their conservatism, literalism, legalism or mysticism. A gap began to develop within the ranks of the *Ummah*, dividing it into Westernizing secularizers and their opponents. The colonialist powers saw to it that the former became the decision-makers in society.

By the colonialists directly or by their native stooges, everything Islāmic fell under attack. The integrity of the Qur’ānic text, the genuineness of the Prophet (ṢAAS), the veracity of his *Sunnah*, the perfection of the *Sharī’ah*, the glories of Muslim achievements in culture and civilization – none of these were spread. The purpose was to destroy the Muslim’s confidence in himself, in his *Ummah*, in his faith and his ancestors to undermine his Islāmic consciousness; also to subvert his Islāmic personality, and thus, to make him more subservient, lacking the spiritual stamina necessary for resistance. The colonialists and their stooges filled the Muslim’s daily life with tasks and ideas promoting Western culture. He (the Muslim) was bombarded with newspapers, books and magazines, radio and television, cinema and theater, records and tapes, street posters and neon signs. Muslim governments took pride in the new boulevards they opened in their capitals dotted with Western-style high-rise office or apartment buildings, but they were not shamed by the squalor and degradation of the rest of their towns and villages. Westernized elites frequented public halls to watch or hear a movie, an opera, a concert or a drama, and their sons and daughters read about them in books in the secular or mis-

sionary schools and colleges, without realizing their incongruity with everything else they thought or did. Those who completed their self-Westernization stood out even more oddly against their Muslim environment and background. The integrity of Islāmic culture and the unity of the Islāmic style of life were shattered in their own persons, in their thought and action, and in their homes and families. Western social institutions and customs were introduced with impertinence. Instead of raising themselves from their decay to the heights of virtue and societal efficacy envisaged for them by Islām, Muslim women began to hanker after the manifestations of Western decay: gradual nudity and *tabarruj*, economic independence aimed at individualistic license, egotistic pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of duties imposed by the extended family.

In our cities, Islāmic architecture is dead and Islamic town planning non-existent. Our overgrown urban centers repeat every mistake and shortcoming of the European cities which underwent the industrial revolution two centuries ago as if we are utterly incapable of learning from the experience of others. Our homes, our furniture, and arts of decoration are hodgepodge of all styles, betraying our confused notions of who and what we are.

In short, despite all claims to the contrary, to the extent that he has Westernized himself, the Muslim has, in fact, barbarized himself. His life has become a conglomeration of styles discontinuous with his past. He has made of himself something neither Islāmic nor Western, a cultural monstrosity of modern times.

C. The Self-Perpetuating Core of the Malaise

There can be no doubt that the main locus and core of the *Ummah's* malaise is the prevalent educational system. It is the breeding ground of the disease. It is in schools and colleges that self-estrangement from Islām and from its legacy and style are generated and perpetuated. The educational system is the laboratory where Muslim youth are kneaded and cut, where their consciousness is molded into a caricature of the West. Here, the Muslim's linkage with his past is severed; his natural curiosity to learn the legacy of his fathers is stymied; here, willingness to touch base with them and spring toward creative representation or *Vergegenartigung* (i.e., the making present and alive again) of Islam is blunted with the doubts the system has injected into every recess of his consciousness.

1. *The Present State of Education in the Muslim World*: Despite the tremendous expansion which has taken place so far, the state of Muslim education is at its worst. As far as Islāmization is concerned, the traditional and the secularist schools, colleges and universities have never been more daring in the advocacy of their unIslāmic theses, and never have they had the captive ear of the overwhelming majority of Muslim youth as they do today. Since

its inception under colonialist administrations, the secularist education system has assumed tremendous proportion, elbowing the Islamic system from the field. Islāmīc education, for the most part, remains a private affair devoid of access to public funds. Where public funds are made available, demands of secularization are imposed in the name of modernism and progress. This usually consists of bifurcating the curriculum into contrasting—no, opposing—sections, one Islāmīc and one modern, al-Azhar being the classic example. The Islāmīc part of the curriculum remains unchanged, partly because of conservation and vested interests, and partly because it is in the secularist plan to keep it out of touch with reality and modernity, so that its graduates would present no competition to those of the secular institutions. This was all thought out and well planned by the colonial strategists. National independence gave the secularist system its greatest boost by adopting it as its own, pouring public funds into it, and secularizing it even further in the name of nationalism. The forces of Westernization and secularization and the resultant de-Islāmīzation of teachers and students is worse than under colonialism. A spirit of resistance, of searching for liberation and an Islāmīc solution, then animated nearly everyone. Today, there is cynicism and lethargy, mistrust of all leaders largely due to repeated false promise and disappointments and to the sad example of morally bankrupt leaders. No Muslim government, no university administration, no private organization is doing anything about the sinking morale of college youth or about their continuing de-Islāmīzation through “education”. The colossal building program in the affluent countries and the consequent expansion in students, faculty and facilities, all serve the secularist cause. Hardly any percentage of the funds are devoted to “modernize” in a genuine sense, i.e., to improve the Islāmīc quality of education and the Islāmīc orientation of students and faculty. Every where the race is on at a maddening speed toward the Western educational model.

2. *The Lack of Vision*: Despite all claims to the contrary, the result achieved is not the Western model but a caricature of it. Like the Islamic model, the Western educational model rests ultimately on a vision, though different from that of Islām and is animated by a will to realize that vision. Buildings and offices, libraries and laboratories, classrooms and auditorial teaming with students and faculty are all material paraphernalia of little worth without a vision. It is the nature of the vision that it cannot be copied. Only its incidentals can. This is why in nearly two centuries of Westernized, secularized education, the Muslims have produced nothing—neither a school, college or university, nor a generation of scholars—which matches the West in creativity or excellence. The insoluble problem of low standards in Muslim World institutions is a necessary consequence of this lack of vision. There is no genuine search for knowledge without spirit; the spirit is precisely what cannot be copied. It is generated by a vision of the self, the world and reality, in short,

by religion. Muslim World education lacks this vision. Its leadership does not have the vision of Western man by necessity; it does not have the vision of Islām by choice, i.e., by ignorance, laziness and unconcern. Educational leadership in the Muslim World has been Philistine, without culture and without cause. Nationalism has inspired the Western universities in the last two hundred years because romanticism has replaced the defunct God of Christianity with “*la nation*” as genuine “ultimate reality”. For the Muslim no reality is ultimate but Allah. Ultimate loyalty to the nation-state, is therefore not only impossible to him; it is blasphemous. Whatever the Muslim’s linkage with his legacy and past, it is not possible for him to be a “nationalist” in the same sense as the European who has outgrown his Christianity.

Look at the highest model of Muslim university teacher, the professor with a doctorate from a Western University. He was trained in the West and graduated with a fair or less than fair average. Since he was not Islāmically motivated beforehand—i.e., he has not embarked on his expedition to seek knowledge for the sake of Allah (SWT), but for a materialist, egotistical (at best, nationalistic) goal—he did not obtain all the knowledge available to him in the West. Neither did he surpass his Western teachers at their own game, nor did he, like his ancestors who learned and Islāmized the sciences of ancient Greece, Persia and India, digest what he learned or seek to rehabilitate it within the Islāmīc vision of knowledge and truth. Rather, he was satisfied to pass, to obtain the degree, to return home and achieve a position of affluence and eminence. The books he read as a student are the ultimate reaches of his knowledge, for now, he has neither time, nor energy nor motivation to push the frontiers of knowledge his training had reached. His living and working conditions add to his distraction from such a distant ideal. Naturally, his students must come out even less motivated as well as less competent than him. For them, the Western ideal has receded even farther. Gradually, the standards sink. Western education in the Muslim World becomes a caricature of its Western prototype.

The materials and methodologies presently taught in the Muslim world are copies of the Western ones but devoid of the vision which animated them in the West. Lacking this they are instruments of mediocrity. Unconsciously, these dispirited materials and methodologies continue to exert a sinister de-Islāmizing influence of the student by posing as alternatives to the Islāmīc ones as well as agents of progress and modernization. They make of the graduate of the Muslim World university a typical “sophomore,” thinking that he knows, but knowing very little indeed.

The very possibility of excellence in the Western disciplines is thus removed from the Muslim student. This possibility requires perception of the totality of knowledge in the fields as well as motivation by a driving idea to appropriate and to transcend the totality. The former depends upon the latter since, in

order to acquire knowledge of the totality, one must be driven by a consuming idea which only commitment to a cause generates. Without a cause, the Muslim is not driven to master the totality of knowledge in the discipline, and without that mastery, no transcendence of the discipline's state-of-the-art is possible. For the Muslim, the only cause which can be really a *cause*, is Islām. Lacking it, the Muslim teachers who study in the West never reach the totality of knowledge. As teachers in the universities, they cannot impart either requisite of excellence to their students. They are content in most cases to copy and to translate the less-than totality which they had acquired, dooming their students to a mediocre performance at best.

That teachers in Muslim world universities are not possessed by the vision of Islām and are not driven by its cause, is certainly the greatest calamity of Muslim education. Throughout the Muslim world, students enter the university equipped—as far as the Islāmic vision is concerned—with the little knowledge of Islām they have acquired at home and/or at the elementary or secondary school. Obviously, this constitutes no “vision” and no “cause”. Ideologically therefore, the freshman student enters as a *tabula rasa*. He may come with sentiments but surely not with ideas. These sentiments, if any, are shipwrecked when confronted with the “ideas”, “facts,” and the “objective” judgments of “science” presented to him in the disciplines. Obviously, he has no defense and no vision with which to counter on the ideational level. If he does not graduate a confirmed atheist, secularist, or communist, his view of Islām has receded to the realm of personal, subjective, and sentimental attachment to family and people. Of Islām as a vibrant ideology replete with the best ideas in relevance to **any** problem, he has none. On the ideational level, the student in the Muslim World university confronts the alien ideologies presented to him in textbooks or classrooms with as miserable a defense as a soldier with lance and sword confronts one armed with a tank and machine gun. Nowhere in the Muslim world is the Islāmic vision taught to all students as the Western tradition is taught to high school students in the West, i.e., with consistency, universality, utmost seriousness, and commitment on the part of all. In no Muslim world university is such a vision part of the “basic” or “core” studies program compulsory to all students.

II. The Task

The greatest task confronting the *Ummah* in the fifteenth century *Hijrah* is that of solving the problem of education. There can be no hope of a genuine revival of the *Ummah* unless the educational system is revamped and its faults corrected. Indeed, what is needed is for the system to be formed anew. The present dualism in Muslim education, its bifurcation into an Islāmic

and a secular system must be removed and abolished once and for all. The two systems must be united and integrated. The emergent system must be infused with the spirit of Islām and function as an integral part of its ideological program. It should not be allowed to remain an imitation of the West, nor left to find its own way. It cannot be tolerated to serve merely the economic, pragmatic needs of the students for professional knowledge, personal advancement, or material gain. The educational system must be endowed with a mission, none other than that of imparting the Islāmic vision and of cultivating the will to realize it in space and time. Such a task is indeed difficult to perform and may be costly. However the *'Ummah*, in its totality, spends a far lesser percentage of its “gross national product”, of its annual budget, than most other *Umam* in the world today. Even in those affluent countries where the budget of education is significant, the expenditure is, for the most part, on buildings and administration rather than on research and education activities proper. The *'Ummah* must spend far more on education than it presently does in order to attract the best minds, and to help them maintain the dignity Allah (SWT) has bestowed upon them as “men of knowledge” or “seekers” after it.

A. Uniting the Two Systems of Education

The Islāmic system of education consisting of elementary and secondary *madrasahs* as well as of college level *kulliyahs* or *jāmi'ahs* ought to be united with the secular system of public schools and universities. The union should bring to the new unified system the advantages of both, the financial resources of the state and the commitment to the vision of Islām. Union of the two systems should individual eliminate their disadvantages, that is, the inadequacy of archaic textbooks and inexperience of teachers in the traditional system, and the mimicry of the secular West in its methods and ideals.

The advantages may be gathered by the new system if the respective governments agree to appropriate for it the necessary funds without exercising stifling control. Steps must be taken to make the new educational system financially secure, if not wholly independent, by promoting endowments whose income would fund the system or its parts. Such endowments are precisely the *awqāf* which the Shari'ah recognized and protected for the welfare of the *'Ummah*. It was the *waqf* of each *madrasah* that made it autonomous in the past, and thus enabled its teachers and students to seek knowledge for the sake of Allah (SWT) alone—the necessary condition for any successful search for the truth. It again was the *waqf* institution which gave the *madrasah* the first legal or corporate personality in history. It was the *waqf*-based *madrasah* that constituted the model emulated by the first universities of the West when they were founded eight centuries ago.

Because of the explosion of knowledge as well as of student numbers, education may be too expensive nowadays to be funded by *waqf* endowments alone. A yearly portion of public funds may well be necessary. However, the state should develop the wisdom necessary to negotiate with the educators on the amount of the subsidy and trust them to make the best possible use of it. If state universities in the West could do this, it is certainly presumptuous to claim that Muslims, acting under Qur'ānic injunctions, are incapable of the same. There can be neither good nor future in an *'Ummah* which does not respect its learned sons and daughters; which does not exert itself to transmit to them the cultural and spiritual legacy of the ancestors, and which does not enable its youth to add to and enrich their tradition. It is a sign of tyranny when the state does not trust its educators to do their job without policing the educational establishments. Finally it is a sure sign of decay when educators have to be told by political rulers what to teach and how to run the academic concern.

B. Instilling the Vision of Islām

The union of the two systems is expected to do more than bring means to the Islāmic system and autonomy to the secular. It is expected to bring Islāmic knowledge to the secular and modern knowledge to the Islāmic system. In regard to elementary and secondary education, the crime of entrusting Muslim youths to missionaries or non-Muslim educators must be stopped. Every Muslim youth is entitled to receive full instruction in the religion, ethic, law, history and culture of Islām. The *'Ummah* or any section of it, as well as its leaders, are legally responsible, and in the eye of God criminally indictable if they failed to give that basic instruction in Islām to every Muslim child.

The same is even more true in the case of adult education. The child's spirit is protected by his parents or guardian who will see to it that he commits no act odious to Islām or violates any provision of the *sharī'ah*. The adult, on the other hand, is free. He is the target of anti-Islāmic propaganda in and outside the university. In the college classroom and in the assigned readings, he is constantly presented with alien ideologies in the name of science and modernism. Anti-Islāmic ideas and options for conduct are claimed to constitute scientific truth, to be based on objective fact. In his tender years, the Muslim student was presented with Islām through the voice of parental authority. His mind was not mature enough to understand or appreciate "objective" claims. His attachment to the Islāmic position therefore was born out of sentiment, not of reasoned conviction. Evidently, his commitment to Islām cannot withstand the onslaught of "scientific", "objective" or "modern" truth. This is why, in the absence of any counter presentation of the Islāmic claims, a

presentation made with the same force of objectivity, with the same appeal of modernity, the Muslim college student succumbs to the secular claim and converts to it. So begins the process of de-Islāmization in Muslim universities. After four years of such alienating influence within the university and an equal, if not superior, influence stemming from the mass media, his peers and society, the Islāmīc consciousness of the Muslim is ravaged. No wonder he becomes a cultural Philistine, a cynic who is at home neither in Islām nor in the West, ready to be swayed by anyone who caters to his whim of the moment.

1. *Compulsory Study of Islāmīc Civilization*: The only possible antidote to this de-Islāmization on the university level is the compulsory four-year study of Islāmīc civilization. Every student in the university ought to undertake this course of study regardless of his major. The fact that he is a citizen, a member of the *'Ummah*, imposes upon him the obligation to acquire sufficient knowledge of the *'Ummah's* legacy, an adequate command of the *'Ummah's* spirit and familiarity with its civilization. It is not possible to be civil without such knowledge. Even if the student belongs to a non-Muslim minority, it does not absolve him from fulfilling this basic requirement. Since he and/or his parents have opted to be citizens of the Islāmīc state, he must acquire the necessary familiarity with the civilization to which his home-state belongs, the spirit and hope which move it and his compatriots. No person may be left without acculturation in Islām, without "socialization" or integration into its society. Only such study can immunize him against invading ideologies; for it would enable him to meet argument with argument, objective evidence with objective evidence. Only such study can prepare him for genuine participation in the cultural life and progress of the *'Ummah*; for only through it will he learn the essence of Islāmīc civilization, the *logique* of Islām, and hence the direction into which the *'Ummah* is going, or hoping to go.

The study of civilization is the only way to grow in the person a sense of his identity. No one may be said to be self-conscious who does not know his forefathers; and that is to say, who does not know the spirit which animated them, their achievements in the arts and sciences, in their political and economic life, in their social organization, in their esthetic experience; who is unmoved by their travails and tragedies, their glories and victories; who is uninspired by their hopes. The consciousness of self-identity is not achieved except when such knowledge of one's background is contrasted with knowledge of other peoples and groups, of other civilizations. To know oneself is to know how one is different from others, not in material needs or utilitarian realities, but in the view of the world, in moral judgment, and spiritual hope. This is all the domain of Islām, of the culture and civilization which Islām built and sustained through the generations. It is achievable only through the study of Islām and its civilization, and the comparative study

of other religions and civilizations. Today, to be “modern” is to be civilizationally conscious; i.e., to be conscious of the nature of one’s civilizational heritage, of the essence which produced its various manifestations, of its distinction from other streams of civilizational history, and of its pull and direction for the future. Without such knowledge, one cannot be the subject of his own fate; and certainly one cannot survive in this world. Unlike the past, the civilizational forces contending in this century can reach and overtake anyone without invasion or military occupation of his land. They can subvert his mind, convert him to their world view, neutralize and contain him as a puppet whether he is aware or not. Certainly, these forces are contending with one another to dominate the world. And it is the decision of Muslims today whether Islām will be the victor tomorrow; whether or not Muslims will be the subjects of history or merely its objects. Indeed, the civilizational battle now in progress in the world-scene, will not leave anyone unscathed. Every human is bound to be transformed by one contender or another, unless he himself instantiates the contender civilization and is therefore a transformer of others.

It is unbecoming of Muslims to argue that Islāmic civilization will remain alive as long as it is taught in the departments or institutes of Islāmic study in the universities or colleges of the *sharī'ah*. Indeed, it is indicative of their decadence that Muslims have instituted “departments of Islāmic studies” in their universities. These are always copies of departments of *Orientalistic* studies in Western universities, where the study of Islām is the specialization of the few whom society needs for administering its relations with the Muslim World.

Knowledge of Islām and of its civilization is not meant for the few. The vision of Islām is not meant for, nor needed by the specialist alone; it is for all humans and it is designed to elevate all those who are possessed by it to a higher level of existence. Islām abhors the division of humans into clerics and lay; it insists that all men are to know, teach and observe the truth. The vision of Islām is needed to defend the whole people against the alien ideologies invading the consciousness. Unless everybody is immunized against the disease, the *'Ummah* will become the victim. Moreover, Islām is the comprehensive religion whose vision is relevant to every human activity, to every endeavor, whether physical, social, economic, political, cultural or spiritual. It is not an other-worldly religion like Christianity and Buddhism, content to direct “divinity” affairs and leave the rest to Caesar. Nothing is said or done in any shop or factory, office or home, theater or field or a *fortiori*, in any classroom or laboratory of the university to which Islām is not relevant. The vision of Islām is therefore truncated—and hence dead—if it is cultivated only in one department or faculty. It must be the guiding, determining first principle of every discipline.

What is needed therefore is a four-year course of study to be part of the

“basic” or “core” program for all students, regardless of their majors or professions. It should seek to give the Muslim student knowledge of the first principles of Islām as essence of Islāmic civilization in the first year; of the historical achievements of Islāmic civilization as manifestations in space-time, of the first principles of Islām in the second year; of how Islāmic civilization compares and contrasts with other civilizations in essence and manifestation, in the third year; and of how Islāmic civilization is the only viable option in dealing with the fundamental problems of Muslims and non-Muslims in the contemporary world, in the fourth year.

2. *Islāmization of Modern Knowledge*: It would be a great step forward if Muslim World universities and colleges were to institute compulsory courses in Islāmic Civilization as part of their basic studies program for all students. This would provide the students with faith in their own religion and heritage and give them the confidence in themselves to enable them to face and surmount their present difficulties as well as to forge ahead toward the goal assigned to them by Allah (SWT). But it is not enough.

In order to forge ahead toward this Islāmic goal and thus make the Word of Allah supreme in space and time, knowledge of the world is absolutely indispensable. This knowledge is the goal of the disciplines. Before Muslims went into decay and slumber, they had developed the disciplines, established and clarified the relevance of Islām, of its world view and values, to everyone of them. They integrated them successfully into the main corpus of Islāmic knowledge. They made wonderful contributions in all fields, and they utilize that knowledge efficiently to promote their Islāmic ideals. During their slumber, non-Muslims have taken the legacy of Muslim scientists and men of knowledge, integrated it into their own world view, developed the disciplines, added significant contributions to them and utilized the new knowledge to their advantage. Today, non-Muslims are the undisputed masters of all the disciplines. Today, in Muslim World universities, their books, achievements, world views, problems and ideals are being taught to Muslim youths. Muslim youths are being Westernized on account of this.

This situation must change. There can be no doubt that the Muslim academicians ought to master all the modern disciplines, understand them completely, and achieve an absolute command of *all* that they have to offer. That is the first prerequisite. Then, they ought to integrate the new knowledge into the corpus of the Islāmic legacy by eliminating, amending, re-interpreting and adapting its components as the world view of Islām and its values dictate. Finally, by their example as pioneers, they ought to teach the new generation of Muslims and non-Muslims how to follow in their footsteps, push the frontiers of human knowledge even farther, discover new layers of the patterns of Allah (SWT) in creation, and establish new paths for making His will and commandments realized in history.

The task of Islāmizing knowledge (in concrete terms, to Islāmize the disciplines, or better, to produce university level textbooks recasting some twenty disciplines in accordance with the Islāmic vision) is also the most difficult. No Muslim has yet contemplated it enough to discern its prerequisites, or to articulate its constitutive steps and measures. All that our previous reformers had thought of was to acquire the knowledge and power of the West. They were not even aware of the conflict of Western knowledge with the vision of Islām. It is our present generation that first discovered the conflict as we lived it in our own intellectual lives. But the spiritual torture the conflict has inflicted upon us caused us to wake up in panic, fully aware of the rape of the Islāmic soul taking place before our very eyes in the Muslim World universities. That is why we are alerting the Muslim World to the evil and seeking for the first time in history to elaborate a plan to arrest it, to combat its effects, and to re-launch Islāmic education on its proper track, leading to its predestined goal.

It is most regrettable that the Muslim World is still devoid of a center where thinking on this high level takes place. What is needed is a university which acts as headquarters for Islāmic thought, where the disciplines undergo Islāmization and the process gets tested in the class and seminar rooms of the undergraduate and graduate programs of study. Until the Islāmic University of Islāmabad entered into collaboration with the International Institute of Islāmic Thought, not one educational institution in the Muslim World had moved a finger to Islāmize knowledge, to produce Islāmic textbooks for college use in the disciplines, or the tools of research necessary for the writing of these text books. And yet, everywhere in the Muslim World one hears of the need to Islāmize education, its men and institutions, its curricula and textbooks. On the official level where the power to decide rests, one finds little more than lip-service, either made by the ignorant or designed otherwise to mislead the masses.

This task is the noblest of all tasks, the highest instantiation of the Divine *irādah*, the first categorical imperative of all morality. The world religions, the West and Communism did not begin to grow, to develop and achieve what they did without such a cause animating and driving their adherents. The least argument is that Muslims too, should lend their souls to determination by a cause if they want to stop being the objects of history and become its subjects. And yet, Islām is not another “ism” on a par with these movements; nor does it present its claim as its own, as a dogma—personally experienced and subjectively appropriated—which can only be adopted or dropped arbitrarily. The claim of Islām is a rational, necessary, and a critical claim. It has universal validity, an ought-claim and title to the acknowledge and acquiescence of mankind. As a rational claim it can be met only with counter-argument,

which the Islāmic adherent should welcome and to which he should respond with evidence. No part of the Islāmic claim, or “relevance” of Islām to any discipline, may be accepted without convincing evidence. But when the Islāmic vision has made its claim and established it for the most exacting scholarship; when it has substantiated it for the most fastidious consciousness; then it can be rejected and/or resisted only out of irrationality or malice. The former is the prerogative of the ignorant, the mentally deranged; the latter, that of the committed enemy. Both constitute what Islām calls *jāhiliyyah*.

This is then the great task facing Muslim intellectuals and leaders: to recast the whole legacy of human knowledge from the standpoint of Islām. The vision of Islām would not be a vision unless it is a vision of something, namely, life, reality and the world. That content (reality, etc.) is object of study of the various disciplines. To recast knowledge as Islām relates to it, is to Islāmize it; i.e., to redefine, and re-order the data, to rethink the reasoning and relating of the data, to reevaluate the conclusions, to re-project the goals—and to do so in such a way as to make the disciplines enrich the vision and serve the cause of Islām. To this end, the methodological categories of Islām, namely, the unity of truth, the unity of knowledge, the unity of humanity, the unity of life, and telic character of creation, the subservience of creation to man and of man to God must replace the Western categories and determine the perception of ordering of reality. So too, the values of Islām, namely, the usefulness of knowledge for man’s felicity, the blossoming of man’s faculties, the remolding of creation so as to make concrete the Divine patterns. The building of culture and civilization, of human monuments in knowledge and wisdom, heroism and virtue, piety and saintliness, should replace the Western values and direct the learning activity in every field. To elaborate and articulate more precisely, the foregoing principles reflect the purpose of the rest of this book.

III. The Methodology

A. Shortcoming of Traditional Methodology

In consequence of the terrible devastation which non-Muslims inflicted upon the *Ummah* in the sixth and seventh centuries of the *Hijrah*—the Tatar invasion from the East and the Crusader invasion from the West—Muslim leaders lost their nerves and their confidence in themselves. Thinking their world consigned to doom, they became over-conservative and they sought to preserve their identity and most precious possession, viz., Islām, by proscribing all innovation and advocating a strict adherence to the letter of the *Sharīah*. It was then that they abandoned the major source of creativity in the law—*ijtihād*.

They declared its gates closed. Treating the *Sharī'ah* as perfected in the works of the ancestors, they declared any departure from it an innovation, and every innovation undesirable and condemnable. As elaborated by the schools, the *Sharī'ah* was to become frozen, and as such, to safeguard the survival of Islām. The survival of Islām, and indeed, Muslim victory and expansion in Russia, the Balkans, Central and Southeast Europe in the eighth to twelfth centuries did not undo the conservative measures. The universal adoption of *tarīqahs* or *ways* helped the Muslims to overcome their difficulties in the absence of *ijtihād* as a source of creativity. The *Sharī'ah* therefore remained a closed system until modern times when modern science and technology gave the West the power to confront and defeat the Muslims.

In modern times the West undid the Ottoman conquests in Europe, occupied, colonized and fragmented the whole of the Muslim World except Turkey proper, from where the Western powers were driven by force—Yemen and central and west Arabia—which provided little incentive for colonization. The Western powers exploited Muslim weakness to the utmost possible and contributed in a major fashion to the present malaise of the Muslim World, described in the first pages of this essay. In response to these defeats, tragedies and crises which the West had imposed on the Muslim World in the course of the last two centuries, Muslim leaders in Turkey, Egypt and India have tried to Westernize the *Ummah* in the hope of making it politically, economically and militarily viable. Wherever it was made, the attempt proved itself a failure. Indeed, it continues to be a failure today. The more consistently it was applied, as in Turkey and Egypt, the more striking the failure. In Turkey, it prepared the way for Muṣṭafā Kamāl to abolish all Islāmic institutions and reject every traditional Islāmic principle affecting public life. The whole Islāmic system was to be replaced by the Western system. Today, after two generations (sixty years) of Westernization, Turkey is just as weak and poor in all respects as other Muslim countries. Westernization succeeded somewhat in de-Islāmicizing one class of society, but did nothing else. In Egypt, where Westernization was less consistently pursued, a Western system was implanted and the traditional Islāmic system was permitted to function alongside. The two systems competed with each other; and, despite the tremendous advantages the Western system enjoyed—public funds, government support and favors—both failed to achieve excellence. They succeeded only in weakening each other.

1. *Fiqh and Faqīh(s); Ijtihād and Mujtahid(s)*: Today, the term *fiqh* means possession of knowledge of the *Sharī'ah* according to a given school; and its derivative *faqīh* refers to the person endowed with such knowledge. General *fiqh* and its derivative would apply to possession of knowledge of the *Sharī'ah* in all schools of law. Such knowledge presupposes command of the Arabic language and of the judgmental (*hukmī*) passages of the Qur'ān and *Sunnah*.

Evidently it is a technical meaning, highly restricted when compared with that of the Qur'ānic terms *faqaha* or *tafaqqaha* which are repeated in numerous verses—which point to intellection and understanding, to grasping the essence and explanation, in short, to knowledge of Islām as a whole. The movement of the term from this general connotation to the narrow technical one is itself an index of the *Ummah's* outgrowth of the need for a general meaning capable of containing its creative tendencies and varied activities. This shift in meaning of the term, and the loss of the dynamic aspect the early usage of the term indicated, constitute a sign of conservatism and narrowing of vision. The great jurists of Islām—Shāfi'ī, Abu Ḥanīfah, Mālik and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal—all understood the compound term *'uṣūl al fiqh*—not as the general principles of Islāmic law, but the first principles of Islāmic understanding of life and reality.

Moreover, the early *faqīhs* of the *'Ummah*—namely, the Prophet's companions, their successors, the *tābi'un*, and the great founders of the schools (RAA)—were preeminently knowledgeable in all matters affecting the lives of Muslims. The *faqīhs* of the classical period were real encyclopaedists, masters of practically all the disciplines from literature and law to astronomy and medicine. They were themselves professional men who knew Islām not only as law, but as ideal and theory, as a system of thought and life lived by millions of humans in actual practice. The highest Islāmic qualification ever, namely, *al dhawq al sharī*, or the intuitive knowledge of the purposes of the law, was well within their grasp. If they were the models of creative handling of the Muslims' problems on account of their superb competence, certainly neither the knowledge nor the wisdom of today's *faqīh*—graduate equip him adequately to assume the responsibilities which the early *faqīhs* have carried out so successfully.

Within the traditional system itself, several attempts at self-reform were made, the most daring of which was proposed by Muḥammad 'Abduh, and his teacher, Jamāluddīn al Afghānī. Although awakened Muslims everywhere approved their call to reopen the gates of *ijtihād*, the measure failed for two reasons: First, the traditional qualifications required of the *mujtahids* remained the same and thus restricted the practice of *ijtihād* to the graduates of the traditional *madrakah*, i.e., to those who saw no need for it. For the graduates of the traditional schools were precisely the recipients of an education which convinced them that the methodology was absolutely adequate and that the problem of the Muslim World was merely one of human reluctance to realize the values of Islām. Secondly, the understanding of the *mujtahid* as necessarily the *faqīh*, (i.e., the person whose training has enabled him to translate all problems into legal terms, to make pronouncements upon them under the categories of the law), contained or subsumed the problems of modernity under those categories. This restricted *ijtihād* still further by concentrating all its

effort upon *iftā'*, or the pronouncement of juristic verdicts upon specific actions which Muslims have done or propose to do in their daily lives. Almost by definition, as it were, the traditional *faqīh* or *mujtahid* were incapable of looking at the problem as a whole, lost as he was in determining the exact correspondence of given deeds to norms and rules already specified in one or more schools. The situation called for a new methodology of which the traditional *mujtahids* were incapable of conceiving, for reopening our very understanding of *uṣūl*, or sources of Islāmic knowledge.

2. *The Opposition of Wahy to 'Aql*: Perhaps the most tragic development in the intellectual history of the 'Ummah is the alienation of *Wahy* and '*aql* from each other. It was the advent of Greek logic and its influence upon some Muslims who were all too anxious to utilize the methods it provided to convince non-Muslims of the truths of Islām which set them on the path leading to such alienation. Hellenized Christians and Jews lived for centuries under the dichotomy; and many had brought it into the *Ummah* with them when they converted to Islām. It was al Fārābī who gave it its classical statement, upheld by the philosophers against the *mutakallimūn*. It was accepted by some later *mutakallimūn* who were content to elaborate the faith defensively. And it dominated the field of intellectual discussion in the age of decline, especially under the influence of *taṣawwuf* which advocated a purely intuitive and often esoteric methodology, and hence, found no fault with such estrangement between reason and revelation.

The separation of *wahy* and '*aql* is utterly unacceptable. It is inimical to the whole spirit of Islām and opposed to the central appeal of the Qur'ān to reason, to weigh rationally all matters, to favor the more reasonable, more median course. Unlike those religions which sought to overwhelm man's understanding—to overpower his conscience so that he would surrender to the irrational, or even the absurd—the call of Islām was rational and critical. Invariably, it invited men to use their intelligence; to apply their critical faculties to all claims; to consider the alternatives; always to be cogent, coherent, to say nothing but the truth, of which one is absolutely certain and always to seek correspondence with reality. Such exhortations, injunctions and commands are found on practically every page of the Qur'ān. Without reason, the truths of revelation cannot be appreciated. Neither would they be recognized for what they are—namely, Divine—and acknowledged as such. The claims of revelation would be indistinguishable from other claims including the absurd. When acceptance of revelation is based not on reason, it is subjective, arbitrary and whimsical. No religious thesis based upon personal whims could claim the acquiescence of mankind, or of any significant part of it for a long time. The Muslims' exaggerated emphasis on intuition at the cost of reason opened the gates to corruption of the faith. By not distinguishing it rationally

from the absurd, superstition and old wives' tales can certainly masquerade as truth and penetrate the faith. Just as surely, the overemphasis of "reason" at the cost of intuitive faith corrupts the "life of reason" by reducing it to materialism, utilitarianism, mechanism and meaninglessness.

3. *Separation of Thought from Action*: In the early period of Islāmic history, the leader was the thinker and the thinker was the leader. The vision of Islām was dominant, and the zeal to realize it in history determined all conduct. It was the preoccupation of the whole community of Islām. Every conscious Muslim sought to probe reality for materials and opportunities to undergo re-kneading into the Islāmic patterns. The *faqīh* was at the same time *imām*, *mujtahid*, *qāri*; *muḥaddith*, teacher, *mutakallim*, as well as political leader, army general, farmer or businessman, and professional. If he felt weak in any aspect, everybody around him was eager to step in and make up the deficiency. Everybody gave freely all that he had to the cause, and everybody felt strong with the collective strength of others. Muslims were so closely associated with one another that the weakness of any one of them was quickly overcome by the solidarity and total experience of all. Since Islāmic thought was, by nature, oriented toward reality, this association with concrete living and doing provided the laboratory in which Islāmic thought explored its creative ideas. Equally, it anchored thought in reality and compelled it to keep its gaze focused upon the real commonweal of living men and women. If that period witnessed little speculative or metaphysical thought, the reason is not that they were incapable of it, but that priority for most Muslim thinkers lay in enabling the masses of people to lead healthy, rational, virtuous and prosperous lives.

On the other hand, the actual life of the people, being objects of continuing thought on the part of the leaders, had the benefit of their creative ideas. Adequate thought was applied to the problems of the *Ummah*, and the solutions fitted the requisites of the situation. The *Ummah* prospered in every facet of thought and life; for her welfare was constantly in view of the best minds, and the solutions projected by them were put to practice and implemented because the same minds commanded the executive power, or were closely associated with those who did.

Later, this unity between thought and action was broken. The moment they were separated from one another, each began to deteriorate. Political leadership and the men of power moved from one crisis to another without the benefit of thought, without consulting the learned and obtaining their wisdom. The result was bungling which alienated the wise subjects and isolated the leaders still more. Put on the defensive, the political leaders perpetrated still more and greater mistakes. On the other hand, the thinkers estranged and removed from active engagement in the *Ummah's* affairs, focused upon the ideal as

grounds for their condemnation of political authority. Some began to indulge in affirming the normative over and against the actual. Those whose condemnation carried political consequence were subjected to persecution by the leadership in power. Those thinkers whose condemnation did not, were encouraged to soar still higher away from reality. Other thinkers began to compromise the normative in their association with the political leadership. Increased tension led to polarity and this brought about the ruin of both thought and action. Whereas action became tyrannical, succession to power violent, and empirical reality abandoned, the real commonwealth had to contend itself with commentaries on older works or retreat into the mystical flight of Ṣūfī speculation. Soon, the whole *'Ummah* became impervious to its own political leadership. The long succession of tyrants, corrupt leaders, throne-usurpers and caliphal puppets, manipulated by powerful *sultāns*, demoralized the *'Ummah* and repulsed it from the political scene. The Ṣūfī brotherhoods received the people with open arms. They provided them with spiritual self-discipline and cultivation of mystical experience, and thus compensated them for their loss on the scene of history. In their hands, religion provided an avenue of escape from the tyranny which none could bear.

While the *Sultāns* reigned without challenge, the greatest mental energies of the *'Ummah* were channelled toward the spiritual, personal and subjective values contemplated by *taṣawwuf*. The equivalence and convertibility of the spiritual with the worldly, characteristic of the early period, disappeared. In its place came the pursuit of the spiritual, at the cost of the worldly; of the **other world** at the cost of **this world**. Losing its anchor in the actual experiences of the *'Ummah*, Muslim thought became conservative and literal in law, speculative in Qur'ānic exegesis and world view, world-denying in ethics and politics and esoteric in the sciences of nature. Great thinkers, jurists and saints looked down upon political authority and action as something beneath them—something contemptible. First, resistance to the world, and then complete disregard for it, became the first conditions of virtue. The *'Ummah* seemed to have lost the balance between the personal and the public values sublimely exemplified by the Prophet (ṢAAS) in his life.

4. *Cultural and Religious Dualism: al Ṣirāṭ al Mustaqīm*, or “the straightforward path”, which was the hope of all and the practice of early Muslims, was a single unitary path stemming from the vision of Islām, integrating all of man's tendencies and activities into one integral surge toward Islāmīc self-realization in history. In the period of decay—and because of the estrangement between thought and action—the path split into two: the **way of the world** and the **way of God** or virtue. This bifurcation of the Islāmīc life into two paths in constant opposition to each other—the one praiseworthy and involving all the religious and ethical values and the other condemnable and

involving the material world with all its values—corrupted and destroyed both. Both paths were transformed. The former became an empty spirituality, similar to the vacuous spirituality of Christian and Buddhist monkhood. For a spirituality that does not concern itself with the empirical welfare of the masses, which does not seek to actualize justice in the rough and tumble of the market place of the world, must be subjective and bent upon the religious interest of the adherent alone. Such a spirituality is egotistic even when it calls for altruistic acts, its prime concern is the state of consciousness of the practitioner. The others and their welfare are for it, tools and instruments of self-trial, self-purification and self-ennoblement. No wonder that this spirituality fell to the lure of gnosis and the mystical experience and became the prey of superstition and miracle-mongering. It never occurred to the *shaykh(s)* who founded the *Ṣūfī tariqah* and the great minds that provided them with the ideological foundations, that their brotherhoods would become such an aberration and develop an ethic and a hope which would run counter to Islām. But the fact is that most brotherhoods did succumb to this temptation.

The path of the world, on the other hand, developed its own immoral system, absolved as it were from the moral requirements, which the representatives of the religion of Islām had declared the specialized pursuit of another class of Muslims. Without moral values as internal to and constitutive of it, the system was bound to deteriorate and become the prize for anyone who could contend for it successfully. Government and political leadership thus became an instrument for either self-glorification and the brute exercise of power, or for extortion of moral and material benefits from the people. When, in the modern period, the foreign colonial enemy attacked, invaded and occupied the land, the masses put up little resistance. The battle, they had already become convinced, was not theirs. Finally, when the colonial administrations set up another educational system and began to favor a style of life, thought and activity, alien to that of the masses, they regarded it as something *déjà vu*, condemnable and contemptible but not worthy of total uprising of the *‘Ummah* in a holy war (*jihād*) against it.

B. First Principles of Islāmic Methodology

As prerequisite for the removal of dualism from the educational system, which is in turn a prerequisite for the removal of dualism from life and for the solution of the malaise of the *‘Ummah*, knowledge ought to be Islāmized. While avoiding the pitfalls and shortcomings of traditional methodology, Islāmization of knowledge ought to observe a number of principles which constitute the essence of Islām. To recase the disciplines under the framework of Islām means subjection of their theory and method, their principles and goals to the following:

1. *The Unity of Allah (SWT)*: The unity of Allah (SWT) is the first principle of Islām and of everything Islāmic. It is the principle that Allah is indeed Allah; that no other being is Allah; and that He is absolutely **One**, absolutely transcendent, metaphysically and axiologically ultimate; that everything else is separate and different from Him and is His creation. He is the Creator by Whose command everything that is, has come to be, and every event that happens, has come to happen. He is the source of all goodness and beauty. His will is the law of nature, as well as the law of morality. His worship and praise is due from all creatures, above all from humans, whom Allah has created in the best of forms and endowed with faculties with which to recognize Him and acknowledge His works, as well as the capacity to transform creation so as to fulfill therein His ethical and esthetic patterns.

To think and live in consciousness of divine unity is to do so in a world enchanted and alive, since everything in it is there by Allah's act, is sustained by His providence, nothing is futile or devoid of meaning. Everything in Allah's creation is according to a precise measure which Allah has ordained for it. To be part of such a world is to recognize one's infinite complex of relations with all creatures; above all to acknowledge one's creatureliness, one's indebtedness to Allah, and to give Him His due of love and obedience. To be a Muslim is to have Allah constantly present in one's consciousness. And since He is the Creator and the Judge, to be Muslim means to do all and everything as He has directed and for His sake. All good and all happiness, as all life and all energy, are His gifts. In the Islāmic life, while in Islāmic thought, these are acknowledged and used as such, while in Islāmic thought, He is the First and ultimate cause and end of everything. As such, His being and activity are the first constitutive and regulative principles of all knowledge. Whether the object of knowledge is the microcosm of the atom or the macrocosm of the stars, the depth of the self, the conduct of society or the march of history, Islāmic knowledge regards the object of knowledge as materially caused by the antecedent constituents of the situation from whence that object proceeded. The actual discharge of causality however, which brought about the object out of an infinity of other possible objects to which those same constituents might have led is seen as the initiative of the Divine Being, issuing from a Divine command. Likewise, Islāmic knowledge regards every object of knowledge as fulfilling an end willed by Allah, or serving another end which is so willed, so that the causal hierarchy of the universe is at once a hierarchy of ends, at the top of which stands the Divine Will, *willing* the end of every individual being, of every series of ends, and of the hierarchy as a whole. Islāmic knowledge recognizes that there is neither being, nor truth, nor value outside the chains and complexes of same in which Allah (SWT) is cause and end, both immediate and ultimate; that whatever is conceived of, known or evaluated outside the divinely ordained nexus is non-existent,

false or value-free, or merely misrepresented as standing outside that nexus.

2. *The Unity of Creation:* From the unity of Allah (SWT), the unity of His creation follows with logical necessity. As He has said in the Holy Qur'ān, "If they were in heaven and earth other gods than Allah, both heaven and earth would have fallen into chaos" (21:22). If there were more than one ultimate reality, ultimate reality would not be ultimate. Moreover, the universe would then have to follow different orders; and if it did, it would not be the ordered universe we know. Nor would it be possible for us humans to know a universe in which more than one order obtains.

a. **Cosmic order:** it must be remembered, is that under which we discern objects as substances, qualities, relations and events. It is the consistency or unity of cosmic order that enables us to recognize the permanence of substances as things, and the repetition of events as causal relations. Without cosmic order, neither things nor causes and consequences would be the same.

Creation is an integral whole precisely because it is the work of the Creator Whose order and design has infused every part of it. Cosmic order consists of the laws of nature. These operate throughout the universe and permeate every part or aspect of it. The material, the spatial, the biological, the psychic, the social and the esthetic—all reality obeys and fulfills these laws. All laws are the *sunan* (patterns) of Allah (SWT) in His creation. Allah (SWT) is not merely the source of these laws, or, having once designed nature according to them and established their working in nature, operates and/or controls them no more. He is not retired but eternally living and active. Therefore, every being in the cosmos, and every event that takes place, are so by His command. At any stage of its existence, every being has built within it the dynamic power to change. This dynamic power comes from Allah and is sustained by Him. Furthermore, this power is not necessarily bound to produce the result with which it is associated. It is by Allah's command that a particular effect is caused by the causes usually associated with it. Allah (SWT) may operate a cause to bring about its effect immediately; but He may and does operate a cause by means of other causes, so that what seems to us to be an inexorable chain of causes is just as much a Divine cause as a single cause. For our part, as humans, we trust Allah (SWT), or His cosmic order: that given a cause, its effect will follow. As al Ghazālī and Hume had found out despite their ideological differences, there is no necessity to any causal connection. Indeed, what we call causality is mere "following upon" and repetition, leading us to believe that a cause is usually followed by its effect. Such faith has nothing to stand upon except the benevolence of the Divine Being. For Allah (SWT) seeks not to cheat or misguide. He is a benevolent Creator Who ordered things in the universe to make it livable and comprehensible to us; to make it possible for us to exercise our moral options and prove our ethical worth in the deed.

b. **Creation: A Kingdom of Ends.**—Allah (SWT) created everything and did so with precise measure (25:2). This measure assigns to everything its nature, its relations to other beings, and the course of its existence. Equally, the Divine measure subjects everything not only to the system of causes described above, but also to a system of ends. Everything has a purpose, a *raison d'être*, which is being served. This purpose is never final but always subject to other purposes constituting a final nexus which ends only in Him. For only He is the ultimate End, the final Purpose, unto Whom everything returns. His Will makes every good, *good*.

Everything that is, therefore, is at once related in a cause-effect relationship to everything else, as well as in a finalistic, or means-to-end relationship. For both the metaphysical and the axiological relationships terminate with Allah. The network of each is infinite. Certainly, both are open for human inspection, for human knowledge and appreciation. Being infinite, however, humans can know only a portion of the relationship, led, as it were, by a pocket spotlight in a dark jungle. But it is their prerogative and duty to press ever forward in its exploration and discovery. To discover and establish those relationships is to establish for knowledge and appreciation, the immutable patterns of Allah (SWT).

That all things in creation serve a purpose and that all purposes are inter-related as means and ends to one another makes the world one telic system, vibrant and alive, full of meaning. The birds in the sky, the stars in the firmament, the fishes in the depth of oceans, the plants and the elements—all constitute integral parts of the system. No part of it is inert or evil, since every being has a function and a role in the life of the whole. Together, they make an organic body whose members and organs are interrelated in ways which humans are only now coming to discover for science, but only in very limited parts of nature. Muslims know all too well that creation is organic, that every part of it serves some end or another, even if that end is not known to them. This knowledge is a consequence of their faith. Confronted with the wolf devouring the lamb, the bird eating the butterfly or the human body feeding the worms in the earth, they assume all being to be good, fulfilling in a natural way, a divine purpose and serving a system of purposes which culminates in the Divine Will. The Muslim is not free to ascribe anything to accident or to blind fate. Earthquakes and pestilences, drought and tragedy, are regarded by Muslims as being ordained by Allah. However tragic or painful, the Muslim accepts these events as His effects, willed by Him for a good cause which may not be discerned presently. The Muslim is never overwhelmed by them because he knows Allah, the Author of them, to be at once his beneficent Protector. He therefore assumes them to be tests, ordained by Allah to try him, calling for the greatest firmness, faith and optimism in the final out-

come. This aspect of the faith of Islām is precisely what humans need when faced with tragedy.

Allah's ordaining of this world as one in which causes are followed by their effects, where causes converge on everything from an infinite scope, and where effects diverge from every event in infinite scope, and where the same infinite interrelationships exist and bind everything together in a system of ends, is itself meant to provide a theater for man's life and ethical endeavor. The theater is not its own end; nor is it the property and exclusive domain of man. Since man is created for a life of service to His Creator, the world is His grant to him. Man's duty is therefore to work out the divine patterns in it, but to safeguard it from deterioration and indeed to improve it.

c. *Taskhīr* (Subservience) of Creation to Man.—Allah (SWT) has granted the world as a temporary gift and theater to man. He has made everything in it subservient to him; i.e., capable of being used by man for his nourishment, enjoyment and comfort. Such use may be immediate, as in the case of nourishment and enjoyment, or mediate as when the forces of nature are utilized to produce the goods men need. Between the objects of creation and human usufruct there is a built-in concordance. Creation has the needs of humanity built into it, its objects being meant to serve those needs. The whole range of nature is capable of receiving man's efficacy, of suffering change at his initiative, of transformation into any pattern man desires. Mankind can dry up the seas or harness the sun, move the mountains and cultivate the deserts, or lay the whole world waste. Mankind can fill the world with beauty and enable everything to prosper, or fill it with ugliness and destroy everything. The subservience of creation to man knows no limits. Allah (SWT) has willed it so. The causal and finalistic interconnections of the objects of creation are the substance of this subservience which would be futile and meaningless without them. Man would quickly lose interest in creation and give up any attempt to transform it into the ought-patterns revealed by Allah, if he could not depend on causes to bring about their effects, or if the means were not to be good for the ends. It was a Muslim thinker who first expressed the Kantian notion, "You should, therefore you can," as the first principle of the metaphysics of ethics; and he did so under the inspiration of the Qur'ānic principle, "Allah does not make imperative except that which is possible" (2:286). Without this necessary implication, the universe would be either an inert, immovable and unchangeable world, or a world for fools.

3. *The Unity of Truth and the Unity of Knowledge*: Reason may certainly have its illusions and aberrations as well as its uncertainties. Its capacity for self-criticism gives it a fair degree of protection; but wherever ultimate truth and reality are concerned, its human predicament leaves it in need of corroboration by the infallible source of revelation. Once the questions of first

or ultimate principles are settled, then reason acquires new vigor with which it can overcome the problems confronting it. Its basic presuppositions must all be apodeictically certain. Some are so by self-evidence; others are the common experience of humanity at large. There are others, however, which are capable of an ought-necessity only; i.e., they are capable of being perceived as true only by those who have the requisite degree of wisdom, or maturity of religious or ethical vision, and who are on that account expected to see the reality as it is. Hence, recognition of such truths and values may not be mathematically universal, but it enjoys a different kind of necessity, an ought-to-be necessity or *Sollensnotwendigkeit*. Where reason does not enjoy apodeictic certainty, the light of faith can provide this certainty and in fact cast illuminating light on all other presuppositions, and support with additional certainty the whole worldview built upon them. This light of faith is definitely epistemological, and comes as the consequence of reasonableness, not its opposite. Between it and the apodeictically certain presuppositions of reason, there is affinity, harmony, correspondence and complementarity. At least in Islām, unlike the other religions which are dogmatic through and through, faith is never irrational in its role and contribution. It does not stand above reason, just as reason does not stand above faith. The perception of reason and faith as diametrical opposites, and of man having to choose between them is not Islāmic, but rather the antithesis of the Islāmic position.

As concerns the theory of knowledge, the position of Islām may be best described as the unity of truth. This unity devolves from Allah's absolute unity, and is convertible with it. *Al Haqq* ("the truth") is the name of God. If God is indeed God, as Islām affirms, then the truth cannot be many. God knows the truth and, in His revelation, He tells it as it is. What He conveys in the revelation cannot be different from reality, since He is the Creator of all reality as well as of all truth. The truth which is the object of reason is embodied in the laws of nature. These are the patterns of God in creation, His *sunan*, which are constant and unchangeable, and hence are possible to discover, to establish and to use for the benefit of humanity. Besides proclaiming God's existence and creation, revelation instructs about the world, giving the very same laws of nature or Divine patterns in accordance with which the universe runs. Obviously, there can be no truer disclosure or rendering of these laws or patterns than by their Maker and Author. Theoretically, therefore, there can be no discrepancy. This logical equivalence of reason, truth, and reality with the facts of revelation is the most critical principle epistemology has every known. This equivalence is based on three principles underlying all Islāmic knowledge.

First, the unity of truth prescribes that no claim on behalf of revelation may be made which goes counter to reality. The propositions which revelation is supposed to teach must be true; i.e., they must correspond to reality

and agree with it. It is inconceivable that God may be ignorant, or that He may seek to cheat or misguide His creatures. His statements, therefore, given expressly to guide and instruct, cannot oppose reality. Wherever such variation from reality occurs, the Muslim is rightly cautioned by the doctrine of the unity of truth to reconsider his understanding of revelation. The doctrine guards him against over-hasty interpretation, exaggerated allegorical interpretation and exegesis, or the reading into the material of any esoteric meaning (*bāṭin*) which is arbitrarily assumed on someone's personal authority. The meanings of the Islāmic revelation are eternally anchored in two solid rocks: Arabic lexicography and syntax which remain unchanged since the revelation of the Qur'ān, and reality. This is why the Qur'ānic revelation has known no hermeneutical problems as such. All exegetical issues have revolved around questions of lexicography and syntax.

Second, the unity of truth prescribes that no contradiction, difference or variation between reason and revelation is ultimate. It categorically denies that there is no over-arching principle, fact or understanding which can solve the contradiction. In one's investigation of nature and attempt to discover the patterns of laws of the Creator in the universe, it is certainly possible to make mistakes, to fall under illusion and to think one has grasped the truth while being in error. Such would create discrepancy between revelation and reason. The unity of truth rejects such discrepancy as illusory and demands the enquirer to reconsider, and re-investigate the data. The cause of the discrepancy may well be in the findings of science or reason, in which case it would be salutary to send the investigator back to the data for re-examination. And it may well be in his understanding of revelation, in which case it would be equally salutary to send him back to the data for review.

Third, the unity of truth, or the laws of nature with the patterns of the Creator, prescribes that no inquiry into the nature of creation or any part of it may be closed and concluded. The patterns of God in creation are infinite. No matter how much or how deeply we may come to know of them, there will always be more of them to discover. Hence, openness to new evidence and persistence of the quest are necessary characteristics of the Islāmic mind which accepts the unity of truth. A critical attitude to all human claims, and an active search for the laws of nature which is never ultimately conclusive, are at once necessary conditions of Islāmic and of genuine science. Under this view, the strongest conclusion is always tentative, valid only until new evidence has questioned, refuted or verified it. The highest wisdom, the most certain pronouncement, must always be followed with the affirmation, *والله أعلم*, (Allah knows better!).

4. *The Unity of Life*: In a passage of the Qur'ān, Allah (SWT) said: "And when (after creating heaven and earth) Allah (SWT) told the angels that He was about to create a vicegerent and to assign him to the earth, the angels

pleaded; 'Would you place on earth persons who will do evil and shed blood while we praise and adore you constantly?' Allah (SWT) replied: 'I have an ulterior purpose which you do not know.' Having created 'Ādam, Allah (SWT) taught him the names of all things, showed him to the angels and asked them to name the things of nature. They could not and answered, 'Praise be to You. We know only what You have taught us. Yours is the knowledge and the wisdom.' Allah (SWT) asked 'Ādam to tell the names, which he did . . . Then Allah (SWT) asked the angels to prostrate themselves to 'Ādam." (2:30-34). In other passages concerning the creation of man. Allah (SWT) said: "We offered Our trust heaven and earth and mountains. But they withdrew and refused to accept it. Man, however, agreed to carry it (33:72). I have not created men and jinn but to serve me . . . (51:56). Allah (SWT) created heaven and earth . . . that you (humankind) may prove yourselves ethically worthy by your deeds (11:7). Praised be He . . . Who created life and death that you may prove yourselves ethically worthy by your deeds (67:1-2).

a. **The Divine *Amānah***—The foregoing passages of the Qur'ān answer for all time the question of whether or not man's being has reason which explains it. Islām affirms with all possible emphasis that man has a *raison d'être* which is the service of Allah (SWT). The Divine Will is of two kinds, a kind that is realized necessarily, and the Divine patterns on the basis of which creation runs. These patterns are the laws of nature. They are immutable and their fulfillment is cosmic. In addition to revelation, they may be known by reason. Allah (SWT) enjoined upon man to seek them, to understand them, to establish them for knowledge, and to utilize them to his advantage. The second kind is realized only in freedom, only when they are fulfilled in a condition where both fulfillment and violation or non-fulfillment are distinct possibilities. These are the moral laws. They co-exist with the laws of nature; i.e., they are always realized in a context of things, persons and relations in the empirical world, but they belong to a different order from the empirical. They are *a priori*. Whether or not they enter the real situation and become fulfilled therein depends upon that situation's fulfillment or otherwise of their own peculiar requirements. They demand the free exercise of a personal will. Devoid of such will, "heaven and earth and mountains" were incapable of carrying the Divine *amānah* (trust). Only man carried it; for he alone is capable of such moral freedom. His capacity puts him above the angels, because they do not enjoy the freedom to obey and disobey. That is why Allah (SWT) commanded them to prostrate themselves before man. For their lack of moral freedom, they are inferior to man. They are perfect and can only obey Allah's orders. They praise and serve him constantly, and never disobey. Thus the obedience of man is worthier than the obedience of the angels, precisely because it is done by a person who is well capable of doing otherwise. For such a person, to turn away from the way of evil, the way of the lesser good, the way of

the material or utilitarian or selfish good, and opt freely to do that which the moral law demands, is to realize a higher value. The moral life is a higher, superior, nobler and greater kind of life. The higher part of the Divine Will does not enter history and become real unless human beings chose to realize it in freedom. Man is therefore a cosmic bridge between the higher echelons of the Divine Will and historical reality. Evidently, his being is of tremendous significance.

b. *The Khilāfah*—Man's carrying of the Divine *Amānah* constitutes his *khilāfah* or vicegerency to Allah (SWT). His *khilāfah* consists in the fulfillment of the moral laws. But these have aspects which are not merely religious or other-worldly, but which are quite this-worldly in their character and effect. The rest of the corpus of religious or moral laws consists of actual practices of living, of being and doing. What they add to the actual practices is a quality, a perspective, a way of discharging those self-same practices. It is commonplace for men to desire; to grow and to enjoy; to acquire and possess, to love, to marry and procreate, to seize and exercise power, etc. Islām wishes these activities to continue. It does not, like Christianity or Buddhism, condemn and wish them to stop. All it seeks is to have humankind enter into these actions with different motivation, and to perform them in a different way. The different motivation is for them to be willed for the sake of God; and the different way is to do them justly and righteously, to have them bring about their utilitarian or moral objective without entailing any undesirable, unjust or immoral consequence.

The aforementioned unity follows from the fact that Islām does not separate the sacred or religious from the secular. In its view, there is one reality only, not two, as in the case of religions which bifurcate life into a sacred sector and a secular sector. Nothing is, as such, sacred except Allah. Islām regards everything as creaturely, not sacred, and it assumes it to be good since it is God's. It is the manner of doing what we do that fulfills or does not fulfill the religious or moral requirement. When it does, it is good; when it does not, it is evil. Human deeds alone, therefore, could be good or evil, virtuous or vicious, depending on whether they bring about justice, righteousness, beauty, happiness or otherwise. To be religious, therefore, does not mean to withdraw from the usual processes of life, nor to perform deeds which are utterly devoid of utilitarian value. The whole matter of religion is fundamentally the very practice of living. On this account, Islām remains imbedded in the very processes of life and history. There is neither piety nor virtue, and certainly no Islām, outside of these processes. Christianity and Buddhism may regard religion as requiring other imperatives such as the processes of life and history, self-mortification asceticism, monkery, and etc. They do so because in their view the processes of life and history stand condemned as evil and doomed. For Christianity believes creation is "fallen" and "evil" and

“hopeless” and prescribes faith and the *imitatio christi* as salvation. Likewise, Buddhism believes creation is evil, (*tanha*), full of nothing but pain and suffering; it prescribes self-and-life denial as salvation from the processes of life and history.

Islām denies such *a priori* axioms condemning life and history. In its view, creation, is as such good, brought about by Allah (SWT) for a good purpose, namely, that it may be affirmed with devotion to Him and justice to mankind. Involvement in its processes is at the root of Islām’s view of man. Allah (SWT) has appointed him to achieve two objectives. First, humans should transform creation into the Divine patterns, i.e., re-arrange its materials so as to make them fully and beneficially subserve human needs: the material (food, shelter, comfort, procreation) as well as the moral, the intellectual and the esthetic. Second, in the very act of transforming creation, humans ought to instantiate the ethical values by choosing to enter into those acts of transformation in an ethical way, that is, in a way that fulfills the requirements of devotion to Allah (SWT) and justice to mankind.

The content of the Divine *amānah*, and therefore of *khilāfah*, is the development and establishment of culture and civilization. To institute peace and assurance of life and property; to organize humans into an ordered society capable of producing food; of processing, storing and distributing it to all in adequate quantities and quality; to provide shelter, warmth and comfort, communication and ease; to build and make available the tools necessary to realize these goals and; and finally to furnish opportunities for education and self-realization, for recreation and esthetic enjoyment—this is the core content of *khilāfah*. It is equivalent to the making of culture and civilization, and to the affirmation and promotion of life. Allah (SWT) commands all this to be done and declares it to be the very reason for His creation of the world. The Divine ulterior motive in all of this is to provide humans the opportunity to prove themselves ethically worthy in doing it. Allah knows best. They can do so by entering into their routines of action for His sake and maintaining the balance of justice throughout their actions. Rightly, Muslims understand *khilāfah* as predominantly political. The Qur’ān repeatedly associated *khilāfah* with establishment of political power (7:128; 10:14, 73). Political action, i.e., participation in the political process as in election of *bay’ah* of the ruler, giving continual counsel and advice to the chief of state and his ministers, monitoring their actions, criticizing and even impeaching them—all these are not only desirable, but prime religious and ethical duties. Failure to perform such duties is, as the Prophet (ṢAAS) said, to lapse into *jāhiliyyah*. On the other hand, to be part of the politico-economic body of Islām is integral to the faith itself. Abū Bakr and the *ṣaḥābah* (RAA) fought those who wanted to secede from the state while maintaining the faith; they were regarded as apostates who have rejected the whole of Islām. Unlike Christianity, which

regards the political process as the depth of evil, and counsels against involvement in it, Islām regards it of the essence and prohibits withdrawal. The same is true *a fortiori* of culture- and civilization-building. Islām regards them as the very business of religion. All the more contrasting with the norms of Islām, therefore, is the disengagement of the Muslim masses from the political process in the period of decay.

The same is true of the requirement of peace and security, perhaps the most precious and the most sought-after prize in the Muslim World today. Every Muslim must feel secure in his life, property, personal honor, and place in society. To fulfill this requirement is a first Islāmic societal imperative. To this end, Islām requires that every Muslim be politicized, i.e., awakened, organized, and mobilized to seek fulfillment of the objective in his own person as well as in the persons of his family members, neighbors, and all fellow-Muslims.

c. **Comprehensiveness**—The will of Islām to culture and civilization is comprehensive, as it must be if it is meant seriously. This comprehensiveness is at the foundation of the comprehensiveness of the *sharī'ah*. Every aspect of human life is affected and this affection is the relevance of Islām to it. This relevance may be clear or unclear—hard as in the *sharī'ah's* injunctions and prohibitions, its *wājibāt* and *muharramāt*; or soft as in its categorizations of *mandūb*, *makrūh* and *mubāh*. But nothing escapes Islām's relevance. True, the area of the *mubāh* (permissible) is wide. But its width is not a sign of Islām's irrelevance, but of its fall outside the realm of strict enforcement, whether coercively, as in the case of the *wājib* and *ḥarām*, or by moral authority as in the case of the *mandūb* and *makrūh*. Behind that realm stands the realm of culture and life-style which is just as important for Islām as that of strict enforcement. In fact, strict enforcement depends upon proper acculturation which is its presupposition, and without which it is unthinkable. Nothing is enforceable to which the masses have not been acculturated already, of which they are not already convinced.

It is therefore the duty of the Muslim thinker to Islāmize, i.e., to define and apply the relevance of Islām to every single item in human living. The Qur'ān has already done so in a number of areas of human activity, normally assigned the status of "soft enforcement" or neutrality; e.g., greeting, soft voice, door-knocking before entry, quick exit after food, gentleness to parents and elders, etc.. The Prophet (ṢAAS) did his best to complete the application by his teaching and example in the areas of how to eat and drink, to keep clean, to recreate oneself, to treat one's neighbor, etc.. The style of life, which Islām had instituted in the early period in elaboration or extension of these Qur'ānic and *Sunnatic* directives, needs today to be redefined, recrystallized, complemented so as to extend to those activities which were not known or common then, or to apply more firmly to those areas which modernity had

raised from the status of luxury or marginality to that of necessity. The areas of social intercourse, of travel and transportation, of recreation, of the audio and visual arts, of mass communications, for example, are especially needy of such extension of coverage by the relevance of Islām.

5. *The Unity of Humanity*: Being the unity of the Creator, the Divine unity must stand in absolutely the same Creator-created relation to all humans. The converse of this relation is that all humans must stand inversely in a created-creator relation to the Creator. Humans cannot be ontically plural without this plurality implying an equal plurality in the Creator. Certainly, humans can and do have different characteristics such as race, color, physical build, personality, language style and culture. None can have ontological value; i.e., constitute the person it qualifies as a different being. None of them can affect the person's creature-status before Allah (SWT). Their value remains accidental to the person being Allah's creature. By affecting or sometimes determining the personality and/or conduct of the individual these characteristics may very often bring about his moral felicity or ruin. But their determination of the ethical outcome is never necessary, never final or ultimate. The inner core which is constitutive of the person's being must therefore remain somewhat free of them, capable of following their determinative power, as well as of doing otherwise, i.e., of channeling their causal efficacy to other ends.

The foregoing argument is the reason underlying the Divine statement of the Qur'ān: "O People, We have created you (all) of a single pair, a male and female (namely Adam and Hawwā' (Eve)); and We have constituted you into tribes and nations that you may know one another. Nobler among you in the estimate of Allah (SWT) is the more virtuous" (49:13). Belonging to one gender or another, to "tribes and nations" or one ethnicity or another, is perhaps the most obvious characterization of, and first differentiation among, humans. Second, comes language, physiognomy, intelligence, dexterity, body strength, which are less fixed at birth and more apt to undergo change. Third, there are the readily changeable characteristics of personality which constitute the virtues and vices: from wisdom and knowledge, piety and patience, to ignorance and foolishness, faithlessness and rebellion. All these constitute human personality or life style, at least in its foundation and base. The rest of personality and life style is what is built up as a habit or judgement, tendency or temperament, reputation, history or tradition of that personality through the accumulation of its own deeds. All of them are constitutive and determinative of the human person. But they differ widely from pre-determination before birth and hence immutability, to acquisition in various stages of life and hence growth and development, or change and abolition.

Humans are most apt to mistake the values of these characteristics, the nature of the roles they play in the life of the person. In history, no other human facts have determined judgment of persons and groups more than the first

order of characteristics, namely, gender and ethnicity. And yet these are the most innocent because they are the least dependent upon moral decision and action, the least susceptible to change. In most cases, their immediacy and obviousness misled judgment to take them as ontic and to differentiate and discriminate on their basis. That is why the Qur'an picked them first and sought to demolish all judgments dependent upon them. These characteristics are the work of Allah, necessary and unchangeable, created by Allah (SWT) merely for the purpose of identification. They are to be regarded solely as a "passport" or "identity card", saying absolutely nothing about the moral character or value of the carrier. This is the meaning of the verse if its terms are taken literally. If the term "know" is taken figuratively, then the Qur'an would be telling us that gender and ethnic characteristics were created by Allah (SWT) to the end of humans finding in them mutual cooperation.

All humans are therefore one and the same. On this ground, the universalism of Islam is based. All humans are one in the eyes of Allah (SWT) except as their deeds distinguish them in moral virtue, in cultural or civilizational achievement. If these deeds are dependent upon preemptive cultural characteristics hampering such achievement, it is a moral duty to alter those characteristics and to grow others—which is always possible. The door to such alteration is never closed. On the other hand, where judgment does take place on the basis of the immutable characteristics, a mortal crime—namely, ethnocentrism—is committed. The implications of such crime are ominous; the unity of humanity is violated, and Divine unity is violated as well. Nothing is more odious to Allah (SWT) than *shirk* (i.e., associationism, or polytheism); and nothing less than *shirk* is the implication of ethnocentrism. Religion and all sorts of causes have been paraded as cause of various conflicts among groups of humans. In reality, nearly all conflicts among groups are ultimately reducible to ethnocentric decisions made on the basis of the immutable characteristics of a so-called "enemy."

With ethnocentrism, of which racism and nationalism are the commonplace expressions, Islām can have no compromise. The conflict between them is insoluble, as the damage which ethnocentrism inflicts upon the human spirit—whether as subject or object of discrimination—is irreparable.

To condemn ethnocentrism as Islām does, is not to condemn patriotism. The latter means the attitude of love and endearment, of appreciation of the life and value of the group, of self-preparation to undergo any exertion or sacrifice, including laying down one's life, for its defence. As such, patriotism is not only an evil, but a positive good enjoined by Islām. It is both a religious and ethical duty, to love and serve, to defend one's people and land against aggression and injustice. Ethnocentrism, however, is far removed from patriotism. Its essence is to assume the advantage of the ethnic entity as the ultimate criterion of good and evil; and its most common expression is to

hold the ethnic entity superior to mankind because of the image characteristics of it members and to regard and pursue that advantage at the cost of any other. It is because ethnocentrism makes such assumptions that it is possible for it to command the absolute loyalty of its adherents. The claim it makes is the claim of ultimate reality. The committed ethnocentrists, whether Jew, German, French or Russian, genuinely assumes that their people are ultimate realities constituting ultimate criteria of good and evil. What Zionism built in the psyche of the Jewish people; what Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche and other Romantic thinkers built in the psyche of the German people as to what is "Deutscheland"; what Rousseau, Fustel de Coulanges and others had built in the psyche of the French people as to what is *la Nation*, or *la France*, was nothing short of a mystique which bloated their people into something approximating the ultimate reality of a religious faith. The pride and inspiration which those mystical entities command, the moving appeal which they exercise upon the heart and imagination of the adherents, are indeed those of a reality that is a mysterious, tremendous, fascinating *a priori*—absolute, transcendent and ultimate.

The Muslim is the person who believes the exact opposite precisely because his God is absolutely the only God of all, the premise which necessitates his assumption of the unities referred to above as well as the unity of humanity. A Muslim nationalist or racist is therefore a contradiction in terms; and the Muslim who claims commitment to nationalism is either a *munāfiq* or *zindīq* (i.e., a non-Muslim pretending to be one) or one whose commitment is so superficial that it cannot withstand the lure of bribe or personal advantage. That is also the reason why the careers of the overwhelming majority of so-called committed Muslim nationalist leaders had left much to be desired by way of consistency, fidelity to the professed ideal, and moral integrity.

In modern times, knowledge of man has nearly all been based upon ethnicity as the ultimate definition of humanity; and knowledge of society, upon ethnicity as the ultimate ground of social order and organization. The universalism of the "Enlightenment" had never been given a chance of implementation before it was repudiated in favor of the ethnocentric approach of Romanticism. Indeed, the universalism of the "Enlightenment" was theoretical and suspicious, considering that even in the hands of the prince of the movement, Immanuel Kant, the various peoples of mankind were graded as superior and inferior on the basis of traditional European prejudices and the innate characteristics of Asians, Africans, and Europeans. Romanticism swept over the whole of the West, wiped out every trace of rationalist or Christian universalism, and provided the greatest impetus for the humanities, the arts and the social sciences. Man was defined by the thinkers as a function of facts, faculties and forces which spring and nourish themselves from a land mythically conceived, from a race or people or blood mysteriously standing in an infinite

dimension of time, and from a tradition whose roots run infinitely as to depth and extension in both space and time. Furthermore, these are understood not by reason, but grasped by feeling, immediate experience and intuition. Their most eloquent and clearest expression is to be found in the arts, especially in music, painting, and literature. Even religion was re-conceived by these romantic thinkers, notably Schleiermacher, as founded solely on the ineffable experience of the adherent, i.e., personal feelings – after conceding the point to detractors that it is irrational and arbitrary and of the same nature as “illusion” and “opium”.

The Western humanities continued to speak of “man” and “humanity”. But in their romanticized understanding, these terms denoted Western man and Western humanity. If they did not exclude the billion “blacks”, and the billion “browns” and the billion “yellows” of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, they counted them only as approximations of humanity which may be colonized, exploited and used for the welfare of Western humanity. Certainly these “humanities” ought to be studied; but only as specimens of an age that the West once underwent, and thus contribute to the Western man’s historical (evolutionary) understanding of himself.

Ethnocentrism is internally divisive because it is always possible to find within any defined group, sub-groups which reveal a greater concentration of innate characteristic than the larger group. Such “fact” could then furnish the base for a small group to call itself an ethnic entity endowed with a stronger particularism. Hence, besides separating the Westerners from the rest of the world with which they were coming into more intensive contact because of the development of industry and transportation, romanticism divided the West into mutually hostile and competitive nations, each seeking its “national interest” as if it were the criterion of all good and evil. The nations of the West learnt from and readily accepted the findings of one another. The romantic insights, analysis and expression of one nation were quickly acknowledged as true of another, then adopted and applied as if they were one’s own.

The Western social sciences: history, geography, economics, political science, sociology and anthropology, were all developed under the impetus provided by Romanticism. All of them, each in its own way, are based upon the ethnocentric view that the nation, or ethnic entity in its well-defined geography and demography, but infinite and woozy history, is the ultimate unit of analysis and value. When they speak of “society” or “social order”, they mean their own national entity or order. In political science, Western geography and history conceives of the world only as a satellite to the West, a world revolving around England, America, France, Germany, or Italy as its heart and core, depending on the author and place of publication. Western economics was at its earlier stages impertinent enough to claim for itself the status of a universal science. But it was put back in its place as a Western analysis of a Western

nation by the arch-romanticists and ethnocentrists of Europe, the Nazis. The same bombastic claims made on behalf of the discipline by Karl Marx were denied in practice by Lenin and Khrushchev. Their regimes however have not yet permitted a statement to this effect to appear in print; but it has allowed a fair measure of ethnocentric (in this case, national-socialistic) declarations to be included in the new U.S.S.R. (1978) constitution.

Finally, anthropology is the boldest of all. In its view, “humanity” means ethnicity and is logically equivalent to and convertible with it. In the last two centuries, its effect has been to whip up mankind into a frenzy of ethnocentric consciousness by singling out one subgroup after another, and constructing for it an ideology and axiology out of that group’s innate characteristics or what its advocates have fabricated and declared to be innate and particular to that ethnic group. Instead of identifying and emphasizing what is universally human, its whole concern is to identify, develop and blow up to great proportion the particular.

Islām recognized the family as the constitutive unit of social order and buttressed its extended form with legislation regarding inheritance and dependence to enable the largest possible family membership to eat from the same kitchen, and hence economically. The purpose is that by living in close proximity to one another, often under the same roof, the members of the extended family would mutually support their social, emotional and mental health and well being. Beyond the family, Islām recognized not the nation or ethnic group, but humanity, the universal social order. Nothing stands between the two circles of family and humanity. By themselves they constitute all there is to the social order. Man’s membership in this order is Islām’s concern in the social sciences. Human groupings between the family and humankind, namely, the country or region, the people or nation, is regarded in Islām as purely administrative units which are absolutely irrelevant to the definition of good and evil and to the interpretation and application of the *sharī‘ah*. The arts, the humanities and the social sciences of the modern West must therefore be totally recast. A new foundation of first principles should be given to them which are concordant with the universalism of Islām. And they ought to receive from the Islāmic thinkers a new axiology—*viz.*, Islāmic values and ends—as ultimate objectives for guiding social research.

V. The Workplan

The objectives of the Work Plan are the following:

1. To master the modern disciplines.
2. To master the Islāmic legacy.
3. To establish the specific relevance of Islām to each area of modern knowledge.

4. To seek ways for creative synthesis between the legacy and modern knowledge.
5. To launch Islāmic thought on the trajectory which leads it to the fulfillment of the Divine patterns of Allah (SWT).

To realize these objectives, a number of steps must be taken. Their logical order defines the order of priority belonging to each step.

A. The Necessary Steps Leading to Islāmization of Knowledge.

Step 1. Mastery of the Modern Discipline: Categories Breakdown.

The disciplines, as they stand today in their most advanced state in the West, must be broken down today into categories, principles, methodologies, problems and themes. Such breakdown must reflect the “table of contents” of a classic textbook in the discipline’s methodology, or the syllabus of a course in the discipline which all graduate courses in that discipline assume their students to have taken and mastered. Such breakdown will not be couched in technical terms, nor in chapters’ titles. It would have to be couched in sentence-form, making clear what the technical terms mean, and explaining the categories, principles, problems and dominant themes of the discipline in its Western and highest form.

Step. 2. Discipline Survey

Every discipline ought to be surveyed and essays written on it to lay bare the broad outlines of its genesis and historical development, the growth of its methodology, the widening of its field of vision, the main contributions which its great votaries have made. An annotated bibliography of the most important works should conclude the survey for each discipline. It should include, in categorized and ordered form, the most important books and articles upon which knowledge of the discipline stands, and without which no mastery of it may be achieved.

This step has for purpose to ascertain Muslim understanding and mastery of the discipline as it developed in the West. Clearly substantiated and amply annotated and footnoted, the discipline survey would constitute a base of common understanding for specialists on the discipline which they are expected to Islāmize. Since disciplines in the West today have become “many-splendored things” because of the explosion of knowledge, it would be necessary for Islāmic scholars dealing with that discipline to touch base and agree together on the identity, history, topography, and frontiers of the object of their Islāmization efforts.

Step 3. Master of the Islāmic Legacy: The Anthology

Before any elaboration of the specific relevance of Islām to the discipline, it is necessary to discover what the legacy of Islām had to say on the discipline. The legacy of the ancestors must remain for us the starting point of the relevance of Islām. Our Islāmization of the discipline would be all the poorer if it did not make the legacy into account and did not benefit from the insights of the ancestors. However, the contribution of the legacy to the discipline is not ready for the modern researcher to obtain, to read or to understand. Indeed, the modern researcher is not equipped even to search in the legacy for Islām's contribution to the discipline. The reason is that the categories of the modern discipline, sometimes even its very name, are unknown as such in the legacy. Likewise, the legacy may contain worthy materials which are not classifiable/relatable to any modern category. The Western-trained Muslim scholar is too often defeated by inaccessibility of the legacy. He is strongly tempted to give up in despair, judging that the legacy is silent on the matter in hand whereas the fact is that he is unfamiliar with the legacy's categories under which the sort of material relevant to his discipline is classified. Moreover, the Western trained Muslim scholar has neither the time nor the energy requisite for successful exploration of the vast and colossal works of the legacy of Islāmic learning.

On the other hand, the traditionally trained Muslim scholars, masters of the Islāmic legacy, can neither discover nor can establish the relevance of the legacy to the modern disciplines because of their ignorance of those disciplines. This is so despite their expertise in the legacy. They are unfamiliar with the topics, the problems and themes of the modern disciplines. Therefore, it is necessary to instruct them in what is needed and then turn them loose on the legacy to draw from it what is pertinent. For this, the products of steps 1 and 2 serve the purpose, by familiarizing the experts with the modern disciplines and thus providing them with a criterion of relevance which they can use in their searches.

This step involves the preparation of several volumes of anthologies of selected readings from the legacy for each modern discipline, arranged according to the categories of that discipline. These anthologies would give the modern Muslim scholar ready access to the legacy in the area of his specialization. They would present in a topical order familiar to him, the best that the legacy has contributed to the range of issues which are the main objects of his disciplined study. Since the modern Muslim disciplinarian has neither time nor know-how to reach the legacy by himself (in most cases he does not even know the language of the legacy), no familiarity with the legacy—let alone the mastery of it—is possible for him without these anthologies.

Step 4. Mastery of the Islāmic Legacy: The Analysis

In order to bring the achievements of the Islāmic legacy closer to the understanding of the Western-trained Muslim scholar, it is necessary to do more than merely to present in anthological form, pages of materials dealing with a given subject. The ancestors had done their own work of relating the Islāmic vision to the problems which they faced. And they did so under influence of all sorts of factors and forces which pressed upon them for attention. In order to understand their crystallization of the Islāmic vision, their works must need be analyzed against their historical background, and the relations of the problem at issue with the other departments of human life and thought identified and exposed. Historical analysis of the contributions of the legacy will undoubtedly illuminate numerous areas of the Islāmic vision itself. It is conducive to a better understanding of the vision to learn how the ancestors understood and were moved by it; how they translated it into prescriptions for action and a style for conduct; how it helped them overcome and solve their peculiar difficulties and problems.

Such analyses of the contributions of the Islāmic legacy cannot be undertaken at random. A hierarchy of priorities ought to be established and Islāmic scholars invited to undertake them in order. Above all the main principles, the major problems, the continuing themes—those issues which promise relevance to the problems of the present, ought to be the object of Islāmic educational and research strategy.

Step 5. Establishment of the Specific Relevance of Islām to the Disciplines.

The foregoing four steps amount to posing the problem to the Islāmic thinker. Together, they sum up for him the development of the discipline which Muslims have missed during their slumber. Equally, they should inform him with the greatest authority and clarity possible of the contributions of the Islāmic legacy to the areas studied by the disciplines, and generally, to the goals of the discipline. These materials will have to be made more specific by translating them into principles on a level with the modern discipline in general, or in theory and of reference and application. In this regard, the nature of the modern discipline, its constituent methods, principles, problems, objectives and hope, its achievements and shortcomings—all of these should be related to the Islāmic legacy; and the legacy's specific relevance to each must be deduced from the general contribution. Three major questions must be posed and answers to them found. The first is, what did the Islāmic legacy of learning, from the Qur'ān to the modernists, contribute to the whole range of issues envisaged by the discipline? The second is, how does the Islāmic legacy's contribution to the discipline compare or contrast with the achievement of the discipline? Where has the legacy fulfilled, fallen short of, or transcended the vision and

scope of the discipline? The third is, given the areas or issues in which the Islāmic legacy has given little or nothing, in which direction may the Muslim effort be henceforth exerted in order to fill the discrepancy, reformulate the problem, and enlarge the vision?

Step 6. Critical Assessment of the Modern Discipline: The State-of-the-Art.

Now that both the modern discipline and the Islāmic legacy have been exposed, their methodologies, principles, themes, problems and achievements identified, surveyed and analyzed; and finally, now that the specific relevance of Islām to the discipline has been clarified and established, the discipline should be subjected to critical analysis from the standpoint of Islām. This a major step in the Islāmization of knowledge. All the previous five steps seem to lead to it as a sort of *preparatio*. In its historical development, the circumstantial factors which determined the discipline to be what it is must be identified and exposed. Its methodology—what it regards as its data and problems, their classification and categorization; what it regards as its theory, the first principles under which it treats its problems—must be analyzed and tested for reductionism, adequacy, reasonableness and consistency with the five-fold unity which Islām teaches. The discipline's dominant problems and persistent themes ought to be analyzed for their assumptions, their importance and relationship to the essential vision of the discipline. The discipline's ultimate purpose ought to be critically related to its methodology as well as to its front line objectives. Has it fulfilled the vision of its own founders? Has it realized its role in the total enterprise of knowledge-seeking that is the human quest? Has it established for the understanding and for history the Divine patterns of creation it was meant to establish? The answers to these questions should give a genuine state-of-the-art report on the discipline from the standpoint of Islām, as well as to shed the necessary light upon the areas where one or another kind of Islāmic correction, amendment, addition or elimination is necessary.

Step 7. Critical Assessment of the Islāmic Legacy: The State-of-the-Art.

By the Islāmic legacy we first mean the Holy Qur'ān, the word of Allah (SWT) and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS). These are not objects of criticism or of assessment. The Divine status of the Qur'ān and the normativeness of the *Sunnah* are beyond question. Muslim understanding of these two sources however is not. Rather, it is subject to both assessment and criticism in terms of the principles which these sources provide. So too is everything else in the legacy, which may be derived from either of the two sources by human intellectual endeavor. This human element needs to be reviewed because it is not playing the dynamic role in Muslim life which it

once did, and which it is always supposed to play. The relevance of our human understanding of the relation to the various problems of the present must be subject to critique from three areas of reference: First, the Islāmic vision insofar as it can be established from the sources of revelation directly and from its concrete instantiation in history by the Prophet (ṢAAS), his companions (RAA) and their descendents; Second, the present needs of the *Ummah* around the world; and Third, all modern knowledge represented by the discipline. If the legacy is found to be inadequate or erring, it should be corrected by our present endeavor. If it is adequate, further development and creative recrystallization are necessary for the future. At any rate, no Islāmic stand is viable today which does not relate to the legacy of Islām. To do so, it must be based upon thorough knowledge of the legacy in its strength and weakness. Moreover, today's and tomorrow's Islāmic stand must assume a form that is consistent with the legacy, rather than a radical departure from it.

The task of assessing the Islāmic legacy's contribution in each fields of human activity must therefore fall upon the shoulders of the experts in that activity. They are the monitors of the Muslims need in that field and they are the masters of the modern discipline studying that activity. Certainly, they should be assisted by the experts in the legacy in order to guarantee the most adequate and correct understanding of it possible.

Step 8. Survey of the *'Ummah's* Major Problems.

Awakening from its slumber, the *Ummah* is today confronted with formidable problems on all fronts. Its economic, social and political problems which are overpowering by any standard' are "iceberg tops" of deeper-lying malaise on the intellectual and moral levels. The whole "iceberg", or complex of causes, manifestations, dialectic with other phenomena and consequences of the *Ummah's* problems, requires empirical survey and critical analysis. The wisdom of the discipline should be brought to bear upon the *Ummah's* problems, i.e., to enable to the Muslims to understand them correctly, to assess with precision their effect upon the cause of Islām in the world. No Muslim disciplinarian may pursue his disciplined study as pure, ivory tower, intellectual curiosity; as it were, in isolation from the *Ummah's* existential realities or from its hopes and aspirations. The prayer to Allah (SWT) to grant us a "useful knowledge" must apply to our disciplinarian pursuits, by bending our gaze to the problems at hand. Above all, the problem of the disciplines and of our educational institutions, viz., the persistence of their de-Islāmization attempts. Simultaneously, our attention must be devoted to the main problems affecting the *Ummah's* political, social, economic, intellectual, cultural, moral and spiritual problems; indeed, the *Ummah's* problems in every department of human endeavor.

Step 9. Survey of the Problems of Humankind.

It is an intrinsic part of the Islāmic vision to bear responsibility not only for the welfare of the *'Ummah* but for that of the whole human race. Indeed, the *amānah* of Allah (SWT) encompasses the whole universe; and man's responsibility must accord therewith. It is true that the *'Ummah* is in many respects backward and non-developed by comparison to other *'Ummah*. But in the respect of possessing the truth, the ideological statement of it which is most conducive to religious, ethical, and material prosperity at the same time, the *'Ummah* is second to none. Because of Islām, the *'Ummah* alone possesses the vision requisite for the felicity of humankind, for history to be as Allah (SWT) has desired it to be.

Hence, the Islāmic thinker is called upon to confront the problems facing the world today and to contend for their solution according to Islām. As carrier of the Islāmic vision, the *'Ummah* is today the only viable speaker for the human masses of the earth whose cause it lost between imperialists-colonialists' conquests, and the resulting results of the people revolutionaries seeking to throw off their yokes. Ethnocentrism is still ravaging inter-human relations worldwide. Alcohol and other drugs, sexual promiscuity and deterioration of the family ethic, illiteracy and laziness, militarism and armament build up, the rape of nature and the threat to the earth's ecological balance have been doing the rest without effective check from any source. Certainly, these problems constitute another area of reference for Islāmic thought, planning and action, that is of crucial importance to the *'Ummah's* felicity as well as to the felicity of mankind. To solve these problems and to lead mankind to felicity—that is to prosperity with justice and dignity—cannot be separated from the Islāmic hope.

Step 10. Creative Analysis and Syntheses.

Having understood and mastered the modern disciplines as well as the Islāmic legacy; having assessed their strengths and weaknesses; having established the relevance of Islām to the specific areas of inquiry of the disciplines; having identified and grasped the problems facing the *'Ummah* in its march in history as the *khulafā* of Allah on earth; and having understood the larger problems of humankind from the standpoint of Islām which enjoins upon the Muslims to be *shuhadā' 'alā al nās* in human history, the stage is now set for the Islāmic mind to make its creative leap. A new road must be blazed for Islām in the fifteenth century if it is to resume its world leadership and continue its salutary and civilizing role in human affairs.

A creative synthesis must be struck between the Islāmic legacy and the modern disciplines which would bridge over the gap of centuries of non-development. The legacy of Islāmic learning must become continuous with

the modern achievements and start to move the frontiers of knowledge to more distant horizons than the modern disciplines have envisaged. The creative synthesis must maintain its relevance to the *Ummah's* reality by addressing itself to its problems which have already been identified and analyzed. Indeed, it must provide efficacious solutions to the problems of the whole world as well as address the ever-new issues presented by Islāmic hope. What are the specific contents of that hope in every department of human life and how does the new synthesis move the *Ummah* and mankind forward in its realization of that hope?

Given the specific relevance of the legacy to a certain topic or problem, and given the particular character of the pertinent issue, what options are legitimate for the Muslim to pursue? Certainly in every case, a vast array of options are possible, which approximate or stand at a distance from the Islāmic ideal; which are more or less effective; which generate or retard movement toward Islām's ultimate goals. Which of these options is possible, necessary or indispensable, desirable, legitimate? By what criteria may the specific relevance of Islam (its *shari'ah*., its ethic, its culture and spirit) to the problem be ascertained? By what principles may the contribution of the creative synthesis be projected, tested and evaluated; the proper emendations and corrections introduced, and their progress and efficacy monitored and evaluated?

Step 11. Recasting the Disciplines under the Framework of Islām: The University Textbook.

By nature, the Islāmicly determined minds will not all reach the same solutions, or choose the same options in their determination of the relevance of Islām to the present and future existence of the *Ummah*. Such diversity will not be undesirable, but highly welcome. We need scores of diverse critical analyses by the Islāmicly committed and modern-disciplined in order to enrich the *Ummah's* consciousness of its own desiderata and goals. In fact, the *Ummah* may not be said to have recaptured its dynamism of the first centuries of the Hijrah unless Islām itself becomes again for all Muslims a cauldron constantly bubbling with new ideas in which Allah's patterns may be objectified in nature; an infinite mine of ethical and creative options in which His divine values and commandments may be concretized and instantiated in history.

It is out of a wealth of such new insights into the meaning of Islām, of creative options for the realization of that meaning, that the desired college or university textbook may be written for the discipline. The essays representing individual breakthroughs in any topic, branch or problem must pile high in order to provide a "background vision", or "field of relevance" from which the Islāmic vision for the discipline may be drawn.

Islāmization of the discipline is not fulfilled by one textbook, even if it complies perfectly with the foregoing requirement. Scores of textbooks are need-

ed to develop the intellectual stamina of Muslim minds. Above all, numerous books are immediately needed to fill the educational needs of the various university levels (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior and graduate). More books are needed to satisfy the Muslim needs which are infinite and to project and crystalize the vision of Islām which is equally infinite. However, priority dictates that our first efforts be devoted to the production of a standard textbook in each discipline which would state definitively the relevance of the Islāmic vision to that discipline—and serve as a general guide for future Islāmic minds to follow. Hopefully, it need not be said that any attempt to preempt the production of the university textbook by leaping over the foregoing steps is bound to result in mediocrity. The Prophet Muḥammed (ṢAAS) commanded us to do anything that we enter upon doing, *perfectly*. The university textbook is truly the final end of the long process of Islāmization of the disciplines. It is the work which crowns the long search of all foregoing steps.

Step 12. Dissemination of Islāmized Knowledge

It would be idle, even if great, should all these works be produced by Islāmic scholars, and be kept in the privacy of their personal collections. And it would be a great pity if they should remain known only to a closed circle of their authors' acquaintances and friends, or utilized by the educational institutions of their neighborhoods or countries alone. Whatever is produced for the sake of Allah (SWT) belongs to the whole *Ummah*. The benefit of it will not win Allah's blessing unless it is brought to and is appropriated by the greatest number of His creatures. Although Muslims may, and indeed should be, materially rewarded for their intellectual effort, the work of thought in Islām cannot be copyrighted, i.e., monopolized for profit. The fact that it is produced for the sake of Allah (SWT) imposes upon it always to remain available to whomsoever wishes to invest in the paper, ink and binding necessary to carry it.

Second, the intellectual work to be produced in the foregoing steps is intended as something by which the Muslims of the world—nay, mankind—are to be awakened, enlightened and enriched. They are the readers, or "consumers" of the product. However, being Islāmic, executed for the sake of Allah (SWT), and carrying within it the vision of Islām itself, it is expected to do more than to inform. In presence of the vision of Islām, human consciousness should lose its poise, become astir, and generate new energies hitherto unknown. Under its spell, the subject is expected to become an instrument of the Divine will, and ready to press forward and achieve in Allah's (SWT) name, what he had never dreamt of achieving before.

That is why the **Work Plan** calls for measures to place everyone of the works produced, under the foregoing steps, in the hand of every Muslim university academician free of charge. To such academician, the given article, essay,

pamphlet, anthology or book should come as a personal invitation to join in this enterprise, to become a “producer” of better works in consequence of his appropriation of the product in hand. Equally, to place such products in the hand of all Muslim thinkers is the greatest reward possible in this world. This is not to obviate the need for the material reward; but for the scholar determined by the vision of Islām and devoted to seek *wajh Allah* (SWT) there can be no greater reward than to plant that vision in the heart and mind of another human, no greater duty than to nurture that vision in the consciousness of the Muslims of the world.

Third, the products of this **Work Plan** should be officially presented to the universities and colleges of the Muslim World with the request to consider them for possible adoption as required readings in the pertinent courses of instruction. Naturally, they would have to be translated to the languages of instruction in the various countries of the Muslim World.

B. Other Necessary Aids to Islāmization of Knowledge.

1. **Conferences and Seminars:** A series of conferences and seminars should be held between experts in the relevant fields designed to solve any problems transcending any single discipline. The *Ummah's* problems mostly fall in this category requiring all the light numerous disciplines could shed on them at the same time. Another series of conferences should be held between scholars specialized in various aspects or areas within one and the same discipline in order to assist one another in their respective tasks.

2. **Classroom Workshops for Faculty Training:** Once the textbook and the literature preceding it in steps 1-12 have been produced, it is necessary for the teaching faculty to be trained in their use. The experts who produced these works should be given the opportunity to meet the faculty and discuss with them the unwritten presuppositions, the unprojected effects of the theories, principles or solutions they have included in their essays and books. In addition, such meetings would explore the pedagogical issues of materials-presentations and thus help the faculty to achieve the ultimate goal efficiently.

C. Further Rules of Implementation.

1. In this stage of Muslim academic development, it is not reasonable to expect Muslim scholars to contribute their work free. Honoraria proportionate to effort, and additional to their regular salaries, should be instituted as incentives and rewards for production and quality. Such honoraria should be fixed on the basis of scholarly standards universally applied throughout the

world. We do not believe that the Muslim and/or native or resident scholar should be paid less than the non-Muslim, non-native or non-resident. Such discrimination is at the very root of the “brain drain”; at the very root of the demoralization of the Muslim scholar; and finally, at the very root of the cynicism, unconcern, and the lapse into academic nihilism of the resident scholar.

2. The greatest possible care should be taken to see to it that only the most competent scholars are commissioned to produce the instructional materials projected. However, since it cannot be absolutely ascertained that any scholar commissioned to do a certain piece of work will actually produce it, and since the quality of the product thus commissioned cannot be absolutely guaranteed, more than one scholar should be commissioned to produce the same work. Casualty is only the other side of exacting demand, and cannot be compromised. Hence, it is to be accepted as principle that up to five scholars will have to be commissioned to do each piece of work. Moreover, since scholarly work—even in the exact sciences, though to a lesser degree than in the social sciences and humanities—is bound to be personal and represent differing viewpoints and styles of the authors, the multiplication of commissioned works in one discipline is never a duplication. It is always an enrichment.

3. Wherever the work contemplated is too big for any individual, it should be divided into parts, each of which would be commissioned to a separate scholar. This will also expedite completion within the projected time.

4. Since this work is a pioneering effort—a real “first” in the Muslim World—and since its benefits will fall to all Muslim countries, it is certainly justified to seek funding for it from every Muslim country. Islāmization of modern knowledge is a *fard ayn* on the whole *Ummah* as long as no responsible agency of the *Ummah* has undertaken it. Every effort must be exerted therefore to obtain funds from the Muslim World, its organs and agencies, and its rich individuals.

**Islamic Thought in the Modern World:
The Need for
an Integrated Approach**

Abdul Majid Muhammad Mackeen

Islamic Thought in the Modern World: The Need for an Integrated Approach

Abdul Majid Muhammad Mackeen

The conflicts and tensions in the world today have resulted largely from conflicting systems of thought, which in turn provide contradictory stimuli and breed contradictory human motivations and responses—a situation that has brought about a serious imbalance in the human behavioral and thought patterns. This tendency was particularly marked in countries that came under the political and economic determinism of alien ruling powers. In the lands of Islam, the process started much earlier with the disintegration of Islamic political authority, which weakened the political existence of the *Ummah* and gradually paved the way for the infiltration of a kind of “foreign thinking” among the ranks of the Muslims.

The ultimate result was the creation of a distinction between the socially realistic “secular” thought and the faith-oriented “religious” thought, with little or no prospect of ever closing the gap between them as these distinctions were perpetuated by powerful vested interests. The eventual outcome of this development was the insulation of Islamic thought from the main currents of thought predominating in the minds of the Muslim thinkers, planners, and administrators in the contemporary Muslim world. Though denied its proper place in modern planning and thinking, Islamic thought refused to be crushed out of existence but withdrew instead into sheltered precincts of its own and closed its door to the challenges flung at it by the vast expansion of knowledge in the modern world. This state of Islamic thought continues to prevail among the ranks of Muslims the world over.

A similar situation had confronted the early Muslim community when the over-rapid territorial expansion of Islam in the first and second centuries AH seventh and eight centuries AC thrust them into the heartlands of the Greco-Roman and Christian domains—to places like *Al Iskandariyah* (Alexandria), *Dimashq* (Damascus), *Antakiyah* (Antioch), Mesopotamia, Baghdad and Spain and exposed them to the entire intellectual might of Greek sciences and Chris-

tian scholastic theology. The intellectual hegemony of the Greek and Byzantine Christian civilization of that time rested on such sophisticated tools as Aristotelian dialectics, physics, mathematics, and philosophy. Consequently the faith of the Muslims in the supremacy and transcendence of the Word of Allah was subjected to an enormous test of survival. The Muslim savants of that period did not abdicate their responsibilities in the defense of their faith, the viability of which has stood the test of all times. Instead, they maintained the supremacy of the *revealed word*, The Qur'ān, as the final arbiter of all causes. Hence the tools of logic and rhetoric were restated and extensively used in a number of instances; the commentators of the Qur'ān and the *Ḥadīth* used them in expounding the *revealed word* of Allah and the utterances and conduct of His Messenger; the scholastic theologians (*Mutakallimūn*) used rational criteria to the extent legitimized revelation to provide the philosophical arguments for monotheism; the jurists (*fuqahā*) of Islam constructed a comprehensive *fiqh* (jurisprudence) system by redefining many concepts in the light of the established norms of Islamic first-principles.

They accomplished this not by rejecting the tools of intellectual argument and the standards of rational criteria, but by a careful and extensive study of the nature and potential of these tools in order to convert them into new Islamic modes of expression within the framework of the first-principles set down in the revealed bases of Islam, the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. The enormous intellectual development and literary activity which followed during the Abbasid period is a clear testimony to the assimilative and the creative potential of those men who understood the first-principles of the ideology of Islam. The understanding and preservation of the integrity of the Islamic world-view in all segments of human thought and behavior were the basic factor that provided the stability and resources to withstand the strains and stresses accompanying the internal expansion of Islam in the early centuries.

The sense of the integrity and wholeness of Islam was at its highest during the life time of Prophet Muhammad, (ṢAAS). Its impact was absorbed in the following centuries and found itself permanently enshrined in the entire range of Islamic literature. If we look at the titles of books produced by the early Muslim scholars—whether in the field of historiography, law, theology, or science—we cannot escape the conclusion that every single work authored by Muslim scholars, until very recent times, bore the imprint of a category of knowledge that had its roots in the *revealed* guidance of Allah.

The work produced in the successive periods of Islam carried titles, reflecting to some extent, the mood of the historical period concerned, but at no time did the Muslim ideologues compromise with the tendencies of their times, (which were foreign to the Islamic base), and abandon the centrality of Islamic thought. This was particularly so in the realm of Islamic literary activity. Unlike events, the record of man's inner thinking always remain a silent, though can-

did witness to his innermost thoughts. There can be no clearer evidence of this integrity of Islam than the format and substance of the *Sharī'ah* (Islamic Law), which represents the finest example of the integration of Islamic thought. In the early political organization of the Islamic state and in the social organization of Islamic society too, the same integrity of Islamic thought was maintained. Although political and social structure failed to absorb the pressures exerted upon it by certain historical processes, the organization of Islamic thought constructed upon the twin foundations of the immutable Qur'ān and the exemplary *Sunnah* has survived the ravages of time and—thanks to the labors of many great Muslim minds—they remain our sole custodian of the integrity of Islam.

At this point it is worth remembering that the great literary movement of Islam, which received its greatest stimulus from the Qur'ān and the personality of Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS), was the result of the endeavors of dedicated individual scholars who emerged to answer the need for a theoretical elaboration of the substance of Islam. The possession of a common language of exposition, Arabic, the language of the Qur'ān, proved to be a significant factor in maintaining a community of interests among scholars from the diverse regions of the then Muslim State. The whole history of Arabic literature during the Islamic period demonstrates the fact that Arabic is not so much the language of the Arabs as the language of Islam—the language of the speech of Allah (SWT), and that of His Messenger (ṢAAS), or the language of revelation. Many an Arabic term developed significant changes in conceptual meaning in the Islamic period. The language began to embrace a whole range of a highly technical vocabulary to express specific norms of thought and patterns of behavior. The importance and value of Arabic therefore, for a sound and safe knowledge of Islam, cannot be denied. Muslims, the world over, should concern themselves, very seriously, with the study of Arabic as a means to reach the first and secondary principles of Islam in their most original form and sources. Conversely stated, it is a matter for serious concern that resulting from the political dislocation the Muslim countries suffer today, numbers of ardent students of Islam have laid themselves exposed to half-truths and to adverse propagandistic writings without being adequately equipped and trained to challenge distortions of facts in the “knowledge” they acquire. The immediate task therefore is to acquire the knowledge of Islam from the proper sources and through the proper channels and components of Islamic learning.

As I mentioned earlier, the magnificent response of the early Muslim scholars in the elaboration of the entire theory of Islam was a brilliant exercise in the integration of Islamic thought, an exercise in which they captured something of the inscrutable will of Allah as it works in the life of this universe. The march of history, however, as engineered by man, led to some sad though inevitable consequences; the abuse of political authority cost them their

freedom and caused the totality of Islamic thought to disintegrate.

In recent studies, scholars have suggested that the anxieties facing the present generation of Muslims the world over are to some extent comparable with those that troubled the Islamic State from the early years of the Umayyads. The comparison is, no doubt, striking, for which the rapid spread of Islam during the century following the death of Prophet Muhammad (SAAS), the Muslims inherited an extensive geographical area embracing peoples and states of widely differing cultures and traditions. The age of the Umayyads, which began in 41 A.H. / 661 A.C. was an era of fresh challenges and political resettlements. The immediate tasks that agitated the minds of the Umayyad generation were the elaboration of a constitutional and legal tradition and the construction of Islamic thought in conceptual terms within the framework of the revealed criteria. This challenge produced the minds and the minds produced the books that to this day have continued to provide great stability to the intellectual horizon and spiritual fabric of Islam.

The present generation of Muslims has also inherited a situation of equal, if not of greater, dimension because the vast expansion of knowledge in the modern era in the social and natural sciences, and a whole series of other technological and scientific developments have called for the same vigilance and determination displayed by our pioneer Muslim scholars in maintaining the integrity of Islam as communicated in the revealed sources. True knowledge cannot but bear witness to the true nature and behavior of all forms of existence, which by the true nature of its laws must accord with the universal law of the creator as revealed to Allah's creation through specific channels of communication. Any incongruities with the revealed law of Allah can represent only a distortion of the essence of natural being and must be rejected. New conclusions with respect to the essence of the revealed universal law, must be utilized for the fulfilment of the divine purposes.

The impending challenge of the problems caused by the expansion of unfiltered knowledge, the active evolution of behavioral patterns of humans, and their conflicts with rationally accepted conclusions and morally approved norms of behavior, is enormous. We must mobilize the resources at our command to produce the minds and the books to ensure the proper understanding and realization of the relationship between the knowledge of Allah and the knowledge of man, the act of Allah and the act of man, and the power of Allah and the power of man.

Although the predicament of the Muslims of this age may be compared in one sense with the position of the early Muslims on whom fell the onus of pinning down precision with the terms of the Islamic Civilization, yet the contrast between them in the nature and ability of their striking power seems so helplessly marked that nothing short of a major offensive to halt the fur-

ther disintegration of the mentality of the Muslims can save the situation. The early Muslims had accepted, without reservation, the postulates of a revealed thought-world and the integrity of Islamic thought and channelled their energies toward the realization of these concept both in thought as well as in deed. This stamp of an integrated mind, that had understood the first principles of Islam, has disintegrated dangerously and needs immediate corrective measures.

The corrective measures at our disposal seem limited in their capacity to prevent the collapse; the seeds of Islamic knowledge are being sown on shallow soil and are germinating in a restricted area. Our energies should be directed toward a re-exposition of the first principles of Islam with the aid of all the useful and effective weapons at our disposal. Let the Muslims re-construct upon the foundations of the Qur'ān and *Sunnah* of Prophet Muhammad (ṢAAS), the first principles of Islam, test them in their own lives, and bestow the benefits of their re-discoveries to the world at large.

In the exposition of first principles, care must be taken to ensure finding one perfectly in accord with the will of Allah, for by definition a Muslim must submit to the Will of Allah, and the Will of Allah is represented in the revelationally-guided behavior patterns of all matter and thought. But what is important is not just to verbalize our submission to the Will of Allah and to witness the natural behavior of the universe as a manifestation of His Will but to understand and surrender to the law of Allah with full awareness of its implications. This alone can protect man from the consequences that may follow the rejection of this law of Allah.

Although Islamic law accepts the fact that man is fundamentally free, the form of his freedom on earth is not a subject for negotiation either with Allah or with man. Consequently any law we make, or theory we expound, or any act we undertake, must necessarily follow the revealed behavior patterns envisaged in the scheme of Allah; such behavior patterns have been exemplified by Prophet Muhammad (ṢAAS), in the organization and conduct of government; in the enunciation of political and legal concepts; in the organization and use of economic resources, in the cultivation of ethical conduct, and in the organization of all other forms of human life. This normative conduct of Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS), should serve as an ample commentary on the first principles enunciated in the Qur'ān.

It is worth resrating at this point that the relationship between theory and practice or theoretical fundamentalism and historical development, insofar the viability of ideologies is concerned, must be viewed against the first principles of a given ideology; the deviationist tendencies of interest groups or the evidence they have left behind in history should be rejected as bad evidence because the law of Allah cannot be made subject to the verdict of those men who failed to discover the direction of that law. The canons of modern historical

criticism might reject this interpretation of history as being normative, but historians of today cannot deny the fact that they too rely on professional definition of historical norms in order to evaluate historical processes.

History is generally considered to be the beneficiary of diverse sources of knowledge concerning human behavior in response to a given set of stimuli. The evidence gathered from such diverse sources provides the criteria of historical evaluation. The danger inherent in this method of historical criticism is that the preponderance of the human will in defiance of the law of Allah assumes a normative pattern and thus leads to serious error of judgment in determining the order of human life and society. There are many examples and periods of what may be called "deviationism" in the historical development of Islam. It is no easy task to identify the deviationist elements of Islamic history. The whole process is complex and sensitive. There have been too many instances of human interference with the law of Allah, and of political intrigues being hailed and ratified as valid precedents. Islamic historians must distinguish between evidence of positive conduct in accordance with the revealed law and those of negative behavior in defiance of that law. The entire history of Islam needs a critical re-examination. That re-examination can attain its objective only if there is integration of thought.

An Approach to Knowledge and Human Limitations

Muhammad Hamidullah

An Approach to Knowledge and Human Limitations

Muhammad Hamidullah

It is inspiring and exciting to recall that the very first word in the very first Divine command, in the very first revelation was اقرأ (Read . . .), and that it was revealed to an *ummī*, (illiterate person). This command was later complemented by the revelation that human knowledge will always remain limited and small compared to all that is knowable in the universe. (وما أوتيتم من العلم إلا قليلاً) Man is urged, however, to continue to seek knowledge. (وقل ربني زدني علماً) Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) is a model for us, (أسوة حسنة); so let us see what his attitude was on the subject that concerns us. He has ordered us: “Wisdom is the lost property of the Muslims, he recovers it wheresoever he finds it”. (الحكمة ضالة المؤمن أينما وجدها أخذها).

This attitude is inspiring because it shows that there is no untouchability in science and knowledge, and there are no monopolies in matters of knowledge.

We should recall that sciences were developed before Islam and Muslims contributed to several of them. Non-Muslims have also participated and are continuing to participate in the development of knowledge. This fact implies that one cannot eliminate the non-Muslim part in scientific development without demolishing the very foundation of the knowledge. If we keep silent on this point, it would be dishonest to those who have the right to be duly recognized for their work.

The way open to us is the following:

- (a) study the history of each and every individual science and establish what part Muslims have played in it.
- (b) Find out that part of non-Muslim knowledge which should not be left unchallenged, and attempt to refute it for the benefit of the younger generation.

Both are important, and the failure to do so is causing harm to Muslims.

I take the liberty of adding a personal note: that there is “knowledge” which some of the Muslims would say is **wrong**, while others would declare it **right**. This will continue to be so till the end of the world, since it is in the nature of man—

To illustrate this point, note that photography, to some, is a permitted thing, and to others forbidden; celebration of the birthday of the Prophet (ŞAAS) is to some an innovation بدعة and forbidden, but for others it is an obligatory duty enjoined by the Quran: (واما بنعمة ربك فحدث). I add to the list the Darwinian theory of Evolution.

I conclude by humbly suggesting that the Muslim contributions to the science of law, to astronomy, to medicine, and to botany have been such that Muslims may be justifiably proud. Certainly other researchers would say the same for other sciences such as navigation, mathematics, architecture etc. But I would warn my younger brethren that instead of crying بدرم سلطان بود (my father was acting), let them try individually to merit the praise by doing something to promote knowledge so they may say شاديم که کاري کرديم (I am happy that I have been able to do something). Such should be our attitude and our motto.

PART II

Perspectives on the Islamization of Disciplines

Islamic Categorization of the Disciplines: An Islamic Example

Mahmoud Abu Saud

Islamic Categorization of the Disciplines: An Economic Example

Mahmoud Abu Saud

The Issue

In the letter of invitation, the task of this conference was classified under two headings:

1. The Examinations of Disciplines: An Islamic Approach and Work plan

- a) To clarify the perspective of Islam under which Islamization of the disciplines is to take place.
- b) To establish a strategy and work plan.
- c) To begin, in earnest, the examination of some of the disciplines and to consider the relevance of Islam to their methodologies.

2. Islamization of Specific Disciplines.

- a) To prepare a paper (in the particular discipline of the invited participant) in answer to the questions raised in the Memo.

The issue of Islamization of disciplines, or, in simple words, the setting-up of Islamic prototypes of concepts for a society willing to live according to its Islamic teachings is a result of two interacting factors:

1. The failure of the Muslim *Fuqahā'* (Islamic Jurists) in understanding the contemporary problems and in evolving the *Fiqh* (science of the laws of Islam) to cope with these problems.
2. The absence of the Islamic state that would require such *Ijtihād* (creative self exertion to derive laws from the legitimate sources) and attain the best of results by the natural process of trial and error.

What is actually required is the clarification of concepts about our systems: The social, the political, the economic and the aesthetic. We cannot establish any Islamic state without knowing what sort of social relations, political institutions, economic establishments and moral values such a state would adopt. Equally valid is that such systems do not exist in a vacuum, nor are they relevant as scholarly tracts and argued in specialized academic institutions. In any case, there is no doubt that the concept must precede the establishment and application—a fact that confers on this conference great significance.

In this paper I assume that “disciplines” are of two main categories:

1. The philosophical aspect, or what Dr. Ismā‘īl al Fārūqī calls the “*Logique*”. I construe this to mean the theory of the doctrine or the essence of the ideology. In Islamic language, this is rendered by the word “*Shir’ah*” (Universal Islamic Concept).
2. The behavioral and transactional aspects. These include all the principles and laws administering our human relations among individuals and their collectivities.

The importance of this classification is due to the fact that behavioral and transactional systems derive from the ideological aspect. In every society, and in an Islamic one in particular, human activities are motivated by the common concept reaching so deep in psyches of individuals that it becomes a belief. Belief constitutes the dynamism of an ideology. Hence, the first discipline to be cleared is the doctrine itself. We are in need of studying the discipline of our *Shir’ah* in order to establish a uniform understanding of Islam, because without such uniformity there can never be any unity of purpose among Muslim societies all over the world. It is not enough to define Islam as the attestation of one God, the acknowledgement of Muḥammad (ṢAAS) as His last Prophet, and the performance of Islamic rituals. What is required is to understand the implication of “*Shahādah*” (The act of witnessing that there is no God but Allah and that Muḥammad is his prophet, servant and messengers) and the belief that urges the individuals and their societies to act according to the understanding. Understanding without belief or belief without understanding will never lead to Islamization. Belief is abounding all over the Muslim world, but what is required and what we are expected to discuss in this conference is the “understanding”.

Discipline of Economics

The discipline we wish to discuss in this paper is economics. It obviously

belongs to the behavioral and transactional category, thus deriving its principles and objectives from the universal Islamic concept, *Shir'ah*. Since the dictum of Islamic ideology has not been established as a discipline, I shall start from a basis which, I assume, is universally accepted.

Islam's main objective is the worship of Allah (SWT) (Qur'an, *al Dhāriyāt*, 51:56). Worship comprises the observance of rituals and the application of Allah's (SWT) laws and commands. As Allah (SWT) commanded us to obey Him and His Prophet (SAAS) (Qur'an: *al Nisā'* 4:80), the application of *Sunnah* (The Path and example of Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) consisting of all that he said, did, approved of or condemn), becomes incumbent upon Muslims and constitutes an integral part of their worship to Allah (SWT). The worship of Allah (SWT) comprises two elements:

- (1) The individual's belief in the abstract, which is a mental attitude and subtle relationship between the individual and his Creator.
- (2) The individual's actions which are reflected in the activities of Muslims in their respective societies and their inter-relationships.

Both elements are equally vital for evaluating worship. In fact, they are mutually interdependent. But while there is at present conspicuous evidence of vehement belief in the Islamic world, there is a sharply marked lack of substantive action. The main reasons for this may be:

1. The difficulty in applying the Qur'anic injunctions (*al Nuṣūṣ*) and the *Sunnah* to current problems. This is due in turn to:
 - (a) Lack of modern Islamic studies.
 - (b) The conservatism of the contemporary *Fuqahā'*.
2. The influence of the Western civilization on the minds and modes of transactional activities of the Muslims.

Economics, as a discipline, is the study of man's activities related to the attainment of material satisfaction for his well-being within his ideological setting. What I should like to underscore here is the fact that economics—as all other transactional disciplines—is only a means to help man achieve his happiness as conceived in his ideological conviction. The concept of *homo-economico* as expressed in the economic classics is neither valid nor realistic. The demand curves differ from one individual to another and from one society to another, because of the difference of ideologies and convictions. There is no standard nor congenital demand schedule. Thus, the assumption of *homo-economico* having its particular transactional behavior is fallacious and misleading. Accordingly, Islamic economics is nothing more than a system, administering man's activities with a view to maximize his material satisfaction within the scope of the Islamic *Shir'ah*. It does not exist *per se*, nor can

we perceive such a system independent from Islamic dogma. Islamic economics – as a system (i.e., a discipline in application) – can only exist when Islam prevails as a living ideology, not as pathos airing emotions and passions, but as a driving force that motivates actions, reactions and interactions. In short, the economic discipline must issue out from the *Shir'ah* to flow back into it.

The History

Since the advent of Islam, all transactional disciplines have been treated as one discipline under the caption of “*Fiqh al Mu'āmalāt*” as distinct from the jurisprudence of rituals or “*Fiqh al 'Ibādāt*”. All jurists of the “golden” age of the Islamic history strictly adhered to a single methodology in their studies of these transactional disciplines. They would start by quoting the Qur'anic texts and *Ḥadīths* concerning the different issues, and would then analyze the subjects adopting analogical instruments. Their main study was invariably juristic, their arguments legalistic, and their verdicts a judgment on the permissible, the reprehensible and the prohibited. Even when they went into some analytical economic discussions, it was basically the question of Ḥalāl (permissible) or Ḥarām (forbidden). This trend in methodology persisted from the second *Hijrah* century (cf. *al Umm* by al Imām al Shāfi'ī) until today (*Al Fiqh 'Alā al Madhāhib al 'Arba'ah* by al Jezīrī). It is amazing that the contemporary *Ulamā'* still talk about the rules of commercial and financial associations in the same terms of the third and fourth centuries AH.

The economic conditions prevailing prior to the fourteenth century AH/nineteenth century AC were rather simple compared to those of our modern age. As a matter of fact, these conditions were much more sophisticated in the first five centuries after *Hijrah* than in subsequent centuries because of the excellence in civilization and the stupendous expansion of the Muslim rule. The growth of culture meant a correspondent growth in human relations necessitating new rules and regulations befitting an ever evolving civilization. The need for *Ijtihād* was legitimate and pressing. This gave rise to the different schools of thought (*Madhāhib*).

There has never been a separate study of economics. *Al Kharāj* by Abū Yūsuf, Yaḥyā Ibn Ādam or *Al Amwāl* by Ibn Salām (both of the third century *Hijrah*) are mostly concerned with the legal side of some state financial and fiscal jurisdiction. The scattered economic literature is mixed up with other non-economic issues. For instance, al Imām al Ghazālī's excellent passage about the nature and functions of money was mentioned when the author was stressing the duty of the Muslim to be grateful to Allah for His bounties. Ibn Taymiyyah discussed some economic basics in his book about *al Ḥisbah*.

It is only in our time that economics has been recognized as a discipline. There are many modern writers who tried, and still are trying to formulate the general principles of economics. Most of these writers are greatly influenced by the Western ideas although they are keen to come up with a distinct system having its own characteristics and genuine philosophy and techniques. One can safely say that the majority of such writings were not based upon an established methodology.

Method

A method for the study of Islamic economics would include, in our view:

- (1) The nature and scope of economic resources, including human resources.
- (2) The priority of our requirements.
- (3) The positive (permissible) and the negative (prohibited) laws as prescribed by Islam in the field of economics.

The method is a means to an end which is the establishment of a discipline. But the discipline itself is a means to a further end which is realization of the ideology or *Shir'ah*. If Islam were a liberal (capitalistic-cum-democratic) doctrine, or if it were a socialistic (Communist) one, or if it were a mixture of both and/or other doctrines, there would be no need to have a new Islamic discipline. We need the method, conducing to the formulation of the discipline in order to achieve a goal, i.e., the application of *Shir'ah* in our daily material activities. Accordingly, the first element in our methodology is to sort out all Qur'ānic injunctions and all the *Sunnah* that touch upon economic activities. Such basic data would then be so paraphrased in modern language so as to provide the fundamentals of Islamic economics.

The task of sorting out, classifying and paraphrasing the basic data is difficult and vast in scope. The interpretation of the Qur'ān, the authentication of the Ḥadīth, and the reconciliation of all texts make it a task that requires a collective effort. It could be a long process, but it is essential if any serious study of the discipline is to be pursued.

In the past, economic problems—among other mundane problems—were approached through the rules of *'Ilm Uṣūl al Fiqh*. (The science of Islamic Jurisprudence or the Methodology of deriving laws from sources of Islam and of establishing their juristic or constitutional validity). With sound knowledge of Islam and with oral courage and insight, our predecessors could provide their societies with solutions and new ideas. What we have today are incoherent efforts without any solid basis either in Islamics or in methodology (*Uṣūl*). The result is a variety of schools within the same discipline:

- (1) There are the traditional authorities of Islamic law or what we generally call the *Ulamā'*. They know very little of the prevailing economic system and models. They abstain from innovation and *Ijtihād*, and they try to fit the present societal modes in the past framework. Their attitude is usually negative because of their ignorance of the contemporary sophisticated mode of dealings. Besides it is negative in as much as developing and evolving the science of *Fiqh* is concerned. Unless and until our *Ulamā* study the present complex of dealings and the economic rules regulating them, they will be unable to help in initiating an Islāmic economic discipline. In fact, their negative attitude and conservatism is an impediment in the way of many new sound ideas.
- (2) The second school is represented by those who adopted the Western culture and who propound the secularity of all disciplines. Their knowledge about Islam is very limited and, in many cases, corrupted. Unfortunately for the *Ummah*, those are the upper class in Muslim societies, having a considerable political power. They may occasionally praise Islam, but only in words and to appease the Muslim masses who are incessantly calling for the application of the Islamic laws in their daily life. The effect of this school is more damaging than that of the previous one as its adherents have the power of the mass media and the material power of the government establishment.
- (3) The third school's exponents believe in Islam as a living ideology, susceptible to evolution and growth. Their number is on the increase and their good intentions are beyond doubt. They have been quite active in the last two or three decades and have contributed a great deal to the Islamic thought. The main shortcoming of such thinkers is the lack of material resources which would enable them to carry on their research work and bring about the long-awaited Islamic solutions to the contemporary problems.

Due to the absence of an established methodology, the new ideas lost much of their credibility in the economic field. In my view, the source of weakness may be traced to the following:

- (1) The vagueness of the doctrine itself made every thinker start from premises different from what others adopt. This is a very important element as mentioned above, though some thinkers take it very lightly and satisfy themselves by claiming that Islam is crystal clear and that the Qur'ān is its unequivocal expression. The result of

overlooking this basic principle is the diversity of approaches and the abundance of generalities which can never produce any serious scientific results.

- (2) The ambivalence stemming from the contradictory principles of Islam versus the Western material and/or secular doctrines. It is not rare to read articles and books composed by sincere Muslim economists in accordance with the Western economic concepts and only qualified by some Qura'nic verses and *Sunnah*. Lacking the Islamic methodology, such writers adopt the Western one, unaware of the fact that such procedure will lead them to a critical situation where conclusions cannot be qualified as Islamic or Western.

Content and Problems

The study of Islamic economics should start when the student (or the researcher) has acquired a solid background of Islam as a doctrine that administers all our societal relations. Teaching liberal or capitalistic economics under a communistic doctrine is vain and meaningless. In every economic discipline, the relation between economics and the other disciplines of the same ideology comes in the forefront. Islamic economics is no exception.

Next comes the study of the economic conditions prevailing in any given Muslim community. To be practical, we have to admit that all Muslim countries are adopting non-Islamic systems borrowed from other cultures alien if not antagonistic toward Islam. The main issue here is to have a good grasp of the origin of the economic phenomena, the problems accompanying them, and how they are dealt with.

Where economics stand in an Islamic state should be the introduction to macro-economics. This should be illustrated through a thorough study of the Qura'nic verses and *Sunnah* that deal with matters related to the discipline. Such stipulations should invariably be related to practical matters and factual problems. In this stage, the difference between Islamic and non-Islamic discipline should be pointed out. The Islamic economic system as a whole should be clearly explained and compared to other systems.

In the field of micro-economics, some models should be set up so as to demonstrate how the economic machinery would work and what results would be expected.

Such are the general contents of an Islamic economic discipline. It is not an easy task to accomplish because the views on the subject vary widely. The problems that one encounters in formulating the theorem of the discipline are multiple. Besides the difficulty of exegesis and authentication referred to above, there is the problem of application or models. The "theory" is a

mental exercise, an abstract concept, that cannot serve any practical purpose unless it is tested in practice. Our ancestors did not leave us any economic structure to examine or simulate, nor did they record statistical data that relate to their economic activities.

Another difficult problem is the well-known fact that those engaged in this research are mostly students of Western sciences and cultures. Their knowledge of Islamic sciences is limited—a shortcoming that makes many of their judgments somewhat biased or restricted to unrealistic assumptions or erroneous in their totality.

From the applied point of view, it is extremely difficult to utilize the available data of our present societies in any Islamic system or mode. What is available is the product of alien systems and economic orders. The problem here is the great difference between Islam and other doctrines in their respective outlook and philosophy. What patterns of production and distribution would be under an Islamic economic order is the guess of any economist.

Islam and Economics

There is consensus of opinion that economics occupies a prominent front in any Islamic state. *Al Zakah*, the third corner of belief, is the core of this discipline and should be studied and interpreted in a functional manner to suit our contemporary societies. It is sad to find this corner of Islam to be vague and disputed by Muslim scholars in the past and at present. Both schools, *Sunni* and *Shi'i*, have their own interpretation of what is subject to *Zakah*. Even the amount of *Zakah* is not agreed upon, and should be reconsidered on account of the difficulty in finding the exact values of the ancient measures of value, weight and capacity. We have to determine also the margins of exemption (*Niṣāb*) and to whom or where the collected funds are to be dispensed.

In my opinion, Islamic economics has great relevance to our present transactional behavior and material requirements. *Zakah*, to me, is not only a ritual of worship, it is also a philosophy or a doctrine that should always be applied in our economic processes. It implies the enjoinder of continuous circulation of wealth. By penalizing any withheld money (which is basically the means of exchange) which necessitates the continuous sequence of purchase and sale, Islam projects a new distinct doctrine, having its own features. It gives production, consumption and distribution its own meanings and thus establishes its methodology and genuine system. This is the basis of the economic discipline, its frontier, so to speak and its essence.

This phase of analytic presentation has not been fully accepted by modern economists as yet, though one meets with amazingly appropriate development in the doctrine in the writings of some of the past great Muslim thinkers such as Imām al Ghazālī, al Khaldūn and Ibn Taymiyyah. Due to the absence

of a doctrinal synthesis, economists differ greatly in their approach to the subject, although I would say that their variance is complementary rather than contradictory. Had they agreed on a basic doctrine, they would have achieved greater success.

The direct relevance of Islam to our contemporary economics does not make of the Islamic doctrine an art or a science or a humanitas. It is the three altogether. The doctrine is built on solid axiomatic arguments to be developed on scientific basis with a view of attaining the maximum human welfare and social prosperity. Man is the center of all Islamic studies and the economic discipline is only a study of one of man's aspects as a member of a human society.

Modernization

Economics is a modern social science-cum-art. It did not exist in ancient times except as a phase of human activities integrated in the socio-political systems. Its development accompanied the economic evolution in Europe and, accordingly, it became a "European" science. As Muslims lost the tempo of their advance, and were overtaken by the Western civilization—being constrained to adopt the European cultures—they had applied Western economic doctrines in lieu of reviving their own ideology and Islamic system.

Thus, what we need is not mere modernization, but a construction of a new discipline utilizing the basics of Islam, and the remodeling of our methodology to help build new systems and practical models. How can this be done? The answer is neither difficult nor controversial. Initially a standing committee should be formed to collect the preliminary data comprehending the Qura'nic and *Sunnah* texts relating to economics and the writings of earlier Muslim jurists.

The committee should then work out and paraphrase a theorem, a doctrine or a logique which lays down the outlines of the discipline with clarification to its function within the comprehensive Islamic ideology and with respect to the methodology to be adopted. Once this is done, analytic research would be easier to undertake, more coherent and easier to apply. The problem is, can such a committee be formed? *May Allah will it.*

**Islamization of Knowledge:
A New Approach Toward Reform
of Contemporary Knowledge**

AbdulḤamīd A. AbūSulaymān

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I. The Crisis of Knowledge

This paper discusses the crisis of thought prevailing in the Muslim world today, and considers it a fundamental cause of the current degeneration, decadence, and backwardness of the *ʿUmmah*. It also highlights the potential role of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in counteracting and ultimately overcoming the crisis.

Such a theme inevitably brings the Islamic concept of knowledge to the forefront. First of all it must be decided whether such an investigation is merely an intellectual extravaganza or whether there is actually a real issue that deserves investigating. No one possessing insight into the condition of the *ʿUmmah* can fail to realize that there exists a crisis involving a number of issues and complex dimensions. These issues are:

1. The backwardness of the *ʿUmmah*.
2. The weakness of the *ʿUmmah*.
3. The intellectual stagnation of the *ʿUmmah*.
4. The absence of *Ijtihad* in the *ʿUmmah*.
5. The absence of cultural progress in the *ʿUmmah*.
6. The *ʿUmmah's* estrangement from the basic norms of Islamic civilization.

All these issues indicate, in one way or another, the intellectual crisis prevailing in the Muslim World. There is no doubt that this crisis is both cause and evidence of the decadence and impotence of the *ʿUmmah* and prevents it from contributing decisively or even significantly to the culture and civilization of the modern world. This incapability is further exacerbated by the frequency of political, economic, and military crises.

Whether we discuss the problem of *Ijtihad* in Islamic thought, or the causes

of the disparity between our past and our present, the disparity between Islamic values and the actions of Muslims, or the insignificance and marginality of the presence of the Islamic character, we inevitably find that the crisis in the *'Ummah's* conception of knowledge is the sole cause of the state of decadence of our *'Ummah*. Removing its misconception is essential for any clarity of vision, effective reforms, and redirection of the *'Ummah*.

It is a fact that despite its backwardness, the *'Ummah* has never been short of natural resources, human potentiality, or historical perspective. Nor has it been deficient in ethical and moral values. It still possesses the time-honored principles and values revealed in the Qur'an and the *Hadith*. Furthermore, the *'Ummah* has made limited and short-lived attempts in Morocco, the Sudan, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Sub-continent, and other Muslim countries to salvage itself from its decadent and backward situation by reviving the perspectives envisaged by traditional thinking. But all those attempts have been confined largely to Muslims in remote desert areas. They have failed to influence or attract the urban population. They have failed to counter the distracted and diseased forces of the metropolitan cities, which are hostile to the cultural, intellectual, and organizational progress of the *'Ummah* and evidence its impotence.

Whenever the *'Ummah* has tried to adopt foreign tactics, it has undergone bitter experiences, such as those which took place in Turkey during the reign of Sultan Salim III and in Egypt ever since the reign of Muhammad 'Ali. The Turkish experience is the oldest and the most inclusive. These countries tried to imitate the technical, organizational, and intellectual styles of foreign countries, basing their political constitutions on concepts, such as nationalism and secularism, which they imposed through state intervention. But the imitative experiments have ended in miserable failures, as can be seen in extremity by the utter helplessness and deteriorating conditions of modern Egypt and Turkey.

This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the imitation of foreign styles is just as fruitless as the traditional imitation of past perspectives. Both of them have failed to achieve the *'Ummah's*, objectives. It is imperative that reconstruction requires an original redefining of the intellectual and socio-cultural potentialities of the *'Ummah* on the basis of its values, principles, and historical perspectives. A redefinition of knowledge should be the starting point for such reconstruction.

A. How the Crisis of Knowledge Began

We must realize that knowledge was the basic cause of the progress and development of the *'Ummah*. At its very beginning Islam managed to build

up the structure and character of the *'Ummah* on the firm basis of knowledge acquired through its proper sources, namely, Divine revelation and active reason. Divine guidance endowed Prophet Muhammad, (ṢAAS), with a clarity of vision that enabled him to weave an exemplary pattern of life. The Qur'ān explicitly encourages the gaining of knowledge and education as well as the value of learning from experience. The first revelation calls upon the Prophet and humanity to seek education and acquire knowledge in accordance with the Divine guidance:

“Read and understand in the Name of thy Lord and Cherisher. . . [Qur'ān *Sūrah al Qalam*, (97):1]

There was nobody more capable of leadership than Prophet Muhammad (ṢAAS). Nonetheless, he used to consult his companions on almost all matters, and this enabled him to excel in directing the individual and collective affairs of the Muslims in the most efficient and comprehensive manner during war and peace. The extent of that strength can be gauged by the failure of the West to counter the challenge of the *'Uthmānīyūn* (the Ottomans) until it started the intellectual and cultural revolution that came to be known as the age of enlightenment. Through that enlightenment the Western nations reorganized their forces, defeated the Muslims, and emerged as a formidable factor in history.

On the other hand, when the tables had turned and the balance of power had shifted to the West, the reaction of the Muslims, which was essentially political and military, failed to make use of a spirit of sacrifice and sincerity, which would have enabled the Muslims to defend not only their homeland but their values as well. Backward and lacking confidence in its moral and spiritual values, the *'Ummah* attempted to counter Western Power, but this resulted only in bloodshed, economic disorder and general deterioration in every walk of life. An analysis of the relations between any two Muslim countries reveals tendencies which sabotage the overall interests of Muslims.

With the passage of time, knowledge deteriorated and Islamic character weakened. In short, there followed a steady decline in the cultural and intellectual domain, despite the fact that the spirit of sacrifice and sincerity persisted in devout Muslims. Virtues and qualities, such as competence, energy, initiative, seriousness, creativity, and wisdom, which had characterized the early “emergency” phase of the *'Ummah*, and which had enabled the Muslims not only to defeat the forces of anarchy, disruption, and barbarism but also to win for them respect and admiration all over the world, have disappeared. One wonders why the virtues that enabled the Muslims to establish a matchless civilization have disappeared; why the energy and resourcefulness have been dissipated; why the Islamic character has degenerated; and how it is that the whole Islamic system has disintegrated?

B. The Split in Leadership

The strength of the *Ummah* resided in the Caliphate system established by the Prophet, (ṢAAS) in al Madinah. but during the process of local defense and outside conquest, tribal men infiltrated into the army. The habits of thought and up-bringing of these men were far below the standard of the Companions, (RAA) who had built the state in al Madinah. Lacking the spirit that motivated the caliphs, these tribal men sought to secure their position by establishing a new system which was a mixture of the tribal notions prevailing in the pre-Islamic state of ignorance and the half-cherished Islamic notions acquired after the rise of Islam. That hybrid system was the starting point of the deterioration and ultimate disintegration.

Although the ruling body was guided by tribal norms, the people in the Hijaz who represented the true Islamic consciousness refused to accept the new tribal order and revolted against it using physical force. This encounter led to a series of internal wars led by pious personalities such as al Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, 'Abdullah ibn al Zubayr, Zayd ibn 'Alī, and others.

But the spirit of revolt remained confined to the Hijaz for two reasons. First of all, the newly converted Muslim populace was not well acquainted with the teachings of Islam. Second, as more and more people embraced Islam, they brought with them their traditional, pre-Islamic customs and habits. Furthermore, a separation between religion and politics gradually isolated the intellectual leadership. The religious scholars, who always represented the opposition to the political authorities, were forced to withdraw as far as possible from the scuffles and struggles of politics. Thus al 'Imām 'Abū Ḥanīfah died in prison refusing to accept a high judicial post. al 'Imām Mālik ibn Anas was physically tortured because he gave a verdict on compulsory divorce against the wishes of the rulers. Al 'Imām al *Shāfi'i* was forced to immigrate from Baghdād to Egypt.

This schism of the intellectual and political leadership initiated the evils of deceit, ignorance, and arrogance, which crippled the structure of the *Ummah*. Religious thought was confined to the level of abstraction, and was not allowed to function in regulating practice and evaluating experience and experiment. Thus the very concept of the *Ummah* and its leadership began to wither.

This withering was accelerated by the theoretical, unsystematic manner of Islamic thinking, which made the *Ummah* lose touch with its attitudes, needs, and priorities for progress. On the other hand, the deviation of the political leadership and the measures it adopted to silence all opposition made the task of the intellectual leaders more difficult than ever before. Mutual distrust was

the rule rather than the exception. The religious personalities became suspicious and sceptical of any initiative taken by the politicians irrespective of its validity. This scepticism created an uncompromising attitude in the intellectual leadership, a rigidity that sealed up the avenues of *Ijtihād* in attempt to protect the teachings ordained in the Qur'ān and the *Hadīth* from any deviations threatening to their authenticity. Such a rigidity is understandable, but it must be admitted that the intellectual leaders failed to foresee the dangers of confining and concentrating their efforts on abstract thinking.

There was another conflict regarding the application of the teachings of Islam in every day life. This conflict impoverished the intellectual activities of the Muslims and consequently enfeebled the character of Muslim culture and civilization. During the early days of Islam, Islamic ideology was marked by a spirit of initiative, fruitful interaction, resourcefulness, competence, and vigour. It was a time that fostered intellectual courage and moral uprightness. That quality kept the spirit of Islam fully alive; its aims and objectives clearly defined, expounded, and pronounced. A conflict started as early as the time of 'AbūBakr when he clarified the misconceptions lurking in the heads of the tribal men who had embraced Islam. On the basis of that clarification, 'AbūBakr obliged the tribal men to pay al Zakāh and pledge allegiance to the caliph. Similarly, 'Umar resorted to *Ijtihad* in order to clarify issues regarding *al kharāj* (land tax) and divorce. So did 'Ali Ibn 'AbūṬalib on various issues. Admittedly, the period of the first caliphs was a natural continuation of the time of the Prophet. Nonetheless, many aspects of their era, especially in the field of administration, clearly indicate their depth of insight into, and strict adherence to, the *Sharī'ah* to settle the problems they encountered.

The phenomenon of technical, abstract, and academic intellectuality was not known then. It alarmingly emerged when the gulf widened between the intellectual and political leadership. It is no wonder that this tendency dealt a blow to the true spirit of Islamic legislation and politics. And with the passage of time, Islamic thought became lifeless.

During the reign of the Righteous Caliphs, the leaders struck a harmonious balance between religion and politics. The caliphs' faith and practices fully adhered to Islamic values and objectives and consequently won the confidence of their subjects. The fruits of their experience and thought was utilized for the welfare of the *Ummah*. There was no dichotomy or conflict between the temporal and the spiritual. The caliphs firmly believed that human reason was fallible but could be utilized within the limits set by Divine Revelation.

But when the leadership lost its strength, the gulf between religion and politics widened, and there followed more and more dependence upon reason. At the same time, the Muslim's conquest of other nations and the contact resulting therefrom brought about an intellectual and cultural pomposity which lacked seriousness, especially in the court and political circles. As a result,

academic pursuits did not adhere strictly to the spirit and objectives of Islam. This tendency made itself conspicuously evident in the popularity of rhetoric, philosophical and theological discussions, and sophistry. Those in authority made the situation even worse by patronizing philosophers, orators, and factioneers. Such unwholesome favoritism led to the emergence of extremist movements such as the *'Ikhwān al Ṣafā'* (Brethren of Purity), the *Bāṭinīs* (those who believe in divining a hidden, secret meaning in the revealed texts) and the Sophists.

It goes without saying that these intellectual pursuits were not governed by the spirit of Islam. The clearest instance was the indulgence in discussing the nature of God's transcendence. Such a theme has no place in Islamic thought because the Qur'ān explicitly pronounces: He (Allah) begets not, nor is He begotten, and there is none like unto Him. [Qur'ān *Sūral al Ikhlās* (112):3-4].

The heretical nature of the futile and unbridled rationalism of the age outraged eminent Muslim scholars such as Ḥujjah al Islam AbūḤāmid al Ghazālī and Shaykh al Islām Taqīy al Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymīyah, who spent their lives exposing the deviations introduced by these sects.

The struggle against the infiltration of foreign thought and culture proved fruitless, and as a result Muslim scholars grew more and more skeptical and hostile toward the manifestations of reason in philosophical discourse. Henceforth academic pursuits became more inclined toward explicating *the Sharī'ah* texts, the Arabic language, and jurisprudence. This tendency led to more concentration on second-rate thought, authentication of texts, and the compiling of glossaries and historical trivialities. The result was a state of intellectual incompetence which closed off the gates of *Ijtihād* and promoted concentration on textual studies in a repetitious way and from an exclusively theoretical point of view.

II. The Present Crisis in Islamic Thought

The present crisis in Islamic thought is more alarming than ever before. Admittedly, the long-standing isolation previously mentioned has resulted in incompetence and superficiality of thought, but it is not the main cause of the crisis. Much more to the point is the inability of our thinkers to measure the extent of change that has taken place in the realm of knowledge, culture, and civilization in the modern world. There is also a parallel inability to locate the points of strength in the sources of Islamic knowledge and to learn from past experience.

As a result of this situation, people have felt the urgent need to restore *Ijtihād*. This call has brought about conflicting reactions. Some have argued that it

should be restored even if it has been revoked. Nonetheless, *‘Ijtihād* has remained sealed up and consequently thought has remained inept. Here and there, however, have emerged occasional glimpses of systematic thought which could have defined the direction of knowledge, thought, and culture but which have failed to mature into proper schools of thought because they depended so heavily upon the characters of the men who initiated them.

But redefinition and redirection of thought require a radical change in our attitude toward what the human mind can and cannot do. This is essential because the main cause of the crisis of knowledge lies in our understanding of the sources of knowledge, which has confused our attitude toward reason. The crisis also lies in the nature of our Islamic methods of research, which are confined to textual studies of language, traditions, and orthodox jurisprudence. These two attitudes are manifested in our tendency to regard the *faqīh* (jurist) as one who is still capable of resolving the crisis of thought, culture, and knowledge. The jurist is expected to use *‘Ijtihād* in order to provide solutions and alternatives which the *‘Ummah* might use to counter its enemies.

If we desire to reform our knowledge, culture, and civilization to steer the Islamic movement in the right direction to invigorate the Muslim character and to formulate plans for Islamic *da‘wah* (preaching), we must initiate reform in each of the following ways:

First, we must rectify the relationship between Divine Revelation and reason as manifested in our lines of thinking.

Second, we must redefine knowledge in a way that leaves no ambiguity about concepts such as *‘Ijtihād* and roles such as that of the *faqīh*. In this respect, there must be a clear-cut distinction drawn between *‘Ijtihād* and *‘Ifā‘* (deliverance of formal legal opinion) in the light of the current trends in Islamic thought.

Third, we must reorganize and reorient the methodology of Islamic education and instruction in order to put an end to the confused dualism that divides knowledge into intellectual, social, religious, and legal categories, thereby creating further dualism in the leadership.

A. Rectifying the Relationship Between Revelation and Reason

It is quite obvious that the position of superiority achieved by the West in the realm of knowledge and thought is purely intellectual and has nothing to do with Divine Revelation. In spite of the tremendous achievements reached by Western thought in experimental fields, Western scholars cannot deny the maladjustment and imbalance in Western society. This is caused by the inap-

plicability of empirical methods to the conflict between societal welfare on the one hand and the pursuance of personal desires and interests on the other. This is so because human reason alone is incapable of attaining the ultimate truth about and full understanding of what is desirable for humanity in this life and in the life hereafter. This predicament lies in the fact that Western civilization is lost in so many haphazard and contradictory theories that it is unable to arrive at one single theory or confidently resolve any problem. Islamic sources of knowledge on the other hand are Divine Revelation and reason. There is no problem in saying that revelation and reason are the sources of knowledge in Islam, but the problem lies in defining and giving a concrete shape to the relationship between the two.

Such a dichotomy has no place in Islam because Divine Revelation embodies the objectives of human reason and prescribes checks and controls against intellectual deviation and spiritual perversion. Nonetheless, it is important for Muslims to realize that Divine Revelation itself might be subject to misunderstanding and misinterpretation. This is both a problem and a challenge which Muslims have to face because inadequate use of intellectual faculties may also thwart the revelation itself. Fears about the negative results of a perverted misuse of intellectual faculties, which have beset the lives of non-Muslims, should not discourage Muslims from the application of reason. Should that be the case, Muslims would lose the golden opportunity that Divine Revelation offers in defining the role of the mind for pursuing the purpose of existence. They might also misunderstand Divine Revelation, thereby wreaking further damage.

One can cite countless examples of the *'Ummah's* practices that result from ignorance, inexperience, and a failure to use systematic reasoning. Such deficiencies not infrequently lead the *'Ulamā'* to reach deceptive and unreasonable conclusions or to adopt unfortunate attitudes which cause more harm than good and also alienate Muslims and non-Muslims alike from the cause of Allah (SWT). This is the reason why it has to be emphasized that the crisis lies in the perception of the relationship between revelation and reason. This is to say that the two should be harmoniously synchronized so they are inextricably bound with one another. Revelation cannot function in the absence of a rational mind, and the rational mind is not worthy of recognition or respect if it strays from pure and simple revelation. Therefore it can be concluded that the core or the problem does not lie in the failure to use the mental faculties, but in the manner in which they are made to function as well as the quality of their functioning.

The mind is an indispensable source of knowledge, thought, and culture, but it must be used cautiously within the defined purpose of existence and the framework of revelation in a disciplined and committed spirit which seeks to enrich rather than enfeeble Islamic thought. In this way we can avoid the

haphazard practices and false assumptions that have disturbed and occasionally distorted our history.

This leads me to conclude with a few, emphatic statements. It is un-Islamic to indulge in any investigation or express one's opinion on any matter if one is uncertain of one's knowledge in this regard. Ignorance cannot enlighten anything or anybody. Conclusion reached through ignorance are usually extravagant and excessive. Islam enjoins us to refrain from extravagance and excessiveness, and requires us to exercise mercy and kindness. Accordingly, it is equally un-Islamic to disregard the needs of Muslims and the effect of what we say on their behavior. It is also un-Islamic to accept the notion that we are unable to look after the affairs of Muslims as a result of an inability to apply our mental faculties properly. Last but not least, it is un-Islamic to give reins and spurs to the human mind in total ignorance of Islamic principles, ideals, and values.

One example may clarify my point. If Muslim scholars had based their thinking solely on the apparent meaning of Islamic texts when considering the pricing system, they would have prohibited controlling prices. But common sense alerted them to the problems that might result. Observation and experience indicate quite clearly that in the absence of a truly free market the absence of a pricing system creates vices such as exploitation, fraud, and injustice to the masses. That being the case, an absolute prohibition of a pricing system would undermine the cause of Islam, which preaches justice and equality. This shows that the mind has been used advantageously and has proved capable of giving proper guidance in the light of the total spirit of Islam. By realizing the priority of justice in Islam, it has not been distracted by technical theories and considerations from accepting a system that might put a minimum of checks and controls on economic transactions.

Unfortunately, those whose common sense directed them to the necessity of a pricing system failed to analyze and comprehend the phenomenon in its totality. More consideration should have been given to reconstructing the market and reforming the financial infrastructure to achieve balanced transactions. It was not enough to introduce protective measures and be content with them. Nonetheless, it has to be emphasized that such introduction can reflect a courageous, well-informed policy. Such courage would demonstrate the good that can be derived from purposefully applying a seriously committed Islamic line of thinking to investigate a phenomenon and manage it cautiously and wisely within the frame-work of the fundamentals of Islam.

B. Redefining the Scope of Knowledge

One of the mistakes made by Muslim researchers as a result of the influence

of historical practice upon their manner of thinking is their continued belief that the orthodox jurists are the only persons responsible for defining the scope of Islamic knowledge. They believe them to be capable of providing the thinking and *Ijtihad* necessary for reorganizing modern life. They assume that the authority of these jurists can provide a basis for activity responding to the challenges the 'Ummah faces and provide it with alternatives to counter hostile cultural and social interests.

This understanding is basically wrong because it rests upon an assumption that is no longer valid in the realm of modern knowledge, namely that the *faqih* possesses the necessary knowledge capable of providing Islamic alternatives through rational effort. Historically, this understanding was largely true because the *faqih* was a merchant, philosopher, mathematician, physician, and chemist. In addition, he was well-versed in various branches of Islamic *Sharī'ah* and jurisprudence. In that capacity, he was well-equipped to direct his versatile intellectual abilities in the service of Islamic studies and in the interest of the 'Ummah.

We must realize, however, that modern knowledge has expanded immensely and has become so complex that it is impossible for a single person to acquire a command of the multiple aspects of even one branch of knowledge. This means that the ability necessary for *Ijtihad* in any one of the various branches of knowledge requires specialization in and absolute mastery of that branch. In view of this multifacetedness of knowledge, and the multifariousness of the fields of specialization, it is clear that *Ijtihad*, insights, solutions, and alternatives, in the domain of social and scientific knowledge cannot be provided by the specialists in legal studies alone. But the task and the expectation are impossible.

This is most noticeable in the case of the legislators who formulate and categorize the laws and regulations covering economics, politics, information, industry, and scientific research or transformation. It cannot be assumed that they are the masterminds of the knowledge from which the laws and regulations have been derived. In view of the achievements and progress made in the modern fields of knowledge, we need to bring to bear the expertise of economists, politicians, administrators, and others who are well-versed in the various affairs of social life as well. Such specialists should at the same time have first hand knowledge of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, which give them proper insight into the morals, values, and purpose of existence as understood in Islam and validate their activities and contributions.

Such well-equipped specialists can develop the legislative source materials on which legislators can draw to meet the day-to-day requirements of the 'Ummah and vitalize its existence. By so doing we can define the place of *Iftā'* and of the legislature in the field of knowledge, as well as realistically assess their potential social performance in order to avoid overburden or

misguiding either the experts or the solons. This means that we will continue to call upon orthodox jurist and legislators to provide the insights, originality, and answers to new, intricate problems, but only in conjunction with an unflinching determination to keep them abreast of knowledge by preparing cadres of specialists capable of living up to the expectations and requirements of the age.

The responsibility of these inter-disciplinary specialist cadres should not remain confined to a particular legislative think-tank or authority but should be shared by the academic community, by representatives of interest groups, and by legislative bodies responsible for pronouncements arising from the need and demands of the *Ummah's* social structure. This approach is necessary to enhance the intellectual vitality of the *Ummah* and to reduce any ambiguities or anxieties in its daily practices.

C. Establishing an Islamic Infra-Structure and Education

Historically, the dichotomy between the political and the intellectual leadership was the main cause of the weakness and gradual withering away of Islamic knowledge and culture, and also of the tyranny, ignorance, and despotism of the politicians. At present, as a result of the historical vacuum created by that dichotomy and the military, political, and cultural impact of Western colonial influence, there is still a dualism in knowledge itself.

There exists a so-called Islamic knowledge, which until recently became limited in scope and legalistic in nature, so much so that some of the so-called Islamic states dominated by secularism dared to amend, alter, and pervert even family and personal laws.

There also exists in the Muslim world an imported, secular knowledge, which dominates every aspect of life, and whose advocates respond thoughtlessly to and imitate blindly the trends and developments of the age. This secularism is perpetuated and popularized by institutions, universities, and organizations in the various Islamic countries.

The two categories of knowledge form a tree which is unable to grow because the first category lacks the essential dynamism to foster growth, and the second is alien to the Muslims, their lands, goals, and objectives. For this reason, when one talks about reforming and reconstructing the perspectives of Islamic knowledge and culture, one has in mind the initiation of a revival that should make them fit once again for production and growth. But that goal cannot be achieved without reconstructing and reorienting the programs of education and instruction. The hope for and the possibility of uprooting the forms of dualism in knowledge at the leadership level lies in providing technically

able and Islamically committed cadres who are well-versed in simplified and purposefully categorized Islamic teachings.

Initially, each field of specialization must include in its curriculum a sufficient number of texts of religious knowledge to mould and guide the mentality of the learner. Next, it would be imperative that every aspect of the curriculum reflect the objectives and values of the teachings of Islam in a harmoniously comprehensive manner so that the essential unity of the nature of Islamic knowledge and culture not be lost. Only then can the *Ummah* claim to possess knowledge that corresponds to the Islamic objectives. This approach will not leave any room for an Islamic university and a secular university to coexist at the same time and in the same place. There will be no room for limiting our objectives, thought, and curricula by confining them to legal and linguistic studies. There will be room only for studies oriented toward fulfilling the Islamic purpose of existence, abiding by its checks and controls, and following an Islamic approach to the sciences and the humanities. The reorientation of education and instruction toward a purely Islamic style for the fulfillment of Islamic objectives would include methodology, professional commitment, and social involvement in accordance with what is proper for each field and is required by the Muslim *Ummah*.

Talking about the bases of reform necessarily leads to investigation of the methods of research and foundations of Islamic thought in order to determine their place in the process of reform. This is necessary for a clear understanding of the relationship between the redefinition of knowledge and the reconstruction of its research methods on the one hand, and between the historical concept of the foundations of Islamic thought and the terms associated with it on the other.

Generally speaking the term *Uṣūl* refers to the sources and research methods in Islamic thought. In view of what has already been said it seems proper that the direction of reform should begin with investigating the sources of knowledge and determining the organic relationship between them prior to considering the issue of *Uṣūl*. *Uṣūl* is an inclusive term comprising a variety of unrelated issues which historical circumstances caused to be grouped together. In my opinion, this lack of homogeneity has become a source of confused intellectual and methodological complications. The term stands for the Qur'ān, the *Sunnah*, *Qiyās* (analogy) and *Ijmā'* (consensus). *Ijmā'* is a legal concept comprising the consensus of the competent scholars of the *Ummah* with regard to legal questions that are not commented upon in the written sources. *Qiyās* is also one of the legitimate sources of normative legal inference. Other elements of *Uṣūl* are "*Ḍarūrah*" (necessity), "*Maṣlahah*" (need of the hour), "*Istiṣhāb*" (association) and "*Istiḥsān*" (preference), all of which are methods to facilitate legal inference, i.e., to apply the Qur'ān to practical problems. This framework requires an objective, patient study to trace the

evolutionary development of the *‘Uṣūl* or methodology of Islamic thought and the various influences leading to its present formation in order to develop it and invigorate it so it can better serve Islamic knowledge, culture and legislation.

In spite of the superficiality, inaccessibility and general lack of specialized studies with regard to the research methods from which thought originated in the early phase of Islam, it is quite easy for us to perceive the vitality, initiative, courage, and perspicuity that characterized the thinkers of that generation. At the same time one cannot help noticing the instances of stagnation, rigidity, and trivialization that crept into Islamic research methods, particularly with regard to the concept of *Ijmā’* as understood by the exponents of *‘Uṣūl*.

It is important to realize that the current concept of *‘Uṣūl* was formulated in an earlier period and, in that capacity it responded to the needs of that age. The developments, changes, and trends in the realities of Muslim life require a reframing in order to determine the amendments that have to be introduced into the research methods pertaining to the study of Revelation and the pursuit of knowledge.

While instituting reform, the factors of time and place have to be given adequate consideration with regard to the influence they might have on the interpretation or amendment of each text individually, as well as on the totality of related texts within the framework of the principles of Divine guidance. For example, the traditions of the Prophet (ṢAAS) and the books on jurisprudence abound in minute details about the procedures pertaining to raising *zakāh*, on animal and plant production, because these were the sources of wealth in the Arabian Peninsula during the life of the Prophet (ṢAAS). That is why he had to utilize whatever sources were available to meet the needs of the poor and indigent sections of the population. We also find instances of exemption from *zakāh* with regards to industry, mining, and estate property, in accordance with the condition of wealth and production at that time. But at present we find that the wealth resulting from the production of oil is historically unprecedented, and that the future of revenues from estate property and that of the nation itself depends upon industry. Such developments require careful and focal reconsideration to achieve the noble objectives of meeting the needs of the indigent and the “have-nots.”

The effects of time and place must influence our methodological approach to understanding the totality of the *Sunnah* of the Prophet (ṢAAS) and the comprehensiveness of the instructions and plans which enabled him to find and organize the true Islamic Society.

Research work, particularly on the *Sunnah* of the Prophet (ṢAAS), has to be developed on similar lines. What is required is a comprehensive and detailed study of the texts pertaining to a particular issue, and establishing the relationships between the various issues in the light of the objectives formulated

by the Prophet (SAAS) for the Muslims in al Madinah and the Arabian Peninsula. A good example of such a fruitful approach was represented by a conference held by the Muslim Students Association in the United States and Canada. The proceedings of the conference have been published in the form of a book called *Contemporary Aspects of Economic and Social Thinking in Islam*. The participants deliberated on the issue of usury, singling out and studying patiently every relevant text focusing on how the policies which the Prophet (SAAS) adopted and the goals which he set for the abolition of the system of usury show his wisdom and far-reaching insight. The deliberations brought to light some texts which were hitherto quite unknown and dispelled all ambiguities.

The effect of time and place and a comprehensive study of issues in their right perspective puts special emphasis on the method of *Qiyās*, which ensures arriving at conclusions that are not limited by time and place but are in keeping with the spirit of the Prophet's *Sunnah*. In addition, *Qiyās* will put an end to the continuous disputes in which partial and unrelated texts are advanced without any comprehensive vision of what the realities of the present time require. These disputes continue to tear the *Ummah* apart through the repetitious introduction of trivial issues. Furthermore, the failure of research to point out the damage to Islamic studies and the inefficiency which result from such trivialization points to the ineffectiveness of such dispute. It needs to be emphasized that, however valid a partial issue may be, it is not necessarily the real issue. On the contrary, the conclusions arrived at may well be the exact opposite of what might have been made if the issue had been considered in its entirety, within the context of time and place, because such a holistic approach influences and highlights both the concept of *Qiyās* itself as well as the validity of the purpose it is required to serve.

I place much hope in the reconsideration of our approach to revealed knowledge and the quest for acquired knowledge. The way to achieve this seems to lie in clarifying the role we give the mind to investigate, discover, and verify subjects while giving due emphasis to the factors of time and place. Such reconsideration is the way to allow the mind to serve and be guided by Revelation so that we may attain—through *qiyās*—a comprehensive vision with true insight into the core of our heritage, whose fundamentals and objectives are beyond the barriers of time and place. This approach will enable us to reconstruct our system of education and instruction and thereby achieve unity of knowledge and leadership.

III. Islamization of a Discipline: Political Science

The problems facing Islamic thought are complex, but they can be best

illustrated by a consideration of a single discipline. First, political science is a social field of study which for various reasons has hitherto drawn little attention from Muslim scholars. Second, the historical dichotomy between the intellectual and political leadership has caused technical, unsystematic methods of thought to dominate Islamic studies. Thirdly, these inadequate methods have failed to develop a comprehensive vision capable of providing solutions and alternatives appropriate to the requirements of time and place to meet the challenges of progress, change, and construction.

A. Examples of Deficiency

The intellectual deficiency in this field may be illustrated by citing two examples. The issues involved here have already been posed by two eminent figures in the field of Islamic jurisprudence, but they remain unresolved because of the inadequacy of their methodology, which can be detected by any specialist in the field.

The first example comes from *al Qāḍī* Abū al Walīd Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn al Rushd, al Qurtūbī al Andalusī. In his treatise on Islamic jurisprudence, *Bidāyah al Muḥtaḥid wa Nihāyah al Muḥtaḥid*, this eminent scholar describes the differences of opinion among jurists over the sanctions against cutting trees in time of war. The confusion originated from the assumption that AbūBakr’s prohibition against cutting trees during the *Riddah* (Apostasy) was not in conformity with the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, who, during his campaign against *Banū al Naḍīr*, burnt down their date-trees. To reach a compromise for the justification of AbūBakr’s action, it is argued that: a) AbūBakr knew that the permission to burn trees was later abrogated by the Prophet and b) the Prophet’s action was confined to the particular campaign against *Banū al Naḍīr*. Ibn Rushd’s final comment on the literature regarding this issue is that “those who endorse the Prophet’s action, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, have to abide by his directives.”

It goes without saying that it is obligatory upon every Muslim to act publicly and privately in accordance with the spirit of the *Sharī‘ah* both in peace and war time. This caution has to be made because modern military strategies require more alertness, vigilance, initiative, and dynamism than those planned and executed in distant times and at different places. This means that the requirements of the present times are essentially different from those of the past. If the foregoing instance is considered in this context, it will be clear that purely theoretical but unspecialized and unsystematic reasoning creates false issues and conclusion, and tries to resolve the inner contradictions it has created by resorting to hypothetical suppositions.

The very tendency to hunt for textual quotations when considering the nature of the stands and policies to be adopted by the leadership to counter military

challenges and resolve political conflicts is in itself a kind of theoretical thinking which the leadership cannot adopt practically or consider seriously. Objective thinking necessitates approaching and dealing with each problem in the context of its specific requirements in time and place so as to attain clarity of vision about the responsible and unquestionably Islamic reaction demanded by the particular situation.

If we adopt such a realistic and comprehensive approach, there will be no point in making a comparison between the blockade of *Banū al Naḍīr* (which occurred at a stage in the foundation of the State in Madinah when the Muslims were not only outnumbered, but threatened in their very existence by the enemies) and the campaigns by the Muslim army despatched by AbūBakr to conquer Iraq and Syria.

The campaign against the *Banū al Naḍīr* took place at a time when Madinah had very little power and limited resources. Indeed, the Prophet properly realized that the deterioration of Muslim prestige in Madinah had made the whole cause vulnerable to the greatest dangers. On the other hand, *Banū al Naḍīr*, who also enjoyed a well-established solidarity with the Jews, were able to withstand any seige, no matter how long it lasted, because they had a permanent supply of ground water for their orchards in Madinah on which they very much depended. Madinah's dates are particularly known for their long-lasting nutritious value. From a military point of view, a prolonged seige was bound to exhaust and incapacitate the Muslim army. Consequently, the Prophet ordered the Muslims to cut down the date trees and burn them in order to reduce the incentive for the Jews to stay in Madinah and to protect and enjoy their properties. Since date trees take a long time to grow and bear fruit, the Prophet's decision also put an end to the Jew's main source of food. It also ended the conflict in favor of the Muslims without any losses. Realizing the imminent doom that might result from this strategy, *Banū al Naḍīr* requested safe passage out of Madinah and permission to take with them what they could of their belongings. The true significance of the Prophet's wise strategy was demonstrated by the fact that peace, tranquility, and prosperity were eventually restored in Madinah, after the forced evacuation of the *Banū al Naḍīr*.

AbūBakr dispatched expeditions to combat the hostile Roman and Persian empires, which threatened the very existence of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula by stationing some of their military forces along the Muslim borders. These armies practiced all forms of atrocities, especially in Iraq and Syria where they oppressed the inhabitants, usurped their produce and possessions, and prohibited any worship that did not conform to their own faith. Consequently, with proper insight and wisdom, AbūBakr planned to put an end to this state of violence, tyranny, and oppression in a manner that would not alienate those in whose cause he had dispatched his liberating forces. In other words, he had to act in a manner that would clearly demonstrate the fundamen-

tal moral and ethical differences between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. If the liberating armies had been allowed to cut down and burn the date-trees, the consequences to the Muslims would have been disastrous. Losing their source of sustenance, the inhabitants would have sided with the old tyrants. Viewed from this angle, the validity and wisdom of Abu Bakr’s action cannot be questioned. Both the Prophet’s action and that of his successor were appropriate for the particular conditions they faced. There is no point in forcing or permitting a text known to AbūBakr to raise the issue of deviance from the Prophet’s *Sunnah*. The real problem lies in our approach and in our methods of thinking.

The second example comes from the contemporary *Faqīh Shaykh* Sayyid Sābiq, whose writings are very popular in Islamic circles. His book *Fiqh al Sunnah* holds a high place among jurists. The book includes a chapter on *Jihad* wherein this eminent scholar talks about *Tabyīt* or taking the enemy by night. *Shaykh* Sābiq considers various aspects of the subject and elaborates on the reasons that necessitate night attacks, such as fear that the enemy might resort to killing Muslim prisoners of war or totally uninvolved people in case of an open attack. He also considers the negative aspects for the Muslims, such as killing innocent people whom they could not identify in the darkness. He cites many orthodox views on the matter to authenticate and justify his ultimate conclusion that *tabyīt* is permissible.

The problem facing the reader who wants to have a full grasp of the subjects of *jihad*, politics, and war in Islam, however, does not lie in the appropriateness of *Shaykh* Sābiq’s material or its authentication. It lies, rather, in the failure to satisfy the expectations of the specialist, the research student, the man in authority, and the common reader—each of whom comes to *Shaykh* Sābiq’s work expecting to find an answer to the challenges he encounters in his special field. Unfortunately, he finds that both the vision and the manner of presentation are disarmingly helpless. Thus his hopes and expectations are dashed to the ground.

There is no doubt that *tabyīt* was an indispensable element in the ancient wars which were fought with swords and spears by soldiers usually on horseback. In those times, though it might have been difficult, it was not impossible to distinguish between one person and another; and should there be any victims, they would not exceed tens or hundreds. But modern wars do not distinguish between day and night, or man and woman. Their victims are counted in the thousands, in fact hundreds of thousands. The targets for destruction are chosen according to their strategic significance irrespective of who lives and works there. They can begin and end in the twinkle of an eye. In such wars, the study under discussion is totally irrelevant and useless. The pertinent problem here concerns the method of study, research, presentation, thought, and insight.

If we realize the nature of the problems affecting Islamic thought as a result of its methodological deficiencies, we can easily understand the inadequacy of Islamic political studies. This shortcoming appears in the limited, contradictory, and naive nature of our studies despite the loftiness of the principles behind them such as the system of the caliphate, *Shūrā* (consultation), justice, brotherhood, equality, freedom, and responsibility.

By failing to combat important problems, our processes of thought have created chaos in our political perceptions and made the *'Ummah* incapable of participating actively or exerting sufficient effort to counter the forces that threaten its very existence. There are two types of inadequacies:

- 1) Misconceptions about original texts and models, which are the source of the Islamic vision that regulates thought and *jihād*, and
- 2) The perilous, naive, and mindless drive for Westernization, which has caused some of our intellectuals to embrace concepts and systems that have distorted our thought and blurred our vision.

B. The Caliphate: A Case Study in Confusion

One of the most misunderstood concepts in the field of political science is the system of the Caliphate. Muslim scholars consider it no more than a system of autocracy. Some intellectual leaders even speak apologetically about what they call the just autocrat "*al Mustabid al 'Ādil*". Such tendencies result from the concentration in Islamic studies upon mere technical conditions such as who should be the caliph, who should be the heir, the pledge of allegiance, the obligation upon the ruler to follow *Sharī'ah*, and the duty of the masses to obey him. But they fail to fathom the core of the political and organizational operation, the factors and forces affecting its structural stability, and the regulations that determine the choice and define the role of the political and social cadres responsible for handing over authority from one leader to another and from one generation to the next. Equally important is the ability of these cadres to supervise the manner of decision-making, the manner in which the leadership exercises authority, and the limits it should not exceed. The urgent need for these fundamental checks and controls totally escapes the attention of the writers in this discipline, due no doubt to the dichotomy between the intellectual and the political leadership and the writers' lack of experience and specialization. These shortcomings have resulted in shallow thinking, unsystematic reasoning, and simplistic perception not only of the systems under consideration but of history itself.

The misconceptions about the Caliphate system are not baseless. First the system holds a tremendous significance in Islamic thought as it vibrates with

spiritual as well as historical connotations dating back more than a millennium. As a result of the changes that have taken place since that distant period of time, nostalgic feelings make it difficult, even for an expert, to visualize the workings of the structure of this system.

Needless to say, the study of political systems cannot be confined to studying the official organizations, documents, and regulations of government. It has to include all of the official and unofficial factors and forces that influence the system one way or the other. In the absence of such a comprehensive approach, neither the system nor its working can be understood. Unfortunately, the Caliphate system does not lend itself to this kind of examination. There is only a bare minimum of officially documented information about the organizational structure of the system. This insufficiency is no fault of the system itself but a natural by-product of the primitive nature of the environment in which the system originated. Before the rise of Islam, there was no complex system of monarchy or empire in the Arabian peninsula. It was inhabited by scattered tribes each following its own style of life. These tribes had never been united under one government before the establishment of the Muslim society which, as a result of the challenges it faced and the insufficiency of the human potential, did not pay much attention to the luxury of maintaining codified documents. Therefore the Muslim government in Madinah under the rule of the Prophet and his companions needed to do no more than to lead the *'Ummah* and administer the political and military affairs of the community for 23 years. It is no wonder therefore that there is a scarcity of detailed information on how leaders were chosen. The companions who established the government inevitably constituted the collective leadership. They knew about each other's competence and commitment to the cause of Islam. Each of them knew where he stood in relation to the Prophet (ṢAAS) and the other companions. This is why the nomination of the caliph presented no difficulty at all. The mosque provided the place where the cadres of the leadership and the public consulted with each other and settled all matters relating to the welfare of the *'Ummah*. The common commitment to the cause of Islam, which characterized the leaders as well as the members of the public, made the system function smoothly.

The period covered by *al Khulafā' al Rāshidūn*, however, was too short for systematic organization of the foundations on which the transition of the leadership could take place from one generation to the next in accordance with the principles outlined during the life of the Prophet (ṢAAS) or his immediate successors. This is the reason why immediately after the collapse of *al Khulafā' al Rāshidūn* the fundamental qualities for the choice of a leader, such as seriousness, ability, and religious commitment gave way to tribal bias, self-interest, and power.

Therefore an examination of the system of *al Khulafā' al Rāshidūn* and in-

sight into the manner in which it functioned has to be cautious and specialized. Jumping to shallow conclusions and making sweeping generalizations about concepts such as the benevolent autocrat do more harm than good to the cause of Islam. In addition, such approaches are in direct contradiction to the Qur'ān.

This leads me to the conclusion that we have had enough of such irrational inferences. If our concern about our heritage is genuine, we must subject every aspect of that heritage to specialized and systematic study. This is all the more necessary with respect to the modelling of our political set-up on that of *al Khulafā' al Rāshidūn*.

One of the issues arising from shortsightedness is the common misconception about the system of *al Shūra*. The issue was raised by Abū Bakr's decision during the *Riddah* Wars. The argument goes that Abū Bakr made the decision to go to war against the murtaddīn in spite of the opposition of 'Umar and some of the other companions. The strange thing is that those who follow this line of argument cling to marginal points lifted from the text of the dialogue between Abū Bakr, who stood for the war, and the companion, who argued otherwise.

This argument is faulty because it fails to put the issue in its proper context. It fails to realize that the subjugation of the primitive, pagan tribes and their accommodation into the new system occasioned many Divine revelations to the Prophet (ṢAAS) and decisions by him. These show that accepting Islam was one thing, and abiding by the regulations of the new system was quite another. This is expressly stated in the [Qur'ān, *Sūrah al Ḥujurāt* (49):14].

Second, this argument fails to appreciate, or rather understand, the character of Abū Bakr, who is known for his tolerance, mercy, compassion, intelligence, and sagacity. In addition, there was nothing novel in the events that led to the *Riddah* wars. Even during the life of the Prophet (ṢAAS), some tribes revolted against the new system and some individuals even claimed prophethood. Names such as Musaylamah, Sajaḥ, and al Aswad al 'Anasī are well known. Well aware of this background, Abū Bakr would never have made an immature or a thoughtless decision. Those who think otherwise fail to realize the amount of time and the degree of effort needed to fathom the subtle considerations that underlie important political decisions.

A comprehensive examination of the issue reveals that it was much more than a theoretical confrontation or a quibble about words, as the available studies we have want us to believe. First, the issue poses important questions about the social and political reorganization of the Arabian Peninsula under a new system. Second, the issue involved here provides a concrete example of the problems that influence political decisions and the conditions that underline the responsibility of accepting political leadership. This is clearly shown in the confrontation between Abū Bakr as Caliph and 'Umar as a

representative of a group that did not at first understand the magnitude of the issue. ‘Umar told Abū Bakr that he should either accept the opinion of his counsellors or leave the caliphate. Abū Bakr did not accept either of these alternatives. He stuck to his opinion with the full conviction that he was doing the right thing and argued patiently and persuasively in favor of his opinion. Eventually ‘Umar and his supporters were able to perceive and concede to Abū Bakr’s viewpoint. ‘Umar later admitted that Abū Bakr’s perseverance, subtle firmness, and acute intelligence left no ground for misunderstanding or ambiguity. The force of the argument opened the hearts of his opponents to the truths of his convictions, and they consequently reconciled themselves to the right path. This issue amply demonstrates that the caliph had no authority over his counsellors, but it was his personal characteristics which won him their support and full confidence. It is pertinent to mention here that they had previously told the caliph that if they observed in him any deviation from the right path, they would straighten him out by the use of force. Their acquiescence in this particular case shows their conviction of and satisfaction with Abū Bakr’s point of view.

The objective researcher will not fail to realize the significance of *al Shūrā* and how it was practiced during the period of the four *Khulafā’ al Rāshidūn*. Mutual consultation was the rule rather than the exception. There was no place for any form of despotism. Those who think otherwise are definitely shortsighted. Their failure lies in their inability to distinguish between executive and administrative matters, which necessarily limit the scope of responsibility, and major political decisions, which require consultation, exchange of ideas, and a minute examination of these ideas so that the final decision will be binding on all concerned because of their conviction and satisfaction. Such consultation and conviction are essential to success.

C. Un-Islamic Concepts and Terminology

There is a great deal of confusion in Islamic studies regarding foreign systems and the political terminology used in them. This confusion is due to the researchers’ insufficient knowledge of the foreign systems on the one hand, and the inadequacy of their approach on the other. These drawbacks are further augmented by thoughtlessly striving to catch up with the standards of the so-called “civilized” world. Under such pressure research is hastily conducted and consequently not only fails to achieve the desired goals but also adds to the confusion, lack of discrimination, and uncertainty.

1. *Democracy*

These two related concepts of democracy and sovereignty are alien to our

culture. Nonetheless, Muslim scholars have given them undue importance both as academic terms and as concepts. Some scholars go so far as to argue that they are in tune with the spirit and teachings of Islam and have to be adopted into Islamic thought and political systems.

There is no doubt that there are some apparent similarities between these concepts and the overall spirit of Islam. Unfortunately, these concepts contain un-Islamic elements which our scholars have failed to detect. Through this failure, Islamic thought has inherited a kaleidoscopic phenomenon in which the pursuit of insignificant similarities has brought about undesirable notions that completely distort an already blurred vision.

Democracy, both as a concept and a system, has ancient roots in Western history, thought, and philosophy. It does not signify merely the procedural measures of choosing political leaders. It is a natural extension of the materialistic philosophy that regards man as a physical entity whose value is measured in terms of the pragmatic or utilitarian sense of his usefulness to the "state," society, and the world. The spiritual aspect of man's existence, which is his real value, is not stressed in this system. In essence, democracy is no more than an amalgamation of individuals who, by forming a majority, assume the right and the power to propagate their thoughts and achieve their personal interests, while making minimal concessions to minorities.

This is the reason why concepts such as majority, minority, election, party system etc., are of paramount importance in Western political systems. Since these systems are based on secular foundations, any concept of justice cannot be of real value to the individual or to society. Indeed, the systems provide legal loopholes for the strong to gratify their personal interests at the expense of the weak.

Although *al Shūrā* aims at choosing the proper leadership, establishing checks and controls over them, and arriving at decisions accepted, appreciated, and supported by the public, it is not the same thing as democracy, which seemingly seeks to achieve similar purposes. By definition, *al Shūrā*, derives from a philosophical perception essentially different from that of democracy. This difference lies in the notion of justice as a concrete fact of existence which man arrives at through his own nature and Divine revelation, and which he endeavors to attain irrespective of his personal desires and interests. As a method, the system of *al Shūrā* provides the procedure whereby Muslims sit together and deliberate upon important matters to arrive at and be bound by conclusions in the light of the philosophical concept of justice. If the issue under consideration does not concern justice but a case of preferring one to the other, there is no harm in adopting measures such as voting, abiding by the point of view of the minority, etc. The same measures could be resorted to if the discussion reached a deadlock in the absence of an authentic analogy. But even here, no decision should be taken until everybody has had the chance

to express his or her opinion and cite relevant evidence.

Hasty decisions, insufficient investigation, and blind imitation will not bring about the reform we desire. If we concentrate on the philosophical background of the concepts pertaining to this or that system, we will be able to develop insight into the nature of Islamic political systems, whose processes for arriving at and executing decisions are totally different from those of the West. Blind Westernization will not only cause us to drift away from our avowed goals but will ultimately lead to catastrophic results.

2. *Sovereignty*

Some Muslim scholars have introduced the concept of sovereignty into Islamic thought, arguing that the pledge of loyalty by individual persons to the Caliph confers sovereignty on the *Ummah*. Others disagree with this view on the grounds that since Divinely revealed knowledge is the only source of the *Sharī‘ah*, no mortal can be vested with such powers. Thus, the term sovereignty applies to Allah alone. In my opinion any debate on the merits or demerits of this term with the intention of adopting or rejecting it does no service to Islamic thought. It distorts rather than clarifies the vision.

Sovereignty is a Western concept deeply rooted in the gradual evolution of Western systems. On all occasions it was resorted to in order to determine who should be entrusted with the responsibility of decision-making in the fields of politics and legislation. It first emerged during the confrontation between the monarchy and the feudal lords who gained power by uniting together during the emergence of the European nationalist states. Eventually the term sovereignty was used to indicate the placing of political and legislative power in the hands of the representatives of the people. This became politically evident after the broadening of political participation and the emergence of new classes which sought to achieve position of influence within the competing industrial and commercial communities.

Arguments about adopting or rejecting this term clearly show not only insufficient awareness of the nature of the Islamic constitution but also the inability to distinguish between the varying levels of decision-making in Islamic systems. It is incorrect to assume that any one authority or level of authority in the legislative affairs of the *Ummah* is absolute. Nor is it correct to assume that legislative bodies do not exist in the Muslim *Ummah*. To dispel any misconceptions in this regard, we have to be aware of the different legislative levels on the basis of which we can determine the fields of specialization in Muslim communities. The basic constitutional elements, which are the fundamental principles and values revealed in the Qur’ān, cannot be questioned or tampered with. They must be accepted as they are. But legislation at the level of the daily concerns of existence and to which we do not find any direct

reference in the Qur'ān or the *Sunnah* can be handled by the specialist bodies in the various sectors of the *Ummah*. If we reject this, how can we possibly explain Islamic practices such as “*Ijtihad*,” “*Ra'i*,” (opinion) and “*Tarjih* (preponderance).”? If the outcome of such efforts is not called “legislation,” what else can we call it? In practice many of our differences and disputes are settled through the previously mentioned channels, which neither permit confrontation over the source of the decision taken or cause enmity between the deliberating parties. There is no place for victory or defeat.

Blind imitation of Western systems ultimately leads to confusion in defining the spheres within which the various bodies conducting the affairs of the *Ummah* should behave in accordance with Islamic teachings. Mixing the two systems by adopting the concept of sovereignty leads either to depriving the *Ummah* of the power of decision-making and turning it over to an individual who behaves according to his own personal interpretation of what is right and wrong, or placing absolute authority in the hands of the *Ummah* irrespective of whether the structure is compatible with the spirit of Islam.

Sovereignty has no place in the framework in which the Islamic political structure is organized, but it does exist in the workings of the basic legislative spheres. The issue posed is not whether the source of decision-making is revealed knowledge or the *Ummah*. The real issue, needed for the implementation of a properly Islamic system, is a method which enables the *Ummah* to practice its role and authority in accordance with the true purpose and spirit of Islamic teachings. This method is necessary to understand properly the nature of the Islamic framework, its evolution, and the challenges it has encountered since the Umayyad period, as well as to sustain a commitment to its future.

3. Separation of “Church and State”

In the absence of a clear-cut Islamic literature in the field of political science, Muslim scholars continue to pose the question whether Islam is a state, a religion, or both. This debate entails feelings of embarrassment in Muslim scholars whenever there is a call for the restoration of the Caliphate in our age. These two issues amply demonstrate the success of orientalists and hostile non-Muslims in confusing and misleading the thought of scholars.

By raising these issues our attention has been diverted from more useful engagements. Indeed, in the absence of a proper method and research, we will never attain any clarity of vision, and will continue to mistake trivial issues for important ones. Comprehensive insight into Islam reveals that it does not sanction any form of separation between religion and politics. Islam signifies that concepts such as the nature of the Creator, good and evil, the Hereafter, etc., all aim at giving proper guidance to man's behavior at the

individual as well as at the social level. This point is too obvious to be elaborated upon. But the fact remains that there are conditions which have resulted in unnecessarily prolonged and futile discussions on the preceding themes. These conditions are: the non-Muslims distorted picture of Christianity; Muslim awareness about the crisis of knowledge; Muslim dissatisfaction with the existing systems and an urgent desire to find an easy way out of the crisis. Thus enemies of Islam were able to take advantage of this situation by writing about Islam in a manner that would make the non-perceptive Muslim believe that they were praising it. They would glorify it as a legacy full of indisputable Divine secrets that ignore the social needs of human existence. Once that un-Islamic idea had been inculcated, they began to hammer the minds of Muslims with concepts such as mastery, racism, nationalism, secularism, and communism—all of which are contrary to the purposes, principles, and values of the teachings of Islam. The end result for the Muslims is confusion, decadence, and incapacity.

The issue of the Caliphate is representative of a state of confusion among Muslims over Islamic ideals, values, principles, and their historical application in Muslim societies.

Generally it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reinstitute historical systems in their entirety. This makes the hope of re-establishing the Caliphate system only a remote possibility, especially if the system is interpreted as a practical embodiment of political organizations. This is true whether such hopes are entertained by orientalists or Muslim scholars, irrespective of the degree of accurate perception in such interpretations. It needs to be emphasized that the Caliphate is no more than an Islamic term denoting the establishment of a social and political system in Islam. Any system, whatever its form, based on the requirements of time and place can be in keeping with the Caliphate system provided that it adheres to the Islamic fundamentals regulating the spiritual and mundane affairs of the *'Ummah*. No true Muslim would accept a system that is not based upon and committed to that Islamic purpose.

The Caliphate system is an ideal for which every Muslim must strive. But our struggle should not be clouded by transcendental or historical misconceptions. Nor should we be misled by those who have no respect for our Islamic identity. Such efforts require perseverance, determination, and originality.

D. Political Studies in Muslim Universities

The main theme of this essay is the need for the Islamization of knowledge in general and that of political science in particular. The first prerequisite in the process of Islamization is to have a clear idea of the reality of Islamic political studies. Without going into details one could say that texts pertain-

ing to Islamic political studies are no more than a handful of personal reflections on Islamic constitutional law, administration, biographies, and laws regulating war and peace. Despite that narrow scope, or perhaps because of it, they occupy a marginal place in most academic curricula. These studies are insufficient because:

- 1) There are scarcely any analytical studies in the field of Islamic political thought.
- 2) There is no effort to trace the nature and significance of issues brought about by political phenomena in Islamic history.
- 3) There is no attempt to distinguish between the original and alien elements, or the permanent and ephemeral elements in the system.
- 4) There is no clear-cut Islamic definition of international relations.
- 5) The historical factors that actually influenced the foundations of the *'Ummah*, its experiences, and interactions with other nations have been totally ignored.
- 6) The studies conducted both locally and internationally about Islamic systems of government and the lessons to be learnt from the actual application of these systems are also inadequate.

The reforms we are striving to achieve require the Islamization of knowledge in general and that of political science in particular because without proper insight into this field, the reconstruction of the *'Ummah* and the preparation of cadres for leadership are impossible. Initially this can be done by founding research centres and holding discussions in the hope of clarifying our vision and defining our objectives on a more systematic basis. Those in charge of such activities should be specialists committed to the cause of Islam and to the welfare of the *'Ummah*. Admittedly, the effort needed can be exacting because it required comprehensive and systematic analysis of the legacy of Islam in all its primary and secondary sources. A great deal of editing will be needed. Subjects will have to be categorized; terms will have to be coined, modified, or defined anew. A total renovation will be required.

Armed with deep insight, critical understanding, and systematic analysis, we would not refrain from investigating knowledge discovered by non-Muslims or adopting new experimental methods provided that we remain conscious of the differences in background, motivation, and purpose.

A great deal of time has already been wasted. Research centers and academic institutes should now take up the challenge.

Political and Constitutional Thought: Some Guidelines for Islamization

Mahmood A. Ghazi

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The Contemporary Age

We are living in a predominantly Western age with its thought-pattern, culture and civilization, and its intellectual make-up and educational training. This age of our history can rightly be called an age of intellectual enslavement preceded by an age of political and military subjugation. This intellectual enslavement is mostly the result of the long period of the imperialistic rule of the West over the Muslim world, but the main cause of its subsistence is our present academic and educational system which is based on Western concepts of education, developed after Western fashions and supplied with textbooks, curricula and sciences which are Western in their appearance, contents and spirit, and run by men educated in Western tradition.

Curriculum can always and easily be changed, and a number of efforts have been made in the Muslim world during the past one hundred years to evolve a suitable educational curriculum. Some of these efforts have also met with partial success. But the problem of the textbooks and the sciences which are taught has proven very difficult and cumbersome. Textbooks on many subjects cannot be written unless the relevant science and field is purged, purified and then recodified.

Every science, social or human, physical or chemical, comprises a set of notions and information arranged and systematized according to the ideas and beliefs, outlooks, dispositions, social conditions and intellectual environments of its founders and experts. They codify and design their sciences according to their intellectual, academic and ideological requirements. The sciences designed, systematized and developed by a particular people or nation are fashioned after its own basic concepts and outlooks and nurtured by its own historical developments.

The Social Sciences we have inherited from the West are a clear example of this fact. These have originated in the West, developed in a peculiar Western historical background and have a definite European color and nature in their contents as well as in their spirit. These Sciences cannot be imported and implanted in an environment which is totally different from that of Europe. Even in Europe, when and where that environment required change, the need was felt to critically re-examine, recodify and re-interpret it according to the new requirements and environments. The examples of the Russian and the Communist world are before us. They have rejected all Western Sciences and dismissed them as Bourgeois sciences and felt the need to reconstruct all the sciences in the light of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. During the past fifty years they have changed and recodified all the social, human, physical and other sciences and made them in consonance with Communist philosophy. The Muslim world should not hesitate to follow the Communist example; it should reject all the sciences it inherited from the West in their present form and contents and should reconstruct them anew on the bases of Islamic ideology.

We should treat the Western sciences as a raw-material which should be thoroughly re-examined. What is useful and in consonance with our ideology should be retained, recodified and reformed and the rest should be rejected and thrown away.

This process which has been termed as the process of *Islamizing* the knowledge should be in three phases:

1. In phase one all the social and human sciences of the West should be critically examined and their drawbacks and shortcomings should be pointed out. The elements which are repugnant with our ideology should also be pointed out.
2. In phase two the rest should be recodified and re-stated so as to be in total conformity with our intellectual traditions.
3. In phase three, it should be integrated with our classical literature on the subject so that, on the one hand, the intellectual experiments and discoveries of the modern world are fully and suitably utilized and, on the other hand, our traditional sciences are also revitalized and re-invigorated.

In this paper a very humble effort has been made to produce a brief critique of the Western political and constitutional thought with a view to contribute, of course on very modest scale, to the cherished ideal of the *Islamization of knowledge*.

Background

The Western political thought traces its origin and subsequent development to the Greek Philosophy and thought. It has been generally agreed upon by

the writers on the history of European political theories that the systematic political thinking in the West began with the ancient Greeks. The main cause of the origination of systematic political philosophy in ancient Greece is said to have been the essential secularity of their mind which had made them particularly prone to reason about things.

The so-called city-state of the early Greece provided that immortal model which constitutes the basic and foremost source of all political thinking in the West. The models it set, the terms it employed and the lines of argumentation it adopted are still discernible in the political utterances and practices of the modern West.

The earliest form of Government in ancient Greece was monarchy. The monarch claimed his descent from Greek national gods and this claim was generally believed to be right and genuine. As such he was also the chief pontiff for his subjects. He exercised his authority with the help of a proto-type of a Council of elders and a public Assembly which had practically no say in decision-making; the monarch had absolute powers. But this despotic arrangement did not last long. By the middle of fourteenth century BH / eighth century B.C., the nobles were in position to take an effective share in the statescraft and to change the absolute monarchy into a limited aristocracy. In this system power was concentrated in the hands of a few privileged and wealthy nobles. Due to its inherent defects, the system soon turned into what they called oligarchy, i.e., the selfish rule of the wealthy few. The political set-up of ancient Greece fluctuated between these two systems: absolute tyrant monarchy or the aristocratic oligarchy.

The political thinking crystallized during this period was systematized and epitomized by Plato and Aristotle. Both of them exerted the utmost influence over the subsequent political and philosophical thinking in the Orient and in the Occident. But it is strange that they lived at a time when the hey days of the ideal Greek democracy had gone. The ideal political systems, as visualized by these two thinkers, are only reflections of the political realities of early Greece.

After the Greeks, the Romans came forward and exerted their influence on the political and constitutional thought of the West. The political and constitutional history of the Romans was not basically much different from that of the Greeks. Ancient Rome periodically saw the emergence of monarchies and republics. Their republics were, in fact, a more developed form of Greek oligarchy. Wealth and property played vital role in the achievement of a share in the administration. W.W. Fowler has criticized the ancient Roman republic as 'the most compact and powerful oligarchy that the world has ever yet seen.'¹

The Roman oligarchy gave rise to, and stabilized, the feudal system which became the most outstanding feature of medieval Europe. Feudalism continued to exist, developed and reached a peak between the fifth and eighth century

AH / eleventh and fourteenth century AC. It left its deepest possible impact upon the political and constitutional developments in Europe down through the ages. According to the theory of feudalism, the feudal lords were the vassals of the kings; the kings were the vassals of the Emperor, who was the vassal of God. In this hierarchy, all the vassals, big or small, were virtual sovereigns in their respective domains or constituencies.

Towards the middle of second century AH / eight century A.C. European feudalism took the shape of Holy Roman Empire which covered almost all of central Europe. The position of the emperor vis-a-vis other small kings and local potentates was almost the same as that of the kings vis-a-vis feudal lords. By this time the Church of Rome had assumed the character of a well-developed and well-knit religious organization which covered all of Europe. Now the government affairs were divided into two separate spheres: all the religious, divine and eternal matters came under the aegis and control of the Church headed by the Pope while the mundane and temporal things were given to the Emperor and his vassals. Ordinary and common citizens were ruled by two separate authorities. The Pope ruled the citizen's soul and the Emperor ruled the citizen's body.

With a long series of vicissitudes, the Holy Roman Empire managed to exist till the beginning of the thirteenth century AH / the nineteenth century AC. During this period, Europe saw a fluctuation between absolute monarchies and feudalist aristocracies. This fluctuation also frequently took place between the power and prestige of the Pope and the Emperor.

This was, in brief, the history of the major political and constitutional developments which took place in Europe during a period extending over twenty-five hundred years and contributed to the advancement of political and constitutional thought in the West. Now some brief observations will be made on the characteristics and thought-patterns of European political and constitutional philosophy.

Characteristics and Thought Patterns

'The Middle Ages', says Sir Ernest Baker, 'are not dead. They live among us, and are contemporary with us, in many institutions of our life and many modes of our thought.' In this analysis, Ernest Baker is absolutely right. Both in their outward manifestations and in their spirit, most political, legal and constitutional institutions of the modern West trace their origin to Greek and Roman history. The Romans did not have much interest in philosophical speculation and thinking as compared to the Greeks, however, they had a special interest in establishing legal and political institutions. Their taste for evolving institutions seems to be somewhat out of proportions. It seems that they

gave more significance to the outward manifestations of the institutions than to the principles, spirit and the philosophy behind them. The most striking illustration of the institutionalizing mind of the Romans is perhaps the institution of the Church. With the passage of time it turned a living religion into a spiritless semi-political semi-religious institution.

Today, perhaps under the impact of this Roman spirit, it is generally believed that the establishment of institutions, specially political and constitutional, must be ensured for the proper realization of concepts, ideals and principles. It is true that the institutions have their importance, but what is clear and evident is that every institution has an outward appearance and an organizational structure which is essentially different from the spirit and the philosophy working behind it. Normally when some idea, thought or philosophy is reduced to an institution, in view of our present understanding of it, it is gradually relegated to the background while the outward appearance of the institution comes to the forefront. With the passage of time, the outward appearance becomes "real" in the minds of the people and the *real* idea or thought withers away. There can be many examples from history and social life to illustrate this contention. But since the present discussion is in the context of political thought, suffices here to refer to the principle of public participation in the affairs of the government as practiced in the institution of parliament. Now when we study the relevant provisions of the constitutions of various countries we feel that the basic idea of public participation in the affairs of the government is seldom kept in view.

Under the impact of the Romans, the love for appearance and outwardly manifestation of the institutions has so much penetrated the Western mind that they generally dismiss the ideas and principles without any institutional manifestation. The example of the Islamic principle of *Shūrā* (consultation) can be cited here. The West had considered it necessary, in view of its peculiar conditions and peculiar historical background, that the consent of the masses and their confidence in the men-in-authority should be ascertained only through the ballot. Ballot and voting is only a means to realize the principles of the Public Will and public confidence. It is not an end in itself. The West has been practicing this method for the last several hundred years. The Europeans have now become so used to this peculiar process that many of them might not see any other method for ascertaining public confidence; they would consider all those who claim to have won the confidence of the masses without having recourse to this or that particular method as liars, false and unreliable. Thus, when they comment upon the Muslim rulers right from *al Khulafā' al Rāshidūn* "the rightly guided caliphs" they consider them to be self-styled rulers without any popular support and mandate.

We have already mentioned the institutionalization of Christianity at the hands of the Romans. In fact, the day the first step was taken to turn Chris-

tianity into an institution, it took its first step toward its downfall as a living religion. Although Christianity's political authority and prestige rose with the increase of its power and strength as an institution, the religious *soul* and the living *spirit* in it was shaken and impoverished. Consequently, the basic message of religion, i.e., the purification of the human soul, strengthening man's relation with God and accountability on the Day of the Resurrection, went into eclipse. Those who yearned for quenching their religious and spiritual thirst through the institution of Church met with failure and disappointment. Their disappointment gradually developed into resentment and, at last, the masses stood up and revolted against the authority of the Church.

This revolt was crystalized in the Reformation and the appearance of Protestantism. The very word 'protest' signifies that it was initially a negative reaction against the all-powerful authority and emotionless organization of the Church. The anti-Church lava which had been nourished for centuries, was given religious expression by Martin Luther and political expression by the kings and potentates of Europe, who not only adopted the protestant religion but also made the Church totally subservient to the Government. The rulers of central Europe and specially those of Germany were in the forefront, rendering their all-out support to Martin Luther's movement. They thought that through this movement they would be able to smash the authority of the Church and thereby to acquire absolute power and authority.

The Reformation coincided with the Renaissance. Each of them received impetus from the other; each of them was influenced by the other. Perhaps Martin Luther did not want to let loose the bond of religion. He denied only the special right for the Pope or any minister of the Church to interpret the religion and the scripture. But his denial set in motion that long process which resulted in the denial of all religious authority. The freedom of the individual in religious matters crossed all bounds and caused much corruptions and perversions, which in turn contributed to the complete transformation of Western culture into a heretic and God-less one.

During the past fifty years, a number of Western scholars embraced Islam and renounced Christianity in view of these basic drawbacks of Western materialism, Western culture and civilization. These scholars include celebrities like Leopold Weiss, Fritjof Schuon, Rene Guenon and T.B. Irving who are now known as Muḥammad Asad, Isa Nuruddin, 'Abd al Wāḥid Yaḥyā and al Ḥaj Ta'līm Alī respectively. The first three of them produced effective critiques of the Western thought, culture and civilization. In his book, *The Crisis of the Modern World*, Rene Guenon (Shaykh 'Abd al Wāḥid Yaḥyā) has made a detailed critical survey of the basis and spirit of the Renaissance and has established that the entire movement aimed at the total denial of the Divine guidance. According to Rene Guenon, the spirit of modern Western civilization is heretic and diabolical because it is the result of the Renaissance. The

literature produced in the West during this period frequently refers to the old Greek and Roman civilizations as their "Paradise Lost."

The gulf between the Church and the State was further accentuated by the philosophical dualism of the French philosopher, Descartes, a Roman catholic priest who perhaps wanted to save his religion through his writings. His apparent purpose was to take religion out of the arena of politics and public life to keep it safe in the private custody of the individuals. But it seems that he could not apprehend the far-reaching effects of his ideas. A similar attitude can be found in our recent history which was adopted by a section of our *Ulamā* in the Sub-continent after the debacle of 1273 / 1857. They tried to save Islam from the onslaught of Western culture and civilization by confining it to the four walls of mosques and *Madrasahs* (schools). But due to the vigor, vitality and dynamism at Islam, those negative results did not appear on the Sub-continent.

The separation of religion and politics resulted in the removal of ethics from political life. Politics concentrated more and more on the acquisition of material benefits and physical power. The more physical power one has the greater politician he is. Consequently, all scientific progress and technological development aimed at the acquisition of as much physical force and energy as possible. This attitude was given impetus by the writings of Machiavelli. He virtually replaced God by his prince. When these princely-gods started to tease mankind, they were replaced first by *nation* and *nationalism* and then by *patriotism*.

The bifurcation of human unity into religious and secular, spiritual and profane, Divine and mundane is the root-cause of all evils. The history of Europe during the past five hundred years bears testimony that such bifurcation of life could not give peace and spiritual satisfaction to mankind. Politics in the West has become devoid of all ethics, morality, truthfulness and mutual relationship on human grounds. I do not mean to say that these moral values are absent in Western life-style, but that these moral and ethical principles no longer have any real significance in European-style politics. Many legal, constitutional and political problems have emerged in Western-style politics due to the disregard of these principles. If we study the constitutions of modern countries, we come across a number of articles and provisions which clearly reflect the mutual distrust, misstatement and selfishness of their framers.

Contents and Terms of Reference

The Political and Constitutional thought of the West as it stands today, embraces a number of problems which do not find their parallels in the political and constitutional thought of Islam as expounded by its classical writers. These

problems can be divided into four major fields:

- (1) Basic political and constitutional problems and theories analyzed;
- (2) History of political thought in general;
- (3) Origins, development and comparative study of the constitutions of various countries;
- (4) Organization of the government, its various organs and agencies in various countries and their comparative study.

An overwhelming majority of the textbooks written on Western political and constitutional thought deal mainly with these issues. The basic concepts about the science of politics, the origin of the institution of state, its purposes and objectives and scope and spheres of its activities are some of the major discussions of the first field. Some writers also include the concepts of sovereignty, law, legislation, liberty, equality and such other related concepts in this field.

The last cited field above (No. 4) is somewhat a factual study of what is happening in different countries in the domain of politics and constitutional frameworks. Although there is much scope for interpretation from a given writer's point of view, the field is less influenced by the writer's own prejudice and intellectual reservations. The preceding three fields have a very deep impact on Western history, politics and constitutional development. They should be re-studied thoroughly, overhauled and reconstructed in our own classical pattern.

Some Key-Problems

The entire science of politics, as it stands today, and as it has come to us via the West, requires a thorough stock-taking. There are some key-problems which are very important and frequently agitate the minds of many Muslim individuals. These problems are generally studied against a European background and are seen from a Western angle. The Western term of reference is employed with a view to understand the Islamic point of view on these problems, which may be totally different or even diametrically opposed. Here is a list of these Key Problems:

- 1) Origins and development of the state; objectives of the state; elements and constituents of the state;
- 2) Sovereignty and its location and attributes;
- 3) Sphere of the state; laissez-faire; totalitarian views;
- 4) Fundamental rights, civil liberties, social and economic rights;
- 5) Form of government;
- 6) Separation of powers;

- 7) Checks and balances;
- 8) Legislation and law-making agencies;
- 9) Method of elections;
- 10) Political parties and pressure groups.

Some of these problems may not find their parallel in Muslim political thinking at all. Some other problems are discussed in the political-juristic literature of Islam but from a different stand-point, in a different term of reference.

One of the main problems that one faces while dealing with political issues, is that of terms. It has become a fashion in the West that unnecessary and unwarranted terms are coined. Sometimes absurd and superficial ideas are presented and given currency in the garb of an impressive terminology. The majority of these terms has a close relationship with the intellectual, cultural, civilizational, political or religious history of the West. These terms cannot be divorced from their background and the spirit of their respective ages or situations. When we cast a glance over the political and constitutional terms we find that their origins go back to the intellectual or religious history of Europe. Theocracy, sovereignty, separation of powers, Human Rights, Democracy and many other terms have definite Western-Christian-Heretic connotations.

Conclusion

This was, in brief, a critique of the Western Political thought, highlighting its weak points and giving an idea of the dimensions of the process of its Islamization. Following in the humble opinion of the writer, in a nutshell, are the steps to be taken to Islamize the political and constitutional thought of the West and to reinvigorate and revitalize the Islamic thought:

- 1) The history of the political thought in the West should be re-written with a thorough critical analysis.
- 2) Critiques of various political and constitutional concepts and institutions of the modern world should be prepared from an Islamic point of view.
- 3) In-depth studies should be undertaken on the key-problems enumerated earlier. These studies should be prepared in the light of the relevant provisions of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* and the writings of authentic Muslim scholars.
- 4) Political and constitutional thought of a people is closely related with its history. Islamic history has, unfortunately, been very much misrepresented and misinterpreted. It should be re-written with a view to bring out the dynamic and creative genius the Muslim *Ummah* demonstrated during the course of history.

- 5) A comprehensive history of Muslim political thought should be written with a view to highlight the lime light the consistency and continuity of its development. The present writer had once given thought to this problem and has prepared an outline for the writing of such a detailed and comprehensive book on this subject. Such a book should be patterned after M.M. Sharif's *A History of Muslim Philosophy*.

Islamizing the Teaching of Science: A Model in Challenge and Response

Zaghlul R. al Najjar

Islamizing the Teaching of Science: A Model in Challenge and Response

Zaghlul R. al-Najjar

Introduction

Contrary to all anthropological claims, man was created as a human being, knowing and believing. The Holy Qur'an clearly states this in the verses below:

And He taught *'Adam* the names of all things. (Qur'an 2:31)

Which commentators take to mean the names of both animate and inanimate beings as well as the inner nature and qualities of such beings and things, including feelings involved in such innate nature.

Then *'Adam* learned from his Lord words (of inspiration or of revelation) and his Lord turned towards him; for He is Oft-Returning, Most Merciful. (Qur'an 2:37)

Words here mean inspiration or spiritual knowledge. Again, the verb *talaqqā* “تَلَقَّى”, which has been translated as *learned*, implies some effort on *'Adam's* part, to which Allah's Grace responded.

These Qur'anic verses clearly testify to the fact that on his creation, *'Adam* was immediately taught both the knowledge he needed for his worldly existence and that which he needed for his spiritual development. *'Adam* (AS), undoubtedly, did teach his children, and did ask them to pass the message to younger generations. Not only this, but belief has been deeply implanted by the Creator into the inner nature of every single being, as clearly indicated by the Holy Qur'an where it reads:

When thy Lord drew forth from the children of *'Adam*—from their loins—their descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves, (saying): “Am I not your Lord (Who cherishes and sus-

tains you)?” They said “Yea! We do testify” (This) lest ye should say on the Day of Judgment: Of this we were never mindful. (Qur’ān 7:172).

The verse clearly means that each individual in the posterity of ’Ādam (AS) had a separate existence from the time of ’Ādam (AS), and that a Covenant was taken from all of them which is binding accordingly on each individual. The words of the verse refer to the descendants of the children of ’Ādam (AS) i.e., to all humanity (born or unborn), without any limit of time. ’Ādam’s seed carries on the existence of ’Ādam (AS) and succeeds to his spiritual heritage. Recent advances in the science of heredity testify to this, and thus Humanity must have a corporate aspect and in addition to this innate Covenant. He has also been given by Allah, certain powers and faculties whose possession necessitates special spiritual obligations which man must faithfully discharge.

These obligations can be considered as arising from implied Covenants. The Covenant could be completed in this way: *“We acknowledge that Allah is our Creator, Cherisher and Sustainer; therefore, we acknowledge our duty to Him; when we so testify concerning ourselves, the obligation is assumed by us, for it follows from our very nature when it is pure and uncorrupted. The latent faculties in man are enough to teach him the distinction between good and evil, to warn him of the dangers that beset his life. But to awaken and stimulate them, a personal appeal is made to each individual through the “still small voice” within him. This, in its uncorrupted state, acknowledges the truth and swears its Covenant with Allah.”*

It follows from this, that without both knowledge and faith, man can never live up to the honor Allah has bestowed upon him when He said: “We have honored the children of ’Ādam.” (Qur’ān 17:70)

Consequently, the rise and fall of human communities at all places and in all times can be directly related to their adherence to or detachment from both useful knowledge and true faith. Knowledge is retained by the human intellect while faith settles in the heart and is proved by the deeds. True faith and useful knowledge have to go side by side for the successful achievement of the human mission on earth. The only true faith is **al Islām**, and the useful knowledge covers all sorts of knowledge that can illuminate the human intellect and help man to achieve his mission on earth as a servant of Allah entrusted with this life.

What is Islam?

Islam is the eternal message from Allah, the Creator of the universe, revealed to humanity through a chain of messengers that extended from ’Ādam (A.S.)

to the last Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) in whose message all the previous revelations have been finally integrated and preserved, and hence that message addresses humanity at large in all places and at all times. The belief was implanted by Allah within the inner structure of every human being, and the details of the religion were revealed by Allah to 'Ādam (AS) on the very moment of his creation. 'Ādam (AS) passed that religion to his descendants and whoever conformed with it became a Muslim, while deviators realized that they were transgressing the limits ordered by their Creator. Through repeated human failings, man kept on deviating from the Divine message until it became distorted or completely lost. Consequently one had either to live according to man-made ideologies, or have no ideology at all. Both courses led man astray and drove his communities to corruption, violence, injustice and complete degeneration. Then life becomes impossible without the divine guidance, and whoever was ordained for this guidance was sent with "Islam". This went on, and the struggle between the Divine system of life (Islam) and the man-made systems alternately ruled human beings and their communities in ups and downs, necessitating a lengthy chain of messengers from Allah to different peoples at different places and times with invariably the same message, "Islam". Finally, this was integrated in the message of Muḥammad (SAAS) to which the whole world has since been invited. Being the last of the Divine messages, Allah has taken the responsibility of preserving the Qur'an. It reads:

"We have without doubt sent down the message and We will assuredly guard it (from distortion)." (Qur'an 15:9)

It follows that Qur'an is the only revelation within the hands of human beings that has been perfectly preserved in the same language in which it was revealed in the minutest detail, while previous revelations have been either distorted or completely lost. Improvised systems on the basis of whatsoever human memory could recollect from the distorted or lost previous scriptures (e.g., contemporary Christianity, Judaism, etc.) cannot therefore be considered religions, because of the human influence in them. This is why the Qur'an clearly states that the only religion acceptable to Allah is "*al-Islām*." (Qur'an 3:85)

The word *Islam* in Arabic means the peaceful surrender, joyful submission, willful yielding, cheerful acceptance of bondage and volitional consigning of oneself. Consequently, the religion of *Islam* means the cheerful submission to the Will of God and the volitional obedience of His Orders, the rational renouncing of one's own independence and the devoted surrender to

the Creator, holding fast to the teachings and guidance toward which Allah has invited men with knowledge and commitment. Islam cannot be based on ignorance, and faith cannot be without commitment.

This is why the believer in Islam is constantly asked to seek knowledge. We need only to mention that the first verse revealed from the Qur'an came down with the order to read and write:

“Read in the Name of thy Lord and Cherisher, Who created man out of a clinging clot of congealed blood (a tiny piece of flesh surrounded with blood clinging to the inner side of the womb)—Read! And thy Lord is most bountiful,—He Who taught with (by the use of) the pen,—Taught man that which he knew not”. (Qur'an 96:1-5)

And enough to mention how Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) describes himself: “I have been sent as an educator,” he said. The Qur'an confirms this description of the Prophet (SAAS):

“It is He Who has sent amongst the illeterate *a messenger* from among themselves, to rehearse to them His signs, to sanctify them, and to instruct them in Scripture and Wisdom,—although they had been before, in manifest error.” (Qur'an 62:2)

The Qur'an honors knowledge and the knowledgeable people in numerous verses of which we select these:

“.....Are those equal, those who know and those who do not know? It is those who are endued with understanding that receive admonition.” (Qur'an 39:9)

“Allah will raise up to honorable ranks (and degrees) those of you who believe and who have been granted knowledge.....” (Qur'an 58:11)

“He granteth wisdom to whom He pleaseth; and he to whom wisdom is granted receiveth indeed a benefit overflowing; but none will grasp the Message but men of understanding.” (Qur'an 2:269)

“.....and say: O my Lord! advance me in knowledge”. (Qur'an 20:114)

Similarly, the sayings of the Prophet (SAAS) in honoring knowledge and the knowledgeable, and in making the seeking of it an incumbent duty on

every Muslim are, indeed, beyond counting.

Such emphasis on knowledge in Islam has created a great interest and a very strong zeal among Muslims to seek it, and hence their mosques were, above all other duties, great centers of learning, and remained the main centers of learning for centuries. Indeed, the ideas of the present schooling and of the modern university were established in the very early Muslim communities and in the early mosques. The first known mosque-related universities were, in historical order, the Madinah Mosque, the Makkah Mosque, al Fustāt Mosque (in old Cairo), al Zaytūnah (in Tunis), al Qarawī yīn (in Fāz), Morocco), Qurṭubah (Cordova) Mosque (in Spain) and al Azhar (in Cairo). They preceded the first known formal universities elsewhere by centuries, and most of them are still functioning today.

This pioneering educational system which became deeply rooted by the turn of the second century of *Hijrah* did not restrict itself to Arabic language and Islamic studies, but assimilated all the available knowledge of that time and all the contributions of the previous and contemporary civilizations (India, Persia, Iraq, Egypt, Greece, Rome, etc.). This stemmed from the fact that knowledge is the legacy of humanity at large, and it is the duty of every intelligent human being to critically review, cherish and preserve it. Consequently, the Islamic civilization did collect, review and criticize the available knowledge of the time, and added to it numerous original contributions. The fundamental understanding of man and the universe from the Islamic perspective also enriched the knowledge of that era. This continued for more than ten centuries, during which the Muslims remained the leaders of humanity, the promoters of knowledge, the fosterers of wisdom, and the architects of every sphere of development.

Suddenly, however, this unique civilization came to a halt. Without going into too much detail, one can easily record that in 1073 A.H. / 1662 AC the “Common Duty” slogan spread all over Europe calling on all Christians to struggle against the Muslims and the Islamic Caliphate, which were designated as the enemies of the Church. Since then the Muslim *Ummah* has been subjected to a continuous process of fragmentation, that began with the eleventh century AH / eighteenth century AC impact of the Austrian and Russian victories against the Ottoman Caliphate and the British success in India. From the middle of the twelfth century AH / nineteenth century onward came a further wave of European imperial expansion manifested by the suppression of the Indian mutiny. The disappearance of the last remnants of the Moghul monarchy in India, the consolidation of the British Empire in that Muslim realm, the rapid advance of the Russians in Central Asia and the expansion of the French into Tunisia and of the British into Egypt culminated in the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and the fall of the Islamic Caliphate (1342 AH / 1924 AC)

Dissection of the Muslim *Ummah* into more than 60 weak bodies (i.e., states, provinces, kingdoms, sultanates, emirates, sheikhdoms, republics, protectorates, etc.) followed. These fell easy preys to one or the other of the world powers which had subjected them to their direct or indirect domination. During such oppression, devilish plans to drive Muslims into secularism under the disguised slogans of modernization, advancement and development, have led to the adoption of ideological, political, economic, educational and administrative social systems completely alien to Islam. This has jeopardized the whole Muslim *Ummah*, dissipated its potentials, caused its backwardness in every field, and subjected most of its political systems to repeated military coups d'etat and counter-coups which further fragmented the *Ummah* and exhausted it physically, economically, spiritually and morally. It is worth noting that thirteen centuries ago illiteracy had been almost overcome among Muslims, whereas the percentage today is more than 75%.

Despite all this, the world is currently witnessing the slow but very sure return of Islam, not only in countries with Muslim majorities, but also among the non-Muslims. Such return, however is facing numerous challenges in the ideological, political, military, scientific, technological, economic, industrial, agricultural spheres, etc., but most serious of all are illiteracy and the distortion of knowledge. As the title of this lecture is "Islam and the Teaching of Science," I shall restrict my discussion to current distortions in the writing as well as the teaching of science. But, before doing so, I cannot overlook the sad fact that the population of the Muslim *Ummah* today exceeds one billion (more than one-fourth the total population of the world), but the literate among them are less than 25%. Of these not more than 5% can be considered educated, and more than half of those educated people have been plagued by the distortion of knowledge, particularly so in the area of pure and applied sciences. Consequently, in addition to the challenge of illiteracy, Muslims are currently facing another serious challenge in the field of science and technology. This is an area where Muslims have lately lagged behind, while non-Muslims have achieved astounding progress during the present century, in general, and during the last half of it, in particular. Such progress has clearly marked our time as "the age of pure and applied sciences." These are fields to which the majority of the Muslim countries did not contribute much, and then, it is only through limited individual efforts which cannot at all keep pace with world progress in such fields. This lag in the area of science and technology resulted in a wide gap separating the Muslim states (being part of the underdeveloped world), from the scientifically and technologically developed countries.

The challenge Muslims are exposed to these days is not simply represented by this gap, which is becoming wider and deeper with time. Neither is it embodied in the intellectual, economic, political and military backwardness which

accompanied the scientific gap. The true challenge lies in the clear atheistic background with which the imported scientific writings have been constantly flowing to us from both the West and East. This brought about disbelief in all that is “super-material”—a peculiar characteristic of the present age which some writers wrongly call it “the age of atheism.” The problem can be further explained by the fact that amid the unanimous admiration for the achievements of science and technology, these wrong concepts penetrated into our Muslim world and are being repeated falsely and intentionally in the name of science. With the understanding that we are the bearers of the last Divine and most complete message and that our role is to guide and lead humanity, this represents the true challenge Muslims face at present. It makes it incumbent upon us to urgently start rewriting science and teaching it from the Islamic perspective.

What is Science?

In Latin “Scientia” means Knowledge so defined, science means all the knowledge man has achieved in different places and at all times, arranged according to subject-matter. This includes knowledge gained through Divine revelation, by human thinking, creative intellect, and through human legacy and tradition in these two areas. The prevailing direction, however, tends to limit the term “Science” to natural and experimental studies of all that is within reach of the senses and intellect in this universe (i.e., matter, energy, living beings and natural phenomena). This is usually carried out through observation and conclusion or through experimentation, observation and conclusion, in an attempt to discover the characteristics of matter, energy and living things, to classify all these and discover the laws governing them. As thus defined, Science also includes deductions, suppositions, hypotheses and theories which are put forward to explain prevailing phenomena.

This definition has limited science to “a branch of study which is concerned either with a connected body of demonstrated truths or with observed facts systematically classified and more or less collated by being brought under general laws, and which includes trustworthy methods for the discovery of new truth within its own domain.”

Accordingly, human knowledge has been divided into scientific studies (both pure and applied), literary and art studies and religious studies. Writers, however, differ much in classifying and chaptering human knowledge, but the following classification seems appropriate:

- Islamic Studies
- Philosophy (general philosophy)
- Humanities and Social Studies
- Philosophy of Sciences

- Pure and Applied Sciences
- Cosmic Science (science of the universe).

In each of these major divisions of human knowledge, the interaction of all information available to man, whether acquired (through direct observation of the universe or through experimentation, observation and conclusion), or donated (through Divine revelations in the Qur'ān or the *Sunnah* of the Prophet (SAAS), has to take place, intelligently and truthfully, without undue forcing of conclusions. If this does not take place, human knowledge can remain partial, and such partiality can be further magnified by the current trend of over-specialization, the flood of literature, secularization and separation of gnosis from wisdom.

The placement of pure and applied sciences at the bottom of the triangle of human knowledge does not belittle the importance of such knowledge to man, but makes it the most accessible one to his senses and observation. I have preferred the name Pure and Applied Sciences (Cosmic Sciences or Sciences of the Universe) however, to the generally accepted term Natural Sciences, because the terms “nature” and “natural” have been repeatedly misused and misinterpreted.

The Scientific Procedure and the Limitations of Science

Science, necessitates a mass of organized objective observations which are gradually recorded with time, and repeatedly examined by trained minds to put forward the necessary theories for the explanation of such observations and to arrive at the laws that govern them. This can be fulfilled by repeated experiments until their truth is “confirmed”. This is what is called the scientific method. It is a research procedure which necessitates the use of the principles of logic in explaining observations gathered directly from the universe or through experiments designed to reach a number of conclusions. This necessitates the proposition of hypotheses and the formulation of theories as part of a logical reasoning process deducing knowledge. Despite the fact that the scientific method puts man directly in contact with the universe which evinces the Divine laws, unequaled knowledge, order and regulation. And despite the “accepted” precision of the scientific-procedure, its own limitations are evident. The limitation of experimental science can be demonstrated by the following points:

1.) However direct the observation or the experiment and observation might be, it is no more than an outward appearance of the actual truth and not the truth itself. There is of course, a great difference between being aware of things and knowing their actual truth. The former is limited to sensible events only, while the latter is beyond the capacity of our senses. It is no more than a

facade behind which truth exists.

The object to be studied may be fully or partly observed, or not observed, but sensed through some effects perceived through repeatable experiments. The conclusions derived from partial or complete observation are classified under what is known as the “exact readings, data or information”. These are mainly manifested through human senses, which are proved by experimental science itself to be very much limited. Because of this, the human mind often tries to support its senses through various technical appliances devised on the basis of what man has known about the laws of matter and the characteristics of living creatures. With the help of such devices, we can detect things in the universe which our naked senses cannot. But these instruments, however complicated they may be, remain merely devices that help the human senses to perceive at a distance. Their readings are remote sensing of the truth and not the truth itself.

2.) There are things in the universe which cannot be felt by human senses either directly or indirectly. These can be detected, however, by the existence of evidence of a logical presumption which is sufficient to prove the claim of its existence. This is known as scientific deduction or priori reasoning and is an acceptable means in reaching logical scientific conclusions. Not only this, but deduction may sometimes be nearer to the truth than sensual observation because truth is holistic, while observation is partial. Hence, major conclusions normally start where limited information derived from sensual observation or experimentation and observation ends. Here emerge other limitations for experimental science, represented by the limitation of the human mind and logical faculties.

3.) Science comprises both sensual and non – sensual information, the latter is known as “scientific abstraction” or “higher truth” which is a common ground for science, philosophy and religion. Here, the different branches of human knowledge should interact to understand the universe and its governing laws. Each, via its own means, should look for judgements through which it can fully explore the universe and exploit its resources, understand its creation in general, and the creation of man in particular, his message in this world, and his destiny after it, etc. Such questions are reiterated in every human mind whatever his culture and his specialization may be, and in the largest majority of cases, man cannot arrive at conclusive answers to such questions through his individual effort. This is simply because of the fact that man’s observations and measurements are limited to the outer appearances of things in this universe, masked by the limitation of his senses and the relativity of his space and time.

Whether his measurements might be defined as exact readings or

deductions—all that is proved by them is liable to be true or false. To accept a measure as correct does not necessitate that we should accept what it yields. Accordingly many higher truths cannot be reached through human thinking alone or via the limited methods of scientific research. We have no means for knowing such higher truths except through Divine revelation. Here man shifts from the orbit of science and philosophy to that of religion, which if correct is the highest level of human knowledge.

4.) By nature of man's limited existence in space (on that tiny planet Earth and for a very limited period of time represented by his average age) and the limitations of his senses in both space and time, all his conclusions are considered "relative". This makes the results of pure and experimental sciences nothing more than the outward appearance of truth as man can see it from his position in the universe and in the very limited time allocated to him, and not the truth itself. It also makes scientific theories only working hypotheses, even the ones based on direct observation and experimentation.

5.) Man's ability to know a number of universal laws in spite of the limitations of his senses and abilities and the relativity of his place and time points to the perfect structure of this universe and the perpetuality of its laws. In their study of the universe through close observation, testing and following up, then treating such observations and tests with intellectual powers, scientists take the universe with all its components of matter, energy, phenomena, laws and creatures as their instructor.

6.) Due to the continuously expanding range of science, it has become impossible for an individual to grasp all branches of knowledge, nor even to have a full grasp of one branch. Hence man is obliged to specialize in small sectors of the spheres of knowledge which have become almost countless. Even in the very narrow specialization, it has become difficult for any individual to have a comprehensive grasp of everything, and the current trend is generally toward increasing the narrowness and depth of specialization. This has made the results of experimental science very partial, and, because it is partial, information cannot answer man's comprehensive inquiries. His need for a greater and more comprehensive knowledge than his own is confirmed.

7.) Science bears the stamp of its intellectual and social milieu. In every sphere of knowledge man's grasp and output vary according to his background, upbringing and mental as well as psychological conditions. Thus major scientific conclusions are sometimes defined as mental and psychological states through which man sees the world around him. These states are ever-changing throughout one's life; thus man's grasp and creativity will differ accordingly.

This confirms the limitation of human writings in general and the scientific ones in particular, especially where generalized.

8.) The ever-increasing knowledge about the universe, and our obvious need to revise it continuously in the light of new discoveries, and to amend, develop or drop some parts of it, is clear evidence about the incompleteness of science and the limitation of its methods.

9.) One working in the scientific field usually inherits a large load of ready-made thoughts which cannot be thoroughly scrutinized by him. Consequently, his contribution cannot represent but a small portion of an ever-increasing amount of knowledge, based fundamentally on imitation. Science, despite its preoccupation with the present and the future, does not neglect scientific achievements of the past. To do so would fail to fulfill the requirement of progress. That is why reviewing the scientific literature, criticizing and developing it is a fundamental part of science. A scientist cannot contribute in any field without prior knowledge of previous contributions. This stresses the role of the Islamic civilization in cherishing, preserving and developing human knowledge in general, and the scientific ones, in particular, for over ten centuries to become the basis of the current scientific and technological advances. It can also portray the amount of illusion and mis-guidance contemporary scientific writings can lead to since they have been snatched from the hands of Muslims and written from a secularist point of view. Such allegations are all non-scientific and untrue. They are a natural outcome of the fact that modern science (when moved from Islamic Andalusia to Europe) has developed in an atmosphere of outraged hostility toward Christianity, in particular, and religion, in general.

In this process modern science has acquired a negative attitude toward belief and has limited its course and style to that direction. This has been supported by the anti-religion stand in the communist world and the retreat of contemporary Muslims from their leading position, particularly in the area of science and technology.

Added to these, one cannot overlook the activities of the varied evil forces, interests and affiliations which tried their best to strengthen such approach by numerous material philosophies, campaigns, extremist racial and political movements, destructive social associations, obvious and underground military and semi-military actions which all aim at annihilating religion and establishing the sovereignty of secular thinking over all aspects of life.

Science itself cannot correct its path because it is continually expanding and its fields of specialization continuously narrowing, making it difficult for the specialist to form the comprehensive view necessary for such a correcting process. Consequently science is still written from a secularist position despite

its huge achievements. This has caused great harm to both science and humanity, because keeping scientific writing to the material side has only resulted in confining it within the cycle of human senses. This is the smallest circle of knowledge in our universe. Our senses can only feel and understand the outer appearance of things as seen within the limits of our time, place, abilities and the nature of our bodies. When scientific thinking imprisoned itself within the purely material framework it could not enter wider and more comprehensive areas.

Consequently, scientific contributions have fallen short of many objectives which they could have reached if they had not limited themselves by the material frame. In its essence, science is a method of knowing the truth, while matter is only a small portion of that truth. Scientists have thus been put on a closed path, deciding to keep their conclusions within the limits of matter, thus leading to many erroneous conclusions such as:

1. The false claim of the eternity of matter and energy (that both matter and energy can neither be annihilated nor created from nothing), and hence the alleged eternity of the universe and negation of creation.

2. The wrong reference of everything in this universe to nature and its laws (without a logical definition of nature) and the consequential refusal to relate anything in it to a supernatural power, accounts for the unfounded refusal to believe in the Creator.

3. The erroneous explanation of the graduality of life on earth with time as a material proof for spontaneous evolution without the need of a Creator (the evolution of elements, chemical evolution, organic evolution, mental evolution etc.). This was wrongly taken as basis for the false allegation that creation took place randomly by mere coincidence. Thus wisdom, design, aim and objectivity could be negated. Such mistaken conclusions have been used as basis for numerous materialistic philosophies which ignored religion and rejected its bases (the belief in God, His angels, His books, His apostles, and the life Hereafter) as well as all the moral bindings and ethics it teaches.

These have changed our time (which is characterized by scientific and technological achievements with no parallel in human history and by a real explosion of knowledge) into an age of anxiety and unrest, moral decay, loss of identity, psychological and mental disturbances. It is the age of the build-up of the most sophisticated of armaments (e.g., biological, chemical, nuclear, etc.) and of their different carrying and launching devices. It is the age of hunger and drought, the age of irrational depletion of the earth's resources, pollution of its environments and degeneration of its inhabitants (as individuals, families and societies). In brief, it has become the age of material, psychological

and spiritual crises which has alienated man from both his integrity and destined mission in this world and transformed him into an egoistic being who cares little about anything beyond his limited needs in this worldly life.

We, in the Muslim world could not in all cases keep away from this turmoil, because, in an attempt to catch up, we have been eagerly sending our students abroad where they are severely subjected to endless challenges. We have also been copying the alien scientific writings with all its good and bad, and all its materialistic agnostic background. In the contemporary Muslim world, the number of Muslim students abroad has exceeded hundreds of thousands. The majority of sciences are still being taught and published in foreign (non-Arabic) languages, as was the imported writings. Even what is published in Arabic or in local languages of other Muslim countries, is, in the majority of cases, a direct or an indirect translation of the alien thoughts, and often contain clear contradictions with Islamic basic beliefs. This can create confusion in an age of great fascination with science and technology.

Some individual efforts to write science from a true believing perspective have emerged, however, like the writings of the following Muslim scholars: Ibrahim Farag, Muhammad Ahmad El-Ghamrawi, Muhammad Mahmoud Ibrahim, Khattab Muhammad, Malek bin Nabi, Waheed-uddin Khan, Muhammad said Kira, Ahmad Abdis-slam El-Kerdani, Muhammad Jamaluddin, El Fandi, Abder Razzak Nawfal, Ahmad Zaki, Hanafi Ahmad, Mustafa Mahmood, Khales Konjo, Hasan Zeino, Afeef Tabbarah, Qais Al Qirtas, M. Ferdouse Khan, M.M.M. Qadri, A. Q. Chowdhury, M. Akbar Ali, Maurice Buccaille, etc. Among foreign writers the list includes Sir. James Geans, A. Cressy Morrison, Alexis Carel, Graham Cannon and Albert Einstein and others such as the forty American specialists whose writings appear in Dr. John Clover Monsma's book, "*The Evidence of God in an Expanding Universe*," that has been translated into Arabic by Dr. Ab-Dimirdash Abdel-Majeed Sarhan, and revised by Dr. M.J. El Fandi.

These writings are mostly general scientific or philosophical writings, or quite distinct scientific teaching or research work. In the field of "Earth Sciences," Dr. Ibrahim Farag's works, like that of Dr. Khales Kanjo in medicine (the former being a university textbook and the latter a Ph.D. thesis) are pioneering works on the path of rewriting science from the Islamic point of view. The present writer has also written a book on historical geology entitle *Images from Pre-historic life*. Beyond these, informational material on science, whether textbooks, reference books, periodicals, circulars, films etc., are all given from a purely materialistic outlook which denounces, or ignores all that is supernatural. Hence they are full of erroneous expressions levelled against both science and belief.

Broad Lines for Rewriting and Teaching Science from Islamic Perspective

It is clear from the above mentioned discussion that scientific writings published during the last two centuries were mostly written from a purely materialistic background. Such trend in scientific writing started as a challenge to the Church in a revolution against its attempts to constrain human thinking. However, this has gradually become the rule, to the extent that most scientists indulge in such style of erroneous writing without really contemplating the ultimate results. Accordingly, scientific victories were wrongly considered victory over religion, and were used as tools to demolish it instead of emphasizing the fact that science is one of the short-cuts for one to get acquainted with the marvels of the great Creator.

Human knowledge is the heritage of all humanity, and Muslims are the middle nation and the trustees of the last heavenly message. It becomes incumbent upon Muslims to purify all knowledge, and particularly the scientific one, from biased ideas based on erroneous historic stands, human distortions or misconceptions. The accumulated errors that had, in the past, shifted science and scientists from the domain of belief to that of disbelief are becoming obvious, even to non-Muslims. This is definitely one of many reasons currently driving a large number of non-Muslims to Islam. Muslims should take the initiative to rewrite science and teach it from the Islamic perspective. Here are some broad steps for achieving this goal:

1. Stress the value of science and of scientific investigations in Islam. Indeed the Holy Qur'ān has perpetually, and in more than 750 verses, directed the human beings to observe the universe and try to understand its miraculous structure because by so doing one can get to know his Creator, understand the laws governing the universe and hence use it for bettering life on earth.
2. Point out the greatness of the universe and of everything that is in it (matter, energy, natural phenomena, plants, animals, human beings, etc.) and emphasize that such an intricate and vast universe could not possibly have made itself, but rather was created by the great Creator. It could neither have been the outcome of chance or chaos, because the mathematical probabilities for the creation of the universe by chance are almost nil. This clearly proves that our universe must have been created by the predetermined, very well-planned wisdom of a Supreme Being that has always been looking after it. Naturally, the qualities of the Supreme Being are beyond the abilities of the human brain to comprehend, and are definitely not in any way comparable to anything in His creation.
3. Emphasize the fact that the universe is actually built on the same basis from its smallest to its largest units, and that its basic elements, matter, energy,

space and time are interchangeable and interconnected. This transforms the observable components of our universe into one entity which we have not yet to comprehend, but which represents the unity of the universe. This points clearly to the Oneness of the great Creator.

4. Emphasize the fact that our universe is not eternal, as it had a beginning which scientists have been trying to estimate, and it will definitely have an end as indicated by the observable changes in it. These facts have been repeatedly proved through different scientific disciplines, but have been always overlooked and neglected.

5. Point out that science, in its restricted definition, is a human attempt to explore Allah's creation in the universe and discover the laws that govern them. By discovering cosmic phenomena and the Divine laws that govern them man can make use of it in bettering his life, and this is a major part of his message on earth.

6. Stress the fact that science is basically a human attempt for reaching the truth. In so doing, it necessitates honesty, sincerity, willingness, devotion and precision. If armed with these qualities, scientific endeavors are considered in Islam a sacred act for which a Muslim will be rewarded.

7. Emphasize the fact that experimental science only represents partial knowledge that is becoming more and more partial with over specialization. Despite its great value, such partial knowledge cannot answer the major queries of the human mind. Such major queries need more integral and encompassing knowledge. This can only be given by the Creator, and hence the need for Divine revelations.

8. Stress the fact that experimental science itself proves the existence of the unseen. Most of the recent discoveries were not known before and hence were part of the unseen for previous generations. It is the running after the unknown that helps science to develop.

9. Point out the fact that experimental science cannot recognize the essence of life. It only studies its phenomena. We currently know the detailed chemical composition of the living cell, but we can not make it.

10. Emphasize the fact that science itself proves both the possibility and the necessity of revelation, the possibility of destruction of this world, and of man's accountability and his resurrection.

11. Point out the Qur'anic verses of scientific nature which have been counted to be more than 750, with the clear understanding that the Qur'an is basically a book of guidance, not a book of science. Yet, the precedence of the Qur'an, fourteen centuries ago, with scientific notions and facts that were only discovered a few years ago is, in itself, a clear proof that it is a Divine revelation. Such verses must be thoroughly studied, understood in the light of the most recent scientific contributions, commented upon and used wherever adequate in our scientific writings, without undue emphasis. These could be land-

marks for future discoveries because they are signs from Allah, the Creator of everything, and would be clear evidences for guidance in a world fascinated by the contributions of science.

12. Stress the fact that the human brain, senses and other faculties represent one of the greatest donations of Allah to man. To express our appreciation for such donation, we should make maximum use of all our faculties. The Qur'ān states that one is accountable for his senses.

13. Point out the contributions of Muslims to the fields of science and technology in particular, and to human knowledge in general. Muslims played a major role in the advancement of the different branches of knowledge. This is often overlooked.

14. Stress the fact that Islam is the system of thought and conduct of the whole life of all human beings of all ages. This system was taught to the message of 'Adam by Allah on the very day 'Adam was created. Thereafter, whoever was ordained for the guidance of man in different parts of the world, and at different periods, was invariably the same. Prophet Mohammad (ṢA'AS) invited the whole world to this reality. It is the only acceptable religion with Allah, and hence human deviations in the name of religion cannot be considered religion. Consequently, the onslaught directed toward religion in non-Muslim countries cannot be applied to Islam.

15. Emphasize *Imān* by pointing out the signs of Allah in everything in this universe wherever possible and whenever necessary.

16. Refrain from the use of ambiguous omnibus and meaningless terms such as "nature" and "natural." Such terms were intentionally introduced in scientific writings out of disbelief. A Muslim writer could use the word Cosmos or universe instead of nature. Terms such as natural laws and natural selection should be replaced by Divine laws (or cosmic laws) and Divine selection. By such a minor change, numerous misconceptions could be rectified. Similarly, a Muslim scientist should refrain from using terms such as "chance", and "random" when he knows definitely that it is plan and order. He should also refrain from using such wrong expressions as "life appeared or disappeared, developed or evolved", when he deeply knows that it was created and was made to evolve, develop or become extinct by its Creator. Similarly, such misguided slogans as "survival for the fittest", "struggle for existence", "Struggle against nature", "invasion of space", etc., should be totally abandoned. These are not only wrong from the scientific point of view, but are direct expression of human arrogance and conceit.

Consequently, any word or expression that could contradict with or cast doubt on a clearly expressed Islamic fact should be deleted. This however, should be carried out in a way that can never interfere with the scientific procedure, or limit the human endeavor to explore the universe.

17. Emphasize the fact that in directing man to scientific research, Islam

defies ignorance, fanaticism, wrong inheritance and maljudgement through imagination or personal desires. It always asks for the proof and commands the founding of one's judgement on non-refutable logical deductions. In this, Islam has indeed founded the scientific method and its ethics. Experimental science is described to be Qur'anic in its approach.

Summary and Recommendations

Modern science developed in Europe within an atmosphere of outraged hostility against Christianity, and hence has been written from a purely materialistic point of view. This limitation of science to the material substances alone has alienated it from wisdom and has been used to allege that science and its contributions contradict religion and refute its teachings. Such allegations have, sadly enough, been widely accepted in the wave of fascination with recent scientific and technological achievements. Consequently, the advances in the area of science and technology were paralleled by repulsion against religion, rejection of faith and revolt over its edicts. This trend crystallized in a number of materialistic ideologies that emerged as a product of the processes of secularization, and, in the absence of the right belief dominated the scholarly community. Muslims also abetted this trend by neglecting the areas of science and technology.

Going back to the roots of the problem, one can easily find out that science did clash with Christianity for three basic reasons that can be summarized as follows:

- (a). The deviation of Christianity from the basic teachings of Christ (AS), which took it out of its original Divine Framework (Islam).
- (b). The infiltration of numerous man-made ideas into both the Old and New Testaments. These have been disproved by recent scientific findings (cf. Bucaille, 1399 / 1979), and
- (c) The wrong stand of the Church, pitting religion against science, and in the early days of scientific advances in Europe.

If this has been the scientific communities stand toward Christianity, it could not be justifiably applied to Islam. Contemporary Christianity is essentially a man-made religion, while contemporary Islam is the integration of the Divine messages to man since the very early days of 'Adam. Whoever was ordained for the guidance of man in different parts of the world, and at different periods [e.g., Ibrāhīm, Mūsā, 'Īsā (AS) etc.] the message was invariably the same. As we have stated, Prophet Muḥammad's message (ṢAAS) was an invitation to the whole world. It is the only revelation within the hands of human beings that has been preserved in the same language in which it was revealed to the least detail. All the previous revelations have been either completely

lost or distorted. An agreement between Islam and science as to approach, morals, obligations and major conclusions cannot be concealed (cf. Bucaille, 1399 / 1979). This is simply because science, in its restricted definition, is no more than a human attempt to explore Allah's creation in the universe and discover the laws that govern them. As the Qur'ān is revealed from Allah the Creator, there can be no contradiction between it and the laws Allah has placed in His creation. Moreover, the precedence of the Qur'ān for over fourteen centuries with scientific facts not known to man until late in this century, is in itself a clear evidence of the Divine nature of the Qur'ānic verses (cf. Bucaille, 1399 / 1979).

Despite all this, science is still written in the Muslim world from the same materialistic attitude of the non-Muslims. As this conflicts with both Islam and the current process of Islamic revival, it has to be rectified and science has to be rewritten and taught from the Islamic perspective. In this connection, the following recommendations and suggestions are made: –

1.) Revise science text-books that are currently in use in the Muslim World, especially those at the pre-university levels and the undergraduate ones, to eradicate all undue un-Islamic or anti-Islamic expressions and/or generalizations.

2.) Re-structure curricula and syllabi for writing new science textbooks from the Islamic perspective. These are suggested to cover the following major items:

- (a) The scientific material purged of all non-Islamic anti-Islamic generalizations and/or expressions, and re-written in a humble modest way without undue presumptions.
- (b) The spiritual implications of the scientific information (i.e., the wisdom behind it) is clearly understood. These should be mentioned in various forms according to the level of instruction, and should stress laid upon reverence to Allah and upon following the example of His Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS), also the vastness of the universe, its intricate and orderly structure, unified pattern and miraculous expanse, the limitations of science and need of Allah's mercy to human beings throughout their existence.
- (c) All ethical and moral laws and instructions associated with such information.
- (d) Relevant Qur'ānic verses and/or sayings of the Prophet (ṢAAS) wherever applicable, and without compulsion.
- (e) Muslims' contributions to specific fields (past and present).
- (f) Undiscovered or unexplored areas of these fields and motivations for future research.

3.) Begin a long-term program for translation of the basic books in the different fields of science and technology into Arabic (or the other languages

of the different Muslim countries) with comments on any un-Islamic expression or generalization. This step should be taken in preparation for the teaching of science and technology in either Arabic or the other mother tongues of the Muslims.

4.) Check misinterpreted and mis-figured scientific information propagated in the press or other media of information (e.g., television, radio, etc.) and answering to it.

5. Prepare special science and technology programs for the TV and radio to educate the masses from an Islamic perspective.

6.) Encourage scientific and technical research in the Muslim World (in universities, institutes, industrial centers, etc.) on Islamic bases.

7.) Minimize the number of Muslim students that are being sent abroad to be educated at the hands of non-Muslims, to only the very necessary areas, and to specific ages and specializations.

8.) Establish an Islamic organization for science, technology and development to plan for the scientific and technological revival of the Muslim *Ummah*. The potentials of such *Ummah* are enormous, but these have been dissipated by its division into more than 60 countries and minority groups.

9.) Besides the World Center for "Islamic Education" in Makkah and the "Islamic Foundation for Science, Technology and Development" proposed to be in Jeddah, an "International Union for Muslim Scientists and Engineers" (with headquarters and offices in different countries) is deemed necessary for the promotion of the scientific and technical revival of the Muslim *Ummah* through various activities including statistical studies, surveys, publications, conferences, etc. This union should include "International, Specialized, Islamic Societies, in the different disciplines of science and technology, which would exercise its activities independently as well as within those of the "International Union" (e.g., publications, meetings, etc.).

10.) Added to the above mentioned organizations, the "World Center of Islamic Education" should encourage the rewriting and teaching of Science from the Islamic perspective by drafting the broad lines for both the necessary curricula and syllabi as well as the guidelines for text-book writing. The center could then invite committed specialists for writing the necessary books for the different levels of education in an open competition. The manuscripts should be critically reviewed, and the best ones adopted. This may necessitate the establishment of committees that include specialists in pure and applied sciences, philosophy and Islamic studies for proper assessment of both the curricula and syllabi and for judging the manuscripts.

11.) Promote science and technology in the Muslim World through various incentives such as the establishment of annual prizes, awards, and other honoraria.

An Islamic Approach to Economics

Muhammad Najatullah Siddiqi

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Introduction

This paper begins with a brief look at the development of economics through the last two centuries, focusing on the major methodological approaches, although we have something to say about the earlier periods also to set the perspective right. We try to identify the issues which engaged the attention of the masters of the discipline and the problems facing man and society that engaged their attention. We note in this regard the gradual ascendancy of formalism in economic theory and the meaning and purpose of economics gradually yielding ground to tools and techniques of analysis. This would bring us to the second quarter of the twentieth century when economics was again forced to come face to face with reality and a methodological crisis ensued. We shall note the contemporary content of economics and the various methodological approaches before we pass on to the next part of the paper which deals with its major theme: *relevance of Islam to our discipline*. It is argued that the Islamic tradition in economics has always been free of formalism, focusing on meaning and purpose with a flexible methodology. This suits the multi-dimensional concern of Divine guidance with man and society. Economics must be open to contributions from other disciplines and both science and art must join hands to realize, in economic affairs, the Islamic vision of good life. Contemporary Islamic economic thought is an extension of this well established tradition. We try to elaborate upon the nature and scope of Islamic economics by evolving a framework designed to accommodate its contemporary content and capability of explaining its development through history. This would bring us to the third and the last part of our paper which reviews the progress of Islamic economics in behavioral analysis, policy studies, and system building. This account of the current state of the art, examined in the context of the current state of conventional economic theory and policy, provides an opportunity for making some suggestions on priorities for research in Islamic Economics as a program for the future.

I. History and Method of Economics

A. Early Economic Thought

The thinking man has always paid attention to economic matters: poverty and riches; barter, money and trade, price fluctuations, taxes and interference by the rulers. Sometimes they also pondered over rise and fall of civilizations, accompanied by prosperity and economic backwardness. In doing so, they described as well as prescribed. They were, generally speaking, not bound by any particular method though induction may be regarded as the more popular one. During the periods when large populations were inspired by one of the great religions, namely Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity or Islam, scriptural injunctions and religious law dictated policies or recommended approaches which were interpreted and debated by scholars providing fresh food for thought. This applies even to the devices for circumventing some of the prohibitions like that of interest. But the religious inspiration accounted for much more than that in the evolution of economic thought. It provided a point of reference for well meaning critiques of social institutions, the rulers and the dominant classes of society.

This was the situation, broadly speaking, till Adam Smith and the birth of 'classical' economics. Mercantilism, the strand of thought preceding the classical school, was devoid of the tendency to abstract generalize or to deduce *a priori* notions about human behaviour. The Mercantilist writers did not construct imaginary models nor did they strive after discovery of universal laws. They were practical people thinking and writing like participants in a process designed to realize certain ends. It never occurred to them to pose as spectators interested in giving a detached positive analysis of the reality they observed.

B. Classical Economics

Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1189 AH/1776 AC, has rightly been credited with ushering in a new era in economics. Smith still shared many of the characteristics of the earlier periods, his economics being a part of a system of morality. He was concerned with the ends, the purpose, the ethical values of the society and was not averse to shaping them.¹ But the desire to abstract, generalize and arrive at universal laws had its own demands. He

¹ Piero V. Mini, *Philosophy and Economics: The Origin and Development of Economic Theory*, (The University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 1974), p. 64.

postulated “a logical system of economic relationships based on an underlying law of human nature (analogous to Newton’s law of gravity).”² The essence of this law was self-interest, which ensured order in the apparent chaos of the exchange economy appeared to be and also propelled the system towards growth. The individual, as consumer, appeared as the chief actor on the economic scene since his wish was realized by the market mechanism. Any interference from any quarter, especially from the government, was bound to disturb the perfectly harmonious operation of the system which promised to maximize the social good through maximizing the individual good. Thus he ‘provided moral defence and a scientific blueprint for the market exchange system.’³ Smith had many a disparaging aside on the traders and the capitalists but the self propelling system seemed to him to be too powerful either to admit a need for social coercion to thwart their manoeuvre or to assign them—or to investment as such—as prominent a role in the system as he assigned to the consumers and their demand. The heart of his economics was the theory of value of which he considered labor to be the essence. Applied to capital (goods) this posed a serious problem with which Ricardo, the second architect of the classical economics, was to grapple throughout his life, only to conclude that relative value was affected not only by labor but also by the rate of profit, which had nothing to do with it. “After all, the great question of rent, wages and profits must be explained by the proportions in which the whole produce is divided between landlords, capitalists and laborers and which are not essentially connected with the doctrine of value, he said.”⁴ Ricardo added much to the rigor of economic analysis, carried abstraction to a level higher than that found in Smith and showed a far greater predilection to logical reasoning from *a priori* axioms and demonstrated the determination of economic variables by economic variables. He had little use for Smith’s deep insights into a reality which was far too complex to admit such rigor and ruthless enough to allow ‘experience’ or ‘observation’ to deter him from the logical conclusions to which his Cartesian methodology led him. But his preoccupation that the ‘laws of distribution’ led the future course of economic theory, in both its Marxian and Marginalist versions, to envision a composite theory of value and distribution which was henceforth to form the core of economics for more than a century.

But before we pass on to Marx or the Marginalists, a brief mention is due to the Historical School which originated in Germany. Though it failed to change the course of mainstream economics, it did serve as a caution against

² Phyllis Dean, *The Evolution of Economic Ideas*, (London and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 11.

³ E. Ray Canterbury, *The Making of Economics*, (Belmont, California, Wadsworth Company Inc., 1976), p. 5.

⁴ From a letter of David Ricardo to J. R. McCulloch, quoted by Piero V. Mini, op. cit., p. 95.

sweeping generalization and abstract laws and concepts of the classical economics.

C. Marxism

We do not propose to devote much space to Marx either, not because we deny him the place he has in the history of modern thought in general and of economic thought in particular, but only because time and space force us to economize and concentrate on mainstream economics which developed through the Marginalists into neoclassicism till we reach the age dominated by Keynes. Suffice it to note that the economics of Karl Marx was based on an epistemology different from the Cartesian theory of knowledge and being which inspired the classicists. He was inspired by Hegel, but he proceeded by 'turning Hegel right side up again'.⁵ 'Marx's theory of knowledge is empirical and historical from beginning to end'⁶ and his economics closely follows his philosophy of history. But despite its roots in the world of matter his philosophy deals very much in concepts and abstractions, sharing the heritage of the classicists and often being counted as one among them. Nevertheless, his was a totally different paradigm being "focused on the failure of orthodox political economy to prescribe for a desirable *distribution* of wealth."⁷ This is the one thing that stands out from the tough and rough texts that Marx and his followers contributed to economics and the feature which still continues to attract many adherents to his system, adherents who may share neither his epistemology nor his philosophy of history.

To note another significant departure: Whereas in the classical scheme, the ideal obtained of necessity, only if the world was left uncontaminated by human interference, but for Marx the ideal must clearly be recognized and fought for. 'This activism distinguished Marx from Hegel as well as from orthodox economists'⁸ and reinforces the capacity of his system to attract socially concerned citizens.

D. Marginalism

The Marginalist revolution in economics related to the formal aspect of the analysis and not to any new vision of solving man's economic problems. All objects of desire were reduced to a common denominator, utility, which allowed for increase or decrease in infinitesimally small amounts to permit the application of differential calculus. Consumption goods were, of course, available

⁵ Piero V. Mini, op. cit., p. 174.

⁶ Ibid., p. 177.

⁷ Phyllis Dean, op. cit., p. 16.

⁸ Piero V. Mini, op. cit., p. 167.

only in units of a given size and value but the demands of the method were supreme, hence the assumption of perfect divisibility. Later the same method was applied to factors of production whose employment we assumed capable of being increased or decreased in small amounts and substitutable one for other, on the margin. The rational consumer had all the knowledge he required for a choice among the myriad options so as to equate utility on the margin and, thence, maximize it. The same applied to the producer who substituted one factor for another till the marginal productivities were equal all along the line. All the real world hurdles of indivisibility, heterogeneity, rigidity in production functions and basic qualitative differences between various units of labor, and between labor and capital, etc., were brushed aside to perfect a technique which afforded the rational maximizer unhindered operation in a perfectly competitive world where all concerned had all the knowledge. The results were wonderful indeed: Maximum satisfaction to the consumers, maximum profits for the producers, optimum allocation of social resources with regards to distribution, the system ensured for each, a reward equal for his contribution to the joint product, factor prices being equal to marginal productivities.

More than half a century following J. S. Mill (1232-1291 / 1816-1873)—whose *Principles of Political Economy* was the last of the classical contributions which still had deep roots in the complex reality that was the economy of man—was required to achieve the perfection of this methodology. Jevons, Menger, Wieser, Walras, Bhoem Bawerk and Clark were thus able to dethrone the cost of production theory and enthrone the subjective theory of value and distribution. Henceforth it was clear, in the words of Wieser that ‘The theory takes its point of departure from within, from the minds of the economic man.’⁹ What mattered was the method. All that defied this method was simply abstracted away. Since the system itself ensured perfection, there was simply no room for policy. The only policy prescription that could emerge was to let things have their way unhindered by any interference.

E. Neoclassical Economics

Reviving the Smithian style of frequent references to social reality and reliance on analogies where deduction might fail, Alfred Marshall (1258-1342 AH / 842-1924 AC) assimilated Marginalism into the classical framework, reinterpreted the latter where necessary, and reinforced the theory of value and distribution by introducing the famous cross of demand and supply curves and analyzing in detail the various types of equilibria. The neo-classical school

⁹ Quoted by Piero V. Mini, op. cit., p. 105

in economics symbolized the ultimate triumph of free enterprise Capitalism against its socialist detractors. The triumph of method over meaning, of means over purpose and of formal analysis over the content of what was being analyzed was now complete. The very debate on positive versus normative nature of economics indicates this triumph. Such a controversy did not arise a century earlier when analysis was a means to increase man's ability to manage his economy, not an end in itself. For this is what positive economics amounted to; its only social relevance was its ability to assure that what is, also ought to be. The analytical insights the neo-classical economics had to offer related to an imaginary world of perfect competition and perfect knowledge in which marginal techniques of analysis demonstrated maximization of utility and output, and the solution of the central economic problem as conceived by it, i.e., allocation of scarce resources. Neither time nor space disturbed this analysis, not to speak of the variety in culture and tradition and other features distinguishing man from man, society from society, region from region and one historical epoch from another. All these were irrelevant for the universal categories with which the system dealt.

One should not conclude that economists did not talk about anything other than the theory of value and distribution. They did discuss money but only as a *numeraire*, (because the marginal calculus could deal only with numbers not with speculation and expectation). International trade was taken care of by the assumption of perfect mobility and the real world complexities were confronted with only one option: free trade growth and development were concepts foreign to a system which envisioned maximization of production with optimum allocation of resources and which, having abstracted away time, as well as uncertainty, could not admit technological change in any real sense. Public finance could hardly deserve any notice in a regime of *laissez faire*. Labor and industrial relations could deal only with the pointlessness of any resort to unionism. What else is left?

Marshall's *Principles* was the standard text in economics even beyond the first quarter of the twentieth century. But already new and disturbing thoughts were surfacing. Schumpeter's characterization of the entrepreneur and Knight's insights into the all-pervading uncertainty, hardly fit into the neo-classical wonder world. Flaws into the neo-classical theory of value (and distribution) appeared as the perfectly competitive equilibrium and a remainderless distribution of product were shown to depend on the assumption of constant returns to scale. The work of Piero Sraffa followed by those of Joan Robinson and Chamberlin shattered the harmonious edifice so diligently constructed over the last century. Goods were heterogeneous and indivisible, mobility imperfect, numbers not necessarily large, some prices were sticky, supplier could manipulate demand through advertisement and, above all, knowledge was always deficient. As a result of these fresh insights the belief in the automatism

of the economic process was yielding to a recognition for the need to control this process in varying degrees. It was not however, the academia which forced this realization upon the economists, but the rude reality intruding upon their peace in the form of the Great Depression in 1929 (1337-8 AH). "The masses of the unemployed and the idle productive facilities, during the depression, made many economists realize that major economic problems had been excluded from orthodox economic theory and that their micro-instruments of "the logic of choice" were completely inadequate to tackle the problems society then faced,"¹⁰ to put it rather mildly.

F. Keynes' Theory

Keynes' General Theory (1355 / 1936) offered an entirely new kit of tools and broke away from the traditions of the Marginalist analysis by employing such categories as aggregate demand, aggregate supply, savings, investment and volume of employment and national income. He discarded the assumption of perfect knowledge and certainty by pointing to the ignorance that pervaded decision making and emphasized the veritable nature of the expectations of which investment was based. He denied the causal nexus between interest and savings, and emphasized the rigidity of wage rates. He regarded money to be much more than a mere numeraire by making liquidity preference a crucial factor in his analysis. He did not have much use for the classical fascination with equilibrium either. Thus the whole apparatus of neo-classical analysis was, if not declared useless, relegated to the position of being specific to certain uses and supplemented, if not entirely replaced, by a whole set of new ones. More important than these formal changes was, however, the reference to social reality which provided the justification for doing so and served as a grim reminder to the fact that, after all, economics had a purpose.

Whereas the classicists were convinced they understood human nature, Keynes hardly pretended he did. Whereas they confidently proceeded to deduce everything else from what they thought they knew, Keynes' analysis rested on facts as he observed them. And as all that needs be known cannot be, his conclusions are often in terms of 'mays' rather than the 'musts' his predecessor's methodology yielded. Unlike the Cartesian roots of the classical methodology, Keynes' method had affinity with Existentialism. As a matter of fact it is hard to ascribe a definite methodology to Keynes. He was pragmatic, making use of deduction sometimes but mostly being guided by empirical truths and a sense of what was desirable. He looked forward to proper manage-

¹⁰ Sachs (ed), *Main Trends in Economics*, (London, George Allen and Unwin), p. 18.

This point has been stressed by many historians of economic thought. See amongst them Sydney Weintraub, *Modern Economic Thought*, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977), p. 34.

ment of man's economic affairs, the efforts to understand and analyze were a means to this end. Many macroeconomic categories and some macroeconomic analysis can be traced back to the classical economists, but was no macroeconomic policy. Once economic policy came to the fore, the social institution primarily responsible for implementing any policy, i.e., the State, became one of the chief actors on the economic scene. Indeed one of the greatest contributions of Keynes was bringing home the realization that the Market could not always be relied upon and recourse to State action was a constant feature of economic life even in a free enterprise system.

G. The Contemporary Scene

Economics was never the same after Keynes, although neo-classicism did reassert itself by reinterpreting Keynes and introducing variables into his 'model', which his interpreters never imagined he would have deliberately left out. Time and space do not permit us, however, to trace these developments further. Nothing has happened since Keynes which could compare in significance with the advent of classicism, the rise of Marginalism, the Marxian critique and the Neo-classical synthesis. We will turn now for a brief look at the present state of the art. Three distinct stands can be noted:

- (1) Mainstream economics which assimilated Keynesian contributions into neo-classicism by adding macroeconomic theory, including macroeconomic theories of distribution, to economics, and by allowing macroeconomics to dominate policy studies, but holding on to the microeconomic theory of value and distribution centred around rational choice, demand and supply, competition of various types and the equilibria and optima resulting from the market process.
- (2) Revival of the historical and institutional or, to put them together, as an evolutionary methodology. It advocates a holistic approach and openness to ideas and methods from other disciplines such as sociology and political science. Instead of merely focusing on 'what is', evolutionists ask 'how' did the economy get there and 'where' it is leading us. Galbraith has drawn attention to a number of formative factors conventional economics fails to consider, 'power' being the most prominent among them. The postwar period witnessed a great spurt in literature on growth and development, analyzing the causes of under-development and exploring possible strategies of development. This brought historical

and sociological considerations to the fore and exposed the limitations and weaknesses of abstract economic laws. Myrdal's *Asian Drama* is one of the best examples of this trend. Development economics has strengthened the case for mechanisms other than the market to get things done. The state has to play a crucial role in this process.

- (3) The Marxist critique of capitalism also took a more positive shape in writings of authors like Baran and Sweezy. Armed with new concepts like that of 'potential surplus' they pointed out the costs that growth through free enterprise capitalism entailed, thus joining hands with Veblen who had earlier exposed the predatory nature of competition. The Marxists did not show much of a success, however, in constructing a theory of rational organization of productive forces in a socialist society, not to speak of a distinct theory of economic behavior relevant to a socialist society. An important by-product of their efforts was, however, the almost universal acceptance for the realistic view that market and plan were complementary and economic analysis defied a dogmatic approach.

The radical economists are also important as far as their critique of neoclassical economics is concerned, but thus far they failed to evolve a viable alternative. Mainstream economics' concentration on small marginal changes and shifts within a capitalist system prevented it from a meaningful analysis of production and distribution which often required consideration of large qualitative changes. It also failed to take into account the actual socioeconomic determinants of productivity and excluded important social and political variables from its analysis. It had no method to deal with the negative costs outside the market system such as pollution and depletion of resources. These and numerous other criticisms are impressive enough to shake one's faith in the received doctrines and methods, but the question is, where do we go from here?

Though our review has been critical, two centuries of economic theorizing did add something to man's insight into his economic life and his ability to manage it for good or bad. One can lose sight of the complex reality only to his peril, but it does help to be able to grasp certain uniformities and long term trends which can be discussed despite the complex variety and vicissitudes. The supply-demand analysis, the kingpin of classical-neo-classical analysis is one such example. Focusing on the margin to trace the consequences of changes in economic variables is a useful technique in itself, only if one learns to discard it when the changes are out of the ordinary. The concept of equilibrium also helps understanding provided one does not attach any ethical

significance to it and remember the 'other things' assumed to be given. Many other examples can be cited, especially when the contemporary, often moderate and more qualified, versions of economic doctrines are considered.

We have already noted that one of the key drawbacks of the market is that it 'does not provide within itself any defensible income distribution'.¹¹ "The integration of distribution as an explanatory variable in the theoretical framework of economics has to be accomplished on both (a) *positive analytical* and (b) *normative grounds*."¹² Since "the organizing principles of economic system guided by exchange values are incompatible with the requirements of the ecological system and the satisfaction of basic human needs,"¹³ a broader approach to economic problems is called for. This led Kapp to observe that "The new task of economics would be to elucidate the manner in which collectively determined social goals and objectives could be attained in the most effective and socially least costly manner."¹⁴ "Collective determination of social goals" raises, however, an epistemological problem. The contention that the market translates individual preferences into social goals has been demonstrated to be untenable. That the democratic process can do so still begs the question whether individuals always *know* what to prefer. Furthermore choice involves both preferences and opportunities¹⁵; how to broaden and equalize the opportunities for every one brings the whole issue of social goals back.

Economics in its Western tradition never considered the possibility of referring to some source higher than human preferences for arriving at social goals. All schools of economics accepted self-interest and pursuit of material progress as the norm despite weak efforts to discuss altruistic behavior and quality of life that involved non-material dimensions. That self-interest and pursuit of material progress alone are not in harmony with the human situation, is a realization calling for exploring the possibilities of changing the current attitudes which are largely the creation of Western sensate culture in which economics has been a major contributor.

To sum up, economics matured as an independent discipline in the West in a cultural milieu which idolized material prosperity and accepted self-interest as the normal human motivation. It extolled individualism and disfavored state intervention in economic affairs. Though the need of some state action is now admitted, attention is still focused on the theory of rational choice and the market is regarded as the main mechanism for translating individual preferences

¹¹ Kenneth J. Arrow, *The Limits of Organisation*, (New York W. W. Norton and Co., 1974), p. 22.

¹² Kurt Dopfer (editor), *The Economics of the Future: Towards a New Paradigm*, (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1976), p. 25.

¹³ K. William Kapp, *The Open System Character of the Economy and its Implications* in Kurt Dopfer, op. cit., p. 95.

¹⁴ K. William Kapp, op. cit., p. 102.

¹⁵ K. E. Boulding, *Economics As a Science*, (McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 124.

into the *how* or *why* of *which* economics, but does not enquire into social solutions of production, distribution and consumption. Mathematical techniques are employed to study functional relation between macro and micro economic variables. There is a strong bias against any variables which cannot be handled mathematically. Non-economic factors are generally excluded from analysis. Behavioral laws and functional relations should, in the context of minimization of costs or maximization of returns, constitute the core of economic theory. This core is surrounded by studies relating to Monetary and Fiscal Policy, Distribution, Growth and Development, Labor and Organization, International economic relations, etc., which admit of ends and policy options. Using the concepts and tools perfected in theoretical analysis these studies also admit of control and planning situations and tend to incorporate sociological and historical material. Most of the differences in their approach to current problems between mainstream economics in its conservative (Friedmanian) and liberal (Samuelsonian) traditions on the one hand and the Radical and Marxist economics on the other, relate to these areas. They do not disagree on such basic assumptions as the primacy of self-interest or supremacy of material progress, or the capacity of man to *know* what is good for himself.

II. Nature and Content of Islamic Economics

To be meaningful and relevant, economics must explicitly recognize its purpose. It is man's concern with survival, hence the primacy of need fulfilment, which prompts him to understand nature and society. Man is a social being and society requires a just order. Justice had always been the major concern of social thinkers, especially those morally inspired. Then come the concerns for efficient use of resources and growth with a promise of convenience, comfort and dignity which nature can well afford. These ends are to be realized within the framework of freedom which is the very essence of being human. Once the moral purpose of economics is recognized formal techniques of analysis would cease to be ends in themselves determining content of economics to the exclusion of what a method cannot handle even though its consideration may be basic for the overall purpose. To some extent the current methodological crisis in economics is a product of this realization of the primacy of ends over means of analysis.

A. The Islamic Tradition in Economics

Economic thought in its Islamic tradition has always been inspired by moral purpose. This followed from clear Islamic injunctions laying down social goals

and individual norms of conduct relevant to man's economic life. The Qur'ān itself outlined a definite framework for the organization of man's economic life which could and did provide a distinctive paradigm for Islamic economics.¹⁶ To note its salient features: The world of nature is there for man to make a living out of it, promising sufficiency for all human beings. Man has to ensure this through his efforts for which he has freedom of ownership and enterprise. Justice must, however, be ensured, if necessary through law. Cooperation and benevolence rather than self-centeredness and avarice should be the norm for men in economic affairs. Allah (SWT), being its real owner, property has to be handled as a trust and all economic activity conducted in the framework of trusteeship. Poverty is an empirical reality, hence the rich must surrender a part of what they possessed to the have-nots. Trade is lawful but *ribā* interest is prohibited. Waste is sinful and it is imperative to economize and be sufficient. Worldly wealth should be treated as a means to good normal life leading to eternal bliss rather than as an end in itself. The Prophet (SAAS) reinforced this approach with his elaborations. There is a clear emphasis on a cooperative attitude, the motto being: "utilize the resources given by Allah, including your own abilities, to live and help others live a well provisioned life conducive to moral excellence." It was this motto which inspired the rightly guided caliphs in their management of the economy, the jurists in their working out the details of the *Shari'ah* relating to economic affairs and the social thinkers when they surveyed economies, and made policy recommendations. Thus we find AbūYūsuf¹⁷ (123-182 AH / 731-798 AC) emphasized need fulfilment and justice and reminded the ruler of his responsibilities in this regard. He argued in favor of efficient management and elimination of waste. Individual freedom was not to be encroached upon unless inevitable and the social authority should arrange for growth and development. He derived his ends from the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* and did not hesitate to refer to the generally recognized good (*ma'rūf*) for complementing the same. His method was flexible, resorting to deductions when needed and inferring from facts of life frequently. He analyzed with a purpose, but was always faithful to facts. In making policy recommendations he frequently referred to the ultimate goals mentioned above: need fulfilment, justice, efficiency, growth and freedom. This is brought out very well by his discussions on the economic

¹⁶ For references on this point and what follows the reader may refer to the author's *Muslim Economic Thinking: A Survey of Contemporary Literature*, (chapters one and two and the relevant items in the bibliography appended to the same volume. The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1981).

¹⁷ For references on AbūYūsuf see the bibliography mentioned above and the author's forthcoming paper on *Recent Writings on the History of Economic Thought in Islam*, to be published by the International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, Jeddah. The best reference is, however, AbūYūsuf's *Kitāb al Kharāj* now available in English, translated by Abid Ahmad Ali and published by the Islamic Book Centre, Lahore, in 1979.

responsibilities of the ruler and on the tax system.

What applies to AbūYūsuf applies to economic thinking in Islam in general. This is not to deny variety in emphasis and scope of the economic thinking of AbūYūsuf and other great scholars like Abū'ubayd, Ibn Khaldūn, Ibn Taymiyyah, al Ghazzali, al Ṭusi and Shah Waliullah of Delhi. This, however, is not the time and place to discuss these distinctive features.¹⁸ What concerns here are the common elements shared by every Islamic thinker noted above. All these writers analyzed the existing economic reality with reference to the social goals and norms of individual behavior they derived from *Shari'ah* and proceeded to make policy recommendations designed to transform the existing reality into what they considered to be Islamic ends and values. In doing so they were also influenced by the social and political conditions of their times and their sense of what was within the range of possibilities. They had a practical approach to the problems though some of them, like Ibn Khaldūn and Shah Waliullah, did strive at valid generalizations valid far beyond their time and place. The jurists among them also tried to deduce from particular traditions, rules and laws of general validity. But we do not propose to go into the details of the methods followed by various scholars. What we wish to note is that our scholars had an open mind as far as methodology was concerned. Their theory of knowledge told them that only Allah (SWT) had all the knowledge and that man's knowledge was always deficient, even with respect to what concerned him directly. Just as human knowledge was limited, so was reason deficient to decide what was good. Man was in need of *hidāyah* (guidance) from Allah (SWT) which was duly provided through the Prophets (AS) and the Books revealed to them. Divine guidance was therefore the starting point of all social thinking and economics was no exceptions. We first enquire of what is desired by the *Shari'ah* and what rules are already prescribed for its realization. With reference to the actual economic problems facing man and society not directly covered by *Shari'ah*, we try to infer the appropriate rule by analogy wherever possible and by reasoning in the light of the public good (*maṣlahah*) where necessary. In order to make laws for society, or prescribe good behavior to the individual or recommend a policy to the ruler, one has to analyze the reality, unburdened by any notions that are not derived from the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*.

B. Three Components of Islamic Economics

It is possible to identify three distinct components in Islamic economics.

¹⁸ This has been attempted in the paper on *Recent Writings on the History of Economic Thought in Islam* mentioned above.

First, it requires an enquiry into the ends and values cherished by Islam which are relevant to economics. It involves goals of social policy as well as rules of conduct and norms of behavior for the individuals. In terms of old Islamic categorization this component of Islamic economics belongs to the *‘Ulūm al Sharī‘ah* or *Naql* (tradition). But reason has a vital role to play at two levels. It is involved in analogical reasoning or *qiyās* which is a recognized method of translating the precepts of Qur‘ān and *Sunnah* into rules and policies applicable to situations not directly covered by these precepts. Second, reason is called upon to interpret the *maṣlaḥah* (public good) and what is *ḥasan* (good), categories to which frequent reference is made in the Qur‘ān, in situations where analogical reasoning does not help and *ijtihād* (independent exercise of judgement) is inevitable.

This is an area on which expertise in *Sharī‘ah* studies and economics must converge. The case for the former is obvious, the latter is required for indicating the relevance of any particular precept for economic affairs. It is the economist—one who specializes in the knowledge of the economic problems and processes—who can discern the relevance of particular *Sharī‘ah* rules or its general precepts for real life economic problems. Whether the two expertise are combined in the same person or persons having expertise in *Sharī‘ah* or economics join together is a matter of detail and organization. What is important from the view point of defining the nature and scope of Islamic economics and its methodology is that this component is an integral part of Islamic economics. Islamic economics begins with an understanding of Divine-ly ordained ends and values and cannot be conceived without them.

The second component relates to the analysis of human behavior, social relations, processes and institutions which relate to production, distribution and consumption of wealth which fulfil needs, provide comfort and contribute to progress. This is the task positive economics is meant to perform, but as we have seen above, its methodology has limited its scope. Islamic economics is open to a variety of approaches including the historical and the sociological. Islamic economists may make full use of the past contributions in understanding the existing economic reality. They are, however, aware of the fact that modern economics facility assumes Western modes of behavior to have universal validity.¹⁹ As their first object of study is the economic reality obtaining in their own countries they better not start with preconceived notions about human motivation. Even where a particular motivation not in harmony with the Islamic values does exist they do take it as given but go beyond the existing reality to the historical or institutional elements responsible for it. Take for example the degree of risk aversion among depositors in the present society which has become used to interest, as compared to an equity based Islamic

¹⁹ Joan Robinson, *Exercises in Economic Analysis*, (London, Macmillan, 1963), p. xvii.

system where interest could not exist. While it would be unrealistic to deny the comparatively higher degree of risk aversion in the present society, it would be naive to consider it natural, or universal. The same may apply to the extent to which self interest dominates the behavior of the consumer or the firm, or to liquidity preference and the speculative demand for money. The analysis of what it must take into consideration why it is so, how it came about and in what possible ways it might change under the influence of a different environment, a different value orientation, a different institutional arrangement etc.

This leads us to the third component of Islamic economics: an enquiry into how to transform what *is* into what should *be*. This enquiry may be conducted in two stages. We may first ask the question what would be the results if every economic agent (ignoring the state) behaves as it ought to (which is defined in the first mentioned component of Islamic economics). The state is brought in at the second stage for remedial action and activities supplementing or complementing the market under influence of Islamic values with a view to ensuring the goals defined in the first component discussed above. In other words, the goals set by *Shari'ah* have got to be realized; the strategy is to realize them through Islamically oriented actions in the market as far as possible and let the state do the rest. This again is a distinctive component of Islamic economics, being a necessary complement to its first component. It involves analysis based on a new set of hypotheses as well as policy studies.

Islamic economics is therefore both a science, analyzing its data, and an art, discussing ways of creating a new order. The two can be distinguished from one another conceptually, as we have tried to do in defining the content of Islamic economics above, but the economist cannot always keep them separated. There is in fact no need for doing so as long as one guards against the naivety of projecting into reality what in fact does not exist, his vision of the desirable order, for example. The early masters like Adam Smith, J. S. Mill and even Alfred Marshall always combined the two elements in their writings. Keynes' General Theory is as much essay on how to manage the economy as an analysis of how the economy actually functions.

III. Progress of Islamic Economics

The primary Islamic concern in man's economic life has always related to need fulfillment, justice, efficiency and growth, and freedom in about that order of priority, depending on the circumstances in which a particular thinker wrote on the subject. These goals are squarely rooted in the Qur'an and the

Sunnah and provide a framework which accommodates almost every past contribution to the subject. Modern economics has, on the other hand, focused primarily on efficiency and growth, the issues of justice and need fulfillment being forced upon it by economic crises or attacks from radical quarters, to which attacks, the orthodoxy has generally responded by extolling freedom as the overriding concern. These goals never got an integrated treatment by any school of economics. True to its outlook on life and society, and in continuation with its past traditions, contemporary Islamic economics has taken up the three dimensional task of defining the Islamic ends and values, analyzing the existing economic reality and exploring ways and means for transforming the existing into the desirable pattern of things. The above mentioned concern stands out clearly in the literature on Islamic economic system, but that is not what primarily concerns us here. We would rather focus on the contributions of a theoretical nature made by Islamic economists recently. As a comparatively recent survey is already available,²⁰ we will note only the main points without referring to particular authors.

Most of the theoretical work done so far answers the question: How would a particular economic agent behave under the influence of Islamic ends and values, and what would be the resulting order of things? Mostly the analyst proceeds further to discuss the remedial or complementary role of the Islamic state in order to arrive at the desired order of things.

A. Consumer Behaviour

Applied to the consumer the main conclusions have been as follows:

- (1) Abstinance from prohibited items of consumptions (e.g., pork, wine etc., hence no market demand and no resources allocated for their production (ignoring for the sake of simplicity, the non-Muslim consumer's demand).
- (2) Moderation in consumption resulting in avoidance of waste and fall in the demand for luxury goods. The state is envisaged as ensuring a production mix that prevents resources from being spent on luxury items which the conditions of a particular society may not allow.
- (3) Consumer behavior is oriented toward a welfare function which covers the well being in life after death implying a concern for the welfare of others.
- (4) The rationality assumption is retained as modified in accordance with (3) above.

²⁰ Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, *Muslim Economic Thinking*, op. cit.

- (5) Since the market mechanism serves only those who have purchasing power, consumer needs which are not backed by purchasing power, especially when the needs are basic for survival, necessitate social action. This may take anyone or more of the following forms:
- (a) Transfer of purchasing power from the rich to the poor, directly or through the state.
 - (b) Subsidizing the production of necessities in order to increase their supply and/or bring down their prices.
 - (c) Price control, rationing and other direct means of need fulfilment.

These conclusions relate to the third component of Islamic economic according to our scheme. Contributions relating to the first component; ends and values, abound in the literature. Analysis of consumer behavior as it is, which corresponds to our second component, does not make any significant departure from conventional analysis. As a matter of fact very little attention has been paid to it till now despite the general feeling that conventional analysis leaves out altruistic behavior and influence of custom and tradition.

Regarding the transformation of the existing reality into the Islamically desirable order emphasis is placed on education and inculcation of Islamic values in individuals, voluntary action on part of concerned groups and institutions in the society, and state action by way of information, direction, planning and direct intervention. Further details are lacking due to the neglect of the second component: analysis of existing consumer behavior in Muslim societies.

B. Behavior of the Producer

- (1) Profit maximization subject to constraints imposed by the interests of the society (*Maṣlahah al 'Ummah*). This may involve other objectives too, such as increasing employment opportunities, keeping down the prices of necessities, increasing the supply of certain goods which have social priority etc.
- (2) Cooperation with other producers with a view to achieving social objectives.

Though cooperation is frequently emphasized in the context of Islamically oriented behavior, especially among producers, it is not clear what forms it is expected to take and to what extent the outcome will be different from that obtaining in the competitive model. Cooperation in order to maximize profits would lead to monopoly. This is, therefore, ruled out as monopoly in that sense it unanimously considered to be un-Islamic. It is cooperation in order

to achieve some of the other objectives mentioned above that is relevant. Insofar as these objectives are social, their pursuit requires much more information than is normally available to the individual producer. Cooperation for promoting social interest and realizing public good would therefore involve other social institutions especially the state. It may also require a different kind of interaction with the consumers and the laborers.

Case studies on the behavior of Muslim producers (past as well as present) would have helped, but none are available. How to transform existing behavior into the desirable one is also not discussed in detail. The available material is confined to the first component and the influence of Islamic values on behavior as noted above.

C. The Price Mechanism

It is agreed that the shape of the supply and demand curves as depicted by the conventional analysis is valid, subject to the usual qualifications. But no moral approval can be given to prices so determined unless the market is free from deception, coercion, hoarding, monopoly and similar evils and the distribution of income and wealth is fair. It is noted that the latter condition is not satisfied in any contemporary society. Assuming that both conditions are satisfied the resulting prices are acceptable but not sacrosanct. The social authority may still intervene if doing so is necessary for realizing social goals, but it is preferable to try other means and let price controls be the last resort. This would suit the objectives of freedom and efficiency, exception being made only when it becomes necessary to secure justice and ensure need fulfilment.

Islamic economists emphasize the influence of Islamic values on the functioning of the market and hope to see better results in terms of allocation of resources and need fulfilment. No attempts have been made to support this contention as shown by case studies, even dating from early Islamic history.

D. Distribution

Wages are allowed to be determined by the market, subject to a minimum wage constraint. The same applies to profit and the ratios of profit-sharing (between those who supply money capital and those who employ it in productive enterprise). The same may apply to rent. Unfortunately, distribution is one of the least researched areas in Islamic economics, and this deficiency is very conspicuous concerning the nature and rationale of rent in an Islamic economy. A theory of distribution is especially called for in view of the high

priority attaching to justice and need fulfilment. Islamic economists affirm that the reduction of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth is a policy objective. A macroeconomic theory of distribution applicable to an Islamic society has the potentiality of identifying the possible policy options in this regard. But the subject has been generally discussed in the context of *Zakah* and the Islamic laws of inheritance. A more comprehensive treatment at the microeconomic and macroeconomic level comprising all the three components of Islamic economics (ends and values, existing reality and market solutions under the influence of Islamic norms of behavior and policy directed at a transition toward the desirable pattern) is very much needed. It is on the basis of such study that a role for the Islamic state, providing a just distribution of income and wealth and in maintaining balance over time, can be envisaged. In the absence of this basic work, opinions vary from 'radical' suggestions on socialization to legalistic approaches aimed at perpetuating the status quo.

E. Theory of Income Determination

The basic Keynesian tools are employed by some writers to discuss income determination in an Islamic economy in which the rate of profit and the ratios of profit-sharing play a crucial role since interest disappears from the scene. Another significant point made recently is the integration of savings and investment decisions in an interest-free economy and the resulting close linkage between the financial and real sectors of the economy. Productive enterprise in an Islamic economy will be financed by equity debt financing playing only a marginal role. The dominant factor determining the behavior of both investors and savers will, therefore, be expectations regarding productivity. It is argued that *Zakah* will discourage idle savings and encourage investment. Thus productive enterprise will be encouraged due to the replacement of contractual interest obligations by an agreement to share the actual returns. The overall effect, it is argued, will be to increase the volume of investment leading to a higher level of income and employment, other things being equal.

F. Monetary Economics

Replacement of interest by profit-sharing has been shown to have far reaching consequences. Some of the important points are noted below:

- (1) Money creation will become investment oriented and will cease to be based on lending as it is now. This applies to high power money created by the central bank as well as to the creation of credit by the commercial banks. This direct linkage makes

it possible to control the supply of money *pari pasu* with the growth of the economy far more effectively than it is possible in the present system.

- (2) Demand for money would be a function of the level of income and expected changes in the productivity of investment as reflected in the rate of profit. It is argued that demand for money will be more stable in an Islamic economy than it is in the regime of interest.

The same applies to such areas as labor, industrial relations and population. Discussion is generally confined to principles while the requirements of the second and third components of Islamic economics are not fulfilled. The same can be said about international economic relations. Even the goals of policy in an international context are not properly discussed. Independent analysis of the existing reality and strategies for Islamic transformation of international economic relations are attempted only with reference to Muslim countries. A more universal framework has yet to be adopted.

It may be noted that the Islamic vision has not prompted equal attention to all dimensions of economic management or all spheres of economic activity. Greater attention has been paid to Islamically oriented behavior of economic agents and functioning of the market mechanism under its influence. The monetary sector has such attention because the abolition of interest is a major Islamic contribution to economic affairs. The second component, analysis of the existing reality, is essentially very weak. One reason may be non-availability of empirical data relevant for such studies. Most theoretical studies belong to the third component but they suffer from the dearth of material relating to the first component, i.e., derivation of Islamic ends and values specifically related to the various spheres of economic activity. This applies even to monetary economics which has high priority in contemporary Islamic economics. A major reason for this deficiency has been the inability of professional Muslim economists to acquire direct access to Qur'ān, *Sunnah*, *Fiqh* and Islamic history. Contributions from *Shari'ah* scholars generally lack relevance because they are not fully aware of the specific issues relating to various aspects of the modern economy. Proper development of Islamic economics as a discipline or, put differently, a thorough Islamization of economics requires, besides pioneering individual contributions, organized institutional efforts which only the universities and institutes of higher learning can afford. The progress made so far, which has been mostly due to individual efforts, is both relevant and encouraging in view of the present state of economics and the unanswered needs of the society.

Islamization of Modern Science and Technology

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Introduction

Islamization of modern empirical knowledge is in fact an effort to assimilate this knowledge in an Islamic framework with a view to use this knowledge for the greater good of the Muslim society. It is an attempt to understand and perhaps adopt all that is good in this knowledge by integrating it with traditional Islamic knowledge. The question, arises however, arises as to how this can be done, particularly in the case of sciences. For instance, how should science be taught and learned as a part of an Islamic curriculum in Muslim educational institutions from grade schools to the universities. And what methodology should be used and what procedure adopted in planning a course of instruction in science? How do we establish the relevance of Islamic knowledge to contemporary scientific progress, and what parameters need to be identified and studied to bring this change? The problem has to be looked at from a total perspective, namely, the present scene, past achievements, immediate problems, and strategy of action.

I. The Present Scene

The World of Islam is facing today a constant challenge from the industrialized countries. Partly due to the strategic location of the Muslim world and their wealth of men and material and partly because of accumulated religious prejudices, the belt of Muslim countries has become an arena of heightened power play, rivalries, and conflicts. Border conflicts in different regions are often masterminded to create ready markets for arms and ammunition in order to keep these countries engaged and occupied so that their progress and develop-

ment is slowed down and they remain under the constant subjugation and influence of the advanced nations.

In many Muslim countries the colonial rulers have left behind a pattern of social organization characterized by sharp dichotomy. There exists in every Muslim country a miniscule modernized sector, which enjoys a high standard of living, side by side with a large traditional sector subject to extreme poverty, malnutrition, disease, and ignorance. The modernized sector, by virtue of its vested interests, generally collaborates with the affluent industrialized world in perpetuating the global system of unequal relations and economic exploitation. This sector has its affiliations and loyalties outside the country. It does not identify itself with the masses; it is always afraid and apprehensive of the majority. For its very survival it plays a game of hide and seek in the body politics of the country, which results in the political instability and economic uncertainty of these countries. Both the external and internal situations thus tend to perpetuate economic inequity and socio-political unrest and thereby generates conflict within the Muslim countries.

The laws of nature, however, follow their own course. History is taking a turn. Today with the grace of the Almighty, the Muslim world is spearheading a global reassertion of the dignity of man everywhere. It is reassuring to witness a revival and upsurge of that old spirit of scientific enquiry in the world of Islam which had once shaken the entire world during the early centuries of the present era. It is heartening to see that in all the Muslim countries of the world there is so much enthusiasm and determination to forge ahead in developing science and technology and applying it to improve the condition of life and living in Muslim society.

But the Muslim communities throughout the world are very restive and impatient. They want to turn the pages of history immediately. They are eager to reverse the process of economic domination, political exploitation, and social and intellectual subservience, which they have suffered over centuries under the colonial influence and alien power. They are very keen and desperately trying to rediscover and restore the old spirit and glory of Islam and recover their destiny in this new and increasingly complex civilization.

The Islamic world today constitutes nearly one fifth of the humanity inhabiting the globe. Extending from Senegal to Indonesia, the Muslim world occupies the middle belt of the globe and assumes a position of strategic importance. It has tremendous economic attributes and is richly endowed with natural resources. It produces nearly 50 per cent of the world's oil and accounts for 40 per cent of world's export of raw materials. Furthermore, the inherent resilience of Islam is now triggering a thundering resurgence, producing tremendous motivational force and enthusiasm for greater cooperation and collaboration within the entire Muslim *Ummah* and for speedier progress and development of the Islamic world. This is indeed a great turning

point in our history. The Muslim society is again acquiring renewed strength from its faith and from the religion that once placed them on the top of the world.

II. The Islamic World View

The first five centuries of the present *hijrī* era, i.e., from the eighth to the twelfth century A.C., was a period of Islamic glory. It was a period of phenomenal rise and remarkable achievements in Muslim thinking and understanding. During this period Muslims developed a great thirst for learning, a craving the like of which history had never known before. Islamic civilization reached its zenith and Muslims became world leaders in philosophical and scientific thought. It was, however, in the field of natural sciences that they made the most obvious advances and achieved their greatest triumphs. These crowning successes were largely due to the tremendous ideological motivation provided by Islam for the study of natural phenomena and the pursuit of empirical knowledge.

In the period of their ascendancy, the Muslim scholars and scientists firmly believed, in conformity with their faith and religion, in the oneness of Allah, the unity of the universe, the unity of all mankind, and the infallibility of the Divine Law. All knowledge according to them was a confirmation of Divine unity and purpose. In fact, in Islam there is no science for the sake of science and there is no knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Everything is for an end, which is using scientific knowledge for the good of humanity at large. The Islamic approach toward the cultivation of knowledge has always been holistic and integrated. Therefore the Muslim scientists, in their golden era, were always guided by a moral zeal and consequently were not oriented or disposed toward its deployment of scientific knowledge for exploitative destructive ends. In Islam, the responsibilities of a person who knows and who can observe and think for himself have been laid down as greater than those of someone who does not know and who cannot contemplate. Therefore the responsibilities of a scientist, who is trained to be both knowledgeable, as well as observant and rational, are far greater than the ordinary citizen in preserving peace and harmony and leaving a happy world for his progeny and for posterity.

The renaissance of science and learning in Europe was accompanied by a separation of the religious and the secular, due to the peculiar conditions then prevailing. This value-neutral framework of science has over the years led to moral relativism and ethical anarchy. Knowledge has increasingly come to perform a utilitarian function. The ends of knowledge are determined largely by the prevalent and dominant distribution of societal power. Knowledge and

science have become a means toward the continued pursuit of whatever aims are deemed appropriate by those with the greatest influence, prestige, and control. They are a major tool for social manipulation and the service of profit. Modern science, mistakenly based on the separation of the secular from the religious, has been cut off from its moral moorings. The world needs to rethink the assumptions that led to the creation of this value-neutral framework. The highly integrated and holistic framework of Islamic science provides an alternative model, which permitted the growth of science and learning while protecting society from its misuse.

Science is a cultural phenomenon and Western science reflects the worldview of Western societies. At the zenith of its civilization and scientific achievement, Islam produced its own unique culture and tradition of science. It developed a mold of science and knowledge that progressed and flourished under the paradigm of belief in divine, unity the unity of universe and reflected the Islamic value system. Islam integrates the sacred and the temporal. The application of knowledge and science in Islam is for beneficent ends and in harmony with the purposes of the Creator. Consequently, knowledge was not considered an end in itself; it was a means for the attainment of higher moral and spiritual goals. Unlike modern science, there is no dehumanization, abstraction, or alienation in Islamic science. On the other hand, the early conflict between science and the church has led Western science to arrogate to itself an exclusive prerogative to apprehend truth and reality, thus reducing man's capability to develop an integrated appreciation of reality and react to it rationally and holistically. Modern man therefore stands disoriented by a total lack of value and purpose. The assumptions of value-neutrality in science, adopted by the West, as a result of the conflict between the Church and science, has brought mankind to the brink of destruction and needs to be re-examined from a correct historical and rational perspective.

III. The Progress of Knowledge

There have been three important periods in human history when empirical knowledge and science took a quantum jump in the world. These three periods are distinct from each other in their philosophy, time framework, methodology, and developmental pattern. These periods are: (i) Hindu and Greek civilizations, (ii) the Islamic civilization, and (iii), the modern Western civilization. In the early Greek period, no doubt, some important discoveries were made, but science grew and progressed in an atmosphere of superstition and fear. The methodology adopted was not systematic and the development was sporadic and lopsided. There was little public patronage for science. More often it followed individual fancy and enterprise. But it must be recognized that some remarkable achievements were made during that period.

On the other hand the inspiration, the conscience, and the morality given by Islam for the acquisition, dissemination, and advancement of knowledge is not only well known but is now universally recognized. History is witness to the fact that Muslim philosophical thought and scientific knowledge in its golden period had essentially a moral and religious base. The entire scientific effort was devoted toward understanding natural phenomena, opening new frontiers of knowledge, discovering hidden resources, and developing new processes for the welfare and well-being of humanity at large. This moral was peace and prosperity through science, and not the war and destruction we see today.

In contrast to this, the enormous physical progress that has been achieved in the modern world today through science and technology has brought in its wake, an oppressive and inequitable world order. There is strife, convulsion and tension all over the world. Scientific progress and technological advancement has produced a value-neutral society with an amoral base. There is a decline of authority at all levels, a disruption of the family, and a lack of social harmony. The secular nature of education has perpetrated a philosophy of anarchy and arrogance in the social behavior. Thus the development of science has been influenced by its social and intellectual milieu, which in turn grows out of the moral and religious environment.

Science arose in response to some basic human drives. 1) a desire to improve one's environment, and 2) a curiosity to learn more of the nature of one's world. These same drives still lead to scientific research and investigation. The aim of science is to discuss the broad principles underlying the structure and behavior of nature in order to understand and predict natural events and happenings. The fundamental motivation for scientific endeavor, however, is deep curiosity about the nature of the world.

An abiding impulse in every human being is to seek order and harmony. Man's historic attempt to understand his environment has been based in large part upon his success in observing and in arranging his growing collection of facts in what seems to him an orderly and harmonious way. His search for order has been stimulated whenever lack of order has made him dissatisfied and disenchanted. This effort has increased tremendously over the years as a result of his ever-widening interest in careful observation and in purposeful and planned experiments.

Science is not only an organized body of knowledge but a way of doing things. It is an activity and not merely a body of facts. It is both a product and a process. Science can be fully understood only as a mode of action. The search for truth is the outstanding feature of the method of science and scientific research. Science never reaches "absolute truth" or "absolute reality" but only attempts to get nearer or closer to it.

Scientific research connotes systematic investigation toward increasing the

sum of knowledge in scientific fields with or without a specified aim in view. Scientific research is usually prompted by scientists getting new ideas or is undertaken under a planned program. The methods of research, however, do not follow a path leading infallibly from success to success. When an investigation of natural phenomenon is undertaken, it is certain that something will be found, but it is difficult to say in advance just what it will be. The unpredictable aspect of scientific activity complicates its organization, but time has shown that unexpected turns may often lead to more important developments than the main intent of the investigation.

IV. The Function of Knowledge

The basic function of knowledge is problem solving with a purpose. Any knowledge that cannot or does not solve mundane human problems or does not help the individual to know more about his Creator is in fact no knowledge. In true Islamic tradition, only knowledge that ennobles is worth pursuing; knowledge used for unworthy purposes is considered to be as poisonous as the bite of a serpent. Modern scientific knowledge brings comfort and happiness by improving one's life style and mode of living, but it has also created destructive weaponry for nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare. The value system given by Islam requires co-existence, and also active cooperation, on the basis of justice and equity, and unequivocally condemns the exploitation, aggression, and destruction that we see in the developing chaos brought about by the power of scientific knowledge harnessed to the secular goals of alienated man.

Modern knowledge is today divided into two important groups of disciplines: the social sciences and the natural sciences. These social sciences are basically man-made sciences and usually develop along with the development of society and the new culture that emerges as its consequence. The modern social sciences, namely economics, political science, sociology, psychology, etc., are the products of Western culture and society. They can thrive and perform a problem solving function effectively only in a Western environment and secular economic framework. They cannot be equally effective in an Islamic framework because the basic assumptions of the two systems are different. Unfortunately most of the modern Muslim scholars are trained in a Western system of education and have consequently developed expertise in that system. They are not equipped well enough to handle, much less to solve, problems rationally and satisfyingly in an Islamic framework. The traditional Islamic system had its own culture and mold of social sciences and it is the duty of the Muslim scholar of Islam to introduce, develop and disseminate the knowledge of Islamic social sciences to the Muslim *Ummah*. Unfortunately they have failed to do this sacred duty.

There are two types of Muslim scholars. The traditional orthodox *'ulemā'* are well versed in Islamic History, Islamic Law, and Islamic Jurisprudence (*fiqh*). They have mastered the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* and they know their interpretation very well. They are indeed authorities in early Islamic scholarship. But they have very little knowledge of modern philosophy and science, which have transformed the world today. They look to the past with pride but have little to offer for the present or future. Another class of Muslim scholars has been educated in the Western system of education. Their knowledge is basically of the type that one finds in Western societies, namely, the modern social or natural sciences. Their knowledge of Islam is restricted to prayers, fasting, and various rituals for different occasions. There are very few Muslim scholars at home with the knowledge of Islam equally with the knowledge found in the modern social natural sciences.

The ignorant among the scholars try to find the details of scientific knowledge in the Holy Qur'ān, but the Qur'ān is not a text-book of science. It is a book giving light and guidance. It is code of ethics and morals. At many places no doubt, it indicates and sometimes explains the fundamental laws of nature and speaks of many scientific facts and sets directions for the believers. But it is neither a textbook of physics, chemistry, biology, or medicine, nor it is a manual of social sciences. Its greatness lies in its guidance and the framework it provides for an integrated and holistic approach to life and for acknowledging the power, greatness, and kindness of the Creator. One can draw inspiration from this reservoir for the study of all knowledge, that is, what is known today and what will be discovered in the future.

V. Islamization of Knowledge

This is not the first time that an attempt is being made toward the Islamization of knowledge. It has been done before. During the second and the third Islamic centuries a major exercise was conducted by Muslim scholars to translate most of the Hindu, Chinese, and Greek literature. They learned different languages, invited many non-Muslim scholars as teachers and researchers, built libraries, and did research. Part of this useful knowledge was rewritten and assimilated into the Islamic framework. What was unworthy was rejected. Today most of this literature and its improvement and further extension by Muslim scholars is associated with the Islamic heritage. Muslims have done this before and they can repeat it again. The task is no doubt stupendous but it can be done. Muslim scholars are quite capable of doing it only if they undertake it as a mission.

The starting point for Islamization of knowledge is indeed the reshaping and restructuring of education in the Islamic world. There is urgent need

seriously to rethink and reconsider the form and the content of science education in the Islamic countries. A fresh appraisal has to be taken of newly emerging problems and new programs designed in response to the requirements of each country. The new demands of agriculture, industry, trade, commerce, engineering and medicine must be seriously considered by the course designers. It is therefore absolutely essential that the system be reorganized and reshaped anew. And the reorganization and reshaping must be fully designed to meet societal needs in accordance with the objectives of all Islamic society for the future.

A nation's pre-eminence in the field of science and technology is determined by the excellence of its institutions of higher learning and research. An urgent need of all Muslim countries is to develop high level managerial expertise and high quality manpower in order to direct developmental efforts. Therefore it is vitally important for Muslim countries to develop a strong and productive system of higher education. Their higher education should be large enough to meet their future requirements and strong enough to give the Islamic world a feeling of self-respect and self-reliance.

The educational system currently prevalent in the Islamic world is a legacy from the colonial rulers. It is incapable of inspiring the Muslim youth or helping them to solve the problems of the Muslim *Ummah*. In fact, it has proved counter-productive. The system needs not only a drastic overhauling but, over time, a complete transformation. It needs a change of character and a transformation of the value system and ethical practice. Let our educational system be available to all, the rich and the poor, the privileged and the deprived, the talented and the average. Let our system encourage multiple entries, free access for everyone, different channels of studies, formal as well as non-formal, and recurrent programs, student-oriented curricula, and community participation. Let us shift emphasis from teaching to learning, from material gains to character formation, and from individual to social and national objectives. Let us give priority to adult education, universal elementary education, and sound scientific and technical education in our new plan of action.

VI. Strategy of Action

In order to prepare a blue print of action for the Islamization of knowledge it will be necessary to have some basic premises. We should recognize that:

- (i) To seek knowledge is an article of faith for every Muslim. One must continue to learn and seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave and follow it wherever one can acquire it.
- (ii) Muslims are enjoined to seek knowledge in submission to Allah (SWT), that is, to make manifest the Divine unity and to serve

humanity. Purposeless research and unworthy knowledge is forbidden in Islam.

- (iii) Islam believes in the integrated and holistic concept of knowledge. The epistemology of Islam recognizes that knowledge has a social function. In fact, in Islam there is a unity between man and his knowledge.
- (iv) The Western Capitalistic and Communistic philosophies and their operational forms are completely alien to Islam and cannot be assimilated and justified within the Islamic framework of knowledge and action.
- (v) For Islamization of knowledge, prior commitment to Islam as an epistemology is necessary. One has to be a believer before one can participate in this undertaking.
- (vi) Revealed knowledge is the highest form of truth and has a distinct place in Islamic society. All light and guidance has to come from this source.

The next step is communication among Muslim scholars and scientists. They must involve themselves in a thorough re-examination of science in terms of Muslim culture and conscience so that it can be fully absorbed and assimilated. It must however, that science is also a cultural force. It penetrates into society easily and effectively and therefore can bring a significant change in thinking, norms, and additional complexion. Science has to become indigenous to Muslim society before it can be used for the welfare and well being of Muslim society. It is not opposed to religion. On the contrary it strengthens the faith of the believer. Unfortunately, in Western society, science has been divorced from the moral value system of society and has become highly mechanistic and value free. The Islamic view point that it is value-full will have to be brought out clearly in teaching science to Muslim students and researchers.

The task may look difficult to begin with, but as we go along we will receive help and guidance from Allah, (SWT), to continue the good work of our mission. The following steps may be taken initially:

- (i) Muslim scientists from different countries should be asked to write textbooks on science for primary, secondary and tertiary stages of our educational system. These textbooks must reflect an Islamic world-view of science. Although scientific facts cannot be changed, their presentation and explanation can certainly be done in such a manner that they conform with our ideology and value system. In writing these textbooks, we must ensure that whenever we have to prove a scientific theory or principle on the basis of available information and arguments, we must provide an additional proof by quoting a relevant reference from the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* if

available. This will not only impress the enquiring Muslim mind but strengthen its faith and belief.

- (ii) The Muslim scholar, must bring out clearly in these textbooks the unique contributions made by Muslim scientists. Unfortunately, there has been much dishonest reporting by modern writers on the contributions of Muslim scientists, although occasionally they do mention the Greek scientists. In fact, there exists incontestable historical evidence that many discoveries currently attributed to Western scientists were actually made by towering Muslim geniuses like Jabir, al Khawārizmī, al Rāzī, al Mas'ūdī, al Wafa, al Birūnī, Ibn Sīna, Ibn al Haytham, Umar al Khayyām, al Ṭūsī, Ibn-Rushd, and Ibn al Nafīs. Muslim historians of science must accept this challenge and break the myth of current claims by revising the original sources of Muslim scholarship.
- (iii) Simultaneously comprehensive programs of teacher training should be launched. The present cadre of science teachers in the Islamic world require a great deal of training in Islamic education and Islamic thought. In the Islamic system of education, the role of the teacher is central and pivotal. There is a kind of personal relationship between teacher and student. The teacher is also a mentor and spiritual guide and consequently should be fully equipped to discharge this function.
- (iv) Existing institutions in Muslim countries will have to be reorganized in order to overcome the present secular framework and character left behind as a legacy from the Western colonial powers. The older concept of *madrasah* with modern facilities will have to be revived and the artificial system of modern schools, colleges, and universities must be reorganized and reformed.

These reforms can convert the existing system of education into a new system designed to bring out the genius of the Muslim people and to meet their growing needs and aspirations. Complementary to educational reform however, is a social and economic transformation. Unless these are planned side by side the impact of educational changes will be minimal. A parallel program of social transformation must be launched with the spirit and fervor of a mass movement.

Much hard work must be done by Muslim scientists and scholars to Islamize scientific knowledge and philosophy. A note of caution, however, is necessary. In our enthusiasm let us not overplay our hand. We will have to be liberal and forward looking in the way we present science to Muslim students. It is the conceptual framework of science that needs to be recast from the Muslim point of view and emphasized. The details, methodology, and content can remain largely the same.

The Concept of Knowledge in Islam and the Principles of Mathematical Sciences

M. Raziuddin Siddiqi

The Concept of Knowledge in Islam and the Principles of Mathematical Sciences

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The theme of this Symposium is *Islamization of knowledge*. The word 'Islamization' is used here as a technical term, and, like every term, it has a certain connotation which is determined by definition. The term is understood here to mean that the concept, principles and methodology that are needed to organize and develop the system of knowledge should be in conformity with the spirit of Islam and the epistemology derived from the Qur'ān.

I think that in the present era, Muḥammad Iqbal of Pakistan, the great Poet of the East and the renowned Muslim philosopher, put forward this idea of *Islamization of knowledge* for the first time in his Persian Mathnavi, "Musafir" in the early (1350/1930's): The actual words used by Iqbal are as follows:

جون عرب اندر اروپا برکشاد علم و حکمت را بنا دیکر نهاد
دانه آن صحرا نشینان کاشتند حاصلش افرنکیان برداشتند
خوشر آن باشد «مسلمانش کنی» کشته شمیر قرآنش کنی
این پری از شیشه اسلاف ماست باز صیدش کن که او از قاف ماست

When the Arabs spread their wings in Europe
Knowledge & Science were given a new foundation
One fruit of the seed that these desert dwellers had planted was
plucked out by Europeans
Happy are those who Islamize it
This fairy is from the bottle of our ancestors
Capture it again because it comes from our mountains.

Thus the object of Islamization should be to capture the 'fairy' of *ilm* and *hikmah*, i.e., science and technology, to make it our own, to master it and make great advance in it, and to apply it for the benefit of humanity (بما یفیع الناس) through the conquest of Nature, so that the declaration in the Qur'ānic verse below may be realized by the human race:

﴿ألم تروا ان الله سخر لكم ما في السموات وما في الأرض﴾ لقمان (٣١:٢٠)

Do you not see that Allah has subjected to your use all things in the heavens and on earth . . .” Qur’ān (31:20)

This means that the re-orientation and re-organization of knowledge should be such that the acquisition and creation of new knowledge which is the *sine qua non* for the conquest of the forces of Nature is not lost to the human race. Let us therefore examine what are the Islamic concepts and principles of acquiring and creating knowledge.

There are three degrees of knowledge, viz.:

- (1) علم اليقين , *Ilm al Yaqīn*, i.e., knowledge by inference. This depends either on the truth of its assumptions (postulates) as in *deduction*, or on probabilities as in *induction*.
- (2) عين اليقين , *Ayn al Yaqīn* i.e., knowledge by perception and observation. This is based on the actual experience of phenomena.

Scientific knowledge is of the above mentioned two kinds and is acquired from the study of natural phenomena which are signs of Allah (آيات الله), *Āyāt Allah* and symbols of ultimate Reality. The study of Nature, of the Heavens and the Earth, and their contemplation is enlightening for men of understanding. They learn the ways of Allah—سنة الله—*Sunnah Allah*, i.e., Law of Nature and subjugate the forces of the physical world.

- (3) The third category of knowledge is حق اليقين *Haqq al Yaqīn*. Allah reveals His signs not only in the observation and contemplation of the outer world (آفاق), *Āfāq*, but also through the inner experience of the mind (أنفس) *Anfus*. This Divine guidance comes to God’s creatures in the first instance from this inner experience by means of:
 - (a) Instinct, i.e. جبله *Jibillah*
 - (b) Intuition, i.e. وجدان *Wijdān*
 - (c) Inspiration, i.e. الهام *Ilhām*
 - (d) Revelation, i.e. وحي *Wahy*

Knowledge and wisdom are two of the Attributes of Allah Who is علم *Alīm* and حكيم *Hakīm*—Omniscient and All-Wise. He knows what is in the Heavens and the Earth: يعلم ما في السموات والأرض

On the other hand, man does not know anything except what has been taught to him by Allah: علم الانسان ما لم يعلم. The first Revelation to the Prophet of Islam (SAAS) ﷺ dealt with reading and learning, and the Prophet (SAAS) ﷺ then pronounced the categorical injunction that it is the sacred duty of every believer—man and woman—to acquire knowledge!

طلب العلم فريضة على كل مسلم ومسلمة

The Qur’an further explains that those believers to whom knowledge has been vouchsafed occupy higher ranks and exalted positions: (Qur’an 58:11)

﴿يرفع الله الذين آمنوا والذين أوتوا العلم درجات﴾ المجادلة (٥٨:١١)

and that those who know and those who do not know cannot be equal:
(Qur'ān 39:9)

﴿قل هل يستوي الذين يعلمون والذين لا يعلمون﴾ الزمر (٩:٣٩)

Islam thus sanctified knowledge, and created a keenness for it among the believers. The impetus of this injunction of Islam about learning and its emphasis on acquiring knowledge was such that the spirit of enquiry spread rapidly throughout the Muslim world.

Let us see how this knowledge, whose acquisition has been made obligatory on every individual, is obtained.

Going back to the early period of the human race, it is found that man accepted things at their face value. As time passed and his consciousness developed, he acquired knowledge by experience. His knowledge, which consisted of a catalogue of events, was quite sketchy and haphazard. He had no concept of drawing inference or making predictions. Systematization began much later with the Babylonians and Egyptians.

The Qur'ān, on the other hand, appealed constantly to reason and observation, and thus showed that knowledge was based on both experiment and theory. According to Islam, contemplation is only one source of human knowledge. There are two other sources, viz., history and nature. By tapping these sources the spirit of Islam is seen at its best.

The observable aspect of Reality is emphasized by the Qur'ān in several verses such as:

﴿إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ وَالْفَلَكَ الَّتِي تَجْرِي فِي الْبَحْرِ بِمَا يَنْفَع النَّاسَ وَمَا أَنْزَلَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مِنْ مَاءٍ فَأَحْيَا بِهِ الْأَرْضَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِهَا وَبَثَّ فِيهَا مِنْ كُلِّ دَابَّةٍ وَتَصْرِيفِ الرِّيَاحِ وَالسَّحَابِ الْمُسَخَّرِ بَيْنَ السَّمَاءِ وَالْأَرْضِ لَآيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يَعْقِلُونَ﴾ البقرة (٢:١٦٤)

The Qur'ān sees signs of the ultimate Reality in the sun, the moon, the stars—in fact in the whole of Nature as revealed to the perception of man. And a Muslim's duty is to reflect on these signs, and not to pass by them as if he is "deaf and blind". (Qur'ān 2:164) Do you not see?; do you not think?, is the theme constantly recurring in the Qur'ān. Repeatedly does the Book lay stress on the phenomena of this world as a sure means of knowledge. The Book awakened the empirical spirit in the Muslims, and made them the founders of modern science. The appeal to the concrete was first made by the Prophet (SAAS ﷺ) who prayed constantly for the knowledge of the ultimate Nature of Things: رب أرني حقائق الأشياء كما هي

The Muslim savants acted on these guide-lines laid down by the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*, and developed the new methods of enquiry, observation, experiment and measurement on which modern science is based. They never lost sight however, of the fact that the Omniscient Allah has clearly pointed out that man has been given only a little knowledge. (Qur'an 17:85):

﴿وما أوتيتم من العلم إلا قليلاً﴾ (الاسراء ١٧:٨٥)

The final cause, the total explanation, and the real nature of things are transcendental, and belong to the unseen world, (عالم الغيب), the knowledge of which cannot be obtained by human senses and perception, and are, therefore, not amenable to the method of science. According to the Qur'an, the invisible is known only to Allah: (Qur'an 27:65)

﴿قل لا يعلم من في السموات والأرض الغيب إلا الله﴾ (النمل ٢٧:٦٥)

Belief in the Unseen (الإيمان بالغيب) is one of the cardinal principles of faith in Islam. On the other hand, the quest for the knowledge of the unseen is inborn in the nature of man:

﴿فطرة الله التي فطر الناس عليها﴾ (الروم ٣٠:٣٠)

In such a situation, Allah who is sole possessor of the knowledge of the Unseen reveals it to whom so ever he wills from among his messengers (Qur'an 3:179)

﴿وما كان الله ليطالعكم على الغيب ولكن الله يجتبي من رسله من يشاء﴾ (آل عمران ٣:١٧٩)

It is thus obvious that when man cannot know the unseen directly through his own perceptive faculties or reason, and when this knowledge can be imparted to him by the chosen Apostle, to whom it is revealed by Allah, the only way for man to attain this knowledge of the unseen is to believe in Allah and his Apostles.

In the light of these basic principles of knowledge derived from the teachings of Islam, we have to evaluate the various branches of science, and see whether, and how far, they violate any of these principles, and how the re-orientation can be brought about.

Naturally there can be many difficulties, when one sets about this task. The *Ummah* should, however, face this challenge, and competent scholars who combine in themselves expert knowledge of the scientific discipline as well as of the Islamic principles, should devote themselves to the task of re-organizing and re-constructing the major disciplines, taking care that the advances and development (a great deal of which have been contributed by the

Muslims themselves), and on the basis of which the conquest of nature can be effected, are preserved as far as possible.

Of course, if any of the modern developments are demonstrably against the spirit of Islam, they should be discarded by all means. However, the subject should be so developed on Islamic foundations, that its proven parts about which there can be no objections are not lost entirely to the Muslim people and the *Ummah* is not deprived of beneficial applications of that knowledge. No doubt we have to make sure that there is nothing in the various branches of knowledge repugnant to the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. We have also to remember: الحكمة ضالة المؤمن that "wisdom is that which the muslim searches for."

Turning now to the Mathematical Sciences, we have to analyze their foundations as well as the structures erected on these foundations.

Mathematics is the development of Logic, dealing with the laws of thought and of deriving valid inferences from the fundamental axioms. It deals with numbers and their generalizations and mutual correspondence and relationships.

The foundations of many branches of mathematics were essentially laid by the Muslims themselves, and essentially these foundations were not influenced by any political or social beliefs. Hence there would probably not be much scope for re-organizing them to any appreciable extent. Let us consider this in some detail. I am discussing here only a few fundamental and epoch-making ideas which revolutionized the different branches of mathematics. The overall contributions of Muslims, as we know, are innumerable, verified as by George Sarton (Introduction to the History of Science), Moritz Cantor (Geschichte der Mathematik), Heinrich Suter and a host of other writers. I have also given my account in the *History of Muslim Philosophy*, edited by M. M. Sharif.

As pointed out earlier, mathematics can be described as the science of numbers, their generalizations and relationships. First of all, let us consider the numbers themselves. Prior to the work of Muhammad ibn Mūsā al-Khawārizmī, numbers were depicted by the letters of the Alphabets; thus 'i' stood for one, 'v' for five, 'x' for ten, and so on. In the very beginning, the Arabs also used their alphabets . . . د، ج، ب، أ etc., for denoting numbers. With this kind of arithmetic mankind could not have made much headway. It is said that the Chinese and the Indians had some conception of the numerals but systematically the numerals were introduced and employed by the Arabs who spread them throughout the world. They have been generally known as "Arab Numerals" ever since.

These Arab numerals however, would not have been sufficient for the development of mathematics, and consequently of modern science. Two things were still missing. One was the number 'zero'. This numeral called 'ṣifr' (صفر) in Arabic, which means 'empty', was essential and indispensable to make the

system of enumeration complete.

The second missing was the positional value of a numeral, viz., its value when it occupies the first, second, third or other position in the row. These positions signify the units tens, hundreds, thousands and so on.

These three important and vital ideas about numbers were given by al-Khawārizmī in his book on arithmetic which systematized the knowledge of the subject known up to that time.

Al Khawārizmī went much further than this and made great strides. Prior to him, the mathematicians, including the Greeks, considered the number to be a pure magnitude. It was only when Al Khawārizmī conceived of the number as a relation in the modern sense, that the science of algebra became possible. The development of algebra is one of the greatest achievements of the Muslims, and it was cultivated so much that the symbolical process which it idealizes is still called “Algorithm” in modern mathematics. Al Khawārizmī himself formulated and solved the algebraic equations of the first and second degree, and discovered his elegant geometrical method of finding the solutions of such equations. He thus laid the foundations of geometrical algebra, which was developed a great deal by the later Muslim scholars.

Like the other Muslim scholars and scientists, the great Al Khawārizmī was a staunch believer in Islam, and has invariably recorded ‘Praise’ (حمد) to Allah and *Ṣalāh* (صلاة) to the Holy Prophet (ﷺ) at the very beginning of his writings. By way of illustration I am quoting here from the first paragraph of his famous *book of algebra* المقابلة الجبر :

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 ”هذا كتاب وضعه محمد بن موسى الخوارزمي افتتحه بأن قال الحمد لله على نعمه بما هو
 أهله من محامده التي بأداء ما افترض منها علي من يعيده من خلقه يقع اسم الشكر ويستوجب
 المزيد وتؤمن من الغر إقراراً بربوبيته وتذلاً لعزته وخشوعاً لعظمته.
 بعث محمداً ﷺ بالنبوة على حين فترة من الرسل وتكر من الحق ودروس من الهدى
 فبصر به من العمى واستنقذ به من الهلكة وكثر به بعد القلة وألف به بعد الشتات.
 تبارك الله ربنا وتعالى جده وتقدست أسماؤه ولا إله غيره، وصلى الله على محمد النبي
 وآله وسلم“.

The great al Bīrūnī introduced the idea of a “function” which describes the correspondence of two numbers and the dependence of one number on the other. This concept of function has become a most important idea in mathematics.

AbūBakar al Kartūbī wrote a book on algebra called *Al Fakhri*, in which he developed among other important ideas—such as the theory of surds, the

summation of series and the indeterminate quadratic equations—the very important concept of mathematical induction. It is generally recognized that the method of inductive reasoning is one of the greatest contributions of Muslims to modern civilization.

The illustrious ‘Umar al Khayyām, who is considered as one of the greatest mathematicians, made what was for his time an uncommonly great progress by dealing systematically with algebraic equations of the cubic and higher orders, and by classifying them into various groups.

In the subject of geometry, the three sons of Shākir Ibn Mūsā, Muhammad, Aḥmad, and Ḥasan, who are also called the Banū Mūsā, discovered a method of trisecting an angle by the geometry of motion, thus connecting geometry with mechanics. That this problem is not solvable by means of the ruler and compass alone, has been well-known from the time of the Greek mathematicians.

In the fourth century of *Hijrah*, al Kūhī and others founded and successfully developed a branch of Geometry that consists of problems leading to algebraic equations of the third and higher degrees. This correlation of geometry with algebra, and the geometric method of solving algebraic equations introduced by al Khawarizmi, anticipated Descartes’ discovery of analytical geometry in the eleventh century A.H. / seventeenth century A.C.

The crowning achievement of Muslims in the subject of Geometry was, however, connected with the appraisal of Euclid’s postulates. It is well-known that in each science or logical system, the beginning is made with some fundamental concepts and a few assertions called postulates (or axioms) which are accepted without demonstration or proof, and on the basis of which further statements (called theorems) are established. Now it is recognized that some of Euclid’s postulates are quite self-evident. For instance, no one questions the validity of the statement that the whole is greater than a part, or that equals added to equals result in equals. But the same cannot be said about Euclid’s, parallel postulate. Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī (d.606 AH / 1210 AC) made a preliminary critique of this postulate, but it was Naṣr al Dīn al Ṭūsī (d.673 AH /1275 AC) who recognized the weakness in Euclid’s theory of the parallels. Since the days of Ptolemy no one had given serious thought to the difficulties of demonstrating the truth of *Euclid’s* parallel postulate on the basis of perceptual space. After the lapse of more than a thousand years, it was Naṣr al Dīn al Ṭūsī who first tackled this problem, and in his efforts to improve the postulate, realized the necessity of abandoning perceptual space. It was only in the thirteenth century AH / nineteenth century AC century that such studies continued by Bolyai, Lobachievsky, Gauss and Reimann resulted in the discovery and development of the various non-Euclidean geometries, culminating in the hyperspace movement and the Theory of Relativity of our own time.

Trigonometry, both plane and spherical, is, for the most part, a creation of the Muslims. Al Khwārizmī himself compiled trigonometric tables that contained not only the sine function as utilized by his predecessors, but also for the first time, the tangent functions. Muhammad ibn Jābir al Baṭṭānī (d. 317 AH / 927 AC) used sines regularly because he was convinced of their superiority over the Greek chords. The previous works contained the full arc, but al Baṭṭānī remarked that it was more advantageous to use the half-arc, which is regarded as a very important advance in mathematics. He completed the introduction of tangents and cotangents in trigonometry, and gave the relation between the sides and angles of a spherical triangle.

Abu al-Wafa al Kūhī was the first to show the generality of the sine theorem relative to the triangles. He introduced the secant and the cosecant in trigonometry, and was aware of the relations between the lines connected with a triangle that are used to define the six trigonometric functions.

After developing trigonometry, and preparing accurate trigonometric tables, the Muslim mathematicians could calculate the heights of mountains, distances of inaccessible places, and breadths of rivers.

Later developments in mathematics have been established on the above mentioned foundations which were laid by the Muslim scholars themselves. It is unlikely, therefore, that there is anything in these developments which is repugnant to the spirit of Islam.

There is, however, one branch of the mathematical sciences, viz., cosmology, for which a detailed review has to be undertaken to see how far the present theories of the origin and evolution of the nebulae, the stars, the planets and other celestial bodies can be harmonized with the account of the creation of the universe given in the Qur'ān.

For instance, Astro-physicists have proposed a theory that initially the primordial matter, consisting of the elementary particles, was spread out uniformly when, all of a sudden, there was a disturbance and a big bang when the process of condensation started and the evolution of nebulae and stars began. The scientists are not in a position to say what this bang was but the believers can say that it was the Divine Order: Be! “ کن ”.

Anyway, this is the subject which would have to be considered in depth by competent scholars who possess an expert knowledge of the cosmological discipline and of the origin and creation of the universe contained in the Qur'ān.

Mulāḥazāt Sarī'ah
Ḥawl al Dirāsāt al Qānūnīyah

(Brief Remarks on Legal Studies)

Muhammad al 'Awwa

ملاحظات سريعة حول الدراسات القانونية

الدكتور محمد سليم العوا

ملاحظات سريعة حول الدراسات القانونية

الدكتور محمد سليم العوا

الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله

أما بعد

فهذه ملاحظات سريعة حول الدراسات القانونية وموضعها من محاولة وضع إطار إسلامي متكامل للمعرفة العصرية ، أردت بها ألا تخلو الندوة الأولى حول هذا الموضوع من كلمة حول الدراسات القانونية تقديراً لخطورها ، وإدراكاً لأثرها الكبير في حياة الناس كافة من جهة ، وتبصيراً بأثرها في صوغ كثير من جوانب حياة الأمة و صبغها بالصبغة التي تنحوها دراسة القانون .

(١) ولا شك أن القانون في كل أمة هو أحد مقاييس حضارتها و تقدمها، وبقدر ما يوفر للقانون من أصالة ومن صلاحية لتلبية حاجات الأمة، بقدر ما تكون طاعته والخضوع لأحكامه والتزام أوامره ونواهيه.

(٢) والقانون في الأمة الإسلامية أصيل أصالة هذه الأمة ذاتها . إذ نزل الوحي على رسول الله ﷺ مقررراً العقيدة والشريعة معاً ، ولم يقبل الله عز وجل من الناس احداهما دون الأخرى ﴿فلا وربك لا يؤمنون حتى يحكموك فيما شجر بينهم ثم لا يجدوا في أنفسهم حرجاً مما قضيت ويسلموا تسليماً﴾^(١) . وتحكيم رسول الله ﷺ تحكيم لشرع الله الذي ارتضى لعباده ، إذ الرسول لا ينطق عن الهوى . والوحي من ورائه يصوبه في اجتهاده إذا كان ثمة ما يحتاج إلى تصويب .

(٣) وقد صلح القانون الإسلامي دائماً لتلبية حاجات الأمة التنظيمية

والتشريعية ، وآتسع فقهه اتساعاً لم تبلغ بعضه النظم القانونية قديمها وحديثها ، وما لجأ إليه المسلمون إلا وجدوا فيه الغناء عن غيره والكفاية عما سواه . وقد ساهم قانون هذه الأمة الإسلامية في صنع حضارة لم تبلغ شأوها حضارات العالم مجتمعة ، وكان المنهج الإستنباطي والاستقرائي الذي اتبعه فقهاء القانون الإسلامي ، وكان مفتاح المنهج العلمي الحديث الذي قاد الدنيا إلى أرحب آفاق الإختراع والإكتشاف . ولم يتخلف المسلمون إلا حين تنكبوا عن منهجهم القديم .

(٤) ولم يكن تخلف المسلمين مقتصرأ على حياتهم المادية فحسب ، بل امتد متجاوزأ الجانب المادي من الحياة ليشمل الجانب القانوني والفكري ، فنشأت أجيال متتابعة تدين بالإسلام ولا تطبق قانونه ، بل هي تجهله . وتؤمن ببعض الكتاب ، إذ تصح فيها العقيدة وتؤدي العبادة . وتكفر ببعض ، إذ تهمل تطبيق الشريعة أو تنكر إلزامها .

وقد أدى ذلك الفصام — الذي هو مظهر التخلف وليس سببه — إلى أن أصبحت حياة الأمة القانونية محكومة بقوانين استوردت من بلاد الغرب المسيحي ، هي التي تجري معاملات الناس على أساسها ، وهي التي يتحاكم الناس إليها ، وهي التي يدرسها أبناء المسلمين في الجامعات والمدارس ليطبقوها بعد ذلك في المحاكم والدواوين . وقرق شيئاً فشيئاً ما بين المسلمين وما بين نظامهم القانوني حتى رأينا من ينكر صلاحيته للتطبيق ، بل رأينا من ينكر صحة وصفه بأنه «نظام قانوني» .

(٥) وفي تطور طويل استغرق قرناً من الزمان أو يزيد ، رأينا جذوة الإيمان بصلاحية الإسلام في جوانبه كافة لحكم الحياة تعود مرة أخرى قوية في الصدور ، ورأينا كثيراً من مفكري العالم — مسلمين وغير مسلمين — يهيبون بالمسلمين أنه لا سبيل لكم للعودة الى قيادة مركب البشرية إلا بعودتكم إلى عربة الإسلام .

وقد كان نصيب الدراسات القانونية غير ضعيل من تفكير

المفكرين وتنبية المصلحين بلغ قريباً من نصف قرن في عالم الدرس الجامعي ، وعالم التطبيق العملي .

وأنا لنستطيع القول أن الدراسات القانونية الإسلامية تفرض اليوم نفسها فرضاً على الراغبين والكارهين على سواء . تفرض نفسها لأنها مطلب للأمة سجلته في كل مناسبة ، وأعلنته في وثائقها الدستورية في البلاد العربية والإسلامية كلها أو جلها ، وليس الحادث اليوم في باكستان والسودان ومصر وليبيا والإمارات العربية المتحدة ونيجريا وغيرها من الدول العربية والإسلامية إلا بعض مظاهر هذه الحقيقة . وقد صدرت القوانين المستمدة من الشريعة الإسلامية بحمد الله في بعض تلك البلاد ، وهي في طريقها إلى الصدور بإذن الله في البلاد الأخرى ومن ثم فإن الدراسات القانونية الإسلامية لا يجوز أن تعطى اليوم فضل الجهد ولا فضل الوقت ، ولا يصح أن تعد مجرد متعة فكرية يهتم بها الهواة ، ويهملها المحترفون . بل هي اليوم جزء من صميم مهنة القانون يتعين على كل مشتغل بها في البلاد الإسلامية أن يلم منها بقدر يؤهله للمشاركة اليوم في حركة التطور نحو تطبيق النظام القانوني الإسلامي وأن يشارك غداً في حمل تبعة تطبيق أحكام الإسلام القانونية في واقع الحياة وفي علاقات الناس . بل وإنما نتطلع — ونعمل — حتى يأتي اليوم الذي تسود فيه أحكام قانون الإسلام علاقات الدول العربية والإسلامية وغيرها من دول العالم .

(٦) ولذلك فإننا دعونا — ولا زلنا ندعو — إلى أن تتوجه الدراسات القانونية الإسلامية إلى محاور ثلاثة :

المحور الأول : ويدور حوله العمل التشريعي لتبيين الطريق للمسؤولين عن التشريع في أقطار الإسلام ويعين على اختيار منهج من بين مناهج الفقهاء المسلمين يتخذه المشرعون أساساً لعملهم ولست أرى مانعاً من أن تتعدد المناهج ، وأن تتعدد طرق تطبيق المنهج الواحد ، ما دام يجمع

ذلك التعدد في النهاية تسليم بالأصول قطعية الورد وقطعية الدلالة من القرآن الكريم والسنة النبوية ، وتسليم بأصول الإجتهد في منهج ما كان ظني الدلالة من هذه الأصول القطعية الورد .

المحور الثاني : ويدور حوله عمل القاضي ، وفي هذا المحور يجب أن تنحو الدراسات الإسلامية القانونية المعاصرة منحى موجهاً نحو الإهتمام التطبيقي اليومي والحل العملي لمشكلات الحياة .

والقضاء يقوم — كما هو معلوم — على تطبيق نوعين من القواعد : القواعد الموضوعية التي تحكم كل نزاع على حدة ، والقواعد الإجرائية التي تحكم عمل المحكمة نفسها أيأ كان نوع النزاع الذي يعرض أمامها . فأما القواعد الموضوعية ، فما كان منها منصوصاً عليه في القرآن الكريم أو السنة النبوية فليس للقاضي إلا إعماله على موضوع الدعوى في حدود قواعد التفسير المقبولة في النظام القانوني الإسلامي ، وما لم يكن منصوصاً عليه في القواعد الموضوعية في القرآن الكريم أو السنة النبوية ، فسبيل القضاء فيه هو سبيل الاجتهد في ضوء قواعد التي سلمها المجتهدون من علماء الإسلام جيلاً إلى جيل حتى يومنا هذا ، والتي مهما يكن رأي بعض الباحثين في صياغة بعض عباراتها أو مدوناتها ، فإنها تبقى هي التعبير الأصدق — في نظرنا — عن وسائل النظر الصحيحة في أصول القانون الإسلامي لاستنباط حكم ما لم ينص عليه في أحكام هذا القانون التفصيلية من المسائل والوقائع .

وأما القواعد الإجرائية . فهي فيما عدا أمور معدودة منصوص عليها في القرآن والسنة ، لا سبيل إلى التوصل إلى تحقيق غايات النظام القانوني الإسلامي من خلالها إلا لاجتهدانا في اختيار الأصلح للمسلمين من بين ما توصلت إليه فطرة الإنسان ، أو هدته إليه تجاربه ، مما يحفظ حقوق المتقاضين ويصون حرية الفرد ، ويوازن بين مختلف

المصالح ومتضارب الغايات في المجتمع . ولا تثريب على القاضي المسلم اليوم في دولة تحكم بالشريعة الإسلامية . كما أنه لا تثريب على المشرع في دولة مسلمة، إن هو أخذ في المسائل الإجرائية بحلول خلت من نظائرها وقائع التاريخ الإسلامي القضائي ولا إذا هو ابتكر بعض هذه الحلول ابتكاراً ، أو اقتبسها من الغير محوراً فيها أو بدون تحوير، لأن غاية القاعدة القانونية الإجرائية في النظام القانوني الإسلامي هي تحقيق العدل، والكشف عن الحق . فأبي طريق تبين بها الحق فثم شرع الله ودينه، كما يقول العلامة ابن قيم الجوزية رحمه الله . وليس معقولاً ، ولا هو مطلوب أن يظن بالقانون الإسلامي حصر القواعد الإجرائية القضائية في أوضاع معينة وإغلاق الباب دون التجديد فيها أو التعديل ، حين يكون التجديد والتعديل أقرب إلى تحقيق المعدن المرجو من هذه الأوضاع نفسها، ألا وهو إقامة الحق والحكم به ، وهدم الباطل والبراءة منه .

المحور الثالث : وهو الذي ندعو إلى أن تقوم حوله الدراسات القانونية الإسلامية العصرية فهو المحور الذي يدور حوله عمل الفقيه .

وعمل الفقيه في أي نظام قانوني لا يخرج عن التحليل والتأصيل فهو حين يعنى بدراسة القيم التي يراعيها المشرع في وضع القاعدة القانونية . أيّاً كان نوعها . يتجه نحو تأصيل هذه القاعدة القانونية بربد فروعها المختلفة إلى أصول واحدة ، فيبدو نتيجة لعمله وضوح الهيكل الشامل للنظام القانوني ، وتتحدد معاملة . وحين يهتم الفقيه بتحليل اتجاهات القضاء ، أو غايات المشرع في فروع القانون المختلفة ، فإنه يبسط ثوب الأصول القانونية المستقرة في نظام قانوني ، على تفرعات هذا النظام .

وتتداخل المهمتان التأصيلية والتحليلية للفقه وتتفاعلان بحيث نجد

بين أيدينا محصلة نهائية واحدة تتمثل في ثروة عظيمة من الشروح والدراسات والتفسيرات الفقهية التي لا يكتمل بناء «النظام القانوني» إلاّ بها ، بل لعله لا يستحق وصف «نظام» ذلك المجموع من القواعد القانونية . مهما بلغ من دقته وإحكامه مالم يكن إلى جواره مجموع مماثل في الجودة من الأعمال الفقهية .

ولا جدال — بين المختصين في القانون المقارن — في أن النظام القانوني الإسلامي كان أحظى النظم القانونية على الإطلاق بعمل الفقهاء فيه . بل إن بناء هذا النظام القانوني كله قد قام على جهد فقهي متواصل لم يسبق أن عرفت دنيا القانون له مثيلاً ، ولا زالت تخلو حتى اليوم من نظير له .

من هنا كانت دعوتنا إلى أن يتجه العمل في دراسات القانون الإسلامي إلى محور الفقه ليقوم بمهمة تجديد الفقه الإسلامي وذلك بتجديد الاجتهاد المحكوم بأصول واضحة، المتجه إلى غاية محددة . أما أصوله فهي أصول الشريعة ذاتها في القرآن والسنة . وأما غايته فتفسير تطبيق الأحكام القانونية الإسلامية في عالمنا المعاصر . وحين يقتضي المنهج المشار إليه أو الغاية المرجوة منه اجتهاداً غير مسبوق ، أو ترجيحاً أو انتصاراً لرأي قل مؤيدوه ، فإن خوف الخطأ لا يجوز أن يوقفنا عن الاجتهاد، وخشية معارضة الكثرة لا ينبغي أن تمنعنا من حسن اختيار ما يناسب ما نريد من التطبيق الكامل لشريعة الإسلام ، كل ذلك شريطة أن يكون لما نذهب إليه دليل واضح يدل عليه من نصوص الشريعة أو أصولها ، أو يكون ما نذهب إليه مما تقبله هذه الأدلة والأصول ولا ترده . ولا علينا بعد ذلك أن يقبل من شاء مانصل إليه من اجتهاد أو أن يرده من أراد ، لأن قاعدة قضية الاجتهاد هي كما قال الشافعي رحمه الله : ”إذا قاس من لهم القياس فاختلفوا، وسع كلاً أن يقول بمبلغ اجتهاده ، ولم يسعه

اتباع غيره فيما أدى إليه اجتهاده بخلافه“.

(٧) وإذا كانت رغبة الأمة المسلمة — في أقطارها كافة — تتجه اليوم نحو المطالبة بتطبيق أحكام الشريعة الإسلامية ، وكانت التغيرات التشريعية قد بدأت فعلاً تأخذ طريقها في إحلال القانون الإسلامي على القوانين المستوردة من العالم المسيحي فإن المنهج الذي يجب — في نظرنا — إتباعه في الدراسات القانونية العصرية يقوم على محاور ثلاثة تتجه إلى المشرع وهو يهتم بإصدار القوانين الإسلامية ، وإلى القاضي الذي يعنى بتطبيقها ، وإلى الفقيه المعنى — عادة — بتأصيلها وتحليلها ، وذلك كله لن يتم ولن يؤتى ثماره إلا باتجاه مباشر وعاجل نحو مناهج الدراسة في كليات الحقوق وفي أقسام القانون في جامعات العالم الإسلامي كافة ، اتجاه يرمى إلى تغيير هذه المناهج بحيث تعبر عن «علم القانون الإسلامي» لا عن «علم القانون الغربي المسيحي» .

وهذا العمل هو وحده الذي يمكن أن يؤثر تأثيراً كافياً من حيث عمقه ومن حيث سعة المساحة التي يعمل فيها على مسيرة الحياة القانونية للأمة المسلمة .

والعقبة التي قد تستخدم للحيلولة دون ذلك — في الوقت الحاضر — تتمثل في أمرين :

الأمر الأول : أن القانون الإسلامي ليس مطبقاً إلا في نطاق محدود جداً ، اللهم إلا في المملكة العربية السعودية — حيث يطبق المذهب الحنبلي — واليمن الشمالي — حيث يطبق المذهب الزيدي أو الشافعي — (ويمكننا أن نضيف إيران فهي طبقاً لدستورها لايجوز للمحاكم فيها أن تطبق سوى الشريعة الإسلامية وفق المذهب الإمامي الإثني عشري) . وفي باكستان تطبق بعض القواعد القانونية الإسلامية في النطاقين المدني والجنائي .

الأمر الثاني : هو أن مناهج الدراسة القانونية في كليات الحقوق وأقسام القانون في الجامعات مثقلة بالمواد التي يتعين على الطالب استيعابها لأداء متطلبات التخرج بحيث لا يتسع وقته لمزيد من المواد .

فأما عدم تطبيق القانون الإسلامي إلا في نطاق محدود ، فإن ذلك هو عين مانسعى إلى إنهائه والقضاء عليه . ولا سبيل إلى ذلك إلا بإعداد جيل من القانونيين القادرين على الموازنة بين أصول القانون الإسلامي وحاجات العصر .

وتلك هي رغبة الأمة في أقطارها كافة ، وعلى مؤسسات التعليم والإعداد المهني أن تستجيب لتلك الرغبة ، وأن تغير من أساليبها ومناهجها تبعاً لما يحقق ما هو مرجو منها .

وأما الأمر الثاني ، فإنه ليس مطلوباً إتحال الطالب في كليات الحقوق وأقسام القانون — بأعباء دراسية جديدة ، وإنما المطلوب هو أن يتحول بعض وقت المنهج الحالي ، وبعض التركيز فيه ، إلى دراسة منهج علاج القانون الإسلامي لكل موضوع من موضوعات الدراسة القانونية . ذلك أنه من المعلوم علماً يقيناً أن دراسة القانون في جميع المعاهد التي تعنى بها هي دراسة مقارنة لا تكتفي بالنظام القانوني المطبق في البلد الذي يوجد فيه المعهد المعني بالدراسة ، وإنما يتسع نطاقها لتشمل نظاماً قانونية أخرى أثرت فيه ، أو تأثرت به ، أو اشتركت معه في التأثير بنظام قانوني آخر . فإذا أعطى بعض الوقت ، وبعض الجهد الذي يخصص لهذه الدراسة المقارنة لإبراز دور الفقه القانوني الإسلامي ، والمنهج القانوني الإسلامي ، واعتنى بذلك عناية كافية ، لحققت تلك العناية آثارها وآتت أكلها في إعداد جيل من القانونيين المسلمين القادرين على إحداث التغيير المنشود في حياتنا القانونية .

والله الهادي إلى سواء السبيل وآخر دعوانا أن الحمد لله رب العالمين .

PART III
Islamizing Individual Disciplines

***Uṣūl al Fiqh:
Manhaj Baḥth wa Ma'rifat
al Fiqh al Islāmī***

**(The Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence:
Methodology of Research and Study
of Islamic Law)**

Dr. Tāhā Jābir al 'Alwānī

أصول الفقه : منهج بحث و معرفة الفقه الإسلامي

الدكتور طه جابر العلواني

أصول الفقه:

منهج بحث و معرفة الفقه الإسلامي

الدكتور طه جابر العلواني

١ - تعريف علم «أصول الفقه» :

عرفوا علم «أصول الفقه» بأنه مجموع طرق الفقه على سبيل الإجمال ،
وكيفية الاستدلال بها، وكيفية حال المستدل بها^(١).

٢ - موضوعه :

الأدلة الشرعية السمعية من حيث إثبات الأحكام الشرعية بجزئياتها
بطريق الإجتهد بعد الترجيح عند تعارضها^(٢).

٣ - فائدته :

إيجاد القدرة على معرفة الأحكام الشرعية من الأدلة التي نصبها الشارع
للمؤهلين للإجتهد والمستوفين لشروطه.

أما ما يستفیده غير المؤهلين للإجتهد من هذا العلم فهو معرفة مذاهب
المجتهدين، ومدارك الأحكام عندهم بحيث تنمو لدى الأصولي القدرة على
دراسة المذاهب وتحليلها والقدرة على الاختيار منها والترجيح بينها ، والتخريج
على قواعد الأئمة المجتهدين .

٤ - العلوم التي استمدت مسائل العلم منها :

علم «أصول الفقه» في حقيقته علم قائم بذاته ، مستقل عن غيره ،

(١) فخر الدين الرازي "المحصل في علم أصول الفقه"، دراسة وتحقيق طه جابر العلواني، الرياض جامعة الامام محمد بن سعود
الاسلامية ط ١٣٩٩/١٩٧٩، (ج١/٩٤).

(٢) مذكرة أساتذة كلية الشريعة في الأزهر لسنة ١٣٨٢ هـ - ١٩٦٣م في أصول الفقه (ص ٢٢) .

ولكن له مقدمات لا يستطيع الأصولي الاستغناء عنها قد استمدت من علوم كثيرة :

- (أ) فبعض هذه المقدمات قد استفيد من علم المنطق الأرسطي الذي اعتاد الكاتبون في الأصول من المتكلمين أن يقدموا لكتاباتهم بها : كمباحث الدلالات اللفظية وأقسامها ، وانقسام اللفظ إلى تصور و تصديق ، والحاجة إلى الكلام بناء على ذلك على مبادئ التصورات من الأقوال الشارحة والتعريفات وانقسامها إلى حدود ورسوم ، ومبادئ التصديقات ، والكلام على البرهان وكيفية استخدامه في إثبات دعوى المستدل ونقض كلام المعارض ونحو ذلك .
- (ب) وبعض هذه المقدمات استقوها من علم الكلام ككلامهم عن «الحاكم» أهو الشرع أم العقل وما لحق ذلك من الكلام عن «حكم الأشياء قبل الشرع» و «شكر النعم» أيجب بالشرع أم بالعقل ؟
- (ج) وبعضها عبارة عن أحكام كلية للغات بلورها الأصوليون واستمدوها من المباحث اللغوية كالمباحث المتعلقة باللغات ووضعها وانقسام الألفاظ إلى حقائق ومجازات، والكلام عن الاشتراك والاشتقاق والترادف و التوكيد والعموم والخصوص ومعاني الحروف ونحوها .
- (د) وبعضها قد استمدت من علوم الكتاب والسنة ككثير من المباحث المشتركة بين الكتاب والسنة : نحو الكلام على التواتر والآحاد ، والقراءة الشاذة وحكمها ، والجرح والتعديل ، والناسخ والمنسوخ ، والأحوال الراجعة إلى متن الحديث أو طريقه وغيرها .
- (هـ) كما أن الأمثلة التي يمثل بها الأصوليون مستمدة من الفروع الفقهية أو أدلتها التفصيلية من الكتاب والسنة .

٥ - المباحث التي يتعرض لها الأصوليون غالباً :

(أ) مقدمات منطقية .

(ب) مباحث اللغات .

- (ج) الأوامر والنواهي .
- (د) العموم والخصوص .
- (هـ) المجمل والمبين .
- (و) النسخ .
- (ز) الأفعال (أفعال رسول الله ﷺ ودلالاتها) .
- (ح) الإجماع .
- (ط) الأخبار (السنة) .
- (ي) القياس .
- (ك) التعارض والترجيح .
- (ل) الاجتهاد والتقليد .
- (م) الأدلة المختلف فيها .

٦ — نشأة هذا العلم وتاريخه :

من الصعب دراسة تاريخ هذا العلم ونشأته بعيداً عن تاريخ «الفقه» الذي هو «الأحكام الشرعية العملية ، المستمدة من أدلتها التفصيلية» .

فالأصل : ما يبنى عليه غيره ، والفقه قد بنى على أصوله التي هي أدلته وتفرع عنها . ولذلك فإنه لا بد من تكوين فكرة إجمالية عن تاريخ التشريع .

إن سنَّ الشريعة وإثبات الأحكام ، وإنشاء القواعد والقوانين ، ووضع النظم ، حاكمية اختص الله سبحانه بها ، ونسبها إلى نفسه ، فنسبة شيء منها إلى غيره جلُّ شأنه شرك بالله تعالى يناقض التوحيد ويناقضه .

وقد نصب الله سبحانه وتعالى لهذه الأحكام التي أوبرمها حججاً واضحة وأدلة بينة تهدي إليها ، وتعرف الناس بها .

وهذه الأدلة منها ما أجمعت الأمة على حجيتها ، وأطبقت على دلالاته على الأحكام . واتفقت على قبوله ، ومنها ما اختلفت فيه .

فالذي اتفقت عليه ، وأجمعت على الاحتجاج به دليلان من أدلة

الأحكام ، ومصدران من مصادر التشريع وهما الدليلان اللذان كانا عمدة التشريع ، في عهد رسول الله ﷺ وهما :

(١) الكتاب الكريم : وهو : «اللفظ المنزل على رسول الله صلوات الله وسلامه عليه ، المتعبد بتلاوته ، المتحدى بأقصر سورة منه ، المنقول إلينا بالتواتر كل حرف منه ، المكتوب بين دفتي المصحف الشريف ، المبتدأ بالفاتحة ، والمختتم بسورة الناس» .

(٢) السنة المطهرة : وهي : «كل ما صدر عن رسول الله ﷺ غير القرآن من قول أو فعل أو تقرير».

فكل ما تلفظ به رسول الله ﷺ عدا القرآن أو ظهر منه — في الواقع ونفس الأمر — من ابتداء رسالته ، إلى آخر لحظة في حياته فهو من سنته — بمفهومها العام — سواء أثبت حكماً عاماً لسائر أفراد الأمة ، وهذا هو الأصل ، أم أثبت حكماً خاصاً به ﷺ ، أو خاصاً ببعض أصحابه رضي الله عنهم .

وسواء أكان فعله عليه الصلاة والسلام جبلياً ، أم كان غير جبلي فما من قول أو فعل أو تقرير يصدر منه عليه الصلاة والسلام إلا ويثبت به حكم شرعي اعتقادي أو عملي بقطع النظر عن كونه إيجاباً أو ندباً أو تحريماً أو كراهة أو إباحة ، وبقطع النظر عن كونه مبنياً على حكم قد ورد في القرآن العظيم ، أو منشأً لذلك استقلالاً .

والأحكام الشرعية بكل أقسامها الأصلية منها والفرعية ، الاعتقادية والعملية ، التكليفية والوضعية كلها قد استمدت في حياة رسول الله ﷺ من هذين الأصلين : الكتاب والسنة .

(٣) وأما الاجتهاد فقد كان يقع من النبي ﷺ ومن أهل النظر من أصحابه رضوان الله عليهم .

أما اجتهاد النبي ﷺ فأحياناً يقره القرآن الكريم ، وأحياناً لا يقره ،

ويبين له أن الأولى غير ما ذهب إليه .

وأما اجتهاد أصحابه رضوان الله عليهم فقد كانوا يجتهدون فيما يعرض لهم من وقائع ، فإذا لقوا رسول الله ﷺ عرضوا عليه اجتهاداتهم فأحياناً يقرهم عليها فتكون تلك الأحكام ثابتة بالسنة ، وأحياناً لا يقرهم على ذلك ويبين لهم فيكون بيانه عليه الصلاة والسلام هو المعتمد .

ومن هنا فإن من الممكن القول بأن التشريع في هذا الدور اعتمد على الوحي بقسميه : المتلو المعجز وهو القرآن ، وغير المتلو وهو السنة.

وأما الإجتهد منه عليه الصلاة والسلام فهو سنة سنه ليبين لهم ولمن بعدهم مشروعية الإجتهد ، وأن عليهم وعلى من بعدهم من المسلمين أن يفرعوا إليه عندما لا يجدون في الكتاب أو السنة دليلاً يدل على الحكم .

وربما لتأكيد هذا المعنى وترسيخه كان عليه الصلاة والسلام يأمر بعض أصحابه بالإجتهد في بعض المسائل بمحضر منه ﷺ فيصوب المصيب ، ويخطيء المخطيء .

٧ — طريقة استقاء الأحكام من هذه المصادر :

أما الكتاب فقد كانوا يتلقونه ، ويفهمون المراد منه دون حاجة إلى شيء من قواعد النحو أو غيرها ، كما كانوا يدركون مقاصد الشارع وحكمة التشريع لما آتصفوا به من صفاء الخاطر وحادّة الذهن و جودة القرينة .

وكذلك كانوا قليلاً ما يسألون رسول الله ﷺ عن شيء قبل أن يبدأهم به . عن ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما أنه قال : «ما رأيت قوماً كانوا خيراً من أصحاب رسول الله ﷺ ما سألوه إلا عن ثلاث عشرة مسألة حتى قبض ، كلهن في القرآن منهن : ﴿يسألونك عن الشهر الحرام قتال

فيه... ﴿٣﴾ ، ﴿يسألونك عن المحيض..﴾ ﴿٤﴾ ، قال : ما كانوا يسألون إلا عما ينفعهم ﴿٥﴾ .

وقال ابن عمر: «لاتسأل عما لم يكن فإني سمعت عمر بن الخطاب يلعن من سأل عما لم يكن» ﴿٦﴾ .

وقال القاسم : «إنكم تسألون عن أشياء ما كنا نسأل عنها ، وتنقرون عن أشياء ما كنا ننقر عنها ، تسألون عن أشياء ما أدري ما هي ، ولو علمناها ما حل لنا أن نكتمها» ﴿٧﴾ .

وعن ابن إسحاق قال : «أدرکت من أصحاب رسول الله ﷺ أكثر ممن سبقني فما رأيت قوماً أيسر سيرة ، ولا أقل تشديداً» ﴿٨﴾ .

وعن عبادة بن نسي الكندي قال : «أدرکت قوماً ما كانوا يشددون تشديدكم ولا يسألون مسائلکم» ﴿٩﴾ .

وقال أبو عبيدة في كتابه (مجاز القرآن): «لم ينقل أن أحداً من الصحابة رجع في معرفة شيء من القرآن إلى رسول الله ﷺ» ﴿١٠﴾ .

وأما السنة — فإن كانت قولية — فهي أيضاً بلغتهم يعرفون معناها ويفهمون منظوقها وفحواها .

وإن كانت فعلية شاهدوها وتناقلوها كما شاهدوها : فقد كان رسول الله ﷺ يتوضأ فيشاهد المئات منهم وضوءه ، فيأخذون به من غير استفعال عما فعله باعتباره ركناً أو فرضاً أو واجباً أو مندوباً أو مباحاً ، وكذلك شاهدوا حجه وصلاته ، وغير ذلك من عباداته .

(٣) سورة البقرة : ٢١٧ .

(٤) سورة البقرة : ٢٢٢ .

(٥) أنظر سنن الدارمي (٥١/١) .

(٦) أنظر سنن الدارمي (٥٠/١) .

(٧) أنظر سنن الدارمي (٤٩/١) .

(٨) أنظر سنن الدارمي (٥١/١) .

(٩) المرجع نفسه .

(١٠) الشيخ علي عبد الرازق، تمهيد لتاريخ الفلسفة، القاهرة (ص١٥٢).

كما سمعوا الناس يستفتون في الوقائع فيفتهم وترفع إليه قضاياهم فيقضى فيها ، وتنزل بهم النوازل فيبت فيها سواء أكانت في المعاملات أو السير أو السياسات المختلفة . شاهدوا ذلك كله وعرفوه ، وأدركوا مغايزه ومراميه . كما شاهدوه عليه الصلاة والسلام ، وهو يلاحظ تصرفات أصحابه وغيرهم فيمدح بعضها فيدركون أنه من المعروف ، وينكر البعض الآخر فيدركون أنه من المنكر ، وكل ما أثر من قضاياها وفتاواها وإقراره وإنكاره كان بين الناس ، وبمراى من الكثيرين منهم . فكما أن جلساء الطبيب يعرفون مقاصد الأدوية التي يأمر بها بطول المخالطة والممارسة^(١١) ، كان أصحاب رسول الله يعرفون ذلك .

وأما الإجتهد — فالأدلة على مشروعيته والأخذ به في هذا العصر كثيرة جداً . منها حديث معاذ لما بعثه رسول الله ﷺ إلى اليمن قال : «كيف تصنع إذا عرض لك قضاء؟» قال : أقضي بكتاب الله ، قال : فإن لم يكن في كتاب الله ؟ قال : فبسنة رسول الله ﷺ ، قال : فإن لم يكن في سنة رسول الله ﷺ ؟ قال معاذ قلت : اجتهد رأيي ولا آلو . فضرب رسول الله ﷺ صدره ثم قال : الحمد لله الذي وفق رسول رسول الله لما يرضي الله ورسوله^(١٢) واجتهد الرأي في حديث معاذ يفسره ما في عهد عمر رضي الله عنه لأبي موسى حين ولاه القضاء فقد جاء فيه قوله : «القضاء فريضة محكمة ، أو سنة متبعة» ، ثم قال : «الفهم الفهم فيما تلجلج في صدرك مما ليس في كتاب ولا سنة ، فاعرف الأشباه والأمثال ، وقس الأمور عند ذلك ، واعمد إلى أقربها إلى الله وأشبهها بالحق»^(١٣) .

ولذلك فسر الإمام الشافعي الرأي بالإجتهد ، ثم فسر الإجتهد

(١١) الدهلوي ، حجة الله البالغة، (ج ١ / ٢٨٩) طبعة مصر تلخيص سيد سابق.

(١٢) في الحديث والإستدلال له و إزالة الجهالة عنه راجع كتابنا "الإجتهد والتقليد في الإسلام"، القاهرة، دار الانصار ط١ (ص٢٣ - ٢٤)، ومباحث الاجتهاد في الحصول .

(١٣) أنظر الكتاب بكامله في إعلام الموقعين .

بالقياس ، وقال: «هما إسمان لمعنى واحد»^(١٤) .

أما أبو بكر الصديق رضي الله عنه فقد قال : «... إن الرأي إنما كان من رسول الله ﷺ مصيباً فإن الله كان يريه ، وإنما هو منا الظن والتكلف»^(١٥) .

ويمكن القول بأن مفهوم «الإجتهد» أو «الرأي» في هذا الدور لا يعدو أن يكون واحداً من الأمور التالية :

(أ) حمل ما يحتمل من الكلام محملين أو أكثر على أحدهما كما في أمره ﷺ لهم بالصلاة في بني قريظة .

(ب) قياس تمثيلي تلحق فيه واقعة وقعت وحدثت بواقعة مماثلة لها تعرض لها الكتاب أو السنة . كما في قياس عمار التيمم من الجنابة على الاغتسال منها ، وتمعهك بالتراب^(١٦) .

(ج) الإجتهد في ملاحظة مصلحة ، أو سد ذريعة ، أو تخصيص عموم أو أخذ بمفهوم أو نحو ذلك .

ولقد بلغ من حرص رسول الله ﷺ على حملهم على ممارسة الإجتهد ، والدربة عليه أن قال : «الحاكم إذا اجتهد فأصاب فله أجران وإذا أخطأ فله أجر» .

ولقد بلغ من دقة اجتهاد الكثيرين منهم أن القرآن العظيم كان كثيراً ما ينزل موافقاً لإجتهداتهم ، ويوافقهم عليها رسول الله ﷺ ، ذلك أن صحبتهم لرسول الله ﷺ أتاحت لهم من الإطلاع على مقاصد الشارع الحكيم والإدراك لأسرار التشريع والمعرفة بمعاني النصوص ما لم يتح لسواهم ممن جاء بعدهم .

(١٤) أنظر الرسالة للإمام الشافعي (ص ٤٧٦) .

(١٥) أنظر إعلام الموقعين (٥٤/١) و جامع بيان العلم (١٣٤/٢) .

(١٦) الحديث .

أصحاب الفتيا — من الصحابة في عهد رسول الله ﷺ :

كان الذين يفتون في زمن رسول الله ﷺ من الصحابة : أبو بكر ، وعمر ، وعثمان ، وعلي ، وعبد الرحمن بن عوف ، وعبدالله بن مسعود ، وأبي بن كعب ، ومعاذ بن جبل ، وعمار بن ياسر ، وحذيفة بن اليمان ، وزيد بن ثابت ، وأبو الدرداء ، وأبو موسى الأشعري ، وسلمان الفارسي رضي الله عنهم أجمعين .

وفيهم المُكثِر والمُقل : فالمكثرون رضي الله عنهم عائشة أم المؤمنين ، وعمر بن الخطاب ، وأبنة عبدالله ، وعلي بن أبي طالب ، و عبدالله بن عباس ، وزيد بن ثابت وهؤلاء سبعة يمكن أن يجمع من فتاوى كل واحد منهم سفر ضخمة . وقد جمع أبو بكر محمد بن موسى بن يعقوب بن الخليفة المأمون فتاوى ابن عباس في عشرين كتاباً .

وأما المتوسطون منهم فيما روى عنهم من الفتيا فهم : أم سلمة أم المؤمنين وأنس بن مالك وأبو سعيد الخدري ، وأبو هريرة ، وعثمان بن عفان ، وعبدالله بن عمرو بن العاص وعبدالله بن الزبير ، وأبو موسى الأشعري ، وسعد بن ابى وقاص ، وسلمان الفارسي ، وجابر بن عبدالله ، ومعاذ بن جبل وأبو بكر الصديق فهم ثلاثة عشر فقط يمكن ان يجمع من فتاوى كل منهم جزء صغير جداً .

ويضاف إليهم طلحة والزبير، وعبد الرحمن بن عوف ، وعمران بن الحصين ، وأبو بكره ، وعبادة بن الصامت ، ومعاوية بن أبي سفيان . والباقون منهم مقلون في الفتيا لا يروى عن الواحد منهم إلا المسألة والمسألان والزيادة اليسيرة على ذلك فقط ، ويمكن أن يجمع من فتاوى جميعهم جزء صغير فقط بعد التقصى والبحث^(١٧) .

وكانوا رضوان الله عليهم في فتاواهم يرجعون الوقائع الجزئية الحادثة إلى

(١٧) راجع الأحكام لابن حزم (٩٢/٥ - ٩٣) .

النصوص الجزئية التي تدل على أحكامها من الكتاب أو السنة بطريق الظاهر الذي يستفاد فيه المعنى والمدلول فيها من مفهوم اللفظ وإيحائه وسائر القرائن المرتبطة به . فكانوا يذكرون الحكم الذي اهتموا إليه بطريق اللفظ ، أو بطريق الدلالة للناس ، والناس تأخذ عنهم ، و كانوا لا يدعون البحث في المسألة قبل الوصول إلى برد اليقين فيها ، والإحساس بأنهم قد بذلوا في البحث ما لا مزيد عليه .

عصر كبار الصحابة :

بعد عصر رسول الله ﷺ جاء عصر كبار أصحابه والخلفاء الراشدين من بعده ، وهو عصر قد امتد منذ سنة إحدى عشرة للهجرة إلى سنة أربعين للهجرة ، وكان أهل الفقه والفتوى ، من الصحابة فيه يلقبون «بالقراء» :
أبو بكر الصديق رضي الله عنه :

يلخص ميمون بن مهران طريقة الصديق رضي الله عنه في الحصول على الأحكام الشرعية فيقول : « كان أبو بكر إذا ورد عليه الخصم نظر في كتاب الله فإن وجد فيه ما يقضي بينهم قضى به وإن لم يكن في الكتاب وعلم من رسول الله ﷺ في ذلك الأمر سنة قضى بها ، فإن أعياه خرج فسأل المسلمين وقال : أتاني كذا وكذا فهل علمتم عن رسول الله ﷺ فيه قضاء فيقول أبو بكر : الحمد لله الذي جعل فينا من يحفظ عن نبينا فإن أعياه أن يجد سنة من رسول الله ﷺ جمع وجوه الناس وخيارهم فاستشارهم ، فإذا اجتمع رأيهم على أمر قضى به» (١٨) .

وهو رضي الله عنه إذا استنفذ اجتهد رأيه سواء كان في تفسير نص ومعرفة دلالاته أو في اجتهاد محض ، فمن الأول قوله لما سئل عن الكلالة : «أقول فيها برأبي ، فإن يكن صواباً فمن الله ، وإن يكن خطأً فمني ومن الشيطان : الكلالة ما عدا الوالد والولد» .

(١٨) راجع حجة الله البالغة (١/٣١٥) .

ومنه أيضاً قوله : «الزكاة من حقها» حين أورد عليه عمر رضي الله عنه حديث «أمرت أن أقاتل الناس حتى يقولوا : لا اله إلا الله» وذلك عندما هم بقتال مانعي الزكاة فسيدينا عمر قد استدل بالحديث على عدم جواز قتالهم وذلك لأن رسول الله ﷺ قال فيه : «.. فإذا قالوها فقد عصموا مني دماءهم وأموالهم إلا بحقها» وحقها في نظر سيدنا عمر «الزنا بعد إحصان ، وقتل النفس والردة» ومنع الزكاة فقط ليس واحداً مما ذكر ، ولكن الصديق قال له : «الزكاة من حقها ، والله لأقاتلن من فرق بين الصلاة والزكاة والله لو منعوني عقلاً كانوا يؤدونها لرسول الله لقاتلتهم عليه».

ومن الثاني : أنه ورث أم الأم ، ولم يورث أم الأب ، فقال له بعض الأنصار : «لقد ورثت امرأة من ميت لو كانت هي الميتة لم يرثها ، وتركت امرأة لو كانت هي الميتة ورث جميع ما تركت فرجع إلى التشريك بينهما في السدس» .

ومن ذلك حكمه في التسوية في العطاء حتى قال له عمر : كيف تجعل من ترك دياره وأمواله وهاجر إلى رسول الله كمن دخل في الإسلام كرهاً؟ فقال أبو بكر : إنما أسلموا لله و أجورهم على الله ، وإنما الدنيا بلاغ . ولما انتهت الخلافة إلى عمر فرق بينهم فأعطى على البلاء والسابقة والهجرة.

ومن ذلك قياسه تعيين الإمام بالعهد على تعيينه بعقد البيعة ، حتى أنه عهد إلى عمر بالخلافة ووافق على ذلك الصحابة .

وكتب إليه خالد بن الوليد : أنه وجد في بعض نواحي العرب رجلاً ينكح كما تنكح المرأة ، فاستشار رضي الله عنه أصحاب رسول الله ﷺ — وفيهم علي — رضي الله عنهم أجمعين وكان أشدهم قولاً فقال : إن هذا الذنب لم تعص به أمة من الأمم إلا واحدة فصنع الله فيهم ما قد علمتم ،

أرى : أن يحرقوا بالنار ، فكتب أبو بكر إلى خالد أن يحرقوا فحرقوهم.^(١٩)
والملاحم الفقهية التي يمكن ملاحظتها في هذا العهد.

(أ) اتساع الأخذ بالقياس في الوقائع التي لا نص فيها من غير إنكار من أحد من الصحابة.

(ب) ظهور الإجماع بصورة واضحة كدليل من أدلة الأحكام ، وساعد على ذلك كون الصحابة قلة لا يتعذر اجتماعهم ولا اتفاقهم . وقد ظهر إجماعهم في أمور كثيرة منها إجماعهم على وجوب نصب إمام للمسلمين وإجماعهم على قتال أهل الردة بعد اختلافهم فيه ، وإجماعهم على أن المرتد لا يسبى وإجماعهم على جمع القرآن وكتابة المصحف وغير ذلك .

عهد عمر رضي الله عنه :

عهد عمر رضي الله عنه لقاضيه شريح — الذي قدمنا ذكره — يبرز طريقته رضي الله عنه في استقاء الأحكام من أدلتها ، ولكن الملاحظ عليه أنه كان كثير المشاورة للصحابة رضوان الله عليهم، كثير المناظرة لهم حتى يحصل على أفضل فهم ، وأحسن سبيل للتطبيق . لقد كان رضي الله عنه في نظرته للمسائل التشريعية كصيدلاني حكيم يحاول أن يركب الدواء الذي يشفي من الداء من غير أية أعراض جانبية .

ولذلك فقد ترك لنا فقهاً متميزاً ، وثروة فقهية هائلة وقد قال ابراهيم النخعي (توفي سنة ٩٧هـ) لما استشهد رضي الله عنه : «ذهب تسعة أعشار العلم»^(٢٠) . وقال ابن مسعود رضي الله عنه : «كان عمر إذا سلك طريقاً وجدناه سهلاً»^(٢١) .

(١٩) راجع إعلام الموقعين .

(٢٠) حجة الله البالغة (١٧/٢٧٨) .

(٢١) المرجع نفسه .

لقد كان رضي الله عنه ذا عقلية كلية وحس عام سرعان ما يربط الجزئيات بالكليات ، يرد الفروع إلى الأصول والضوابط العامة ، كان هذا شأنه في عهد رسول الله ﷺ ثم في عهد خليفته من بعده ، ولم يخرج عن ذلك حين آل الأمر إليه .

لقد تعلم من رسول الله ﷺ وتلمذ عليه ، فلقد كان كثيراً ما يسمعه عليه الصلاة والسلام يتوقف عن الأمر بشيء حسن يود أن يأمرهم به لولا اشفاقه عليهم وخوفه المشقة عليهم ، فكثيراً ما كان يقول : لولا أن أشق على أمتي لأمرتهم بكذا .. وأحياناً كان ينههم عن أمور ، ثم يرى عليه الصلاة والسلام أن الداعي إلى النهي قد زال فيرخص لهم ، وأحياناً يهيم بتحريم شيء فيخبرونه عليه الصلاة والسلام بالمشقة التي تلحقهم بتحريمه فيرخص لهم بما يدرأ عنهم المشقة والحرَج ، ويراه عليه الصلاة والسلام كيف يختار أيسر الأمرين كلما خير بين أمرين ، فأثر ذلك كله فيه رضي الله عنه فأدرك أن لهذه الشريعة مقاصداً وأهدافاً وغايات لا بد من استهدافها وتوحيها ، ومحاولة استكشافها ، وإن لتلك الأحكام عللاً صرحت النصوص ببعضها وأومات إلى البعض الآخر وعلى أهل العلم استنباط علة ما لم يصرح به ، أو يوم إليه لإدراج الحوادث المستجدة ، والنوازل الحادثة تحت أحكام الله لكي لا يخرج شيء عن حاكمية الله تعالى ولكي لا يألف الناس البحث عن معالجات أو أحكام لقضاياهم خارج دائرة شرع الله .

ولذلك تجدد في اجتهاداته رضي الله عنه طرق استنباط واضحة . فإن المتبع لفتاواه رضوان الله عليه لا يعجزه أن يجد التعليل بالمصلحة ، والأخذ بسد الذرائع ، ودفع المفسد ، والسياسة الشرعية ، وإيقاف العمل ببعض الأحكام لزوال عللها ، أو لفقدان بعض شرائط تطبيقها فمن ذلك : طلبه من رسول الله ﷺ قتل أسرى بدر ، واقتراحه الحجاب واقتراحه أن لا يحدث الناس بأن من قال : لا إله إلا الله دخل الجنة لثلاثا يتكلموا . واقتراحه على أبي بكر إلغاء سهم المؤلفه قلوبهم وإيقافه قسمة الأراضي المفتوحة بين الغانمين .

عهد عثمان رضي الله عنه :

حين بويع عثمان رضي الله عنه بالخلافة ، بويع على أن يعمل بكتاب الله وسنة رسوله وسيرة الخليفين من بعده وعاهد على ذلك . أما علي فقد أبدى استعداداً لأن يعاهد على العمل بكتاب الله وسنة رسوله ، ثم أن يعمل بمبلغ علمه وطاقته ، ولإعلان عثمان استعداده للعمل بسيرة الشيخين دون تحفظ بايعه عبد الرحمن فكان هناك مصدراً ثالثاً قد أضيف في عهد الخليفة الثالث ، وأقره وهو سياسات الشيخين أو سيرهم ، وهذا ما تحفظ عليه علي رضي الله عنهم أجمعين ولذلك رأيناه حين آل الأمر إليه حاول أن يعمل باجتهاده في مسائل اجتهد فيها من سبقه ، كمسألة بيع أمهات الأولاد .

لقد كان سيدنا عثمان بن عفان من المتوسطين في الفتيا ، ربما لأن معظم القضايا التي عرضت له كان للشيخين قبله فيها فقه أثر أن يأخذ به . ولكنه اجتهد كما اجتهد من سبقه، سأله عمر رضي الله عنه في واقعة فقال : «إن تتبع رأيك فأريك سديد ، وإن تتبع رأي الشيخ قبلك فنعم ذو الرأي كان» كما اجتهد وصلى في منى أربعاً بدلاً من اثنتين قصراً ، وذلك بتأويلين : أحدهما : أنه قد تزوج بمكة فظن أنه لا يجوز لأهل مكة القصر في منى ، وثانيهما : أنه خشي أن يتوهم الأعراب بأن تمام الصلاة ركعتان .

كما اجتهد في حمل الناس على قراءة زيد ، ورأى أن ذلك أسلم وأبعد عن وقوع الاختلاف .

عهد علي رضي الله عنه :

كان رضي الله عنه أشبه الناس بعمر بن الخطاب رضي الله عنه في طرق فهمه للنصوص، وسبل تفهمه لتطبيقها ، وحرصه الشديد على ربط الجزئيات بالكليات ، كان يعتبر أفضى أهل المدينة ، ولآه رسول الله ﷺ قضاء اليمن ، ودعا له : «اللهم ثبت لسانه وآهد قلبه» ، ف كان موفقاً في قضاياه ، حلالاً لمعضلاتها ، يصف علمه فيقول : «والله ما نزلت آية إلا

وقد علمت فيم نزلت وأين نزلت وعلام نزلت أن ربي وهب لي قلباً عقولاً
ولساناً ناطقاً ، كان يقضي إذا عرض له قضاء ، ويفتي إذا استفتى بكتاب
الله ، وقد علمت مدى علمه به . ثم بسنة رسول الله ، وتقول أم المؤمنين
عائشة رضي الله عنها : «أما إنه لأعلم الناس بالسنة» .

ثم يجتهد رأيه فيقيس ، ويستصحب الحال ، وقد يستحسن ، ويستصلح
مستفيداً في كل ذلك من مقاصد الشرع : قاس السكر على القذف حين
استشير بزيادة حد شارب الخمر مقيماً لمظنة القذف الذي هو السكر مقامه .
واستشاره أمير المؤمنين عمر في القصاص من الجماعة اذا اشتركت في
قتل الواحد ، فقال : رأيت يا أمير المؤمنين لو أن نفرأ اشتركوا في سرقة
أكنت تقطعهم ؟ قال : نعم . قال علي : فكذلك هؤلاء ، فقال عمر قوله
المشهور : «لو اجتمع أهل صنعاء على قتل رجل واحد لقتلهم به جميعاً» .
وفي هذا قاس القتل على السرقة بجامع تحقق القصد الجنائي في كل منهما
لدى مرتكبي الجريمةين مما يقتضي الزجر والردع .

واستحسن تحريق المرتدين الزنادقة الذي ألّهوه ، وهو يعلم السنة في قتل
الكافر والمترد ، ولكنه أراد أن يحقق أقصى أنواع الزجر لأعتى أنواع الردة
لأنه رأى أمراً عظيماً جعل عقوبته من أعظم العقوبات لينزجر الناس عن مثله
ولذلك قال مرتجراً : لما رأيت الأمر أمراً منكراً ، أجمت ناري ودعوت
قبراً . ويرسل عمر إلى امرأة زوجها في غزاة ، وبلغه أن هناك من يدخل
منزله ، فأراد أن ينهبها إلى أن دخول غرباء إلى منزلها في غيبة زوجها أمر
ليس لها أن تفعله ، وكانت حاملاً ، فلما أخبرت بأن أمير المؤمنين يدعوها
فرغت ، وكانت حاملاً فأجهضت وهي في الطريق إليه ووضعت غلاماً
صوت ومات فشاور الصحابة رضوان الله عليهم فقال قوم فيهم عثمان بن
عفان ، وعبد الرحمن بن عوف : «إنما أنت مؤدب ولا شيء عليك» .
فالتفت إلى علي ، وقال ما تقول يا أبا الحسن ؟ فقال : «قد قال هؤلاء ،

فإن يك هذا جهد رأيهم فقد قضاوا ما عليهم ، وإن كانوا قاربوك فقد غشوك ، أما الأثم فأرجو أن يضعه الله عنك بنيتك وما يعلم منك . وأما الغلام فقد والله غرمت ، فقال له : «أنت والله صدقتني ، أقسمت عليك أن لا تجلس حتى تقسمها على بني أبيك» .

عصر الفقهاء من الصحابة والتابعين :

تعتبر بداية هذا العهد من نهاية العهد الذي سبقه ، أي من سنة أربعين للهجرة التي بها ختم عهد الخلفاء الراشدين ، وعهد قراء الصحابة ، لبدأ عهد فقهاء الصحابة وكبار التابعين. وكان التشريع في هذا الدور يسير على نحو ما سبق في الدور الذي سبقه من حيث كون مصادر التشريع فيه هي نفس المصادر التي كانت في ذلك الدور ، وهي الكتاب والسنة والاجماع والقياس ولكنه يختلف عنه بأمر عدة ، منها :

(١) أصبح الناس في هذا العهد أكثر رغبة في الغوص على المعاني والتعمق فيما وراء النصوص .

(٢) اختلفت طرقهم في الأخذ بالسنة ، فإنه نتيجة للاختلافات السياسية وظهور الفرق المذهبية والكلامية : من شيعة و خوارج ، اختلفت مواقفهم من السنة فالشيعة رفضوا الأخذ بسائر الأحاديث التي رويت عن غير الأئمة المعترين عندهم والخوارج رفضوا الاحتجاج بأخبار الآحاد عموماً ، وبكل خبر ليس له معضد من الكتاب .

(٣) أما الإجماع فلم يعد تحققه بالأمر الممكن، لحدوث الفرقة ، ولأن كل فرقة سحبت ثقها من سائر علماء الفرق الأخرى ، فلم تعد تعدت بشيء من قولهم وافقوا أو خالفوا .

يضاف الى ذلك أن فقهاء الصحابة قد تفرقوا في الأمصار الإسلامية المختلفة وانتشروا فيها فلم يعد اجتماعهم لتدارس المسائل ممكناً.

(٤) شاعت في هذا الدور رواية الأحاديث والسنن بعد ان لم تكن كذلك .

(٥) ظهرت حركة وضع الأحاديث لأسباب كثيرة معروفة — لا مجال لتفصيلها — أخرج مسلم عن ابن عباس رضي الله عنه قوله : «إنا كنا نحدث عن رسول الله ﷺ إذ لم يكن يكذب عليه ، فلما ركب الناس الصعبة والذلول تركنا الحديث عنه».

التشريع بعد عهد الصحابة :

انقرض عهد الصحابة ما بين تسعين ومائة من الهجرة ، وجاء عهد التابعين وإلى علمائهم آل أمر الفقه والفتيا . فإن آخر من مات بالكوفة من الصحابة عبدالله بن أبي أوفى توفي سنة (٨٦هـ) وقيل (٨٧هـ) وآخر من مات منهم بالمدينة سهل بن سعد الساعدي توفي سنة (٩١هـ) . وآخر من مات منهم بالبصرة أنس بن مالك ، توفي سنة (٩١هـ) ، وقيل : (٩٣هـ) ، وآخر من مات بالشام عبدالله بن يسر ، توفي (٨٨هـ) وآخر من مات منهم عامر بن واثلة بن عبد عبدالله (أبو الطفيل) توفي سنة (١٠٠هـ).

والذين آل إليهم أمر الفتيا في هذا العهد هم الموالى الذين كان معظمهم يعيش مع فقهاء الصحابة ، أمثال : نافع مولى ابن عمر ، وعكرمة مولى ابن عباس ، وعطاء بن رباح فقيه مكة ، وطاووس فقيه أهل اليمن ، ويحيى ابن كثير فقيه اليمامة ، وإبراهيم النخعي فقيه الكوفة ، والحسن البصري فقيه البصرة ، وابن سيرين في البصرة أيضاً ، وعطاء الخراساني في خراسان وغيرهم ، وخصت المدينة بفقهيها القرشي ، سعيد بن المسيب رحمهم الله جميعاً . وهؤلاء التابعون ما كانوا يتجاوزون فتاوى من تلقوا عنه العلم من الصحابة الا في اليسير النادر ولذلك فإن من العسير العثور على كبير فرق بين مناهجهم في استنباط الأحكام الشرعية ، ومناهج من سبقهم من الصحابة ، ولكن مناهج الاستنباط في هذا العهد قد بدأت تظهر وتتضح أكثر من قبل ، عن الحسن بن عبيد الله النخعي قال : قلت لإبراهيم النخعي : «أكل ما سمعتك تفتي به سمعته فقال : لا . فقلت : تفتي بما لم

تسمع ؟ فقال: سمعت الذي سمعت، وجاءني ما لم أسمع فقصته بالذي سمعت»^(٢٢).

وإذا كان هناك ما يمكن ملاحظته في هذا العهد فهو ظهور الاختلافات في الرأي بين المفتين في مسائل كثيرة . وقيام الإمام عمر بن عبد العزيز رضي الله عنه بأمرين لهما دلالتهما في هذا السبيل.

الأول : أمره بجمع السنن وكتابتها فكان أهل كل بلد يكتبون ما عند علمائهم من السنن في دفاتر^(٢٣)

والثاني : جعله أمر الفتيا في كثير من البلدان إلى أناس يعينهم كما فعل بالنسبة لمصر حيث جعل أمر الفتيا فيها إلى ثلاثة رجال : اثنين من الموالي هما يزيد ابن ابي حبيب ، وعبدالله بن أبي جعفر ، وواحد من العرب ، وهو جعفر بن ربيعة . وقد عوتب رضي الله عنه في هذا ، فقال : «ماذنبني إذا كانت الموالي تسمو بأنفسها صعداً وأنتم لاتسمون»^(٢٤) .

أما سبب أمره بالتدوين فقد صرح به في كتابه إلى أبي بكر محمد بن عمرو بن حزم الأنصاري ، حيث قال : «... أنظر ما كان من حديث رسول الله ﷺ أو سنة أو حديث أو نحو هذا فاكتبه لي فإني خفت دروس العلم ، وذهاب العلماء»^(٢٥) .

عصر أتباع التابعين والأئمة المجتهدين :

يقول ولي الله الدهلوي في هذا العصر : «أن فقهاء هذا العصر أخذوا حديث النبي ﷺ وقضايا القضاة واجتهاد المجتهدين عن سبقهم من الصحابة والتابعين وتابعيهم ، ثم اجتهدوا ايضاً» . وكان صنيع العلماء في هذه الطبقة

(٢٢) أنظر الإصابة لابن حجر (١١٢/٤) و بهامشها الاستيعاب (ص ٤١٥) .

(٢٣) جامع بيان العلم (٣٣/١) .

(٢٤) خطط المقرئ (١٤٣/٤) .

(٢٥) علقه البخاري ، ورواه مالك في الموطأ ، فأنظره بشرح الزرقاني (١٠/١) .

متشابهاً ، فإن حاصل صنيعهم أن تمسك كل منهم بالمسند من حديث رسول الله ﷺ والمرسل جميعاً ، واستدل بأقوال الصحابة والتابعين ، لأنها إما أحاديث منقولة عن رسول الله وقفوها عند روايتها إلى أحد من الصحابة والتابعين تخرجاً من نسبتها إلى النبي وأحتياطاً وورعاً عن الرواية عنه خوف الزيادة أو النقصان في العبارة . وأما أن تكون أقوالهم هذه إنما قالوها استنباطاً من النصوص ، أو اجتهاداً منهم بأرائهم ، وهم أحسن في كل ذلك ممن يجيء بعدهم ، وأكثر إصابة ، وأقدم زماناً ، وأوعى علماً ، فعين العمل بها إلا إذا اختلفوا ، أو كان حديث رسول الله ﷺ يخالف قولهم مخالفة ظاهرة .

أما إذا اختلفت الأحاديث نفسها فالمرجع أقوال الصحابة فإن قالوا بنسخ بعضها ، أو بصرفه عن ظاهره ، أو لم يصرحوا بذلك ، ولكن اتفقوا على تركه ، وعدم القول بموجبه ، فإنه كإبداء علة فيه ، أو الحكم بنسخه أو تأويله اتباعهم في كل ذلك . فإذا اختلفت مذاهب الصحابة والتابعين في مسألة فالخيار عند كل فقيه مذاهب أهل بلده ، وشيوخه ، لأنه أعرف بصحيح أقاويلهم من السقيم ، وأوعى للأصول المناسبة لها .. فمذهب عمر وعثمان وابن عمر وعائشة وابن عباس . وزيد بن ثابت ، وأصحابهم من التابعين مثل سعيد بن المسيب (توفي سنة ٩٣هـ) ، وعروة بن الزبير (توفي سنة ٩٤هـ) ، وسالم (توفي سنة ١٠٦هـ) وعطاء ابن يسار (توفي سنة ١٠٣هـ) ، والقاسم بن محمد (توفي سنة ١٠٨هـ) ، وعبيدالله بن عبدالله (توفي سنة ٩٩هـ) ، والزهري (توفي سنة ١٢٤هـ) ، ويحيى بن سعيد (توفي سنة ١٤٣هـ) ، وزيد بن أسلم (توفي سنة ١٣٦هـ) ، وربيعه الرأي (توفي سنة ١٣٦هـ) . كان مذهب هؤلاء الصحابة والتابعين أحق بالقبول من مذهب غيرهم عند أهل المدينة ، ولذلك ترى مالكاً يلازم محجتهم .

ومذهب عبدالله بن مسعود وأصحابه ، وقضايا أمير المؤمنين علي وشرح (توفي سنة ٧٧هـ) والشعبي (توفي ١٠٤هـ) وفتاوى ابراهيم النخعي (توفي سنة ٩٦هـ) أحق بالأخذ عند أهل الكوفة .

يقول الدهلوي : «... وحين مال مسروق (توفي سنة ٦٣ هـ) إلى قول زيد بن ثابت رضي الله عنه في التشريك (أي بين الجد والأخوة في الميراث) قال له علقمه (توفي سنة ٦٢ هـ): (هل أحد منكم أثبت من عبدالله (يريد ابن مسعود) ، فقال مسروق : لا ولكن زيد بن ثابت وأهل المدينة يشركون (أي بين الجد والأخوة)» .

يقول الدهلوي : «فإن اتفق أهل البلد (أي المدينة) على شيء أخذوا بنواجزه . وهو الذي يقول في مثله مالك : السنة التي لا اختلاف فيها عندنا أي في المدينة كذا وكذا» .

وإن اختلفوا أخذوا بأقواها وأرجحها إما بكثرة القائلين به ، أو لموافقته لقياس قوى ، أو تخريج من الكتاب والسنة ، وهو الذي يقول في مثله مالك : هذا أحسن ما سمعت ، فإذا لم يجدوا فيما حفظوا منهم جواب المسألة خرجوا من كلامهم ، وتبعوا الأيما والاختضاء .

قال : وألهموا في هذه الطبقة التدوين ، فدون مالك (توفي سنة ١٧٩ هـ) ، وابن أبي ذئب (توفي سنة ١٥٨ هـ) ، وابن جريج (توفي سنة ١٥ هـ) ، وابن عيينة (توفي سنة ١٩٦ هـ) في مكة والثوري (توفي سنة ١٦١ هـ) بالكوفة ، وربيع بن الصبيح (توفي سنة ١٦٠ هـ) بالبصرة. قال : وكلهم مشوا على هذا النهج الذي ذكرته .

ولما حج المنصور ، ولقى مالكا قال : قد عزمت أن أمر بكتيبك هذه التي صنفتها فتنسخ، ثم أبعث في كل مصر من أمصار المسلمين منها نسخة وأمرهم بأن يعملوا بما فيها ولا يتعدوه إلى غيره . فقال مالك : يا أمير المؤمنين لا تفعل هذا ، فإن الناس قد سبقت إليهم أقاويل، وسمعوا أحاديث ورووا روايات ، وأخذ كل بما سبق إليهم ، وأتوا به من اختلاف الناس ، ودع الناس وما اختار أهل كل بلد منهم لأنفسهم ، وتحكى هذه القصة منسوبة إلى الرشيد وأنه أراد أن يحمل الناس على ما في الموطأ ، فقال له مالك :

لاتفعل ، فإن أصحاب رسول الله ﷺ اختلفوا في الفروع وتفرقوا في البلدان ، وكل سنة مضت .

قال الدهلوي : وكان مالك من أثبتهم في حديث المدنيين عن رسول الله ﷺ وأوثقهم إسناداً ، وأعلمهم بقضايا عمر وأقوايل عبدالله بن عمر وعائشة وأصحابهم من الفقهاء السبعة، وبه وبأمثاله قام علم الرواية والفتوى . وكان أبو حنيفة رضي الله عنه ألزمهم بمذهب ابراهيم وأقرانه لا يجاوزه إلا ما شاء الله، وكان عظيم الشأن في التخريج على مذهبه ، دقيق النظر في وجوه التخريجات مقبلاً على الفروع أتم اقبال.

وإن شئت أن تعلم حقيقة ما قلنا فلخص أقوال ابراهيم وأقرانه من كتاب (الآثار) لمحمد و (جامع) عبد الرزاق و (مصنف) ابن أبي شيبة ثم قايسه بمذهبه تجده لا يفارق تلك المحجة إلا في مواضع يسيرة وهو في تلك الأمور اليسيرة — أيضاً — لا يخرج عما ذهب إليه فقهاء الكوفة^(٢٦).

والحق أن فيما ذكره الإمام الدهلوي نظراً ، فإنه رحمه الله حريص على أن يؤكد أن الأئمة مالكا وأبا حنيفة وأصحابهما كانوا مقلدين أو شبه مقلدين لمن سبقهم من التابعين والصحابة ، وأنهم ما تجاوزوا فقه من سبقهم ، وهذا أمر من العسير موافقته رحمه الله عليه ، فإنه من المعروف أن هناك طرقاتاً للفقهاء قد أخذ بها كل منهما ليس من السهل إدعاء أنها أخذت عن الصحابة والتابعين مثل ذهاب مالك إلى الأخذ بعمل أهل المدينة، وذهاب أبي حنيفة إلى الأخذ بالاستحسان و العرف ، كما أن أياً منهما لم يحتج بفتاوى التابعين ، بل زاحموهم وقالوا : هم رجال ونحن رجال .

كما أن كلاهما قد وضع لقبول الأحاديث شروطاً لم يشترطها من سبقهم .

(٢٦) ملخصاً بشيء من التصرف من كتاب وحجة الله البالغة (٢٠٥/١ - ٣٠٨) .

وشيوع الرواية في هذا العصر ، وظهور أحاديث لم تكن قد ظهرت وانتشرت أدى إلى الذهاب في بعض الأمور إلى مذاهب مغايرة لمذاهب بعض الصحابة .

أهل الرأي وأهل الحديث :

ولعل مما يزيد هذه الحقيقة وضوحاً ظهور مدرستي أهل الرأي وأهل الحديث وبروز الاختلافات بينهما في بعض الأصول ، وكذلك في الفروع ، صحيح أن لكل من المدرستين جذوراً في العصرين السابقين ، لكن الاختلاف لم يبرز بوضوح في مسائل الفقه إلا في هذا العصر ، ولم يتميز الناس تبعاً لاختلاف مناهجهم في الاستنباط إلا في هذا العصر كذلك .

إن الكتابين في تاريخ التشريع يؤكدون أن مدرسة أهل الرأي ، هي إمتداد لمدرسة عمر وعبدالله بن مسعود رضي الله عنهما اللذين كانا أكثر الصحابة توسعاً في الرأي فتأثر بهما علقمة النخعي (توفي سنة ٦٠ هـ أو سنة ٧٠ هـ) أستاذ ابراهيم النخعي وخاله ، و ابراهيم هو الذي تتلمذ عليه حماد بن أبي سليمان (توفي سنة ١٢٠ هـ) شيخ أبي حنيفة .

كما يؤكدون : أن مدرسة أهل الحديث هي امتداد لمدرسة أولئك الصحابة ، الذين كان يحملهم الخوف والحذر من مخالفة النصوص على الوقوف عندها أمثال : عبدالله بن عمر بن الخطاب ، وعبدالله بن عمرو بن العاص ، والزبير وعبدالله ابن عباس في الكثير الغالب رضي الله عنهم أجمعين .

ولقد شاع مذهب «أهل الحديث» في الحجاز لأسباب كثيرة ، قد يكون من أبرزها :

كثرة ما بأيديهم من الأحاديث والآثار ، وقلة النوازل التي كانت تعرض لانتقال الخلافة، ومعظم وجوه النشاط إلى الشام ، ثم إلى بغداد .
فإمام أهل المدينة سعيد بن المسيب (توفي سنة ٩٤ هـ) رحمه الله كان يرى

أن أهل الحرمين لم يفهم من الحديث والفقه شيء كثير ، فلداهم فتاوى أبي بكر وعمر وعثمان وعلي قبل الخلافة ، وعائشة وابن عباس وابن عمر وزيد بن ثابت وأبي هريرة ومروياتهم رضي الله عنهم أجمعين وفي هذا ما يغني عن استعمال الرأي .

أما مذهب «أهل الرأي» فقد شاع وانتشر في العراق ، وكان علماء هذا الفريق يرون أن أحكام الشرع معقولة المعنى ، مشتملة على مصالح راجعة للعباد وحكم شرعت لأجلها تلك الأحكام وأن على أهل العلم البحث عن تلك الحكم والعلل الضابطة ، وربط الأحكام بها ، وجعلها تدور وجوداً وعدمًا معها ، فإذا عثروا على تلك العلل فرموا الأقيسة القائمة عليها على بعض أنواع الأحاديث إذا عارضتها .

ولقد ساعد على انتشار هذا المنهج في العراق كثرة الصحابة المتأثرين بمنهج عمر رضي الله عنه فيه أمثال ابن مسعود ، وأبي موسى الأشعري ، وعمران بن الحصين ، وأنس بن مالك وابن عباس وغيرهم . ثم انتقل الخلافة إليها وإقامة علي وأنصاره رضي الله عنهم فيها .

ولما ظهرت فيها الفرق من الشيعة والخوارج ، واحتدمت الصراعات ، وفشت حركة الوضع في الحديث اضطر علماءها لوضع شروط في قبول الحديث لم يسلم معها من المروي لهم إلا القليل من مرويات الصحابة الذين أقاموا في العراق . كما أن النوازل والحوادث في تلك البيعة كانت أكثر من أن تواجه بذلك العدد من المروي .

وهكذا انقسم جمهور الأمة الذين لم يدخلوا فيما دخل فيه الخوارج أو الشيعة إلى «أهل الحديث» و «أهل الرأي» ويبدو أن التنازع بين الفريقين قد اشتد فصار «أهل الرأي» كثيراً ما ينبزون «أهل الحديث» بعدم الفقه وقلة الفهم ، و«أهل الحديث» ينبزون «أهل الرأي» بالأخذ في دينهم بالظن ، وبالبعد

عن الثبوت الواجب في أمور الدين والذي لا يتأتى بغير الاتباع والأخذ بالنصوص .

والحق أن «أهل الرأي» يتفقون مع سائر المسلمين في أن من استبانته له السنة فليس له أن يدعها لقول ، وكل ما أخذ عليهم مما اعتبر من مخالفتهم للسنة فعذرهم فيه أنه لم يصلهم فيه حديث ، أو وصلهم ولم يثقوا به لضعف راويه ، أو لوجود قادح فيه لا يراه غيرهم قادحاً ، أو لأنه ثبت عندهم حديث آخر معارض لما أخذ به سواهم .

كما أن «أهل الحديث» يتفقون مع «أهل الرأي» في وجوب اللجوء إليه حين لا يكون في المسألة نص ، ومع ذلك فقد كان التنازع والتعابر بين الفريقين على أشده .

ظهور الإمام الشافعي :

ولد الإمام الشافعي سنة (١٥٠هـ) ، وهي السنة التي توفي فيها الإمام أبو حنيفة ، وكان قد تفقه أول الأمر في مكة على بعض رجال العلم من أهل الحديث فيها ، كمسلم بن خالد الزنجي (توفي سنة ١٧٩ هـ) ، وسفيان بن عيينة (توفي سنة ١٩٨ هـ) ثم ذهب إلى إمام دار الهجرة ، ومقدم أهل الحديث مالك بن أنس ، فلزمه وروى عنه الموطأ ، وكان يعترف بفضلته عليه ، فعن يونس بن عبد الأعلى أنه سمع الشافعي يقول : «إذا ذكر العلماء فمالك النجم. وما أحد أمن عليّ من مالك ابن أنس^(٢٧)» كان ذلك منه رضي الله عنه بعد دراسة اللغة والشعر والأدب ، وبعض العلوم الرياضية والطبيعية وأخبار الناس .

ولم يكن يعجبه كل ما عليه من عرفهم من أهل الحديث فأخذ عليهم عملهم «بالمنقطع» وقال : «... المنقطع ليس بشيء» كما أخذ عليهم عملهم «بالمرسل» مطلقاً ، واستثنى مراسيل سعيد فقط . وأخذ على بعضهم

(٢٧) الإنشاء لابن عبد البر (ص ٢٣) .

التشدد في التزكية ، ولما ذهب إلى العراق — قاعدة أهل الرأي — لاحظ تحمل أهل الرأي على «أهل المدينة» وفي مقدمتهم استاذهم مالك فابرى للدفاع عن استاذهم ومذهبه ومنهجه . وروى عنه أنه قال : «... قال لي محمد بن الحسن : صاحبنا — يعني أبا حنيفة — أعلم من صاحبكم — يعني مالكا — وما كان على صاحبكم أن يتكلم ، وما كان على صاحبنا أن يسكت ، قال الشافعي : فغضبت وقلت : ناشدتك الله من كان أعلم بسنة رسول الله ﷺ مالك أو أبو حنيفة ؟ قال : مالك ، ولكن صاحبنا أقيس ، فقلت : نعم ، ومالك أعلم بكتاب الله تعالى وناسخه ومنسوخه ، وسنة رسول الله ﷺ من أبي حنيفة ، فمن كان أعلم بكتاب الله وسنة رسوله كان أولى بالكلام»^(٢٨).

ثم انصرف رحمه الله لدراسة كتب محمد بن الحسن وغيره من كتب العراقيين ، ولازم محمد بن الحسن ، فكان كثيراً ما يرد عليه ، ويناقش آراءه انتصاراً للسنة وأهل الحديث ، ثم ترك بغداد — بعد ذلك — لكنه عاد إليها سنة (١٩٥ هـ) وكان في جامعها الكبير نيف وأربعون أو خمسون حلقة فما زال يقعد في حلقة حلقة ، ويقول لهم : قال الله وقال الرسول ، وهم يقولون : قال أصحابنا حتى مافي المسجد حلقة غيره^(٢٩).

واختلف إلى حلقة درسه كبار أهل الرأي كأبي ثور والزعفراني والكرائسي وغيرهم فانتقلوا عن مذهب أهل الرأي إلى مذهبه ، كما ارتاد الإمام أحمد بن حنبل حلقتهم ، ويروى عنه أنه قال : «ما أحد من أصحاب الحديث حمل محبرة إلا وللشافعي عليه منة ، فقلنا : يا أبا محمد كيف ذلك ؟ قال : إن أصحاب الرأي كانوا يهزأون بأصحاب الحديث حتى علمهم الشافعي وأقام الحجة عليهم»^(٣٠).

. (٢٨) الإنتقاء (ص ٢٤) .

. (٢٩) تاريخ بغداد للخطيب (٦٨/٢ - ٦٩) .

. (٣٠) الإنتقاء (ص ٨٦) .

واستجابة منه لطلب أهل الحديث وضع كتاب (الحجة) في بغداد ليرد على أهل الرأي فيما خالفهم فيه (٣١).

وبعد ذلك غادر إلى مصر ، فوجد أكثر الناس قد أخذوا وتشبثوا بكل ما كان يراه مالك أو يذهب إليه دون تمييز . فأخذ ينظر في أقوال مالك نظرة الفاحص الناقد ، فوجده في بعض الأمور « .. يقول بالأصل ويدع الفرع ، ويقول بالفرع ويدع الأصل » .

كما وجده ترك بعض الأخبار الصحيحة ليأخذ بقول واحد من الصحابة ، أو بقول واحد من التابعين ، أو برأي نفسه .

وأحياناً يترك قول الصحابي لرأي بعض التابعين أو لرأي نفسه ، وذلك في الجزئيات والفروع والتفاصيل من غير مراعاة للقواعد والأصول ، وفي الكثير أنه يدعي الإجماع وهو مختلف فيه .

كما وجد أن القول بحجية «إجماع أهل المدينة» قول ضعيف وصنف كتاب «اختلافه مع مالك» وأحصى فيه المسائل المشار إليها (٣٢) .

فمالك — في نظر الشافعي — قد أفرط في ملاحظة المصالح المطلقة المرسلة غير المستندة إلى شواهد الشرع مع توفرها . وأبو حنيفة قصر نظره في الجزئيات والفروع والتفاصيل من غير مراعاة للقواعد والأصول في الكثير الغالب (٣٣).

ولذلك رأى رحمه الله أن أهم ما ينبغي توجيه العناية إليه هو : جمع أصول الاستنباط الفقهي ، ولم قواعدها ، وتحويل هذه القواعد إلى منهج بحث يستخلص الفقه به من أدلته ، ويكون الفقه تطبيقاً عملياً لقواعده ، ليظهر بذلك فقه جديد بديل لفقه المدرستين في أصوله وقواعده ، فوضع كتابه «الرسالة» وبنى على القواعد التي جمعها فيها فقهه ومذهبه ، يقول الإمام أحمد

(٣١) المرجع السابق .

(٣٢) أنظر مناقب الشافعي للفخر الرازي (ص ٢٦) .

(٣٣) مغيب الحلق لإمام الحرمين الجويني.

بن حنبل رحمه الله : «لم نكن نعرف الخصوص والعموم حتى ورد الشافعي»^(٣٤).

وكان يقول للإمام أحمد رحمه الله : «.. أما أنتم فأعلم بالحديث والرجال مني ، فإذا كان الحديث صحيحاً فأعلموني ، وإن يكن كوفياً أو بصرياً أو شامياً أذهب إليه إذا كان صحيحاً»^(٣٥) .

وذلك يدل بوضوح على مدى اهتمامه بتقعيد القواعد أكثر من اهتمامه بالفروع والجزئيات .

ولقد أطبق أهل العلم من الكاتبيين في تاريخ «أصول الفقه» على أن أول مؤلف فيه هو الإمام الشافعي ، وأول مؤلف هو «الرسالة»^(٣٦) .

وقد عقد الزركشي (٧٩٤ هـ) في كتابه «البحر المحيط» فصلاً في هذا جاء فيه : «..الشافعي أول من صنف في أصول الفقه ، صنف فيه كتاب الرسالة وكتاب أحكام القرآن ، واختلاف الحديث ، وإبطال الاستحسان ، وكتاب جماع العلم ، وكتاب القياس الذي ذكر فيه تضليل المعتزلة ، ورجوعه عن قبول شهادتهم ، ثم تبعه المصنفون في علم الأصول» .

وقال الجويني في شرحه للرسالة : «..لم يسبق الشافعي أحد في تصانيف الأصول ومعرفتها ، وقد حكى عن ابن عباس تخصيص عموم ، وعن بعضهم القول بالمفهوم ، ومن بعدهم لم يقل في الأصول شيئاً ، ولم يكن لهم فيه قدم فإئناً رأينا كتب السلف من التابعين وتابعي التابعين وغيرهم ، وما رأيناهم صنفوا فيه»^(٣٧) .

(٣٤) البحر المحيط للزركشي (مخطوط) .

(٣٥) الإنتقاء (ص ٢٥) .

(٣٦) لم يشذ عن هذا الإتيان إلا شذوذ من التعصين لبعض المذاهب ليس لهم سند علمي يدل لما ذهبوا إليه : من كون الشافعي مسبقاً بالكتابة في هذا العلم .

(٣٧) عن كتاب ومهيد في تاريخ الفلسفة (ص ٢٣٤) .

منهج الشافعي في الرسالة :

بدأ الشافعي الرسالة بوصف حال الخلق عند بعثة رسول الله ﷺ فيبين أنهم كانوا صنفين :—

أهل كتاب حَرَفوه وبدلوا أحكامه ، وكفروا فخلطوا باطلهم بالحق الذي أنزله الله تعالى .

ومشركين كافرين آخذوا من دون الله أوثاناً آلهة . ثم ذكر أن الله جلَّت قدرته استنقذ الناس كلهم بخاتم رسله ، وأنزل عليه كتابه ليخرجهم به من الكفر والعمى إلى النور والهدى ، ﴿وإنه لكتاب عزيز * لا يأتيه الباطل من بين يديه ولا من خلفه تنزيل من حكيم حميد﴾ (٣٨) .

ثم أفاض في بيان منزلة القرآن العظيم من الإسلام وأشتماله على ما قد أحل الله وما حَرَمَ، وما تعبد به الناس ، وما أعد لأهل طاعته من الثواب ، وما أوجب لأهل معصيته من العقاب، ووعظه جل شأنه لهم بالإخبار عمن كان قبلهم .

ثم بين الإمام ما ينبغي لطلبة العلم بالدين من بلوغ غاية جهدهم في الاستكثار من علم القرآن العظيم ، وإخلاص النية لاستدراك علمه نصاً واستنباطاً .

ثم ذكر في ختام مقدمته للرسالة أنه : «... ليست بأحد من أهل دين الله نازلة إلاّ وفي كتاب الله جل ثناؤه الدليل على سبيل الهدى فيها» ، قال الله تعالى : ﴿كتاب أنزلناه إليك لتخرج الناس من الظلمات إلى النور بإذن ربهم إلى صراط العزيز الحميد﴾ وقال : ﴿وأنزلنا إليك الذكر لتبين للناس ما نزل إليهم ولعلهم يتفكرون﴾ ، وقال : ﴿نزلنا عليك الكتاب تبياناً لكل شيء وهدى ورحمة وبشرى للمسلمين﴾ ، وقال : ﴿وكذلك أوحينا

إليك روحاً من أمرنا ما كنت تدري ما الكتاب ولا الإيمان ولكن جعلناه نوراً نهدي به من نشاء من عبادنا وإلك لتهدي إلى صراط مستقيم ، صراط الله .

ثم عقد باباً للكلام عن (البيان) فعرفه ، وبين مراتب البيان الذي جاء به القرآن الكريم للأحكام وهي خمسة :

الأول : ما أبان الله تعالى في كتابه نصاً جلياً لا يتطرق إليه التأويل وهذا النوع لا يحتاج في بيانه لغير القرآن .

الثاني : ما أبانه القرآن بنص يحتمل أوجهاً ، فدلّت السنة على تعيين المراد منه من بين هذه الأوجه .

الثالث : ما أتى القرآن فيه على غاية البيان ، في فرضه ، وبين رسول الله : كيف فرضه ، وعلى من فرضه ، ومتى يزول ويثبت .

الرابع : ما بين الرسول ﷺ مما ليس لله فيه نص حكم وقد فرض الله في كتابه طاعة رسوله ، والانتفاء إلى حكمه ، فما قيل عن رسول الله ﷺ بفرض الله قيل .

الخامس : ما فرض الله على خلقه الاجتهاد في طلبه ، وهو القياس ، والقياس — عنده — ما طلب بالدلائل على موافقة الخبر المتقدم من الكتاب أو السنة .

وبعد أن أجمال (مراتب البيان) الخمس أخذ يوضحها ويبين لها الأمثلة والشواهد في أبواب خمسة . وقد رتب الرسالة في الأبواب التالية :

باب بيان ما نزل من الكتب عاماً ، يراد به العام ويدخله الخصوص .

باب بيان ما نزل من القرآن عام الظاهر وهو يجمع العام والخصوص .

باب ما نزل من الكتاب عام الظاهر ، يراد به كله الخاص .

باب الصنف الذي يبين سياقه معناه .

باب الصنف الذي يدل لفظه على باطنه دون ظاهره .

باب ما نزل عاماً فدلّت السنة خاصة على أنه يراد به الخاص . وقد تعرض — في هذا الباب — لبيان حجية السنة ومنزلتها من الدين ، ولذلك فقد وضع بعد هذا الباب الأبواب التالية :

باب بيان فرض الله تعالى في كتابه اتباع سنة نبيه ﷺ .
باب فرض الله طاعة رسوله ﷺ مقرونة بطاعة الله جل ذكره ومذكورة وحدها .

باب ما أمر الله به من طاعة رسوله ﷺ .
باب ما أبان الله لخلقه من فرضه على رسوله اتباع ما أوحى إليه ، وما شهد له من اتباع ما أمر به ، ومن هداه ، وأنه هاد لمن اتبعه .

وفي هذا الباب أكد الإمام القول بأن رسول الله ﷺ سن مع كتاب الله ، وبين فيما ليس فيه — بعينه — نصّ الكتاب ، وأثبت وجود السنة المستقلة عن الكتاب ، وحاجج المخالفين في ذلك ، ثم قال : « .. وسأذكر مِمَّا وصفنا من السنة مع كتاب الله والسنة مما ليس فيه نص كتاب بعض ما يدل على جملة ما وصفنا منه ان شاء الله تعالى » .

فأول ما نبدأ به من ذكر سنة رسول الله ﷺ مع كتاب ذكر الاستدلال بسنته على الناسخ والمنسوخ من كتاب الله عز وجل .

ثم ذكر الفرائض المنصوصة التي سن رسول الله ﷺ معها .
ثم ذكر الفرائض الجمل التي أبان رسول الله ﷺ عن الله كيف هي ، ومواقبتها . ثم ذكر العام من أمر الله تعالى ، الذي أراد به العام ، والعام الذي أراد به الخاص .

ثم ذكر سنته فيما ليس فيه نص كتاب .
ثم عقد فصلاً للكلام عن «ابتداء الناسخ والمنسوخ» ذكر فيه أن الله سبحانه وتعالى جعل النسخ للتخفيف والسعة . ثم ذكر أن الكتاب إنما ينسخ بالكتاب ، وأن السنة إنما تنسخ بالسنة .

ثم تحدث عن الناسخ والمنسوخ الذي يدل الكتاب على بعضه ، والسنة على بعضها .

وعقد باباً للحديث عن فرض الصلاة الذي دل الكتاب ، ثم السنة على من تزول عنه بالعذر ، وعلى من لا تكتب صلاته بالمعصية .

كما عقد باباً آخر للكلام عن الناسخ والمنسوخ الذي تدل عليه السنة والإجماع .

ثم تحدث عن الفرائض التي أنزلها الله تعالى نصاً في باب خاص .

ثم تكلم عن الفرائض المنصوصة التي سن رسول الله ﷺ معها .

وتحدث بعد ذلك عن الفرض المنصوص الذي دلت السنة على أنه إنما أراد به الخاص .

ثم تحدث عن «جمل الفرائض» التي أحكم الله تعالى فرضها بكتابه وبين كيف فرضها على لسان نبيه ﷺ فتحدث في الصلاة والزكاة والحج ، وعدد النساء ، ومحرمات النساء، ومحرمات الطعام .

ثم عقد باباً للكلام عن «العلل في الأحاديث» تعرض فيه إلى ما يكون بين الأحاديث من اختلاف ينشأ عن أسباب متعددة تعرض لبعضها كالإختلاف بسبب النسخ و بسبب الغلط في الأحاديث ، وبين بعض ما ينشأ عنه الغلط في الحديث كما تعرض لكثير من الأسباب الأخرى التي ينشأ عنها الإختلاف .

ثم تحدث رحمه الله عن أبواب النهي وأقسامه ، وأوضح أن الأحاديث يوضح بعضها بعضاً .

ثم عقد باباً «للعلم» فبين أنه نوعان ، هما : علم عامة لا يسع بالغا غير مغلوب على عقله جهله ، وأكد أن هذا الصنف من العلم موجود كله نصاً في كتاب الله تعالى و موجودة تفاصيله بشكل عام عند جماهير المسلمين تتناقله

أجياهم عن رسول الله ﷺ لا يتنازعون في حكايته ، ولا في وجوبه عليهم ، وهذا العلم العام لا يمكن فيه الغلط من الخبر ولا التأويل .

أما الصنف الثاني فهو : ما ينوب من فروع الفرائض ، وما يخص به من الأحكام وغيرها مما ليس فيه نص كتاب ولا في أكثره نص سنة إلا من أخبار الخاصة ، «أي خبر الواحد» . وقد مهد بهذا لمبحثين جاء بهما رحمه الله بعد ذلك ، وهما :

باب خبر الواحد ، فبين المراد به ، وشروطه وتعرض للفرق بين الشهادة والرواية ، وذكر ما يقبل في خبر الواحد من الأمور ، ومالا يكتفي به وحده فيه . ثم انتقل عليه رحمة الله للكلام عن حجية خبر الواحد والاستدلال عليها ، ورد جميع الشبهات التي أوردها المخالفون بأسلوب استدلال في غاية القوة والرصانة .

ثم انتقل إلى باب «الإجماع» فبين حقيقته ، ولماذا كان حجة . وبعد ذلك تكلم عن «القياس» فأوضح معناه ، وماهيته ، والحاجة إليه ، وأنواعه ، ومن له أن يقيس ، ومن ليس له ذلك . ثم عقد «للإجتهد» باباً ، بين الأصل فيه من الكتاب ، ثم من السنة ثم تحدث عن الصواب والخطأ في الاجتهاد .

ثم تحدث عن «الاستحسان» أوضح فيه أنه لا يحل لأحد من المسلمين أن يستحسن على ما يخالف الحديث ، وأكد أنه ليس لأحد أن يثبت حكماً شرعياً إلا بكتاب أو سنة أو إجماع أو قياس ، وبين الفرق بين القياس والاستحسان .

ثم عقد باباً للإختلاف بين أهل العلم ، فبين أن هذا الإختلاف نوعان : نوع محرم ، وآخر ليس كذلك ، فالإختلاف المحرم ، هو : كل إختلاف فيما أقام الله به الحجة في كتابه ، أو على لسان نبيه منصوباً بينا .

وأما الإختلاف الجائز ، فهو الإختلاف فيما يحتمل التأويل ويدرك

قياساً ثم استدل لما ذكره ، ومثل للاختلاف الجائز ، وذكر بعض أسبابه ، وتناول نماذج مما اختلف فيه علماء الصحابة كالعدة والإيلاء والموارث . وفي هذا الباب تعرض رحمه الله إلى مذهبه في أقوال الصحابة إذا تفرقوا .

ثم ختم الرسالة في بيان مذهبه في «مراتب الأدلة» المذكورة ، فقال : ”.. نحكم بالكتاب والسنة المجتمع عليها التي لا اختلاف فيها ، فنقول : لهذا حكمنا في الظاهر والباطن .

وبحكم السنة قد رويت من طريق الانفراد لا يجتمع عليها فنقول : حكمنا بالحق في الظاهر ، لأنه قد يكمن الغلط فيمن روى الحديث . ونحكم بالإجماع ، ثم القياس ، وهو أضعف من هذا ، ولكنها منزلة ضرورة لأنه يحل القياس والخبر موجود .

ولقد ظهر من خلال ما كتبه الإمام الأصول المتفق عليها والأصول المختلف فيها في هذا العصر .

أما المتفق عليها فهي : الكتاب والسنة على الجملة .

وأما المختلف فيها ، فهي السنة جملة لدى البعض ، أو خبر «الآحاد» أو «الخاصة» كما يسميه الشافعي على وجه الخصوص . والمذهبان قد تولى الشافعي وغيره مناقشتها وردهما بما لا مطمع بمزيد عليه في الرسالة ، وفي «جماع العلم» وغيرهما .

(١) الإجماع ، والخلاف في حجيته ، وفي بعض أنواعه ، وفيمن يعتبر إجماعهم ، وفي الأمور التي يعتبر فيها الإجماع حجة ، وفي إمكانية العلم به عند وقوعه .

(٢) اختلفوا في كل من القياس والإستحسان اختلافاً تناول مفهوميهما ، وحقيقة كل منهما ، وحجيته ، وإمكانية العمل به ، وطريقته ، والأمثلة التي يمكن أن ترجع إلى أي منهما من عمل الصحابة .

(٣) كما كان الإختلاف بيننا في مفاهيم «الأمر والنهي» ودلالة كل منهما وأثره في سائر الأحكام الفقهية . ويلاحظ في هذا المجال أن الأئمة الأربعة في هذا العصر لم يكن استعمال المصطلحات المحددة كالتحريم والإيجاب وغيرهما شائعاً في لغاتهم وتعابيرهم ، بل حدث ذلك بعدهم كما يؤكد ابن القيم (٣٩) .

(٤) أما الأدلة الأخرى فيما يذكره الأصوليون ضمن الأدلة المختلف فيها فكذلك لم ترها عند الأئمة في هذا العصر ظاهرة في تعابيرهم كالعرف والعادة والاستصحاب وغيرها .

أصول الفقه بعد الإمام الشافعي :

لقد سيطرت «رسالة» الإمام الشافعي منذ ظهورها على الدراسات الأصولية وانقسم العلماء إلى فريقين : فريق تقبل الرسالة ، وحوّلها إلى قاعدة حجاج عن مذهبه ، وهم جمهور أهل الحديث . وفريق رفض معظم ما جاء فيها ، وأدرك أن عليه أن يرد على صاحبها ما أورده مما يخالف مذهبه قبل أن يتأثر الناس بما جاء فيها ، وهذا ينطبق على جمهور أهل الرأي ، والمخالفين في الأمور التي تعرض لها الإمام في رسالته .

وقد ذكر ابن النديم ما كُتب بعد «الرسالة» في علم «أصول الفقه» ، فنسب للإمام أحمد بن حنبل (توفي سنة ٢٤٣ هـ) كتاب «الناسخ والمنسوخ» وله كتاب «السنة» وهو أقرب إلى كتب التوحيد والعقائد من كتب الأصول ، طبع في مكة سنة (١٣٤٩ هـ) والكتاب جاء بصيغتين : كبرى ، وهي المشار إليها ، ولها نسخ خطية في دار الكتب المصرية وفي الظاهرية . كما طبعت بالقاهرة بدون تاريخ .

أما «السنة» في صيغته الصغرى فهو في اعتقاد أهل السنة ، طبع بالقاهرة

بدون تاريخ. وله كتاب «طاعة الرسول» صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم نقل عنه ابن القيم في إعلام الموقعين، ويبدو أنه كان يمتلك نسخة منه وقد بحثنا عن الكتاب في كثير من الأماكن فلم نعثر عليه، وظاهر مما نقل ابن القيم عنه أنه كتاب أصولي هام في مباحث السنة، فلعله فقد بعد ذلك التاريخ، أو أنه أدمج أثناء التجليد مع أي كتاب من الكتب الأخرى أو ضاعت منه ورقة العنوان فلم يعد من الممكن العثور عليه إلا بطريق الإستقراء والتتبع.

كما نسبت المصادر لداود الظاهري (توفي سنة ٢٧٠ هـ) كتاب «الإجماع» و«إبطال التقليد» و«خبر الواحد» و«الخبر الموجب» و«الخصوص والعموم» و«المفسر والمجمل» و«الكافي في مقابلة المطليبي» — يعني الشافعي — وكتاب «مسألتين خالف فيهما الشافعي».

وفي هذه الفترة عكف علماء الحنفية على دراسة رسالة الشافعي للرد على ما خالفهم فيه، ولاستخلاص أصول لفقهم من خلال فتاوى الإمام أبي حنيفة رحمه الله في المسائل الجزئية التي عرضت له :

فكتب عيسى بن أبان (توفي سنة ٢٢٠ هـ) كتاباً في «خبر الواحد» وكتاب «إثبات القياس» و«اجتهاد الرأي».

وكتب البرزعي (توفي سنة ٣١٧ هـ) «مسائل الخلاف»، له نسخة في الزيتونة بتونس في (٢٣٦) ورقة وهو برقم (١٦١٩).

وكتب أبو جعفر الطحاوي (توفي سنة ٣٢١ هـ) «اختلاف الفقهاء» الذي اختصره الجصاص (توفي سنة ٣٧٠ هـ)، له نسخة في القاهرة راجع لمعرفة أوصافها فهرس معهد المخطوطات (٣٢٩/١) كما طبع.

وكتب الكرايسي النجفي (توفي ٣٢٢ هـ) كتابه «الفروق» له نسخة خطية في أحمد الثالث وفيض الله في استنبول.

كما نسب لأبن سماعة (٢٣٣ هـ) كتب أصولية لم تذكر أسماؤها^(٤٠).

(٤٠) راجع الفهرست لأبن النديم (ص ٢٨٤).

وكتب الكناني (توفي سنة ٢٨٩ هـ) كتاب «الحجة في الرد على الشافعي» كما صنف علي بن موسى القمي الحنفي (توفي سنة ٣٠٥ هـ) كتاب «ماخالف فيه الشافعي العراقيين في أحكام القرآن» و «إثبات القياس» و «الاجتهاد» و «خبر الواحد» .

وكتب الكرخي (توفي سنة ٣٤٠ هـ) «أصوله» المعروفة والمطبوعة بالقاهرة ضمن مجموعة بدون تاريخ .

وكتب أبو سهل النوبختي (٩٣ هـ تقريباً) من الإمامية كتاب «نقض رسالة الشافعي» و «إبطال القياس» و «الرد على ابن الرواندي في بعض آرائه الأصولية» .

كما كتب ابن الجنيد (توفي سنة ٣٤٧ هـ) من الزيدية كتاب «الفسخ على من أجاز النسخ لما تم شرعه وجل نفعه» و «الإفهام لأصول الأحكام» . أما الشافعية فقد كتب أبو ثور (توفي سنة ٢٤٠ هـ) منهم كتاب «اختلاف الفقهاء» . ولأبي عبدالله محمد بن نصر المروزي (توفي سنة ٢٩٤ هـ) كتاب في «اختلاف الفقهاء» أيضاً. وكتب أبو العباس بن سريج (توفي ٣٠٥ هـ) في الرد على عيسى بن أبان ، وناظره محمد بن داود الظاهري فيما خالفوا فيه الشافعي . وكتب ابراهيم بن أحمد المرزوي (٣٤٠ هـ) كتابي «العموم والخصوص» و «الفصول في معرفة الأصول»^(٤١). كما عكف بعضهم على شرح «الرسالة» فشرحها أبو بكر الصيرفي (توفي سنة ٣٣٠ هـ) ، وأبو الوليد النيسابوري (توفي سنة ٣٦٥ أو ٣٦٣ هـ) ، وأبو بكر الجوزقي (توفي سنة ٣٨٨ هـ) ، وأبو محمد الجويني «والد إمام الحرمين» ، ونسبوا الخمسة آخرين شروحاً للرسالة أيضاً ، وهم : أبو زيد الجزولي ، ويوسف بن عمر ، وجمال الدين أفهسي ، وابن الفاكهاني ، وأبو القاسم : عيسى بن ناجي . ولم يظهر حتى الآن أي من هذه الشروح التي كان العلماء ينقلون

(٤١) الفهرست (ص ٢٩٩) .

عن بعضها إلى ما بعد القرن السابع الهجري . وقد ذكر الشيخ مصطفى عبد الرزاق (٤١) أن المكتبة الأهلية بباريس تحتفظ بنسخة من شرح الجويني على الرسالة ، ونقل منها بعض النصوص ، وحاولنا العثور عليها هناك فلم نوفق فلعلها وضعت ضمن كتب علم آخر ، أو باسم مغاير فتحتاج إلى استقراء بطريق تصفح المخطوطات المحفوظة مما لا يتيسر إلا نادراً ، ويحتاج إلى فترة زمنية كافية ، يقضيها الباحث في المكتبة .

تطور علم أصول الفقه بعد الشافعي

إن ما ذكرنا من العسير أن يعتبر تطوراً حقيقياً في هذا العلم، فإنه — كما رأينا — يدور في الكثير الغالب حول الرسالة نقضاً أو تأييداً أو شرحاً يكاد لا يخرج عن ذلك، وبقي الأمر كذلك حتى دخل القرن الخامس ، وفيه بدأ ما يمكن اعتباره تطوراً لهذا العلم بعد وضعه وجمعه.

ففي هذه الفترة أنبرى القاضي الباقلاني (توفي سنة ٤٠٣ هـ) ، والقاضي عبد الجبار الهمداني (توفي سنة ٣١٥ هـ) لإعادة كتابة موضوعات الأصول جميعها ، يقول الزركشي في كتابه «البحر» : ”حتى جاء القاضي قاضي السنة أبو بكر الطيب ، وقاضي المعتزلة عبد الجبار ، فوسعا العبارات، وفكا الإشارات' وفصّلا الإجمال ، ورفعوا الإشكال“ .

ومن هنا استحق القاضي الباقلاني لقب (شيخ الأصوليين) (٤٢) بعد أن كتب كتابه «التقريب والإرشاد» ، وهو كتاب لم يظهر إلى الآن فعله في بعض خزائن المخطوطات ، فالأصوليون ظلوا ينقلون عنه إلى القرن التاسع الهجري .

كما كتب القاضي عبد الجبار كتابه «العهد» أو «العمد» وشرحه . وقد اختصر «تقريب القاضي» أمام الحرمين (توفي سنة ٤٧٨ هـ)

(٤٢) في كتاب تهديد لتاريخ الفلسفة .

(٤٣) كما في نفائس القرافي في مواضع متعددة منها (١٩/١ - ١) .

بكتاب سماه «التلخيص» أو «الملخص» تحتفظ بعض خزائن المخطوطات بأوراق منه والأصوليون الذين جاءوا بعده نقلوا عن ملخصه الكثير من آراء القاضي . كما ألف كتابه «البرهان» على نحو كتاب «القاضي» من حيث شموله لكل المباحث الأصولية ، وتحرره في منهجه ، وسيره مع الدليل حيث كان ، حتى أنه وهو الأشعري الشافعي قد خالف أماميه الأشعري والشافعي في مسائل كثيرة جعلت أصحابه الشافعية ينصرفون عن شرحه ، وإيلائه من العناية ما يستحق وإن كانت كتبهم تكثر النقل عنه . وشرحه عالمان من علماء المالكية هما الإمام أبو عبدالله المازري (توفي سنة ٥٣٦ هـ) ، وأبو الحسن الأبياري (٦١٦ هـ) ، ثم جمع بين الشرحين مالكي ثالث هو أبو يحيى ، وكل هؤلاء قد تحامل على إمام الحرمين لما رأوا من جرأته في الرد على الإمام الأشعري فيما خالفه فيه ، وردده على الإمام مالك في مسألة «المصالح المرسله» .^(٤٤)

كما أن إمام الحرمين قد وضع لكتابه مقدمات خلت من معظمها رسالة الإمام فقد بدأ بالكلام على ما يجب على من يريد الخوض بعلم من معرفة مصادره ومعناه ، فأوضح أن مصادر «أصول الفقه» هي الكلام والعربية والفقه ، ثم تعرض إلى الأحكام الشرعية والتكليف والأهلية وعوارضها ، ثم فصل الكلام في مدارك العلوم وبيان ما يدرك بالعقل ، وبين مدارك العلوم في الدين ، وذلك كله قدم به على مباحث «البيان» التي بدأ الإمام الشافعي بها رسالته .

وحين انتقل إلى «البيان» وبعده الموضوعات الأخرى التي وردت في «الرسالة» لاحظنا أنه قد نزع إلى تحديد «البيان» بشكل أدق من تحديد الإمام الشافعي له : فبين ماهيته ، والاختلاف فيه ، ومراتبه ، ومسألة أخرى لم تأخذ من اهتمام الإمام الشافعي شيئاً ، تلك هي مسألة «تأخير البيان إلى وقت الحاجة» واختلافهم فيه ، ولكنه في الكلام عن «مراتب البيان» نقل المراتب

(٤٤) قد طبع البرهان في قطر طبعة نفيسة وحقق .

الخمسة التي ذكرها الإمام الشافعي وأيد ما أورده عليه أبو بكر بن داود الظاهري . ثم ذكر «مراتب البيان» عند بعض الفقهاء . واختار أن «البيان» عنده هو الدليل ، وهو نوعان : عقلي وسمعي . فأما الدليل السمعي فالمستند فيه المعجزة فكل ما كان أقرب إلى المعجزة فهو أولى بالتقديم ، وما بعد في الرتبة أحر : فالأول الكتاب ، والسنة المتواترة ، ثم الإجماع ، ثم خبر الواحد والقياس .

ثم تطرق إلى اللغات وأوضح : أن الأصوليين يعنون من مباحث اللغات بما أهمله أئمة العربية من كلام على الأوامر والنواهي والعموم والخصوص ، وغيرها مما تعرض له الإمام الشافعي .

وقد أشار خلال ذلك إلى بعض ما ذكره القاضي الباقلاني مما يشير بوضوح إلى أن هذه الإضافات على منهج الإمام الشافعي قد سبقه بها القاضي الباقلاني .

وإمام الحرمين من أبرز شيوخ الإمام محمد أبي حامد الغزالي (توفي سنة ٥٠٥ هـ) ومن الطبيعي أن يتأثر الغزالي بشيخه ، وللغزالي في الأصول كتب أربعة ، أولها «المنحول» وهو كتاب متوسط الحجم ، مطبوع كأنه ألفه للمبتدئين في الأصول ، أو المتوسطين فيه ، وكتاب آخر أحال عليه في «المستصفي»^(٤٥) ولا يعرف عنه غير عنوانه الذي ذكره ، وهو «تهذيب الأصول» و «شفاء الغليل في بيان الشبه والخيل ومسالك التعليل» الذي حقق وطبع في بغداد سنة ١٣٩٠ هـ — ١٩٧١ م وموسوعته الأصولية ، وخاتمة كتبه في هذا العلم «المستصفي» الذي طبع عدة مرات في مصر وغيرها . وقد ألفه بعد أن خرج من خلوته ، بدأه بمقدمة أتى بها على معظم مباحث علم المنطق الأرسطي الذي كان شديد الاهتمام به فأتى على الحد وشروطه وأقسامه وتكلم عن الدليل وأقسامه ، ثم بدأ بالكلام على أقطاب الكتاب

(٤٥) راجع (١٨٧/١) .

الأربعة التي أتى بها على جميع المباحث الأصولية التي عني بها شيخه إمام الحرمين وسابقوه كالقاضي الباقلاني ، وإذا كان لشيخه آراء قد انفرد بها ، وخالف إماميه الشافعي والأشعري ، فإن للغزالي — أيضاً — آراء خاصة تفرد بها عن سابقيه ارتضاها البعض وأخذها عليه الآخرون .

هذه أهم جوانب التطوير التي يمكن تسجيلها للشافعية في هذا العلم . أما الفريق الثاني الذي ساهم في هذا التطوير — فهم المعتزلة — فبعد أن كتب القاضي عبد الجبار كتابه «العمد» أو «العهد» وشرحه ، وسجل بعض آرائه الأصولية في موسوعته التي عثر على بعض أجزاءها ، وطبعت ، وهو «المغنى» حيث أفرد الجزء السابع عشر منه للمباحث الأصولية .

وكما اهتم إمام الحرمين بكتب القاضي الباقلاني فقد اهتم أبو الحسين البصري المعتزلي (توفي سنة ٤٣٥ هـ) بكتب القاضي عبد الجبار فشرح كتابه «العهد» أو «العمد» ولما شعر بطول هذا الشرح قام بتلخيصه في كتابه المعروف «المعتمد» وهو مطبوع متداول .

وفي هذه الفترة كتب الشيخ أبو اسحاق الشيرازي (توفي سنة ٤٧٦ هـ) كتابيه «اللمع» و «التبصرة» ، وكلاهما مطبوع متداول .

كما كتب القاضي أبو يعلى الفراء الحنبلي كتابه الأصولي «العدة في أصول الفقه» الذي حقق ونشر في المملكة العربية السعودية سنة ، (١٤٠٠ هـ — ١٩٨٠ م) . وكتب ابن عقيل البغدادي — من الحنابلة أيضاً — «الواضح في الأصول» ، وكتب أبو الخطاب كتابه الأصولي الشهير التمهيد وقد قام بعض الباحثين في الآونة الأخيرة بتحقيقه ، وقد طبع في مكة .

والكتب التي ألفها المالكية — في هذه الفترة — «عيون الأدلة في مسائل الخلاف بين فقهاء الأمصار» له نسخة في القرويين بفاس^(١) ، واعتبره الشيرازي أفضل كتب المالكية في الخلاف ، ألفه ابن القصار البغدادي (توفي

(٤٦) وأنظر بروكلمان الملحق (٢/٩٦٣ رقم ٤٩) .

سنة ٣٩٨ هـ) و «مقدمة في أصول الفقه» لها نسخة في مكتبة الأزهر للمؤلف نفسه .

وقد سارت كتب الشافعية والحنابلة والمالكية والمعتزلة على نمط متقارب في التبويب والتنظيم غلب عليه اسم «طريقة المتكلمين» .

الحنفية ودورهم في كتابة الأصول :

ذهب بعض مؤرخي «أصول الفقه» إلى أن أبا يوسف القاضي ، ومحمد بن الحسن رحمهما الله قد كتبا في الأصول^(٤٧). ولكن هذه الدعوى لم تثبت .

وقد نقل صاحب «كشف الظنون»^(٤٨) عن علاء الدين قوله في كتابه «ميزان الأصول»: ”اعلم أن «أصول الفقه» فرع لعلم أصول الدين ، فكان من الضروري أن يقع التصنيف فيه على اعتقاد مصنف الكتاب وأكثر التصانيف في «أصول الفقه» لأهل الاعتزال المخالفين لنا في الأصول ، ولأهل الحديث المخالفين لنا في الفروع ولا اعتماد على تصانيفهم .

وتصانيف أصحابنا قسمان : قسم وقع في غاية الاحكام لصدوره ممن جمع الأصول والفروع ، مثل «مأخذ الشرع» و «الجدل» لأبي منصور الماتريدي (توفي سنة ٣٣٣ هـ) .

وقسم وقع في نهاية التحقيق في المعاني ، وحسن الترتيب لصدوره ممن تصدى لاستخراج الفروع من ظواهر المسموع ، غير أنهم لما لم يمهروا في دقائق الأصول ، وقضايا العقول ، فأفضى رأيهم إلى رأي المخالفين في بعض الفصول ، ثم هجر القسم الأول إما لتوحش الألفاظ والمعاني ، وإما لقصور الهمم والتواني“ .

(٤٧) راجع مناقب المكي (٢٤٥/٢) ومقدمة أصول السرخسي (٣/١) ، ومفتاح السعادة (٣٧/٢) ، والفهرست لابن النديم الذي استند جميع من ادعى ذلك إلى عبارته في ترجمة محمد بن الحسن : «وإن له في الأصول كتاب الصلاة ، الزكاة ، الحج وظاهر أنه يريد بهذا أصول الدين .
(٤٨) أنظر (١١٠/١ - ١١١) .

وفي هذا القول مجال كبير للنظر وان صدر عن حنفي ، ولكنه قريب إلى الواقع في بيان دور الحنفية في تطوير «أصول الفقه» ففي الفترة الأولى انصرف علماءهم قبل الماتريدي لمناقشة بعض ما ورد في رسالة الإمام الشافعي كما فعل عيسى بن أبان وغيره .

أما في الفترة التالية لتلك فإن من أبرز ما كتبوا «أصول الكرخي» ، (توفي سنة ٣٤٠هـ) ، وهي صفحات معدودة طبعت مع كتاب ابي زيد الدبوسي «تأسيس النظر» المطبوع في القاهرة طبعت عدة .

وتلاه الجصاص (توفي سنة ٣٧٠ هـ) فكتب «أصوله» ليكون مقدمة لكتابه «أحكام القرآن» وقد حققه أحد الباحثين رسالة للدكتوراه وطبع في الكويت .

ويمكن أن يعتبر بدء التطوير في كتابة «أصول الفقه» عند الحنفية على يد الإمام أبي زيد الدبوسي (توفي سنة ٤٣٠ هـ) ، فقد كتب كتابه «تقويم الأدلة» حققه أو بعضه أحد الباحثين ، ولم يطبع إلى الآن ، و «تأسيس النظر» ، وقد استفاد أبو زيد من أصول سابقه خاصة الكرخي والجصاص ، ولكنه وسع وفصل ، كما تطرق بإشارات موجزة إلى ما اتفق فيه الحنفية مع غيرهم ، وما اختلفوا فيه من الأصول .

وتبعه فخر الإسلام البزدوي (توفي سنة ٤٨٢ هـ) فألف كتابه الشهير «كنز الوصول إلى معرفة الأصول» فتناول فيه المباحث الأصولية عامة ، وقد اهتم الحنفية فيه كثيراً وكتبوا عليه شروحات كثيرة أهمها وأحسنها «كشف الأسرار» لعبد العزيز البخاري (توفي سنة ٧٣٠ هـ) ، وقد طبع في الإستانة ومصر .

كما كتب شمس الأئمة السرخسي (توفي سنة ٤٢٣ هـ) «أصول السرخسي» المطبوع بجزئين في مصر ، والكتاب يعتبر نسخة معدلة عن كتاب «تقويم الأدلة» للدبوسي وقد استأثر كتابا البزدوي والسرخسي باهتمام علماء

الأصول من الحنفية وعكفوا عليهما فترة طويلة .
 ومما تقدم يتضح أن «أصول الفقه» بوصفه علماً مخصوصاً قد تكامل نموه واتضحت مباحثه وانحصرت مسائله في القرن الخامس ، وفيه دوّن علماء المذاهب أصولهم بشكل كامل .

طريقة الشافعية أو المتكلمين وطريقة الحنفية :

وقد تم تدوين الأصول بطريقتين إحداهما بطريقة الشافعية ، أو المتكلمين ، وهي الطريقة التي سار عليها الشافعية والمالكية والحنابلة والمعتزلة^(٤٩) وقد غلب عليها لقب «طريقة المتكلمين» لأن الكتب المكتوبة بهذه الطريقة إعتاد أصحابها أن يقدموا لها ببعض المباحث الكلامية كمسائل «الحسن والقبح» و «حكم الأشياء قبل الشرع» و «شكر المنعم» و «الحاكم» .

ولأنهم يسلكون في تقرير قواعد الأصول مسلكاً استدلالياً قائماً على تقرير القواعد ، والاستدلال على صحتها ، والرد على المخالفين من غير أن يولوا الفروع التي تدرج تحت هذه القواعد كبير اهتمام ، أو يراعوا تطبيق الفروع عليها .

طريقة الحنفية :

أما الحنفية فقد سلكوا في كتابة أصولهم سبيل تقرير القواعد الأصولية على مقتضى الفروع المنقولة عن أئمتهم : فالقاعدة مستنبطة من الفروع دائرة حولها ، لا العكس ، فالدارس لأصول الفقه بهذه الطريقة يجمع الفروع التي أفتى بها الأئمة ، ويقوم بتحليلها ، وتقرير أنهم إنما أفتوا بها بناء على أصول يتوصل إليها فيقررها قواعد لتلك الفتاوى .

(٤٩) وكل فريق من هؤلاء كان يزيد علماءه في كتبهم الأصول التي ينفردون بها عن غيرهم ، ويبنون ما يخالف قواعدهم بنفس الأسلوب الاستدلالي المشار إليه .

يقول الدهلوي : ”... وأعلم أنني وجدت بعضهم يزعم أن بناء الخلاف بين أبي حنيفة والشافعي رحمهما الله على هذه الأصول المذكورة في كتاب «اليزدوي» و نحوه ، وإنما الحق أن أكثرها أصول مخرجة على أقوالهم ، وعندني : إن المسألة القائلة بأن الخاص مبین ، ولا يلحقه البيان ، وأن الزيادة نسخ ، وأن العام قطعي كالخاص ، وأن لا ترجيح بكثرة الرواية ، وأنه لا يجب العمل بمحدث غير الفقيه إذا آنسد باب الرأي ، وأن لا عبرة بمفهوم الشرط والوصف أصلاً ، وأن موجب الأمر هو الوجوب البتة ، وأمثال ذلك : أصول مخرجة على كلام الأئمة ، وأنه لا تصح بها رواية عن أبي حنيفة وصاحبيه ، وأنه ليست المحافظة عليها ، والتكلف في جواب ما يرد عليها من صنائع المتقدمين في استنباطاتهم كما يفعله اليزدوي وغيره أحق من المحافظة على خلافها والجواب عما يرد عليه (٥٠) ، ثم استطرده رحمه الله في ضرب الأمثلة على ذلك .

علم أصول الفقه في القرن السادس وما تلاه :

بعد أن ضمت مباحث هذا العلم ومسائله في الكتب الأربعة «العهد» و «المعتمد» و «البرهان» و «المستصفي» على طريقة المتكلمين ، قام إمامان جليلان من أئمة المتكلمين بتلخيص هذه الكتب الأربعة هما الإمام فخر الدين الرازي (توفي سنة ٦٠٦ هـ) الذي لخصها بكتابه «المحصل» الذي تشرفت بتحقيقه ، وقامت جامعة الإمام بطبعه ونشره بست مجلدات كبار وتجري الآن إعادة طبعه .

والإمام سيف الدين الآمدي (توفي سنة ٦٣١ هـ) قد لخصها في كتابه «الإحكام في أصول الأحكام» الذي طبع في الرياض والقاهرة وغيرهما .
والكتابان من الكتب المبسوطة الميسرة بالنسبة إلى غيرها ، والمحصل

(٥٠) أنظر حجة الله البالغة (٣٣٦/١ - ٣٤١) ، وكتابه الإنصاف في بيان سبب الإخلاف (ص ٣٨ - ٤٠) طبعة السلفية .

أوضح عبارة وأكثر تفصيلاً . وتوالت الاختصارات والشروح والتعليقات على هذين الكتابين فاختصر «المحصول» تاج الدين الأرموي (توفي سنة ٦٥٦ هـ) بكتابه «الحاصل» الذي حقق رسالة للدكتوراه في الأزهر ، ولم ينشر إلى الآن . واختصره محمود الآرموي (توفي ٦٧٢ هـ) بكتابه «التحصيل» وقد حقق ، ولم ينشر كذلك . واختصره الفخر الرازي نفسه بكتاب سماه «المنتخب» قام أحد الباحثين بتحقيقه ، واختصر «الحاصل» القاضي البيضاوي (توفي سنة ٦٨٥ هـ) بكتابه «مناهج الوصول إلى علم الأصول» اختصاراً شديداً بلغ حد الالغاز ، فأنبرى لشرحه كثيرون ، وأحسن شروحه شرح الاسنوي (توفي سنة ٧٧٢ هـ) المسمى بـ «نهاية السؤل» ، وهو الذي عكف عليه المشتغلون بهذا العلم فترة طويلة من الزمن ، ولا يزال الشافعية من الأزهرين عليه عاكفين .

أما كتاب الآمدي «الإحكام» فقد اختصره ابن الحاجب المالكي (توفي سنة ٦٤٦ هـ) بكتابه الشهير لدى المالكية «منتهى السؤل والأمل في علمي الأصول والجدل» و أفضل شروحه المتداولة شرح عضد الدين (توفي سنة ٧٥٦ هـ) ، وعليه حواشٍ وتعليقات .

وكل هذه الكتب كتبت على «طريقة المتكلمين» تقرر القواعد ، وتقام الأدلة عليها، ويحاول كذلك المخالفون لها حتى يستسلم أحد الفريقين .

أما الحنفية فقد شغل أصوليوهم كذلك بالعكوف على دراسة كتابي «اليزدوي والسرخسي» ، وظل الحال كذلك حتى أواخر القرن السادس وأوائل القرن السابع حيث اتجه الأصوليون إلى طريقة جديدة في كتابة الأصول هي : طريقة الجمع بين طريقتي المتكلمين والحنفية لتخرج كتب تجمع أصول الفريقين ، وتوائم بين الطريقتين :

فكتب مظفر الدين الساعاتي (توفي سنة ٦٩٤ هـ) كتابه «بديع النظام الجامع بين كتابي اليزدوي والإحكام» ، وهو من الكتب المطبوعة المتداولة.

وكتب صدر الشريعة (توفي سنة ٧٤٧ هـ) كتابه «تنقيح الأصول» لخص فيه «المحصول وأصول البزدوي ومختصر ابن الحاجب»، ثم شرح كتابه هذا بشرح سماه «التوضيح» كتب عليه التفتازاني (توفي سنة ٧٩٢ هـ) حاشية سماها «التلويح»، والتنقيح والتوضيح والتلويح كلها مطبوعة متداولة، وكتب تاج الدين السبكي من الشافعية كتابه الشهير «جمع الجوامع»، ذكر في مقدمته أنه جمعه من مائة كتاب أصولي وقد اهتم الكثيرون بشرحه والتعليق عليه وأهم شروحه وأكثرها تداولاً شرح الجلال المحلي الذي بقي عمدة الدراسات الأصولية لدى الشافعية خاصة. كما شرحه بدر الدين الزركشي (٧٩٤ سنة هـ) بشرح سماه «تشنيف المسامع» طبعت قطعة منه في القاهرة مع تعليقات للشيخ المطيعي رحمه الله (سنة ١٣٥٤ هـ) وقام أحد الباحثين بجامعة الإمام بتحقيق قسم منه رسالة للدكتوراه.

كما كتب الزركشي كتابه «البحر المحيط» جمع فيه أقوال الأصوليين مما يزيد على مائة مصنف. قام أحد الدارسين بتحقيقه باشرافنا رسالة للدكتوراه، وقد انجز تحقيق المجلد الأول منه وهو جاهز للطباعة.

وكتب ابن قدامة (٦٢٠ هـ) من الحنابلة كتابه «روضة الناظر وجنة المناظر» لخص فيه «المستصفي» للغزالي وضم إليه فوائد أخرى مما خالف فيه الحنابلة غيرهم وقد طبع عدة مرات، وعنى به الحنابلة، واستغنوا به عما عداه. وقد اختصر الروضة سليمان الطوفي (٧١٦ هـ)، ثم شرح مختصره بمجلدين.

وكتب القرافي (٦٨٤ هـ) من المالكية كتابه «تنقيح الفصول في اختصار المحصول» كما شرح «المحصول» بكتاب ضخم سماه «نفائس الأصول» جرى تحقيق بعضه باشرافنا في الرياض.

مباحث الإجهاد :

أبواب أو كتب تلك الكتب ، يتناول فيه الأصوليون تعريف الإجتهد وبيان شروطه وأنواعه والكلام عن تعبد رسول الله بالإجتهد وعدم تعبد به، وهل الصحابة في عهده متعبدون بالإجتهد أم لا ؟ وهل المصيب واحد من المجتهدين ، أو يجوز تعدد الصواب ؟ وما يجوز الإجتهد فيه وما لا يجوز . ثم يتناولون «مباحث التقليد» بالأسلوب نفسه.

وفي القرن الثامن كتب ابراهيم بن موسى الشاطبي (توفي سنة ٧٩٠ هـ) كتابه «الموافقات» الذي تكلم فيه عن «الإجتهد» باعتباره عملية فكرية تعتمد على دعمتين الدعامة الأولى معرفة تامة بقواعد اللغة العربية ، وأساليب التعبير فيها ، وهذه تركها الرجل للمصنفين في اللغة العربية، وللمؤلفين الآخرين في «أصول الفقه» .

أما الدعامة الأخرى للإجتهد — في نظره — فكانت المعرفة بمقاصد الشارع الحكيم مما شرع . هذه المقاصد ما كان الأصوليون الذين سبقوا الشاطبي يولونها الكثير من العناية، بل كانوا يبحثونها في ثنايا الكلام عن أقسام «العلة» أما الشاطبي فقد وضع كتابه هذا للكلام في هذا الموضوع ، وهو بالغ الخطر ، شديد الأهمية ، ضروري لإدراك حكم الشارع ومقاصده. ولكن هذا الكتاب قد لقي من إهمال الباحثين في الأصول ما لا يستحق ، لما استقر في أذهان الدارسين من أن التعليل بالحكم لا يجوز ، لأنها غير منضبطة ، وما دام الأمر كذلك فإن البحث فيها — في نظر الكثيرين — يعد من قبيل الترف العقلي . والكتاب مطبوع متداول ، وليت القائمين على تدريس «أصول الفقه» أو وضع مناهجه يلفتون أنظار الدارسين إليه خاصة أولئك الذين يدرسون مباحث «القياس والتعليل والإجتهد» وقد عنى الشيخان الجليلان ابن عاشور وعلال الفاسي بالكتابة في مقاصد الشريعة في عصرنا هذا.

وألف ابن الهمام (توفي سنة ٨٦١ هـ) كتابه «التحريير» ، وشرحه تلميذه ابن أمير الحاج (توفي سنة ٨٧٩ هـ) بشرح سماه «التقرير والتحبير»

والكتاب و شرحه مطبوعان ، وهو من الكتب التي كتبت بطريقة الجمع بين طريقتي «الحنفية والمتكلمين» وله شرح آخر مطبوع لأمر بادشاه اسمه «تيسير التحرير» .

وكتب القاضي علاء الدين المرادوي (توفي سنة ٨٨٥ هـ) مختصراً «لأصول ابن مفلح»^(٥١) (توفي سنة ٧٦٣ هـ) سماه «تحرير المنقول وتهذيب علم الأصول» وقد قام بتحقيقه أحد الباحثين ، ويتوقع نشره قريباً كما حقق أصول ابن مفلح نفسه.

وألف بعد ذلك ابن النجار الفتوحى الحنبلي «مختصراً» «لتحرير المرادوي» ثم شرح ذلك المختصر بشرح جيد يعتبر من أجمع الكتب الأصولية المتأخرة وأحسنها وقد طبع في مصر ناقصاً ، ثم حققه استاذان جليلان هما الدكتور نزيه حماد والدكتور محمد الزحيلي ، وقام بنشره مركز البحث العلمي في كلية الشريعة بمكة المكرمة ، وقد ظهر أكثره ، وما بقي منه تحت الطبع .

وفي القرن الثاني عشر الهجري كتب محب الله بن عبد الشكور البهاري الحنفي (توفي سنة ١١١٩ هـ) كتابه الأصولي «مسلم الثبوت» ، وهو من أدق وأجمع ما كتب متأخرو الحنفية ، وقد طبع منفرداً كما طبع مع شرح له في الهند ، وطبع مع شرحه المشهور «فواتح الرحموت» بحاشية «مستصفي الغزالي» عدة طبعات .

وهذه الكتب كلها قد كتبت بالطرق التي تقدم ذكرنا لها ، وكلها كانت تتركز حول إبراز مذاهب أصحابها ، وإبطال مذاهب المخالفين ، ولم نجد منذ القرن السادس الهجري حتى يومنا هذا كتباً عنيت بتقديم «أصول الفقه» على أنه منهج بحث للفقهاء المسلم يعصم ذهنه من الخطأ في الاجتهاد الفقهي إلا إشارة عابرة وردت في كتاب الشيخ مصطفى عبد الرازق «تمهيد لتاريخ الفلسفة الإسلامية» وحاول بيانها وإيضاحها تلميذه د. النشار في كتابه مناهج البحث.

(٥١) الذي حقق أحد الباحثين بجامعة الإمام قسماً منه لرسالة الماجستير ويقوم بتحقيق ما بقي منه لرسالة الدكتوراه .

وفي القرن الثالث عشر الهجري كتب القاضي الشوكاني (توفي سنة ١٢٥٥ هـ) كتابه الأصولي «إرشاد الفحول»، وفي هذا الكتاب — على صغر حجمه — عرض جيد لمختلف الآراء الأصولية مع ذكر أدلة أصحابها باختصار غير مغل ، مع ترجيح بعض ما يراه راجحاً ، والكتاب يصلح للدراسة الأصولية المقارنة لدارس «أصول الفقه» وقد طبع عدة مرات ، ولم يقرر للدراسة في أي معهد من معاهد العلم — التي نعرفها — مع صلاحه لذلك .

ولخصه محمد صديق خان (توفي سنة ١٣٠٧ هـ) في مختصره «حصول المأمول من علم الأصول» ، وهو مختصر مطبوع . وإرشاد الفحول يعتبر تلخيصاً دقيقاً لكتاب البحر المحيط للزرکشي، كما يعتبر «تسهيل الأصول» للمحلاوي تلخيصاً واختصاراً لإرشاد الفحول.

وبعد ذلك نجد أن الدراسات الأصولية قد أخذت اتجاهين :

الأول : كتابة المذكرات والمداخل والملخصات التي يقوم بإعدادها الأساتذة المتخصصون لتيسير دراسة هذا العلم على طلابهم في الكليات المتعددة بعد أن رأوا عزوف طلابهم عنه أو عجزهم عن دراسته وهي مذكرات ودراسات لم تقدم لهذا العلم كثيراً فهي في الكثير الغالب إعادة لكتابة بعض مسائل هذا العلم بلغة عصرية : فكتب الشيوخ المرصفي والمحلاوي والخضري وعبد الوهاب خلاف والشنقيطي والسايس ومصطفى عبد الخالق و عبد الغني عبد الخالق وأبو زهرة وأبو النور زهير ومعروف الدواليبي وعبد الكريم زيدان وزكي الدين شعبان ومحمد سلام مذكور وغيرهم ، كتب كانت عبارة عن تحرير لمحاضرات القوها على طلابهم في كليات الحقوق او الشريعة .

الثاني: كان عبارة عن كتابة الرسائل الجامعية في بعض مباحث هذا العلم، أو تحقيق كتب قديمة من المخطوطات . ولا شك أن هذا الاتجاه بشقيه قد قدم خدمات جليلة لهذا العلم ولكن هذه الخدمات — على تقديرنا البالغ لها — لم تزل دون الطموح المطلوب فلا يزال هذا العلم واقفاً في الموضع نفسه

الذي تركه فيه أسلافنا في القرن السادس الهجري .

ومن خلال العرض الذي قدمناه نستطيع أن نستخلص النتائج التالية :
 (١) إن هذه القواعد التي عرفت بـ «أصول الفقه» لم يظهر شيء منها في عصر رسول الله ﷺ ولا في عصر أصحابه بألفاظه الاصطلاحية ، وإن كانت معظم المعالجات الإجتهدية في العصرين المذكورين يمكن أن تندرج تحت هذه القواعد وذلك لأنهم كانوا يستخلصون الأحكام الفقهية الجزئية من مداركها ومصادرها التفصيلية سليقة ، كما كانوا يتكلمون اللغة العربية سليقة دون ملاحظة قواعد النحو التي ما عرفت إلا بعد ذلك .

(٢) إن قواعد علم «أصول الفقه» أول من جمعها في كتاب هو الإمام محمد بن أدريس الشافعي المولود (سنة ١٥٠ هـ) والمتوفى (سنة ٢٠٤ هـ) ، وأن أول كتاب جامع في هذا العلم هو كتاب «الرسالة» التي ألفها بناء على طلب الإمام عبد الرحمن بن مهدي (١٣٥ — ١٩٨ هـ) وذلك بعد قيام المدرستين الفقهيتين الشهيرتين : مدرسة «أهل الحديث» التي كان مقدمها الإمام مالك بن أنس (٩٣ — ١٧٩ هـ) ومدرسة «أهل الرأي» التي كان مقدمها الإمام أبو حنيفة (٧٠ — ١٥٠ هـ) وبعد أن انتشر فقه المدرستين ، ونشب بين أتباعهما ما يمكن تسميته بالصراع الفقهي^(٥٢) . الذي أضيف إلى النزاعات السياسية والكلامية والفلسفية التي نشبت في تلك الفترة .

(٣) إن علم «أصول الفقه» هو منهج البحث عند الفقيه^(٥٣) فهو كالمناطق بالنسبة إلى الفلسفة^(٥٤) . ولذلك عرفوه بأنه مجموع طرق الفقه — على سبيل الإجمال — وكيفية الاستدلال بها، وكيفية حال المستدل بها^(٥٥) .

(٥٢) أنظر مقدمة ابن خلدون (١١٦٣/٣ — ٦٤) طبعة وافي .

(٥٣) راجع مناهج البحث للنشار (ص ٥٥) .

(٥٤) وراجع مسلم الثبوت وشرحه بمباشرة المتصفي (٩/١ — ١٠) حيث نفى صاحبه أن يكون المنطق كذلك ، وزعم أن نسبة المنطق إلى الفلسفة وأصول الفقه واحدة ولعله تأثر بقول من قال : أن المنطق معيار العلوم .

(٥٥) المحصول (١/١ ق١) .

«فأصول الفقه» إذن قانون كلي يعصم ذهن المجتهد من الخطأ في الاستدلال على أحكام الشرع من طرقها المختلفة^(٥٦)، ولكنه لم يستخدم بهذه الصفة إلا عند الشافعي رحمه الله في فقهه الجديد .

(٤) إن من الحقائق الهامة التي لا ينبغي أن تغرب عن البال أن الناس قد خاضوا في الفقه، وقالوا فيه قبل أن يتكلموا في أصوله (إلا ما كان من الشافعي في فقهه الجديد) ، ولذلك كان «أصول الفقه» قد أخذ عند غيره دور المبرر للفتاوى الجزئية وقاعدة الجدل والحجاج عما قالوه فيها لا دور القانون الكلي ، ومنهج البحث الذي يحكمها . فإن الفقهاء درجوا على أن يردوا المسائل والوقائع إلى الأدلة التفصيلية مباشرة دون إحساس بالحاجة إلى توسط القواعد الكلية التي جمعت في علم «أصول الفقه» .

فالإمام أبو حنيفة رحمه الله قد أفتى فيما يقرب من نصف مليون مسألة من المسائل الفقهية^(٥٧) . تناقلها أصحابه ، ولكن «القواعد الأصولية» التي فرع الإمام عنها فتاواه تلك لم تنقل بسند متصل إليه^(٥٨) . غير عبارات قليلة تعرض رحمه الله فيها لبعض مصادر استنباطاته واجتهاداته ، منها قوله رحمه الله : ” .. آخذ بكتاب الله فإن لم أجد في سنة رسول الله ﷺ فإن لم أجد في كتاب الله ولا سنة رسول الله ﷺ أخذت بقول من شئت منهم ، وأدع من شئت منهم ، لا أخرج عن قولهم إلى قول غيرهم فإذا انتهى الأمر إلى إبراهيم والشعبي وآبن سيرين والحسن وعطاء وسعيد بن المسيب فقوم اجتهدوا فاجتهد كما اجتهدوا^(٥٩) . وحين حاول البعض استعداد الخليفة العباسي المنصور عليه كتب أبو حنيفة رحمه الله للمنصور بقول : ” ... ليس الأمر كما بلغك يا أمير المؤمنين إنما أعمل بكتاب الله ، ثم سنة رسول الله ﷺ ثم بأقضية أبي

(٥٦) راجع مناقب الشافعي للرازي (ص ٩٨) وما بعدها ، ومناهج البحث للنشار (ص ٥٥) .

(٥٧) أنظر كتاب الإمام الشافعي لمصطفى عبد الرزاق (ص ٤٥) .

(٥٨) أنظر الإنصاف للدهلوي ، و أبو حنيفة لأبي زهرة (ص ٢٢٣) وما بعدها .

(٥٩) أنظر تاريخ بغداد (٣٦٨/٣١) ، والإنشاء (ص ١٤٢) ، ومشايخ بلغ من الحنفية (ص ١٩٠) .

بكر وعمر وعثمان وعلي رضي الله عنهم ثم بأقضية بقية الصحابة، ثم أقيس بعد ذلك إذا اختلفوا وليس بين الله وبين خلقه قرابة^(٦٠).

ولما اتهم رحمه الله بتقديم القياس على النص قال: ”.. كذب والله وافتري علينا من يقول: إننا نقدم القياس على النص، وهل يحتاج بعد النص إلى قياس“^(٦١).

(٥) إن من الأمور المسلمة أنه منذ بداية العهد الأموي إلى أن هدمت الخلافة الإسلامية كان السلطان والقيادة في الأمة الإسلامية في أيدي غير المؤهلين للإجتihad فآل أمر الإجتihad إلى علماء لا سلطان لهم، ومن المتعذر استثناء أية حالة غير الخليفة الراشد عمر بن عبد العزيز رضي الله عنه حيث رويت عنه اجتهادات فقهية، وقد كان لهذا أثر بالغ في فصل «الفقه وأصوله» عن جوانب هامة من حياة المسلمين العملية ليتهاجها في كثير من القضايا اتجاهات نظرياً ومثالياً^(٦٢). جعلهما يعبران عما ينبغي أن تكون عليه حياة المسلمين، لا عما هو واقع في حياتهم، أو يمكن أن يكون.

(٦) ان الكاتبين — في هذا العلم — والمؤرخين له قد صنّفوه ضمن العلوم الشرعية النقلية^(٦٣). وإن كان بعضهم قد نص على أن مبادئه مأخوذة من العربية وبعض العلوم الشرعية والعقلية^(٦٤) كما أن واحداً من أبرز الكاتبين فيه وهو الإمام الغزالي قد قال ”... وأشرف العلوم ما ازدوج فيه العقل والسمع واصطحب في الرأي والشرع، وعلم الفقه وأصوله من هذا القبيل فإنه يأخذ من صفو الشرع والعقل سواء السبيل، فلا هو تصرف بمحض العقول بحيث لا يتلقاه الشرع بالقبول ولا هو مبني

(٦٠) راجع الميزان (٥٢/١) والطبقات السنة (١٤٣/١) ومشايخ بلخ (ص ١٩٣).

(٦١) المراجع السابقة.

(٦٢) راجع تاريخ الفقه لمحمد يوسف موسى (ص ١٦٠).

(٦٣) راجع مفاتيح العلوم للخوارزمي (٦ - ٨) والمقدمة (١١٢٥/٣ - ١١٢٨ و ١١٦١ - ١١٦٦).

(٦٤) راجع مفتاح السعادة.

على محض التقليد الذي لا يشهد له العقل بالتأييد والتسديد^(٦٥)“. .
ولعل ما قاله الإمام الغزالي وغيره من الأصوليين يتيح لنا أن
نقول: بأن طرق الفقه ثلاثة :

[١] الوحي : بشقيه المتلو المعجر ، وهو الكتاب ، وغيره وهو السنة .
[٢] العقل : لتفسير النصوص ، والبحث في سبل تطبيقها وربط
الجزئيات ، بالكليات ، واستنباط العلل لما لم يعلل ، والحكم فيما لم
ينص الشارع على حكمه ، ونحو ذلك مما يمكن تحديده وتفصيله .
[٣] التجارب والأعراف والمصالح :

وعلى هذه الأسس الثلاثة يمكن توزيع سائر «الأصول الفقهية» المتفق
عليها، والمختلف فيها، وهي : الكتاب ، والسنة ، والإجماع ،
والقياس ، وكون الأصل في المنافع الإباحة وفي المضار المنع
واستصحاب الحال ، والإستحسان ، وقول الصحابي إذا انتشر بين
الصحابة ولم يخالفه أحد منهم ، والأخذ بأقل ما قيل ، والأخذ
بالأخف ، والاستقراء الناقص ، والمصالح المرسله والعرف والاستدلال
على عدم الحكم بعدم ما يدل على حكم ، وشرع من قبلنا وسد
الذرائع .

(٧) أن هناك عوامل في تاريخنا كالتي أشرنا إليها في الفقرة (ب) — قد فرضت
علينا مخاوف أدت إلى وضع كثير من القيود نجم عنها تحول العقلية
الإسلامية والتوجه الفكري فيها نحو الأمور الجزئية والإبتعاد عن التفكير
الكلّي الشمولي — الذي يعتبر طابعاً مميزاً للتفكير الإسلامي ، وكان
لذلك أثره البالغ في حلولنا ومعالجاتنا الفقهية ، حيث سمت بهذه
السمة ، وأخذت هذا الطابع .

(٨) أن من الأمور المعروفة أن في كل علم أو شأن من شؤون الحياة أموراً

(٦٥) أنظر المستفي للغزالي (٣/١) . وللغزالي غير المستفي «النحول» وشفاء الغليل في بيان شبه والخيل ومسالك التعليل،
و «تهذيب الأصول» وكلها من أهم الكتب الأصولية .

تقبل التطور وتحتاجه، وربما لا تتحقق إلا به، وأموراً أخرى ثابتة، والمنطق الإسلامي يوجب أن يكون هناك تكامل بين الأثنين، ولذلك كان لأصول الفقه قواعد ثابتة لا تقبل تغييراً، وأخرى تعتمد على التطور والتجدد الدائمين، وذلك واضح في «مسائل الإجتهااد» .

وعلى هذا فإنه في الوقت الذي ندعو فيه جميع أهل العلم أن لا يبدأوا من فراغ وأن يستفيدوا من إجتهاادات من سبقهم من مجتهدى الأمة وعلمائها فإننا نؤكد أنه لا أحد يستطيع أن يدعي فرضية متابعة أي مجتهد في أمر أداه إليه اجتهاده فقط، فإن ذلك أقصى ما يقال فيه : أنه رأي والرأي مشترك^(٦٦) .

(٩) تبين لنا — من خلال الدراسة لمناهج السلف — أن الهدف ليس معرفة الحكم ولا صدور فتوى فيه، وإنما هدفهم دائماً إقامة حكم الله في تطبيقه، وهذا ما يوجب عدم فصل ظروف تطبيق الحكم وشروطه عنه .

إذا تبين ذلك وأردنا أن نعيد هذا العلم إلى وضعه الصحيح بين العلوم الإسلامية وتحويله إلى منهج بحث في الأدلة الشرعية لاستفيد منها أحكاماً ومعالجات وحلولاً لسائر قضايا المعاصرة لتبسط عليها حاكمية الشرع لا سواه، فإننا نحتاج إلى ما يلي :

(١) إعادة النظر في المباحث التي يشتمل عليها هذا العلم وتخليصه مما لا يحتاجه الفقيه الأصولي نحو مباحث «حكم الأشياء قبل الشرع» والنزاع في مسألة «شكر المنعم» و «مباحث حاكمية الشرع»، والعناية الزائدة بالحدود والتعاريف والإنشغال بمناقشتها. كذلك التخلي عن المباحث المتعلقة بنزاعهم في مسائل «القراءات الشاذة وعربية جميع القرآن» وحسم النزاع الطويل في «خبر الواحد» بأن يعتبر خبر الواحد — إذا استوفى شروط

(٦٦) من كلام سيدنا عمر رضي الله عنه .

التصحيح، وثبتت صحته — مقبولاً تؤخذ منه الأحكام، وإعادة النظر في سائر الشروط التي وضعها بعض الأئمة لظروف خاصة أملتها عليهم : ككون الحديث غير مخالف لقواعدهم العامة، أو كونه مروياً من غير فقيه، أو مخالفاً لقياس، أو مخالفاً لما عليه العمل في المدينة، أو لظاهر القرآن، أو وارد فيما تعم به البلوى ولم يشتهر، أو غير ذلك من شروط كانت ولا تزال موضع جدل، ومصدر اختلاف وخصام بين المسلمين، وشغلاً شاغلاً للدارسين .

(٢) ولا بد من دراسة لغوية فقهية تدرس من خلالها أساليب التعبير لدى العرب في عصر الرسالة وملاحظة التطورات التي مرت بها هذه الأساليب، ومفاهيم المفردات اللغوية كذلك ليتمكن من فهم النصوص الفهم المطلوب .

(٣) إيلاء الأدلة أو الأصول «الاجتهادية» كالقياس والإستحسان والمصلحة وغيرها عناية خاصة ودراستها دراسة تاريخية والظروف التي أملت على المجتهدين القول بها، ومحاولة تنمية الحس الفقهي بها لدى الباحثين في مجالات الفقه والأصول .

(٤) لا بد من إدراك أن من غير الممكن أو الميسور في عصرنا هذا وجود المجتهد المطلق، وما دام الأمر كذلك فإن الجامع العلمية هي البديل للمجتهد المطلق .

ولتتمكن هذه الجامع من تلبية احتياجات الأمة في قضايا التشريع لا بد أن تتألف من خبراء تتناول اختصاصاتهم جميع مناحي الحياة ويستطيعون أن يتبينوا أي قضية تعرض من جوانبها المختلفة، ولهم مع ذلك معرفة تامة بالقواعد والأصول العامة للشريعة الإسلامية، ويكون من بينهم فقهاء على أعلى مستوى ممكن في العلوم الشرعية والأدلة التفصيلية — ولعل فقهاءنا رحمهم الله — كانوا يشيرون إلى هذا المعنى حين طلب بعضهم من الذي يريد الفطر في رمضان أن يستفتي طبيباً

مسلماً عدلاً، فإذا افتاه أن الصيام يضره جاز له الفطر.

(٥) وهذا يقتضي فيما يقتضي بتيسير العلوم الشرعية وتسهيل دراسة ما يحتاجه منها أولئك المتخصصون في العلوم الأخرى.

(٦) كما أننا في حاجة شديدة إلى معرفة فقه الصحابة والتابعين، والقواعد التي استنبطوا منها ما استنبطوه وخاصة فقه الخلفاء الراشدين ومعاصريهم من أهل الفتوى من الصحابة وكبار التابعين، لتكون هذه الدراسات بين أيدي أولئك الذين يراد منهم الاستجابة التشريعية لمتطلبات مجتمع إسلامي معاصر.

(٧) الإهتمام بمعرفة «مقاصد الشريعة»، وتنمية دراساتها والعمل على وضع قواعد أو ضوابط لها.

والله وليّ التوفيق ...

Contemporary Sociology: An Islamic Critique

Ilyas Ba-Yunus

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Contemporary sociology is one of the most recent contributions that Western civilization has made to human understanding. It is not only one of the youngest, but also perhaps the most all-encompassing of all the sciences that strive to understand human behavior in social interaction. Sociologists have concerned themselves with the processes of consensus and conflict, cooperation and conflict, organization and disorganization, conformity and deviance, order and change, and other phenomena that fall within the preview of human society. On the one hand, they have focussed on interpersonal relationships in small group situations. On the other, they have studied processes of larger magnitude generated within the larger human society. Polity, economy, education, family, war, peace, law, justice, religion, crime, birth, death, migration, recreation—whatever human beings do in relation with other human beings has been considered to be a *bonafide* area of sociological enquiry.

Lately, with the developments in industry and commerce, as human relationships have become more complex and problematical, sociologists have been increasingly called upon to serve as planners, analysts, advisors and administrators in addition to their normal careers as college teachers and professors. In short, demand for sociologists has increased with the increase in the problems of society. A quick survey of sociological offerings like criminology, military sociology, industrial sociology, sociology of education, demography, and population, shows us how sociologists have been selling their discipline in the market place of their problem-ridden societies.

On the other hand, the lay perception of sociologists has been varied. Some look at sociologists as social philosophers or armchair theorists. Others regard sociologists as sociologists and therefore radicals and rabble rousers. Many think sociologists teach one to be sociable. Those who tend to divorce social from economic and political affairs take sociologists to be experts in family affairs and child socialization or in education and other every day affairs. In fact, a sociologist may fit any of these impressions. On the other hand,

he may not possess any of these qualities and expertise. Depending upon one's specialization, one may be oriented toward grand theory or more interested in testing hypotheses by collecting and generating data. One may or may not be a socialist. In fact, some sociologists are among the most conservative persons in the world today. Likewise, some sociologists may be quite sociable while others may be most difficult to get along with. Finally, for sociologists the term social means anything pertaining to social interaction, which includes political, economic, business, industrial, and professional aspects of society, although some sociologists may not like to specialize in such themes.

I. Origins of Sociology

Although Ibn Khaldūn introduced his *Science of Society* (*ʿIlm al ʿImrān*) in and around the year 778 A.H. / 1377 A.C., it is customary to trace the origin of modern sociology back to the writings of the French philosopher, Auguste Comte (1212-1273 A.H. / 1798-1857 A.C.), who was born almost four hundred and fifty years after Ibn Khaldūn. Although there may be a few common points between the views of Ibn Khaldūn and those of Comte, the discontinuity between the Western sociological tradition and what could have become a full grown Islamic tradition of sociology has been almost complete. Even the belated discovery of Ibn Khaldūn in the West cannot be credited to the efforts of Western sociologists; in fact, of all the Western social scientists, sociologists are perhaps most ignorant of Ibn Khaldūn and his work today. This does not mean that a continuity between Ibn Khaldūn and Comte could necessarily result in the enrichment of the Islamic tradition. Most plausibly, however, it could have saved contemporary sociology from its present extreme provincialism. There is little doubt that sociology, as it is practised and taught in schools of higher learning today, is intimately related to and is an intellectual product of its native post-industrial civilization. In its search of problems, in its methodology, in its world view, and in its biases, it reflects the impact upon its practitioners of the general Western environment from which they derive their basic sustenance.

II. What Can We Learn from Sociology Today?

Whatever its other weaknesses, sociology cannot be blamed for intellectual self-praise or self-serving indulgence. Within the domain of science, there is hardly a discipline more critical of itself. As the discipline is maturing with time, sociologists are spending a great amount of energy in tearing it apart. Sztompka (1399 / 1979: 3-22) has summarized more than twenty types of

criticisms that sociologists have made against sociology. They have denounced their job as “sorcery” (Andresky, 1392 / 1972), “a doctrine of hypocrisy and irresponsibility” (Gray, 1388 / 1968), and “pseudo-science” (Kirk, 1381 / 1961), to “a bag of fads and foibles” (Sorokin, 1375 / 1956).

Sociologists not only have criticized sociology, but have been perhaps the most potent critics of Western civilization itself. Whereas Durkheim (1370 / 1951) and Merton (1357 / 1938) spoke of anomie as inherent in the industrially developed and prosperous West, and Reisman (1372 / 1953) pointed out the acute level of individuation from modern man’s unending rat-race, Mills (1375 / 1956) bemoaned the accentuation of power mongering in contemporary, complex society. Likewise, sociological researchers and theories abound on such topics as mental sickness, suicide, crime, delinquency, criminal justice, divorce, unwed mothers, and racial and ethnic prejudice in Western civilization.

The rampancy of these problems in Western civilization and their seeming incurability must be a lesson for those non-Westerners in general and Muslims in particular who, looking at the West from a distance, have been unduly impressed with its glamor. If a Muslim student in the West has learned this lesson, sociology has served him well. After all, Comte conceived of his science of society mainly in order to solve the compounding problems of his industrially developing civilization.

III. Assumptions and Strategies

In introducing his “social physics,” Comte had two important motivations. One was his perception that industrial revolution had liberated forces that were playing havoc with society. Second was his theory that a rational, rather than religious strategy, could be applied to alleviate these problems by incorporating the methodology of physical and natural science in the service of social relationships. Aron (1387 / 1968, 76-77) summarizes Comte’s position in these words: the method that has triumphed in mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology must eventually prevail in politics and culminate in the founding of a positive science of society, which is called sociology.”

In this quest for a scientific status for sociology, Comte received a great deal of support from a number of notable European social philosophers. Herbert Spencer, for instance, was of the opinion that “there can be no complete acceptance of sociology as a science as long as the belief in a social order not conforming to natural law survives.” (1311 / 1894, 394) This position was also explicitly taken up by John Stuart Mill, Emile Durkheim, Lester Ward, and Vilfredo Pareto, to name just a few. This positive strain in sociology hit a responsive chord in America where, following the lead of Lester Ward, sociology produced such “paper-and-pencil” empiricists as George Lundberg,

Samuel Stauffer, Clifford Shaw, and lately James Coleman and Ottis Dudley Duncan.

As mentioned above, however, sociologists suffer from an acute discord among themselves. There are more disagreements than agreements among them. One area of disagreement pertains to this very issue i.e., the application of scientific empiricism in sociology. Despite Comte and a number of notables who followed him on this issue, there have been equally notable challengers of this view. Not the least important of these has been none other than Max Weber. Weber conceived of sociology as a science of social action which is to be explained by way of understanding the interpretive meanings that the actor attaches to the environment.

The action is social insofar as, by virtue of the subject meanings attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course. (Weber, 1366 / 1947, 88)

Because the interpretation of the actor cannot be reached by empirical observation, experimentation or otherwise, sociology according to Weber is fundamentally distinct and different from the natural-scientific disciplines. It is a cultural science.

Later, Alfred Vierkandt, a forerunner of modern phenomenology followed almost the same approach, and toward the beginning of this century, George Herbert Mead, a contemporary of Weber, almost independently introduced his social behaviorism also known as symbolic interactionism or simply as the interactionist approach. This has posed a most persisting challenge in America to the once dominant structural functionalism. (Ba-Yunus, 1401 / 1981, 25-29)

Both phenomenology and symbolic interactionism have focused on internal processes of thought, meanings, rationalizations, and justifications, which are supposed to be building blocks in the development of the visible and "objective" entity called action or act. There is little doubt that especially during the decade of the (1390's / 1970's), empirical sociology, which followed the lead of physical and natural science, has come under severe attacks on both sides of the Atlantic. Literature in criminology and mental sickness as well as what has come to be known as ethnomethodology have been the greatest beneficiaries of this subjective emphasis in sociology.

Despite their mutual opposition in sociological methodology, these views have one thing in common, and it is here that they may be vulnerable to the Islamicist attack. The element common to these two is their perception of the relationship between man and his environment (natural as well as social). They both view these relationships in terms of mutual autonomy and maybe

even hostility. Taking off from this common assumption, however, the empiricists look at the environment as controlling individual persons and thus creating predictability in human action. Starting with the same assumption, the rationalists, on the other hand, look at man as being the master and the manipulator of the environment, thus rendering the scientific method in social enquiry untenable.

In fact, we most question the initial assumption. From the Islamic point of view, man and his environment may not be two separate entities engaged in mutual conflict. Both man and his environment are Allah's creation. As I understand the principle of *tawhīd* here, man and his environment are united in the oneness of Allah. Ismā'īl al Fārūqī puts it more succinctly:

“Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of Islamic methodology is the principle of the unity of truth. This principle holds that truth is a modality of God and is inseparable from Him, and that truth is one just as God is one. Reality does not merely derive its existence from God Who is its Creator and ultimate cause; it derives its meanings and its values from His will which is its end and its ultimate purpose.” (1401 / 1981, 13)

If we understand this, it may not be difficult to assume that man and his environment, instead of being mutually exclusive and conflicting, are in fact two interdependent aspects of the Divine will, which, far from promoting mutual conflict, is actually the only source of harmony in the whole of creation.

This model of harmony between man and his environment renders unnecessary the extreme positions taken by sociological methodologists. At times, environment may be seen as influencing man's judgement and his actions as well. The influence of parents over their children (even when they have grown up), the influence of teachers on their students, and the influence of “religious” or political leaders over their followers are all examples of man going along with (rather than being inexorably impinged upon by) environmental elements. Here application of statistical methodology may yield quite valid correlations. Likewise, there may not be anything invalid about discovering correlations, say, between family size and religion and/or income, migration, and income differentials; or between social disorganization and religious conversion.

But, then, to insist that this is the only scientifically valid mode of sociological enquiry would be too tall a claim. The human person as a thinking, rationalizing, justifying, and decision-making actor is quite capable of innovating and generating new ideas or of making a fool of himself as well.

To resolve the controversy, one might say that when the environment has a great deal of consistency in its various elements, most often people tend to adopt to it and follow its guidelines. When the environment is itself inter-

nally discordant, or is full of dilemmas, human rationality is activated and becomes available for analytical study.

IV. Centrifugal Tendency

Discussion in the above section shows that Western sociologists may have a tendency to take extreme positions. Perhaps nowhere is this tendency more visible than in the theoretical views that sociologists have presented. In fact, when we look into the history of sociological development in America, it sounds almost like the story of the survival of the fittest.

The interactionist approach or symbolic interactionism started around the turn of the century, to begin with mainly as a *coup d'état* against the then dominant behaviorism as preached by G. B. Watson in social psychology. This highly deterministic psychology was rejected by George Herbert Mead who lectured at Chicago for more than thirty years. As if reacting to Watsonian behaviorism, Mead devoted his whole academic career to preaching an extreme form of indeterminism. During his long teaching career, Mead was able to spread his views through his students and their students. Although Mead never wrote a book on the subject, his interactionist approach remained unchallenged for the first thirty-five years of this century, due mainly to default. Besides his theory, theoretical sociology was an almost empty field.

Another important reason for the general acceptance of this approach, especially among sociologists, was its comprehensiveness. Unlike other fields of social psychology, interactionism had the promise of enlarging its scope until it brought all of society as a complex interaction process within its grasp. Whatever its scope, the interactionist approach remained unequivocally tied to the idea of indeterminism and unpredictability in human action. This is so because the fundamental assumption of human psychology in Mead's view is that basically man has an impulsive character and that mainly in terms of this character he selectively experiences the environment. According to Mead, as man grows, his self-defined experience also grows and accumulates; and in order to satisfy his impulses, man has to read through this experience. This review of his experience may be called his thought process. According to Mead, this thought process helps man make decisions one way or the other, though it does not determine his decisions. According to him, the self is emergent during this very thought process—a process of self-conversation “mind” which culminates in decision making.

Seemingly so close to Weber's “cultural science”, this “radical” indeterminism has yet to present a methodology that would match Weber's technique of the “ideal type.” Although it has generated some innovative research at the small-group level, symbolic interaction has yet to put its claim into practice, i.e.,

to analyze society as a *macro* process of interaction.

Slow as it was, the growth of symbolic interactionism was almost terminated with the advent of structural functionalism in American sociology in the late 1930s. Deriving its basic inspiration from such European sociologists of repute as Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, and Marshall, structural functionalism went a long way in re-unifying sociology under its umbrella. Yet at both the academic and personal levels it distanced itself from symbolic interactionism, which it considered to be a weak adversary and a dying creed. As Harvard University students of Talcott Parsons at Harvard spread around North America during this period, they, in their enthusiasm of being the adherents of a newly emerging field, did not feel like finding any common grounds between their views and those of the few remaining symbolic interactionists. The distance between the two grew wider until symbolic interaction was reduced to the muffled protests of Herbert Blumer, the heir apparent of George Herbert Mead.

The new school of thought spread in America with a respectable aura of affiliation with Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Princeton. Applying a broad deterministic formula, structural functionalists looked at society as an organic system which grows and gradually becomes more complex in the relationship of its interdependent substructures. In the final analysis these substructures, or institutions, are maintained by individual role playing. The main job of research, then, is to discover how individual roles are related to the institutional imperative and how developments in one substructure are related to developments in other substructures.

With their system orientation, structural functionalists became the “scientific” justifiers of the Western capitalist-democratic system. The development of structural functionalism coincided with the continued political stability and economic prosperity in the West, especially in America during the 40’s, 50’s, and most of the 60’s. What was particularly intriguing for these citizen-sociologists was the fact that the social system remains intact after all—in spite of itself.

Well entrenched in their prestigious ivory towers, structural functionalists failed to notice or accommodate three developments that took place during the almost thirty-five year history of their dominance in the sociological field. First, a number of the adherents of the creed started showing signs of rupture within their ranks. For instance, while Kingsley Davis (1378 / 1959) saw nothing new and different in this mode of analysis from what had been going on in sociology all along, Merton (1376 / 1957) called for refraining from “grand theorization” and advocated his “middle-range” theories.

Second, symbolic interactionism refused to die and started moving again under the guise of “neo-Chicagoans.” Howard Becker’s much applauded research on *Becoming a Marijuana User* (1373 / 1953) was seen as a proof of the fallacy of clinical and deterministic behavioral psychology. What went

almost unnoticed was that Becker was advocating a research strategy and was redefining the very concept of motivation, both mainly in terms of the symbolic interactionist perspective. Especially in criminology, symbolic interactionists made deep inroads. While Matza (1376 / 1957, 1384 / 1964, 1388 / 1968) started his devastating attacks against structural-functional and other deterministic positions, the so-called labelling approach appeared mainly as a result of the contributions of the neo-Chicagoans (See Becker, 1384 / 1964 and Matza, 1388 / 1968).

Third, the late 1380s / 1960's and the "radical" 1390's / 1970's saw an almost uncritical import of the Marxist sociology, which had been gaining some grounds in Europe for quite some time. Although Karl Marx was basically an ideologue, his ideology was supposed to be based upon sound sociological assumptions. His historical and economic determinism notwithstanding, his views on class became a vanguard of the Marxist attack on the "conservative" positions of structural functionalism. As against the assumption of consensus in structural functionalism, the Marxists saw conflict as being rampant in society. Whereas structural functionalists saw law, along with mores and folkways, as the very defining feature of human society, Marxists saw these mainly as artifacts or tools manufactured by the more powerful in society in order to confirm their hold on the powerless. Crime was seen by the Marxists as a form of protest against the high-handedness of arbitrary legislation in society. In short, the sociological conflict between these two positions reflects a parallel with the political conflict between these two positions for the domination of the world.

It should be clear that these political battles are not conducive to a sociological synthesis. Islamic doctrines however, could be used to create such a synthesis. For instance, the Islamic view of man is that he is determined to be responsible for his own actions. The whole system of sin and punishment in Islam rests on this description of human nature. Further, the nature of human history, as described by the Qur'ān is such that it alternates dialectically between good and evil. It looks almost as if Hegel, if not Marx, stole the very notion of ideational conflict from the Qur'ān. Finally, structural-functional analysis cannot be divorced from Islamic discourse on the very fundamental institutions of human society i.e., family, economy, and polity. In fact, the whole Islamic ideological analysis that exists today is basically systematic analysis. Thus, we see that the three mutually disputing schools of thought in contemporary sociology actually constitute three logical steps in the over-all design of Islamic strategy. Those who are engaged in the promotion of Islam have to be fully aware of the nature of man, which has the potential of oscillating between good and bad, and which itself is at least partially constrained by the very forces of conflict or consensus that it helps generate on a collective basis.

V. The Bias of Nativity

Science, particularly of the physical and natural variety, pursues universal laws which are found to govern a particular phenomenon. Comte conceived of sociology as a prototype of natural science. He was wrong at least in one major respect. His vision of society remained limited to the problems that he wanted to seek solution for Western society. Although some of his successors like Durkheim and Weber have been more careful in this regard, by and large, sociology has continued to seek principles of human behavior, by whatever means, by focusing almost exclusively on Western society. Human society is different from other physical and natural objects. Whereas it does not make a difference for a chemist whether an element, say uranium, has come from Canada or China, it does make a world of difference whether a marriage takes place in Germany or in Arabia. Those scientists who ignore this principle are guilty of extreme, even if unintended, ethnocentrism. With the exception of a very few, modern sociologists are guilty of this academic nativism.

There are several examples of this defect in modern sociology. Theories of crime and delinquency abound, for example, in the Soviet Union (Connor, 1392 / 1972), in Pakistan (Ba-Yunus, 1396 / 1976), in Egypt (Hassan, 1397 / 1977) and in Indonesia (Bannister, 1393 / 1973). Modern sociology has explained religion on the basis of experiences of the organized Christian church and the sectarian dilemmas in Western Christianity. Naturally, such studies on religion are foreign to the sensibilities of people in non-Christian societies and even those of non-Western Christian societies. Major theories of social change are based on the aftermath of industrialization in Europe and America (for instance, Moore, 1393 / 1973; Inkles, 1399 / 1979; Inkles and Smith, 1394 / 1974). These and similar views on social change have come under severe attack for being ideologically biased (Hechter, 1395 / 1975; Wallerstein, 1395 / 1975; Hill, 1395 / 1975). At the same time, Portes, a major contributor to modernization research, has attacked these theories for promoting counter-productive models of economic development (1393 / 1973).

And when we shift our attention from non-Western societies to Muslim societies, the situation seems even more disappointing. There is no tradition of an Islamic sociology today. Sociologists who have spent a great deal of time and energy in analyzing and comparing socialist ideology with that of democratic capitalism, often fail to even recognize that Islam may provide an ideology that is different from the two warring ideologies as they exist in the world today and could even provide an alternative to it. Seldom, if ever did they find time to devote to an analysis of Islam, and then they were misled by their own pre-existing biases. So was the case with none other than Max Weber himself. For instance Turner writes:

. . . In his observation on Islam and Muhammad, Weber was one of the first sociologists to abandon his own philosophical guidelines . . . On the one hand, Weber provides a stimulating framework within which one can raise important theoretical issues in relation to Islamic development. On the other hand, Weber inconsistently applied principles which he declared were crucial to an adequate sociological approach. (1394 / 1974, 3)

Islam provided to mankind the civilization that immediately preceded the present Western one. Ignoring Islam or making biased judgements about it would not hurt it so much as it would the whole discipline of sociology, because sociology would benefit from a comparative analysis of the two civilizations so closely adjacent to each other in time.

VI. Sociology for What?

Science generally proceeds in two major steps. First is the “pure” science which is the study of a given phenomenon as objectively as possible in order to discover the principles and laws that govern it. On the other hand, a large number of scientists today specialize in what is called “applied” science, which involves the use of the principles discovered in pure science in the controlled manipulation of phenomena.

In most sciences, social sciences included, the controversy between “pure” and the “applied” has become more than academic today. In all the physical sciences, applied aspects are now as important as are pure aspects, and this seems to be true even in the social sciences. Economists, psychologists, geographers, and even political scientists are more interested in application than in the results of pure research. Sociology, on the other hand, is a science that has kept this debate alive until today. It seems that sociologists have a kind of identity crisis with respect to this issue. The question of the application of sociological knowledge necessarily raises the question of values. Most sociologists, however, have preferred to remain value-neutral, i.e., they see their task as a technical one and themselves as scientific investigators who need not be concerned with the values that generated their studies or with the societal implications of the results. Or, as Couldner (1382 / 1962) pointed out, “today, all powers of sociology from Parsons to Lundberg, have entered into a tacit alliance to bind us to the dogma ‘thou shalt not commit a value judgement.’”

What is interesting is that no sociologist speaks out loudly in favor of “pure” sociology. A quick glance, however, over a large number of the several respectable sociological journals in the field (*The American Sociological Review*,

The American Journal of Sociology, The Social Forces, The European Journal of Sociology, The Annals of the Academy of Social and Political Science, The Journal of Marriage and the Family, The Canadian Journal of Sociology, etc.) shows a preoccupation with pure sociology, especially in presenting new theories, criticizing existing theories, testing hypotheses and discoursing on methodological issues. It seems that what sociologists say only off the record is recorded only indirectly in their professional journals.

This sociological dualism is also manifest in the practice of many sociologists to concentrate on tasks other than teaching and research. They seek and are given employment in business, industry, and policy planning. In such capacities, they use their knowledge to solve problems of drug addiction, crime, delinquency, urban congestion, city planning, family planning, industrial labor relations, and several other areas of practical significance. Thus, sociologists have served not only as social analysts but also as planners and problem solvers. Their organizational or motivational techniques, however, are never made a part of academic sociology. Consequently, these practical strategies are never passed on to the on-coming generations of sociologists in universities.

Few societies in the world can afford to bear the cost of an academic discipline that does not prepare its students for its application. American college graduates with an undergraduate major in sociology are now beginning to feel this inadequacy in their discipline. Anthropologists were quick to grasp this problem during World War II when they developed the so-called "Survival Kit," however dubious its value, for American soldiers fighting in far off and strange lands. Sociologists were also employed by the American military during the war. "The American Soldier" series, which involved such sociologists of repute as Sam Stauffer and Robert Merton, helped us understand the reason for the superior performance of the German and the Japanese soldier relative to his American counterpart. Likewise, sociologists were given huge grants to study the problems of American soldiers in Korea and Vietnam. These sociologists, however, did not serve to boost the morale of the soldier; neither could they help develop any war strategies. What came out of these studies, however, is considered to be academically most valuable. The referenced group theory is to a very great extent an outcome of a World War II series in sociology.

Generally, it has made no difference to which school of thought in sociology one belongs. Emphasis in research has always been on enhancing theoretical knowledge and not on developing strategies in order to solve chronic problems. Indeed, there have been significant protests against this dualism in sociology (for instance, Lynd, 1384 / 1964; Mills, 1379 / 1959; Becker, 1387 / 1967; and Gouldner, 1391 / 1971). Or, as Horowitz (1385 / 1965: 8) put it, "Who pays how much for what . . . best explains the dominant motif in American sociology."

True, the emergence especially in the 1390 / 1970's, of critical and radicals

sociology (Freigberg, 1393 / 1973; Szymanski, 1391 / 1971; Strasser, 1396 / 1976) reflects almost similar concerns. Such protests however have hardly made any dent in “mainstream” sociology in the past and they do not show much promise of doing so in future. Major sociological journals which are the main barometers of change as well as respectability in the field, are still firmly under control of the establishment which continues to favor and promote “pure” sociology. From The Islamic point of view no knowledge is complete unless it serves its ultimate purpose which is to “Invite others towards good, establish good deeds and prohibit what is bad.” (Qur’ān, *Āl ‘Imrān* (3): 104)

Thus, even if contemporary sociology comes out of its Western mould, it would still not satisfy Muslim sensibilities unless it is put to use in achieving what is implied by the above verse in the Qur’ān.

Reorientation of Islamic History: Some Methodological Issues

Anis Ahmad

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I. The Meaning of History

To clarify our subject-matter, we may start by defining history as a record of human action in a given space-time. This may be too general, but it will restrict the subject to human activity and will exclude theological views such as “God’s Intervention, Incarnation and personal revelation”¹, which make history revolve around “His own acting in space-time”². The Islamic understanding of history is that it is carried out by man’s action. Freedom of human will therefore, rather than divine determinism, is at the basis of the Islamic concept of history. This means that the latter assigns no specific predicament to history such as the “realm of suffering and sin” or the “realm of death”³.

Our working definition presumes three fundamentals: first, it recognizes the natural role of *hidāyah* contained in the Qur’ān or other heavenly scriptures, yet it underscores the constructive role of human beings in a given human society. Second, it liberates history from the common understanding of it as “. . . the entire human past as it actually happened . . . man’s attempt to describe and interpret that past.”⁴, or as “the attempt to discover on the basis of fragmentary evidence the significant things about the past.”⁵ And last but not least, the insistence on the freedom of the will suggests the existence of a moral dimension which to confirm human action.

¹ Karl Loweth, *Meaning in History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), Chapter IX, pp. 160-173, 191.

² Emile L. Fackenheim presents this idea in a precise way. “Nevertheless, the Midrash insists that not messengers, not angels, not intermediaries, but God Himself acts in human history—and He was unmistakably present to a whole people at least once.” *God’s Presence in History* (New York: Harper, 1970), p. 4.

³ Karl Loweth, *op. cit.* p. 193.

⁴ Arthur Marvick, *The Nature of History* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1971), p. 15.

⁵ Geoffrey Barraclough, *History in a Changing World* (Oxford: 1955), pp. 29-30.

The image of life in this world and in the hereafter which is put so vividly in the Qur'ān and the related *aḥādīth* in this reference, provide the necessary framework of thought for a universal human history. *al 'ākhīrah*, is not a pure theological or metaphysical notion. The image of *al 'ākhīrah* in Islam is so clear and specific that it leaves no room for speculation due to ambiguity.

Mechanical systems, in general, are determined. They are closed systems in which the role occupant is not really crucial. In social systems, where social forces play a creative role, where there is a strong tendency for "potential" and "talent" to become manifest, the course of history is viewed in terms of a dynamical role and participation of human beings.

Dynamic human action in any situation takes place in response to the psychological "states" inherent in one's upbringing and environment. Dynamic action is directly related to the kind of image one has of the future. If for some reason the image is pessimistic, for example among some Christian sects, this produces a negative attitude toward progress and development. If the image of the future is optimistic, then even if it is utopian as the case is for communism and Jehovah's witnesses, it can lead to organized, positive and dynamic action.

When they were clear and confident about their image of the future, "*Ḥasanatan fī al dunyā wa Ḥasanātan fī al 'ākhīrah*," the Muslims had no problem in shifting the center of civilization from elsewhere to Makkah. Why then a reversal of the course of history? The fact that the question is even asked shows that the popular Western interpretation of Islamic history is in error. This is really a question of the philosophy of history. Our present task is to demonstrate the need to reorient Islamic history and identify the issues that need to be addressed in order to better understand Islam and its socio-cultural and dynamic role, which is independent of any specific place and time.

For two reason, a reorientation is needed to make Islamic history relevant to the modern age. The first is external to Islam and Muslims. History in the non-Islamic world has customarily been local, dynastic, and national in outlook. It is only recently that recognition, though not in its own right, has been granted to the history of Islam. In 1396 / 1976 for the first time, the American Academy of Religion, a learned society, granted an independent status to Islamic Studies, which was previously put under "History of Christianity." In the imperialistic-colonialist view, Islam and its history are merely a continuation of the achievements of the early Europeans. The implications of this view are academic and psychic, not merely political. Academically, it is neither objective nor honest to interpret the culture and history of a people in terms of one's own belief system. If the purpose is to make a comparative study of two or more existing types, the basis of comparative methodology must be spelled out clearly. At least the purpose should not be to praise the beauty and strength of colonialist history.

Moreover, methodologically, the division of history into “ancient” “medieval”, “early modern,” or “modern” periods may well make sense for European history, but is irrelevant to Islam and its history. Unfortunately not only non-Muslims but many Muslim scholars, due to the Western training in education and thought, use the same phrases for Islamic history.⁶

Peculiar to Western scholarship is the conception of history in terms of an “idea” or conceptual framework. This leads to a subjective interpretation of events such as the Marxist’s effort to fit the societies of the world and of different periods into a series of stages suggested by Marx and Engels. Similarly attempts by historians like Spengler and Arnold J. Toynbee to interpret history in terms of their preconceptions fail to acknowledge Islamic history which is often taken by them as superficial, unnecessary, or even inappropriate. For example the event of *hijrah*, the transfer of resources for strategic reasons, from Makkah to al-Madinah, is understood by Toynbee as a failure of Islam to achieve a sacred status of “crucifixion.”

Internally, the attitude of Muslim historians to treat Islam, on occasions as a sacred past, or as a belief isolated and unrelated to the contemporary scene, imposes on Islam a Christian approach of separation between the ideal and the real, which is equally incapable of presenting Islam and its true features. The best representation of this approach by Western historians is Wilfred Cantwell Smith, a Christian theologian,⁸ and among the Muslims, Syed Ameer Ali⁹. Due to these and other reasons, there is a need to explore a better methodology in understanding Islamic history.

II. Islamic Historiography: Some Major Issues

Before we talk about an appropriate methodology for the study of Islam and its history, it might be suitable to identify major issues in Islamic history.

A. Relevance of the *Sunnah*

First and perhaps most central is the issue of temporal, local, or universal

⁶ For example, Professor M. M. Shareef, *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963).

⁷ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (New York: Dell Publishing Co. Abridged edition, D.S. Somerwell, ed.), Vol. 11, p. 42.

⁸ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (New York: Mentor Books, 1965), p. 167.

⁹ Anis Ahmad, “Two Approaches to Islamic History: A Critique of Shibli’s and Ameer Ali’s Interpretation of History” (Philadelphia: Temple University), Ph.D. dissertation.

aspect of the modality known as *al Sunnah*. History deals with human action and with the image of this action. This may not be confused with the motif of “hero image” as it exists in literature of many other cultures. The issue is simply how to relate action in a specific space time with human action in contemporary age. According to the Qur’ān all earlier prophets and messengers commissioned by Allah were human beings.¹⁰ So it is with the Prophet of Islam, according to the Islamic creed.¹¹ His *Sunnah*¹² or *ḥadīth*¹³ being human, temporal and spatial, calls for the special attention of a historian. The basic issues envolved from a historical point of view are as follows: **First**, if *Sunnah* is only spatio-temporal expression of the behavior of the Prophet (ṢAAS), would it be relevant only to the age in which he lived or also to subsequent times? **Second**, does its relevance to the age in which he lived imply that its role was mainly the moral example of an inspired leader or that it also carried enforceable legal authority for the rest of Islamic history? And **lastly**, what constitutes the *Sunnah*? Is it the practice of the people of al Madīnah, or were the practices of other Islamic territories also given the name *Sunnah*? It is imperative for us to have a proper understanding of the term *Sunnah* for a clear understanding of Islamic history and the life of Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS).

Taking the last point first, we find that the word *Sunnah* or its plural *Sunan*, means habitual practice, norm, prescription, enactment, or usage sanctioned by tradition. It also refers to “continuity and extension forward.”¹⁴ Its full meaning however, cannot be comprehended by referring to its etymology alone, which would make us believe that *Sunnah* means “beaten track,” “precedent”,

¹⁰ The Qur’an, *al Mā'idah* 5:18; *al An'am* 6:91; *Ibrāhīm* 14: 19-11, *al Kahf* 18:110; *al Anbiyā* 21:3; *al Mu'minūn* 23: 24-33; *al Shu'arā'* 26:154, 186; *Yāsīn* 36:15; *Fuṣṣilat or Ḥā Mim* 41:6; *al Shūrā* 42:51; *Hūd* 11:27.

¹¹ “Say, indeed, I am a human being like you, but revelation is sent to me that your God is One and Unique,” *al Kahf* 18:11; “My Lord be glorified! Am I not but a mortal messenger?” *Banī Isrā'īl* 17:93; “Thou art but a mortal like us,” *al-Shu'arā'* 26:154; “They said: ye are but mortals like us . . .,” *Ibrāhīm* 14:10; “We gave them (apostles) not bodies that would not eat food, nor were they immortals,” *al Anbiyā'* 21:8; “And they say: What aileth this messenger (of Allah) that he eateth food and walketh in the markets? Why is not an angel sent down to him to be a warner with him,” *al Furqān* 25:7; also *al Ra'd* 13:38; *Yūnūs* 10:46; *Āli 'Imrān* 3:44.

¹² As an Islamic term *Sunnah* refers to acts, words or tacit approvals of the Prophet of Islam (ṢAAS). See Ṣubḥī Muḥammasānī, *Falsafah al Tashrī' fi al Islam*, “The philosophy of Legislation in Islam”, tr. Farḥāt S. Ziadeh (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961), p. 71.

¹³ The term *Ḥadīth* is drawn from *ḥadath* meaning event, incident, occurrence, happening. Technically, the term *Ḥadīth* refers to a conversation or report about an act, saying or endorsement of an act by the Prophet (ṢAAS). The difference between *al Sunnah* and *al Ḥadīth* is that the latter is a verbalization of the former.

¹⁴ S. M. Yousuf, *An Essay on the Sunnah* (Lahore Institute of Islamic Culture, 1966), p. 14.

“custom”, or “past practice.”¹⁵ The term has been used in the Qur’ān¹⁶ as well as in *aḥādīth* (traditions). Al Shāfi’ī (150-204 A.H. / 768-820 AC) is reported by one orientalist to have institutionalized the *Sunnah* by assigning to it a legal character, and to have given it no less authority than to the Qur’ān.¹⁷ But historically speaking, we find this authority assigned to the *sunnah* by the Qur’ān and also by the early Muslim society during and after the lifetime of Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS).

This brings us to our second point, viz. the legal status of the traditions (*aḥādīth*). It is reported that it was al Shāfi’ī who, after a systematic study of the Qur’ān, attributed the *tashrī’ī* (legalistic) character to the *Sunnah*. We know that the authority of the *Sunnah* was established due to direct injunctions in the Qur’ān. It would be too naive to think that those verses of the Qur’ān were not known to the legal thinkers and practitioners who preceded al-Shāfi’ī. Therefore when al Shāfi’ī is saying that “. . . God has given evidence to mankind that they should accept the judgement of the Apostle and obey his order . . .” he is only trying to reconstruct an Islamic methodology in law; he is not discovering for the first time the authority of the *Sunnah*. At the methodological level he assigns to the *Sunnah* a transcendent or extra-spatio-temporal applicability; some Muslim thinkers, however, interpret the

¹⁵ Ignaz Goldziher compares *Sunnah* with the *mores majorum* or *usus longaevus* of the Romans. He defines it as “ancestral use, by practice transmitted through past generations.” (*Historians’ History of the World*, ed., Henry Smith William London, 1907), Vol. 8, part 12, p. 294. This leads him to conclude that “the conception involved in the *Sunnah*, as defined at the beginning of this essay, represents the heathen Arab’s ideal of life and the primitive idea of laws and morals in tribal life.” (*op. cit.*, p. 295) At another place he tried to develop a parallel between *Sunnah* and *Ḥadīth*. He believes that the *Sunnah* is simply a practice of the early Muslim community, sometimes supported by an oral tradition, while at others without any sanction from *Ḥadīth*. Also, on occasion the *Sunnah* was contributed by an oral tradition (Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, Vol. II, ed. S.M. Stern, London: George Allen and Urwin Ltd., 1971), p. 24). D. S. Margoliouth in his *Early Development of Muhammadanism* (New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1914), p. 70) assigns a similar character to *Sunnah*. Most of the Western Orientalists and their Muslim disciples fail to see the two most important aspects of *Sunnah*, namely its role as *shāriḥah* (elaboration) of the Qur’ān and also its roles as a source of *tashrī’* (legislation). The reason apparently is their failure to comprehend the Islamic methodology of *‘uṣūl al fiqh* in law and history.

¹⁶ The term has been used in more than one sense in the Qur’ān. First it refers to the practice of the predecessors, for example, in *al Anfāl* 8:38; *al Ḥijr* 15:13; *al Kahf* 18:55; *Fāṭir* 35:43. It also refers to the practice of Allah, for example, in *al Aḥzāb* 33:38, 62; *Fāṭir* 35:43; “*al Mu’min/Ghāfir*” 40:85; *al Faṭḥ* 43:23. Alternate terms carrying a similar meaning are *Shir’ah* and *minhāj*, referring to a straight path or distinctive mode of behavior, for example in *al Shūrā* 42:13; *al Mā’idah* 3:48.

¹⁷ Muhammed Ibn Idrīs al Shāfi’ī, *al Risālah*, tr. Majid Khadduri (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), p. 122.

¹⁸ Al Shāfi’ī, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

judgements of the Apostle as transient.¹⁹

The dichotomy between the interpretation of the *Sunnah* by al Shāfi'i and by Ameer 'Ali, for example, is indicative of two major trends, viz., "traditionalism" and "modernism" in Islamic history. The *Sunnah* or ideal human action in history, by its very nature, is traditional.

Al Shāfi'i's concern in assigning the *Sunnah* a character which, in his opinion, the Qur'ān had already bestowed upon it, was obviously intended to preserve continuity in Islamic history. His main fear had been that interpretation of the relevance of the *Sunnah's* as temporary might cause a serious gap between the Islamic ideal of the Qur'ān and its subsequent translation into action, thus causing problems in Islamic legal, political, social, and economic doctrines. The *Sunnah*, or ideal tradition in Islam means "continuity"; beyond continuity, it also means "authoritative legislation."²⁰ In other words, the contents of the *Sunnah* is considered relevant not only to the age of the Prophet but for all ages to come. This brings forth an "accusation" that "the traditionalists are failing to understand what God requires under the changed circumstances of the community."²¹ The accusation from a historian's point of view would be valid and legitimate if the traditionalists maintained the "sanctity" of the *sunnah* without giving any consideration to the constant socio-cultural and evolutionary changes of humanity. Before we make any comment on the above statement it might be appropriate first to exemplify the meaning of "traditionalism."

B. Traditionalism Versus Modernism: Some Definitions

Traditionalism in Islam means adherence to the *Sunnah*. Deviation from the *Sunnah* is interpreted as *bid'ah*, meaning aberration or deviation. In a narrow sense, anything that does not draw its source from the Qur'an or the *Sunnah* is *bid'ah*. We tend to believe that much of the controversy and accusations against the traditionalists is due to a lack of accurate information about their positions.²² Shehab Eddin is correct in exposing the two extremes in the corruption of tradition, when he says that "as traditionalists, they tend to interpret tradition in terms of their fears and aspirations. Their fear of the unknown drives them to aspire to preserve the familiar in the present, and

¹⁹ Ameer 'Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1922), p. 182.

²⁰ R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, *Beyond Tradition and Modernity* (London, University of London, 1976), p. 66.

²¹ Sheela McDonough, *The Authority of the Past* (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania: American Academy of Religion, 1970), p. 52.

²² "Here by Traditionalists" we do not mean the so-called *mullas* (graduates of seminaries), but rather the *muqallidūn*.

reconstruct the familiar in the past. Hence comes their frequent preference for an accumulated corruption over a useful innovation. And as modernists, they often prefer modernism, not because it has the answers to the problems involved, but because they have been exposed and used to it. Further, one must admit that many prefer modernism because they do not really know what tradition is.”²³

“Classical modernists”,²⁴ like Ameer ‘Ali, interpret traditionalism as “anti-reason” and “backward-looking pastism.” It is a gross underestimation, however, to equate traditionalism with *taqlid*.²⁵ On the contrary, traditionalism, with reference to Islam, has been the bedrock of modernization and consequently a major source of revivalism in Islamic thought.

Historically speaking, in the recent past going back as far as Taqiyy al dīn Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (660-738 A.H. / 1263-1328 A.C.), himself a practicing traditionalist, it was the “traditionalists” who rebelled against the *salaf* (the ancestors), called for *ijtihād* (Creative self exertion to derive laws from the legitimate sources), and, in this way led to modernization and revival in Islam.²⁶ Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb (1112-1206 A.H. / 1703-1792 A.C.), like Ibn Taymiyyah, followed the school of Ibn Ḥanbal (163-240 A.H. / 780-855 A.C.), who was an extreme traditionalist. Similarly, Shah Waliyy Allah of Delhi (1112-1175 A.H. / 1703-1762 A.C.) was a *muḥaddith* (traditionalist) and at the same time founder of revivalism in the Muslim community in South Asia. Even the secular modernist, Syed Ahmad Khan (1232-1325 A.H. / 1817-1898 A.C.), associated himself with the *ahl al ḥadīth* or *Ghayr al muqqalidūn* of South Asia. Syed Abul A’la Maududi (1320-1399 A.H. / 1903-1979 A.C.), a contemporary legal thinker from Pakistan, usually called a “traditionalist,” has been a prime source for activism and revivalism in Muslim countries.

In other words, it was traditionalists (*ghayr al muqqalidūn*) who waged a *jihād* (war) against the dogmatism of *taqlid*. Then why have the traditionalists been a target of criticism by the so-called modernists? The fact of the matter

²³ Mohammad M. H. Shehab Eddin, *Pan Arabism and Islamic Tradition* (Washington, D.C.: The American University 1966) Ph.D. dissertation, p. 227.

²⁴ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 292.

²⁵ *Taqlid* is defined as “. . . the adoption of utterances or action of another as authoritative with faith in their correctness without investigating his reason.” J. Schacht, in Gibb and Kramer, *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 563.

²⁶ Contemporary sociologists define modernization in economic and political terms as “development” of underdeveloped societies. In this process “. . . major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior.” Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV (Sept. 1961), pp. 463-515; David Lerner in *The Passing of Traditional Societies* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958) deals with this problem in detail.

is that while Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn 'Abd al Wahhab, Shah Waliyy Allah, and Maududi raised the strongest voices for *ijtihād*, they did not replace *al ḥadīth* or *al Sunnah* by pure reason (*aql*). George Makdisi has correctly pointed out that the basis of conflict between the “traditionalists” and the “modernists” is theological.²⁷ The insistence of the traditionalists on the purity of *'aqīdah* (creed) leads the liberal thinkers to infer that the traditionalists were anti-rationalists. In fact, in the realm of law, which is the main vehicle for modernization in Islam, the traditionalists were perhaps further ahead in their use of rational methods than even the so-called people of *ra'y* “personal reasoning”. The Maliki *fuqahā'* (legists) use the principle of *al Iṣṭiṣlah* or *al maṣāliḥ al mursalah* (public welfare) as a source of legislation,²⁸ although it is neither commended nor prohibited in any Islamic school, as source of Islamic Law. This means that even the “literalists” among the traditionalists recognized the need for change in life, for new solutions, or in short, the use of reason. On the other hand, traditionalists are unanimous about the primacy of *'aqīdah*. They do not allow any *ifs* or *buts* about the nature of Allah, His attributes, and His uniqueness. The traditionalists, in their urge to protect the purity of basic Islamic *'aqīdah* in *tawḥīd* (Oneness of Allah), *nubuwwah* (prophethood), and *al 'ākhirah* (life after death) have sometimes gone to the extent of declaring that “we have no need to know the meaning Allah intended by His attributes”. . .²⁹

It is at the theological level and not at the plane of law or *fiqh* that the traditionalists and the modernists disagree. There is no difference between them about the necessity and importance of *ijtihād* for finding new solutions, but at a methodological level they have fundamental disagreements. For the traditionalists, *al ḥadīth al ṣaḥīḥ* is a valid category for making logical inferences, while for the modernists generally, *al ḥadīth* is no more than history.

To understand the position of *al ḥadīth* and its role in the development and progress in society, it is necessary to review the so-called “modernist” and “traditionalist” positions. In doing so, we will focus on three major issues; the logic of the relationship between religious faith and backwardness; the nature of religious doctrines in Islam; and the ideal of modernism in Islam:

1. The Logic of The Relationship Between Religious Faith and Backwardness

The point of departure for modernist writing on history is a feeling that

²⁷ George Makdisi, “Remarks on Traditionalism in Islamic Religious History”, in Carl Leiden, ed., *The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas, 1966), p. 78.

²⁸ Muhammad Taqi Amini, *Fiqh Islami Ka Tarikhi Pas Manzar* (Lahore: Twentieth Century Islamic Study Circle, n.d.), p. 268.

²⁹ Makdisi, *op. cit.*

the backwardness of the Muslim masses is due to their “misguided religious beliefs and practices.”³⁰ Indeed, the modernists have a valid point on this count. A classic example may be on Egypt. According to one estimate, at the end of the twelfth century AH / eighteenth century AC, Cairo alone had more than seventy educational institutions.³¹ Because of traditional education, at least despite it, Egypt could not overcome its backwardness. It must be said that al Azhar in Egypt or Deoband in India, for that matter, discouraged the use of rational arguments. They implanted *taqlīd* in the minds of their students and forbade the use of intellectual freedom.³² The attitude of blindly following the past, which was thus created in the ‘*ulamā*’, simply could not provide solutions for new social problems.³³ But does the “blindness” of the ‘*ulamā*’ in recognizing new problems imply partial or total rejection of the *Sunnah* and the *Hādīth*? Is it valid to infer that since the ‘*ulamā*’ adhere to their *salaf* (ancestors) in their juridical positions, responsibility for their blindness concerning new problems lies with the *Sunnah*?

We tend to believe that this kind of inference was due to more than one reason, chief among them an *evolutionary* understanding of Islam.

2. Evolutionary Nature of Religious Ideas

The modernist interpretation of Islam, to a great extent, presents Islam as a sociological phenomenon (Durkheimian type). Ameer ‘Ali, particularly, interprets not only the *Sunnah* but even the Qur’ān as carrying “temporary” legislation appropriate for an elementary type of culture. But with the disappearance of those circumstances, the need for such legislation disappears.³⁴ Some modernists, also hold that the “religious consciousness” of the Prophet of Islam (ṢAAS) and the religious ideas he presented were also passing through an evolution.³⁵ It is only natural that if an evolution in the “religious consciousness” of the Prophet (ṢAAS) was going on, the process should not stop with his death. Therefore to make Islam relevant to modern life, it needs to be interpreted in terms of universal moral teachings, and not as transient legal sanctions.³⁶ Traditionalists fully recognize the need for new legislation, but they do not disregard the word and form of *sunnah* and *Hādīth*. They want

³⁰ Sheela McDonough, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³¹ Bayard Dodge, *Al-Azhar: A Millennium of Muslim Learning* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 91.

³² Desmond Steward, *Young Egypt* (London: Allan Wingate Publishers, 1958), p. 43.

³³ Robert Bellah, *Beyond Belief* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 165.

³⁴ Ameer ‘Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

to reactivate *ijtihād* but not at the cost of abrogating or contradicting the legislation (*tashrī'*) of the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*.

3. *The Ideal for Modernism in Islam*

The modernists, do not differentiate much between modernization and Westernization. Modernization for them means “a process of change toward those types of social, economic, and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries AC.”³⁷ Modernists face a dilemma because the practice of the *'ulamā'*, due to its monotonous ritualistic form, is inadequate to modernize Muslim society. The modernist mind wants to modernize Muslim societies by confining “religion” to certain rituals and providing freedom for human reason in other realms. In the final analysis, neither the *'ulamā'*, graduates of religious *madrasas*, nor the modernists appear to extend religion to the realm of political, social, legal, and economic activities.

The ideal of modernity perhaps, in the modernists' vision, is the contemporary materialistic Western society. They want to see Islam and the Muslims uplifted to at least that level, but they are skeptical about Islam's ability to achieve this objective single-handedly. They see the role of Western ideology in the Muslim world as an assimilated modernizing factor in the overall moral and ethical teachings of Islam. Perhaps the urge to modernize Islam by sifting what was historic in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* can be interpreted as an attempt to secularize Islam. When developing an analogy between the Western Christian religious tradition and Islam some of them even state that “excepting for the conception of Jesus, there is no fundamental difference between Christianity and Islam.”³⁸ It is very natural to conclude that progress, modernization, and development could not go hand in hand with “religion.” Hamilton Gibb very correctly points out that “. . . the dangers to which Islam, as a religion, is exposed today are perhaps greater than any that it has faced in the past . . . The most patent come from those forces which have undermined or threatened to undermine all theistic religion. The external pressure of secularism, whether in the seductive form of nationalism, or in the doctrines of scientific materialism and the economic interpretation of history, has already left its mark on several sections of Muslim societies. But even this, however insidious its influence, is probably less dangerous in the long run than the realization of the religious conscience and the weakening of the catholic tradition of Islam.”³⁹

³⁷ S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 1.

³⁸ Ameer 'Ali, op. cit., p. 179.

³⁹ H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 128-129.

Neither the pastism of the *'ulamā'* nor the liberalism (secular tendency) of the modernists is capable of protecting the purity of the Islamic faith and at the same time meeting the modern challenge Islam is facing. An independent approach in interpreting Islamic history is being developed by religious thinkers who are aware of the dilemma the modernist mind is facing.

C. Reformism Versus Revivalism

1. Traditional Reformists

Without breaking away from the tradition (*Sunnah* of the Prophet of Islam), the "reformists," oppose *taqlīd maḥḍ* (blind imitation of the *'ulamā'*). Following in the footsteps of Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 H/1328 AC), the reformists uphold the sanctity of the Qur'an and the *sunnah* and condemn the dogmatism of the *'ulamā'* of the mosque. Rashīd Riḍā (1281-1353 AH / 1865-1935 AC) and Shibli Nu'mānī (1274-1333 AH / 1857-1914 AC) may be regarded as the best representatives of this approach⁴⁰ The *Salafism* of Riḍā should not be confused with the *taqlī* of the *'ulamā'* of the mosque, because the *salafism* of Riḍā simply meant recognition of the example of the companions of the Prophet (ṢAAS) as a force for legal deductions.⁴¹ Shibli plainly rejected the secularism of Aligarh as well as the dogmatism of the Deoband⁴² because of his middle of the road approach.

A major criticism, however, against the middle of the road approach is its failure to provide an alternate course of action. Its main objective was to defend the Muslims from alien influences by offering an apologetic interpretation of Islamic history. But how to relate the past with the future? The reformism of Riḍā and Shibli does not provide us with any clear answer to this problem. It does, nonetheless, trace the roots of the subcontinent's Muslims and their culture back into early Islamic history. The self-image thus created does infuse a certain degree of self-reliance and pride in the Muslims, but still it offers no solution to their socio-political decline.

The modernist-secularist, as well as the reformist-traditionalist approach to history, to a great extent fail to take into account the challenges Muslims are facing from within as well as from without.

In a limited sense, knowledge of past Islamic cultural achievements provides Muslims with a link through which they could relate themselves to the

⁴⁰ Shehab Eddin, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ Albert Howrani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), p. 230 ff.

⁴² Shibli, *Khutbat-i-Shibli* (A'zamgarh: Maṭba' Ma'arif, 1941), pp. 100, 140-141.

past. But it was not sufficient to meet challenges such as the decolonization of the colonized. The colonizer had impressed on the minds of the colonized, not only his military, economic, and political supremacy but also the superiority of his values. With this pessimistic (rather defeatist) attitude, a historian could not provide his readers with a vision of past glories. This could not initiate a movement for regaining liberty, freedom, self-determination, and socio-political and economic independence for the Muslims from the West. At a conceptual level, the Muslims of this era did not recognize much difference between the Western ideals of freedom, equality, and justice and the Islamic doctrines of *hurriyyah* and *adl*.

A history deprived of its dynamic and activist role may provide an individual or a people with some self-respect and satisfaction, but it cannot play a positive role in their national life and in nation-building. Perhaps it was in this context that the well-known Christian theologian, Bishop Kenneth Cragg, remarked, "the negative task of Islamic history in this century has been more fully achieved than the positive."⁴³

2. Traditional Revivalists: Focus on *al Dīn*

Another obvious shortcoming in contemporary understanding of Islamic history lies in the understanding of Islam as a religion in the Western sense of the term. In the West, religion is generally interpreted as faith. "Faith is a personal quality of which we see many sorts of expression."⁴⁴ Acceptance of Islam as a personal faith implies limiting its area of influence and activity to worship, rituals, ceremonies, and statements of belief. The fact of the matter is, Islam arose as a movement for social change, the establishment of justice, equity, and equality among human beings irrespective of their color, creed, ethnicity, language, or national and geographic origins. The term "religions" in its common Western connotation fails to cover the scope and area of the influence of Islam. This is why Islam is defined as *al dīn* (the way of life).

Etymologically, the term *al dīn* is used, in the Qur'ān, to convey four meanings.⁴⁵ First, it refers to the right to rule, dominate, command, subjugate, or

⁴³ Kenneth Cragg, "Islam and the Challenge of the Modern World", in Guy S. Metraux and Francois Grouzet, *Religions and the Promise of the Twentieth century* (New York, The New American Library, 1965), p. 226.

⁴⁴ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, (New York: The New American Library, Mentor Books, 1964), pp. 167; 176.

⁴⁵ In this systematic treatment of the term *al Dīn* we have relied heavily on Ibn Taymiyyah's *Al 'Ubūdiyyah*, tr. Sadruddin Işlahi, (Lahore, Islamic Publications Ltd., 1972); and Syed Abul A'la Maududi, *Four Basic Terms of al Qur'an* (in Urdu) (Lahore, Islamic Publications Ltd. 1970).

supersede.⁴⁶ The second meaning is similar, but differs in emphasis. It means obedience—to serve, to submit or to be humble.⁴⁷ Third, it refers to *Sharī'ah*, law, custom, and manner of habit.⁴⁸ And lastly, it means the reward of an act, judgment, or reckoning.⁴⁹

But going beyond this lexicographic and philological analysis, conceptually *al dīn*, the way of life, the code or prescribed path, is an all inclusive term. It includes all the above four aspects, thus standing for the sovereignty of Allah, acceptance of His authority, law or *Sharī'ah*, and ultimately accepting Him alone as the custodian of the Day of Judgement. When we look from a convergent point of view, we realize why “traditionalist revivalist” Muslim thinkers, such as Syed Abul A'la Maududi, have not used the term faith and have preferred to use *al Islam* or *al dīn*.⁵⁰ The Qur'an uses the term *al dīn* in its comprehensive meaning referring to a total way of life and to the system best suited for mankind at all times and places. It might be sufficient to mention only a few references from the Qur'an: (*'Al 'Imrān*) 3 : 19, 85; (*al Anfāl*) 8 : 39; (*al Tawbah*) 9 : 33, 29; and (*al Nūr*) 24 : 2 and 55. Here *a dīn* signifies the establishment of an Islamic economic, political, social, and moral system, thus transforming every aspect of life.

It must be said at once that *al dīn* cannot be equated with *dīn*. Nasr is probably confused when he fails to draw a line between *dīn* and *al dīn*.⁵¹ *Al dīn* refers specifically to Islam while *dīn* may refer to any system of a religious or political nature.⁵² The Qur'an uses *al dīn* and *al Islam* interchangeably, denoting the eternal religion. It traces the origin of *al dīn* or *al Islam* to the beginning of life on earth.

On a cosmological level, the Qur'an claims that *al Islam*, the acceptance of obedience to Allah and the code given by Him, is the religion of the cosmos.⁵³ “Do they seek for other than the religion of Allah? While all creatures

⁴⁶ Maududi, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 142. These are only a few of the sixty-three places where this term has been used in the Qur'an. We find the above four meanings emphasized at one or another place in the Qur'anic verses. For example, *Sūrah al Mu'min/Ghāfir* 40:64-65; *al Zumar* 39:2-3, 11-17; *'Al 'Imrān* 3:83; and *al-Bayyinah* 98:5 refer to the first two meanings in the Qur'an. Similarly, *Yūnus* 10:104-105; *Yūsuf* 12:40, 76; *al Rūm* 30:26-30; *al Nūr* 24:2; *al Tawbah* 9:36; *al An'am* 6:138 and *al Shūrā* 42:21; refer to the third sense. Finally, *al Dhāriyyāt* 51:6; *al Mā'un* 107:1-3; and *al Infitār* 82:17-19 use the term in its fourth connotation.

⁵⁰ Three of the recent titles are *Hādihā al Dīn*, *al Mustaqbal li Hādihā al Dīn*, both by Syed Quṭb, and *Dīn al Haqq*, by Syed Abul A'la Maududi.

⁵¹ Seyed Hossein Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam*, Boston, Beacon, 1972, p. 15.

⁵² For instance the Qur'an uses the term *Dīn* for referring to the political and religious system followed by the Pharaoh in Egypt as *Dīn al Malik*, *Yūsuf* 12:86.

⁵³ Ibn Taymiyyah, *Al 'Ubūdiyyah*, tr. S. Islahi (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1972), pp. 111-112.

in the heaven and on earth have willingly or unwillingly bowed to His will (in the text the word used is *aslama*, i.e. adherence to Islam) and to Him shall they all be brought.”⁵⁴

At a human level, the Qur’ān, dealing with the history of mankind, shows that Prophet Adams and all notable prophets including *Sayyidna* Ibrāhīm (Abraham), *Sayyidna* Ismā’īl (Ishmael), *Sayyidna* Mūsā (Moses), *Sayyidna* Yūsuf (Joseph) and *Sayyidna* ‘Īsa (Jesus), may Allah bless them, were all followers of *al dīn* or *Islam*. None of them invited their followers to worship any other than Allah.⁵⁵ Without exception they called themselves Muslims.

In brief, the Qur’ān claims not only that acceptance of *al Islam* as *al dīn*, the way of life, is a cosmological fact, but that throughout the past history of mankind the prophets of Allah practiced and preached it. From an economic point of view, acceptance of Allah, the Creator and the Nourisher of all that is in heaven and earth, provides a solid base for interfaith understanding and communication. Particularly with reference to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, this understanding of *al dīn* provides a new approach to the transcendent reality in religion by declaring that “Ibrahim was not a Jew, nor yet a Christian; but he was an upright man who had surrendered (to Allah as a Muslim) and he was not of the idolators.”⁵⁶ The Qur’ān suggests a reorientation in our understanding of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. If *Sayyidna* Ibrāhīm was a Muslim (one accepting and submitting to Allah’s transcendence and uniqueness) it creates an ideological relationship between the Judaeo-Islamic and Christian tradition besides the already existing genealogical relationship.⁵⁷

In view of the above, it is inappropriate to define Islam as consisting of just three things: creed, worship and moral code.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Qur’an, ‘*Āli ‘Imrān* 3:83.

⁵⁵ The Qur’an says:

1. “Nūḥ said I have been commanded to be of those who submit to Allah’s will” (*min al Muslimīn*). *Yūnus* 10:72.
2. “Ibrāhīm and Ismā’īl said our Lord make of us Muslims, bowing to Thy (will) and of our progeny a people Muslim,” *al Baqarah* 2:128.
3. “Ibrāhīm said to his children O my sons, Allah hath chosen *al Dīn* for you; then die not except in the faith of the Islam,” *al Baqarah* 2:132.
4. “Mūsā said “O my people, if ye do really believe in Allah then in Him put your trust if ye are Muslims,” *Yūnus* 10:84.
5. Yūsuf prayed: “. . . take Thou my soul (at death) as one submitting to Thy will (as a Muslim) and unite me with the righteous.” *Yūsuf* 12:101.
6. “. . . And behold: I inspired the disciples (of ‘Īsa, saying) have faith in Me and My apostle; they said, ‘we have faith and do Thou bear witness that we bow to Allah as Muslims,” *al Mā’idah* 5:111.

⁵⁶ Qur’an, ‘*Āli ‘Imrān* 3:67.

⁵⁷ *Sayyidna* Ibrāhīm is recognized as the common father of the children of *Ismā’īl* (Ishmael) as well as the children of *Ishāq* (Isaac).

History plays an important role in social change. All theories of social change presume an interpretation of the past and an image of the future. An individualistic interpretation of Islam as a “creed,” “worship,” and “morality” may only propose some modifications in the existing personal conduct of Muslims in a given society. Islamic social change involves a reorientation in the realm of politics, economics, law, and society. It cannot be implemented by subscribing to Islam in the realm of personal ethics while participating in the socio-economic and political system imposed by colonialism.

The misconception of Islam as a “religion” in the Western sense of the term necessarily reduced Islam to a personal dimension, to a “faith,” as Cantwell Smith understood this term.⁵⁹ Understanding of Islam as simply a faith implies that a working relationship (passivity and cooperation) may be developed between Islamic personal piety and any secular socio-economic and political structure. But it does not and cannot demand from the faith that it engineers social change. Islam, on the contrary, as contained in the Qur’ān and the *Sunnah*, presumes no compromise between Islam and un-Islamic systems, i.e. *Jāhiliyyah* and *Ṭaghūt*.

The particularistic interpretation of Islamic history as a faith and creed fails to explain the *raison d’être* of the conflict between the Makkans and the Prophet (ṢAAS). If Islam was merely another religion, then the polytheistic society of Makkah could easily have accommodated it. But Islamic monotheism (*Tawḥīd*) is not confined to a creed or to a personal faith. It implies an ethical revolution in every aspect of life. The Qur’ān rejects all kinds of exploitation as unethical (*fitnah*, *fasād*, *ṭughyān*) and therefore as totally unjust (*zulm*). Such exploitation, according to Islam, is directly related to a wrong perception of man-God and man-man relationships. Islam rejects the idea of dichotomizing life into the realm of the religious and the secular. It calls for total acceptance of Islam,⁶⁰ so that all activities, personal, social, and international might be organized in accordance with the guidance given in the Qur’ān and the *Sunnah*. In this way, Islam tries to eliminate all possible contradictions and polarities in life through the doctrine of *tawḥīd* or Oneness of Allah.

Islam integrates in itself the so-called spiritual and worldly aspects of life. It makes it imperative for all Muslims to struggle for societal change. This is why *jihād* (struggle) is obligatory on every Muslim. Many of the Muslim historians in their interpretation of Islamic history, fail to appreciate this dynamic, constructive and revolutionary aspect of Islam. They try to explain *jihād* in a rather distorted manner as a “defensive mechanism,” while it is

⁵⁸ Shibli, *al Kalām*, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

⁵⁹ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49, 176.

⁶⁰ The Qur’ān, *al Baqarah*, 2:208.

through *jihād* at different levels and not simply by sophisticated intellectual discourse that Islam tries to establish a new moral system. At this point, it is important to note that the Islamic moral system in its active, conscious, and creative role of transforming individuals and societies, cannot be conceived of without *jihād*. Islam provides us with a comprehensive understanding of *jihād*. The intent of the *sharīah* is to inspire and activate the Muslims for *al amr bi al ma'rūf* (enjoining the institution of virtue and good). This institutional realization, or actualization of virtue according to the Qur'ān can be done only with extreme diligence and persistence (*ṣabr* and *istiqāmah*). Those who take a passive view of *ṣabr* (persistent effort) do educate us about the transforming role of Islam in early history, but they fail to show the future role of Islam as a driving force in history. They succeeded in furnishing the Muslims with an image of self-respect, but this image would have led Muslims to an introverted and deceptive attitude had not Iqbal and Maududi come up with positive, dynamic, and activist solutions for the revival of the Muslim *Ummah*.

III. The Historical Vision of *Tawhīd*

An important issue in contemporary Islamic history is the absence of a clear vision of the future of the Muslims. History, as a socially dynamic force, presupposes the existence of a vivid image of the future. For any meaningful social change, the presence of an “image directed”⁶¹ system is necessary. At a theological level, in early Islamic history, the extremely vivid image of *al 'āakhirah* (life hereafter) as an achievable ideal was the main motivational force behind the appreciation and actualization of the Islamic way of life. It was not a passive image. The achievement of *al hasanāt* (bounties) in *al 'āakhirah* was not possible without conscious and creative moral activity in this world. In other words, *al 'āakhirah* was not a promise for the “oppressed,” but rather provided a vivid image of an achievable future through an active and responsible role in this world. An image is not merely a projection of aspirations and conviction, but aggregates all the necessary information needed for a social structure. Only when all necessary information about a social system is collected and disseminated in its constituents is a potential system translated into an actual system.

Reconstruction and writing history are complementary activities. No reconstruction or purposeful change is possible without defining what in the past may be relevant to the present and the future of a people. No strategies for improving the existing state of people can be successful without a clear perception of the future—both the real and the potential.

If history is to play its educative role and not be simply a narrative, it should

provide us with a clear analysis of social change, the driving forces in history, and an image of the future that the people under study wanted to achieve. Since Islam is a system and a way of life, the history of Islam written from an apologetic point of view would only be a distortion of Islam. It is our sincere belief that with these considerations in mind a new interpretation of Islamic history is needed.

The Islamic intellectual and cultural heritage, as well as the life and times of the Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS) and his successors (*Khulafā'*), and the resulting Muslim contributions to history can be understood properly only in the light of a *Tawḥīdi* vision of history. The one single factor responsible for the transformation of the otherwise backward, underdeveloped, and highly divided house of the Arabs into a people in whom humanity discovered its lost dignity was simply a statement of the fact that Allah alone is to be worshipped and obeyed.

“O men! Call to mind the grace of Allah unto you: Is there a Creator other than Allah to give you sustenance from heaven or earth? There is no god but He: how then are you deluded away from the Truth.”
(Qur'an 35:3)

Tawḥīd, or the oneness and uniqueness of Allah, is a revolutionary principle. Its application in the personal, social, political, and religious realms caused a total transformation in the vision and personality of the early Muslim *Ummah* (global community). Therefore no account of the dynamics of Islamic history can be complete without an appropriate treatment and understanding of this principle.

Tawḥīd is not simply a statement of belief. It is an assertion of the ultimate universal truth and reality about the Creator and Sustainer of the universe. It furnishes man with a new vision of the cosmos, humanity, knowledge, morality, and eschatology. It infuses a new meaning and dimension in human life, its purpose objective, and the specific role man has to play in achieving global peace, justice, equality, and freedom. *Tawḥīd*, in fact, was the secret of the rise and expansion of Islam as a world civilization in seventh century A.C. The historian of religion knows, more than anyone else, that if Muslims have a future role in the history of mankind, it should emanate from *Tawḥīd* alone. Is *Tawḥīd* a theology or a methodology for social change? The answer calls for more elaboration of the meaning of *Tawḥīd*.

Tawḥīd simply means cognizance of the fact that man and the universe are creations of the One and only Allah. He, alone, is eternal, transcendent, and totally independent. No one can share with Him in His attributes or person. This discovery is made, not by an act of faith, but by a rational process, though the direct knowledge of *tawḥīd* can come to a person through inspiration (*Ilhām*). Use of reason and empirical evidence in discovering truth is an obligation on every Muslim and by implication on every seeker of knowledge. It

is through the use of reason that a conscientious Muslim discovers the limitations of reason and the need for *wahy* or direct guidance to all of mankind from Allah, *subḥānahu wa ta'ālā*.

Interpretation of *wahy* as a rational necessity for man brings in a new and more universal common ground for human interaction and a universalistic vision of history. It reduces tremendously religious prejudice and the particularism reflected in the assertion that "God is only on my side." Once there is an interfaith understanding that different religions and their scriptures emanate from one single source and that their prescriptions and proscriptions in pristine form were made by Allah the Creator, then *Tawḥīd* provides a natural ground for developing a global brotherhood of humanity.

With this general re-orientation of one's vision, mission, and purpose of life, *Tawḥīd* produces a qualitative change in the behavior and outlook of man in the realm of society, economy, religion, law, and political life.

A. *Tawḥīd's* Role in the Realm of Worship

In the realm of personal worship or "religion," the Qur'an asserts that reason forbids one to confuse the Creator with His creation and therefore demands that one submit to the Creator alone.

"O my two fellow prisoners, are diverse lords better or Allah the One, the Almighty? Those whom you worship beside Him are but names that you have named, you and your forefathers. Allah has revealed no sanction for them. The decision rests with Allah alone, Who has commanded you to worship none save Him. This is the right religion, but most men know it not." (Qur'an: 12:39-40)

Rejection of any ultimate premises and goals other than Allah and any other claimants to divinity, as well as the call to purify religious obligations and direct them exclusively to Allah, are recurring themes in the Qur'an.

"And they are ordained naught else than to serve Allah. Keeping religion pure for Him, as men by nature upright, and to establish *al-Dīn* (the religion) and to pay the due, that is true religion." (Qur'an: 98:5)

Ikhlas (literally, purity, sincerity) is an all inclusive process. It means that devotion, prayer, hope, love, obedience, reliance, assistance, refuge, sacrifice, in brief, all forms of worship and submission are for Allah alone, the Creator of man and universe. He not only is Sovereign in this world, the realm of

history, but is the Lord of the Day of Judgment. This immediate and direct relationship between the Creator and His creation eliminates all possibilities of intercession or mediation in the Islamic view of history and eschatology. The iconoclasm of *Tawhīd* also manifests itself in the Islamic approach toward the messengers of Allah, including Prophet Muḥammad (ṢAAS). It assigns no divine character to the messengers. They are treated like any other human beings. The difference, however, is great. Only the messengers received public revelation of Allah's Will, and only Prophets Mūsā and Muḥammad (ṢAAS) received it in verbal form. The Qur'an tells us:

“Say: I am only a mortal like you. My Lord sends revelation (*wahy*) to me that your God is One God. And whoever hopes for the meeting with his Lord let him do righteous work and not create a rival for the worship due unto his Lord”

(Qur'an: 18:110)

Tawhīd, thus, puts to an end any hero worship or ascription of super-human characteristics to human beings.

B. *Tawhīd* and Social Transformation

Tawhīd transforms the value system of the individual as well as of society. One's vision of reality and one's perspective on virtue and vice, justice, benevolence, honesty, brotherhood, family, sex ethics, equality, and rights and obligations of individuals in a society—in brief, on every single aspect of life—undergoes a transformation. In Makkah (in the first century AH / seventh century A.C.) when the Islamic movement began, its objective was not to make specific reforms in the religious life of the Arabs. Its emphasis on modernity and social change was manifest. It rebelled against the traditionalism of the Arabs. In many world religions, the traditions of the elders are taken as sacred. Animism, totemism, ancestor worship, etc., have survived in even some of the so-called modern religions of man. *Tawhīd* emancipates man from the worship of tradition and introduces the element of forward-looking purpose and planning in one's attitude and in society. The Qur'an says:

“They say: We follow that wherein we found our forefathers. What, even though their forefathers were wholly unintelligent and had no guidance.” (Qur'an: 2:170; 7:28-29); and 43:22-24)

This emphasis on the use of reason liberates one from dogmatism and backward-looking traditionalism.

The realization and implementation of *Tawhīd* in the life of the individual leads one to liberate oneself from the particularisms of blood, color, race, soil, language, tribe, or nation. Obedience to Allah, the Creator of the Universe, and not to one's economic, political, or social interests and benefits, becomes one's sole objective in life. A process of maturation in one's outlook takes place and one is liberated from a self-centered idiom (*my* personal comfort and the good of *my* children or family) to a universalistic, humanistic vision of life. This calls for new social relationships. Serving Allah, and not the idol of utilitarianism, becomes one's ultimate objective and ultimate good. This transformation of individual and social outlook is reflected in a new social order. A brotherhood on the basis of *'Imān* and *Taqwā* (two forms of the Consciousness of Allah) and *'ukhuwwah* (brotherhood) is realized.

Consequently, exploitive practices, whether by the entrepreneur or the laborer, all kinds of religious, cultural, political, economic, and social imperialism are challenged, so that a new social order based on religious respect and cooperation, a universal love of humanity, the brotherhood of mankind, equality, justice, and freedom can be established. This process of social change is comprehensive.

C. Effects of *Tawhīd* on Epistemology

In the realm of epistemology, *Tawhīd* provides a new understanding of knowledge. Since public revelation (*wahy*) is the only reliable source of ultimate knowledge and truth, reason is brought into harmony with revelation. Revelation in Islam should not be confused with the mystical experience. Though there exist many apparent similarities between them, these are two different kinds of experience. Both experimental/empirical and intuitive knowledge shows the relevance of Revelation to life. This eliminates the possibility of skeptic and agnostic systems of thought.

D. Effects of *Tawhīd* on Economic Activity

Recognition of Allah's sovereignty in personal and social life is followed by its introduction and application in the market place. One of the fundamental teachings of Islam is that seeking *ḥasanāt* (goods) in this world is no less moral and virtuous than seeking Allah's favor in the life hereafter. *Tawhīd* persuades a believer to indulge more and more in economic activity, though indeed with a full awareness of one's accountability to Allah in the day of judgement. The significance of economic participation, production, and distribution is impressed on the Muslim's mind by placing it in the context

of an important ritual, the *Jumu'ah* (Friday) congregation.

“O you who believe when the call is heard for the prayer of the day of *Jumu'ah* (congregation), hasten unto the remembrance of Allah and leave your trading. That is better for you if you did but know. And when the prayer is over then disperse in the land and seek of Allah's bounty and remember Allah much so that you may be successful.” (Qur'an: 62:9-10)

Here the Qur'an develops a harmony and balance between the spiritual and economic needs of man. Friday is not a day for rest nor is it a holy day. Therefore as soon as the prayer is over, the believer is asked to resume his economic obligations. Seeking economic prosperity, in this context, is a continuation of prayer and worship. Balance, however, is to be maintained. Economic activity, even large scale production, should not lead him to wantonness.

“They who hoard up gold and silver and spend not in the way of Allah, unto them give tidings (O Muhammad) of a painful doom.” (Qur'an: 9-34)

This harmonious balance leads to at least three responses: first, it helps one overcome the tendency to amass wealth out of selfish motives, though one may find at the end of a fiscal year a reasonable saving in one's purse; second, it encourages one to spend in the way of Allah and help the needy in society; third, it also persuades the person to engage in lawful economic competition for spiritual and material purification (*tazkiyah*). This purification is reinforced in Islam by the third pillar of the faith, *al Zakah*.

“Take dues from their wealth, wherewith you may purify them and make them grow, and pray for them.” (Qur'an: 9:103)

The word *al Zakāh* in the Qur'anic language means both to purify and to grow. *Al Zakāh* in Islam causes wealth to grow and also purifies earnings. It is important to note that *al Zakāh* is not defined in the Qur'an as charity or alms. It is an obligation. It is paid not to show favor or sympathy but for two major objectives: to purify one's savings and to cause material growth. Let us take second point first.

Al Zakāh is applicable only to wealth in excess of one's needs. To fulfill his obligations a Muslim is asked to produce more than he needs so whatever is over and above his needs may bring economic prosperity to society.

This function of saving is part of his obligation to fulfill the covenant he

makes with Allah, when he declares His supremacy.

“Lo Allah has bought from the believers their lives and their wealth because the heaven will be theirs . . .” (Qur’an: 9:111).

Establishment of *al Zakāh* is possible only when a just and equitable economic system exists. *al Zakāh* cannot purify or multiply wealth accumulated through injustice, exploitation, corruption, and immoral economic activities. *Tawhīd* stands for the absolute justice of Allah to men and women and at the same time for the implementation of justice among them in human societies.

“Lo Allah enjoins justice and kindness, and giving to kinfolds . . .” (Qur’an: 16:90)

Justice demands elimination of all kinds of exploitation and oppression. In a capitalist economic system the entire institutional infrastructure tends to penalize the debtor and unjustly reward the lender. In an Islamic economic order, where *Tawhīd* is fully implemented, the financial and other institutions facilitate a very different behavior and result.

“And if the debtor is in straitened circumstances, then (let there be) postponement to (the time of) ease, and if you write off the debt as alms giving it would be better for you, if you did but know.” (Qur’an: 2:280).

This humanistic approach is a consequence of actualizing *Tawhīd* in economic life.

Concern for the needs of other human beings is further reinforced by the Qur’anic endorsement of only healthy and morally acceptable economic activities. Non-Islamic societies are often loaded with products which may be harmful but bring profit to the investor. Western news media freely publicize alcohol and cigarettes, though they are aware of the harmfulness of both. Through advertising and other techniques the media create an artificial demand for these harmful products and thus keep the cycle of economy going. Acceptance of Allah’s authority in the economy requires reorientation of economic objectives and of the means to achieve them. Islam prohibits the production of all harmful commodities and tries to create a healthy society.

Recognition of Allah’s authority in the production and consumption of wealth also leads to an interest-free economic system. Islam encourages economic development and growth on the basis of profit sharing (*muḍārabah*) and prohibits any charging of interest or fixed profits whether usurious or not, on any investment or other intermediation of wealth.

“O you who believe, devour not usury, doubling and quadrupling, observe your duty to Allah that you may be successful.”
(Qur’an: 3:130).

It further asserts:

“ . . . Allah permits trade and forbids usury . . . ”
(Qur’an: 2:275)

On a more positive and constructive level, both the *zakah* system and the system of sharing profits and risks provide incentives for investment and deter hoarding or any other artificial means for price manipulation. It represents the social justice that Islam wants to implement. The social good of all the members of a society is central to the new socio-economic order created under the doctrine of *Tawhīd*.

E. The Impact of *Tawhīd* on Political Life

The application of *Tawhīd* in the realm of politics brings far reaching results. First, it introduces the idea that all men are equal in dignity and as such are equally entitled to participate in political processes and responsibilities. There should be no privileged class with political ascendancy over others. Second, it calls for a rejection of all kinds of exploitation and condemns exploiters such as unjust kings, dictators, and so on. Third, and at a more positive level, it established a political system based on the sovereignty of Allah and the supremacy of the *Shari’ah* in political life. This should not be confused with a theocratic rule because there is no authority of a religious hierarchy in Islam.⁶² It is the *jamhūr* (the people) who, with the help of the Qur’an and the *Sunnah*, decide community affairs.

It appears that most of our contemporary historians, though concerned about the modernization of Muslim society in the subcontinent, somehow overlook this extremely important dimension of *Tawhīd* and its application in society. The lack of proper understanding of *Tawhīd* and commitment to it has been the major cause, in our opinion, of decline and of both economic and political stagnation in any Muslim society throughout history. This is why all revivalist movements in Islamic history take *Tawhīd* as their point of departure. The

⁶¹ Kenneth E. Boulding, “The Place of the Image in the Dynamics of Society,” in George K. Zollschau and Walter Hirsch, *Social Change: Explorations, Diagnosis, and Conjectures* (New York: John Wiley and sons, 1976), p. 9.

⁶² The doctrine of the *Ithna Ashariyyah* “*Imamiyah*” bestows authority on the *Imām* or his representative, but this is an exception to Islamic thought.

thirteenth century A.H. / nineteenth century A.C. *Wahhābī* movement in Arabia and the *Mujāhidūn* movement in the subcontinent founded their political activism on *Tawhīd* alone. The truth of the matter is as Ismā'ī al Fārūqī has written that “. . . uncompromising *Tawhīd* was the breakthrough which released their energies for the fastest and greatest civilization-building movement in history.”⁶³

Establishment of a Muslim society, an Islamic polity and an Islamic social order is a natural consequence of true and proper understanding of *Tawhīd*. But if *Tawhīd* is understood merely as an issue in *kalām* (theology) or only as an article of faith, then a narrow, pessimistic, non-dynamic, and passive interpretation of Islamic history emerges. This in turn would promote compromise between Islam and every kind of oppression (*zulm* and *tāghūt*), whether it be colonialism, imperialism, fascism, totalitarianism or any other form of depression.

IV. Summary

- 1) *Tawhīd* implies that the objective of religious life is to initiate and introduce change in the individual person and at every level of community from the family and the nation all the way to the level of a global *Ummah*;
- 2) This change requires volitional participation of the person in the process of social action;
- 3) *Tawhīd* provide man with a new purpose and goal in life because it defines for him the true source of knowledge and guidance. This source of guidance is *wahy*, or Allah's revelation of His will in the spoken word;
- 4) *Tawhīd* imposes a duty on Muslims, and on anyone who adopts *Tawhīd*, to emancipate and liberate mankind from the yoke of oppression and exploitation; and
- 5) *Tawhīd* stimulates and encourages its followers to investigate, research, explore, and discover new horizons for the development and modernization of human society. There is no conflict between science and faith in Islam. *Tawhīd* demands a full utilization of natural resources in establishing Allah's sovereignty on earth. Therefore seeking knowledge and applying it for the betterment of mankind is an Islamic virtue and obligation. Betterment of the global *Ummah*, the community of the Muslims, and the whole of mankind is an Islamic obligation.

The above understanding of *Tawhīd* sets the frame of reference for an Islamic historian, and especially for the study of comparative religion. From this van-

⁶³ Ismā'īl R. al Fārūqī, *Three Essays on Tawhīd* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1979), p. 9.

tage point, the historian should start his analysis of the past and present and forge a vision of the future in which man's free will and moral choice play a central role in the social reconstruction of reality.

Without a clear vision of the vital and dynamic force of *Tawhīd* in Islamic history, no transition from a tradition-bound, backward society into a modern developing society can take place. Islamic social change is a translation of *Tawhīd* into social reality. No interpretation of Islamic history can be made without taking into consideration the full meaning and comprehension of *Tawhīd*. It is the point of departure and the ultimate objective in Islam.

Wa ākhīru da'wānā 'ani al ḥamdu Lillahi Rabbi al 'alamīn, wa al-ṣalātu wa al-sālamu 'alā Muḥammad Rasūl Allah

Our concluding statement is that "All praise and thanksgiving belong to Allah, Lord of the universe, and may the peace and the blessing of Allah be upon Muḥammad the Messenger of Allah.

**A Typology of Muslim Historiography
from the Perspective of the
Islamic Philosophy of History**

Ahmed Hasan Dani

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I. The Epistemology of History

History is an enquiry into the human conduct of affairs with a specific purpose to increase man's knowledge about himself. Hence all history is human. Historical knowledge cannot go beyond human perception of man's actions. In this sense history is factual, descriptive and scientific in observing individual person's and related events. But their appearance may be different in the eyes of different persons and may be reported differently in accordance with each persons capacity and manner of reporting. However honest and morally superior a person may be, one's narration is limited to the angle from which one has seen things and one's reporting depends upon the kind of perception that one has been able to gain of the persons or things described.

Historical description is a mental reconstruction designed to project one's ideas about persons and events connected with them. Hence all history, even though rooted in the human experience of the reality of this life, ultimately becomes ideational when communicated to others. The process of reconstruction and the process of transmission to others follow in several stages, in which the connecting link is the motivation of the person doing the narrating. In this sense history is purposive and it is the purpose that defines the objective of historical knowledge. The purpose may be explicit, and the story moved around it. In this case, it is the purpose that comes out boldly and the events become only examples to illustrate the purpose. On the other hand, the purpose may be implicit, and the events appear to follow one another in historical time. Here it is the events themselves that stand out boldly and create different situational factors in time but these factors cannot be grasped by man without an intentional effort to perceive them. One perceives them in the light

of one's own purpose although one does not state it. The factors in history reflect the influence of time but at any given moment of history they are constant. It is their reconstruction that varies from person to person, from place to place, from society to society, and from period to period, according to the purpose one has in evaluating the events of history. Such reconstruction will always vary according to what one wants to make of history, or according to one's growing experience in developing new historical insights.

II. The Purpose and Eschatology of History

While historical events are things of the past, purpose implies some futurity—a hope to restate those events in a fashion that can throw light on the shape of events in the future. Man hopes to know where these historical forces are leading him. He wants to know the end of history. In this sense history is goal-oriented and it is the goal that gives meaning to history and keeps history on the right track. But the goal of humanity, as perceived by man, is limited to the extent he understands his own place in the universe of creation. He is not the creator of himself nor is he in a position to dictate the end. Therefore the beginning and the end of history are not within the power of man. These lie above the human field of thought and experience. They are the two poles that correctly determine the bearing or direction of history and it is this direction that gives meaning to human life in the whole process of creation.

The purposiveness of history man has to take for granted as the factor beyond his control. In reliance on Allah, man accepts his own place and understands the meaning of his earthly existence, and the guidance and the light shown to him from time to time. This knowledge is given to him. He cannot challenge it. It is beyond the ken of human history, but following that light man can build his own historical knowledge and keep it within the boundaries of universal principles so that this knowledge is not abused by dubious or false reconstructions. Such a historical knowledge amounts to rediscovery of the role of humanity, which keeps him on the straight path. Man falters, fails, and roams about in his ignorance, but he strives again to come back to the right path. All these failings and strivings constitute human experience. While he is in a position to gather human experience, he does not know how he comes back to the right path. Actually he is led to the right path. History cannot explain this whole process, but human history can certainly extend the horizons of human experience. Such an extension of knowledge may be the purpose.

III. Qur'anic Historiography

The Holy Qur'an contains the germs of historical principles. When the story of the creation of man is traced to Ādam, (AS), there is a definite concept of the beginning of history, and when the goal of man is completed in the world hereafter, the end of history is clearly visualized. These two poles determine the true direction of history. Present human historical knowledge is narrow and limited because the tools of historical discovery are imperfect. Man's own perception about the beginning and end of history therefore is vague and enveloped in darkness. It is all the more necessary that man should strive to better his tools until he comes to the true path of realization. When the Holy Qur'an gives historical examples right from the time of Prophet Nūḥ (Noah) (AS), and of several other prophets, tribes, and peoples, there is a clear-cut methodology laid down for the enquirers to extend the knowledge of human experience by taking into consideration the behavior of other peoples. Human history is thus all-comprehensive and at the same time continuous as is beautifully illustrated in the different phases of the history of the Jews, ranging from in the early religious community of Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) (AS), to their encounter with the Egyptian Pharaoh, their final migration and settlement in the land of Judea and finally their dispersal to a wider world, homeless and forlorn. It is this continuity in human history that comes out clearly in the final emergence of the religion of Islam, as given to us by the last Messenger of Allah. But this Message can be understood only in the long perspective of history, which explains the importance of historical knowledge to the Muslims.

Islam is born in the clarity of history and the *sīrah* or life of the Prophet (ṢAAS) is narrated with a purpose, namely, to provide an illustration for human beings on how they should mould their life in accordance with the guidance provided in the Holy Qur'an. But such a biographical narration is not an end in itself. The Holy Qur'an also gives the details of actual living conditions among the pagan Arabs and shows how to reconstruct the actual environment in which Islam was born. At the same time, this historical narrative delineates the historical forces created by the supporters and opponents of Islam, and illuminates all aspects of events—political, social, economic, legal, constitutional and other—that ensued in Arabia of that time. The history presented in the Holy Qur'an is not a political history of kings and nobles, but is a total reconstruction of life in seventh-century Arabia. Such a reconstruction is meant to inspire future historians to view history from the totality of human life rather than from a narrow angle. In this sense history is all-comprehensive. It can hardly afford to limit itself to one or another aspect of human life. The historical scene of the time of the Prophet (ṢAAS) is an example in the process of human history that can be seen as a reference point for the different ways of human

living. But certainly history cannot stop there. The purpose of Allah must be fulfilled in the future unfolding of history. And hence the continuity has to be traced in the succeeding periods through attempts to gain a total comprehension of life.

Thus from the Holy Qur'an it is possible to derive a philosophy of history that can enlighten man in his effort to develop historical knowledge. But such a philosophy, as reconstructed here, is arrived at by inference and is open to future improvement. It is not a dictum, as is assumed by Professor Rosenthal in his *Muslim Historiography*, that has sealed for ever any further research in this field of philosophy. At the same time, historical methodology emerges from the way events have been handled and narrated in the Holy Book. The most important is the reconstruction of the contemporary scene, which, sociologically speaking, presents a complete picture of the inter-relationship of the different human groups as creative participants in human life. The presentation is entirely different from the journalistic picture of society as reconstructed today by contemporary historians or political scientists. This methodology is certainly the best for understanding the behaviour pattern of society. Yet this methodology itself is reconstructed. It has not been given to us as a permanent dictum. Hence the reconstruction leaves enough scope for future development.

IV. A Typology of Muslim Historiography

The profundity of historical knowledge in the Holy Book has created a historical sense among Muslims. Muslims, however have differed widely in the methods they have used to understand the historical forces that have governed their society. Several types of historical reconstruction can be clearly recognized.

1) The first is the pattern of *Universal History*, introduced by Al-Ṭabarī, in which the events of the known world are accounted year by year in chronological order with a view to set them in historical time. This pattern led to the creation of Muslim chronicles, which are available in plenty all over the Muslim world and as a result of which there is no lack of historical data. But the kind of material available in these chronicles is limited in scope. It is limited by the interest of the author, and again the data are presented as the events occur year by year, the only interrelationship being the time factor. The motivation seems to be a religious zeal of a kind that certainly characterized the historians themselves, but no method was developed to determine whether it also moved the current socio-political power or not. The time factor was sequential but not causal, and stress was placed on the aspects of human life that the historian considered to be important government fac-

tors in human society. Such “universal histories” gave details about the spread of Islam in the three continents, but they hardly noticed the new social forces that emerged as a result of the acceptance of Islam by a wide variety of peoples.

2) Others interested in the true faith realized the need of collecting all the data necessary to transmit the practices of the faithful to new generations. This realization created the great bulk of *Ḥadīth* literature by referring back to the time of the Prophet (ṢAAS). While *Ḥadīth* provided a guideline for the followers of the faith, the historians were satisfied by leaving to posterity mere chronicles, which are more factual than substantive. It is hard to find in them a total picture of social living as we get about the contemporary Arabian scene in the Holy Qur’an. Sociological construction was far from their perception. Similarly no new methodology is developed to analyze the information of past history. The past was accepted as a great tradition and that tradition was included so as to maintain continuity in history. No new urge is evident to discover the meaning of the tradition. And yet every attempt was made to collect the tradition from the most reliable reporter. This attempt led to the building up of a precise methodology in order to preserve the correct tradition from honest reporters. This method is certainly a contribution of these historians, but the scope of the enquiry was limited, so the historical accounts were circumscribed and relevant only to certain aspects of human life.

3) The third method, in addition to chronicles and *Aḥādīth*, may be described as ethnological history, as found in the *Murūj al Dhahab* of al Mas’ūdī or in *Kitāb al Hind* of al Birūnī. Here the urge for knowledge about non-Muslim societies led these scholars to gather first hand material about them, even by learning their languages and by personal contact with their scholars. All they learned was put in a form designed to be readable to their own audience. Such a tendency led to several translations and even to the founding of *Bayt al Hikmah* by al Ma’mūn. As a result the scientific and literary traditions contained in Greek, Syriac, Pahlevi, and Sanskrit languages were translated into Arabic. Consequently the Arabic language became a great store of contemporary learning. It is this variety of ideas and information that generated new thought in the Islamic world. Apart from this scientific development, what we have called ethnological history could not develop any new methodology and hence could not lead to the foundation of a new science. The study of other societies was limited to gathering information and enlightening the readers at home. At best these historians compared behavior patterns. But they did not inquire into the very nature of other societies. Why do societies after all differ from one another? Why do they have different behavior patterns? How is it that different societies embrace different goals of life? These and many other questions could have led to a new kind of historical science and perhaps enabled them to grasp the change that was coming in the Muslim

society in the course of history.

Once the major information was transmitted into Arabic, there certainly grew several schools of thought in different fields of studies. Such schools however, became saturated with their own traditions on the basis of what were then new techniques. Because the historians' approach was not sociologically relevant, the impact of this new thought process on social development remained unnoticed. The historical sense that Islam gave to Muslims remained confined to an aspect of development that could not move the whole society nor urge the Muslims to discover new ways to progress. Even works of great importance, produced by these early masters could not sustain a new discipline and continue to enrich and extend the horizons of historical knowledge.

4) In the fourth category of history-writing we can include Ibn Khurdadhbah's *Kitāb al Masālik wa al Mamālik* and also al Biladhuri's *Futūḥ al Buldān*. They have the merit of collecting much geographical information about other countries and at the same time bringing together the historical data and interrelating it so as to produce a sort of geographical history. Each geographical region finds a description along with the important cities and routes, followed by an historical account. Such historians later on influenced the preparation of several books on geography. They gave relatively complete information on the physical map of the then known world. As a result new contacts were established, trade and commerce developed, and Islam spread along the maritime routes. Several new societies came within the purview of the Islamic world. While these societies felt the impact of Islam and the geographic extent of Islamic culture expanded greatly, many different kinds of human experiences in the various geographic regions were accepted into the fold of Islam. What was their impact on the Muslims in general? While geographic histories recorded the variations, no historical geography developed to visualize the growth of different patterns in human society. While geographic variations were noted, the geographic factors were not analyzed to throw light on the differences among human societies. Muslim society remained confined to its own developed norms and ideals. Although this stabilized the society, under-currents of social variations flowed in the body politic unnoticed and unmoved. Awareness of these factors could have extended the horizons of historical knowledge.

5) Travel accounts form the fifth category of historical works. Among them the *Rihlah* (Journey) of Ibn Battūṭah occupies a prominent place. The geographical information accumulated by Muslims was of tremendous help in arousing curiosity about different peoples. It was this thirst to visit new places and learn about the people living there that made such intelligent travellers keep records and later write them in the form of memoirs of their visit. Whether the records were kept in the form of diaries or otherwise is difficult to say. The manner of gathering information also is nowhere stated.

Obviously personal contact and keen observation of the new places visited and new peoples observed must have formed the primary basis for collecting data. These travellers were not just ambassadors but were common men of the society and hence had the advantage of mixing with different social groups. As they lived with these people and shared their joys and sorrows, they participated in their social life. The way in which they approached the new peoples could be described as the “participant observer” method, as the term used today in anthropology. But certainly these travellers were not anthropologists and hence it is not possible to expect from them the analytical approach of an anthropologist.

Their methodology also cannot be called empirical, although they collected the data on the spot by freely observing people. Out of a wealth of available details, they selected only whatever struck them as useful. Their accounts are full of historical material, but are narrated in the fashion of travel accounts or stories about unknown and far away people. Rightly speaking, they are not histories, although they do contain a lot of historical data. As the data were collected on the spot, their value for historical purposes is immense. In cases like that of Ibn Baṭṭūṭāh, who accepted jobs under local governments, he got first hand information on how they worked. He could compare one system of government with another and examine how different institutions functioned. Yet the travellers’s account could hardly go beyond simple observation. That was quite sufficient to satisfy his curiosity. As his inspiration did not come from any set purpose except that of travel, his account should be understood only from that angle.

6) With the development of monarchical institutions in the Islamic world, another category of history writing came into vogue, this may be classed as regional or dynastic history. The methodology is to narrate the account chronologically, but the purpose of these chronologies is to glorify the role of the *sulṭān* or of the dynasty and sometimes to make their military achievements appear as an inherent part in the progress of Islam. This tendency on the part of the historians is natural because they were moved by the great Islamic fervor that had come to them as a result of their scholarly pursuit. On the other hand a *sulṭān*, or a ruling dynasty, was motivated by political ambition. The *sulṭān* used his knowledge of statecraft to advance his own power. The result seemed always to be victory over the non-Muslims and sometimes over another Muslim *sulṭān*. The tendency is to idolize the victorious and see in him and in his ambition the role of Islam and the embodiment of Islamic virtues. Their historical narration developed under the influence of another similar motivation, namely to reconstruct history from the angle of a particular *sulṭān* or ruling dynasty. Therefore all the events were arranged in a manner pleasing to the *sulṭān* or the *sulṭān*’s followers. The idolized personality of the *sulṭān* rose above his human personality and therefore the historical

account was also constructed in the same idealistic manner. There was no room to understand the *sultān* as an ordinary human or to look at historical forces from the perspective of ordinary human affairs.

This new tendency in historiography was designed to reconstruct what history should be rather than what history is. Such a lack of critical analysis has had a great appeal to those who regard history as a glorification of the past. This tendency has colored the writings of many modern writers who wish to see their ideal of glory in the acts of past heroes or, as seen today, in the glorification of their own national histories. This tendency has departed from the earlier practice of looking at events from the Islamic perspective. At best these heroes, who may have been motivated by their personal ambitions, are made to play a role in line with the spirit of Islam, so that the glory of Islam is seen in the actions of the Muslim *sultāns* or other heroes. The purpose of history has changed, although the methodology remained the same. Historical knowledge is distorted to meet the new requirement of hero worship but actual historical events and forces and trends follow a pattern that remains hidden from the eyes of the historians. The currents of history march in one direction but their accounts follow another set pattern in order to satisfy human vanity. To see an ideal virtue in a hero is something different from the actual role that the hero plays in history. Here movement in a society is held to be subservient to the initiatives and moves of the hero himself. He comes out as a charismatic leader and history becomes a story of charisma rather than an appraisal of different historical forces.

7) In the final category, we can place Ibn Khaldūn, who applied a new hypothesis to understand movement in history and thereby gave us a new reconstruction of history rather than a chronicle. His reconstruction is interpretative rather than descriptive. He does not idolize any ruler but tries to see his role in the development of society. Living as he did in North Africa, he could see society as an interplay of different tribes. In the pure nature of the cohesive force of tribes he saw the binding living force of all societies—a force which he termed tribal solidarity. Without this cohesive bond, a society cannot flourish. The rise and fall of society is traced to the elements that go to make up this bond.

The approach of Ibn Khaldūn to history is sociological. Since he had a unique experience in viewing the role of the tribes in North African society, it was natural for him to extend his own experience to the explanation of social development on its basis. Ibn Khaldūn stands alone in presenting to us a new methodology and a new historiography which was far superior to any then known or followed by other Muslim historians after him. His example was not followed, probably because the purpose of other historians was entirely different from his own.

In choosing the tribe as a unit for understanding history, he introduced an

entirely new concept and thus adopted an approach that was different from what we see in the interpretation of the contemporary scene in the Holy Qur'an. The Holy Book stresses the role of the individuals who compose the *millat* or religious community and defines the place of individual persons on the basis of each person's virtue. The *millat* was the *summum bonum* of the collective spirit of virtue, and as long as man moulds himself in submission to Allah by following the virtuous path, the *millat* remains intact on the straight path toward the final goal of life.

Ibn Khaldūn did not oppose this idea, but in order to save the *millat* from pitfalls, he proposed that the bonding spirit of the tribe might serve more reliably as the cohesive force in society. If the tribe itself stagnates in an archaic system and loses momentum in forward progress because new incentives are lacking, it is regarded by Ibn Khaldūn as the old age of social growth and explained it on the basis of cyclic theory. A society however, is not an organic whole like a human body. It is the individual persons, as laid down in the Holy Qur'ān, who compose the society and who are responsible for movement in the society. The individuals and the society act and react, but it is the nature of the individuals that is reflected in the society. It is probably for this reason that history today places so much importance on the role of the individual and tries to understand him, not simply on the basis of his virtues, but on the basis of his human nature, his failings and achievements, his capacity to choose and decide, and his will to chose any path shown to him by God. The role of the individual in society is the deciding factor in history. It is by gathering human experiences that we add to our historical knowledge. Such experiences are seen in the long and short perspective of history. The longer the view, the better the perception man has about himself, i.e. his own nebulous place in the vast creation of Allah (SWT).

***Naḥwa Şiyāghah Islāmīyah
li 'Ilm al 'Ijtimā'***

**(Toward an Islamic Reformulation
of the Discipline of Sociology)**

Muhammad al Mubarak

نحو صياغة إسلامية لعلم الاجتماع

الأستاذ محمد المبارك

نحو صياغة إسلامية لعلم الاجتماع الأستاذ محمد المبارك

الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على خاتم النبيين المرسل رحمة للناس أجمعين..
وبعد

فقد تسلسل الفكر الغربي بفلسفاته الفكرية ، ومذاهبه العقيدية بما فيها من حق وباطل وصحيح وزائف وصدق وإفك وخير وشر من خلال التعليم وعبر جميع فروع المعرفة والثقافة إلى عالمنا الإسلامي ، يحمله الإستعمار بجيوشه ، والغزو بشتى أنواع جنوده، ودخل دخول القوي المستعلي بقوة الظاهر وفتنة الباطن .

وقد اتخذ هذا الفكر الغربي بجميع خصائصه من جميع العلوم وفروع المعرفة جسراً يعبر عليه بدءاً بالعلوم الطبيعية ، التي أحلت فيها الطبيعة محل الإله الخالق ، فهي التي تعطي للمخلوقات ما لها من صفات و تزودها بالخصائص ، وهي الفاعلة الخالقة المقدرة المدبرة ، وهي نفسها كذلك المخلوقة المدبرة ، وانتهاءً بالعلوم الإنسانية التي جعلت من الإنسان — بصفته إنساناً متميزاً عن بقية الكائنات — موضوعاً لبحثها كالفلسفة وعلم النفس وعلم الاجتماع والتاريخ والتربية والأخلاق والأدب والحقوق التي تبحث عن المعرفة الإنسانية ، والنفسية الإنسانية ، والمجتمع الإنساني ، وتاريخ الإنسان وطرق تثقيفه (تعليمه وتهذيبه) ، ومقاييس الجمال والحق لديه .

وقد كانت أقوى شحنة^(١) من تأثير الفكر الغربي عن طريق هذه العلوم

(١) استعمال مجازي صحيح والشحنة في اللغة كما ورد في القاموس المحيط "ما يقدم للدواب من العلف الذي يكفها يومها وليلتها ، وفي البلد ما فيه الكفاية لضبطها من جهة السلطان" . وأصل شحن السفينة بمعنى ملكها .

الإنسانية، ذلك لأن لها خلفيات عقيدية ، فهي تنطلق من تصور معين للوجود كله ، وتشتمل على مقاييس الحق والخير والجمال المنبثقة عن هذا التصور ، وتختفي هذه الخلفيات وراء ظاهرها العلمي. فالتصور العام الذي انتهى إليه الفكر الغربي — بتأثير عوامل مختلفة — للكون (الطبيعة) وللإنسان فرداً (علم النفس) وجماعة (علم الاجتماع) وتطوراً (التاريخ) ولمقاييسه للحقيقة (الفلسفة) وللحق (الحقوق) والخير (الأخلاق) والجمال (الأدب) هو الأساس الذي تقوم عليه ، والصعيد الذي تنطلق منه في فروعها وجزئياتها .

وهذا التصور العام للوجود في الثقافة الغربية والخلفية العقيدية لفروعها المختلفة تجري في كل منها مجرى الحقائق المسلمة التي اصطلاح أهلها على الإيمان بها والتسليم بها جيلاً بعد جيل ، تسليماً لا يقل عن تسليم أهل الأديان بعقائدهم ولا سيما بالنسبة إلى الأجيال اللاحقة منهم ، فهم في قبول هذه العقائد — التي يزعم أنها علمية أو عقلية — مقلدون لا يقبلون وضعها موضع البحث والنقد ، فضلاً عن أن تكون موضع شك أو إنكار ، فتنسب في الكتب المقررة وفي الحديث فيما بينهم على أنها من البدييات المسلمة أو من الحقائق الثابتة . وهكذا هي الآراء المتعلقة بالدين والإله والوحي والنبوات وأصل خلق الإنسان ونهاية الحياة والخير والشر والفضيلة والرذيلة عند أجيال الغربيين أو أكثرهم وجمهورهم . والفرق بينهم وبين أهل الأديان — ولا سيما المسلمين منهم — أن هؤلاء إنما قبل أوائلهم الحقائق الدينية بعد محاكمتها عقلياً ، وبعد التدقيق في أحوال قائلها وهم الأنبياء وسيرتهم وتطبيق مقاييس النقد في صدقهم وسلامة عقولهم لتصديقهم في ادعاء الوحي الإلهي ، وجميع الأجيال اللاحقة تعاود المحاكمة نفسها فيكون إيمانها عن قناعة عقلية لا عن تقليد .

ونستطيع أن نلخص هذه الخلفية العقيدية المشتركة بين فروع المعرفة والثقافة الغربية بقولنا : الوجود كله منحصر في الإنسان والطبيعة وهو جزء منها ونوع من أنواعها ، والطبيعة وجدت هكذا بنفسها وكذلك سننها

وقوانينها فهي مقدرة بنفسها من غير مقدر لها . والعقل وحده طريق معرفة الحقائق وليس ثمة طريق آخر . وليست المثل الأخلاقية والقيم والمفاهيم الحقوقية إلا وقائع أو حوادث كالحوادث الطبيعية نشأت وتطورت فهي ليست ثابتة . والإنسان نفسه إنما هو حيوان إجتماعي مفكر فحسب وليست النفس الإنسانية إلا مجموعة من الغرائز .

هذه هي جذور العقائد الغربية سواء عند العقلانيين Rationalists أم عند الماديين Materialists ، ولا يشذ عن الإيمان بها وإتخاذها أساساً ومقياساً إلا فئة قليلة جداً هي بقية باقية من المؤمنين بالتفكير الديني المسيحي .. ليس في هذه الفلسفة أو الأساس الإعتقادي أو التصور الوجودي مكان للإله وصلته بالكون ونظامه السببي ، أو بالإنسان ولا مكان للوحي والنبوات ، ولا للجزاء والحياة الخالدة ، ولا للمثل العليا الأخلاقية ، ولا سيما ما كان مصدره الدين ولا لسائر الغيبيات (ماوراء الطبيعة) .

إن هذه المفاهيم منبثة مفرقة في مختلف العلوم التي تُعَلَّم في نظم التعليم السائدة في العالم الإسلامي ويتكون من مجموعها مركب فكري عقدي يخالف الإسلام مخالفة جذرية ، وتكوّن أساساً يتجافى ويتنافى تماماً مع الإسلام . وحصتان أو ثلاثة لتعليم الدين في التعليم الابتدائي وحصّة أو حصتان في التعليم الثانوي — ولا سيما إذا كان المنهج ناقصاً والأسلوب غير صالح — لا تقف مطلقاً أمام هذا الشحن الفكري المستمر خلال سنين طويلة في أكثر من ثلاثين ساعة أسبوعية في التعليم الابتدائي، وأكثر من عشرين ساعة في التعليم الثانوي ، وقريباً من ذلك في التعليم الجامعي وما فوق الجامعي ، مع ما تلقيه دور النشر والمطابع من كتب ودوريات مشربة بالروح نفسها .

إن هذه المشكلة هي أكبر المشكلات كلها بالنسبة إلى العالم الإسلامي لا لأنها تفقده ذاتيته وشخصيته فحسب بل لأنها تجعله يستبدل الذي هو أدنى بالذي هو خير ، ويخسر رأس مال يملكه ويمكن أن يسعد به الإنسانية

كلها . إن هذا النوع من الغزو هو أشد أنواعه فتكاً ولم تعرف الأمة الإسلامية في التاريخ كارثة أشد هولاً وأفضع في نتائجها منها ، ولا تعدلها كارثة التتار ، ولا الحروب الصليبية ، ولا حروب الإستعمار . بل إن جميع المشكلات السياسية والاجتماعية والاقتصادية والتربوية فروع لهذه المشكلة الأساسية .

لقد كان من نتائج هذا الغزو الثقافي الفكري وخاصة في ميادين العلوم الإنسانية ، إلغاء التشريع الإسلامي الخالد ذي المعالم الثابتة في أهدافه الأخلاقية والإنسانية ، والصيغ المرنة المتبدلة في مواجهة الأوضاع المستجدة والأحداث النازلة ، وإحلال التشريع الغربي مكانه . وكان من نتائجه أن تستبدل بالثقافة الإسلامية بمعناها الواسع المستوعب ، الثقافة الغربية ويكتفي برقعة تلصق بها يسمونها التعليم الديني ، ليزداد المنظر تنافراً والتناقض النفسي شدة . وكان من نتائجه كذلك بناء نظم الحكم السياسي على أسس غير إسلامية ، يسمونها علمانية تزيناً لها وإمعاناً في الخداع ، ويسخرون لها صنائع ممن صنعوا على أعينهم ورُبُّوا على أحضانهم ، ويجعلون منهم أبطالاً لأوطانهم ترويحاً لصنيعهم في إقصاء الإسلام بإسم الحياد الديني في المرحلة الأولى . وكان من نتائج هذا الغزو إعداد جيش من المثقفين ليكونوا المختصين لتنفيذ عملية تغريب التشريع ولتنفيذ عملية تغريب الحكم والدولة والسياسة ، وخرجت جيوش الاستعمار باحتفالات كبيرة للترحيب بجيوش التغريب من أبناء المسلمين أنفسهم للتخطيط لإقصاء الإسلام ثم لحصره وتطويره في كل ميدان : في حصة الدين في التعليم ، وفي الأحوال الشخصية في التشريع ، وفي مراسم حضور صلاة العيدين في ميدان الحكم وسياسة الدولة . ثم لإزالته من جميع الميادين وإتمام عملية التغريب . وقد تمت المراحل كلها في بعض البلاد الإسلامية ، وهي سائرة في طريقها إلى النهاية إذا لم يتم التدارك في البلدان الأخرى .

إن حل هذه المشكلة ليست بطرد هذه العلوم وإبصاد الأبواب أمامها

وهي في الأصل علوم لنا فضل السبق في العمل في ميادينها ، والتجديد فيها ، في تاريخنا الإسلامي الطويل ، وللشعوب الإسلامية إسهام في تقدمها . وإنما الحل الذي نطرحه وندعو إلى الأخذ به هو صياغة العلوم جميعها صياغة إسلامية ، أو بعبارة أدق إقامتها على أسس إسلامية ، والسير بها من منطلقات إسلامية أي بناؤها على التصور العام للوجود الذي يقدمه الإسلام .

إذ ما الذي يرجح التصور الغربي للوجود وهو ليس حقيقة عملية جاءت بها المختبرات أو المعامل أو المراصد بل أنه لا يثبت أمام النقد العقلي وما أكثر ما تلون وتغير في الغرب نفسه بتغير المذاهب حتى أصبح مجرد مرير لغايات وأهداف عملية . وهو كما يرى كثير من المفكرين الغربيين أنفسهم مجرد عقيدة (dogme-dogma) ليس عليها ولا على نفى عكسها دليل قاطع . ولو قابلنا هذا التصور الغربي للوجود بالتصور الإسلامي العام لوجدنا التصور الإسلامي مستوعباً له ومتمماً لنقصه وبه من الحجج العقلية ما يجعله الأرجح ومن النتائج العملية ما يجعله الأفضل .

ويمكن أن نلخص هذا التصور الإسلامي العام في مقابل تلخيصنا السابق للتصور الغربي بما يلي :

(١) إن الإنسان والكون (الطبيعة) الذي يعيش فيه ليسا وحدهما في الوجود بل كلاهما يتبدىء من الله خلقاً ووجوداً وينتهيان إليه مصيراً وهو المهيمن عليهما .

(٢) الطبيعة لم تخلق نفسها ولم توجد بنفسها بل أوجدها الله وهي تسير على سنن مطردة وفق نظام مترابط الأجزاء والله الذي خلقها وهو المقدر لسنتها ونظامها .

(٣) العقل الإنساني ليس وحده أداة الوصول إلى الحقيقة بل هناك طريق آخر وهو الوحي ولكل منهما ميدانه واختصاصه ، فالعقل أداة الوصول إلى حقائق الطبيعة وهو معرض مع ذلك للخطأ ، والوحي أداة معرفة ما

وراء الطبيعة (عالم الغيب) .

(٤) الإنسان ليس حيواناً مفكراً فحسب بل إن عناصر تكوينه تتجاوز ذلك فتزيد على العضوية والتفكير .

(٥) إن الله هو المشرع للإنسان كما قدر للطبيعة سننها ، وهو المجدد عن طريق الوحي المعالم الثابتة للأخلاق والحقوق . والمجال مفسوح أمام الإنسان فيما وراء هذه المعالم الثابتة ممّا هو قابل للتغيير والتبدل .

(٦) النبوات منذ بداية خلق الإنسان هي الصلة بين الإنسان والله لتزويده بالقيم الثابتة وبما ينبغي أن يعرفه من عالم الغيب . وقد حُتِمت هذه النبوات بمحمد بن عبدالله ﷺ وأنهيت سلسلة الرسائل السابقة المتفرقة في الشعوب برسالة خاتمة جامعة هي الإسلام الذي تبلغه وبلغه خاتم الرسل .

قبل البحث في عرض فكرة صيغة إسلامية لعلم الاجتماع نرى أن نقدم عرضاً تحليلياً نقدياً لعلم الاجتماع الغربي في وضعه الحالي ولا سيما في الجوانب ذات العلاقة بموضوع بحثنا .

[١] يلاحظ الدارس لعلم الاجتماع في عصرنا هذا أن لمؤلفيه والباحثين فيه اتجاهات مذهبية مختلفة ، وأن لكل من هذه الاتجاهات المذهبية أثراً واضحاً في صياغة علم الاجتماع ، واتجاه النظريات ووضع الإفتراضات والتعليقات . وهذه المذهبية التي نعنيها ليست منبثقة عن علم الاجتماع نفسه بل هي خارجة عنه وقد لا تظهر للباحث مباشرة ولأول نظرة لأنها قد تختفي وراء البحث ، وإنما نعني بها المنطلقات العقيدية التي انطلق منها أصحابها مزودين بل مدفوعين بها قبل الشروع ببحثهم في علم الاجتماع .

وأبرز هذه الاتجاهات المذهبية :

الاتجاه العقلاني (Rationaliste) والاتجاه الماركسي والاتجاه المسيحي وخاصة الكاثوليكي . وبعض أصحاب هذه الاتجاهات يخفون مذهبهم

واتجاههم كأصحاب الإتجاه المسيحي ، وهم وإن كانوا معروفين لدى الباحثين ولهم مؤلفات ومعاهد وجامعات ودور نشر خاصة بهم في كثير من البلدان ، لكنهم يوصفون عادة في بحوثهم الإجتماعية بأصحاب الإتجاه الفكري أو المثالي (Idealiste) . أما الماركسيون فهم مجاهرون بوصف بحوثهم وعلومهم ومنها علم الإجتماع بالماركسية . وإليك نماذج من أقوالهم مأخوذة من كتاب (علم الإجتماع الماركسي)^(١) للمؤلفين : كونستانتينوف و كيل "Constantinov and Kiel" ، قال المؤلفان : "إن العلم الإجتماعي الذي يلتزم إتزاماً صارماً بموقف المادية التاريخية ، هو وحده القادر على ممارسة وظيفته الجوهرية الإجتماعية الخلاقة" (ص ٥) . ويقولان أيضاً : "ومن ثم نجد إلى جانب الإرتباط العضوي العميق بين علم الإجتماع الماركسي والنظرية الإشتراكية العلمية فروعاً نوعية" (ص ١٨) .

وهما يقولان أيضاً بالجمع العجيب بين الموضوعية والإلتزام المذهبي في علم الإجتماع والإخلاص للمبدأ : "ويتطلب كل ذلك من علماء الإجتماع إحساساً عميقاً بالمسؤولية ، والأمانة العلمية والإخلاص للمبدأ والنزاهة والموضوعية والإلتزام الإشتراكي.." (ص ٥٢) .

ويتجاوز المؤلفان حد الإلتزام إلى المقاتلة فيقولان : "ينبغي على المرء في دراسته لأثر القانون أن يكون قادراً بدرجة ملائمة على تقدير القدرات المتاحة وعلى أن يقاتل من أجل تحقيق تلك التي تتوافق مع احتياجات التطور الإجتماعي التقدمي ومصالح الجماهير والطبقات الثورية التي تجسد هذه المصالح" (ص ١٦) .

فلماذا يجوز للماركسيين أن يصبغوا جميع العلوم — وليس علم

(٢) كتاب علم الإجتماع الماركسي تأليف ف. كونستانتينوف . و ف. كيل ترجمة سعيد صموئيل ، دار الطليعة ، بيروت .

الإجتماع فحسب — بصبغتهم المذهبية ، ويتوقف بعض المثقفين عندنا ومنهم بعض أساتذة علم الإجتماع عن صبغ العلوم بالصبغة الإسلامية ومنها علم الإجتماع ، وليس المنطق المذهبي الماركسي أكثر قابلية للدفاع عنه بالحجج العقلية والموضوعية من المنطق الإسلامي ، بل العكس هو الصحيح لدى الباحث المتعمق الواعي .

إن السبب في اعتقادي هو انغماسهم في التقليد والتبعية ، وعدم قدرتهم على التحرر منها ، ومن الوقوع تحت تأثير الدراسات الغربية ، والخروج منها إلى الذاتية والشخصية المستقلة .

القضية واضحة وبسيطة : ذلك أن لكل مذهب من المذاهب التي ذكرناها فلسفة للوجود ، أي نظرة أو تصور عام للوجود خاصة به يدافع عنها ، أوليس للإسلام نظرة وتصور عام للوجود عبر عنها القرآن الكريم بوضوح ؟.. وهي نظرة متميزة دقيقة أشمل وأكثر استيعاباً من جميع النظرات الأخرى ، ولها من سلطان الحجة في الدفاع عنها ما يجعلها متفوقة على جميع النظرات الأخرى (٣) فلماذا تنطلق المذاهب الأخرى — التي ينتمي إليها الباحثون في علم الإجتماع جميعاً — من منطلقاتها المذهبية (فلسفتها الوجودية — اونتولوجي) ولا ينطلق الباحثون المسلمون من منطلق الإسلام في نظرتهم الدقيقة الصحيحة !؟

[٢] إن في علم الإجتماع الحديث مذاهب إجتماعية مختلفة ، لكل منها نظرتهم إلى الحوادث الإجتماعية ومنهجه وتفسيره لها . واختلاف هذه المذاهب ناشيء عن اعتقاد دل عليها بتفسير خاص للحوادث الإجتماعية وبترجيح تأثير أحد العوامل المؤثرة فيها .

فهناك المذهب والتفسير البيولوجي (العضوي) والمذهب النفسي

(٣) أنظر بحثنا (نظرة الإسلام العامة إلى الوجود وأثرها في الحضارة) دمشق ١٩٥٨ .
وبحثنا (نظام الإسلام العقائدي في العصر الحديث) المنشور في مجلة جامعة الملك عبد العزيز — العدد الأول . السنة الأولى ١٣٩٥هـ — ١٩٥٧م ، صفحة ١٣ .

والمذهب السكاني (الديموغرافي) والإقتصادي والفكري الإعتقادي وغيرها .

إن الحوادث الإجتماعية معقدة التركيب متعددة الجوانب ،
والعوامل المؤثرة ، وعلماء الإجتماع مختلفون ولا يزالون مختلفين في
الإعتقاد بترجيح أثر أحد العوامل على غيره .

فالجمال إذن فسيح لتعدد النظرات والمذاهب في حدود البحث
العلمي .

[٣] في علم الإجتماع نوعان من الموضوعات والحقائق والنظريات يوضعان
في موضع واحد أمام الباحث العادي وهما جد مختلفين في نظر المدققين
من علماء الإجتماع أنفسهم ، ومن المهم جداً التفريق بينهما :

● الأول منهما : الحوادث الإجتماعية التي هي تحت سمعنا وبصرنا مما
يمكن مشاهدته و جمعه ودراسته ووصفه واستخراج سننه المطردة .

إن هذ القسم من علم الإجتماع هو الذي يمكن أن يكون علمياً
إلى حد كبير ، وإن كانت درجة هذه العلمية لا تبلغ ما تبلغه البحوث
في الحوادث الطبيعية لتعقد الحوادث الإجتماعية ، وأستحالة إخضاعها لما
تخضع له الحوادث الطبيعية من طرائق ومناهج وتجارب ، ولذلك كان
من الصعب الوصول إلى قوانين ثابتة يقينية وإلى تنبؤات علمية لا
تختلف .

وعلى كل حال فإن الموقف الإسلامي من هذا القسم كما تبين هو
الإسهام في هذه الأبحاث والإستفادة من أبحاث غيرنا مع التنبه للأغراض
والأغلاط وأخطاء المناهج وما ينشأ عنها أحياناً من نتائج خاطئة .

● النوع الثاني من مباحث علم الإجتماع : ما يتناول البحث فيه أموراً
لا يمكن إخضاعها لطرائق البحث العلمي الدقيق ولا مراقبة النتائج وذلك

كالبحت في أصل اللغات ونشأة الأديان وما إلى ذلك .

إن البحث في تطور اللغات وسنن تطور أصواتها ومعاني مفرداتها وتراكيب جملها بعد ظهور هذه اللغات هو من النوع الأول الذي يمكن بحثه والوصول فيه إلى نتائج صحيحة أو قريبة من الصحة ، وكذلك البحث في الظواهر الدينية بالنسبة لكل دين عند المؤمنين به هو من الأمور المشاهدة التي يمكن جمعها والنظر فيها ومقارنة بعضها ببعض وهو كذلك من النوع الأول .

أما البحث في أصل نشأة الدين فلا سبيل للوصول إليه ، وكذلك أصول اللغات. لبعده عن حيز المشاهدة ، وامتداده في الزمن ، وأستحالة إخضاعه للتجربة والموازن العلمية، ولابد هنا من استعمال التأمل والتفكير المجرد فإذا انطلق الملحد لبحث في أصل الدين فلا يمكنه أن يتحرر من فكرته عن الدين .

وفي القسم الثاني من المباحث الإجتماعية كثرت النظريات وتعددت وآختلفت ، ولا سبيل إلى إلزامنا بإحدى هذه النظريات فليست هي من الحقائق العلمية التي لا يُختلف فيها . بل إن مثل هذه البحوث يمكن اعتبارها من قبيل "ميتافيزك" (Metaphisique) علم الإجتماع أي من قبيل القسم الغيبي الذي يكون اقتحامه عن طريق العقل وحده منفرداً دون الإستعانة بمنهج خاص ضرباً من الحدس والتخمين والظن . وهو يقابل مثيله في علم الطبيعة حينما يسأل الكيميائي والفيزيائي نفسه عن أصل المادة ونشئها وخلقها وكيف خلقت ومن وضع لها القوانين التي تجري بموجبها .

إن هذا البحث خارج عن دائرة اختصاصه ، وليس لبحثه فيها قيمة علمية كبحثه في تركيب المادة وقوانينها وتفاعلها . بل إن البحث في هذه الأصول الإجتماعية النظرية أصعب وأكثر تعقيداً .

وهذه البحوث في العلوم الطبيعية تدخل فيما يسمى (فلسفة العلوم) لا في العلوم نفسها من حيث الإختصاص . ومثيلاتها في علم الإجتماع أخرى

أن تسمى بفلسفة الاجتماع فلا تكون له القيمة التي تُدعى له . وعلماء الاجتماع اليوم ينفرون من النسبة ونسبة علمهم إلى الفلسفة وهم يرون أنه استقل عنها والتحق بالعلوم في منهجه وموضوعه ، ويعرفونه بأنه العلم الوضعي للظواهر الاجتماعية ، ويميزون بينه وبين الفلسفة الاجتماعية وفلسفة التاريخ^(٤) !.

ومع ذلك فإن الماركسيين لا يزالون يلحقون علم الاجتماع بالفلسفة ويدرسونه في كلية الفلسفة في جامعة موسكو . وإذا كان الأمر كذلك فلعل فلسفته ، ولا تُلزم بفلسفة غيرنا ، وليس ثمة حتى الآن فلسفة مشتركة كما هناك كيمياء وفيزياء وعلوم طبيعية مشتركة في نتائجها وحقائقها .

في مثل هذه البحوث تندس العناصر الشخصية غير العلمية سواءً أكان الباحث عليها فكرة سابقة يعتقد بها صاحب النظرية ثم يحاول أن يلبسها حلة علمية ظاهرة بتطبيقها على بضع حوادث من غير استقراء ، أم كانت غرضاً يقصد إليه صاحبه أو تدفعه إليه حكومة ذات سياسة خاصة وتحدد له النتيجة التي ينبغي أن يصل إليها ببحثه ”العلمي“ ، أم كانت أيضاً نتيجة لتفكير خاطيء كعدم التمييز بين السحر والدين ، أو عدم التمييز بين وجود الله ، في ذاته وفكرة الإنسان عن الله ، وعقيدته به . فالماركسيون مثلاً ينطلقون رأساً من إنكار حقيقة وجود الله ، ثم يأخذون في بحث كيف نشأت — في زعمهم — فكرة الإله لدى البشر ؟ وكيف تطورت ؟ والأمران مختلفان جداً . وهذا يشبه ترك البحث في ماهية الهواء وتركيبه ، ثم البحث عن رأي الناس في الهواء كيف نشأ وكيف تطور . ورحم الله أسلافنا حين كانوا يفرقون بين الحقيقة الخارجية ، والحقيقة الذهنية ، والحقيقة اللفظية .

من هذا الباب نظرية أوغست كونت ”Auguste Comte“ المعروفة

(٤) أنظر بالفرنسية Manuel de Sociologie تأليف كوفيليه ”A. Cuvilier“ الجزء الأول صفحة ٩٩ سنة ١٩٦٧ ، الفصل الثالث في موضوع أو هدف علم الاجتماع .

بنظرية المراحل الثلاث ، إذ يزعم أن المرحلة الأولى التي مر بها الإنسان هي المرحلة "الدينية" ثم المرحلة "الميتافيزيكية" (الغيبية) ثم المرحلة "العلمية" ، فيجعل الدين سلفاً للعلم إذ كان يحل المشكلات ويفسر الحوادث ، ثم حل العلم محله ، وحل التفسير العلمي محل التفسير الديني ، مع أن لكل منهما موضوعاً ومجالاً للإختصاص ، فالعلم يبحث في تركيب المادة مثلاً ، وقانون سقوط الأجسام ، أو في درجة كثافة الأجسام ، وهذه الأمور لا يبحثها الدين ، فالعلم يبحث كيف تجري حوادث الطبيعة ووفقاً لأي قانون ، ولكنه لا يبحث عن أصلها وكيف وجدت ؟ ومن أوجدها ؟ ومن أوجد قوانينها ؟ والدين لا يبحث في الأولى ويتركها لعقول البشر ولكنه يبحث في الثانية. وهذا على الأقل موقف الإسلام في هذا الموضوع (٥).

وقد تكون نظرية أوغست كونت منطبقة على الدين المسيحي كما وصل إلى أوروبا ، ولكن جهله بالإسلام جعله يعمم هذا التعميم . ونظرية كونت هذه المغلوطة أحدثت آثاراً سيئة جداً في عقيدة كثير من أبناء المسلمين . ومن هذا النوع من المباحث الإجتماعية البحث عن الدين وأصله . ينطلق الباحثون الغربيون من مسلمات عندهم هي نبت بيئتهم ، ونتيجة لرد فعل المسيحية الغربية التي هي مزيج عجيب من الوثنية الرومانية والفلسفة اليونانية والمسيحية أو النصرانية الأصلية التي جاء بها عيسى (عليه السلام) ، وانتهى الأمر بها إلى تناقضات وإلى مصادمات للعقل ، فاصطدمت بالفكر الفلسفي النقدي والفكر العلمي (Scientific = Scientifique) اللذين وفدا من الثقافة الإسلامية في الأندلس وصقلية .

إن النصرانية المبدلة المغيرة والفكر العلمي — الإسلاميّ المصدر — اصطدما ، فكان العلم والفكر النقدي مصادمين للدين في نظر الغربيين . وقد انتهى بهم ذلك إلى نظريات وآراء في الدين غير صحيحة إذا عممت

(٥) أنظر كتابنا نظام الإسلام — العقيدة والعبادة بحث صلة الإنسان بالكون ص ٤٦ - ٤٩ ، الطبعة السادسة .

لا تنطبق على الإسلام ، فالدين في نظرهم ذو منشأ بشري وهو ظاهرة ومؤسسة (Institution) بشرية ، وهو مرحلة سبقت العلم كنظرية لتفسير حوادث الكون ، كما سبق التشريع الديني التشريع الوضعي الذي هو نهاية التطور . هذه الأفكار هي مسلمات عند الغربيين وليست كذلك عندنا ولا عند أي منصف يعرف الإسلام معرفة عميقة صحيحة . والدليل أن آراء علماء الاجتماع في هذا الموضوع ليست حقائق علمية ، إنهم مختلفون جداً في تعليل الدين وعبادة الإله . ويكفي أن نعدد عناوين هذه النظريات التفسيرية أو أبرزها :

- النظرية التي ترجع الأمر إلى عبادة الأرواح أولاً (Animisme) .
- والنظرية التي تعتبر عبادة الطبيعة هي البداية .
- والنظرية التي تنطلق من عبادة الحيوان على أنه جد الجماعة التي تعبد — على زعمهم — وهذه هي النظرية الطوطمية (٦) !
- ونظرية تجسد الضغط الاجتماعي في عقيدة الإله وهي نظرية دوركهايم "Durkheim" . ولو كان الأمر يدور حول حقيقة علمية لما اختلفوا هذا الاختلاف الكبير وأسفوا أحياناً في التعليل إسفافاً عجبياً . وأكثر هذه النظريات نتيجة بحوث ناقصة في الأقوام الإبتدائية في أفريقيا وأمريكا في القرنين الأخيرين ، وهي حتى في هذا المجال مشوبة بكثير من الجهل في فهم الأقوام ، والنقص في الاستقراء (٧) .

ومن هذه النظريات التي لا تقوم على أسس علمية من يدعي عدم وجود فضائل ومثل عليا أخلاقية ذاتية ، وكذلك القول بنسبية الأخلاق ، وهي نظرية أحد زملاء دوركهايم وهو ليفي برول "Levi Bruhl" — وهما

(٦) هذا رأي كبار الباحثين والمفكرين الغربيين . أنظر كتاب المسيح ليس مسيحياً لبرتراند راسل (دار الطليعة — بيروت) وكتاب المسيحية نشأتها وتطورها ، تأليف شارل كيبير ، ترجمة د. عبد الحليم محمود ، (المكتبة العصرية صيدا — بيروت) .

(٧) يشير القرآن الكريم إلى تعليل لطيف لظاهرة عبادة الحيوان ذلك أن الوثنيين كانوا يندرون بعض حيواناتهم لأنهم فتصبح مقدسة .

يهوديان — الذي يقول في كتابه (الأخلاق وعلم العادات) أنه ينفي وجود ما يسمى بالأخلاق أو علم الأخلاق (La Morale) ، وهو يعتبر من أكبر الإختصاصيين في الأقوام الابتدائية وله في ذلك كتب مشهورة^(٨). ثم أعقبه البيربايت "Bayet" في كتابه (علم الظواهر الأخلاقية) .

ومن هذا الباب أيضاً نظرية كارل ماركس "Carl Marx" (١٨٨٣—١٨١٨) في تفسير التاريخ بواسطة الصراع الطبقي والعامل الاقتصادي وبوجه خاص علاقات الإنتاج ، ونظريته في المراحل المتتابعة من القبلية (الشيوعية الابتدائية) إلى الرق ، إلى الإقطاعية ، فالرأسمالية فالإشتراكية ، إنها مجرد افتراضات لم يقم عليها دليل بل إن بعض البلدان الأوروبية كالسويد لم تمر في المرحلة الإقطاعية ، وروسيا التي حصلت فيها الثورة الشيوعية هي أقل تصنيعاً بدرجة كبيرة من انكلترا وألمانيا وفرنسا التي لم يحصل فيها ما تنبأ به . وإن كثيراً من الماركسيين ثاروا على نظريات ماركس ، وانتقدوها انتقادات أضعفت كثيراً من شأنها ومنهم هنري دومان "Henri de Man" في عدد من كتبه و روجيه غارودي "Garoudi" وغيرهما .

إن نظريات ماركس إذا درست باعتبارها ظاهرة إجتماعية في عصر معين تبين أنها رد فعل لما في عصره وبيئته من ظلم الرأسماليين ونقمة الفقراء في مجتمع تعاضمت فيه قيمة المال والحياة المادية حتى أصبحت في قمة القيم ، تبين أنها نتيجة لتلك البيئة والعوامل أكثر من أن تكون تعبيراً عن الحقيقة .

منهج البحث في علم الإجتماع :

إن منهج علم الإجتماع في بحث الظواهر الإجتماعية نفسها معرض لكثير

(٨) لدوركهام كتاب عن الأشكال الابتدائية للحياة الدينية ولزميله ليفي برون كتاب عن عقلية الابتدائيين وجميع هذه الكتب كانت مراجع أساسية لشهادة علم الإجتماع في جامعة باريس .

من الأخطاء في النتائج . ويمكننا أن نستعرض المواطن التي يتسرب منها الخطأ :

(أ) **الهدف** : لا بد لكل بحث إجتماعي من هدف قصد إليه الباحث في نفسه ، أو وُجّه إليه من جهة من الجهات لها رغبة في تحقيق هذا الهدف . تعتمد بعض الحكومات إلى التقليل من عدد السكان تخفيفاً من أعبائها فتوجه الباحثين الإجتاعيين أو تصطنع عدداً منهم ليزينوا فكرة تحديد النسل بطريقة يعطونها الصفة العلمية . ويريد بعض الباحثين أن يقنعوا الناس بالحرية الجنسية فيجندون أنفسهم وتلاميذهم لبحوث يريدون أن يصلوا منها إلى أن الارتباط بالزواج أمر آخذ بالتطور نحو الزوال ، وأنه من صفات أطوار معينة تمر بها البشرية ، وهكذا يزينون الإباحية باعتبارها مرحلة المستقبل وأن حتمية التطور تؤدي إليها . وهذه الأغراض الخبيثة تخفى على أكثر الناس من خلال البحوث ، ويحسنون الظن بهؤلاء الباحثين بسبب انتسابهم للعلم ودوائره مع أنهم من أنواع المجرمين المستترين المستأجرين لمثل هذه الأغراض . وكثيراً ما استأجرت حكومات الإستعمار علماء من بلادها لأغراض استعمارية كإثبات أن البحر الأبيض بحيرة أوروبية ، وأن أفريقيا امتداد لأوروبا ، وأنهما قارة واحدة في الأصل سموها (Europrique) وأن سكان الجزائر من العرق الأبيض الأوروبي .

(ب) **شخصية الباحث** : من الصعب جداً في البحوث الإجتماعية أن يتجرد الباحث من أفكاره وعواطفه وأهوائه الشخصية ومن تأثير بيئته حتى ولو كان في نفسه مستقيماً أميناً خلافاً للعلوم الطبيعية ، وذلك لصلة موضوعات بحثه بأمور هي بالنسبة إليه موضوع حب أو كره أو نفع أو ضرر أو موافقة أو مخالفة . ولكل باحث أفكاره وعواطفه وعصبياته وأهواؤه . إن من الصعب جداً أن تجرد أوروبي يدين بالكاثوليكية ويتعصب لها — ولا سيما في زمن كان شعبه يستعمر شعباً آخر يختلف

عنه قومية ودينا وثقافة — في بحث موضوع يمسّ هذه العصبيات .
أضف إلى هذا أن الباحثين لا يتمتعون جميعهم بالإستقامة والأمانة
التي يستوجبها البحث العلمي ، وقد تحدث عن مثل هذه النماذج السيئة
كلها ستانيسلاس انديرسكى "Stanislas Anderski" في كتابه العلوم
الإجتماعية والشعوذة (Social Sciences as Sorcery).

(ج) وفي مراحل جمع الظواهر الإجتماعية واختيارها وعزلها عن غيرها
وتصنيفها ثم في ربطها بعضها ببعض لتعليلها وتفسيرها ، مجالات كثيرة
للوقوع في الخطأ المقصود وغير المقصود.

وإذا كان البحث في شعب بعيد في حضارته عن شعب الباحث
فكثيراً ما يقع الباحث في سوء فهم في تفسير الظواهر لجهله لهذا
الشعب . ويتعرض الباحث عامة للخطأ بسبب تعقد الحوادث
الإجتماعية وتشابك العوامل والظروف وتعدد الاحتمالات في تفسيرها .
ولذلك كان من الخطورة بمكان أن تلقن نتائج بحوث علماء الإجتماع
الغربيين للطلاب المسلمين مع ما قد يكون فيها من أخطاء وانحرافات
أو تشويهاً على أنها حقائق علمية أو نظريات مسلمة مقبولة ، وقد
نقابلها بحقائق الإسلام الثابتة وأحكامه الصحيحة فنوقعهم في الشك في
الحقائق الثابتة ليحل محلها أباطيل وأخطاء وتشويهاً .

ويتبين مما تقدم أن لعلم الإجتماع ميدانه الخاص الذي لا ينبغي أن
يتجاوزه ، وهو واقع المجتمعات البشرية في حدود كونها عالماً مشهوداً
يمكن ملاحظته واستخراج خصائصه وقوانين حركته وتبدله ، كما يدرس
الطبيعة علماءها المتخصصون . ولا شك في فائدة هذا العلم وبحوثه
ما دام في حدوده المحددة له . وقد اشتغل به العلماء المسلمون سابقاً
بل جاءوا فيه بما لم يسبقوا إليه ، نذكر منهم البيروني والمسعودي وابن
خلدون الذي بلغ فيه قمة من القمم في تاريخ هذا العلم .

ولكن علم الاجتماع على ما هو عليه حالياً في جامعات الغرب في أوروبا وأمريكا لدى الديمقراطيين والإشراكيين أصبح مزيجاً من مباحث علمية مفيدة ومناهج للبحث والتحقيق مضافاً إليها نظريات متفاوتة في قيمتها ، يتخلل ذلك كله عقائد باطلة ومفاهيم منحرفة وقيم زائفة ، تخالف كل المخالفة حقائق تؤمن بها وقيماً نعتقد أنها صالحة للتمسك بها يجمعها الإسلام .

لذلك كان لابد للإستفادة مما في علم الاجتماع من جوانب مفيدة نافعة من إعادة بنائه بناءً صحيحاً على أساس سليم ليوضع في مكانه حينئذ في إطار النظام الإسلامي للتعليم ، أي من منطلق التصور الإسلامي للوجود وللطبيعة وللإنسان وللمجتمع الإنساني .

ونعتقد أنه إذا تم بناء علم الاجتماع على هذه الأسس آتى نتائج هامة ومفيدة للإنسانية بوجه عام لصحة المنطلقات والأسس وسلامة الأهداف ووجود الضوابط الأخلاقية المرتبطة بقيم سامية ، وهي مفيدة ومنتجة بالنسبة للشعوب الإسلامية كلها لانسجامها مع شخصيتها وتجاوبها معها ، وموحدة لهذه الشعوب لوحدة الأسس التربوية والثقافية والقيم الأخلاقية ، وممددة للشعوب الأخرى ومن جملتها الشعوب الغربية بلون جديد في البحوث الإجتماعية بجميع فروعها .

نحو تأسيس علم إجتماع إسلامي :

في ضوء ما تقدم من استعراض لعلم الاجتماع في وضعه الحالي وصيغه الغربية المتعددة ، وما اشتمل عليه من أقسام يمكن أن نصفها أنها علمية ، ومناهج للبحث يمكن قبولها مبدئياً مع الحذر من الوقوع في أخطاء تطبيقاتها ، ومن أقسام أخرى ليست في الأصل من اختصاص علم الاجتماع وما اشتملت عليه من نظريات ومفاهيم عقيدية ألصقت بهذا العلم وأقحمت في مباحثه ، أقول في ضوء هذا التحليل يمكن أن نقترح أسساً ، ونؤصل

قواعد منهجية لعلم إجتماع جديد في إطار التصور الإسلامي كما وضع الإجتماع الغربي في إطار التصور الغربي وفلسفته . وفيما يلي عرض لهذه الأفكار الأساسية :

(١) يشير القرآن إلى الطبيعة الإجتماعية الإنسانية باستمرار كما يشير إلى الطبيعة العامة التي هي أشمل منها ، أعني إلى عالم الجماد والنبات والحيوان بأجزائها وأنواعها وحوادثها . فكما يتردد في القرآن ذكر الأرض والكواكب وأجزاء الأرض من البر والبحر والجبال والسهول والأنهار والأودية والزرورع والنبات والثمار والفواكه والأنعام والدواب وسائر أنواع الحيوان والحديد والفضة والذهب وغير ذلك . يتردد أيضاً ذكر الأمم والأقوام والشعوب والقبائل والعشيرة والأزواج من أنواع التجمعات البشرية .

(٢) وكذلك يشير القرآن إلى الحوادث والظواهر الإجتماعية كما يشير إلى الحوادث الطبيعية كترامم السحب ونزول المطر وسقاية الأرض ونمو النبات واختزان الماء لتكوين الينابيع تحت الأرض ونقصانها وأمثال ذلك . ويذكر القرآن أمثلة من الظواهر الإجتماعية كظاهرة التقليد^(٩) والترف^(١٠) والظلم والاستبداد في الحكم والإجرام وعبادة الأوثان والكواكب ، وتقديس الحيوان ، وعبادة الأرواح من الملائكة والجن ، وواد البنات ، واحتقار المرأة ، وتطيف الكيل والميزان ، واستغلال المستغلين الذين يأكلون أموال الناس بالباطل ، وإلى ظهور الطبقة وامتيازاتها في المجتمع كطبقة رجال الدين ﴿اتخذوا أحبارهم ورهبانهم أرباباً من دون الله﴾ ، التوبة: ٣١ . ﴿إن كثيراً من الأبحار والرهبان ليأكلون أموال الناس بالباطل﴾ ، التوبة: ٣٤ ، وطبقة المتكبرين أو المستكبرين ، وطبقة المستضعفين أو الضعفاء ، وقد تردد ذكر هؤلاء

(٩) ﴿قالوا بل نتبع ما ألفينا عليه آباءنا﴾ البقرة : ١٧٠ . وتكرر هذا المعنى .

(١٠) ورد ذكر ظاهرة الترف في القرآن الكريم سبع مرات .

وأولئك بضع عشرة مرة . ويشير الحديث النبوي كذلك إلى كثير من الظواهر الإجتماعية ويستعمل كلمة (فشا) أو ظهر للدلالة على عموم الظاهرة وانتشارها (ولا فشا الزنى في قوم إلا كثر فيهم الموت) الموطأ، كإشارته إلى ظهور الطبقة والتميز الطبقي في المجتمع ، وتطيف الكيل والميزان ، وتسجيل الديون ، وإشارته إلى نظم الحكم : حكم الشورى في مملكة بلقيس ﴿قالت يا أيها الملأ أفتوني في أمري ما كنت قاطعة أمراً حتى تشهدون﴾ النمل : ٣٢ . وحكم فرعون الاستبدادي ﴿إن فرعون علا في الأرض وجعل أهلها شيعاً يستضعف طائفة منهم...﴾ القصص : ٤ . وإلى تعدد المثل الأخلاقية ﴿كذلك زيناً لكل أمة عملهم﴾ الأنعام : ٦ . ﴿كذلك زين للكافرين ما كانوا يعملون﴾ الأنعام : ١٢٢ . وإلى الظاهرة اللغوية ﴿ومن آياته خلق السموات والأرض واختلاف ألسنتكم وألوانكم﴾، الروم : ٢٢ . ﴿وما أرسلنا من رسول إلا بلسان قومه ليبين لهم﴾ ابراهيم : ٤ . (٣) كما يشير القرآن الكريم إلى ارتباط حوادث الطبيعة بعضها ببعض ارتباطاً مطرداً منتظماً ، إذ يدل على تتابع حادثين : سابق — جرت العادة أن يسمى سبباً — ولاحق — جرت العادة أن يسمى مسبباً أو نتيجة — تتابعاً مطرداً باستمرار كنزول المطر ونمو النبات ، يشير كذلك إلى ارتباط الحوادث الإجتماعية مثل هذا الارتباط المطرد الذي يسميه علماء الطبيعة وعلماء الاجتماع قانوناً .

يتكرر في القرآن الكريم مثلاً حصول الهلاك بعد ظهور الظلم : ﴿فتلك بيوتهم خاوية بما ظلموا﴾ النمل : ٥٢ . ﴿وكم قصمنا من قرية كانت ظالمة وأنشأنا بعدها قوماً آخرين﴾ الأنبياء : ١١ . ﴿فكأين من قرية أهلكناها وهي ظالمة﴾ الحج : ٤٥ . بل أن هذا الارتباط له قانون زمني ﴿وتلك القرى أهلكناهم لما ظلموا وجعلنا لمهلكهم موعداً﴾ الكهف : ٥٩ . ﴿وهل يهلك إلا القوم الظالمون﴾. الأنعام : ٤٧ .

وكذلك ظاهرة الترف فقد تكررت في القرآن واقتربت بالفسق ومحاربة دعوات الأنبياء الإصلاحية وتقليد الآباء والإجرام والهلاك ﴿وإذا أردنا أن نهلك قرية أمرنا مترفياً ففسقوا فيها فحق عليها القول فدمرناها تدميراً﴾ الإسراء : ١٦ . ﴿واتبع الذين ظلموا ما أترفوا فيه وكانوا مجرمين﴾ هود : ١١٦ . ﴿وما أرسلنا في قرية من نذير إلا قال مترفوها إنا بما أرسلتم به كافرون﴾ سبأ : ٣٤ . ﴿وكذلك ما أرسلنا من قبلك من نذير إلا قال مترفوها إنا وجدنا آباءنا على أمة وإنا على آثارهم مقتدون﴾ الزخرف : ٢٣ ، وهناك آيات أخرى غير هذه ونكتفي بما أوردنا .

ويشير الحديث النبوي إلى هذا الارتباط بين الظواهر الاجتماعية كربطه لعدة ظواهر بنتائجها في الحديث التالي :

عن ابن عباس قال : قال رسول الله ﷺ : [ما ظهر الغلول في قوم إلا ألقى تعالى في قلوبهم الرعب ، ولا فشا الزنى في قوم إلا كثر فيهم الموت ، ولا نقص قوم المكيال والميزان إلا قطع عنهم الرزق ، ولا حكم قوم بغير حق إلا فشا فيهم الدم ، ولا ختر قوم بالعهد إلا سلط الله عليهم العدو] الموطأ .

لنأخذ بعض ما ورد في الحديث لبيان الارتباط :

(أ) الغلول وهو السرقة من الأموال العامة . فإذا فشت بين الموظفين وأفراد الشعب كان كل واحد منهم خائفاً على نفسه من أن تعرف خيانتة وليس الرعب إلا هذا الخوف المستمر المفقد للشجاعة ونقد الآخرين نقداً جريماً .

(ب) الزنى ، إذا انتشر أدى إلى قلة الزواج وقلة النسل فيقل عدد السكان أو على الأقل لا يحصل الإزدياد المنتظر وهي المشكلة المعروفة بقلة عدد السكان التي تهتم بها الحكومات وتبحث عن عواملها عن طريق الباحثين الاجتماعيين ويمكن أن يلاحظ انتشار الأمراض المؤثرة في صحة السكان وقلة تناسلهم .

(ج) الحكم بغير الحق (الظلم في القضاء) يؤدي إلى انتشار الثأر ليأخذ صاحب الحق حقه بنفسه لأن القاضي لم يعطه حقه فيؤدي ذلك إلى النزاع والتقاتل .

قد يكون الترابط بين ظاهرتين عن طريق وسائط من ظاهرات أخرى لم تذكر ، إنما يذكر من سلسلة الأحداث بدايتها ونهايتها وهذا لا ينفي الإرتباط السببي ولذلك نظير في الآيات المتعلقة بالحوادث الطبيعية كقوله تعالى ﴿وأنزلنا من السماء ماءً فأنبثنا فيها من كل زوج كريم﴾ لقمان : ١٠ . فبين نزول الماء وظهور النبات عمليات وسيطة محذوفة ولكن الربط السببي ظاهر في هذه الآيات وكثير غيرها بمعناها .

(٤) إذا كان القرآن الكريم ، وكذلك الحديث يشيران إلى ارتباط ظاهرتين إجتماعيتين ارتباطاً مطرداً فمعنى ذلك أنَّهما من القوانين الإجتماعية (سنن الله في المجتمع الإنساني) ، إذ ليس القانون الإجتماعي إلاّ الترابط المطرد بطريقة ما بين ظاهرتين أو ظواهر إجتماعية . بل إن القرآن الكريم يذكر صراحة أن الله سنناً في الأمم والجماعات ويدعو إلى السير إليها والتفكر فيها ﴿سنة الله في الذين خلوا من قبل ولن تجد لسنة الله تبديلاً﴾ الأحزاب : ٧٢ ، ﴿قد خلت من قبلكم سنن فسيروا في الأرض فانظروا كيف كان عاقبة المكذبين﴾ آل عمران : ١٣٧ .

إن القرآن يلفت النظر إلى أن سننه في المجتمع صارمة ودقيقة كسننه في الطبيعة ، وإن الأمم لها آجال كالأفراد تبعاً لأسباب قدرها في صحتها وأمراضها ، لكل أمةٍ أجل ﴿فإذا جاء أجلهم فلا يستأخرون ساعة ولا يستقدمون﴾ يونس : ٤٩ ﴿ماتسبق من أمة أجلها وما يستأخرون﴾ المؤمنون : ٤٣ .

وقد يصوغ القرآن الكريم القانون الإجتماعي بالمعنى الواقعي . وهو غير المعنى التشريعي كقوله تعالى ﴿ولكم في القصاص حياة﴾ البقرة : ١٧٩ .

وكقوله حكاية عن بلقيس ملكة سبا في حديثها عن سليمان ﴿إِنَّ الْمُلُوكَ إِذَا دَخَلُوا قَرْيَةً أَفْسَدُوهَا﴾ التمل : ٣٤ . وهنا ينتهي كلامها كما يرى ابن عباس وتنتهي الآية بقول الله المعبر عن قانون إجتماعي وسنة غالبية ﴿وَكَذَلِكَ يَفْعَلُونَ﴾ التمل : ٣٤ أي هكذا عادة الملوك والقانون العام لسيرهم .

ولكن يجب التنبيه هنا إلى أن الله لم يقصد أن يجعل كتابه كتاب إجتماع ، أو كتاب كيمياء أو فلك ، وإنما وجه الإنسان إلى النظر في الكون والتفكير فيما في ظاهره وباطنه ، لِيَسْتَنَّهُ هو بنفسه سنن الله فيه مما يقدر عليه ووكله الله إليه ، تدفعه إلى ذلك دوافع المنفعة والمصلحة والمتعة . والله أشار إليه ووجهه بل أمره وحضه على ذلك ، وهكذا الحال في سننه في الجماعات . **فَالْقُرْآنَ الْكَرِيمَ** كتاب هداية عن طريق التوجيه تارة فيما يمكن للإنسان أن يصل إليه وعن طريق التعليم والدلالة فيما لا يمكن أن يصل إليه أو فيما يحتمل أن يصل إليه بعد خسارة كبيرة للإنسانية . وتلك هي المعالم والأحكام المحددة في الأخلاق والتشريع . وقوانين علم الإجتماع كقوانين الطبيعة هي من النوع الأول وجه الإنسان إليها وحضه على النظر والتفكير فيها والإستماع إليها . ولذلك يقترن الحديث عن الموضوعات الإجتماعية بألفاظ التفكير والعلم والسماع والنظر كقوله تعالى في الكلام عن الزواج وعلاقاته وأهدافه ﴿وَمِنْ آيَاتِهِ أَنْ خَلَقَ لَكُمْ مِنْ أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَزْوَاجًا لِتَسْكُنُوا إِلَيْهَا وَجَعَلَ بَيْنَكُمْ مَوَدَّةً وَرَحْمَةً إِنَّ فِي ذَلِكَ لآيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يَتَفَكَّرُونَ﴾ الروم : ٢١ ، وفي الكلام عن عاقبة الإجرام ﴿قُلْ سِيرُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ فَانظُرُوا كَيْفَ كَانَ عَاقِبَةُ الْمُجْرِمِينَ﴾ التمل : ٦٩ . فما جاء في القرآن الكريم من الإشارة إلى سنن الله في المجتمعات إنما هو أمثلة ونماذج للإعتبار وليست للاستقصاء فذلك متروك لتفكير الإنسان وبحثه وتجربته . وأخيراً فإن اتصاف الظاهرة الإجتماعية والقانون الإجتماعي بالعموم والشمول يصرح

به القرآن الكريم والحديث النبوي الشريف وذلك في قوله تعالى ﴿واتقوا فتنة لا تصيبن الذين ظلموا منكم خاصة﴾ الأنفال : ٢٥ ، وفي الحديث (قالوا يا رسول الله أنهلك وفينا الصالحون ؟ قال : نعم إذا كثر الخبث) البخاري والموطأ.

(٥) التغير والتغيير : المجتمع الإنساني كما يبدو في القرآن والحديث متغير متبدل ولتغيره عوامل وأسباب . فما أكثر ما يتحدث القرآن عن تبدل الأجيال . ويستعمل القرآن لفظ القرن والقرون بهذا المعنى . كقوله تعالى ﴿وكم أهلكنا قبلهم من قرن مكناهم في الأرض ما لم نمكن لكم وأرسلنا السماء عليهم مدرارا وجعلنا الأنهار تجري من تحتهم فاهلكناهم بذنوبهم وأنشأنا من بعدهم قرناً آخرين﴾ الأنعام : ٦ .

والذنوب التي لم تفصل هنا هي تلك الآفات والأمراض الاجتماعية التي جعلها الله سبباً وعاملاً في هلاكهم ، وقد ورد بهذا المعنى بضع عشرة آية تتضمن الهلاك استعمل فيها لفظ القرن والقرون بمعنى الجيل والأجيال وآيات أخرى تتضمن هلاك المدن كقوله تعالى : ﴿وكم أهلكنا من قرية بطرت معيشتها﴾ القصص : ٥٨ ، ويشير هنا إلى سبب الهلاك وهو البطر حيث تنعدم الدوافع المثالية التي تنشئ الحضارات وتديم حياتها .

إن الكلام عن تبدل المجتمعات من حال إلى حال وهلاك الأمم والأقوام والقرون أي الأجيال كثير جداً في القرآن الكريم ، وهو مقترن بالدعوة إلى التفكير والتأمل والإعتبار ، ويغلب عليه الصيغة المجردة من التفصيلات التاريخية والحوادث الشخصية فهو أقرب إلى صيغ علم الإجتماع منه إلى التاريخ . ولو استعرضنا هذه الآيات الكثيرة لوجدنا أن القرآن الكريم يخرجنا من النطاق المحدود في إطار زمن معين ، وقوم معينين ، وقبيلة معينة ، ويجعلنا نطل على المجتمع الإنساني في إطاره العام الشامل للشعوب والأمم الخاضعة كلها السنن واحدة في التغيير .

عوامل التغيير :

إن في القرآن والحديث إشارات لعوامل التغيير ، وليس ذلك على سبيل الحصر ولا على طريقة البحث العلمي لأن ذلك متروك لتفكير البشر واجتهاداتهم ، فالقرآن كتاب هداية لجمهرة الناس وليس مقصوراً على الخاصة وهدفه هدايتهم وإرشادهم و دلالتهم . ولذلك يكفي أن يشير القرآن ويدل على أن الظلم والبطر والترف تسبب هلاك الأمم لتحصل العبرة والفائدة العملية . ولكن على العالم الباحث أن يفتش فيما وراء كلمة الظلم من أنواع كالظلم السياسي والإستبداد والإستعلاء ، والظلم الإقتصادي أو المالي كظلم المرابين والأغنياء للدائنين والفقراء ، وظلم القضاة والحكام للمتقاضين والمحكومين ، وهكذا له أن يحلل مفهوم البطر والترف والإسراف الواردة كذلك في آيات كثيرة على أنه من أسباب تبدل النعم ودمار الأمم .

من هذه الإشارات ما ورد في الحديث عن تأثير البيئة الجغرافية في الأخلاق وذلك قوله عليه الصلاة والسلام : (من بدا جفا) ، وفي رواية (من سكن البادية جفا) أخرجه الترمذي والنسائي .

وكذلك الإشارة إلى تأثير العامل الإقتصادي في الحديث (اللهم إني أعوذ بك من الكفر والفقر) أخرجه النسائي في الاستعاذة إذ قرن بين الكفر والفقر فجعلهما مصيبتين متعادلتين من جهة وأشار من جهة أخرى إلى ما يوجد الفقر من إستعداد لتغير العقيدة ، وهذا الحديث الصحيح يقوى معنى الحديث الآخر وهو ضعيف ونصه (كاد الفقر أن يكون كفرا) وبيئة الفقر هي البيئة المستعدة للثورة على أوضاع المجتمع وعقائده . لذلك شرع الإسلام أحكاماً كثيرة لإزالة الفقر بطريقتين ؛ طريق الإلزام بواسطة أولى الأمر ؛ وطريق الأخلاق بالحض والترغيب . وفي مقابل ذلك أشار القرآن إلى أن المترفين يميلون إلى التقليد واستمرار الأوضاع الفاسدة ولا يجوبون التغيير الصالح ، ويقفون أما دعوات الأنبياء والمصلحين .

ونجد في القرآن الكريم إشارة سريعة إلى العلاقة بين التمكن من إقامة الشعائر الدينية وعبادة الله ووجود الوسائل المادية المساعدة وذلك في قوله تعالى على لسان ابراهيم عليه السلام ﴿ربنا إني أسكنت من ذريتي بواد غير ذي زرع عند بيتك المحرم ربنا ليقيموا الصلاة فاجعل أفئدة من الناس تهوى إليهم وارزقهم من الثمرات لعلهم يشكرون﴾ ، ابراهيم: ٣٧ .

ويشير القرآن الكريم إلى أن البشر إذا اقتصروا في تطعمهم وهدفهم إلى الحياة الدنيا وحدها فإن النتيجة هي الصراع بين الكتل البشرية حول المال . إن القانون مشروط بإطار الحياة الدنيا وذلك في قوله تعالى ﴿اعلموا أنما الحياة الدنيا لعب ولهو وزينة وتفاخر بينكم وتكاثر في الأموال والأولاد﴾ الحديد : ٢٠ . الصراع لزيادة عدد السكان ولزيادة الأموال وحيازتها ولكن مفعول هذا القانون المشروط يتغير إذا جعل الإطار شاملاً للحياة الآخرة وما تتطلبه من مثل عليا فيصبح المال أداة ووسيلة لا غاية ويأخذ الصراع شكلاً آخر وهو التنافس على العمل الصالح في الدنيا ، لسباق — ولا نقول صراع — أوسع وأبعد ، وهذا ما تشير إليه الآية التالية : ﴿سابقوا إلى مغفرة من ربكم وجنة عرضها كعرض السماء والأرض...﴾ ، الحديد : ٢١ .

ويؤكد هذا المعنى ما تشير إليه الآية الكريمة الأخرى من عوامل العصبية وحب المال والأرض في مقابل المثل العليا التي يدعو الله ورسوله إليها ويريد أن تكون هي العليا والمهيمنة : ﴿قل إن كان آباؤكم وأبناؤكم وأزواجكم وعشيرتكم وأموال اقترفتموها وتجارة تخشون كسادها ومساكن ترضونها أحب إليكم من الله ورسوله وجهاد في سبيله فتربصوا حتى يأتي الله بأمره...﴾ التوبة : ٢٤ .

ويشير النبي ﷺ إلى عامل الوراثة في قوله : (اغربوا لا تضووا) أي تزوجوا من البعيدين عنكم في القرابة لئلا يخرج النسل ضاويًا هزيلًا .
وأما أثر العامل الاعتقادي فالقرآن الكريم ملء بشواهد عليه في حياة

الأفراد . كصاحب الجنتين في سورة الكهف ، وفي حياة الجماعات وماتولده فيها العقائد الوثنية بأنواعها من نتائج سيئة كعبادة الشمس في مملكة سبأ و عبادة فرعون من شعبه وعبادة الكواكب في قوم ابراهيم ، وشعب ما بين النهرين ، وعبادة الأوثان وتقديس الحيوانات المذكورة للإله إلى غير ذلك .

إن هذا التفكير السببي المستند إلى العوامل المؤثرة في الحياة الاجتماعية والذي هو من إحياء الآيات القرآنية والأحاديث النبوية نجد أثره واضحاً في تفكير علماء المسلمين من الفقهاء والمؤرخين وعلماء الأقوام والمجتمعات ويمكن أن نأتي ببعض الأمثلة على ذلك .

سئل الإمام مالك عن رأيه في التسعير على الجزارين فأجازه ولكنه أضاف : ”أخاف أن يقوموا من السوق“ ، وقال الفقيه المالكي أبو الوليد الباجي : ”إن ذلك يؤدي إلى إخفاء الأقوات“ .

وهذا التفكير المعلن بأسبابه في الأمور الاقتصادية والاجتماعية عامة مسيطر على تفكير علماء المسلمين . ويمكنك الرجوع إلى كتاب الحسبة لابن تيمية لمزيد من التفاصيل .

ونعتقد أن هذا التفكير العلمي في الميدان الاجتماعي الذي وجه إليه القرآن الكريم كان السبب في ظهور مؤلفات في دراسة الشعوب وعاداتهم ككتاب البيروني عن الهند ومؤلفات المسعودي ، وهذه كلها من نوع ما يسمى اليوم (علم الشعوب والأقوام) وهذا الإنتاج هو البداية التي انتهت بعد عدة قرون بظهور مقدمة ابن خلدون التي كان فيها أول رائد في العالم لعلم الاجتماع الحديث .

التغيير :

إن الإسلام بناء على ما تبين في القرآن والحديث من تحرك المجتمع وتغيره بسبب عوامل التغيير يدعو إلى التطبيق العملي لعلم الاجتماع أو إلى القسم

الأخلاقي التطبيقي ، فيدعو المسلم إلى تغيير المجتمعات تغييراً نحو الأفضل ، ابتداءً من تفويض عقائد الوثنية والشرك ذات النتائج الضارة في جميع المجالات ، إلى تفويض النظم الفاسدة والجاثرة كالنظم السياسية والاقتصادية عن طريق الدعوة أولاً ، ثم عن طريق الجهاد بأنواعه إذا اقتضى الأمر ذلك .

قال الصحابي ربيعي بن عامر لقائد الفرس أثر إغرائه له بالرجوع عن الحرب : ”إن الله ابتعثنا لنخرج الناس من عبادة العباد إلى عبادة الله و من جور الأديان إلى عدل الإسلام ومن ضيق الدنيا إلى سعتها“ .

إن قانون التغيير الإجتماعي أمر وجودي واقع نص عليه القرآن الكريم صراحة في قوله تعالى : ﴿ذَلِكَ بِأَنَّ اللَّهَ لَمْ يَكْ مَغْيِرًا نِعْمَةً أَنْعَمَهَا عَلَى قَوْمٍ حَتَّى يُغْيِرُوا مَا بَأْنَفْسِهِمْ﴾ الأنفال : ٥٣ .

والله تعالى — كما يقول ابن تيمية — عودنا أن يفعل بالأسباب ، وكذلك تغيير هذه النعمة إنما يقدر الله لها أسباباً حتى تتغير ، وهذه الأسباب هي ما يفعله هؤلاء القوم من أمور سيئة تكون عاملاً في هذا التغيير .

وهذه الفكرة (أي فكرة التغيير وإمكانه وكونه مطلوباً) عبرت عنها الآية الأخرى : ﴿إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُغْيِرُ مَا بِقَوْمٍ حَتَّى يُغْيِرُوا مَا بَأْنَفْسِهِمْ﴾ الرعد : ١١ ، وهي تشمل التغيير في الإتجاهين الحسن والأفضل ونحو الأسوأ . ونقطة الإنطلاق فيها تبدأ من الإنسان فهو الذي يبدأ بالتغيير ليصل إلى حال أحسن أو إلى حال أسوأ . ومعنى هذا أن الإنسان قادر على تغيير المجتمع ، وأن الله أعطاه هذه القدرة ودله على الطريق وهو معرفة أسباب التغيير وعوامله . إن الإسلام طلب تغيير الشرك بالتوحيد ، والجهل بالعلم ، والكسل والبطالة بالعمل ، والفقر بالغنى غير المبطر ، والضعف بالقوة ، والأثرة بالتضامن ، والفحش بالعفة ، إلى غير ذلك من نظام القيم الإسلامية . إن الإسلام جعل للتغيير أهدافاً وطلب العمل والمثابرة والجهاد للوصول إلى هذه الأهداف ، وجعل للتغيير طريقاً وهو حسب التعبير القرآني

(تغيير الأنفس) ويشكل هذا التغيير نوعين : تغيير (الأنفس) مجموعة وذلك هو المجتمع ، وتغيير (النفس) بالنسبة للفرد .

والخلاصة :

(١) إن المفهوم العلمي لعلم الاجتماع باعتباره دراسة واقعية موضوعية للمجتمع الإنساني لحوادثه وظواهره (والظاهرة هي الحادثة المتكررة العامة) ، واستخراج سنن حركتها وتغيرها و تطورها ومراحلها ودراسة التجمعات البشرية والمؤسسات الاجتماعية كالأسرة والدولة ، أن هذا المفهوم مقبول بل مائل وموجود في نصوص الإسلام في الكتاب الكريم والسنة النبوية الشريفة . وقد انطبع في أذهان المسلمين وأقبل علماء المسلمين على السير من منطلقاته ويمكننا اليوم أن نسير فيه ونستفيد كذلك من تجارب غيرنا في ميادينه .

(٢) أما النظريات الخارجة عن هذا النطاق والتي هي من قبيل "ميتافيزيك" علم الاجتماع فينبغي أن يكون مصدرها ومنطلقها هو الإسلام نفسه ، إذ أن للإسلام نظرات محددة في أصل الأديان ونشأتها و تعاقب النبوات وتتابع تشريعاتها وأحكامها ، كما أن فيه مفهوماً للأمة وموقفاً نظرياً وعملياً من التطور الإنساني من القبيلة إلى التعارف الإنساني الذي يجمع وينسق بين جميع أنواع الأشكال الاجتماعية . فما علينا إلا أن نستخرج هذه النظرات ونصوغها لنضعها في مكانها من علم الاجتماع بالمعنى الواسع بدلاً من النظريات المبنية على مفاهيم عقيدية أخرى .

(٣) وهناك قسم ثالث وهو دراسة قضايا إجتماعية متعددة من خلال التشريع الإسلامي ، أو كما يقدمها الإسلام ، وعرضها بالطريقة الاجتماعية ووضعها في موقعها وفي إطارها العام . مثال ذلك الأسرة كما يحددها الإسلام من جهة تكوينها وتركيبها ووظائفها وشخصية أفرادها الحقوقية ، إلى غير ذلك من خصائصها ، ثم مقارنتها بأنواع الأسرة الأبوية الكبيرة المعروفة في التاريخ والأسرة الزوجية المنتشرة في العصر

الحاضر وبذلك تتحدد صفاتها وتصنيفها الإجتماعي بين أشكال الأسرة . ومن هذا القبيل بحث فكرة المسؤولية في التشريع الإسلامي وتحديد صفاتها مستنبطة من الأحكام الفقهية في أحكام المعاملات والجنايات ، ثم الإطلاع على ما كتب من بحوث في تطور المسؤولية خلال التاريخ ، وستظهر في مثل هذه الدراسات المقارنة عظمة الإسلام وخلوده .

(٤) هناك قسم رابع يشتمل على بحوث ميدانية في المجتمع الإسلامي المعاصر ، فيما هو من اختصاص علم الإجتماع ، ويقصد التغيير نحو الأفضل وفقاً للأهداف التي حددها الإسلام ، كدراسة العقائد الدخيلة و التيارات الفكرية ، ودراسة موضوعات الطلاق والعمل والملكية وعلاقات الإنتاج ومرحلة التصنيع ، ودراسة رواسب العصور والتخلف من الأفكار المدسوسة على الإسلام كالتواكل وإسقاط التدبير والإعتقاد بالخرافات التي حاربها الإسلام ، وسائر أسباب التخلف .

هذه خطة مقترحة لصياغة إسلامية لعلم الإجتماع في خطوطها الكبرى وهي وليدة تفكير في الموضوع منذ سنين طويلة كانت البداية الأولى منها منذ أيام دراستي لعلم الإجتماع في جامعة باريس ، ثم كنت أعاود التفكير فيها خلال تدريسي لعلم الإجتماع في كلية الشريعة في جامعة دمشق ، وفي كلية البنات في جامعة أم درمان الإسلامية ، إذ استجيب لاقتراحي بتدريس علم الإجتماع بطريقة إسلامية تحت إسم (النظرية الإجتماعية الإسلامية) — وإن كنت لم أرتض هذه التسمية — ومن خلال أبحاث أخرى إجتماعية إسلامية كالأسرة والمسئولية والأمة .

وأني أرجو أن تتضافر الجهود ، ولا سيما جهود المتخصصين لشق هذا الطريق الجديد وتعبيده ، ثم إقراره لدى الرأي العام العلمي في البلاد الإسلامية ، ليستفاد حينئذ من تدريس علم الإجتماع وليكون

عوناً على تقوية الإسلام ، ولنزيل الآثار السيئة التي تركها علم الاجتماع في صيغته الغربية ، ولتنشط البحوث العلمية كذلك في مراكز البحث والإختصاص للإسهام على الصعيد العالمي في ترقية علم الاجتماع بوجه عام ، ليكون أداة نفع للإنسانية لا أداة للمتاجرة بأسم العلم لحساب مراكز الإستعمار والتبشير بالنظم العقيدية المحطمة للعالم الإسلامي وللشخصية الإسلامية ، وأداة بيد أساطين الصهيونية العالمية من أساتذة الجامعات في الغرب للإفساد والتدمير . والله هو المستعان في إنجاح القصد والتوفيق لما فيه الخير والسعادة ..

ABOUT THIS BOOK

1977 (1397 A.H.) some of the most committed and concerned Muslim scholars from around the world were invited to attend a major seminar in Switzerland to address the crisis of thought faced by the Muslim Ummah. The seminar reflected a general consensus about the need to reform contemporary Islamic thought and to redefine the intellectual and academic basis for the Islamization of knowledge.

At the beginning of the new *Hijrah* century 1981 (1401 A.H.) the International Institute of Islamic Thought was incorporated in the U.S. as an Islamic academic and research Institute committed towards working for the reconstruction of Muslim thought and the Islamization of Knowledge. As one of its first undertakings, the IIIT, in cooperation with the National *Hijrah* Centenary Celebration Committee and the International Islamic University of Islamabad, Pakistan, sponsored the Second International Conference on the Islamization of Knowledge in 1982 (1402 A.H.). Held in Pakistan, the conference provided a world-wide forum for Muslim scholars and thinkers to report developments in Islamic thought and exchange ideas.

This book focuses upon 17 selected papers presented at this conference by distinguished scholars. They embrace the critical topics of the "Perspective on Islamization of Knowledge," the "Perspective on the Islamization of Disciplines" and "Islamizing Individual Disciplines."

One of the major papers presented, and included in this book, was the now widely acclaimed monograph and IIIT publication, *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan*, edited by the late Dr. Ismā'īl R. al Fārūqī. Another major paper, also included in this book, was that of Dr. 'AbdulḤamīd AbūSulaymān, entitled, *The Islamization of Knowledge: A New Approach toward Reform of Contemporary Knowledge*. Other highlights include pioneering works such as *Naḥwa Ṣiyāghah Islāmīyah li 'Ilm al Ijtimā'* (Toward an Islamic formulation of sociology), by (late) Muhammad al Mubarak, and *Uṣūl al Fiqh: Manhaj Baḥth wa Ma'rifat al Fiqh al Islāmī* (The Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence: Methodology of Research and Study of Islamic Law), by Dr. 'Abd al-Jābir al 'Alwānī.

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT

The International Institute of Islamic Thought was founded in 1401 AH/1981 AC to revive and promote Islamic thought and the Islamization of knowledge in the contemporary disciplines. It also explores the potential to package knowledge in specifically Islamic disciplines derived from *Tawhīd* and the Sharī'ah.

The Institute intends to achieve its goals by using various means for promoting research in the social sciences, particularly methodology and the philosophy of science. The objective is to address the problems pertinent to Islam, the Muslim community and the world through the principles, concepts and values of the Islamic paradigm.

The basic means to achieve these goals are specialized seminars, conferences, and the production of scholarly works. The Institute grants scholarships and offers guidance and supervision to graduate students. It is also planning to establish and promote specialized programs of higher studies to help lay a firm intellectual base, necessary to strengthen the creative role of Islam and Islamic culture.

The Institute publishes scholarly works from its own programs as well as contributions from scholars around the world. It also makes important Islamic scholarly works accessible in Arabic, English and other major languages of the world. The Institute welcomes all kinds of academic cooperation and contributions from all sources concerned with the progress of Islamic thought and knowledge.

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