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OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT



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ISLAMIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE (17)

CONTRIBUTION OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT TO MODERN ECONOMICS

Proceedings of the economics seminar held
jointly by al Azhar University and the International
Institute of Islamic Thought (Cairo, 1988/1409)

V. II (English)


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Economic Doctrines of Islam:

A Study in The Doctrines of Islam and their Implications for Poverty, Employment and Economic Growth

Irfan Ul Haq



Allah (SWT) calls the Qur'an "guidance for mankind." Consequently, it provides the human being with the comprehensive criteria for his nature-remolding and society-building activities. The Qur'an not only defines man's beliefs but also establishes what he is to do, as well as how and why.

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
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Edited by Ehsan Ahmed



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
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Economic Growth and Human Resource Development in an Islamic Perspective

Proceedings of the Fourth International Islamic Economics Seminar

Edited by Ehsan Ahmad



Economic Growth and Human Resource Development in an Islamic Perspective

**Edited by
Ehsan Ahmad**



This book is a collection of eight selected papers read at the Fourth International Islamic Economics Seminar held at the World Bank during 1992. The workshop was sponsored by the Association of Muslim Social Scientists and the International Institute of Islamic Thought. The papers examine various aspects of modern economic life and how Islamic principles can be used to further the development of Muslim peoples.

At a time when many Muslim countries remain economically dependent upon the West either for financing or financial services to manage their economy and development programs, there is an urgent need for Muslim economists to undertake research that will lessen this dependency. The scholarly writings in this book are a step in the right direction.

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
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Edited by Zaidi Sattar



The book is a collection of the work of a group of economists committed to the advancement of Islamic economics. This collection, which is representative of the thinking of economists of the Muslim world, attempts to define the principles of managing a country's resources within the framework of Islamic principles.

The authors challenge the view that western capitalism holds a universal answer for all societies and argue that an Islamic system guided by the principles laid down in the Qur'an and embracing economic relationships of property ownership, work compensation, profit and loss, and risk taking provides a viable alternative, one that governs not only economic activity but the complete development of the human person—spiritual, moral, and economic. The authors do not view economics in isolation but as an essential element of social growth determining the mobilization and sharing of the resources of the Muslim state.

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Introduction

Misbah Oreibi

This book contains papers presented at the Conference on the Contribution of Islamic Thought to Modern Economics held in Cairo, Egypt, on 25-28 Muḥarram, 1409 A.H./ 6-9 September, 1988 A.C. sponsored by Salih Kamil Center for Islamic Commercial Research and Studies at al Azhar University and the International Institute of Islamic Thought.

Islamic economics is not entirely a new subject; it has been developed as an integral part of the wider subject of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and is as old as the Islamic way of life. *Fiqh al mu'āmalāt* branch of Islamic jurisprudence covered different aspects of economic activities such as market organization, sale contracts, financial dealings, types of company structures in production and consumer protection. Gradually, international trade became an important economic sector that required tariff estimation and collection, organized transport facilities and trained personnel.

The economic life of the early Muslim community grew in complexity with the expansion of Islam into most parts of the world and international trade played an important role in this expansion. In the process of Islamic expansion new peoples accepted Islam and new territories and countries became part of the caliphate (*khilāfah*). Muslims encountered new and complex methods of production, new technology, and a wider range of products and crops. The free exchange of goods and the free movement of people within the Muslim state enhanced the well-being of its citizens, increased its financial resources thereby allowing it to extend welfare services to all its citizens, irrespective of their belief, race, or background. Even when the unity of the caliphate was no longer sustainable, the free exchange of goods and capital and the free movement of people continued to be the rule rather than the exception.

Islamic scholars studied economic exchange in the light of the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah, and established basic principles for the protection of consumers, workers, merchants, and financiers. Ijtihad (opinion) was used to develop further al *mu'āmalāt* for smoother economic exchange whenever that was needed. For example, the *salām* sale contract (a contract allowing full payment in advance) was introduced to meet the special needs of agricultural producers.

However, the development of Islamic economics like all other intellectual activities came to a halt with the disintegration of the khilāfah and the decline of Islamic civilization. The rising powers of the European nation states, who occupied the Muslim lands, imposed their own social and economic systems. The newly imposed way of life was buttressed by secular education. Islamic education was confined to traditional *madāris* (religious schools), depriving the Muslim community of its most valuable and dynamic support to revitalize itself.

Islamic awakening needed a new economic doctrine, efficient and morally superior to the secular economic doctrines dominating the modern world. A few Muslim economists championed the reintroduction of Islamic economic doctrine. They held conferences, seminars and workshops. They published papers and books that attracted the attention of economists, students and learned circles in the Muslim world as well as in Western countries.

This conference is part of the intense on going efforts to reintroduce Islamic economics on more firm theoretical grounds. Parallel to this theoretical effort, some Muslim businessmen put into practice the concept of Islamic banking, creating interest-free banks. In spite of the difficulties engendered by the international financial system, and the rather negative attitude of governments in the Muslim world, Islamic banking proved to be successful. The venture of interest-free banking has confirmed moral principles as a base for successful financial intermediation. Demand for the services of interest-free banking has expanded in the last decade. Islamic banks are now handling over 80 billion US dollars.

Muslim economists who studied modern economics and mastered the tools of economic analysis, turned to researching Islamic

economics not only to prove the feasibility of an interest-free economic system, but also to prove its fundamental moral and spiritual superiority. At the center of the economic model, Islam replaces the selfish and greedy individual with the individual shaped by strong moral and spiritual values. A Muslim, as an economic agent, is not the classic economic man—an agent of greed and selfishness. Although, in a Muslim society, greedy and selfish individuals do exist, they are the exception rather than the norm.

The papers included in this volume are part of the ongoing effort to reintroduce Islamic economics using modern analytical tools. The first two papers are concerned with teaching Islamic economic programs. The first one by Iqbal and the second one by Khan discuss in detail the existing Islamic economic programs and introduce new ideas and concepts to improve on its teaching and research.

Iqbal compares different existing curricula for teaching Islamic economics in four well-known Islamic educational institutions. He carefully considers the objectives of teaching Islamic economics, highlighting the balance in the existing programs between the traditional shari'ah contents with those of modern economics. Detailed information on the existing programs is presented in an appendix, where comparison can easily be made.

Khan's paper covers extensive ground and points in the direction of further research. His handling of the microeconomics program for the undergraduate level is complete and profound. Microeconomics lies at the center of economic analysis. We are now considering the micro-foundations of macroeconomics. A well designed program of microeconomics is vital to any teaching program. Khan's methodology, prerequisites, coverage, and duration of Islamic economics courses, digs deeply into the epistemological foundations of Islamic economics, discussing the concept of ownership in Islam, the theory of demand, work and leisure, and intertemporal choices. In each of these basic topics, he explores new grounds and points to new directions for further research. He goes into detailed discussions of the theories of production, distribution, costs, and the firm in a comprehensive teaching program of Islamic economics that he suggests for undergraduates in an Islamic university.

The third paper, by Chapra, is centered around economic development strategy. He explores the differences between what he calls the imported development strategy and the Islamic development strategy. Imported strategies have been tried in Muslim countries and have failed to achieve serious economic progress, whether they were capitalist or socialist. The spectacular failures of the imported strategies were due to the fact that they were not in harmony with the system of values and the spiritual aspirations of Muslim societies. The value system of western development strategies is in conflict with the value reference of Islamic countries, so the institutional setup erected by the colonial powers in the Muslim countries represent a superstructure not related to the values and morality of Islam. Despite intensive government efforts and foreign aid, development efforts simply have been in vain.

As an alternative, Chapra develops an Islamic development strategy based on the *maqāṣid* (objectives) of the shari'ah. Equity and efficiency are the focus of the Islamic development strategy. While efficiency is at the core of the secular capitalist economic system that dominates the international arena, it has all but neglected equity. The socialist system, on the other hand, has stressed equity but has failed to realize it and at the same time has lost track of efficiency.

The Islamic development strategy embraces the two concepts of equity and efficiency as vital components. Economic policies are needed to achieve equity and efficiency in the Islamic development strategy as required by the shari'ah. Special attention should be directed to encourage small enterprises, financial intermediation, the human factor, and the reduction of wealth concentration. The role of government is emphasized and governments are urged to take the necessary steps to restructure the Muslim countries' economics to ascertain a positive outcome from the development strategy.

Chapra's paper is a serious contribution to development economics from an Islamic perspective, and will constitute an indispensable reading for the students of economic development.

The fourth paper, by Mirakhor and Zaidi, is critical to the development of Islamic economics. Economic policies and, in particular, monetary policies have been controversial. It has been said that in an

Islamic economic system there is no way to assure the success of economic policies, fiscal or monetary, in the absence of the rate of interest. The question is how to counter economic instability and promote growth where the interest rate is no longer at the disposal of the government and the central bank?

The inability of the government to set rate of return in the PLS system does not exclude the effectiveness of monetary policy in an open economy. This is the basic thrust of the analysis of the Mirakhor and Zaidi paper. They affirm using the supply of credit and money, in general, to successfully implement the required monetary policies to stabilize the economy and promote its growth. The model presents a valuable advance in the development of theoretical analysis in Islamic economics.

It is proved that a banking system free of interest, and using *muḍārabah* (partnership between one who has capital and one who has expertise) and *mushārahah* (joint venture, partnership in which the participants contribute both capital and expertise), can be the basis of a monetary policy that fixes the rate of return on capital and enhances saving and investment.

Included in this volume are extensive discussions and comments by economists whose interest in Islamic economics is well known, and who make valuable contributions to the debate.

Finally, there is an extensive bibliography of references and published materials on development in the Islamic perspective by Muhyiddin Aṭīyah that makes this volume a necessary companion for students and researchers in the subject. We hope that this book will also be used by students and teachers in Islamic universities, and by students and teachers in secular centers of education as a reference to raise the awareness of the emergence of the new paradigm.

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Teaching Programs in Islamic Economics: A Comparative Study

Munawar Iqbal

Introduction

Islamic economics is a new discipline but it is gaining strength and maturity very quickly. Its development in the last few years has led to the establishment of teaching and training programs at a number of places in several countries. With increasing literature of high quality becoming available due to tremendous interest in the area, it is hoped that several new programs will appear in the near future. Therefore, it is a very crucial stage in its development. The seed has been sown but there are years of hard work ahead. This is the time for fertilizing and watering on the one hand and weeding and pruning on the other. While it is imperative to increase the present effort manifold, it is also important to keep a vigilant eye on the experiments under way in order to ensure that they achieve the objectives for which they were designed. It is in this spirit that the present comparative study of the major teaching programs in Islamic economics are being undertaken.

Initially, Islamic economics was introduced as one of the subjects in degree programs in the economics and shari'ah faculties in some universities. It was comprised of only one or two one-semester courses. The number of courses gradually increased. It was only in the early 1980s that complete degree programs in Islamic economics were introduced. At present, there are four accepted teaching programs—the partial program, the undergraduate program, the graduate program, and the training program (designed to meet the short-term needs of the Islamization process). In the following pages we will say a few words about each of them. But before doing so we present some broad objectives that the teaching programs should attempt to achieve. The existing programs shall be evaluated according to these.

Objectives of Teaching Programs in Islamic Economics

The major universities of most of the Muslim countries have inherited or borrowed their style of teaching economics from Western universities. Their approach is purely secular and the contents of their courses mundane. Such an approach is, of course, quite suitable to countries whose ground is materialism and secularism but is most contradictory to Islamic societies where all disciplines should have a profound imprint of Islam so as to provide Islamic vision. Before listing the objectives of teaching programs in Islamic economics, some general remarks about the existing education system may be useful. The major defects from which the education system in most of the Muslim countries suffer may be identified as follows:

- First, the education system has been bifurcated into so-called 'modern' and 'religious' education. The two are being imparted through entirely independent and completely different institutions with no interaction between them. In most of the Muslim world, religious education is given through *madāris* (literally, schools, but here meaning religious schools) while secular, modern education is imparted through colleges and universities.
- Second, religious education receives neither patronage nor recognition. Public funds controlled by the state support the public schools and universities while it is left to charitable institutions to support religious schools. Similarly, the graduates of *dīni madāris* (religious schools) receive no official recognition; almost all public jobs go to the graduates of colleges and universities. The graduates of *madāris* have to survive on very meager and irregular allowances in the informal sector. They have no status in the society and are often looked down upon by the so-called 'educated class'. The natural result has been that most of the talent flows into the secular system of education.
- Third, the quality of education has been pathetically low. The curricula and syllabi for the university education are out-

dated. The system of education and examination is such that the critical and creative abilities of the students are not promoted. The situation in the religious schools is even worse. The system of education and examination is very loose. Quite often it is very informal. Even curricula and syllabi are not standardized. They vary from one madrasah to another both in coverage and standard. There is hardly any place for the study of modern developments, new technology, or research.

The brief review of the problems given above provide useful insights into planning out a strategy for their solution. Any prescription for the treatment of the ailing system must include the following elements:

- So-called ‘modern’ education and the ‘religious’ education systems must be fused together.
- Education must be purpose-oriented. It should be considered as *‘ibādah* and must result in a better understanding of the Islamic faith. It should aim at character building and spiritual elevation along with an increase in knowledge.
- Quality of education must be improved so as to produce people who are not only qualified in modern science and technology but are also imbued with Islamic knowledge, character, and spirit. They should have all the necessary qualities that will enable them to reconstruct modern knowledge on the foundations of Islam and to suggest ways and means for putting it into practice.

In the light of these broad principles the teaching programs in Islamic economics should aim at the following:

- Knowledge of Arabic good enough to enable the students to have direct access to classical Islamic literature and original sources.
- Knowledge of the shari‘ah in general and Islamic economics in particular.
- Knowledge of traditional economics.
- Knowledge of ‘quantitative’ tools of analysis.
- Ability to critically evaluate economic theory.

- Professional awareness of the need for a new approach towards the science of economics.
- Motivation of the students to participate in the process of Islamization of knowledge.
- Preparation of the students for the job market in order to meet the requirements of Islamization efforts on the one hand and to provide a decent means of living for the graduates on the other.

Salient Features of Various Kinds of Teaching Programs in Islamic Economics

Partial Programs

Overall content

As mentioned in the introduction, there are four kinds of programs being offered. The partial program is the least ambitious of them. It involves only one or two courses in Islamic economics. The contents of these courses vary but they are usually very elementary. A typical course is “Economic Values and System of Islam” offered at Punjab University, Pakistan and includes the following topics:

1. **Meaning and scope of Islamic economics:** Economic system of Islam as a part of its overall philosophy of life; sources of Islamic economic concepts; Islamic economics and modern economics.
2. **Basic Values and Principles:** Concepts of equality *musāwāh* (equality), *ikhwah* (brotherhood), *‘adl* (justice), *taqwā* (fear of Allah), *ihsān* (benevolence), and *ta‘awwun* (cooperation) as the basis of all economic policies; concepts of halal and haram and their application to economic activities; islamic code of business ethics.
3. **Islam and other economic systems:** The economic system—its meaning and functions; a comparative analysis of the broad economic features of Islam, capitalism, and socialism.

4. **Consumption:** Importance and principles of consumption in Islam; principles of moderation and its economic significance; behavior of the Muslim consumer.
5. **Production:** Islamic approach to production; areas of private and public ownership in Islam; ownership and cultivation of land; forms of business organizations—*mudārabah* (partnership between one who has capital and one who has expertise) and *mushārah* (joint venture, partnership in which the participants contribute both capital and expertise).
6. **Dignity of labor:** Importance, dignity and rights of labor in Islam; measures to improve labor-capital relationship.
7. **Product pricing:** Concept of just pricing in Islam; prohibition of exploitative prices—monopolistic, speculative, etc.; regulation and control of prices; behavior of firms under the influence of the Islamic spirit.
8. **Principles of distribution of national income and wealth:** Qur'anic emphasis on the circulation of wealth among all sections of the community; limits on rents and profits; Islamic approach to determination of wages; measures against accumulation of personal wealth—the institutions of *zakah* (poor-due; public welfare tax), *ṣadaqah* (charity), *khayrah* (good deed), and *awqāf* (endowments); distributional aspects of the Islamic law of inheritance; state's power for further measures; rights of specified sections of the community to receive pensions; death duties; the revolutionary concepts of al '*afw* (waiver of punishment).
9. **Interest-Free Banking and Insurance:** Prohibition of interest and its economic and social significance; interest-free banking; introduction of interest-free investment and deposit accounts in Pakistan; insurance and Islam.
10. **Public finance, fiscal policy and budgeting:** Taxation in Islam; the institution of *bayt al mal* (public treasury); principles of public expenditure; the institution of *zakah*; *zakah* as an instrument of fiscal policy; the *Zakah* and '*Ushr* (one-tenth) Ordinance, 1980.

11. **International trade:** Islamic approach to trade among nations; new world economic order and Islam.
12. **Economic development and planning:** Islam's keen interest in economic development; encouragement of technology, inventions, and innovations; nature and importance of economic planning in Islam; goals for development policy in Islam.
13. **Role of the state:** Maintenance of law and order; security of life and property; social security; provision of basic necessities of life; social overhead capital; education and *tabligh* (spreading the message of Islam); economic development; social justice.
14. **Social justice in Islam:** Social justice in Islam; goals, strategies and instruments.
15. **Role of Muslim economists:** Muslim civilization and the development of world trade, commerce, agriculture, technology and transportation; contribution of Muslim economists to development of economics as a science.
16. **Islamization process in Pakistan:** The character and objectives of any Islamic economy; the choice of an appropriate policy package.

Two one-semester courses

It goes without saying that partial programs cannot help much in the objective of Islamization of knowledge. However, they have their own importance. They are a good precursor to full-fledged degree programs where introduction of the latter is not possible for one reason or another. They are like the first few drops of rain that herald a downpour. The contents of these courses can, however, be improved. Assuming only two one-semester courses to be offered, we suggest the following sequence: Economic Doctrines of Islam and Introduction to Islamic Economic Theory.

In addition, every teacher should be asked to introduce Islamic elements into the conventional courses as far as possible. The suggested contents of the two courses are given below:

Economic Doctrines of Islam

1. What is Islamic economics and how does it differ from secular economics?
2. Islamic economic system: a comparative study; salient features of the Islamic economic system.
3. The Islamic principles guiding consumption and production.
4. Shari'ah guidelines for the theory of exchange.
5. The concept of ownership and its limits in an Islamic framework.
6. The redistribution mechanism in an Islamic economy.
7. The concept of *ribā* (interest), its interpretations and implications.
8. Alternative institutions to interest-based operations and their justification in the shari'ah.
9. Zakah and its economic role: The place of zakah in Islamic fiscal policy, its effects on consumption, saving and investment activity in the country.
10. Institutions of '*ushr*, *kharāj* (land tax), *jizya*, (head tax on free Nonmuslims under Islamic rule), etc. as sources of public revenue.
11. The economic role of state in an Islamic economy.
12. Muslim economic thinking: A survey of contemporary literature.

Introduction to Islamic economic theory

1. Consumer behavior in Islamic perspective and its effect on demand.
2. Behavior of firms in the Islamic framework and its effect on supply.
3. Market equilibrium.
4. Islamic view on market structures—perfect competition, monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition.
5. Factors of production and determination of return.
6. Distributive justice and need fulfillment.
7. Measurement of gross and net national product—some considerations from an Islamic perspective.

8. An introduction to macroeconomic modeling for an Islamic economy
9. Consumption—saving and investment functions in an Islamic economy.
10. Interest-free banking and monetary policy.
11. Public sector economics in an Islamic economy.
12. Project evaluation from an Islamic perspective.
13. Shari‘ah guidelines for international trade.
14. Concept of economic development in Islam.

Undergraduate Programs

Undergraduate programs are most important for the achievement of the desired objectives. However, designing a program that can accommodate the discipline’s many needs is not easy.

In order to prepare the student for his profession, he must be exposed to a large number of subjects, the latest analytical techniques and technology, as well as the relevant shari‘ah topics. The student must obtain a good understanding of both English and Arabic to gain access to both the rich heritage of the shari‘ah knowledge as well as to the ‘traditional’ economic literature that is in English. The design of the degree program is constrained because one of its objectives is to merge *madrasah* (religious school) education with college education, and the different backgrounds from which graduates of these two streams come. One has to come up with a mixture of courses that produce graduates prepared to meet the challenge of promoting the discipline of Islamic economics while meeting job market requirements. In addition, the problem of preparing bilingual graduates has to be solved.

Given the time constraint, fitting in all the requirements is a very difficult task. Each institution is coping with these requirements in a different way, all of them involve compromise. In this section, we review the programs of four major institutions engaged in undergraduate teaching. They are the International Institute of Islamic Economics at the International Islamic University, Islamabad,

Table 1
Structure of Undergraduate Programs
A Comparative Statement

	IIIE Islamabad	IIU Malaysia	Imam Muhammad Univ. Riyāḍ	Imam Sadiq University Tehran
1. Duration of the Program	4 Yrs.	4Yrs.	4 Yrs.	5 Yrs.
2. Medium of Instruction	English/Arabic	English/Arabic	Arabic	Persian
3. Credit Hours Required	216	134	153	200
i. Shari'ah Subjects (%)	39 (18.05)	28 (20.90)	64 (41.85)	69 (34.50)
ii. Economics (%)	84 (38.88)	63 (47.01)	43 (28.10)	45 (22.50)
iii. Complementary (%)	24 (11.11)	27 (20.14)	21 (13.72)	8 (4.00)
iv. Language (%)	69 (31.94)	16 (11.95)	25 (16.33)	78 (39.00)
4. Number of One Semester Courses	56	48	59	82
5. Average Number of Courses Per Semester	7	6	7.4	8.2
6. Average Hours of Instruction Per Week	27	17	19	20

Pakistan (IIIE); the Faculty of Economics at the International Islamic University in Malaysia (IIU); the Department of Economics, the Faculty of the shari'ah at Imam Muhammad University, Riyāḍ, Saudi Arabia; and the Department of Economics at Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran. A summary of the undergraduate program structure in Islamic economics at these institutions is given in Table 1. The detailed curricula of these programs are given in Appendix A.

Except for Imam Sadiq University, all programs require four years, after completing the higher secondary school level. Program IIIE appears to be the most intensive, in the sense that it requires completion of 216 credit hours. *Hifz* (memorization of Qur'an) requirements and some noncredit courses are in addition to these. Hours of classroom instruction required per week is 27. The most extensive program is the one at Imam Sadiq University in Tehran. It extends over five years and requires 82 one-semester courses. The program at the Faculty of Economics (IIU) in Malaysia is more traditional, in the sense that it follows the work load common in most

Western universities (120 to 135 credit hours). The average number of courses to be taken per semester ranges from 6 to 8.2 in the four institutions under review.

From a study of the composition of these programs and of their course contents, two distinct models emerge. The program of Imam Sadiq University and Imam Muhammad University place much more importance on shari'ah subjects as compared to the programs of IIE Islamabad and IIU Malaysia. The relative weight of shari'ah subjects is almost double in the former two programs as compared to the latter two. The case of economic subjects is exactly reverse. The result is that the graduates produced by the first model will lack sufficient background in economics while the graduates produced by the second model will be weak in their shari'ah background. Finding the right balance between the two is the most important issue in teaching Islamic economics.

Within the second model, the relative share of economics and related subjects which include statistics, mathematics, quantitative methods, etc., is higher in the case of IIU Malaysia (67 percent as compared to 50 percent) but in absolute terms the IIE Islamabad program has a larger component of economics and complementary subjects (108 credit hours as compared to 90 credit hours). Therefore, one can safely conclude that, in terms of economics, the program of IIE is the strongest. It also devotes a lot of time to languages, 69 credit hours, which again are the highest in the four year period. The problem with the IIE program is that it has a very high work load which may not be sustainable in the long run. Secondly, the shari'ah component of the program is rather weak. While the graduates of IIE can be compared to the graduates of any reputable university in terms of their background in economics, their shari'ah background remains much lower than the professed objective of producing scholars who can serve as the vanguards of efforts to Islamize knowledge. Another objective that the IIE program has not been able to achieve is the merger of the college and *madrrasah* streams of entering students. The reason is that, from the start, the program is very technical, and

Table 2
Proposed Structure for a B.A. Degree
Program in Islamic Economics

Subjects	Credit Hours Required			
	Core	Major in Economics	Major In Fiqh	Double Major
Shari'ah Subjects	24	24+12=36	24+24=48	24+24=48
Economics	36	36+24=60	36+12=48	36+24=60
Complementary Subjects	15	15	15	15
Languages (Arabic and English)	21	21	21	21
Optional Subjects	—	15	15	18
Total:	96	96+54=150	96+54=150	96+69=165

the *madrasah* students, who usually have a weak technical background, find it difficult.

A feature common to all the programs is the lack of options available to the students. The program at the International Islamic University in Malaysia (IIU) does provide some options but they are only within the area of economics and business. At an undergraduate level so much concentration is perhaps undesirable. Furthermore, within the discipline itself, if some diversification can be provided, it will suit the varying aptitudes of the students better.

In the light of this discussion we are of the view that some improvements are required in the present undergraduate programs. We offer the following suggestions for improvement:

- The work load should not exceed 150 credit hours in total, nor 20 credit hours in one semester.
- A more judicious balance between economics and shari'ah subjects should be maintained. In this regard, it should be remembered that since the degree to be given is in economics, it should not be dominated by shari'ah subjects. However, the shari'ah component should be strong enough to produce the kind of blend that Islamic economics aims at.
- It is desirable to cater to varying aptitudes of students by introducing the system of majors. Initially two majors, i.e., a major in economics and a major in fiqh can be introduced. More majors can be added later.

Table 3
Curriculum for Proposed Structure of a B.A. Degree Program in Islamic Economics

Core Subjects (To be taken by all)	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Major in Economics	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Major in Fiqh	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Double Major	Credit Hours
Shari'ah Subjects							
' <i>Uliam al Qur'an</i> I	3	Islamic Studies I	3	' <i>Uliam al Qur'an</i>	3	' <i>Uliam al Qur'an</i> III	3
' <i>Uliam al Qur'an</i> II	3	Islamic Studies II	3	' <i>Uliam al Qur'an</i>	3	' <i>Uliam al Qur'an</i> IV	3
' <i>Uliam al Hadith</i> I	3	Fiqh for Economics I	3	' <i>Uliam al Hadith</i> III	3	' <i>Uliam al Hadith</i> III	3
' <i>Uliam al Hadith</i> II	3	Fiqh for Economics II	3	' <i>Uliam al Hadith</i> IV	3	' <i>Uliam al Hadith</i> IV	3
' <i>Uṣūl al Fiqh</i> I	3		3	' <i>Uṣūl al Fiqh</i> III	3	' <i>Uṣūl al Fiqh</i> III	3
' <i>Uṣūl al Fiqh</i> II	3		3	' <i>Uṣūl al Fiqh</i> IV	3	' <i>Uṣūl al Fiqh</i> IV	3
' <i>Fiqh al Mu'āmalāt</i> I	3		3	Fiqh for Economics I	3	Fiqh for Economics I	3
' <i>Fiqh al Mu'āmalāt</i> II	3		3	Fiqh for Economics II	3	Fiqh for Economics II	3
Economics							
Microeconomics I	3	Microeconomics III	4			Microeconomics III	4
Macroeconomics I	3	Macroeconomics III	4			Macroeconomics III	4
		Economics of Welfare and Distribution	4			Economics of Welfare and Distribution	4
Microeconomics II	3	Monetary Economics	4	Monetary Economics	4	Monetary Economics	4
Macroeconomics II	3	Economics of the Corporate Sector	4	Economics of the Corporate Sector	4	Economics of the Corporate Sector	4
Money and Banking	3	Public Sector Economics	4	Public Sector Economics	4	Public Sector Economics	4
Public Finance	3						
International Economics	3						
Economic Development and Planning	3						
History of Economic Thought	3						

Table 3 (Continued)
Curriculum for Proposed Structure of a B.A. Degree Program in Islamic Economics

Core Subjects (To be taken by all)	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Major in Economics	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Major in Fiqh	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Double Major	Credit Hours
Economics							
Comparative Economic Systems	3						
Contemporary Islamic Economics	3						
Economic Survey of Muslim Countries	3						
Complementary Subjects							
Statistics I	3	Statistics I	3	Statistics I	3	Statistics I	3
Statistics II	3	Statistics II	3	Statistics II	3	Statistics II	3
Basic Mathematics	3	Basic Mathematics	3	Basic Mathematics	3	Basic Mathematics	3
Mathematics for Economists	3	Mathematics for Economists	3	Mathematics for Economists	3	Mathematics for Economists	3
Introduction to Computers	3	Introduction to Computers	3	Introduction to Computers	3	Introduction to Computers	3
Optional Subjects							
Five/Six Courses Selected as Follows:							
1. Economics Majors Must Select at Least Two from List 1.		List 1 - Econometrics - Advance Mathematics - Project Evaluation - Computer Programming - Labor Economics - Resource Economics - Economics of Agriculture - Industrial Economics - Principles of Accounting - Principles of Auditing - Principles of Marketing - Principles of Business Management		List 2 - Aqeedah I, II - Tafsir I, II, III - Hadith I, II, III - Fiqh I, II - Maqasid al Shari'ah - Islamic Law		List 3 - Islamic History I - Islamic History II - Political Science I - Political Science II - Sociology I - Sociology II - Foreign Language I, II, III	
2. Fiqh Majors Must Select at Least Two from List 2.							
3. Double Majors Must Select at Least Two from Both List 1 and List 2.							
4. The Rest of the Courses May Be Selected from any of the Lists.							

- Some optional subjects from other disciplines, such as Islamic history, sociology, philosophy, political science, law, business management, accounting, etc., may be allowed. This will help broaden the outlook of graduates.

New Proposed Structure of Undergraduate Programs in Islamic Economics

In the light of the above remarks, we have attempted to design a slightly modified program for undergraduate teaching in Islamic economics. The structure of a four year program leading to a bachelors degree in economics is given in Table 2, while the suggested curriculum is given in Table 3.

In many countries there are local course requirements determined by the government. We suggest that these be accommodated within the 150 hours. However, in exceptional cases the work load may be marginally increased.

The time reserved for languages (i.e., 21 hours) should be divided between English and Arabic for each student depending upon his level in these two languages. For example, students coming from the college stream would take more Arabic while students coming from the *madrassa* stream would take more English.

Three separate lists of optional subjects have been suggested. Out of the five or six optional courses economics majors must take at least two courses from the first list. Similarly, students with a fiqh major must take at least two courses from the second list. Students with a double major should take two courses from each of these lists. The rest of the optional courses may be taken from any of the three lists. Note that these lists are only indicative. More courses can be added to each list. Each department may also choose only a few of these to be offered if facilities do not exist to offer all.

Graduate Programs

Graduate programs in Islamic economics have been started at the International Islamic University in Islamabad (IIIE) and the Faculty

of the shari‘ah at both Umm al Qura University in Mekkah and Imam Muhammad University in Riyāḍ. All of these programs are new and it may be a little premature to evaluate them. We will only offer a few remarks.

The same two tendencies that we find at the undergraduate level are observed at the graduate level. The shari‘ah dominates the programs of Imam Muhammad University and Umm al Qura University and economics dominates the program of IIIE.

Most of the material available in the Islamic economics literature can be covered at the undergraduate level. Therefore, presently, there is not enough graduate level material. With the passage of time more material will surely become available for the graduate level. For this reason, there are people who have reservations about starting graduate programs at this time. However, there are others who believe that today’s graduate programs will lead to good quality papers, dissertations, research, as well as producing teachers for undergraduate programs. The next few years will show the product of graduate programs and an evaluation can then be objectively made.

Training Programs

Training programs are meant to cater to the manpower requirements of the process of islamization. In the field of teaching itself, the most severe constraint has been the availability of qualified manpower. The present generation of economists have had little or no formal education in Islamic economics nor have they had its prerequisite subjects. In order to meet immediate requirements, some orientation programs are needed. Towards this end, IIIE, in 1984, conducted a two-week refresher course for Pakistani universities’ teachers of Islamic economics. The contents of this course are given in Appendix B. In 1988 another refresher course with international coverage was planned under the joint auspices of IIIE and the Islamic Research and Training Institute of the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah.

Table 4
List of Courses for a One-Year Diploma in
Economic Theory for Shari'ah Graduates

First Term

1. English Language I
2. English Language II
3. Basic Economic Concepts
4. Introduction to Economic Theory
5. Money and Banking
6. Public Finance

Second Term

1. Microeconomic Analysis
2. Macroeconomic Analysis
3. International Economics/International Economics Institutions
4. Development and Planning
5. Islamic Economics
6. Comparative Economic Systems

Summer

Summer will be required only for deficiency courses in language or other subjects, if any.

While these programs were a good beginning, two-weeks can hardly be considered sufficient time in which to provide teachers the required training. A cursory look at the course contents reveals that there is too much material to cover in two weeks. Only a broad brush treatment of the topics is possible. Because on-the-job training programs cannot be conducted for much longer periods, one has to settle for short training programs of two- to four-weeks duration and hope that the participants will be motivated to continue their study either through self-study or through follow-up courses.

We believe, however, that in order to meet immediate requirements additional efforts have to be made. We suggest the following two crash programs: a One-Year Diploma in Shari'ah/Islamic Economics for Graduates in Economics and a One-Year Diploma in Economics for Shari'ah Graduates. Tables 4 and 5 present the proposed structures of these programs.

The Diploma of Economics for Shari'ah Graduates will be very useful in assimilating *madrasah* students into the degree programs. They may be required to complete this diploma before entering the degree programs. This will also be useful for shari'ah experts who

Table 5
List of Courses for a One-Year Diploma in
Shari'ah for Economics Graduates

First Term

1. Arabic Language I
2. Arabic Language II
3. *Tafsir*
4. *Usul al Hadith*
5. *Usul al Fiqh*
6. History of Islamic Economic Thought

Second Term

1. *Maqāsid al Shari'ah*
2. *Fiqh al Mu'āmilāt*
3. *Fiqh for Economists I*
4. *Fiqh for Economists II*
5. *Introduction to Islamic Economic Theory*
6. *Readings in Contemporary Islamic Economics*

Summer

Summer will be required only for deficiency courses in language or other subjects, if any.

are teaching fiqh courses to economists or who are involved in research on contemporary problems. These diploma programs will go a long way in bridging the communication gap that presently exists between economists and *fuqahā*. They can then work together to find Islamic solutions to contemporary economic problems.

Another purpose of training programs is to provide qualified manpower for Islamic banking. A beginning was made in this regard by the International Federation of Islamic Banking which established the International Institute of Islamic Banking and Economics in Cyprus. The IIIE started a diploma program in Islamic banking. Unfortunately, the Institute ran into financial problems and was closed down in 1984. The gap created by the cessation of this program has not yet been filled.

The International Islamic University in Islamabad (IIIE) started a Senior Officers Training Program (SOTP) in Islamic Economic Doctrines and their Practical Application in 1986. This is a four-week program meant for senior officers of economic ministries and bank executives. The contents of this program are given in Appendix C. So far, three such programs have been conducted. The course is running

very successfully and is creating a very good impact. Given sufficient resources, the Institute plans to offer this program internationally. Since this program is meant for senior officers the need for similar programs for middle-level management of Islamic banks is still present.

Conclusion

In this paper we have described the major teaching and training programs in Islamic economics, provided some comparative assessment, and, most importantly, identified some of the areas where improvements in the existing programs are needed. An attempt has also been made to identify areas where new programs are required to meet pressing needs. Some suggestions have been made only to initiate the discussion.

Appendix A

Table 1
Curriculum for the B.Sc. (Hons.)
Degree at IIIE Islamabad

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>First Year</i>			
Arabic (Reading) I	4.5	Arabic (Listening Practice)	4.5
Arabic (Grammar) I	4.5	Arabic (Grammar) II	4.5
Arabic (Conversation & Composition)	4.5	Arabic (Conversation & Composition) II	4.5
Islamic Studies (Arabic) I	4.5	Islamic Studies (Arabic) II	4.5
English (Reading) I	3	English (Reading) II	3
English (Grammar) I	3	English (Grammar) II	3
English (Composition) I	3	English (Composition) II	3
Total Credits	27	Total Credits	27
<i>Second Year</i>			
Arabic III	4.5	Arabic IV	4.5
English III	4.5	English IV	4.5
Introduction to Economic Theory I	4.5	Introduction to Economic Theory II	4.5
Mathematics for Economics I	4.5	Mathematics for Economics II	4.5
Usul al Fiqh I	3	Fiqh al Muamilat al Maliyya I	3
Pakistan Studies	3	Economic Doctrines of Islam	3
The Islamic Man	3	The Islamic System	3
Total Credits	27	Total Credits	27

Table 1 (continued)
Curriculum for the B.Sc. (Hons.)
Degree at IIIE Islamabad

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>Third Year</i>			
Microeconomics I	4.5	Microeconomics II	4.5
Macroeconomics I	4.5	Macroeconomics II	4.5
Monetary Theory	4.5	Public Finance	4.5
Introductory Statistics	4.5	Basic Econometrics	4.5
Usul al Fiqh II	3	Usul al Fiqh III	3
Fiqh al Muamilat al Maliyya II	3	Fiqh al Muamilat al Maliyya III	3
Arabic	3	Arabic	3
Total Credits	27	Total Credits	27
<i>Fourth Year</i>			
Advanced Microeconomics	4.5	Advanced Macroeconomics	4.5
Comparative Economic Systems	4.5	Economic Development	4.5
Readings in Islamic Economics	4.5	Economies of Muslim Countries*	3
International Trade and Finance	4.5	Current Issues in Islamic Economics	4.5
History of Economic Thought	3	Readings in Economic System of Islam	4.5
Research Methods for Social Scientists	3	Research Project**	3
Usul al Fiqh IV	3	Fiqh al Muamilat IV	3
Total Credits	27	Total Credits	27
* Alternatively: "The Pakistan Economy"			3
** Alternatively: "Project Evaluation"			3
Total credits in 4 years = 54 + 54 + 54 + 54 = 216			
Total subjects in 4 years = 14 + 14 + 14 + 14 = 56			

Table 2
Curriculum for the B.A. Degree in
Kulliyah of Economics
International Islamic University, Malaysia (IIU)

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>First Year</i>			
Economics I	3	Economics II	3
Quantitative Analysis I	4	Quantitative Analysis II	4
Introduction to Business Administration	3	Introduction to Accounting	3
Introduction to Islam & Its Aqidah	2	Introduction to al Qur'an	2
Elementary Qur'anic Language I	2	Elementary Qur'anic Language II	2
Elementary English Language I	2	Elementary English Language II	2
Total Credits	16	Total Credits	16
<i>Second Year</i>			
Microeconomics	4	Macroeconomics	4
Fiqh for Economists I	3	Fiqh for Economists II	3
Introduction to Computers & Information Processing	3	Introduction to Development and Planning	3
Introduction al Sunnah	2	Fiqh al Ibadat	2
Introduction to al Shari'ah	2		
Intermediate Qur'anic Language I	2	Intermediate Qur'anic Language II	2
Intermediate English I	2	Intermediate English I	2
Total Credits	18	Total Credits	16

Table 2 (continued)
Curriculum for the B.A. Degree in
Kulliyah of Economics
International Islamic University, Malaysia (IIU)

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>Third Year</i>			
Economic Analysis I	4	History of Islamic Economic Thought	3
Monetary Economics	3	Fiscal Economics	3
Economics of Welfare & Distribution	3	International Economics	3
Econometrics I	4	Economic Analysis II	3
Ethical Philosophy of Islam	2	Research Methodology	3
The Preaching of Islam	2	Islamic Civilization	2
Total Credits	18	Total Credits	17
<i>Four Year</i>			
History of Western Economic Thought	3	Regional Cooperation among Muslim Countries	3
Comparative Economic Systems	3	Project Evaluation	3
Project Paper	2	Project Paper	2
Two of the following elective course(s):		Two of the following elective course(s):	
Development Studies		Development Studies	
Economic Planning	3	Econometrics II	3
Development Finance	3	International Trade & Development	3
Comparative Development	3	Regional Economics	3
International Studies		International Studies	
International Economic Institutions	3	Econometrics II	3
Issues in International Economics	3	International Trade and Development	3
International Relations	3	International Finance	3
Modern & Contemporary History of Islam	2	Regional Economics	3
Islam and Society	2	Islamic Thought & Contemporary Issues	2
Total Credits	15/18	Total Credits	15/18
<p>Total hours in 4 years = 32 + 34 + 35 + 35 = 136</p>			

Table 3
Curriculum for the Undergraduate Program at
Imam Muhammad University, Ryād, Saudi Arabia

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>First Year</i>			
Al Qur'an al Karim	1	Al Qur'an al Karim	1
Tafseer and Ulum al Qur'an	6	Al Fiqh and al Siyarah al Shariah	2
Al Tawheed	2	Mathematics for Economists	3
Islamic Studies	2	Basic Economics (Macro)	3
Basic Economics (Micro)	3	Accounting	2
Principles of Accounting	2	Principles of Business Administration	2
English Language	3	Arabic Language	4
		English Language	3
Total Credits	19	Total Credits	20
<i>Second Year</i>			
Al Qur'an al Karim	1	Al Qur'an al Karim	1
Al Fiqh and al Siyarah al Shariah	4	Al Tafseer and al Ulum al Qur'an	6
Islamic Studies	2	Usul al Fiqh and Principles of Fiqh	4
Microeconomic Analysis	3	Islamic View of Public Revenue	3
Principles of Statistics	2		
Arabic Language	4	Statistics Analysis	2
English Language	3	English Language	3
Total Credits	19	Total Credits	19

Table 3 (continued)
Curriculum for the Undergraduate Program at
Imam Muhammad University, Ryād, Saudi Arabia

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>Third Year</i>			
Al Qur'an al Karim	1	Al Qur'an al Karim	1
Al Hadith	6	Al Fiqh and al Siyasaah al Shariah	4
Usul al Fiqh & Principles of Fiqh	4	Islamic Studies	2
Macroeconomic Analysis	3	Money and Banking	3
Economic History for Society	2	International Economics	3
Mercantile Law and Companies	2	History of Islamic Economic Thought	3
English Language	2	English Language	3
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	19
<i>Fourth Year</i>			
Al Qur'an al Karim	1	Al Qur'an al Karim	1
Al Hadith	3	Al Hadith	3
Al Fiqh and al Siyasaah al Shariah	2	Al Fiqh and al Siyasaah al Shariah	2
Islamic Studies	1	Islamic Studies	1
Econometrics	3	Theory of Distribution	3
Economic Development and Planning	3	Mathematical Economics	3
Project Evaluation	2	Islamic Economics (Seminar Course)	2
Islamic Economics (Theory)	3	Saudi Arabian Economy and the Economies of the Islamic World	3
Thesis	1		
Total Credits	19	Total Credits	18
Total hours in 4 years = 39 + 38 + 39 + 37 = 153			
Total subjects in 4 years = 15 + 13 + 14 + 17 = 59			

Table 4
Curriculum for the B.A. Degree at
Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>First Year</i>			
Tajweed	1	Qur'an	1
Islamic History	1	Islamic History	1
Aqeeda	2	Aqeeda	2
Logic	2	Logic	2
Fiqh	2	Fiqh	2
Arabic Conversation	5	Arabic Grammar	5
Grammar (English or French)	2	Arabic Conversation	1
Conversation (English or French)	2	Grammar (English or French)	4
Physical Training	1	Conversation (English or French)	2
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	20
<i>Second Year</i>			
Tafseer	1	Tafseer	1
Islamic History	1	Islamic History	1
Aqeeda	2	Aqeeda	2
Logic	2	Fiqh	2
Fiqh	2	Arabic Grammar	5
Arabic Grammar	5	Arabic Conversation	1
Arabic Conversation	1	Grammar (English or French)	4
Grammar (English or French)	4	Conversation (English or French)	2
Conversation (English or French)	2	School of Philosophy	2
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	20

Table 4 (continued)
Curriculum for the B.A. Degree at
Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>Third Year</i>			
Tafseer	2	Tafseer	2
Islamic History	1	Islamic History	1
Fiqh	4	Usul al Fiqh	3
Arabic Grammar	3	Fiqh	3
Arabic Conversation	1	Arabic Grammar	3
Grammar (English or French)	2	Arabic Conversation	1
Principles of Economics	4	Grammar (English or French)	2
Mathematics for Economists I	3	Mathematics for Economists II	3
		Macroeconomics	3
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	21
<i>Fourth Year</i>			
Usul al Fiqh	3	Usul al Fiqh	3
Fiqh	4	Fiqh	4
Arabic Conversation	1	Arabic Conversation	1
Maani wa Biyan	3	Maani wa Biyan	3
Grammar (English or French)	2	Grammar (English or French)	2
Microeconomics	3	History of Economic Thought	3
Statistics	4	Econometrics	4
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	20
<i>Fifth Year</i>			
Fiqh	4	Fiqh	4
Arabic Conversation	1	Arabic Conversation	1
Grammar (English or French)	2	Grammar (English or French)	2
Economic Planning	3	Economics of Iran	4
Growth and Development Economics	3	Socialist System of Economic Planning	2
Money and Banking	3	Economic Planning in Islamic Economies	3
Multinational Corporation	2	Research Report	3
International Economic Institutions	2		
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	19
<p>Total hours in 5 years = 40 + 40 + 41 + 40 + 39 = 200</p> <p>Total subjects in 5 years = 18 + 18 + 17 + 14 + 15 = 82</p>			

Appendix B

Contents of the Two Week Refresher Course For Teachers of Islamic Economics

The Nature of Islamic Economics

1. Zarqa, A. "Islamic Economics: An Approach to Human Welfare." In *SIE*: 3-18.
2. Hasanuzzaman, S. Muhammad. Definition of Islamic Economics. *JRIE* 1(2), Winter 1984: 51-53.
3. Khan, Muhammad Akram. Islamic Economics: Nature and Need. *JRIE* 1(2), Winter 1984: 55-61.
4. Kahf, M. "Islamic Economics and Its Methodology." *TIE*: Chapter 1: 1-11.
5. Ahmad, K. "Introduction." In *SIE*: xiii-xxiii.
6. Mawdudi, S.A.A. "Ma'ashi Qawaneen ki Tadween-e-Jadid aur Uskay Usul" (Guidelines for Reconstruction of Economics from an Islamic Perspective). In *MI*: Chapter Eleven, 417-436. (U).
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8. Mannan, Mohammad A. Islamic Economics as a Social Science. *JRIE* 1(1), Summer 1983: 49-61.

Muslim Economic Thinking

1. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "Muslim Economic Thinking: A Survey of Contemporary Literature." In *SIE*: 119-315.
2. ——— "Recent Works on History of Economic Thought in Islam: A Survey." *ICRIE*, Research Series in English, Paper No. 12, 1982.
3. Boulakia, J.D.C. Ibn Khaldun: A Fourteenth Century Economist. *Journal of Political Economy* 79(5), September/October 1971: 1105-18.

4. Zaim, S. "Contemporary Turkish Literature on Islamic Economics." In *SIE*: 316-50.

Islamic Economic System/Economic System of Islam

1. Mawdudi, S.A.A. "Qur'an ki Ma'ashi Ta'limat" (Economic Teachings of the Qur'an). In *MI*: Chapter Two, 67-117. (U)
2. ——— "Islami Nizame Ma'ishat kay Usul aur Maqasid" (Principles and Objectives of Islamic Economic Order). In *MI*: Chapter Four, 141-163. (U)
3. ——— "Sarmayadari aur Islam ka Farq" (Different between Capitalism and Islam). In *MI*: Chapter Three, 119-139. (U)
4. Qazi, A.G.N. "Economic System of Islam." Speech delivered at National Defence College, Rawalpindi on 6th August 1983. Karachi. State Bank of Pakistan, 1983.
5. *IKIN*.
6. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. *Some Aspects of Islamic Economy*. Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1970.
7. ——— "Guarantee of a Minimum Level of Living in an Islamic State." Paper read at *21CIE*. (See also comments on this paper by S.N.H. Naqvi at the Conference.)
8. ——— *Islam ka Nazriyya-e-Milkiyyat* (Ownership in Islam). 2 Volumes. Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd, 1968. (U)
9. Chapra, Muhammad Umar. *The Economic System of Islam*. Karachi: University of Karachi, 1971.
10. ——— "The Islamic Welfare State and Its Role in the Economy." In *SIE*: 143-169.
11. ——— Review on Ethics and Economics: An Islamic Synthesis. *The Muslim World Book Review* 2(1), Autumn 1981: 21-26.
12. Naqvi, S.N.H. *Ethics and Economics: An Islamic Synthesis*. Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1979.
13. ——— *Individual Freedom, Social Welfare and Islamic Economic Order*. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1983.
14. Mirakhor, A. "Attempt to synthesize Islamic ethics and modern economics," *Crescent International*, 13(7), Ramadhan 16 - Shawwal 1, 1404 (June 16-30, 1984): 9,11.

15. Ishaque, K. Muhammad. "Private Property and Its Role in Islamic Social Order." In *ESI*: 19-54.
16. ——— "The Islamic Approach to Economic Activity and Development." In *MWFEO*: 74-100.
17. Sakr, Muhammad Ahmad. "The Role of State in the Economic System of Islam." In *INIEO*: 103-116.
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1. Seoharwi, Muhammad Hifz-ur-Rehman. "Inferadi Ma'ishat" (Microeconomics). In *IKIN*: 61-67. (U)
2. Kelani, Abdul Rahman. *Islam mein Zabita-e-Tijarat* (Islamic Code of Business Ethics). Edited by A. Zubeidi and Abdul Wakeel Alvie. Lahore: Maktaba-tus-Salam, n.d. (U)
3. Mannan, Muhammad A. "Scarcity, Choice and Opportunity Cost: Their Dimensions in Islamic Perspective." *ICRIE*, Research Series in English, Paper No. 10, 1982. 35p.
4. Reference Nos. 18 and 19 in III.

Consumer Theory

1. Ariff, Mohammad. "Towards Establishing the Micro Foundations of Islamic Economics. A Contribution to the Consumer Behaviour in an Islamic Society." Paper presented at the 12th Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, November 1983. 29pp.
2. Kahf, M. "The Theory of Consumption." In *TIE*: Chapter 11, 15-25.
3. ——— "A Contribution to the Theory of Consumer Behaviour in Islamic Economy." In *SIE*: 19-36.

Theory of Firm

1. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "Ends of Economic Enterprise." In *EEI*: Chapter One, 1-34.
2. ——— "Justice and Benevolence as the Bases of Entrepreneurial Behavior." In *EEI*: Chapter Two, 35-73.
3. ——— "Muslim Entrepreneur and the Economy." In *EEI*: 139-152.
4. Kahf, M. "The Theory of Production." In *TIE*: Chapter IV, 41-56.
4. Mannan, Muhammad A. "Islamic Perspectives on Market Prices and Allocation." *ICRIE*, Research Series in English, Paper No. 5, 1982. 31pp.
5. ——— "All Efficiency, Decision and Welfare Criteria in an Interest-Free Islamic Economy. A Comparative Policy Approach." In *MFEI*: 43-73.
6. Reference Nos. 18 and 19 III.

Basic Macroeconomic Themes in Islamic Economics

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2. Khan, Muhammad Fahim. "Macro Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework." *JRIE* 1(2), Winter 1984: 1-24.

Investment

1. Kahf, M. "Saving and Investment Functions in a Two-Sector Islamic Economy." In *MFEI*: 107-123.
2. Zarqa, Muhammad A. "An Islamic Perspective on the Economics of Discounting in Project Evaluation." In *FPRAI*: 203-252.
3. Choudhry, M.A. "The Rate of Capitalization in Valuation Models in an Islamic Economy." In *FPRAI*: 287-313.
4. Naqvi, S.N.H. "Interest Rate and Intertemporal Allocative Efficiency in an Islamic Economy." In *MFEI*: 75-106

Money Banking and Monetary Policy in an Islamic Economy

1. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah, "Islamic Approach to Money, Banking and Monetary Policy." In *MFEI*: 25-42, or more recent version of the same in *IIBSP*. 15-50.
2. Ariff, Mohammad. "Introduction." In *MFEI*: 1-23.

3. Ahmad, Z. Iqbal, M. and Khan, Muhammad Fahim. "Introduction." In *MBI*: 1-25.

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1. Saud, M.A. "Money, Interest and Qirad." In *SIE*: 59-84.
2. Ahmad, Z. "The Theory of Riba." *Islamic Studies* 17(4), Winter 1978: 171-85.
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4. Ahmad, M. "Semantics of Theory of Interest." *Islamic Studies* 6(2), June 1967: 171-96.

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2. Ali, M. "Mudarabah and Shirakat as a Basis of Interest-Free Economy." In *IFBP*: 127-41.
3. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah *Shirkat aur Mudabarat kay Shar'i Usul* (Principles of Shirakah and Mudarabah in Shariah). Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd, 1969. (U)
4. ——— "Business of the Bank." In *BWI*: Chapter 2, 19-38.
5. ——— "The Bank and the Owners of Capital." In *BWI*: Chapter 3, 39-52.
6. ——— "Banking in an Islamic Framework." In *IIBSP*: 51-65.
7. ——— "Rationale of Islamic Banking." In *IIBSP*: 67-96.
8. ——— "The Process of Credit Creation." In *BWI*: Chapter 5, 73-96.
9. ——— "Monetary Theory of Islamic Economics." In *IIBSP*: 125-131.
10. ——— "Some Clarification." In *BWI*: Chapter 9, 167-176.
11. ——— "Economics of Profit-Sharing." In *FPRAI*: 163-201. (See also *IIBSP*: 97-123).
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17. Bashir, B. Ahmad. "Successful Development of Islamic Banks." *JRIE* 1(2), Winter 1984: 63-71.

Central Banking and Monetary Policy in an Interest-Free Economy

1. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "The Central Bank." In *BWI*, Chapter 6, 97-124.
2. Uzair, Muhammad. "Central Banking Operations in an Interest-Free Banking System." In *MFEI*: 211-235.
3. Hashmi, S.A. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in an Islamic Economy." In *IFBP*: 109-126.
4. Al-Jarhi, M.A. "A Monetary and Financial Structure for an Interest-Free Economy: Institutions, Mechanism and Policy." In *MBI*: 69-101.
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6. Farooqui, A.H. "Financing of Foreign Trade in an Interest-Free Economy." In *IFBP*: 143-152.
7. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "Issues in Islamization of Banking." In *IIBSP*: 133-145.
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9. Reference Nos. 1 and 17 in VI.3.

Public Sector Economics in an Islamic Economy

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2. ——— "Theory of Fiscal Policy in an Islamic State." *JRIE* 1(1), Summer 1983: 17-35. (See also comments on this paper by Riad el-Shaikh and rejoinder by the author in *JRIE* 1(2) Winter 1984: 79-82.
3. Metwally, Muhammad M. "Fiscal Policy in an Islamic Economy." In *FPRAI*: 59-97.
4. Salama, A.A. "Fiscal Policy of an Islamic State." In *FPRAI*: 99-130.

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1. Al-Qardawi, Y. *Fiqh al Zakah* (Fiqh of Zakah). 4 Volumes. Translated from Arabic by Sajid-ur-Rehman Siddiqi. Lahore: Al-Badr Publications, 1981 (Vols. 1 & 2) (Vols. 3 & 4). (U)
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3. Suleman, R. Muhammad Umar. "Distributive Aspects of Zakah." In *ESI*: 321-339.
4. Faridi, F.R. "Zakat and Fiscal Policy." In *SIE*: 119-130.
5. Hashmi, S.A. "Zakat as an Instrument of Fiscal Policy." In *ESI*: 340-371.
6. Salama. A. Ahmad. "Fiscal Analysis of Zakah with Special Reference to Saudi Arabia's Experience in Zakah." In *MFEI*: 341-371.
7. Kadri, A.H. "The Role and Significance of Ushr in Agricultural Taxation Policy Policy in Muslim Economies." In *ESI*: 250-269.
8. Hasanuzzaman, S. Muhammad. "Issues Relating to Zakat and Ushr." Paper prepared for Work Group on Zakat and Ushr of *2ICIE*.

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1. Seoharwi, Muhammad Hifz-ur-Rehman. "Bait ul-Mal" (The Exchequer). In *IKIN*: 108-13. (U)

2. Abu Yusuf, Imam. *Islam ka Nizam-e-Mahasil* (Public Revenue in Islam). Translated from Arabic by Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi. Karachi: Maktaba Chiragh-e-Rah, 1966. (U)
3. Kahf, M. "Taxation Policy in an Islamic Economy." In *FPRAI*: 131-161.
4. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "Banking System and Public Finance." In *BWI*: Chapter 7, 127-154.

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2. ——— "Economic Policy." In *TIE*: Chapter VI, 125-144.
3. Rushdi, A.A. "Effect of the Elimination of Riba on the Distribution of Income." Paper read at *2ICIE*. (See also comments on this paper by Z. Ahmad and M. Iqbal at the conference.)
4. Reference No. 10 in VI.3.

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1. Ahmad, M. "Distributive Justice and Fiscal and Monetary Economics in Islam." In *MFEI*: 311-340.
2. Hasanuzzaman, S. Muhammad. "The Objectives of Economic Policy in the Early Islamic Period." In *ESI*: 151-171.

Economic Development in an Islamic Framework

1. Ahmad, K. "Economic Development in an Islamic Framework." In *SIE*: 171-188.
2. ——— "Some Thoughts on a Strategy for Development under an Islamic Aegis." In *INIEO*: 127-143.
3. Al-Mahdi, S. "Development—The Islamic Approach." Extension lecture delivered at *2ICIE*.
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Distribution in an Islamic Economy

1. Mawdudi, S.A.A., "Milkiyyat-e-Zamin ka Mas'alah" (The Issue of Ownership of Land). In *MI*: Chapter Six, 187-226. (U)
2. ——— "Islam aur Adl-e-Ijtema'i" (Islam and Social Justice). In *MI*: Chapter Nine, 373-392. (U)
3. Qutb, S. *Islam mein A'dl-e-Ijtema'i* (Social Justice in Islam). Translated from Arabic by Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi. Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1969. (U)
4. Hasan, Z. "Distributional Equity in Islam." Paper read at *2ICIE*. (See also comments by Irfan Shafey and Saeed al-Martani on this paper at the conference.)
5. Shafi', Mufti Muhammad. *Islam ka Nizam-e-Taqsim-e-Daulat* (Distribution of Wealth in Islam). Karachi: Dar al-Asha'at, 1973. (English translation available under the title *Distribution of Wealth in Islam*. Karachi: Begum Aisha Bawany Wakf, 1975.) (U)
6. Tabakoglu, Ahmad. "Labour and Capital Concepts in Islamic Economics." Paper read at *2ICIE*. (See also comments by Muhammad Uzair on this paper at the conference.)
7. Reference Nos. 7, 8, 12, and 15 in III.

Specific Factor Shares

1. Al-Faruqi, I.R. "Islam and Labour." In *INIEO*: 79-101.
2. Hasan, Z. "Theory of Profit. The Islamic Viewpoint." *JRIE* 1(1), Summer 1983: 1-16.

Organization of Economic Activity in Islam

1. Masud, H. Muhammad. *Islamic Land Tenure System*. Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Economics, (forthcoming).
2. Reference Nos. in IV 1, 2, and 3 in VI 3.

Islam and the New International Economic Order

1. Ahmad, K. "A Muslim Response." In J. Gremillion and W. Ryan (eds.) *World Faiths and the New World Order*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-Religion Peace Colouquium, 1978: 171-193.
2. *MWFEO*.

A Glossary of Abbreviations

<i>BWI</i>	Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. <i>Banking Without Interest</i> . Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1983. (Also Volker Neinhaus's Review in <i>J.R.I.E.</i> 1(2), Winter 1984: 84-93.)
<i>EET</i>	Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. <i>The Economic Enterprise in Islam</i> . Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd., 1979.
<i>ESI</i>	Economic System of Islam. (Proceedings of a seminar organized by The National Bank of Pakistan in April 1979.) Karachi: The National Bank of Pakistan, 1980.
<i>FPRAI</i>	Ahmad, Z., M. Iqbal, and Muhammad Fahim Khan (eds.). <i>Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam</i> . Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1983.
<i>ICRIE</i>	International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
<i>IFBP</i>	<i>Interest-Free Banking in Pakistan</i> . (Proceedings of the seminar on "Islamization of Banking" in 1980.) Karachi: The Institute of Bankers in Pakistan, n.d.
<i>IIBSP</i>	Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. <i>Issues in Islamic Banking, Selected Papers</i> . Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1983. (Also Muhammad A. Mannan's Review in <i>J.R.I.E.</i> 1(2), Summer 1983: 69-72.)
<i>IKIN</i>	Seoharwi, Muhammad Hafiz-ur-Rehman. <i>Islam ka Iqtisadi Nizam</i> (Economic System of Islam). Lahore: Adara-e-Islamiyat, 1981. (U)
<i>INIEO</i>	<i>Islam and a New International Economic Order: The Social Dimension</i> . (Proceedings of the symposium held, on the same theme,

- in Geneva, 7-10, January, 1980.) Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1980.
- JRIE* *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics.*
- MBI* Ahmad, Z., M. Iqbal, and Muhammad Fahim Khan (eds.). *Money and Banking in Islam.* Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1983.
- MFEI* Ariff, Mohammad (ed.). *Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam.*Jeddah: International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, 1982.
- MI* Mawdudi, S.A.A. *Ma'ashiyat-e-Islam* (Economics of Islam). Edited by K. Ahmad. Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1969. (U)
- MWFEO* *The Muslim World and the Future Economic Order.* (Proceedings of the conference held, on the same theme, in London during July 4-9, 1977). London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1979.
- SIE* Ahmad, K. (ed.). *Studies in Islamic Economics.* Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1980.
- TIE* Kahf, M. *The Islamic Economy: An Analytical Study of the Functioning of the Islamic Economic System.* Plainfield, Indiana: The Muslim Students' Association of the United States and Canada, n.d. (Also Muhammad Umer Chapra's Review in *J.R.I.E.* 1(2), Winter 1984: 83-5.)
- (U) The title is in Urdu.
- 2ICIE* The Second International Conference on Islamic Economics held during March 19-23, 1983 at the Islamic University, Islamabad.

Appendix C
List of Topics Covered in Senior Officers
Training Programme in Islamic Economic Doctrines
And Their Practical Application Conducted by the
International Institute of Islamic Economics at the
International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan (IIIE)

Sequence

No.	Topics	Remarks
1	Main Components of the Universal Islamic Message	
2	Islamic Approach Towards Life	
3	Ejaz ul Qur'an	
4	Introduction to Hadith Literature	
5	Economics of Qur'an	
6	The Concept of al Adl Wa al Ihsan	
7	Maqasid al Shariah	
8	Idiological Basis for Pakistan Movement	
9	Applicability of Islamic Shariah in the Context of Modern World Conditions	
10	Extension Lecture on "Concept of Credit & Its Application"	Evening lecture "Modern World"
11	History of Islamic Economic Thought	
12	Contribution of Islam of World Civilization	
13	Economic System of Islam	
14	Islamic Economic System	
15	Islamic Viewpoint on Distribution of Income and Wealth	
16	Islam's Distribution System	
17	Concept of Ownership & Property Relationships in Islam	
18	The Prophet (PBUH) ka Mo'ashi Inqila'ab	
19	Land Tenure System and Land Reforms in an Islamic State	
20	Worker-Employer Relationships in Islam	
21	"Source of Islamic Law"	Evening Lecture
22	Social Justice in Islam	
23	Riba in the Light of Qur'an and Sunnah	
24	Economic Rationale of the Prohibition of Interest and Virtues of an Interest-Free Economy	
25	Seminar on "Business Practices in Islamic Shariah"	
26	Islamization of Commercial Banking in Pakistan	
27	Role of Ijtihad in Meeting the Challenges of Modern World	

- 28 Worker-Employer Relationships in Islam
- 29 Commercial Banking Based on Islamic Principles
- 30 Elimination of Interest from Government Transactions
(Including Islamic Viewpoint on Deficit Financing)
- 31 General Discussion
- 32 "The Present State of Islamic Finance Movement" Evening Lecture
- 33 Resource Allocation and Project Evaluation in an
Islamic Economy
- 34 Principles of Public Expenditure in an Islamic Economy
- 35 System of Zakah and Ushr in Operation in Pakistan:
A Description
- 36 Some Misgivings about Islamic Interest-Free Banking
- 37 Islam and Insurance
- 38 Central Banking and Monetary Policy in an Islamic
Economy
- 39 Recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology
on Economic Issues
- 40 Extension Lecture on "Islamisation of Commercial
Banking in Pakistan" Evening Lecture
- 41 Development Finance Institutions and Instruments in
an Islamic Economy
- 42 Taxation, PLS System and Islamization
- 43 Islamic Theory of Public Finance and Principles of
Taxation in an Islamic Economy
- 44 Role of Awqaf
- 45 "Islamization Process in Pakistan" Evening Lecture

Comments on “Teaching Programs in Islamic Economics: A Comparative Study”*

Abdul Rahman Yusri

In “Teaching Programs in Islamic Economics: A Comparative Study,” Iqbal introduces excellent ideas that demonstrate his knowledge of both Islamic economics and the problems of teaching it. He exposes the hiatus between secular social sciences and traditional education in Muslim societies by following the usual interpretation; that is, describing the rift within the educational system between ‘traditional’ education which is devoted to the religious sciences while ignoring the modern sciences, and secular education which is devoted to modern sciences, accepting it in blind faith, while showing no interest in the religious sciences. However, within the educational institutions there exists a more fundamental problem.

Many Muslim countries such as Egypt have introduced modern sciences into the curriculum of institutions of traditional education. For example, al-Azhar University restructured itself, mixing traditional shari‘ah education with the modern sciences. Even so, the gap between the two systems did not disappear, rather, it became even more pronounced. Iqbal indicates his awareness of the problem but does not express it as succinctly and clearly as he should. The gap between traditional and modern education in our societies is reflected in the hearts and minds of our teachers, educators, and intellectuals who believe that integration does injustice to one or the other educational system. A deep-seated belief among some religious leaders is that modern science contains the seeds of evil thought and that the introduction of modern sciences into traditional Islamic education will have a negative effect on the faith. Clearly, mixing the modern and the Islamic sciences alone will not solve the problem facing our schools and universities. Rather, the problem will only be solved when educators expand the traditional curriculum so that it absorbs new branches of knowledge, while at the same time, establishes a

* Translated from Arabic by the editor.

discriminating filter to sift out what is not in accord with Islam. Only when we have developed a methodology to ascertain whether a modern scientific development is in line with the values inherent in our shari'ah will the blind imitation of the West stop. The moment Muslim intellectuals attain this is the moment the imaginary hiatus between the two systems vanishes. Vital to teaching Islamic economics is the knowledge that the real gap to be bridged is the one between the knowledge based on true faith revealed to our Prophet, the Seal of the Prophets, blessings and peace be upon him, and the sciences that do not pay attention to such faith, and may even run counter to it.

The early steps taken by some Muslim educational institutions to establish specialized departments with full curricula for the teaching of Islamic economics encountered the question of balance between shari'ah and secular sciences. The problem was not only how much of each to give the students but also who among the faculties was qualified to teach these subjects. The professors of fiqh saw themselves as the most qualified to teach Islamic economics as well modern economics. On the other hand, the professors who studied economics in the West or in the Muslim countries whose universities followed Western standards and were unconvinced of the relevance of Islamic economics, understood the problem of teaching Islamic economics as no more than modifying the economic theory within ordinary secular economics courses to accord with Islamic ethics and values. What concerned most professors of economics was how to analyse problems and pass them through theoretical studies within a general framework of basic assumptions deduced from the shari'ah and the ethics of Islamic societies. Economics professors concentrated on learning the details of some rather general principles of the shari'ah or considered the shari'ah outside their field of competence. Evidence of this situation was revealed in conferences, seminars, and workshops conducted in many countries since 1971, and is reflected in the curricula of many Islamic universities.

Iqbal analyses the curricula of four leading Islamic Universities, highlighting the balance between the shari'ah and modern econom-

ics in each. He finds traditional shari'ah subjects are prominent and receive higher intensity in Muhammad bin Saud and al Imam Sadiq Universities; whereas he finds modern economics more dominant in the curriculum of the International Islamic University in Malaysia. Iqbal does not explain the reasons behind the curricula differences. I may safely say that the differences in the curricula lie in the fact that at those universities where the shari'ah specialists had the upper hand, the shari'ah subjects dominated the curriculum and vice-versa. At the International Islamic University in Islamabad he found a more balanced curriculum. And reflecting his wide experience at the University of Islamabad, we find that Iqbal, in his proposed curriculum, judiciously mixes shari'ah science and modern economics to produce a balanced curriculum at the undergraduate level.

With care, Iqbal addresses the question of what is the proper mixture of shari'ah and modern economics in the university curriculum. Certainly, the question is not easy to answer and may not be answered until Islamic economics is well established in Muslim countries. Professors of shari'ah, and *fuqahā* in particular, are not economists. This fact does not reduce in any way their prestige—Islamic scientific methodology was developed centuries before the Western system. The Islamic system respects specialization. Professors of modern economics in Muslim universities have to begin economic analysis within the Islamic perspective. Of course, this will need more than a general knowledge of shari'ah principles, it will take a deep and searching exploration of the shari'ah, Islamic economic history, and the contribution of Muslim scholars to economics.

But the problem is not merely deciding the proper mixture of shari'ah and modern economics courses, the problem is how to facilitate the amalgamation of shari'ah and modern economics. The amalgam will not occur unless the hearts and minds of the teachers of both shari'ah and modern economics change. Then and only then will we have a unified concept of Islamic economics and no longer need to divide our courses into shari'ah and otherwise.

Iqbal's work is excellent as is the program he presents as a B.A. degree in Islamic Economics. Those who have studied modern economics and then devoted their time and energy to research in the field of Islamic economics are in complete agreement with him. However, even though a large portion of Iqbal's proposed curriculum contains study of the shari'ah, his proposal will still not be acceptable to most shari'ah specialists.

The fundamental question is how to eliminate the existing gap in the hearts and minds of those who teach. I suspect that, for a long time, there are going to be graduates from our leading universities who have B.A. degrees in Islamic economics but who have different backgrounds. Some will be well-versed in shari'ah principles and codes with little training in economics while others will be well-trained in modern economics but possess very superficial knowledge of the shari'ah.

In Iqbal's examination of Islamic universities, he ignores developments in three leading Islamic universities—al Azhar in Egypt, Um al Qura in Saudi Arabia and Omdurman in Sudan. Neglecting to mention these universities is unfortunate for they are instructive examples. In particular, al-Azhar, which has ambitiously pursued the integration of modern sciences with traditional religious teachings has been a target of criticism from different quarters. Al Azhar is worth evaluating and should have been included in this paper. The other two universities have identical programs of teaching Islamic economics. In these programs, there is a clear attempt to integrate modern economics and the shari'ah. There seems to be no particular reason why these universities were not included in this paper.

From my own experience at Um al Qura University, I know that within two years it is possible to present a substantial portion of the shari'ah of economics to graduate students from secular universities. At the same time, it is also possible to present a substantial portion of modern economics to graduates of shari'ah institutions. Within this program, a student who has passed his preparatory studies is in a position to choose his Master or Ph.D. thesis under the supervision of two professors, one specializing in the shari'ah and the other in mod-

ern economics. The program has resulted in important research and the completion of many theses in different branches of Islamic economics.

Some of the students who finished their Ph.D.s became part of the teaching staff at the university and will have an important role in furthering research in Islamic economics. They are well prepared for the task. They went through a program of balanced education in both economics and shari'ah. Some may wonder how it is possible to develop postgraduate programs where there is no undergraduate teaching of the subject? We should not forget that Islamic economics is not a new science. Its roots extend into history and we are only reintroducing it in the modern context.

The last point which I would like to raise is the importance of offering complementary subjects to students of Islamic economics. The job market is not yet ready to offer employment opportunities to its graduates. In fact, society may demand skills and training not developed by its courses but by the complementary courses. The complementary subjects such as accounting, business administration, foreign language, and quantitative studies, though not part of the study of Islamic economics, will enhance the opportunities of its graduates. This is very important, especially in the beginning. Certainly, students will not specialize in this science if there are no jobs for them.

How to Teach Microeconomics in Islamic Perspective at Intermediate Undergraduate Level in an Undergraduate Program

Fahim Khan

General Discription of the Course

Course Level

Microeconomics has not yet reached a level where the Islamic perspective can be incorporated into microeconomic theory at the graduate or even at the undergraduate level. At this stage, efforts are required to organize an intermediate undergraduate microeconomics course with an Islamic perspective. The course will be taught in the third year of a four-year undergraduate economics program, following courses taught at the principles level in the first or second year. This paper provides guidelines for such a course.

Prerequisites

The course follows the principles level courses—a course on the principles of ‘conventional’ economics, an introductory course on Islamic economic doctrines, and a course explaining the fundamentals of fiqh al mu‘āmalāt (the jurisprudence of economic and financial matters). A list of main topics covered in these prerequisite courses can be found in Appendix A. It is assumed that the student has been exposed to elementary mathematical tools (algebra, graphs, geometry, and differential calculus, etc.).

Duration

The course is two semesters. Normally, a course of this level is taught in one semester; but because students are required to review the secular concepts from the Islamic point of view, they need to learn all of the standard material plus the relevant Islamic literature. The most time consuming aspect of this course is the elaboration and critical appraisal of the philosophical underpinnings of conventional microeconomic theory.

Coverage

The course's basic framework will follow the standard textbooks used at this level at any well-known North American or West European university. The contents of a typical textbook are detailed in Appendix D.¹ The course objective will be to cover all the standard material covered in the secular context and then return to the material viewing it from the point of view of Islam and, when possible, offering Islamic alternatives. An outline of the course along with suggested guidelines for teachers are given below.

General Approach and Methodology

In most Western universities, a course at this level is given a mathematical rather than philosophical treatment. However, this course requires full mathematical treatment along with a detailed discussion, as far as possible, of the philosophical underpinnings. It would be futile to examine the secular concepts from an Islamic point of view without first providing the secular philosophic basis. Usually at the this course level no term paper is required, but for the purpose of this course a paper is highly desirable. Students are required to write a term paper on a topic that reviews a concept of modern microeconomics from an Islamic point of view or integrates a 'conventional' concept with an Islamic concept.

In Muslim countries junior faculty members, who have little exposure to the research in Islamic Economics, will most likely be teaching this course because it is an undergraduate course and there is shortage of adequately qualified faculty. Though the junior faculty members may be perfectly qualified to teach the secular content of the course, because of the lack of teaching material in the field, they will always feel handicapped in providing their students an Islamic insight into the concepts discussed in the course. It will, therefore, be desirable to arrange lectures to be delivered by renowned scholars of Islamic economics in order to present a comparative analysis of philosophical underpinnings of various concepts of modern microeconomics.

¹ These contents have been taken from A. Koutsoyiannes, *Modern Microeconomics*, 2nd edition, Macmillian Publishers Ltd., n.d.

Outlines and Guidelines

Broadly speaking the course should cover the following areas:

1. Introduction to Microeconomics
2. Theory of Demand
3. Theory of Production
4. Theory of Costs
5. Theory of Profit Maximizing Firm (i.e., firm behaving with marginal cost pricing)
6. Theory of Firm under Alternate Pricing Systems (i.e., pricing systems other than marginal cost pricing)
7. Production Factors, Pricing Factors, and Markets Factors
8. Theory of Distribution
9. General Equilibrium and Welfare Theory

Guidelines for content discussions in these areas are given below. (A detailed outline of the above headings are given in Appendix A.)

First Semester

Introduction to Microeconomics

Microeconomics requires an introduction to the concepts of the economic problem, economic agents, and economic social institutions. A brief description of the contemporary methodology of social sciences in general and economics in particular is also required. Usually a discussion on methodology is not covered in this course, but since Islamic economics is yet to be developed as a scientific discipline, it is essential that students broadly know the methodology of economics at this stage too. After a discussion of these topics in the secular context, the teacher then should turn to the Islamic perspective on these topics. An economic problem should be discussed in detail in the light of an Islamic system of life. At this point, a renowned Islamic economist, or, if one is not available, a renowned 'ālim (religious scholar) should be invited to give his idea of 'the economic problem of man.' The teacher then may synthesize this lecture into

the modern economic jargon. Such a discussion should make a student conceptualize ‘maximizing behavior’ within the Islamic context. Optimization, with respect to the objective of economic activity and the objective of the economic activities of Islamic agents, should be elaborated in detail.

The significance of ‘wants’ which emerge from desires is another important point to be discussed in the context of formulating the economic problem of man from the Islamic perspective. Along with wants the concept of ‘needs’ may be discussed. At this point, it will be useful to refer to the literature relating to the objectives of the shari‘ah. In addition, the following topics need to be highlighted: the limits of laissez-laire in the context of the Islamic economy, the role of the State to intervene in the economic affairs of economic agents of the society, the State’s own economic role, the State’s role in modifying the individual’s economic behavior so that it falls in line with the objectives of the shari‘ah, and the State’s role in building up itself as an institution so that it supplements or complements the market institution in achieving the objectives of the shari‘ah. Along with this introduction to the economic problem from the Islamic perspective, the methodology of Islamic economics should be discussed. Here we may introduce the role of the third sector in the Islamic economy, the private sector, which looks after the public needs of the society.

The discussion of microeconomic methodology may start by describing the axioms that relate human behavior to the development of economic theory and then goes on to determining whether or not Islamic economics requires different axioms. Again, a reference to the objectives of the shari‘ah may be required in order to derive the basic axioms of Islamic economic behavior. In this respect, some reading material mentioned in Appendix E can be consulted. So far, two or three different approaches are available. The teacher should discuss all of them as a methodology for Islamic economics.

A discussion of the implications of a difference in the set of axioms for human behavior should also be discussed. For example, it can be argued that whereas axioms of secular behavior emphasize only efficiency (more is preferred to less), the axioms of Islamic

behavior imply not only efficiency but some other norms also (e.g., equity, desirability, etc.). Similarly, as the secular axioms of laissez-faire will promote the market as an economic institution to achieve efficiency, Islamic axioms will promote their own institutions to ensure their norms of equity, desirability, etc. These institutions may be public sector institutions or third sector institutions.

In a secular context, this introduction may not take more than a lecture but in the Islamic context, at least three lectures should be devoted to this section so that students get the necessary background to visualize and compare the Islamic approach to the concepts of micro-behavior that they will be studying in this course. (The readings for this section are shown in Appendix B.)

Concept of Ownership

After the introduction, conventional microeconomic theory begins with the consumption theory. However, when beginning microeconomics from an Islamic perspective, the starting point will be the concept of ownership and individual property rights. Secular economics is justified in ignoring the discussion of individual property rights on the assumption that individuals are operating in a laissez-faire framework. This assumption is not true when discussing Islamic microeconomics.

The manner in which property rights are defined has an extensive and intensive effect not only on the economic activities of a society but also on the institutions that will develop in the society. In fact, the system of property rights determines the parameters of microeconomic behavior.

A precise introduction to the Islamic system of property rights will help students understand the institutional structure regulated in an Islamic society. He will be able to review the following:

- How relevant the assumption of competitive markets are to an Islamic society.
- How far the competitive markets will be able to meet the economic needs of the society.

- What institutions of Islamic society that competitive markets fail to meet.

A proper definition of property rights also determines the divergence between private costs/benefits and social costs/benefits which will provide a basis for understanding the Islamic approach to welfare theory in microeconomics.

The property rights of individuals and state/society need to be defined separately. Individual property rights, also called private property rights, must be explained in relation to a market system. Simple examples from contemporary societies will serve to explain how inadequately defined private property rights lead to market failures. They do so because they create externalities which lead to a situation in which either the private cost of an action is not equal to the social cost of that action or the private benefit of an action is not equal to the social benefit of that action. Distinctive features of the Islamic system of private property rights are required to be highlighted not only to mention that such externalities are minimized but also to mention that these features are extremely important for the formulation of various aspects of microeconomic theory. (References have been provided in the reading list to explain the extent to which the principles of property rights have affected the formulation of microeconomic theory.) Criticism of traditional theory of production and exchange and the new analytical approaches form an important body of contemporary economic literature. A large part of this literature is growing upon the notion of property right structure. Our students, who will have to criticize traditional theory and discover alternate analytical approaches, will benefit from a discussion of the Islamic system of property rights at the beginning of a microeconomic theory course.

While teaching the topics of consumption, production, and firm behavior, the teacher is required, off and on, to explain that the nature of Islamic property rights affects the allocation and use of resources in specific and predictable ways. It has been argued in economic literature that a change in the general system of property relations must affect the way people behave and hence, through this effected behav-

ior, property rights assignments affect the allocation of resources, composition of output, distribution of income, etc.

No in-depth analysis of property rights and their relationship to microeconomic theory is required at this stage. The objective is simply to make the students understand that Islam gives a different system of property rights with its distinctive features having implications on the microeconomic behavior of human beings.

Theory of Demand

In this section, the first topic discusses the theory of consumer behavior. After explaining the secular basis of consumer behavior (covering the concepts of utility, marginal utility, and indifference curve analysis), the question becomes is this a valid basis (or the only basis) from which to describe consumer behavior? One approach may be to derive the basis of Islamic consumer behavior from the objectives of the shari'ah. The objectives of the shari'ah should determine the objectives of Islamic consumer behavior. *Maṣlahah* (considerations of public interest) in the consumption of a good, for example, may be an alternative concept corresponding to the secular concept of utility. According to Shatibi, *maṣlahah* can be at three levels: *ḍarriyah* (necessity), *ḥajjiyah* (complementary), and *tahsinuyah* (amelioratory). There will be a lexicographic ordering in the goods at different levels of *maṣlahah*. Indifference curve analysis, therefore, will not be valid. (Reference has been provided in the reading list to indicate how lexicographic ordering may be analyzed in this respect.) Only those goods which have the same level of *maṣlahah* can be amenable to indifference curve analysis. Such an approach leads to a distinction between wants (based on the utility concept) and needs (based on the *maṣlahah* concept). The question then becomes in what respect is the consumer behavior analysis based on the need concept substantially different from the analysis based on the utility or want concept? It is in this context that discussion should arise about economic institutions (not present in the secular framework) that moti-

vate or force the consumer to fulfill his needs (according to *maṣlahah*) rather than seek maximization of worldly utility (desires).

At this stage, it is necessary to distinguish between the two types of spending performed by the Islamic consumer.

- Type I is to meet his and his family's worldly needs (the fulfillment of which not only yields utility but also a reward in the Hereafter).
- Type II is for the sake of a reward in the Hereafter alone with no explicit motive of meeting worldly needs.

This discussion should start from the explanation of *āyāt* (verses) 2:260 to 2:280 in the Qur'an. It will be useful to invite a scholar in *fiqh* to explain these verses in detail with reference to the consumption behavior of the Prophet (Peace be upon him) and his Companions. Following the scholar's discourse, the teacher should reformulate the same concepts in economic jargon. Comparing the two types of spending we may say that, whereas type I spending may be yielding what is recognized as utility, type II spending yields something different from utility. Let us call it extra-utility (*thawāb* or reward in the Hereafter). Whereas utility is something that refers to the man-material relationship, extra-utility is something that refers to the man-Allah relationship. An optimum allocation between the baskets, therefore, takes place on the basis of several parameters (including the degree to which an individual is committed to behave as a true Islamic person). In fact, type I spending involves utility as well as extra-utility because to spend on one's own genuine needs (i.e., needs having *maṣlahah*) also brings a reward in the Hereafter; whereas type II spending involves only extra-utility. The Qur'an in *āyah* 2:177 "and giveth away his wealth out of love for Him" clearly indicates that type II spending involves only extra-utility. It may be discussed what relationship utility and extra-utility may have in type I spending. For example, it may be argued that marginal extra-utility and marginal-utility are positively related. When the hungry person eats his first portion of food, he gets highest utility and also gets highest extra-utility because he knows that saving his life is a religious obligation. Eating the next portion of food gives him lower utility as

well as lower extra-utility and so on. Since it is difficult to talk about a marginal reward in the Hereafter, particularly in reference to type II spending, one may therefore like to talk in terms of total utility and extra-utility. One may argue that the two are negatively related in type I spending. The higher one spends on one's own needs, though the total utility may increase, the extra-utility may decline. On the other hand, the extra-utility involved in type II spending is a monotonically increasing function of spending.

By maximizing extra-utility while trying to fulfill his needs, the consumer can arrive at an optimum allocation of resources between the two types of spending. There are two types of choices involved: the choices between type I spending and type II spending and the choices within each type of spending. We have to make an attempt to describe rules for each of them. It is not necessary that we should try to explain these rules with the help of indifference curve analysis. We may take the example of a typical Islamic consumer and, making various assumptions about his Islamic orientation, arrive at certain rules governing his choices either in terms of utility or *maṣlahah* or *thawāb*. Also, it is essential to explain the normative spending behavior of an Islamic consumer. Classroom discussion would serve to explain the term *isrāf* (intemperance) in the economic jargon of utility or *maṣlahah* and its role in arriving at a decision rule for the two types of choices. Also, it may be useful to attempt an explanation of *al 'afw* (one's resources that are beyond one's needs). It is here that students may be required to write an assignment on the decision rules of an Islamic consumer for the choices it faces. Hypothetical numerical examples may be given to ask the students to determine how a consumer will allocate his income or how this allocation will be different from the allocation if he behaves other than as an Islamic consumer.

Within the topic Theory of Demand, the standard textbooks cover the following as an application of the theory of consumer behavior: Work-Leisure choice and Intertemporal Choice. These two aspects of choice need elaboration from the Islamic perspective using the same method of analysis used above for consumer behavior.

Work-Leisure Choice

It may be pointed out that leisure is not the only alternative to work. There is another alternative use of time, it is the use of time for the Hereafter. It may, therefore, not be merely a work-leisure choice in the Islamic perspective. We may call it a time-allocation problem (corresponding to the income-allocation problem.² Someone may spend his time in three ways: first, earning income to have a command over other resources to meet his worldly needs; second, leisurely resting or recreating (which too is a worldly need); third, doing something that fulfills no worldly need but which will benefit him in the Hereafter.

How one allocates his time between the three types of uses is part of the discussion on consumer behavior. Parallel with the discussion of income-allocation we may put time-allocation into two types.

- Type I is spending time to meet worldly needs. This includes time allocated to work earning an income as well as resting the mind and body (again, meeting genuinely worldly needs implies a reward in the Hereafter too).
- Type II is spending time earning a reward for the Hereafter only (with no explicit objective to meet any worldly need). This includes time allocated to various *'ibādah* (acts of worship), the propagation of Islam, etc.

Similar to the income-allocation problem, the consumer is now confronted with two choices of expenditure: How much time to allocate to type I and type II spending. After it has been decided how much time to allocate to type I spending, the choice is to decide how much time to allocate to work and how much to leisure within this type I spending. The choice may be discussed with the student first in the utility-based approach using the indifference curve analysis and pointing out its limitation in analyzing such behavior. Then these choices may be discussed in the need-based framework too. Though there are no tools available for analyzing the need-based behavior

² Just as the consumer must decide on how much income to spend on which commodity, so the consumer must face the problem of time allocation, i.e., how much time to spend on what.

such as the indifference curves, still it is hoped that a continuous effort by teachers to explain the need-based approach will ultimately result in the development of our own tools of analysis.

Intertemporal Choices

Intertemporal choices require an in-depth analysis from the Islamic point of view. If the students are not clear about the Islamic position on this aspect of choice, they may later become confused on the issues relating to factor rewards, and income distribution between factors of production.

First, a full exposition should be given to intertemporal choice in the secular framework by explaining, in detail, the concept of time preference and how an equilibrium discount rate is arrived at with the help of indifference curve analysis between present consumption and future consumption. That the philosophical underpinning of such an analysis is important should also be highlighted and reviewed. After an excursion on the secular conceptual plane, a turn should be made towards the Islamic plane. The basic question to discuss is: Does Islam recognize time preference as a legitimate aspect of the economic behavior of human beings or will Muslims have a positive time preference if they behave according to Islamic norms of behavior?

Answering the question may begin by raising the above questions, first, in the secular context. Do people really have a positive time preference? If so, what are the factors that determine the rate of time preference? Do these factors remain valid in the Islamic context? Literature is now available to discuss this question in detail. (References have been provided in Appendix B.) One conclusion may seem to be quite obvious, that is, the rate of time preference in Islamic behavior may be much higher than in secular behavior. This may be because of several factors, e.g., the belief that the Almighty, and not the human being, can take the responsibility of future consumption and the social insurance system will take care of the emergencies. But this should not lead to the conclusion (as some writers have done) that savings in an Islamic economy will be lower or only

negligible due to the higher rate of time preference. The question of savings should be discussed from two angles. First, the motives and factors that generate savings are required to be discussed. Several motives and factors behind savings will turn out to be independent of the rate of time preference. The high rate of time preference may come in the way of savings only when investment and, hence, return on savings is the only motive for savings. Second, savings in an Islamic framework will be required to be invested, otherwise, it will be depleted by zakah. Thus, the savings in an Islamic economy are compelled to be in a productive form and, therefore, the consumer may even raise higher productive savings.³ All such discussion should be confined in the context of intertemporal choice to present and future consumption.

Next, in the context of intertemporal choice within the Islamic framework the question is whether the time has legitimate value in intertemporal transactions and whether this value is allowed to be cashed in the market. In other words, if I believe that I discount future consumption at the rate of 10 percent per annum, does this mean that I am entitled to charge a person who borrows my present resources to pay me a surcharge at the rate of 10 percent to compensate my time preference. There is some controversy about this, therefore, a review of the literature is essential to provide the students with food for thought whenever the issues of discounting, interest rate, deferred sales/payments are discussed. (References to the relevant literature have been provided in Appendix B.)

Now is an appropriate time to discuss a peculiar aspect of consumer behavior in the Islamic framework. In the secular framework, income-allocation in the intertemporal framework makes the consumer a saver who earns interest on savings to maximize his present and future consumption. Similarly, the time allocation between income and leisure makes him a laborer who decides to spend part of his time as labor for wages. But the analysis of consumer behavior in

³ It may be pointed out that a lot of savings in several developing countries are in unproductive assets like gold, jewelry, and other durable consumer items. Such savings are independent of time preference (as time preference in these countries should be high) and are independent of rate of return on savings.

the Islamic framework may lead us to explain how an entrepreneur or a firm is generated as a result of a consumer's work-leisure choice or as a result of his intertemporal choice.

Analysis of intertemporal income-allocation in the Islamic perspective reveals that if a person chooses to save, then he at the same time decides to be an investor too. In the presence of zakah and the absence of interest, he cannot decide simply to save unless he knows how to pay zakah. In other words, he will simultaneously decide in what form he will keep his savings so that he can pay zakah out of the income of such savings. Similarly, time-allocation analysis will simply reveal that a person decides how much time to spend working. But then there is another choice involved, and that is whether to work for a wage or initiate his own work in order to earn an income (in which case he will decide to bear entrepreneurial risk too).

In other words, analysis of how a consumer includes a choice between various risk bearing alternatives is available to him. This aspect may be made an important and integral part of the consumer theory in the Islamic perspective. It is this choice that will help us in understanding the supply of entrepreneurial factors of production⁴ (as opposed to secular consumer theory which helps us understand only the supply of labor and savings—savings being considered as supply of capital on the assumption that all savings are invested).

Next comes market demand analysis. The standard techniques and tools of market analysis may be taught to the students from any conventional textbook. The derivation of market demand resulting from the individual consumer's decisions and a discussion of the factors affecting market demand should be done both under utility-based analysis as well as need-based analysis. The differences in market demand under the two approaches should be discussed. Under the need-based (*maṣlāḥah*-based) analysis, necessities are required to be fulfilled first, then complementarities, and then amelioratories. In a society where institutions exist to motivate or compel its individuals to follow such a hierarchy in needs in the initial stages of develop-

⁴ The concept of entrepreneurial factors of production will be further introduced in detail under the topic of factors of production.

ment, market demand should reflect mostly the fulfillment of necessities. Complementarities and amelioratories may get added at an accelerated rate as society develops. For example, consider market demand of a good say, wheat. The slope of market demand of wheat will depend on, among other factors, the level of development in the country (i.e., per capita income) and the extent of income distributions. If the per capita income is low and income-distribution is more or less egalitarian, the market demand will be almost flat since most of the people will simply be using wheat to meet their necessities. (This may not be so if the economy is not following a hierarchy among necessities, complementaries and ameliorates in its consumption). As the country develops, the slope of the market demand will become steeper and steeper because into wheat's demand will enter the complementary and amelioratory. This result may hold irrespective of the distribution of income in the economy. On the other hand, in a secular economy, the more unequal the distribution of income, the steeper the demand for wheat because some people will be using wheat as complementary and some as amelioratory and the demand of such people will obviously be more price elastic. There is no institutional compulsion in the society not to go for amelioratory consumption of wheat when other people are deprived of even its essential consumption.

It may be instructive to analyze the recent developments in the theory of market demand such as linear expenditure which can have relevance for an analysis in the Islamic perspective. Linear expenditure systems refer to models which deal with groups of commodities rather than individual commodities like food, clothing, consumer durables, services, etc.

It is assumed that the consumer buys some minimum quantity from each group irrespective of prices. In the Islamic framework, we can say that the consumer, first, will have to meet essential needs (for the basic protection of life, property, religion, reason, and posterity), irrespective of prices. Then LES (linear expenditure systems) assures that the income left after the expenditure on these essentials is allocated among various groups on the basis of prices. Here we may

introduce that the income left after meeting the essentials will be first allocated to complementaries because the amelioratories cannot be purchased before fulfilling complementary needs. A constant price elasticity say b may be assumed for these complementaries (as LES assumes for all consumption beyond the minimum requirement). Then we may assume that the income left after spending on essentials and complementaries will be allocated to amelioratories. (This will be a step forward beyond what is discussed in LES). Again a constant price elasticity say b^* may be assumed for these amelioratories with the restriction that $b^* > b$. This is because, by definition, price elasticities of amelioratories are required to be higher than the price elasticities of complementarities. Several arguments can be developed to support such an hypothesis. (A similar division can be done for type II spending where some spending is absolutely essential—such as *zakah/‘ushr* [one-tenth] and *al nafaqāt al wājibah* [required living expenditures]—and some spending may be complementary, and the remaining may be amelioratory.) LES, in fact, is potentially very helpful for econometric estimation of market demand functions in a contemporary Muslim society, which if implemented can help them to strengthen an Islamic theory of consumer behavior. Such an analysis may even help define *isrāf* and understanding the factors behind it. This subject, in fact, has the potential to become the subject of a Ph.D. thesis in Islamic economics.

The theory of consumer behavior is at the core of microeconomics. The introduction and the discussion of the theory of demand should comprise more than two-thirds of the first semester. The remaining one-third should be devoted to the theory of production, the theory of cost, and the theory of profit maximizing firm.

Theory of Production

The conventional textbook treatment of the theory of production simply requires an explanation of technical relationships and concepts such as: law of returns to scale, technological progress, marginal conditions for equilibrium level of output, derivation of cost function

from production function, production possibility curves, etc. These concepts have to be taught in the same detail as any modern text provides on this topic. But before entering into these technical concepts and relationships, the students must be led to ask, Why produce? This is a question usually not discussed in modern textbooks while discussing the theory of production. The modern textbook usually addresses itself to the questions, What to produce? and How much to produce? But the question Why produce? is not raised at all. In the secular framework, the reason is obvious: since consumers have to consume to derive utility, consumption can be met only through production. Maximization of utility requires maximum production. The question Why produce? therefore, does not require discussion. The question Why produce? only becomes relevant when discussing the theory of production in the Islamic perspective because then the discussion requires us to distinguish the secular motives for production from the Islamic ones.

If we agree to divide consumption into two distinct types of spending, one to meet worldly needs and another to meet the needs of the Hereafter only, then production has to be made for both types of spending. An explanation of motives behind production will help to understand various goods of a firm, which will be discussed under the heading Theory of Firm.

While discussing a production function in the secular context, it must be clarified that $Q = F(K, L)$ simply refers to the fact that production depends on certain factors. In addition, it must be clarified that the Islamic framework provides a different approach towards factors of production than the secular framework. At this stage it may simply be mentioned that this production function takes into account only those factors of production which have a definite schedule of marginal productivity and hence are entitled to a reward equal to their marginal productivity. This production function assumes away risk and uncertainty. This assumption may go well with the secular analytical framework, but for an analysis in the Islamic perspective, this assumption may hide some important aspects of economic analysis. It may be mentioned with reference to a later discussion on factors of

production that the factors of production may opt for sharing the outcomes of an activity rather than claiming a fixed reward on the basis of marginal productivity. The above production function cannot adequately take into account this fact, because in the Islamic framework, the factors of production not only may contribute some definite service to the production process but may also contribute some indefinite service, such as bearing the risk of loss.

It is neither possible nor necessary at this course level to provide an alternative form of production function. The objective should simply be to put into the minds of the students that $Q = F(K, L)$ is not a mathematical formula like $(a+b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2$. The above type of production function emerges from a certain set of assumptions which may or may not be true, depending on the nature of the productive organization or the nature of the firm (to be discussed in the next chapter) and on the framework available for these organizations to operate in.

Similarly, while discussing the derivation of cost function from production function, the students should be reminded that this cost function is relevant only in the context of fixed-reward-receiving-factors of production. The cost function will be derived differently if we include profit-and-loss-sharing factors of production in the production function.

Theory of Costs

Theory of Costs is more or less a technical topic, in the sense that it simply explains the logical relationship between the cost of production and the level of output. However, after discussing in detail the conventional analysis of cost-output relationships, once again the issue of uncertain-reward-bearing factors of production should be brought under discussion. The economics of profit-and-loss-sharing-based employment of factors of production should be discussed as opposed to the economics of fixed-reward-based employment of factors of production. In this context, the economic rationale of profit-and-loss sharing, particularly with respect to financial investment,

should be elaborated, highlighting the significance of keeping the sharing of losses strictly in proportion to the invested capital. In other words, we should discuss questions such as Why in *muḍārabah*, and *mushārah* contracts, profits are allowed to be shared in any proportion but sharing of losses have no other option but to be in the ration of capital? and How would this arrangement affect the cost of production vis-à-vis the conventional arrangements?

While discussing the topic of costs, particularly nonpecuniary costs, the attention should be drawn to the fact that a Muslim may consider several things a cost which a non-Muslim may not. Similarly, there may be several elements which require treatment as cost in the conventional framework, but in the Islamic framework may not be considered as cost. For example, payment of a higher wage or some noncash benefits to low income labor out of benevolence and for the cause of Allah, cannot be treated as a cost because this element of wages cannot enter into the firm's decision making process of equilibrium level of production. Such examples of quasi-cost are likely to be numerous in an Islamic economy. Even today, in Muslim economies it has been observed that a lot of employment of labor takes place merely out of the spirit of benevolence and not on the basis of marginal productivity of labor. If marginal productivity of labor were the criterion, employment levels would be much less (e.g., in Pakistan the unemployment rate is only around three percent, whereas the marginal productivity is much less than the prevailing wage rate). Instead of arguing that the marginal productivity theory is not relevant in Islamic economics, it should be argued that the employer is not treating some part of the labor cost as economic cost. The students may be given an assignment to list the Islamic costs that are not treated as costs in the conventional framework, and the conventional costs that are not treated as costs in the Islamic framework.

The rest of the discussion under the title of Cost Theory should be the same as in any conventional textbook.

Theory of Firm

Theory of Firm should first answer the question, How is a firm created? More fundamentally, the question should be asked, How is an entrepreneur generated?

As a result of the allocation of time (as discussed earlier under the topic consumption theory) labor supply will be generated. How much of this labor will choose wage-paid jobs and how much of it will choose to be entrepreneurs (and hence a firm) to organize productive activity? Similarly, the consumer choice between present and future consumption results in savings. Under the Islamic framework, these savings have to be invested so that they are not deleted by *zakah*. Part of the savings will be converted into rentable assets and part will be put into an investment activity. This generates entrepreneurship. Firm, therefore, should be shown as emerging out of consumers and hence, firms should be argued as having the same motivation as consumers. This scenario will also help the students to think of alternative goals of the firm. The fact that conventional economic theory treats the firm as an abstract entity is something that may not fit into the economic system of Islam. A scholar of *fiqh* may be invited to explain the nature of the firm and its liability (as opposed to the limited liability of modern joint stock companies).

The question of how the firm is generated should start by reviewing various forms of economic enterprises or business organizations in Islam and their operation principles, particularly, with respect to the sharing of the outcome. Then compare the economic enterprises of *mudārabah* and *mushārah* with the economic enterprises in Western societies. This discussion should not confine itself to the industrial sector. The forms of economic enterprise in agriculture, such as *muzārah* (temporary sharecropping contract) and *musāqāh* (sharecropping contract over the leasing of a plantation, limited to a one-crop period), etc., also should be discussed.

Detailed discussions of the following should be presented: various forms of market structures within which economic enterprise can possibly operate, along with a review of the Islamic position on dif-

ferent types of market structures; joint stock companies as a form of firm; and the question of limited liability in the light of the shari'ah. A lecture by a scholar of fiqh on the subjects of business ethics, the conditions for operation in the market (rules relating to trade), etc., is also desirable. This presentation should then be rediscussed by the teacher to explain what market structures are promoted by Islam and what contemporary market structures are not desirable in Islam.

Goals of economic enterprise is the next topic that should be discussed. Profit maximization is one legitimate goal but there can be many other goals. Even conventional economics recognizes several goals other than profit maximization. A review of all the goals is necessary, along with the Islamic positions on each one of them. This should be followed by a discussion of the possible goals that can be enumerated in view of the Islamic motivations for production discussed under the theory of production. With reference to motives, firms may be divided into various categories, e.g., profit-motivated individual firms, society-regulated firms, nonprofit-motivated individual firms, state enterprises, trust enterprises, social-cum-profit-motivated firms, etc.

After discussing the goals and the types of firms, the remaining discussion about the theory of firm should be confined to discussing firm equilibrium under profit maximization. Firm behavior under alternative goals should be left for discussion in the second semester. The behavior of a profit maximizing firm under various market structures (other than competitive markets) prevailing in contemporary economies should also be discussed as given in a conventional textbook. However, Islamic positions on these market structures should also come under discussion. For example, while discussing the price-discriminating behavior of a firm relevant shari'ah regulations should come under discussion, including the Islamic conditions under which a firm may discriminate in charging prices for its products. Similar discussions are required while discussing the behavior of monopolist or oligopolist firms or of a firm under monopolistic competition.

Second Semester

Theory of Firm under Alternate Pricing System

The profit maximizing firm is one type of firm. All firms may not behave in a way that requires marginal cost pricing conditions. This has been recognized by conventional theory as well as through empirical analysis of the behavior of firms in contemporary economies. Criticism of neoclassical theories should be discussed using the conventional textbooks and then followed by the Islamic basis for rejecting the marginal price conditions for those types of firm that may not be motivated to maximize their profits.

Several alternative firm pricing systems are discussed in a conventional textbook (e.g., in Appendix D, see chapters 11 through 18). These alternative pricing systems should be reviewed from the point of view of Islamic norms of market behavior. In fact, students should be asked to write a critique of each pricing system from the Islamic point of view. The teacher may suggest possible dimensions in which they can review these systems from the Islamic point of view, but the students themselves should apply their own knowledge of *fiqh al mu'āmalāt* (particularly that relating to production, exchange, pricing, marketing, etc.) to analyze, criticize or promote these systems. They may ask the teachers of *fiqh al mu'āmalāt* to guide them to relevant literature in preparing the reviews. The student reviews should be saved and placed in the library for the next class to consult before they write their own reviews.

The conventional textbook on microeconomics provides a discussion on more than a dozen theories of firm behavior (see Appendix D, chapters 11 through 18). It is possible to select one of these theories and make it represent the Islamic behavior of a firm by making some marginal modifications. As an assignment, ask the students to explain which theories most closely represent Islamic behavior and how those theories can be made more Islamic.

Another useful exercise is to ask the students to classify firms according to their nature and objectives, identifying which theories in

the textbook most closely describe a firm found in an Islamic economy and, when they have been identified, how they can be modified to more closely represent an Islamic firm.

Give particular attention to behavioral theories for the study of private sector firm behavior discussed in conventional textbooks because theory of firm, from an Islamic perspective, means nothing else but the identification of a peculiar behavior of firm. Theory of private sector firms simply require an alternate behavioral theory of firm.

Managerial theories may be especially helpful for explaining the behavior of public enterprise or 'trust' firms, while average cost pricing theories may be helpful for building up Islamic theories of socially motivated firms.

Linear programming, which is simply a mathematical tool, is an important topic in microeconomics. It may be taught in the same way as discussed in a conventional textbook (see the details under chapters 19 and 20 shown in Appendix D).

Factors of Production, Factor Markets And Factor Pricing

After a thorough exposure to the contents of a conventional textbook on the topics of factors of production, factor markets and factor pricing, the following should be brought under discussion: The limitations of existing definitions and classifications of factors of production in capturing the features of the Islamic approach towards the factors of production.

It must be emphasized that theory of distribution heavily depends on how various factors of production are rewarded for their contribution to the output. The emphasis, therefore, should be to work out the peculiarities of the Islamic approach to the rewards of factors of production. Four points require particular discussion.

First, it should be explained why interest has been prohibited or, in other words, why under certain circumstances capital cannot get a

fixed reward and can only earn profit by bearing the risk of loss. In this connection, a brief exposure to the fiqh literature covering the following topics should be provided:

- The principles of *Ijār* (renting) in Islam. What can and cannot be rented? What are the conditions of a rent contract? Who is liable for what under a rent contract?
- The principles of earning profit. What makes a profit legitimate? The principle of *al ghurum bi al ghurum* (benefit through loss) and its implications for defining the concept of profit. How profit is different from rent? Under what condition mark-up on sales becomes a legitimate profit and under what conditions it does not?

These topics, in fact, may first be discussed by a scholar in fiqh and later on reformulated into the language of modern economics by the teacher.

Second, the concept of time-value discounting requires elaborate discussion. For example, why interest (as time value of money) is not allowed but the prices in a *al bay' al mu'ajjal* (delayed business transaction) and a *bay' al salām* (completed business transaction) are allowed to have price differentiation on the basis of time. What justifies time-value discounting and under what conditions is it not allowed? Again, a scholar of fiqh may be asked to give Islamic positions after which the teacher may present the same material in modern economic terminology.

Third, human labor as a factor of production requires discussion from the Islamic point of view, particularly because it has a human dimension and Islam pays special attention to this dimension. For example, the rent of an asset that is in excess supply may be allowed to go down to any limit (theoretically, it may become zero or even negative, at least up to the amount of the rate of zakah). But the rent of labor (i.e., wages) cannot be allowed to fall below a certain minimum required for sustenance. If wages cannot be allowed to fall to zero or negative how then is the minimum wage to be determined in a labor surplus economy? A scholar in fiqh may discuss the issue

from the point of view of Islam, and the feasibility of the same in the context of firm behavior may also be discussed in the class.

Fourth, conventional economic theory does not implicitly discuss determination of the reward of an entrepreneur. Conventional economics discusses the reward of all factors of production other than the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is kept out of the discussion because of the following reasons:

- Uncertainty is assumed away in the conventional framework, therefore, profit is nothing but an interest, a wage or a rent and hence there is no need to consider separately a theory of reward for the entrepreneur.
- Entrepreneur or firm can be assumed to be some an abstract entity and hence a residual (after payment of all wages and rents) is the reward of the firm and since it is an abstract entity, the implication of negative or positive reward may not have much significance.

An Islamic analysis requires a distinct treatment on the follow grounds:

- Factors of production cannot be assumed to have been employed only on the basis of fixed rent or wage. At least one factor of production, i.e., money-capital, is not allowed to earn rent. It can only earn profit by bearing a risk. The Islamic economic analysis, therefore, will have to treat this factor separately and distinctly and the theory of marginal productivity cannot be allowed. Once money-capital is treated distinctly because it cannot get fixed rent, then the possibility of other factors being employed on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis should also be considered. In situations of an excess supply of labor or capital, these factors of production would like to look for an entrepreneurial job rather a low wage or rent. How various factors decide to get an entrepreneurial job and on what factors their entrepreneurial rewards depend, therefore, should be an explicit part of the economic analysis.
- Entrepreneur of firm cannot be considered, in the Islamic framework, an abstract business entity. It has to be a specific

resource (human or nonhuman) which can be held liable for bearing the losses. It means that an entrepreneur or a firm will either be a human resource or it will be a physical resource. How the resources decide to become entrepreneurial resources, what will determine their reward, what are the implications of risk of bearing losses on their supply and demand, what will be the effect of their actual loss on their supply and demand, etc. are the questions to be discussed.

In other words an economic analysis of factors of production may implicitly recognize the presence of two types of factors of production: entrepreneurial and fixed-reward receiving. The implications of the socio-economic institutional framework of an Islamic economy on supply and demand of both types of factors of production requires detailed discussion. For example, the institution of social insurance (based on *zakah* and *ṣadaqah*) may increase the supply of small entrepreneurs. (The *zakah* and *ṣadaqah* may take care of their survival in case they incur loss.)

The discussion of the Islamic approach to the factors of production should be followed or preceded by a full discussion of the contents of a conventional textbook that deals with supply and demand of factors of production and factors of pricing in perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive markets.

The conventional textbooks also discuss income distribution in terms of factor shares. Distribution theory in Islamic economics requires discussion as a separate topic and not as an off-shoot of the rewards of factors of production which is determined by the firm under profit-maximizing behavior. At this stage, however, it must be pointed out that even for the functional income distribution between factors of production, a distinctive approach will have to be adopted to take into adequate account the share of entrepreneurial factors of production in the total output. One additional parameter that will be of interest in an Islamic economy, in the context of functional distribution (or factor share of income), is the ratio in which profits in the economy are distributed among human and physical resources within the entrepreneurial factors of production employed in the econo-

my on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis. It may be pointed out that the profit-sharing ratio between human and physical resources (joining hands on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis) is free to be determined by market forces. This ratio, therefore, depends on several factors, notably:

- Supply and demand of the physical resources on a rent basis;
- Supply and demand of human resources on a wage basis;
- Supply and demand of entrepreneurial resources on profit-and-loss-sharing basis; and
- Risk of loss in productive activities in the economy.

Theory of Distribution

Normally, the theory of distribution is taught only as part of factor pricing. Definition of factor shares is introduced as a measure of functional distribution. While teaching microeconomics in Islamic economics, the theory of distribution should be taught as a distinct topic, not merely as a supplemental topic of factor pricing. Islam emphasizes distribution and it should be clearly defined as an economic activity of society in the same way as the production activity is.

The main emphasis of discussion under this topic should be that within the Islamic framework, distribution is part of microeconomic behavior. This behavior has implications for personal income and wealth distribution, as well as functional income distribution. In fact, it is this personal distribution of income and wealth resulting from microeconomic behavior that makes microeconomic theory within the Islamic perspective a distinct economic theory. The conventional microeconomic theory has no room for the discussion of personal income and wealth distribution.

From the fact that Islam provides economic motivation to induce the distribution of wealth in society it is obvious that distribution of personal income and wealth in an Islamic economy is not just a coercive transfer of resources but is very much a part of economic behavior. Verse 30:39 from the Qur'an reveals the following:

That which you give in usury in order that it may increase on (other) people's property has no increase with Allah; but that which you give in charity, seeking Allah's countenance, has increase manifold.

Transfer of one's income or wealth to the less privileged in society has been promised to bring gains, which includes gains in the Hereafter.

Keeping in view the consumer behavior analysis discussed earlier, it can be seen that the distribution of personal income and wealth in the Islamic perspective is nothing but a part of the consumer's total spending that is done for the sake of a reward in the Hereafter. The first stage of choice, discussed earlier, i.e., is determining how to allocate income between type I and type II spending and is a micro-decision of how much of one's income will be distributed. This dimension is absent from conventional economic theory. No doubt charitable behavior can be seen in non-Islamic economies as well, but this is ignored in conventional economic theory, perhaps on two grounds. First, because type II spending is not considered as an economic choice since it is considered a noneconomic activity that is done for no reward or economic gain but for some psychological satisfaction. Second, because, for an average person, the expenditure on type II spending is generally very low, rather insignificant, and therefore not considered an important aspect to be studied prominently in the theory of consumer behavior.

Type II spending from the Islamic perspective is not only an important aspect of consumer behavior but also involves explicit gains and, hence, is required to be discussed as part of microeconomic theory. Type II spending should be treated as a decision to distribute income. The factors that will determine the level of type II spending should be discussed in detail in the class. The parameters of consumer behavior that will determine the level of type II spending and the parameters of the economy that will make it an effective instrument of personal income and wealth distribution in society should be sorted out through class discussion.

Functional distribution of income should be brought under discussion in detail now along the lines already discussed. Factors of

production, their supply, and their pricing mechanism should be used to explain the functional distribution of income.

General Equilibrium

Most of the discussion in the area of general equilibrium, for the time being, will have to be done in the conventional framework. As a passing remark, however, the following can be mentioned.

Using the Arrow-Debreu type economy, it can be discussed to what extent existence and stability conditions will be affected if interest does not exist in the economy as price of capital. This, in other words, means specifying a pricing mechanism of converting a commodity in one period of time to the same commodity in another period of time. As far as we can assume the following:

- There is no uncertainty.
- Real commodities are exchanged only through money as a medium of exchange.
- No commodity (including money) will be exchanged for exactly the same commodity.

It should not be difficult to argue that the absence of interest does not affect the existence, stability, and other conditions of general equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu type economy. It can also be argued that even the uncertainty assumption can be taken out without affecting the Arrow-Debreu type economy. Risk can be considered as a commodity having a price called profit and the rest of the analysis should remain unaffected. What is important is to assume that there is no price for 'time'. Pricing of time arises when a commodity in one period of time is to be exchanged for a similar commodity in another period of time.

It may, however, be emphasized that the Arrow-Debreu type economy is incapable of describing an Islamic economy. This is because in the Islamic framework, the market is not the only institution of exchange. Nonmarket institutions of exchange are quite substantial in an Islamic economy and hence cannot be ignored. What is important about these nonmarket institutions is that they reinforce the

system and help it work more 'efficiently' by providing solutions to what in conventional economies is referred to as 'market failures'.

The institution of the market cannot achieve all objectives of the Islamic economic system. It achieves only what is called 'efficiency'. There are a whole set of objectives of an Islamic economy that do not fall into the conventional concept of efficiency. But there are several Islamic institutions that take care of the market failures to achieve various objectives of the economy other than efficiency. For example, type II spending in consumer behavior and production for non-worldly motives achieves an important objective of the Islamic economy, (*viz.* distribution), which cannot be achieved by the market.

Hence, in the discussion of general equilibrium, various such economic institutions other than the market, which achieve specific objectives of an Islamic economy, need highlighting with various examples. This should clearly bring into focus the fact that not only is the Arrow-Debreu type economy unable to describe an Islamic economy but also that the study of general equilibrium in an Islamic economy requires an entirely different framework yet to be developed.

Another important point to be discussed in the class in the context of general equilibrium is that even a competitive market economy as described by Arrow-Debreu may fail to achieve market efficiency in several circumstances and a nonmarket institution may achieve efficiency even in the exchange of such commodities which are considered marketable. In this case, an example may be given even from contemporary market economies. A good example is the market of blood donations. In the United States, blood is donated under the framework of a competitive market and it has been realized that the market is not achieving 'efficient' results. In several European countries, on the other hand, blood donation is a voluntary institution and there the need of blood donation is being fulfilled more efficiently. The point is that ethical- and moral-based institutions may achieve, in several instances, better results than market institutions. Islam provides a strong ethical and moral base for the development of nonmarket institutions. The strength of many of

these institutions lies in the fact that they promise a reward in the Hereafter, and hence, the human instinct to maximize gains is satisfied. The ethical- and moral-based institutions are required to be as important a part of general equilibrium analysis as the market.

Welfare Economics

Welfare economics is concerned with the evaluation of alternative economic situations from the point of view of the society's well-being.

Defining a criterion with which alternative economic situations can be evaluated from the point of view of social well-being or welfare is important in the theory of economic welfare. Conventional textbooks provide a summary of various criteria put forward by the economists at different points of time. These criteria should be discussed, particularly with reference to their relevance for an Islamic economy.

The recent approach that requires formulation of a social welfare function should be discussed in detail, along with the related efforts of contemporary Islamic economists. It may be pointed out that problems in the evaluation of different situations from the welfare point of view arise because interpersonal comparison of utility is not possible in the conventional framework. On the other hand, if we deal with the concept of need (instead of utility), based on the concept as defined, for example, by Shatibi, we find ourselves far ahead of the conventional economists in evaluating different situations from the welfare point of view. This is because an interpersonal comparison of need, based on *maṣlahah*, which is objectively defined, is more feasible than the interpersonal comparison of utility, which has no objective basis for the purpose of definition. For example, if there is gross inequality in society, one group being very rich and another being very poor, in the conventional framework, the state intervention to redistribute income in the economy cannot be definitely regarded to have increased social welfare.

On the other hand let us see the Islamic economic scenario. In a situation where there exists a rich group that is believed to be fulfilling all its essentials, complementarities, and amelioratories and still have resources to waste (doing *isrāf*) while there is another group so poor that it does not even have the essentials to protect its life and property, then, if an Islamic state redistributes income so that the poor group at least fulfills all its essential needs while the rich group is deprived of fulfilling some of its amelioratory needs, the welfare (*maṣlahah*) of the society will be considered to have increased.

Another problem that arises in interpersonal comparisons of utility in the context of social welfare is the conflict in individual and social welfare in a non-Islamic society. If a person derives utility from narcotics, then, in order to improve society's welfare, the welfare of the individual will have to be curtailed by prohibiting him from using narcotics. Such conflicts are minimized if we analyze social welfare by comparing needs (rather than utility). Since in an Islamic framework the basis of need is *maṣlahah*, and the *maṣlahah* of an individual is the *maṣlahah* of society, and the *maṣlahah* of society is the *maṣlahah* of the individual, hence, it is unlikely that the economic welfare of society may conflict with the welfare of the individual in terms of individual and social needs. Prohibiting an individual from drinking alcohol will unambiguously increase the welfare of the individual as well as society.

The Arrows Impossibility Theorem may also be discussed with reference to an economy where need (based on *maṣlahah*) and utility are the guiding factors for consumption and production activities. The discussion of welfare also requires a discussion of the relationships of property rights with social welfare. The conventional literature addresses these issues. Some key issues should be selected from the literature in order to discuss them from the Islamic perspective.

This discussion should then be followed by the remaining contents of a conventional textbook under the heading of welfare economics (see the contents of Chapter 23 and Appendix D).

Appendix A

Proposed Outline of the Microeconomics Course to be Taught in Islamic Perspective at Intermediate Level in An Undergraduate Program in Economics

1. Introduction

- a. Economic problem of man: secular point of view and Islamic point of view.
- b. Economic agents and institutions: role of the state, in the context of microeconomic behavior, in the secular framework; and comparison with the Islamic framework.
- c. Economic institutions: classification of market; Islamic perspective on market structures.
- d. Methodology for the study of microeconomic behavior: the role of axioms in developing a social science; and the amenability of Islamic economics to be described with the help of the Islamic axioms for human behavior.

2. Concept of Ownership and Property Rights

- a. Concept of ownership and property rights
 - i. What does property rights mean?
 - ii. Types of property rights.
- b. Main elements of the system of property rights in Islam.
- c. Main features of the system of private property rights in Islam.
- d. Types of private property rights in Islam.
- e. Courses and means of acquiring private property rights.
- f. Limitations on the use of private property rights in Islam.
- g. Rights of others in private property rights.
- h. Brief comparison of Islamic system of property rights with the capitalistic and socialistic system of property rights.

3. Theory of Demand

- a. Theory of consumer behavior
 - i. Cardinal utility theory.
 - ii. Indifference curve analysis.

- iii. Distinction between want and need (derived from the distinction between utility and *maṣlahah*).
- iv. Need as a basis for the analysis of consumer behavior as opposed to utility as a basis for the analysis.
- v. Revealed preference hypothesis and its relevance for the analysis of consumer behavior in the Islamic perspective.
- vi. Consumer's surplus under the utility-based approach and under the need-based approach.
- b. Some extensions of the consumer theory
 - i. Application of indifference curve analysis in income-leisure choice and in intertemporal choice.
 - ii. Consumer's time-allocation in the Islamic framework and income-leisure choice as part of the time-allocation problem.
 - iii. Intertemporal choice in the secular framework and in the Islamic framework.
 - iv. Savings behavior in the secular framework and in the Islamic perspective.
 - v. Risk bearing element in consumer behavior with special emphasis on the generation of supply of entrepreneurs/investors as a result of the decision making of a consumer in the context of his choices.
- c. Market demand
 - i. Derivation of market demand.
 - ii. Determinants of demand.
 - iii. Elasticities of demand.
 - iv. Market demand, total revenue and marginal revenue.
 - v. Demand for the product of a firm.
- d. Linear expenditure systems and their relevance in explaining market demand in an Islamic economy

4. Theory of Production

- a. Motivation for production in an Islamic economy compared with a non-Islamic economy.

- b. Production function for a single production and its relevance for an Islamic economy.
- c. Laws of production (laws of returns to scale and law of variable proportion).
- d. Technological progress and the production.
- e. Equilibrium of the firm: choice of optimal expansion path.
- f. Derivation of cost function from production function and its relevance in the Islamic framework.
- g. Production function for a multiproduct firm.

5. Theory of Cost

- a. The traditional theory of cost.
 - i. Short-run cost.
 - ii. Long-run cost: the 'envelope curve'.
- b. Modern theory of cost.
 - i. Short-run cost.
 - ii. Long-run cost: the 'L-shaped' scale curve.
- c. Short-run and long-run engineering cost curves.
- d. The analysis of economies of scales.
 - i. Real economies.
 - ii. Pecuniary economies.
- e. Empirical evidence on the shape of cost curves.
 - i. Statistical cost studies.
 - ii. Engineering cost studies.
- f. Review of theory of costs under the institutional framework of an Islamic economy.
- g. Cost implications of the employment of profit-and-loss-sharing-based factors of production.
- h. Types of cost in the conventional framework compared with those in the Islamic framework.

6. Theory of Profit Maximizing Firm under Marginal Cost Pricing

- a. How a firm is generated.
- b. Forms of business organization in the Islamic framework compared with that in the secular framework.

- c. Goals of a firm in the secular framework compared with goals in the Islamic framework.
- d. Business ethics in Islam.
- e. Principles of production and trade in Islam (with special reference to the injunctions relating to trade practices).
- f. Identification of the firm of market structures promoted by Islam and contemporary firms of market structures disliked by Islam.
- g. All those topics as discussed in conventional textbook (see contents of chapter 5 to 10 in appendix D).

7. Theory of Firm under Alternate Pricing Mechanism

- a. Criticism of the neoclassical theory of the firm—conventional textbook arguments along with additional arguments from the Islamic point of view.
- b. Alternate theories.
 - i. Average cost pricing theory.
 - ii. Limit pricing theories.
 - iii. Managerial theories.
 - Baumol's theory.
 - Marris' theory.
 - Williamson's model.
 - Behavioral theory.
- c. Review of the theories from the Islamic point of view and identification of theory or theories capable of representing the Islamic behavior of firm (with or without some modifications).
- d. Linear programming.

8. Factors of Production, Factor Markets and Factor Prices

- a. Factors of production in the conventional framework.
- b. Islamic approach to factors of production.
 - i. Rational for the prohibition of fixed-rent on money capital in the overall framework of the principles of renting in Islam.
 - ii. Concept of profit and principles of earning profit in the Islamic framework.

- iii. Concept of human labor—entrepreneurial labor and fixed-wage receiving labor.
- iv. Entrepreneur/firm in the Islamic framework.
- c. Need to distinguish between entrepreneurial factors of production and rent-receiving factors of production.
- d. Factor pricing of the rent-receiving factor of production in the conventional framework (in competitive and imperfectly competitive markets).
- e. Relevance of conventional factor pricing in the Islamic framework.
- f. Supply, demand, and pricing in factor markets in the Islamic framework.
- g. Elasticity of factor substitution and the shares of factors of production (within rent-receiving factor—only in the conventional framework).
- h. Factors of determining the profit-sharing ratio between entrepreneurial human resources and entrepreneurial physical resources.
- i. Technological progress and income distribution in the conventional framework.
- j. Rents and quasi rents—Islamic positions.
- k. Nonhomogeneous factors and wage differentials along with the Islamic perspective on wage differential.
- l. Euler's product exhaustion theorem and its review in the presence of entrepreneurial factors of production.
- m. Clark-Wicksted-Walras "product-exhaustion theorem" and the implications of introducing entrepreneurial factors of production in the theorem.

9. Theory of Distribution

- a. Dimensions of distribution in an Islamic economy.
 - i. Personal and functional.
 - ii. Income and wealth.
 - iii. Distribution and redistribution.
- b. Personal income distribution as a part of microeconomic behavior.

- c. Distinctive features of functional distribution of income in an Islamic economy.
 - i. Features based on the nature of factors of production.
 - ii. Features based on attitudes towards labor.

10. General Equilibrium

- a. Contents of a conventional standard text on various aspects of general equilibrium (e.g., see contents of chapter 22 as shown in appendix D).
- b. Relevance of existence, uniqueness, and stability condition of Arrow-Debreu type economy from an Islamic economy.
- c. Islamic economy as an economy beyond the competitive market economy—the role of nonmarket institutions in achieving economic objectives of the society.

11. Welfare Economics

- a. Criteria of evaluation of social welfare as put forward by conventional economists from time to time.
- b. Social welfare function as discussed in conventional textbooks and their critical evaluation from the point of view of their relevance for an Islamic economy.
- c. Interpersonal comparison of *maṣlaḥat al 'ibād* as compared to interpersonal comparison of utility.
- d. Possible arguments of a social welfare function for an Islamic economy and other contents covered in a conventional textbook under this topic (e.g., see the contents of chapter 23 in appendix D).

Appendix B

Proposed Reading List* for the Course

Suggested in Appendix A

1. Introduction

- Somuelson, P.A, and W.D. Nordhaus. *Economics*. 12th ed. New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1985, pp. 24-26.
- Al Shatibi. *Al Muwafiq*. Cairo: Maktabah Muhammad Ali El-Azhar. N.d. vol. 2, pp. 126-134.
- Naqvi, S.N.H. *Ethics and Economics; An Islamic Synthesis*. Leicester; The Islamic Foundation, 1981 pp. 37-40.
- Iqbal, M. *Ethico Economic System of Islam*. Research Paper Series Center for Research in Islamic Economics. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: King Abdulaziz University, n.d. pp. 1-37.
- Faridi, F.R. "A Theory of Fiscal Policy in an Islamic State." In *Fiscal Policy and Research Allocation in Islam*, ed. Z. Ahmad, M. Iqbal, and M.F. Khan. Islamabad, Pakistan: Institute of Policy Studies, n.d.
- Mannan, M.A. "Islamic Economics as a Social Science." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 49-62.
- Ariff, Muhammad. "Towards a Definition of Islamic Economics: Some Scientific Considerations." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 2, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 87-103.
- Mannan, M.A. *Making of Islamic Economic Society*, chps. 1-4. N.p., n.d.
- Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1979, pp. 3-12.
- Blaugh, M. *Methodology of Economics*. Cambridge: CUP, 1980, pp. 55-250.
- Kahf, M. *The Islamic Economy*. Muslim Students Association of U.S. and Canada. pp. 1-11.

* This reading list is suggested for the teachers but not for the students. From this list teachers may develop a reading list for their students.

Khan, Shah Rukh Raf. "Islamic Economics: A Note on Methodology." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 2, no. 2: 83-85.

2. Concept of Ownership and Property Rights

Siddiqi, M.N. *Islam Ka Nazriyyah-e-Milkiyyat* (Ownership in Islam). 2 vols. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1968.

Khan, M. Fahim. "System of Ownership and Private Property Rights in Islam." (Mimeographed) IIIE Islamic economics program, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Al Maamiry, Ahmed H. *Economics in Islam*. Delhi, India: Lancer Books, 1987, pp. 48-103.

Furubotn, E.G., and S. Pejovich. "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature." In *The Making of Islamic Economic Society*, by M.A. Mannan. N.p., n.d. chps. 5-8.

Demetz, H. "Towards a Theory of Property Rights." *American Economic Review* 57 (May 1967): 374-73.

Mustafa, Ahmed H., and Askari, Hossein, G. "Economic Implications of Land Ownership and Land Cultivation in Islam." In *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfillment in an Islamic Economy*, ed. Munawar Iqbal. Islamabad, Pakistan: International Institute of Islamic Economies, n.d.

3. Theory of Demand

Koutsoyiannis, *Modern Microeconomics*, 2nd Ed. London: Macmillan. 1979 pp. 13-66.

Zarqa. "Islamic Economics: An Approach to Human Welfare" in *Studies in Islamic Economics*, edited by Ahmad. Islamic Foundation Leicesters, pp. 3-9.

Khan, M.F., and N.M. Ghifari. "Objectives of Shari'ah and Some Implications for Consumer Theory." Mimeographed, International Institute of Islamic Economics, Islamabad.

Khan, M. Fahim. "Macro Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 1, no. 2: 1-24.

- Tag el-Din, S.I. "Macro-Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework Comment." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 1 (Summer, 1984): 57-61.
- Mahdi, S. Iqbal. "Macro-Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework Comment." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 2, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 73-77.
- Hasan, Zubair. "Macro-Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework Comment." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 2, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 79-81.
- Kahf, M. "Saving and Investment Functions in Two-Sector Islamic Economy." In *Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam*, Edited by M. Ariff. Jeddah: Centre for Research in Islamic Economics King Abdulaziz University Jeddah, n.d.
- Zarqa, A. "An Islamic Perspective on the Economics of Discounting in Project Evaluation." In *Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam* Institute of Policy Studies. N.p, 1983, pp. 203-251.
- Khan, M. Fahim. "Time Value Discounting in Islam." Mimeographed, International Institute of Islamic Economics Islamabad, n.d.
- Masri, Rafiq. *Al Riba Wa al Hasam al Zamani Fi al Iqtisad al Islami*. N.p., n.d.
- Ariff, M. "Towards Establishing the Micro Foundations of Islamic Economics: A Contribution to the Consumer Behaviour in an Islamic Society." Paper presented at 12th Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, November 1983.
- Stone, R. "Linear Expenditure System." *Economic Journal* (1954).
- Fishburn, P.C. "Lexicographic Orders, Utilities and Decision Rules." *Management Science* (July 1974).
- 4. Theory of Production and Costs**
- Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*, Ch. 3 and 4.
- Kahf, Monzer. *The Islamic Economy*, Ch. 3.
- Siddiqi, M. Nejatullah. *Economic Enterprize in Islam*.
- Siddiqi, M. Nejatullah. "Economies of Profit Sharing." In *Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam*, edited by Z. Ahmad, et al. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1983.

5. Theory of Firm

- Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. Chap. 5-18 (chapters 5 to 10 to be covered in the first semester and chapters 11 to 18 to be covered in the second semester).
- Siddiqi, M. Nejatullah. *Economic Enterprize in Islam*. Chap. 1, 2 and 3.
- Kahf, Monzer. *The Islamic Economy*. Chapter 4.
- Mannan, M.A. *The Making of Islamic Economic Society*. Chap. 10 and 11.
- Metwally, M.M. "A Behavioral Model of Islamic Firm." Research Paper Series (English) No. 5 of Centre for Research in Islamic Economics King Abdulaziz University Jeddah.
- Islabi, Abdul Azim. "Ibn Taimeyah's Concept of Market Mechanism." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economies* 2, no. 2 (Winter 1985): 55-66.
- Muharji, Badal. *Theory of Firm in an Interest Free Economy*. Jeddah: Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University.
- Boulding, K. "The Present Position of the Theory of Firm." In K.E. Boulding and W.A. Spvy (eds), *Linear Programming and Theory of Firm*. New York: Macmillan, 1960, pp. 1-17.
- Coarse, R. "The Nature of the Firm." *Economica* 4 (November 1937): 386-405.
- Goper, W. "Theory of Firm: Some Suggestions for Revision." *American Economic Review* 39 (December 1949): 204-22.

6. Factor Pricing

- Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. Chapter 21.
- Khan, M. Fahim. "Factor of Production and Factor Markets in Islamic Framework." Mimeograph, Centre for Research in Islamic Economics King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah.
- Masud, M. "Islamic Land Tenure System." Discussion Paper, International Institute of Islamic Economics, Islamabad.
- Tabakoglu, A. "Labour and Capital Concepts in Islamic Economics." In M. Fahim Khan (ed.), *Distribution in Macroeconomic*

Framework. Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Economics, n.d. (Under Print).

Hassan, Zubair. "Theory of Profit: The Islamic View Point." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 1, no. 1: 1-16.

Chishti, Salim. "Theory of Profit: The Islamic View Point-Comment." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 2, no. 1(Summer 1984): 49-51.

7. Distribution Theory

Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. Chap. 21, pp. 468-484.

Iqbal, Munawar (ed.). "Distributive Justice and Need Fulfillment in an Islamic Economy." In *Islam International Institute of Islamic Economics*. Islamabad, pp. 1-24.

Zarqa, Ana. "Islamic Distributive Schemes." In Munawar Iqbal (ed.), *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfillment in an Islamic Economy*. Islamabad: IIIE, pp. 159-218.

8. General Equilibrium and Welfare Theory

Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. Chap. 22.

Khan, M. Ali. "General Equilibrium and Capital Pricing in Islamic Framework." International Institute of Islamic Economics, Islamabad. (Under Print)

Arrow, K., and G. Debreau. "Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy." *Econometrica* 22 (July 1954): 265-90.

Arrow, K. "An Extension of the Basic Theorem of Classical Welfare Economics." In J. Neyman ed., *Proceedings of the Second Barkley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability*. Barkely, 1951, pp. 507-532.

Bator, F. "The Anatomy of Market Failure." *Quarterly Journal Economics* 8 (August 8, 1972): 351-379.

9. Welfare Economics

Konlsoyinnis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. Chap. 23.

Zarqa, Anas. "Islamic Economics: An Approach to Human Welfare." In Khurshid Ahmad, ed., *Studies in Islamic Economics*. Islamabad: Institute of Policy, 1980.

Course, R. "The Probelm Social Cost." *Journal of Law and Economics* 3 (October 1960): 1-14.

Appendix C

Sample of Student Assignments on Required Topics to Be Discussed in the Islamic Perspective

1. What is the economic problem of man in the Islamic perspective and how does it differ from that in the secular perspective.
2. Critically examine the axioms underlying the Conventional Consumer Theory. Does the explanation of consumer behavior in the Islamic perspective require a different set of axioms? If so, what are the axioms and how do they differ from the secular axioms?
3. Distinguish between 'need' of *maṣlahah* and 'want' as implied in the concept of utility. Compare their relative merits and demerits for their application of the analysis of consumer behavior in the Islamic perspective.
4. Explain the 'need' of savings as opposed to the 'need' for investment in the Islamic perspective.
5. Explain the concept of *isrāf*, first using the concept of utility in the conventional sense, and then using the concept of *maṣlahah* as explained by Shatibi.
6. Explain how an Islamic consumer will decide what is the '*afw*' (surplus) that he is required to spend in the cause of Allah. Use the concept of need (for consumption and savings/investment) to explain this concept. What parameters will determine the size of the '*afw*' for a typical consumer.
7. List such possible costs of a firm in conventional framework that may not be considered as cost in the Islamic framework and vice-versa.
8. Implication of Islamic principles of *ijārah* for the classification of factors of production.
9. Islamic principles of profit and their implications for supply and demand of entrepreneurs.

10. Give a classification of firms according to its objectives and the nature of ownership of its resources and its liabilities keeping in view the Islamic norms of business organization.
11. From chapters 11 through 18, of Kousoyiannis, find out which theory of pricing of a firm can be regarded as closest to the Islamic approach. Suggest modifications that can bring it closer to the Islamic approach. If you think none of these theories can be regarded as anywhere near the Islamic approach, then suggest your own theory.
12. What aspects of an Islamic economy will fail to be reflected if the conventional definition of factors of production is used to explain the Theory of Production or the Theory of Costs. Suggest an alternative classification of factors of production for an Islamic economy.
13. Discuss the nature of personal income distribution and wealth distribution in an Islamic economy and how it is related to micro-economic behavior in the Islamic economy.
14. Give an Islamic criterion for evaluating situations from the point of view of the economic welfare of society. How does this criterion differ from the criteria given by Islamic economists from time to time?

Appendix D

Contents of a Typical Book on Microeconomics* of Intermediate Undergraduate Level

Part One: The Basic Tools of Analysis

- 1. Introduction**
 - a. Economic Models
 - b. Classification of Markets
 - c. The Concept of an 'Industry'
 - i. The Importance of the Concept of an Industry
 - ii. Criteria for the Classification of Firms into Industry
- 2. Theory of Demand**
 - a. Theory of Consumer Behavior
 - i. The Cardinal Utility Theory
 - ii. The Indifference Curves Theory
 - iii. The Revealed Preference Hypothesis
 - iv. The Consumers' Surplus
 - v. Some Applications of Indifference Curves Analysis
 - b. The Market Demand
 - i. Derivation of the Market Demand
 - ii. Determinants of Demand
 - iii. Elasticities of Demand
 - iv. Market Demand, Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue
 - c. Recent Developments in the Theory of Market Demand
 - i. The Pragmatic Approach to Demand Analysis
 - ii. Linear Expenditure Systems
 - d. The Demand for the Product of a Firm
- 3. Theory of Production**
 - a. The Production Function for a Single Product
 - b. Laws of Production
 - i. Laws of Returns to Scale
 - ii. The Law of Variable Proportions

* This table of contents has been taken from A. Koutsoyiannis, *Modern Microeconomics*, Macmillan Publishers, 1985.

- c. Technological Progress and the Production Function
- d. Equilibrium of the Firm: Choice of Optimal Combination of Factors of Production
 - i. Single Decision of the Firm
 - ii. Choice of Optimal Expansion Path
- e. Derivation of Cost Functions from Production Functions
 - i. Graphical Derivation of Cost Curves from the Production Function
 - ii. Formal Derivation of Cost Curves from a Production Function
- f. The Production Function of a Multiproduct Firm
 - i. The Production Possibility Curve of the Firm
 - ii. The Isorevenue Curve of the Multiproduct Firm
 - iii. Equilibrium of the Multiproduct Firm

4. Theory of Costs

- a. General Notes
- b. The Traditional Theory of Cost
 - i. Short-Run Costs
 - ii. Long-Run Costs: The 'Envelope Curve'
- c. Modern Theory of Costs
 - i. Short-Run Costs
 - ii. Long-Run Costs: The 'L-Shaped' Scale Curve
- d. Engineering Costs Curves
 - i. Short-Run Engineering Costs
 - ii. Long-Run Engineering Costs
- e. The Analysis of Economies of Scale
 - i. Real Economies of Scale
 - ii. Pecuniary Economies of Scale
- f. Empirical Evidence on the Shape of Costs
 - i. Statistical Cost Studies
 - ii. Studies Based on Questionnaires
 - iii. Engineering Cost Studies
 - iv. Statistical Production Functions
 - v. The 'Survivor Technique'
- g. The Relevance of the Shape of Costs in Decision-Making

Part Two: Theory of the Firm

Section A: Perfect Competition, Monopoly, Monopolistic Competition

5. Perfect Competition

- a. Assumptions
- b. Short-Run Equilibrium
 - i. Equilibrium of the Firm in the Short Run
 - ii. The Supply Curve of the Firm and the Industry
 - iii. Short-Run Equilibrium of the Industry
- c. Long-Run Equilibrium
 - i. Equilibrium of the Firm in the Long Run
 - ii. Equilibrium of the Industry in the Long Run
 - iii. Optimal Resource Allocation
- d. Dynamic Changes and Industry Equilibrium
 - i. Shift in the Market Demand
 - ii. Predictions of the Perfect Competition Model when Costs Change
 - iii. Effects of Imposition of a Tax

6. Monopoly

- a. Definition
- b. Demand and Revenue
- c. Costs
- d. Equilibrium
 - i. Short-Run Equilibrium
 - ii. Long-Run Equilibrium
- e. Predictions in Dynamic Changes
 - i. Shift in the Market Demand
 - ii. An Increase in the Costs of the Monopolists
 - iii. Imposition of a Tax
- f. Comparison of Pure Competition and Monopoly
- g. The Multiplant Firm
- h. Bilateral Monopoly

7. Price Discrimination

- a. Assumptions

- b. The Model
- c. Effects of Price Discrimination
- d. Price Discrimination and Elasticity of Demand
- e. Price Discrimination and the Existence of the Industry
- f. Government-Regulated Monopoly

8. Monopolistic Competition

- a. Assumptions
- b. Costs
- c. Product Differentiation and the Demand Curve
- d. The Concepts of the 'Industry' and the 'Group'
- e. Equilibrium of the Firm
- f. Critique
- g. Comparison with Pure Competition

Section B: Classical Oligopoly

9. Noncollusive Oligopoly

- a. Cournot's Duopoly Model
- b. Bertrand's Duopoly Model
- c. Chamberlin's Oligopoly Model
- d. The 'Kinked-Demand' Model
- e. Stackelberg's Duopoly Model

10. Collusive Oligopoly

- a. Cartels
 - i. Cartels Aiming at Joint Profit Maximization
 - ii. Market-Sharing Cartels
- b. Price Leadership
 - i. The Model of the Low-Cost Price Leader
 - ii. The Model of the Dominant-Firm Price Leader
 - iii. Critique of the Traditional Price Leadership Models
 - iv. Barometric Price Leadership
- c. The Basing-Point Price System
 - i. The Single Basing-Point System
 - ii. Multiple Basing-Point System

Section C: Average-Cost Pricing

11. A Critique of the Neoclassical Theory of the Firm: The Marginalist Controversy

- a. The Basic Assumptions of the Neoclassical Theory
- b. The Hall and Hitch Report and the 'Full-Cost' Pricing Principal
- c. Gordon's Attack on Marginalism
- d. In Defense of Marginalism

12. A Representative Model of Average-Cost Pricing

- a. Goals of the Firm
- b. Demand and Cost Schedules
- c. Price Determination: The 'Mark-Up' Rule
- d. Comparison with Pure Competition
- e. Predictions of Average-Cost Pricing Theory in Changing Market Conditions
- f. Critique of Average-Cost Pricing

Section D: Limit Pricing (Or Entry-Preventing Pricing)

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 27. Zakah: First Volume of *al Hidāyah* (p. 96-117)
 28. *Bay‘*: Third Volume of *al Hidāyah* (p. 21-86)
 29. *al Mushārakah*
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 32. *al Musāqāh*
 33. *al Ijārah*
 34. *al Wadī‘ah*
 35. *al ‘Arīyah*
 36. *al Hibah*

Prescribed Texts

1. Samuelson, P.A., and W.D. Nordhaus. *Economics* 12th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1985.
2. Mannan, M.A. *Islamic Economics—Theory and Practice*. Lahore: Sh. Mohammad Ashraf & Sons, 1970.
3. Afzal-ur-Rehman. *Economic Doctrines of Islam* Vol. I, II and III. Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited, 1980.

4. Siddiqi, N. *Islam Ka Nazriyae Milkyyat* Vols. I and II. (Urdu). Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited, 1968.
5. Marhenani. *Al-Hedaya*.

Recommended Books

1. Wonnacott, and R. Wonnacott. *Economics* 2nd Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982.
2. Brue, S.L., and D.R. Wentworth. *Economic Sciences: Theory in Today's World* 2nd Ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980.
3. Shafie Mufie Muhammad. *Ma'arif al Qur'an* 8 Volumes (Urdu *Tafsir*). Karachi: Idarah al Ma'aref, 1980.
4. No'mani, Muhammad Manzoor. *Ma'arif al Hadith* Vols. 4 and 7 (Urdu). Karachi: Darul Asha'at.
5. Al Abadi, Abdussalam. *Nazriyah al Milkyyah*. Jordan, Amman: Maktabat al Aqsa.
6. Ibn Rushd. *Bidyat al Mujtahid*. Lahore.
7. Ibn Qudama. *Mughni*. Egypt.
8. Ibrahim, Ahmed. *Kitab al Mu'amalāt al Māliyah*. Egypt.
9. Ramli. *Nihāyat al Muhtāj*.
10. Hamid, Hussain. *Al Madkhal al Fihi*. (Nazriyat al A'qd).
11. Assalusi, Ali Ahmad. *Mu'amalāt al Banuk al Hadithah*.

Comments on “How to Teach Intermediate Microeconomics in Islamic Perspective at Intermediate Level in an Undergraduate Program”*

A.S. Dunia

I would like to start by congratulating Brother Khan for dealing successfully with such an important field. No doubt, initiating university-level research in Islamic economics will bear fruit. The present Islamic intellectual awakening will provide for us a path away from Western intellectual domination. Then our students will be able to pursue their studies, preparing the ground for generations of Islamic economists. If we can enrich economics departments in the Islamic universities by introducing Islamic economics programs, soon, we will witness a whole generation of Islamic economists from all over the Muslim world contributing profound research.

Realizing such ambitions is not easy. It is not possible to change the secular microeconomics curriculum into an Islamic one in method and content in a short time; but it is possible to change it step by step. Each subject needs to be systematically designed, taking into consideration all relevant elements, such as its importance, its fundamental relationship to the other subjects, as well as the means by which it will be infused with the Islamic character.

I think microeconomics represents the core of economics. So how to achieve such an important objective? Obviously, it cannot be achieved by the efforts of one researcher. It requires the combined efforts of many researchers. Whenever the subject is discussed the enormity of the task looms over the debate. The difficulties are many—a lack of funding, an absence of Islamic economics from the intellectual stage, etc. Presently, there is no serious scientific research being undertaken. Applied Islamic economics is nonexistent in the Muslim countries—they are dominated by secular economics. There are no specialists of Islamic economics.

* Translated from Arabic by the editor.

In the light of these facts, approaches to Islamization must be attempted. One approach is to teach the shari'ah as it relates to economic topics in parallel with secular economics. I contributed to this approach and was associated with it. At the time, it was a necessary beginning but now it is no longer sufficient. It did not produce the hoped-for Islamic economist; rather, it produced a person with two separate cultures, one from secular economics and the other from the shari'ah, without achieving the goal of an Islamic economist.

I believe it is necessary to rethink the problem in order to reach a more effective approach. Presently, the call for the Islamization of economics is urgent. Such a call gives the impression that what we need to do is examine secular economics from an Islamic point of view, eliminate what is not in accord with Islamic values, and then develop what accords, replacing those parts which were eliminated. This approach has many practical points. Already, we have a full-fledged economic science and it is a waste not to use the available literature, particularly when we know that wisdom is the lost property of the Muslim, he recovers it wheresoever he finds it."

There is another approach, and that is to rely totally on given Islamic principles and laws and what was developed by our scholars, then build on this heritage, completely overlooking the existing secular economic theory. Assuming that there has been no secular economics, we would have failed to develop the basis for new economic theory. This approach is quite intricate, but at the same time the outcome will be less influenced by the prevailing secular economics.

I think that the difference between these two approaches can be narrowed. I see no problem in benefiting from the existing secular economics. I even think that it is necessary to use the accumulated knowledge of secular economics, not only as a basis for developing Islamic economics, but also as an aid. The experience of teaching Islamic economics motivated some researchers to investigate the problems related to Islamic economics programs at Muslim Universities. The present paper is an important piece of work in that effort.

Now I would like to discuss the question of production. The author sees that Islam perceives the production function differently than the West. He adds that in secular economics the production function does not take into account the element of risk but that in Islamic economics, the elements of risk and uncertainty are present.

According to the author, in Islamic economics, factors of production do not earn fixed returns as they do in secular economics. I do not agree with that. The production function has only one setting. What differs is the cost line, that may take a different configuration from the 'well-known' cost line. The production function is similar in the two cases. We cannot, however, define the cost function in Islamic economics, because it is derived from the production function. In Western systems, one can derive the cost function because the factors of production receive fixed returns. In Islamic economics, this cannot be done because capital does not receive fixed returns. In fact, this problem deserves detailed treatment because there is no Islamic literature on the subject. Even in secular economics production theory is the weakest point in the science and the focus of much debate.

Khan is convinced that the theory of general equilibrium is not suitable for Islamic economics, where the market decides the allocation of resources. I think that market forces in Islamic economics will function well, because the definition of property rights in Islam will diminish the possible failure in the markets. In fact, they may function even better in Islamic economics.

Finally, I would like to applaud the successful efforts of Khan in this excellent contribution.

Comments on “How to Teach Intermediate Undergraduate Microeconomics with an Islamic Perspective”*

M. Adaniat

Commenting on a paper that covers such an important topic as teaching microeconomics in Islamic universities is not easy. The paper is short but covers a wide-range of topics offered in a full undergraduate program of microeconomics. Khan opens his discussion by introducing the nature of the economic problem and goes on to the following topics: property rights in Islam; the theories of demand, production, and cost; institutional set-up; intertemporal choice; and general equilibrium. Unfortunately, the paper covers these topics too quickly and leaves a lot to be desired. I believe each item deserves a much longer and more detailed treatment.

One topic in particular that struck my interest was the author’s theory of consumer behavior, taken from the work of Al Zarga. Khan’s discussion of consumer behavior tries to connect two consumer behavior axioms, the first one based on ‘need fulfillment,’ which he calls the Islamic way, and the other based on ‘utility maximization’. He treats them hastily within a framework in which expenditure is divided into two types: the needs fulfillment for this world (for himself and for his family), and the needs fulfillment for the Hereafter or extra-utility (*thawab*). He emphasizes that this type of expenditure gives the consumer both ordinary utility and extra-utility at the same time. The consumer will choose the optimum distribution of his expenditure in order to maximize his extra-utility, at the same time fulfilling his worldly needs. This is very clear in his statement that the choice of the consumer is based on the available information. Information, however, does not give a solution to the problem, it only points to a possible solution.

Dr. Khan discusses the question of resource allocation, without elaborating on the issue of budget constraint. But how can we discuss optimum allocation of resources without mentioning budget con-

* Translated from Arabic by the editor.

straint? In discussing consumer behavior one should distinguish between presumed behavior and actual behavior. The author bases his analysis on the presumed, rather than on the actual behavior of the consumer. He assumes that Muslims reach a point of devotion and faith in which they act more like angels than like human beings. We all know devotion is relative, and that there are strong Muslims and weak Muslims. Wrongfully, when discussing a Muslim's consumer behavior, we assume that he is faithful and devout. This has been the attitude of all writers on the subject. For example, Al Zarga has put worldly consumer goods on the horizontal line and *thawāb* on the vertical line in his efforts to reach an equilibrium point. Mathematically, it is impossible to reach a point of equilibrium. Khan assumes that all Muslim consumers are strong and faithful; however, we must take into account the weak ones as well.

Another problem with Khan's argument is the distinction he makes between two types of expenditures, one for utility and the other for extra-utility. The two types are considered consumer objectives, but I do not know of any mathematical model supporting such a proposition. The relevant question here is how the two expenditures are affected if the Muslim consumer considers both types and how would that be reflected in his utility function? I do not believe that there is any important effect. Consumer expenditures on goods and services satisfy immediate needs. The fulfillment of religious duties gives joy and relief and would be part and parcel of the utility function of the consumer. Therefore, it is easier to talk about one utility function and then compare the satisfaction of two consumers.

At this stage, I would like to take issue with the division of goods into necessities, complementaries, and amelioratories which was used by Al Zarga in his study of consumer behavior. Is it true that the division of goods into three types creates a Muslim consumer who is basically different from a non-Muslim consumer? I do not believe that this is the case. Man's priorities are based on personal as well as social considerations. Non-Muslim consumers differ from Muslim consumers because Muslims abide by God's prescribed criteria—this is a special consideration built into Islamic economics. Muslims use

God's given criteria to strike a balance between private and social interests; therefore, economic units in an Islamic economy do not conflict, in fact, they line up in harmony and move in an integrated and supportive fashion.

Though I appreciate their efforts, I do not think science departments and research centers should assign staff to design curricula and write textbooks, even if the effort leads to a difference in what is taught.

The paper suggests that a complete microeconomics curriculum cover the following topics: introduction to microeconomics, private property and property rights, theory of demand, theory of production, theory of costs, theory of the firm, factors of production, theory of distribution, and general equilibrium and welfare economics. In the introduction, the author suggests that the following economic problems be included in microeconomics: the role of government, the role of the third sector, types of markets and their structures, the place of values in social sciences, and the importance of substituting needs for desires. The paper then goes on to discuss the methodology of microeconomics for all these items, comparing them in the light of secular and Islamic economics. Though I agree with the author on what he includes in his study, I think all the items except for the topics of markets and property rights should not be treated as part of microeconomics. They should be included in a course on Islamic economic principles.

Khan raises a methodological problem but does not pursue its solution. Many times he suggests that the course lecturer should consider a topic from the point of view of secular economics and then examine it in the light of Islamic economics. The question is, following such procedures, are we teaching Islamic economics or are we teaching comparative economic systems?

Khan calls for fiqh specialists to contribute to the study of many aspects of Islamic economics. On this we do not differ, but he does not explain how the *fuqahā* are to make their contributions. Shall it be through teaching classes in fiqh or shall it be through directing the

students to write papers in microeconomics on each question related to fiqh? This question needs exploration.

In his exposè of the theory of demand, Khan raises many questions. I found some of them difficult to accept. For example, he points to consumer behavior in the light of the *maqāsid* (objectives) of the shari‘ah as being based on interest (*maṣlahah*), rather than on utility, and that indifference curves may be used to express consumer preferences. Here, I raise a basic methodological point concerning the terminology being used in Islamic economics. Should we avoid the language and terminology used by secular economics? Should we use it widely? Or, should we use it selectively?

I believe we should develop our own terminology for Islamic economics and base our analysis on it. Whatever we find suitable and acceptable in secular economic terminology, and which does not contradict Islamic concepts, we should use. However, whenever we use terms that have already acquired meaning in secular economics a problem arises. Should we dispose with its distorted meaning or should we use it to convey Islamic meaning? For example, the word ‘utility’ in secular economics has connotations of pleasure and pain, but utility as an Islamic concept used in the Qur’an contains consumption as well as production connotations. Allah says, “(Many) benefits you from them and that you may satisfy by their means a need that is in your breasts . . .” (40:80). Moreover the root of the word utility (*manfa‘ah*) with all its derivations is widely used in Islamic thought and the Sunnah of the Prophet. The linguists say that *manfa‘ah* is synonymous with interest (*maṣlahah*). Do we need to avoid ‘utility’ and replace it with another term? Also the terms ‘just wage’ and ‘just price’ need further consideration.

I have another question about utility, Does an analysis based on (*maṣlahah*) differ from that based on utility? There are other questions that we may raise, such as, Is the principle of maximum satisfaction as an objective for consumer behavior acceptable from an Islamic perspective? Or, What are the differences between a Muslim utility function and that of a non-Muslim in the light of humility and self sacrifice? Or, To what extent is the Islamic concept of economic

nationality different from the secular concept? Or, What are the implications of making simplicity a part of buying and selling on the analysis of the consumer as well as the producer's behavior? The secular economic view that tastes and tendencies are given, needs to be recast in an Islamic perspective.

The author exposes many interesting points. Concerning the motives of the Muslim consumer, he distinguishes between two types of expenditures, one to fulfill basic needs in this world, and another to fulfill the needs of the Hereafter. He tries to reach an equilibrium point between these two types and an equilibrium within each type. Here, I would like here to point out the sensitivity of such ideas, and we should not insist on imposing quantitative analysis. On the other hand the position is quite clear and open in this realm. There is the basic satisfaction with its limits, anything above it is prohibited lavishness and anything below it is unacceptable miserliness. There are texts that could be construed as recommending standing within the limits of needs fulfillment. I would like to suggest that treating this question within the theory of consumer behavior may not be suitable from a methodological point of view. This question ought to be looked at from within expenditure or distribution. The most interesting sequence of Islamic economic subjects is the following: principles, consumption, production, distribution and exchange, etc., instead of the usual secular division of economies into 'micro,' 'macro,' etc.

Khan raises the problem of seeing labor and leisure as opposites. He shows that, in an Islamic context, the alternative to work is not only leisure but the work for the Hereafter. Although the author raises the question of how to distribute time between these three alternatives, he does not provide an answer. I do agree with him on the importance of posing such questions. However, I do not think that these questions should be raised within the theory of consumer behavior, rather, they should be raised when dealing with factors of production or labor.

I would like to emphasise here that this sharp distinction made between work for the world and work for the Hereafter is not Islamic.

The Islamic attitude is that the work for this world and work for the Hereafter should be integrated together. It is the spirit of the objectives of the shari'ah. This remark applies as well to time preference. Although I approve of what he said about time preference, I do not agree that this is the right place for it.

I agree with Khan's analysis of market demand, and how it differs in an Islamic context, because it is based on needs and *maṣlahah* in its three types. However, I think that what he says lacks the right setting, particularly, since introducing sequential steps in the market requires clear shari'ah cooperation.

There is a question that I would like answered; i.e., Is it conceivable that during a given period we would find in the market place only the goods and services that fulfill just the basic needs of the Muslims? If the answer is yes, On what evidence is this based? How can this be true when we know that amelioratives as well as luxuries were available in the markets in the early period of Islam, in spite of the fact that there were those who could not meet their basic needs.

I agree with the author's treatment of the theory of production. I would like to stress the importance of the elimination of interest rates and its effect on firm equilibrium and size. Also, I would like to point out the firm's sources of finance and, in particular, the share in the profit of the capital owner.

I agree with the author in his treatment of costs, and in the way he highlights the differences between the concept of costs in Islamic economics and those in secular economics. It needs further detailed analysis. The implications of this distinction are far reaching; for example, some expenditures are undertaken by the firm for social needs or for paying workers wages higher than their marginal product. Are these costs to be considered part of the costs of production? And how do these costs affect the equilibrium of the firm?

I also agree with what Brother Khan included under the theory of the firm, in particular, the objectives of the firm and the Islamic attitude toward profit maximization. However, the subject requires further serious research. I would like to ask, with respect to value and

price and the factors that determine them, Are they the same thing? and Are they different from an Islamic perspective? There is also the need to study market structure in an Islamic economy, and Islamic attitudes vis-a-vis their structures.

I do not agree with Brother Khan's suggestion concerning the factors of production. The same applies to his theory of distribution. I believe that it should be treated separately, rather than the way he adopted. As far as welfare theory is concerned, my direct remark is that the author bases his analysis on an ideal situation, thereby reaching the ideal conclusion that there is no conflict between the needs and interests of individuals and those of society. It may not be wise to neglect the actual situation in our analysis of this particular question and others as well. If we take an actual rather than an ideal situation, a conflict will arise. We may encounter this conflict in ideal situations as well, even though Islam, with the depth of its moral principles introduced the solution, the potential for a conflict of interest exists and should not be overlooked.

Finally, I would like to affirm the importance of using Islamic terminology and of not being influenced by the secular economic system when determining the sequence and content of the subject. I noticed that Brother Khan was influenced by the methodology of secular economics, as witnessed by his list of references in English. To finish, I would like to thank and congratulate Dr. Khan on this excellent work, I am certain that his contribution will take us closer to our objectives, namely the Islamization of economics.

Economic Development in Muslim Countries: A Strategy for Development in the Light of Islamic Teachings*

M. Umar Chapra**

*Revised version of a paper presented to the Seminar on Islamic Economics held in Cairo from 6-9 September 1988 under the auspices of the International Institute of Islamic Thought, Washington, USA, and the Al-Azhar University.

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The Questions

All Muslim countries fall within the category of developing countries, even though some of them are relatively rich. Most of these countries, particularly the poorer ones, are, like other developing countries, beset with a number of extremely difficult macroeconomic imbalances, which are reflected in high rates of unemployment and inflation, excessive balance of payment deficits, continued exchange rate depreciation, and heavy debt burdens. They are also experiencing extreme inequalities of income and wealth. The basic needs of a considerable portion of the population remain unsatisfied; the rich and the upper middle classes live in great affluence, corroding the social fabric and causing sociopolitical instability.

The Islamic revival, which is gaining momentum in almost all Muslim countries, forces us to pose two basic questions. The first is What is the quality of development that Islam stands for? And the second is What can Islamic teachings provide to aid in the development of this quality within each country's existing resource constraints such that their macroeconomic imbalances are reduced?

The quality of development is automatically defined by the objectives of the shari'ah (*maqāsid al shari'ah*). They imply that, while economic growth is essential, it is not sufficient for attaining real human wellbeing (*falāh*); it must be accompanied by a rise in mental peace and a decline in crime and social tensions. This is not possible without spiritual health at the core of human consciousness, and justice and fair play at all levels of human interaction. Accordingly, the shari'ah accords a high priority to spiritual uplift, brotherhood, and socioeconomic justice. But these will remain an unrealized dream unless the scarce resources at the disposal of Muslim countries are utilized for the wellbeing of all its people

through the removal of poverty and the reduction of economic inequalities.¹ Since Islam discourages begging and makes it a personal obligation on every physically and mentally fit person to support himself and his family, the goal of 'need fulfillment' needs to be realized through the development of individual ability and the expansion of both self-employment and employment opportunities.

Because there is no significant controversy among Muslims about the objectives of the shari'ah, this paper will be concerned mainly with formulating a strategy to realize the kind of development that Islam stands for. To lay the discussion groundwork, the paper

¹ The fulfillment of basic needs is now quite widely accepted as a strategy for development (See Paul Streeten's "A Basic Needs Approach to Economic Development" in Kenneth P. Jameson and Charles K. Wilber, eds., *Directions in Economic Development*, [Notre Dame, IN: W. Notre Dame University Press, 1973]; and Frances Stewart, *Basic Needs in Developing Countries* [Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1985].) A number of other authors have also written over the last-decade on the concept of basic needs and its implications for development.

The stress on need fulfillment in Islam should, however, not be construed as an afterthought arising out of the recent Western discussion of the subject. It has received an important place in the fiqh and other Islamic literature throughout Muslim history. The jurists have unanimously held the view that it is the collective duty (*farḍ kifāyah*) of the Muslim society to take care of the basic needs of the poor. (See, for example, Abu Muhammad 'Ali Ibn Hazm, *Al Muhallā*, Beirut: Al Maktab al Tijāri, n.d., vol. 6, p. 156:725.) In fact, according to Shatibi, this is the *raison d'être*, of society itself (abu Ishāq al-Shatibi, *Al Muwāfiqāt fi Usul al Shari'ah*, ed., Abdallah Daraz, Cairo: Al Maktabah al Tijāriyyah al Kubrā, n.d., vol. 2, p. 177). All modern writers, including Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Mustafā al Sabā'i, Abu Zaharah, Bāqir al Sadr, M. al Mubarak, and al Qardāwi, unanimously agree on this point. (See for a brief introduction, M.N. Siddiqi, "Guarantee of a Minimum Level of Living in Islamic State", in Munawwar Iqbal, *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy* (Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Economics, 1986), pp. 249-301; 'Abd al Salām al Abbādi, *Al Milkiyyah fi al Shari'ah al Islāmiyyah* (Amman, Jordan: Maktabah al Aqsā, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 81-95; Ibrahim Ahmad Ibrahim, *Nizām al Nafaqāt fi al Shari'ah al Islāmiyyah* (Cairo: Al Matba'ah al Salafiyyah, 1349 A. H.); and M. Anas Zarqa, "Nahwa Nazariyyah Islāmiyyah Mi'yāriyyah li al-Tawzi'," a paper presented to the Second Islamic Economics Conference at the International Institute of Islamic Economics in Islamabad).

starts with a brief discussion of capitalist and socialist strategies and exposes the fact that continued pursuance of these strategies will either frustrate the efforts of Muslim countries to realize the objectives of the shari'ah or lead to an accentuation of their macroeconomic and external imbalances. The paper then discusses the main ingredients of a strategy in the light of Islamic teachings—a strategy that will enable the poorer Muslim countries to accelerate economic development, giving it the meaning and color that Islam visualizes, and reduce the severity of their macroeconomic imbalances.

Failure of the Borrowed Strategies

If resources were unlimited there would be no difficulty in realizing the objectives of the shari'ah. However, the bitter fact is that resources are limited. This makes it necessary that the claims on these resources be reduced and that they be allocated and distributed in such an efficient and equitable manner that an optimum rate of economic growth is attained (efficiency) and the objectives of the shari'ah are realized (equity) without generating macroeconomic imbalances. It is not possible to accomplish these goals in a vacuum and, therefore, it is necessary to have an underlying philosophy consistent with the goals.

Every economic system has such an underlying philosophy even though, like the foundation of a building, it is not visible. This philosophy helps the system develop its own strategy, consisting of: (a) a filter mechanism to enable individuals to discriminate and choose among the unlimited uses of resources in such a way that the aggregate claims do not exceed supply and socioeconomic goals of the society are realized; (b) a motivating mechanism to induce individuals to contribute their best in conformity with the dictates of such a filter mechanism irrespective of whether this serves their own interest or the interest of society; and (c) a transfer mechanism to bring about resource allocation and distribution that is in harmony with social goals. Unless the underlying philosophy of the system is con-

sistent with its professed goals, a proper strategy cannot be developed and the goals will not be realized.

Muslim countries have tried to pursue development strategies conceived within the secularist and 'this-worldly' perspective of either capitalism or socialism. However, their problems have become aggravated and they have moved farther and farther away from the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah. The fundamental reason is that the strategies they have adopted have been borrowed from societies whose professed goals may be the same as those of Islam but whose underlying philosophy and strategy are in conflict with the realization of these goals.

Capitalism regards self-interest as the primary motivation behind individual initiative and enterprise. It thus assigns primary value to everything that serves self-interest, such as maximum individual freedom, unlimited rights to accumulate private property, market determined prices, and profit maximization. Freedom is also conceived within the framework of unhindered opportunity to pursue this self-interest. The willingness of the sovereign consumers to pay the price in accordance with their individual preferences will interact with the cost schedules of passive suppliers and determine not only the production of that configuration of goods and services which is socially most preferred but also the incomes earned by different factors of production in return for their contribution to output and revenue. The serving of self-interest by everyone in a free and competitive market environment will thus serve the social interest by leading to a most efficient and equitable allocation and distribution. Prices will serve as the filter mechanism in determining necessary from unnecessary and equitable from inequitable. Trying to do this in any other way requires value judgements which are an anathema. Capitalism thus sidesteps the crucial issues of ethics and socio-economic justice by asserting that market forces will be sufficient to keep self-interest within the bounds of social wellbeing. Government intervention is accordingly considered undesirable except when it is necessary to ensure the prevalence of orderly markets.

A number of assumptions are implicitly made in the above reasoning. However, usually they are not spelled out clearly in the literature. First, it is assumed that everything that needs to be done in social interest is also in self-interest, with no possibility of conflict between the two. This is a false assumption; for example, a substantial reduction in luxury consumption of the rich is in the interest of increased savings and investment and of general need-fulfillment, but may not necessarily be in the immediate interest of the rich. Similarly, eliminating the pollution in a country's rivers is in social interest but need not necessarily satisfy the immediate, this-worldly self-interest of an individual because it raises costs and reduces profits; thus, market forces would tend to benefit those who avoid such costs.

Second, it is assumed that background conditions that are necessary to bring about a harmony between self-interest and social well-being in a secularist environment are fulfilled. Two of the most important of these are: perfect competition (many buyers, many sellers, no barriers to entry, and perfect knowledge) and equal distribution of wealth, talents, education, and power. However, none of these two tacitly assumed conditions is fulfilled in any of the market economies around the world. Samuel Brittan has rightly observed that "No real world market is likely to be even approximately satisfactory in all the background conditions."² Hence, while market forces may be able to raise efficiency, they cannot, by themselves, be expected to bring about equity. Rather, they will enable the rich and the powerful to tilt the allocation of resources in their favor. Accordingly, as Samuelson has rightly indicated, market forces will only lead to "starving couples; to malnourished children who grow up to produce malnourished children; to perpetuation of Lorenz curves of great inequality of incomes and wealth for generations or forever."³

² Samuel Brittan, *Two Cheers for Self-Interest* (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, for the Wincott Foundation, 1985), p. 17.

³ Paul Samuelson, *Economics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980, 11th ed.), p. 591.

Third, it is assumed that even in a secularist system committed to utilitarianism, the preferences of utility maximizing sovereign consumers would reflect social priorities. This is also not true. Without the restraint that commitment to moral values promotes in the use of resources, votes cast in the market place cannot reflect social priorities. Why would the rich abstain from diverting scarce resources from need fulfillment to the satisfaction of their preferences, whatever they be.

Given the prevailing inequalities of income and wealth and the lack of commitment to agreed social values, the price system could not but effectively contribute to social Darwinism in resource allocation and distribution. The situation is worsened by value-free advertising to promote the sales of status symbols and the relatively easy access of the rich to the enormous financial resources of the banking system through credit. The result is that in secularist market economies, the rich are able, by the sheer weight of their purchasing power, to get scarce national resources diverted to the production or import of luxuries and false symbols of prestige which do not fall within the category of needs. Thus, as indicated by Tawney, a “part of the goods which are annually produced, and which are called wealth is, strictly speaking, waste because it consists of articles which, though reckoned as part of the income of the nation, either should not have been produced until other articles had been produced in sufficient abundance or should not have been produced at all.”⁴ Nevertheless, every competitive equilibrium is declared to be a Pareto optimum, irrespective of whether the configuration of goods and services produced and the income distribution brought about is in conflict with the professed goals of society.

Therefore, the only policy alternatives left for removing poverty and satisfying needs within the capitalist framework are accelerated growth and government ‘welfare’ spending. However, two decades of unprecedented growth have failed to remove poverty and fulfill needs even in the world’s richest countries. In fact, as Adelman and

⁴ R.H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society* (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1948), p. 12.

Morris have convincingly shown on the basis of a cross-section of data, "development is accompanied by an absolute as well as a relative decline in the average income of the poor."⁵ Moreover, growth has now faltered and there seems to be no hope of faster growth in the near future without rekindling inflation or accentuating external imbalances. Welfare spending, undertaken within the framework of value neutrality, has also helped the rich more than the poor because of their larger purchases and their greater access to facilities.⁶ Thus, while the single-minded pursuit of growth and welfare spending led to an avalanche of claims satisfied through deficit financing, credit expansion, and external borrowing, it did not help accomplish the desired goals; rather, it led to macroeconomic imbalances which have acquired cancerous proportions in some countries. Within the constraints of neoclassical orthodoxy, being championed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the cure lies in a greater resort to the market mechanism. This implies a package of liberalization policies including removal of price controls and subsidies, real exchange rate depreciation, and a general reduction in all forms of market intervention. While these are no doubt essential, their use within the secularist framework of value neutrality not only slows down growth but actually squeezes the poor unduly, leading to riots and socio-political instability.

Socialism, which is equally if not more secularist in its outlook towards life, has an implicit distrust in the ability of human beings to act in the interest of society. Hence, there arises the need to curb freedom and eliminate private property as well as the profit motive through state ownership of all means of production and central planning to promote efficiency and equity in resource use. The removal of profit as a direct reward for individual effort, however, erodes initiative and efficiency, both of which are indispensable for growth. Centralized decision making also makes the transfer of resources

⁵ Adelman and C.T. Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1973), p. 189.

⁶ See Richard Titmus, *Commitment of Welfare* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 2nd ed., 1976), p. 196.

slow and cumbersome and makes the whole economic machinery inefficient.⁷ Thus, the emergence of perestroika in almost all socialist countries—a move to reintroduce private profit, realistic prices, and some other elements of the market system for greater efficiency in resource allocation.

Nevertheless, the basic question that remains is, If individual human beings cannot be trusted to manage their private businesses within the overall constraint of social wellbeing, how can they manage the whole nation's means of production for this purpose? Will not the government officials come out of the same people who cannot be trusted? If so, what is the guarantee that they will not exploit the tremendous power exercised by them through the placing of all means of production at their command. Moreover, even the central planning officials need a philosophy of life and a filter mechanism of values to manage the means of production for actualizing socio-economic justice. Who will provide these values? If they themselves try to develop all values and rules, even the fundamentals, wouldn't there be arbitrariness in their decisions and a conflict of interest, particularly in a system which has dialectics (the counterpart of social Darwinism) as an essential part of its world view? Who will check them and correct them if necessary?

The logical flaws in the reasoning of both capitalism and socialism are also borne out by facts. The experience of capitalist countries indicates that even the richest and most advanced ones have not been able to remove poverty in spite of decades of development and their enormous wealth. In fact, inequalities of income and wealth have risen and unemployment has become a chronic, long-term problem. Some of these countries are also facing chronic macroeconomic and external imbalances that they are finding hard to remove. The record of the socialist countries is no different in either fulfilling needs or in reducing socio-economic inequalities, in spite of their enormous resources. Their economies have stagnated due to lack of motivation among workers as well as executives, and the inability of the system

⁷ For the experience with socialism in some Muslim countries see, Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque, *Socialism in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

to respond to changing realities. The external debt of some of these countries has also risen steeply like that of a number of developing countries. The adoption of market solutions, which perestroika envisages, within the framework of the diehard secularism of these societies is bound to get them engulfed in the problems of inflation, unemployment, and other macroeconomic imbalances that capitalist societies are themselves experiencing.

Thus, both systems have failed to realize their professed goals. This is because their fundamental philosophy of life and the strategy derived from it are not in harmony with their professed goals. The goals are humanitarian but the strategies are conflict-oriented, based on social Darwinism or dialectics rather than on the concepts of brotherhood, trust, and accountability before the Supreme Being. Within the frame of reference of their world view and strategy they are unable to introduce the radical structural changes that are needed to realize professed goals without accentuating macroeconomic imbalances. Systems which have themselves failed to realize their goals cannot serve as examples for Muslim countries. Hence, Muslim countries must turn inward and see whether Islam can provide an allocation and distribution strategy that is different from those of both capitalism and socialism, while at the same time is in conformity with the objectives of the shari'ah.

The Islamic Strategy

Realization of the objectives of the shari'ah requires resources and, in view of the already existing heavy pressure on resources, it is not possible to muster resources for this purpose without reducing the flow for other purposes or, to use the proper economic terminology, reallocation. In the absence of reallocation there is bound to be an excessive resort to deficit financing, credit expansion and external debt. These exacerbate inflationary pressures, balance of payments deficits, currency depreciation, and debt-servicing burdens.

The kind of resource reallocation needed for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah cannot be brought about merely by the operation

of market forces or central planning. It is necessary to have a socially agreed upon filter mechanism of values, which only a moral system can provide. Islam is no doubt such a moral system with values that no sincere Muslim would be willing to challenge. However, values, even if they are accepted by everyone, may be ineffective unless they are acted upon. This requires a strong motivating mechanism, particularly when there is a conflict between self-interest and social interest. Islam provides such a mechanism through a set of inter-linked beliefs. The human being is the vicegerent (*khalifah*) of the One Almighty God, the Creator of this universe and everything in it. As God's *khalifah*, he is accountable to Him for how he uses the resources provided. He is duty-bound to look after his wellbeing and dignity in this world. But this world is not the end of his life. There is a life after death and his self-interest lies in safeguarding his interest in this world as well as in the Hereafter. Islam thus gives self-interest a spiritual, long-term direction by extending the span of self-interest beyond the confines of this life. His wellbeing in the Hereafter is ensured only by behaving in a way that does not hurt the interests of others in this world. This is because he is not the only *khalifah* of God, there are millions of others like him who are his equals and brothers and whose needs must be satisfied through a fair share in God-given resources.

Thus the contribution that self-interest and the desire for profit can make towards individual initiative, drive, efficiency and entrepreneurship are recognized by Islam. However, the evils of greed and the unscrupulous disregard for the rights and needs of others that the secularist, this-worldly perspective of both capitalism and socialism can promote are overcome through the internal self-regulating mechanism of Islam, with its unrelenting emphasis on belief in God, accountability before Him, moral values, brotherhood and socio-economic justice. This accountability serves as a strong motivating force in preventing individuals from pursuing self-interest beyond the limits of social health and wellbeing. Competition and market forces are essential for playing a complementary role but are not adequate to ensure the interest and wellbeing of all because self-interest can tend

to be blind and find different ways of restraining competition and thwarting the operation of market forces, particularly when wealth and power are unequally distributed.

However, even in a morally charged environment, values may be violated and accountability before God ignored, individuals may tend to be oblivious to the problems of scarcity and to social priorities in resource allocation. They may simply be unaware of the urgent and unsatisfied needs of others and, if they are well-to-do, they may unconsciously divert scarce resources to the satisfaction of their relatively less urgent wants. Therefore, a certain degree of economic restructuring is indispensable if the objectives of the shari'ah are to be realized by Muslim countries without exceeding the limits of their resources and engulfing themselves in perplexing macroeconomic imbalances. The restructuring must address itself to the following:

- a. Transforming the human factor in development to enable it to play an active and constructive role;
- b. Reducing the existing concentration in ownership of means of production;
- c. Eliminating or minimizing all wasteful and unnecessary consumption at the private as well as the public level to release resources for actualizing social goals;
- d. Reorganizing investment to enable the production system to fulfill the demands of a need-based economy, increase opportunities for self-employment and employment, and expand the export surplus; and
- e. Reforming the financial system in the light of Islamic teachings to enable it to play a complementary and enabling role in the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah.

Such restructuring is not possible without the government playing a positive, active economic role. Totalitarianism, as envisaged by socialism, does not permit such a role. Islam, on the other hand, takes a complementary role, not through excessive controls, unnecessary violation of individual freedom, and abolition of property rights, but rather through the creation of a healthy environment and development of proper enabling institutions. Islam's four dimensional

approach (i.e., providing a filter mechanism of values, motivating the individual, socio-economic restructuring, and positive role of the government) should prove to be more effective in ensuring the well-being of all within society than the single dimensional capitalist or socialist approach of putting the whole burden on the shoulders of either self-interest and market forces or collectivization and central planning.

In general, the governments of poorer Muslim countries have been inwardly (though perhaps not outwardly) secularist, in step with their colonial heritage and the 'conventional' wisdom. They have not formulated a consistent development philosophy to realize the objectives of the shari'ah. Hence, their policies have lacked a firm direction and have oscillated on the waves of socialism and free enterprise, controls and decontrols that have been in vogue in development literature over the last four decades.⁸ This lack of firm direction, combined with fluctuations and inconsistencies in policies, has generated uncertainties and caused immense harm to the developmental process. Whatever development has been attained has been at a high cost in terms of macroeconomic imbalances, increased inequalities of incomes and wealth, and social tensions.

While formulating policies for Muslim countries within the framework of such an integrated approach, it is not necessary to find a precedent for all of these in early Islamic history. Although the shari'ah has prescribed the essential elements of a basic strategy, it has not spelled out detailed policy measures. These have to be developed. It may be possible to emulate the experience of other countries with respect to specific policies. However, while doing so, it is necessary to ensure that the policy measures being considered for adoption fulfill two criteria—that they make a positive contribution towards the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah without creating a conflict with the shari'ah, and that they do not lead to an

⁸ For some relevant details on the changing moods in development literature, see, Gerald M. Meier, ed., *Pioneers in Developments* (published for the World Bank by the Oxford University Press, 1987), in particular the "Introduction" by Meier himself. See also, Gustav Ranis and Poul Schult, eds., *The State of Development Economics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).

excessive increase in claims on resources. The second criterion should not be fulfilled within the framework of Pareto optimality. A strategy that talks of increasing resources for a specific purpose without effectively reducing its availability for other purposes, cannot but lead to frustrations and imbalances. Hence, value neutrality must be set aside. Policies must be passed through the filter mechanism of Islamic values. This will also help in the public acceptance of these policies, particularly policies which do not satisfy the criterion of Pareto optimality.

In general, the policy measures suggested below may be familiar to those well-versed in development literature. No originality is claimed for most of these. What is important is the integrated approach within the framework of the Islamic world view and strategy to realize the objectives of the shari'ah without putting excessive pressure on the limited resources available.

The Human Factor: Motivation and Ability

Allocating resources efficiently and equitably, and removing imbalances requires a number of essential qualities in the people themselves, qualities that enable them to serve their individual self-interest and qualities that ensure social wellbeing. They must be willing and able to render their best by working hard and efficiently with integrity, conscientiousness, and discipline and must also be willing to sacrifice their personal comfort to overcome obstacles in the path of development. They must also change their consumption, savings, and investment behavior so that it is in conformity with what is needed for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah. This requires proper motivation and ability.

Motivation

Unless individuals are properly motivated, no system can realize either efficiency in resource use or equity in distribution. The present-day Muslim socioeconomic environment has become so inherently unjust that it is unable to motivate people to render their best,

either in their own interest or in the interest of society. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt policies that will help ensure both.

To make people work in their self-interest, they need to have an assurance that their self-interest is served by their hard work, creativity and contribution to output. There must, in other words, be socioeconomic justice—a quid pro quo relationship between the quantity and quality of output and reward.

If individuals, irrespective of whether they are employees, savers, investors or exporters, do not share equitably in the fruits of their contribution to output through a reciprocal reward, they become apathetic and their initiative and efficiency suffer considerably. In most Muslim countries material rewards are inequitable due to biases and lack of realism in official policies. Wealth and power is concentrated in the hands of the few in both rural and urban areas. Biases and lack of realism have distorted key prices which have unconsciously lowered the incomes of tenant farmers, small microenterprises (SMEs), and workers, reducing their demand for needs and creating a misallocation of resources against need fulfillment. The concentration of wealth and power, also due partly to official policies and partly to the exploitative economic system that has prevailed for centuries, has restricted competition, generated widespread collusion and created a climate conducive to the misery of the masses. This has reduced the willingness and ability of the individuals in the Muslim countries to do their best.

The bias against agriculture and SMEs in government policies has retarded the development of human, physical, and financial infrastructure in rural areas, thus not only reducing the rewards for the efforts of tenant farmers and workers in rural areas but also lowering their ability to invest in better seeds, fertilizers and equipment in SMEs to supplement their incomes from agriculture. This has led to an influx of labor in urban areas, thereby depressing wages and living conditions there. The bias in favor of urban development and large-scale businesses and industries, has also raised, along with heavy tariff protection, concessionary financing and subsidized inputs, along with profit rates among favored urban SMEs, further

increasing the concentration of wealth and power. While high tax evasion prevents the governments from reaping the benefit of their urban bias, urban congestion results in low wages and salaries and prevents urban employees from getting rewarded appropriately for their contribution to urban prosperity. However, while it is necessary to remove the bias of official policies against agriculture and SMEs, it is also necessary to remove other policy biases that reduce the real income of workers, savers, investors and exporters, particularly of those who are poor.

Minimum real wages in an Islamic society, not necessarily legally stipulated, should be such that a laborer is able to fulfill all his and his family's essential needs in a humane manner.⁹ In sharp contrast to this, wages in most Muslim countries are so low that, in spite of nearly 10-14 hours of hard work, a laborer is unable to fulfill his and his family's basic needs. This is due to the exploitation that results from inappropriate official policies, concentration of wealth and power, poverty, and lack of training facilities for workers and their children. Unless this pathetic situation is remedied it may not be possible to motivate workers to work conscientiously and efficiently.

The prescription of minimum wages may not, nevertheless, be the immediate solution. It would be difficult to enforce and, if enforced, may tend to exacerbate the prevailing high level of unemployment. Rather, it is better to resort to an entirely different package of policies—policies that raise the ability of workers to earn more through training and finance and also that restructure the entire economy in favor of need fulfillment and a more equitable distribution of incomes and wealth. Profit sharing and the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) should also be made as widespread as possible.

Every firm should be required to establish a profit-sharing scheme for the employees. A certain agreed proportion of the firm's net profit should be distributed among the employees as profit-sharing bonuses and as a means to provide training facilities and improve working conditions, as well as to grant medical benefits, educational

⁹ For discussion, see M. U. Chapra, *Objectives of the Islamic Economic Order* (Leicester, U.K., The Islamic Foundation, 1979), pp. 14-16.

allowances to children, housing facilities, and food subsidies. Linking the increase in income and benefits of employees beyond a certain basic level to their firm's profitability and combining this with a more humanitarian treatment should have a number of benefits, including: (a) boosting employees' morale, thus leading to increased efficiency and productivity; (b) improving labor/management relations and promoting solidarity and the sense of worker participation that should be the characteristic of an Islamic society; (c) keeping the employees' earnings flexible and responsive to the health of the national economy and the performance of their firms—employees sharing in their firm's prosperity when profits are good but not burdening it when profits are low or the firm is suffering losses; (d) reducing tax evasion (provided that the tax system is reformed), because the employees, in their own self-interest, would keep an eye on the firm's actual profits with respect to which they are currently indifferent; and (e) maintaining the competitiveness of the economy and the firms, thus improving the general climate for investment and the macroeconomic performance of the economy.

The introduction of ESOP could also go a long way in benefiting workers and reducing concentration of wealth and power. It will enable workers to become equity owners, thus increasing their stake in the firm's success. It will raise savings, discourage the unproductive alternative of gold hoarding and help raise their social status in the company and society. When ESOP has been adopted even in some capitalist countries like France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, there is no reason why it should not receive enthusiastic support in Muslim countries.¹⁰

The low return on deposits paid by conventional banks because of administrative fiat hurt mainly the small savers; big businesses get a higher return and are, besides, alleged to keep most of their savings abroad to evade taxes, to protect themselves from the depreciation of their currency, and to get a higher international market-related return. However, for domestic investment, they borrow from local

¹⁰ See, J. W. Middendorf II, "Employee Share Ownership: An ESOPs Moral for the Third World" *Financial Times*, 25 March 1987, p. 25.

banks and government financial organizations at lower prime- or concessionary-rates. This is not a plea in favor of higher interest rates, but rather a strong case in favor of equity financing in conformity with the shari'ah because of its more positive role in rendering greater justice to both savers and investors and in bringing about greater allocative efficiency, economic stability, and growth.¹¹

Similarly, unrealistic exchange rates and unnecessary price controls hurt producers and exporters, while high protective tariffs hurt consumers. The claim that these measures are adopted in the interest of the common man and the country's development is usually a lie. They are not, rather, they serve the vested interest of the rich and powerful who have grown continually richer at the expense of the masses who have become more and more impoverished.

All measures that enrich a minority of the population at the expense of the majority cannot be defended in the light of the shari'ah. Nevertheless, since such practices have been in existence for a long time, it may not be advisable to remove them abruptly without taking measures to safeguard the interests of the poor. These measures may take the form of an increase in their incomes or relief payments, or an expansion in the supply of need-fulfilling goods and services, or a rise in income-earning opportunities. Among the needs that should be given priority are education and training, nutrition, the water supply, housing, sanitation, medical facilities, and public transportation.

Although a quid pro quo relationship between work and reward is necessary for hard and efficient work, it is not necessarily sufficient for inducing integrity and conscientiousness. It is also not adequate to motivate people to change their consumption, savings and investment behavior to be in conformity with the objectives of the shari'ah. Secularism, which has tacitly been the philosophy of most of the power elite in the Muslim world, regardless of whether their leaning is towards socialism or capitalism, has neither the filter mechanism necessary to serve social goals, nor the charisma to

¹¹ For a discussion of this, see M. U. Chapra, *Towards a Just Monetary System* (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1985), pp. 107-125.

inspire people and to motivate them to make the sacrifices required. Islam however carries a great potential for creating the desired qualities in people and for making them identify the social interest with their personal interest. Islam not only demands these characteristics in its followers, it also commands the necessary charisma and motivation to inspire and change them.¹² However, due to several centuries of degeneration and foreign domination, Muslims have lost touch with the inner core of their faith. Muslim countries could accelerate development substantially by improving the quality of the human factor through a reform program based on Islamic values. If they do not undertake such a reform, the erosion in morals will continue and contribute to a further degeneration in the quality of people, accompanied by its adverse impact on development and sociopolitical stability.

Ability

While socioeconomic justice and moral consciousness are both necessary to motivate people they are not enough for realizing efficiency and equity. Two persons may be equally motivated, yet they may be unable to contribute equally to the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah. The difference lies in ability, which is not only inborn but also acquired, partly through education and training and partly through access to finance. Hence, expansion of educational and training facilities, and the poor's access to finance are indispensable.

The invaluable contribution that appropriate education and training can make towards improvement in the quality of human beings, greater socioeconomic justice and faster growth is now universally recognized. Education opens the door to opportunity and has been rightly considered to be the great equalizer of the human condition. Nevertheless, Muslim governments have been grossly guilty of

¹² For a more detailed discussion of the moral characteristics required in Muslims see, Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, *The Islamic Movement: the Dynamics of Values, Power and Change*, tr. and ed. by K. Murad (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1984), in particular pp. 93-132. See also, Marwan Ibrahim al Kaysi, *Morals and Manners in Islam: a Guide to Islamic Adab* (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), see particularly the "Introduction," pp. 13-53.

neglecting this important sector in their resource allocation policies. Even literacy, which is the first step on the path of education, has not become universal in Muslim countries. Such a neglect cannot continue for long without ruining the fabric of Muslim society.

The primary stress of education has to be on creating a 'good' Muslim. He must be educated about the qualities of a true Muslim and strongly motivated to create those qualities in himself. But this is not sufficient. It is also necessary to teach him the skills in demand and the most efficient production, management, and marketing techniques available.

The secular educational system in Muslim countries has failed to make its students better human beings and it has also failed to make them more productive. While qualified young men are unable to get admission into vocational training institutes and engineering and medical colleges due to a shortage of facilities, the universities, following loyally the blueprint set by their colonial masters, have been producing generations of secularized liberal arts majors for clerical and civil service jobs, which have now become more than fully saturated. There is thus a steep rise in the number of 'educated unemployed' in urban areas, in spite of a scarcity of trained manpower in several sectors of the economy. While the rich are easily able to get technical education for their children at home and abroad, the poor, who need it more acutely to raise their income and status, are unable to do so. This tends to widen the gulf between the rich and the poor, and to condemn the poor to a position of permanent misery. It is an obvious proof that the educational systems are not responding to the objectives of the shari'ah nor to the changing economic and political realities within Muslim countries.

Hence, there is need for a revolutionary change in educational curricula in order to impart Islamic values and the needed technical skills. It is also necessary to establish a widespread network of institutions such that even a poor man's child in rural areas or urban slums is able to have access to technical education and training facilities. This is an important way of removing one of the primary sources of

iniquity and poverty and providing everyone a chance to push ahead on the basis of his innate ability and the training he has acquired.

The inability of the poor to have access to finance is undoubtedly the most crucial drawback in bringing about a broad-based ownership of businesses and industries and thereby realizing the egalitarian objectives of Islam. Unless effective measures are taken to remove this drawback, a better and widespread educational system will only help raise efficiency and incomes but be ineffective in reducing substantially the inequalities of wealth, thus making meaningless the talk of creating an egalitarian Islamic society. Fortunately, Islam has a clear advantage over both capitalism and socialism through a financial system which is built into its value system and which provides biting power to its objective of socioeconomic justice. This will be discussed later.

Reducing Concentration of Ownership

The most serious obstacle to the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah is the existing concentration in ownership of means of production in Muslim countries, as it is in all market economy countries. Unless this situation is corrected through special measures adopted in the light of the shari'ah, it may not be possible to make perceptible progress in realizing the egalitarian goals of Islam. The Islamic strategy in this case is in sharp contrast with that of socialism, which has reduced human beings to a permanent state of wage slavery through collectivisation of all means of production and centralization of decision making. Proliferation of ownership and decentralization of decision making, conform to the dignity and freedom that are associated with the concept of *khalifah*. This proliferation must be brought about in both the rural and urban areas, as well as in agriculture, industry, and commerce.

Land Reforms and Rural Development

In most Muslim countries, a large proportion of the population is dependent on agriculture for income, employment, and general well-being. However, a constellation of historical and political forces has

led to a socioeconomic structure that is inherently unjust and perpetrates exploitation and misery of the rural population. Nevertheless, this sector has failed to receive the priority it deserves in official policies in order to remove the prevailing iniquities and inefficiencies. Unless measures are adopted to make the agricultural sector more efficient and equitable, the poorer Muslim countries will find it difficult to remove poverty and inequalities or to accelerate development.

A small number of absentee landlords controls large tracts of land in rural areas and a substantial part of the farming population is either landless or has an uneconomic holding. This sets the stage for exploitation by both the landlord and the money lender and serves as one of the major sources of persistent economic and political inequalities. The poverty of tenant farmers and rural laborers prevents them from adopting better farming techniques, thus freezing them into a state of permanent poverty and depravity. It also kills the incentive of the rural population to put in their best and creates in them the characteristics of indolence, dishonesty, and apathy. It also drives the rural population to urban areas in search of work. There, they face unhealthy living conditions and remoteness from their loved ones. Social control declines and, combined with low wages and other frustrations, contributes to crime and social unrest.

Realizing the objectives of the shari'ah is not possible without making land reform the corner stone of all economic policies. However, land reform revolves around the issues of size of land holdings and terms of tenancy. Unless these are settled in conformity with the demands of socioeconomic justice, it will be difficult to make significant headway.

If land had been acquired through fair means and cultivated either by the owner himself or leased to tenant farmers on 'just' terms, and if the Islamic system of inheritance had also been faithfully applied, landholding would not have become concentrated in the hands of a few families. However, since land has been acquired for centuries through unfair means and the Islamic law of inheritance has been disregarded, landholding has become inequitably distributed, subjecting most of the rural population to lives of virtual slav-

ery, poverty and misery. Given this highly unjust situation, it is important to set a ceiling on the maximum size of landholding and to distribute the surplus equitably among landless peasants.

The shari'ah does not visualize the setting of such limits on private wealth in normal circumstances.¹³ Nevertheless, the shari'ah does authorize the state to take all measures that are necessary for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah, provided that they are not specifically prohibited by the shari'ah.¹⁴ Since land ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few families, the existing exploitation, poverty, and inefficient use of land and labor will continue, and the goal of realizing an equitable distribution of wealth will remain permanently frustrated as long as the combined monopolistic and monopsomatic power of landlords is not broken by imposing certain reasonable limits on the maximum size of land held by one family. Even the enormity of the present rural population relative to the limited size of total available land necessitates the adoption of such a measure. Accordingly, a number of renowned scholars have argued in favor of such limits.¹⁵ Since the shari'ah requires the payment of 'just' compensation to 'rightful' owners, the land needs not be given away to the peasants free. Rather, it should be given at a fair price, the entire value being realized by the government gradually over a number of years out of the peasants' earnings, and used partly to

¹³ See Abbādi *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 400.

¹⁴ Ali al Khafif, *Al Milkīyah fi al Shari'ah al Islāmiyyah*, vol. 1, p. 93.

¹⁵ See Muhammad Qutub, *Al Insān Bayna al Māddiyyah wa al Islām*, (Cairo: Isā al Bābi al Halabi, 4th ed., 1965), pp. 160-168 and 200-201; see also Mustafā al Sabā'ī, *Ishtirākīyat al Islām* (Damascus; Mu'assasat al Maṭbu'āt al 'Arabīyah, 2nd ed., 1960), p. 62; and Abbādi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 398-420. There are many others who have expressed similar opinions, for example, Ali al Khafif, Mahmud Abu Sa'ud, Muhammad Yusuf Musa, Wahbah al Zuhayli, Abd al Hamid Mitwalli, Muhammed Anis Ibrahim. Even Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, who, in his early writings, held the opinion that no 'arbitrary' limits can be imposed on land ownership, recanted later and stated that, in the light of the existing unfair distribution of land, the Islamic state should impose certain desired limits as a temporary measure to remove the inequities. See, Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Mas'alah Milkīyat al Zamin* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 3rd ed., 1969), p. 111.

compensate the 'rightful' (and only the 'rightful') owners and partly to meet some of the costs of rural development.

In addition to reducing the size of landholdings, it is important to reform the terms of tenancy. While the objective of establishing justice between the landlord and the tenant remains undisputed by the *fuqahā* of all schools of Muslim jurisprudence, the nature of land tenancy has been one of the most controversial issues in fiqh literature.¹⁶ Some jurists (a small minority) permit neither sharecropping nor fixed-rent tenancy and require that a landowner himself should cultivate whatever land he can and grant the use of the balance to someone who can do so.¹⁷ There are others (a greater minority) who allow share-cropping but prohibit fixed-rent tenancy.¹⁸ Their contention is that although initially the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be on him, discouraged both sharecropping and fixed-rent tenancy, he later allowed sharecropping. This became a widespread practice among the Prophet's companions and their successors. A predominant majority of the jurists, however, allows both sharecropping and fixed-rent tenancy, this being consistent with the permissibility of both *muḍārabah* (partnership between one who has capital and one who has expertise) and leasing in the shari'ah. Their rationale is that the poverty of most Muslims in the early Madinese period had led the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be on him, to discourage both sharecropping and fixed-rent tenancy. However, later on when the economic condition of Muslims improved, he allowed both, and not just sharecropping as is argued

¹⁶ For a cogent summary see, Yusuf al-Qardawi, *Al Halāl wa al Harām fi al Islām* (Cairo: Dār al I'tisām, 8th ed., 1974), pp. 290-301; Abbādi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 113-138; and M. Anas Zarqā "Al Siyāsah al Iqtisādiyyah aw al-Takhtit fi Iqtisād Islāmi," unpublished paper, pp. 36-39.

¹⁷ For a discussion in favor of this point of view see, Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, "The Theory of the Economics of Islam" in *Contemporary Aspects of Economic Thinking in Islam* (Bloomington, Indiana: The Muslim Students Association of U.S.A. and Canada, 1976), pp. 9-12.

¹⁸ For a strong defense of this viewpoint see, Ibn Hazm, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, pp. 210-214; see also al Qardāwi, *op. cit.*, p. 295-299.

by the second group.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyyah and a number of other jurists consider fixed-rent tenancy to be *makrūh* (undesirable).²⁰ According to them sharecropping is preferable because it is closer to justice; it requires both the landowner and the tenant to share in the reward as well as the risk of farming, in contrast with fixed-rent tenancy, which assures the landlord a fixed return even though the tenant may or may not be able to have any output. Hence, a number of jurists argue that since fixed-rent tenancy is undesirable, though not prohibited, it is within the competence of an Islamic state to prohibit it, at least temporarily, or to regulate it sufficiently, if it is considered necessary for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah and serving the interests of the people.²¹

Since the tenants and landless farmers are weak and powerless and are likely to remain so for some time in spite of the enforcement of a limit on the size of landholding, fixed-rent leasing of land may continue to be a source of injustice and poverty when the output continues to be uncertain. Hence, it would be desirable for Muslim governments to make sharecropping the general basis of land lease and to strive for a just sharing of the output between the landlord and the tenant. This should continue at least until the power base in rural areas has become sufficiently broadened and the exploitative edge of landholding families has been substantially curtailed.

The importance of land reforms for creating the egalitarian and democratic climate that Islam visualizes cannot be overstated. The creation of a rural sector of small, independent proprietary farmers would help provide a great boost to farmer incentives, thus raising agricultural output and accelerating development. Combined with the proliferation of SMEs (small micro enterprises), it would help reduce the migration of farm population to urban areas and the associated urban congestion, crime and violence. The reduction of

¹⁹ For a strong case in its favor, see Abu Yusuf Kitāb al Kharāj, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-91 and Ibn Taymiyyah, *Al Ḥisbah fī al Islām*, ed., Abd al Aziz Rabāh (Damascus: Maktabah Dār al Bayan, 1967), pp. 28-31; see also Mawdudi, *op. cit.*

²⁰ Ibn Taymiyyah, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

²¹ Abbādi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 128 and M. Anas Zarqā, p. 39.

inequalities of income and wealth would tend to strengthen democratic processes in these countries.

Given the flagrant iniquities that now exist, land reform is not an option which the governments may or may not consider seriously. If a meaningful land reform is not implemented, it will come ultimately through a violent revolution. Historical experience shows that when such revolutions take place, all ethical values get trampled. Landlords may, in this case, lose not only their lands through expropriation but also their lives. Therefore, it would be in their best interest to strive voluntarily for a just land reform.

Land reforms, though indispensable for reducing concentration of wealth, will not by themselves take the Muslim countries very far in realizing the objectives of the shari'ah unless there is a simultaneous effort to remove some of the other disadvantages from which the entire agricultural sector is suffering. The most serious disadvantage is the absence of an efficient infrastructure (roads, schools, electricity, and health facilities) due to neglect of the agricultural sector in government budgetary appropriations. Unlike the rich industrial countries, which encourage farmers through various incentives, including protection from imports, most developing countries discriminate against their farming sectors.²² They try to offset the inflationary impact of government budgetary deficits through overvalued exchange rates and low administered food prices. Such policies have turned the terms of trade against agriculture and SMEs, lowered agricultural output, increased dependence on imports, reduced exports, and depressed rural incomes. The depressed rural incomes, combined with the inequitable land tenure system, does not leave an adequate surplus to enable tenant farmers to undertake the necessary investments in agriculture and SMEs. This accentuates rural unemployment and underemployment. Thus, there is a vicious circle of poverty, paucity of investments, lower output, and unemployment. The pressure of population in urban areas has also consequently risen, leading to a decline in urban wages and the creation of slums. Hence, the hub of the problem in rural areas, as the authors of *Poverty and*

²² IBRD, *World Development Report, 1986*, pp. 85-109.

Hunger have indicated, is income distribution rather than agricultural technique.²³

Another serious disadvantage faced by the agricultural sector is the lack of availability of financing to small farmers and microenterprises. "Constant indebtedness to traders, informal money lenders, loan sharks, or relatives perpetuates the poverty of poor people."²⁴ The result is that small farmers do not have the financing to purchase better quality agricultural inputs and to operate microenterprises to raise their incomes and to keep themselves fully occupied. Hence, an equitable distribution of landholdings would by itself not lead very far unless suitable arrangements are also made to provide adequate financing, not only for agriculture but also for small enterprises in rural areas.²⁵ This should naturally be done within the framework of the alternative to the interest-based financial system provided by Islam.²⁶ However, it may not be possible unless the governments and

²³ IBRD, *Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing Countries*, 1986; see also "Can Better Farming Feed the World", *Economist*, 5 July 1986, p. 73.

²⁴ *Banking for the Poor: Alleviating Poverty through Credit Assistance to the Poorest Micro-entrepreneurs in Developing Countries*, Report of the Select Committee on Hunger, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1986), p. 1.

²⁵ In Japan, three out of four farming households now get most of their income from outside agriculture. See "When the Salt of the Earth Loses its Savour," *Economist* 20 February 1988, pp. 43-44.

²⁶ The alternative arrangement, in which cooperative societies, commercial banks and government sponsored financial institutions will have to play an important role, must avoid interest and be based on risk/reward sharing (*muḍārabah* or *mushārahah*), *murābahah* (cost-plus financing), leasing, or *bay' al salam*. (*Bay' al salam* refers to a sale where full payment is made in advance against an obligation to deliver the specified fungible goods at an agreed future date. This is not the same as a speculative forward sale because a full, not a marginal payment is required. Under this arrangement the farmer may be able to secure the needed financing by making an advance sale of only a part of his expected output. This will not get him into delivery problems if output falls due to unforeseen circumstances. For details on *bay' al salam* see Abd al Rahman al Jaziri, *Kitāb al Fiqh 'alā al Madhāhib al Arba'ah* (Cairo: Al Maktabah al Tijāriyyah al Kubrā, 1938), vol. 3, pp. 3-20 and vol. 2 pp. 302-318.

commercial banks, who have subsidized large urban enterprises for decades through concessionary or prime-rate financing, now tilt the balance in favor of agriculture. How this may be done will be discussed later.

Land reforms supported by other measures to liberate the peasants from the iniquities and inefficiencies they are suffering from, should not only help expand considerably the productivity of the agricultural sector but also dim the attraction of the bright city lights, thus helping reverse the shift of population from rural to urban areas. Nevertheless, it would be necessary to bring about a change in the attitudes and work habits in rural areas. This may be attained faster if Islam is used as a mechanism for social change and motivation. The mosque plays an important role in rural life and its proper use could open up an effective way of inculcating the desired characteristics in the rural population.

Proliferation of Small and Micro Enterprises

The counterpart of rural land reforms in the industrial and business sectors is the proliferation of efficient SMEs in rural as well as urban areas. This would complement land reforms in reducing the prevailing concentration of wealth and power in Muslim countries. It also has other advantages which occupy a place of high priority in the Islamic value frame.

It will enable man, the *khalifah* of God, to have an independent means of livelihood, thus rendering to him greater dignity and self respect, not possible in the state of wage slavery. In the capitalist world small businessmen, farmers and artists have increasingly lost their independence and bargaining power. In the United States, the proportion of population dependent on wages and salaries has risen steeply over the last two centuries from 20 percent in 1780 to 84 percent in 1970. Accordingly, the proportion of those who are self-employed or those who work as managers and officers has declined from 80 percent to 16 percent over this period.²⁷

²⁷ Michael Reich, "The Evolution of the U.S. Labour Force," *The Capitalist System* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1972); Edward S. Greenberg,

Large businesses dominate the economic and political scene in the capitalist world and the trend is decidedly in favor of even bigger businesses and farms. Competition, which was the predominant form of market relations in the 19th century in the capitalist world, has ceased to occupy that position.²⁸ Socialism sought to solve this problem through collectivisation, which increased wage slavery and alienation, while at the same time eliminating competition, worker incentive, and efficiency. Hence, the change of emphasis in Muslim countries in favor of a proliferation of SMEs should help create a healthier climate for competition and also be more conducive to the realization of greater efficiency and equity.

Wider Ownership and Control of Corporations

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that small business units, although preferable, may not be feasible for all types of economic activity. Hence, large business units cannot be avoided. Preferably, their form should be that of a corporation because of its ability to proliferate ownership. However, the corporation as it exists in the West is a primary cause of wealth and power concentration.²⁹ Even though it constitutes the dominant sector of the economy, it does not reflect the political democracy of the West in its decision-making. The corporation operates as an autocratic institution; the holding of controlling stock by a few families makes it possible for a few people to have control over all policies.³⁰ They exercise an immense power to make

Serving the Few: Corporate Capitalism and the Bias of Government Policy (New York: John Wiley, 1974), p. 244.

²⁸ See Paul A. Baran & Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* (New York: Modern Reader Paperback, 1966), p. 6.

²⁹ See C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 117.

³⁰ One percent of all tax filers in 1960 owned 48 percent of all stock held by individuals (Reagan, "What 17 million shareholders share," p. 102 cited by Greenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 45). "In the 150 Companies on the current Fortune 500 list, controlling ownership rests in the hands of an individual or of the members of a family," (Robert Sheehan, "Proprietors in the World of Big Business," *Fortune*, 15 June 1967, p. 179).

basic product, price, and investment decisions that affect the entire nation and, in fact, the world.³¹

The Western corporation does not, therefore, provide a model for Muslim countries. It must be reformed drastically to reduce the concentration of power. The abolition of interest and the introduction of equity financing in place of borrowing will help remove the inverted pyramid of corporate power. The requirement to raise financing through the issue of shares rather than borrowing will enable broad-based ownership of corporate shares and set the stage for wider distribution of power. Since this may still not solve the problem of wealth and power concentration because most shareholders do not participate in board meetings, other reforms will also be needed to reduce the sweeping powers of directors.

Activation of Zakah and Inheritance Systems

The above measures for reducing inequalities of income and wealth would be more successful if they were further strengthened by the activation of Islamic zakah and inheritance systems. Unfortunately, even though the implementation of both these systems is an essential part of a Muslim's obligations, and indispensable for the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah, they have remained dormant for ages.

Islam requires every Muslim having resources in excess of a certain basic amount to pay zakah as a given proportion of his or her net worth or agricultural output, mainly for the benefit of the very poor and destitute. What could be a stronger rationale for making the needed sacrifice to meet one's social obligations than the belief that all resources are a trust from God and must be used for the wellbeing of all human beings who belong to the one human family of the One God, before whom account has to be given about how resources are utilized. This system of social self-reliance should, along with other measures discussed in this paper, enable the Muslim society to meet the needs of all without putting the entire burden on the public exchequer as socialism and the welfare state have unwittingly done.

³¹ See Gabriel Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America: An Analysis of Social Class and Income Distribution* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 68 and 127.

Since it is the obligation of a Muslim to earn his livelihood, it has been considered desirable by the *fuqahā* to give priority in zakah disbursements to the objective of enabling the poor to stand on their own feet. Zakah should become a permanent income supplement of only those who cannot be enabled to earn enough through their own effort. This requirement, implemented in a socioeconomic environment which encourages SMEs, should make a valuable contribution toward the reduction of inequalities.

The distribution of a deceased person's estate in accordance with Islamic injunctions should also help reduce the skewness in wealth distribution. If necessary, the enforcement of inheritance laws should be in such a way that it does not lead to a rise in unnecessary consumption but, rather, to an increase in investment and a proliferation in the ownership of means of production.

Restructuring the Financial System

The interest-based financial system, which Muslim countries have borrowed from the capitalist countries, is one of the primary sources of the concentration of wealth and power.³² Therefore, the Muslim countries may find it difficult to bring about a reduction in inequalities and a proliferation of SMEs unless the entire financial system is restructured in the light of Islamic teachings. This subject is discussed later.

Economic Restructuring

Actualization of the objectives of the shari'ah without accentuating macroeconomic imbalances requires resources and, given the scarcity of resources, it may not be possible to allocate additional resources for this purpose without reducing their use elsewhere. Such a reallocation of resources is not feasible without a total restructuring of the economy in accordance with the Islamic world view and strategy. Such a restructuring would inevitably cover all aspects of the economy, including private consumption, government finances, capital for-

³² M. U. Chapra, *Towards a Just Monetary System* (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation), pp. 110 and 140.

mation and production. Some of the relevant aspects of these are discussed below.

Restructuring Consumer Preferences

Since an accelerated rise in capital formation is indispensable for realizing the objectives of the shari‘ah, it is necessary to increase savings by squeezing consumption. This objective poses a dilemma. The unequivocal Islamic emphasis on brotherhood and social equality requires that a reduction in consumption be brought about in such a way that the standard of need satisfaction of the poor is not only not worsened but in fact improved. It is not possible to resolve this dilemma without making a revolutionary change in the prevailing life-styles, particularly of the rich, knowing fully well that the inability of society to fulfill needs is not necessarily the result of an absolute lack of resources but rather of the failure to achieve a consumption pattern which is in conformity with its resources and ideals. If the needs of all are to be met within the constraint of scarce resources and if this is also to be accompanied by a rise in capital formation, then an offsetting reduction has to be made by holding consumption within the range of what the society can afford. Consumption cannot then be allowed to become the sole end of an individual’s life as it has become under capitalism.

For decades, Muslim countries have been following a consumption pattern that has been copied from the Western consumer culture which measures a person’s worth by the extravagance of his living and the frequency of his purchases. Accordingly, expensive lifestyles, which even some of the rich industrial countries can hardly afford, have become a prestige symbol in the poorer Muslim countries. The bandwagon effect of this, along with a number of unIslamic customs and ceremonies, extending from childbirth to marriage and death, have led to an unrealistic consumption pattern which is unwarranted in the light of their values as well as their resources. The victims of this competition are forced to live beyond their means. Aggregate consumption has accordingly risen, savings have lagged behind, and capital formation based on domestic savings remains inadequate. Moreover, since most luxury goods and services carrying

a snob appeal are of foreign origin, the pressure on foreign exchange resources has risen steeply. The resources gap has had to be filled by external borrowings, contributing to a higher debt servicing burden and further squeezing of resources.

The crux of the problem is how to distinguish 'necessary' from 'unnecessary' claims on resources and how to induce everyone to abstain from making 'unnecessary' claims? It is necessary to have a filter mechanism and a motivating system. The price system operating in a secular, value-free economy cannot provide either an effective filter mechanism or a complete motivating system.

Though prices are important for regulating consumer demand and generating efficiency in the use of resources, they are inadequate to realize equity, particularly if the background conditions are not satisfied. Reliance on prices alone enables the rich to buy what they want of the luxuries and status symbols, no matter how high their prices. If one family has them others consider them indispensable. Those who cannot afford them try to acquire them through suppression of need satisfaction, corruption, evading tariffs and taxes, and smuggling. In developing countries with their inefficient and corrupt tax administration, it is possible to avoid or evade high tariffs and taxes by means of under-invoicing, bribing and smuggling; however, the higher prices resulting from such tariffs and taxes yield higher profit margins and promote not only larger imports (through official and unofficial channels) but also greater domestic production of such goods. This leads to an unintentional diversion of resources into status symbols and unwittingly squeezes their availability for need satisfaction, thus making their prices higher.

This does not imply that higher taxes and tariffs should not be imposed. It does, however, mean that the effort to check unnecessary consumption merely by means of higher prices cannot be effective. It must also be reinforced by changing the preference scale of consumers by means of another layer of filter based on socially agreed values. If this is done, a substantial chunk of aggregate demand is eliminated even before it gets expressed in the market. A new equilibrium between aggregate supply and aggregate claims on resources

is then established at a lower level of general prices. This should help need fulfillment and improve the living conditions of the poor.

In central planning, the absence of a filter mechanism as well as consumer 'sovereignty' makes resource allocation subject to the whims and vested interests of the politburo members and other power elite. Moreover, the absence of realistic market determined prices removes even the secular motivation for 'efficiency' in the use of resources. However, if realistic prices and consumer 'sovereignty' are bracketed with central planning, as is now intended to be done in many socialist countries, then the absence of a filter mechanism, along with arbitrary decision making and vested interest of the high-salaried power elite, would lead to a resource allocation and price structure that are little different from capitalism.

Hence, as long as the Muslim countries continue to use the capitalist and socialist strategies, they will not be able, like the capitalist and socialist countries themselves, to prevent the use of scarce resources for inessential purposes. They will thus fail to realize the objectives of the shari'ah in spite of their increasing wealth. What the Muslim countries need to do is to distinguish the 'necessary' from the 'unnecessary' by dividing all goods and services into three categories: those that fulfill a need or reduce a hardship and thus make a real difference in human wellbeing; those that make no difference in a person's wellbeing and, being needed mainly for their snob appeal could be classified as luxuries and status symbols; and those that lie within the borders of the two and, there being a difference of opinion about their 'need', a clear-cut decision is not possible and a leeway is considered desirable.

The filter mechanism necessary for such a classification is available within the Islamic value system. There is substantial discussion in the fiqh literature about necessities (*durūriyāt*), conveniences (*hājīyāt*) and refinements (*taḥsinīyāt*). All of these, as defined by the *fuqahā* (jurists), simply fall within the range of what is understood to represent needs (necessities and comforts) in modern economics and do not include luxuries or status symbols. Anything that goes beyond needs has been treated by the *fuqahā* as prodigality and self-indul-

gence and is strongly disapproved of.³³ The Islamic consumption norms could thus be of great assistance in defining ‘unnecessary’ claims on resources.

It is important to bear in mind that since Islam is not an ascetic religion, the classification of goods and services into the three categories given above, need not remain constant through time and place. Since Islam allows a person to satisfy all his needs and to partake of those comforts that increase his efficiency and wellbeing, and since the classification of goods and services into the three categories takes into account the development of technology and the shared increase in the standard of living, the definition of need is bound to undergo a change over time. In fact, most Muslim countries are richer today and can afford a higher standard of need fulfillment than previous Muslim societies. What is, however, indispensable is the satisfaction of all basic needs of all human beings in a Muslim society in conformity with their position as *khulafā* (vicegerents of God) and members of His family. This goal cannot be realized unless the differences in consumption levels which have been allowed in conformity with the status and income of individuals do not go beyond what the economy’s resources can bear. They should not reflect snobbery or lead to wide social gaps that could only weaken the bonds of Islamic brotherhood. The objective should not be to create a monotonous uniformity and drabness in Muslim society. Simplicity in life-styles can be attained along side creativity and diversity. The criteria for classifying a need into one of the three categories should be based upon norms defined by Islam (i.e., the impact of its consumption on brotherhood and social equality) as well as upon availability of resources.

³³ For the definition of these terms within the perspective of fiqh, see Shatibi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 8-12; and Anas Zargā, “Islamic Economics: An Approach to Human Welfare”, in K. Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Economics* (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1980), pp. 13-15. Ahmad al Najjar and Anas Zargā have in fact argued that in the light of Islamic teachings nothing that a man uses (as a consumer or as a producer) is morally free, even if it is economically free. (See Ahmad al Najjar, *Al Madkhal ilā al Nazarīyah al Iqtisādīyah fī al Islām*, Beirut: Dar al Fikr, 1973, pp. 32 ff; and Anas Zargā, *op. cit.*, p. 13).

'Liberalization' may hence be construed only within the framework of these three categories. Production, import and distribution of all goods and services falling within the first category should be liberalized. Market forces should be allowed to play their full role. The government should do all it can to ensure healthy competition and free interaction between a large number of buyers and sellers. The government should also provide all necessary incentives and facilities to increase the supply of goods and services falling within this category. Any indirect taxes that are considered necessary to impose on these goods and services should be modest and graduated inversely to their necessity. The consumption of goods falling within the third category should be discouraged through moral suasion, import restrictions, and relatively higher tariffs and taxes.

However, it would be necessary not to liberalize the use of resources for the second category of goods and services. The price system, as argued earlier, cannot by itself motivate people to use resources in a way that reflects social priorities. It is necessary to change consumer preferences through moral reform. If people understand their social obligations and their accountability before God, and realize that use of the economy's scarce resources by them for inessential purposes will deprive others of need fulfillment, they will tend to change their behavior voluntarily. However, moral exhortation may be ineffective when conspicuous consumption has become common and accepted over a long period of time. It is necessary to change the social mood. Individuals cannot change the direction of the tide and are constrained to conform. Hence, for greater effectiveness in creating the needed social environment, it would be desirable to campaign for simple living accompanied, at least initially, by an officially imposed ban on the third category of goods and services, including luxury imports, ostentatious ceremonies, unrealistic dowries and the display of status symbols. The elimination of 'unnecessary' claims on resources brought about in this manner, would release resources for greater supply of needs, thus keeping their prices at a humane level without the use of force or controls. It will also help prevent the continued depreciation of the currency

which is the obvious consequence of liberalization within a value-free framework as propagated by the IMF and the World Bank.

Efforts to reduce corruption are bound to fail unless the governments first strike at one of the major roots of corruption—ostentatious life-styles that now prevail in Muslim countries. Such life-styles almost force people to resort to unfair means of earning. Acquisitiveness and corruption may decline substantially once they realize that their effort to acquire greater prestige through conspicuous consumption only blemishes their reputation and raises questions about the source of their financing.

Responsible Government Spending

No doubt changing consumer preferences in favor of simple living will reduce private sector pressure on resources and raise the savings needed for investment and development. However it will not be enough. Governments in Muslim countries, as in other developing countries, are as blameworthy as, if not more than, the private sector for the excessive claims on resources. They have almost lost control over their public finances. The result is that, in spite of high rates of both direct and indirect taxes, they have had to resort to unhealthy levels of budgetary deficits. These deficits have been financed by monetary expansion and excessive levels of domestic and external borrowing. The high levels of inflation and the debt-servicing burden which have been generated will continue to plague them for a long time.³⁴

In spite of their excessive spending, governments have neither laid down the minimum infrastructure necessary for a balanced and accelerated development nor adequately supplied the services indispensable for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah. Rural infrastructure and agricultural extension services, on which the wellbeing of a preponderant proportion of the population depends, have been neglected. Education, which should constitute the foundation stone of an Islamic society, has also received inadequate attention. Health expenditure has been concentrated mainly in the major cities, in large

³⁴ See IMF, *Survey*, 6 April 1987, pp. 98-99.

capital intensive hospitals and on curative medicine. Yet the majority of the population lives in the countryside, needs a network of simple clinics and paramedical personnel, control of epidemic diseases, and, above all, the provision of clean water supplies, sanitary services and eradication of malnutrition.³⁵ Housing for the poor has received hardly any public sector attention and slum areas without public utilities and sanitation have mushroomed. Development of an efficient public transport system has been grossly neglected causing great hardship to the poor who have no transport facilities of their own. At the same time considerable lip service is paid to Islam and its imperative of socioeconomic justice. This sorry state of affairs is bound to perpetuate slower growth and economic inequalities, thus accentuating social tensions and unrest. It is therefore necessary for Muslim governments to restructure their spending so that they are able not only to reduce their overall spending levels but also reallocate spending to concentrate more on projects that will help accelerate development and realization of the objectives of the shari'ah.

The absence of a serious effort on the part of governments to utilize their limited resources more efficiently has a number of reasons. First, there is a lack of realization that the resources at their disposal are a trust from God. This failing, along with the expensive life style of government officials, has contributed to corruption. Only a moral reform of the society along with a restructuring of people's life-styles can remove this shortcoming. Second, the absence of an indigenous development philosophy, prepared in conformity with the country's own resources and values, has led to the absence of well-established priorities. Without the establishment of such priorities it is impossible to set up agreed criteria for judging the 'essential' from the 'inessential' and the 'productive' from the 'wasteful' use of resources. Unless a long-term commitment is made to an Islamic development philosophy, it may not be possible to remove the existing confusion and conflict in policies. Third, the price system has not been used and resources, particularly foreign exchange resources, are

³⁵ See Thomas, McKeown, *The Role of Medicine: Dream, Mirage or Nemesis?* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979,; and Alastair Gray, "Health and Society: Reflections on Policy," *IDS Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 3-9.

acquired or sold by governments and public enterprises at less than their opportunity costs. This contributes to inefficient use of resources. Fourth, the absence of an elected parliament and a free press deprive the public of a forum for criticism of government policies. This problem cannot be cured without establishing democratic processes.

Commitment to Islamic values and the objectives of the shari'ah should help on all four counts. The objectives of the shari'ah will in particular help reduce the existing arbitrariness in government spending decisions by providing the criteria for establishing priorities. The objectives of the shari'ah could be further reinforced by adhering to the following six broad principles adapted from the legal maxims developed over the centuries by Muslim jurists to provide a rational and consistent basis for Islamic jurisprudence.³⁶

1. The principal criterion for all expenditure allocations should be the wellbeing of the people (Article 58).
2. The removal of hardship and injury must take precedence over the provision of comfort (Articles 17, 19, 20, 30, 31, and 32).
3. The larger interest of the majority should take precedence over the narrower interest of a minority (Article 28).
4. A private sacrifice or loss may be inflicted to save a public sacrifice or loss and a greater sacrifice or loss may be averted by imposing a smaller sacrifice or loss (Articles 26, 27, and 28).
5. Whoever receives the benefit must bear the cost (Articles 87 and 88).

³⁶ *Majallah al Ahkām al 'Adliyyah*, briefly known as the *Majallah*, states 100 maxims of jurisprudence (*al Qawā'id al fiqhīyyah*) in its preamble. An English translation of the *Majallah* by C.R. Tyser, *et. al.*, and entitled *The Mejelle* was published in 1967 by the All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Nabha Road, Lahore. Although the *Majallah* is a Hanafi compendium codified during the Ottoman period, the maxims of jurisprudence are almost universally used by jurists of all schools of Muslim jurisprudence. See also Mustafa A. al-Zarqā, *Al Fiqh al Islāmi fi Thawbihi al Jadid* (Damascus: Matābi' Bā' Alif Bā' Al Adib, 1967), vol. 2, pp. 945-1060. The numbers given within brackets after each principle refer to the articles of the *Majallah* from which the principle has been derived.)

6. Something without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is also obligatory.³⁷

These maxims have an important bearing on taxation and government spending in Muslim countries. To clarify some of their implications for government expenditure programs, it may be helpful to consider a few examples.

Since general wellbeing has to be an essential objective of all public spending in accordance with maxim 1, then maxim 6 would require that all physical and social infrastructure projects which help realize this objective through accelerated economic growth, job creation and need fulfillment should be given priority over those that do not make such a contribution. Even among the indispensable infrastructure projects, maxim 2 would demand the giving of preference to projects that would help remove the hardship and suffering caused, for example, by malnutrition, illiteracy, homelessness, epidemics, lack of medical facilities, clean water supply, and sewage disposal. Similarly, the development of an efficient public transport system should acquire priority in accordance with maxim 3 because its absence causes hardship to a majority of the urban population, adversely affecting efficiency and development, and leading to an excessive import of cars and gasoline. While these cars provide extra comfort to a small portion of the suburban population, a reduction in their imports and diversion of the savings to import of public transport vehicles could be justified on the basis of maxim 4. Such a measure would not only reduce the pressure on foreign exchange resources but would also provide comfortable transport services to the majority with less congestion and pollution.

If priority is to be given to serve the interest of the majority in accordance with maxim 3, then the secondary importance given to rural development programs has no foundation. Since the majority of the population lives in rural areas and the mass uprooting of manpower from their families and society causes socioeconomic problems, the development of these areas to raise agricultural productiv-

³⁷ See al Shatibi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 394; see also Mustafā al Zarqā, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 784 and 1088.

ity, expand self-employment and employment opportunities, and fulfill their needs must take precedence. This will also automatically improve urban life by reducing the population congestion.

If inequalities of income and wealth are to be reduced, it becomes indispensable, in accordance with maxim 6, to raise the ability of the poor to earn more through greater and more convenient access to better educational and training facilities and to finance. This demands the giving of priority in government spending programs to the establishment of educational and vocational training institutions in rural areas so that everyone who qualifies has an equal access to them. It is also necessary to restructure the financial system to make financing available to a broad spectrum of entrepreneurs in rural as well as urban areas to raise self-employment opportunities and to increase the supply of need-satisfying goods and services.

Given the unhealthy fiscal deficits, the objectives of the shari‘ah cannot be realized without a reallocation of government spending. Hence, a decision has to be taken about areas where spending must be reduced. Without such a reallocation, either the realization of the objectives of the shari‘ah will have to be compromised or else spending will exceed the limits of available resources and lead to macro-economic and external imbalances. Where can spending be reduced? It is important to identify some of the major areas where savings can be realized.

The first and the most obvious way to achieve substantial savings is to minimize corruption, inefficiency and waste, which are seriously eroding the governments’ ability to utilize their scarce resources efficiently. According to the Chairman of the Pakistan National Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee, “the major part of the development budget is misappropriated.” Instances cited by him include: defective buildings collapsing a few years after construction, roads washed away by a single rainstorm, imported railway machinery becoming scrap without being used, imports being sold elsewhere before reaching Pakistan, and big loans extended by national-

ized banks to influential people being written off.³⁸ However, the effort to reduce corruption may have a greater chance of success if it is also accompanied by moral reform, transformation of life-styles and structural changes in the economy.

A second area where substantial savings can be made is subsidies. Even though the welfare of the poor has to be one of the primary considerations of an Islamic state, a number of subsidies provided by Muslim governments (either directly or through public enterprises, and either transparent or opaque) cannot be convincingly supported. Subsidies are usually defended on equity or economic considerations. However, on both these counts they do not stand up to the test of the objectives of the shari'ah or the maxims of public spending stated above.

If equity is the goal, the subsidy must redistribute income toward the truly needy. It does not. A lower price that does not cover the costs in accordance with maxim 5 tends to benefit the rich more than the poor because of their larger consumption and easier access.³⁹ This is not defensible in a system committed to socioeconomic justice. If value judgements are not an anathema, there is no justification for a lower price or subsidy for the rich or those who can afford to pay. Only those who are unable to pay a realistic price should be helped. Since price discrimination is administratively difficult and since it is desirable to make everyone pay the realistic price, the best way to help the poor is through substantially increased scholarships, relief payments and income supplements paid out of appropriations made for this purpose by the government or social service organizations, zakah funds, and other voluntary or compulsory donations. In this way the government may be able to provide more intensive relief to the needy by using only a proportion of the total amount spent on a general subsidy. The income supplement would give the poor the chance to determine their own priorities and the realistic price would

³⁸ "Most of Pak Funds for Development Misused": Ali Shah Details PAK Findings," Summary of a report published on the authority of Reuters by the *Saudi Gazette*, 21 June 1987, p. 7.

³⁹ In Morocco, only 16 percent of the subsidy on subsidized foods reached the lowest income group in 1984. See "World Bank Presents its Six-Point Approach to Subsidies in Developing Countries," *BIS Review*, 8 April 1987, p. 5.

help minimize the wasteful use of goods or services brought about by a general subsidy.

If efficiency is the goal, subsidy must strengthen incentives for the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah and allocate resources more effectively. It does not. Agricultural subsidy has mainly helped the big farmers "who have obtained a disproportionate share of it and have used it to amass land and other assets."⁴⁰ The subsidy paid to large-scale urban industries on the basis of infant industry argument rarely encourages them to cross the threshold of infancy. However, if the subsidy is used to enable small farmers and SMEs to adopt better technology and inputs, and to stand on their own feet, it could be justified on the basis of the objectives of the shari'ah. But the rural and urban poor "tend to be dispersed, unorganized and politically inarticulate" compared with the urban and rural elite.⁴¹ Hence they rarely get producers' subsidies of the kind obtained by large-scale industries and influential landlords. The poor nevertheless end up bearing the tax burden of subsidies because the tax systems in these countries are usually regressive.

A third important area of saving could be the gradual lifting of patronage provided to public sector enterprises. "By and large the performance of state-owned businesses in the developing world has been disappointing."⁴² They have typically failed to provide the spur to industrialization and faster growth that governments had hoped for; not only have the financial returns often been unimpressive but the social returns have been poor. This is because they have operated without competition and governments have often placed little emphasis on efficiency and have rarely been prepared to use the sanction of liquidation. Low profitability limits their ability to self-finance their investments. Consequently, they have often been a cause of large budgetary deficits and external debt. In a sample of 27 developing countries from 1976 to 1979, the net budgetary payments

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6; see also IBRD, *World Development Report, 1986*, pp. 90-104.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁴² "Privatisation in the Third World," *Financial Times*, 3 September 1987.

to nonfinancial state owned companies were more than 3 percent of the GDP.⁴³

A fourth area where large savings can be made is defense. According to the World Bank, "evidence increasingly points to high military spending as contributing to fiscal and debt crises, complicating stabilization and adjustment, and negatively affecting economic growth and development."⁴⁴ Within the framework of the objectives of the shari'ah and the principles discussed above, the claim of national defense for the lion's share in budgetary appropriations loses its rationale in the absence of a serious threat of external aggression.⁴⁵ It is often forgotten that defense spending imposes not only monetary cost but also other costs, including reduced wellbeing of the poor, leading to social unrest and political instability. Only a few Muslim countries are seriously threatened; most of the others usually make undue fuss about defense on the basis of unrealistic assumptions. Moreover, it is always possible to have better defense with smaller spending if efficiency is ensured in the use of resources, if corruption, which is more rampant in defense than elsewhere, is removed, and if a conciliatory policy is adopted and unnecessary conflicts with neighboring countries are avoided.

⁴³ IBRD, *World Development Report, 1983*, p. 74. The net deficit of a sample of Niger's state-owned enterprises accounted for about 4 per cent of the country's GDP in 1982 (*ibid.*, p. 67). Turkish public enterprises averaged net losses equivalent to 3.9 percent of GDP during 1977-9 (*ibid.*, p. 74). One study has found that countries in which state-owned enterprises accounted for higher shares of gross domestic investment generally had lower rates of economic growth. (See IBRD, *World Development Report, 1987*, pp. 66-67).

⁴⁴ IBRD, *World Development Report, 1988*, p. 106.

⁴⁵ Although the average defense expenditure of industrial and developing countries was 14.35 percent and 14.02 percent, respectively, of total government expenditure in 1983, the expenditure of some Muslim countries was: Pakistan, 34.82 percent; Indonesia, 20.04 percent; Malaysia, 15.05 percent (1981); Egypt, 16.59 percent; Oman, 48.51 percent; and Yemen Arab Republic, 30.68 percent. See IMF, *International Financial Statistics, Supplement on Government Finance, 1986*, pp. 30-31.

Since the existence of poverty and extreme inequalities and the absence of adequate educational institutions, hospitals, and public utilities, particularly in rural areas, is subjecting a majority of the population to hardship and economic backwardness, there seems to be little moral or economic justification for spending huge sums on defense hardware. The absence of a real threat prevents the governments from demanding from themselves and the rich the financial and economic sacrifices that defense requires. Countervailing adjustments are accordingly not made in life styles and government spending, and the needed sacrifice is hence quietly passed on to the urban and rural poor through the low priority given to satisfaction of their needs on the basis of the usual plea of 'lack' of resources.

High defense spending does not even provide the security which the governments claim it does. The 'real' source of security for the poorer Muslim countries lies in internal strength attained through moral reform, economic development and socioeconomic justice. No amount of defense spending can provide security against internal disintegration which is gaining momentum in many Muslim countries. It seems that sometimes even the very objective of defense build up, ensuring national and territorial integrity, is jeopardized by 'excessive' defense spending. This is because, as Paul Kennedy has rightly argued, a strong economic base is more vital to a nation, in the long run, than military superiority; and nations which stretch themselves militarily beyond what their economies will sustain are looking for a fall.⁴⁶

Therefore, one of the most important goals of government policy in Muslim countries should be to minimize defense spending through policies of conciliation and peaceful coexistence with a view to release resources for satisfying the needs of the majority. If the Muslim countries concerned take the initiative, there is bound to be public pressure for reduced defense spending even in the neighboring countries from which the Muslim countries feel the psychologi-

⁴⁶ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict, 1500-2000* (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. xvi and 536-540.

cal threat. Every one will then be better off. The nonavailability of borrowed funds due to the Islamic ban on interest should help compel Muslim governments to resort to conciliatory and peaceful coexistence policies. They also need to derive inspiration from the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, who signed a truce agreement with the Makkans on extremely unfavorable terms to get a period of peace and tranquility.

While spending needs to be reduced and reallocated the tax system, which is as guilty of fiscal mismanagement as expenditure policies, also needs to be reformed in the interest of greater equity and higher revenue. Muslim countries, like other developing countries, are not so much over-taxed as they are badly taxed. The tax base is narrow and so the tax rates are high. Tax base, tax rates and corruption are parts of a vicious circle. The narrower the tax base, the higher the rate must be to achieve a given amount of revenue. The higher the tax rate, the greater the incentive for corruption. This vicious circle leads not only to economic distortions but also to a greater reliance on indirect taxes. It is well known that "tax evasion by the well-to-do is colossal, and they are anyhow relatively very few, while the poor are many. Taxation becomes forced to rely on regressive indirect taxes."⁴⁷ The reform of the entire tax system and the collecting machinery are hence indispensable.

Muslim countries have no alternative to expenditure and tax reform; increased reliance on borrowing and foreign aid is not feasible. Borrowing does not bear a great promise because the debt servicing burden of both domestic and foreign debts of these countries has already risen to an intolerably high level. Foreign aid, although indispensable under the existing imbalances and welcome to the extent to which it helps in the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah, has its own limitations. It has gone down in real terms and, excepting for a small proportion of grants, most of it comes as

⁴⁷ Gunnar Myrdal, National Bank of Pakistan, *Quarterly Economic Journal*, January-March 1979, p. 29.

loans.⁴⁸ Even though most of these loans are at concessionary rates, they have nevertheless to be repaid with interest. The tragedy is that most foreign aid is not used ultimately to increase the rate of capital accumulation and growth; it is used to increase private consumption or recurrent public expenditure, including military expenditure.⁴⁹ In the interest of maintaining their geopolitical independence, it would be desirable for Muslim countries to seek as little aid as possible and to use effectively whatever aid they get for the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah. The Prophet's hadith saying that "The hand that is above is better than the hand that is below,"⁵⁰ should be applicable to nations even more than it is to individuals. While there may be a justification for aid that is used for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah, there is hardly any justification for aid that is used for supporting private conspicuous consumption, recurring public expenditure, and military build up in the absence of a real threat.

The Islamic injunction against interest should prove to be of great help in realizing greater efficiency in public sector spending. Since interest-based borrowing may be permissible only in emergencies or extremely difficult circumstances, governments will have to finance

⁴⁸ Total net financial flows to developing countries fell by about 15 percent in volume terms in 1986. For details see, OECD, *Financing and External Debt of Developing Countries—1986 Survey* (Paris: OECD, 1987). Except for a small proportion of grants, most of this aid is in the form of loans. See "Financial Resources for Developing countries: 1986 and Recent Trends," OECD, *Press Release*, 19 June 1987, Table 2, p. 8.

⁴⁹ Mohammad Anisur Rahman, "The Welfare Economics of Foreign Aid," *Pakistan Development Review*, Summer 1967, pp. 141-159; See also, "Foreign Capital and Domestic Savings: A Test of Haavelmo's Hypothesis with Cross Country Data," *Rev. Economic Statistics*, February 1968, pp. 137-138; Thomas E. Weiskopf, "The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic Savings in Underdeveloped Countries," *Journal of International Economics*, February 1972, pp. 25-38; Keith Griffin, *International Inequality and National Poverty* (London: Macmillan, 1978), and "Doubts about Aid," unpublished paper, Magdalen College, Oxford University, June 1984.

⁵⁰ Bukhari, *Al Jāmi' al Ṣaḥīḥ* (Cairo: Muhammad Ali Subayh, n.d.), vol. 2, p. 133; Abu Abd al Rahman bin Shu'ayb al Nasā'i, *Sunan al Nasā'i al Mujtaja* (Cairo: Mustafā al Bābi al Halabi, 1964), vol. 5, pp. 45-46.

their budgetary spending through mainly taxation, leasing and equity finance. All current and unproductive outlays will need to be financed out of tax revenues. Since there is a limit to the extent to which tax revenues may be raised, governments will not be able to overstretch themselves. They will be forced to keep their wasteful and unnecessary current expenditures under control and to apply cost recovery methods in the pricing of goods and services supplied by them.

Since borrowing does not obviate, but rather only postpones, the ultimate need for sacrifice, the ban on interest should prove to be a blessing by removing the long-term heavy debt-servicing burden it normally leads to. The constraint it will impose on government spending in the short-run may tend to be more than offset by the healthy discipline it will impose on the governments, the sustained, steadier growth it will generate in the economy, the greater cooperation it will bring about between the governments and the private sector, and the much smaller debt-servicing burden it will create in both the domestic and external sectors of the economy. To avoid an excessive squeeze in the initial stage, the governments may apply the prohibition gradually and not in one stroke. An unscrupulous government may try to find the easy way out by borrowing excessively from the central bank. This would hurt the Islamic imperative of making money a reliable measure of value through price stability. Accordingly, it would be unrealistic for a Muslim government to talk of Islamization without making a serious effort to reduce its budgetary deficits.

Restructuring the Investment Climate

Implementation of Islamic consumption norms should help increase savings. But, savings may not necessarily get diverted to capital formation. and even if they do, just a rise in capital formation is not the apex of achievement. What is needed is capital formation that would lead to need fulfillment, export expansion and a rapid rise in self-employment and employment opportunities. Therefore, it is not enough to cut consumption; it is also necessary to foster a suitable investment climate.

In the present-day Muslim societies, a substantial part of even the existing low level of savings goes into unproductive channels like hoarding (gold, precious stones, and jewelry) and capital flight. Capital flight has become a serious problem for most developing countries. During the 11 years to 1985, about \$150 to \$200 billion of the total capital outflow of \$250 billion from capital importing countries represented capital flight.⁵¹ Capital flight of this magnitude depresses domestic investment and makes sustained growth more difficult to achieve. If the same policies continue, it will be difficult to prevent capital flight and to raise domestic investment, thus frustrating the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah.

Productive investment of one's savings so as to contribute to need fulfillment and increased self-employment or employment is the social obligation of all Muslims who are capable of saving in keeping with the already-quoted maxim: "Something without which an obligation cannot be discharged is also obligatory." It becomes even more obligatory because the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, himself glorified productive effort and investment by saying: "Any Muslim who plants a tree or cultivates a field such that a bird or a human being or an animal eats from it, this deed will be counted as an act of charity."⁵² The Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, also discouraged disinvestment by saying: "He who sells a house [without need], but does not invest the proceeds in something similar, God will not bless the proceeds."⁵³ The Caliph Umar, may God be pleased with him, used to say: "He who has wealth, let him improve (develop) it and he who has land, let him cul-

⁵¹ See Stephen Fidler, "Third World's Missing Millions," *Financial Times*, 7 September 1987. See also C. L. Ramirez Rojas "Monetary Substitution in Developing Countries," *Finance and Development*, June 1986, pp. 35-38.

⁵² Bukhāri, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 128; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* (Cairo: 'Isā al Bābi al Hālabi, 1955), vol. 3, p. 1189:12; Muhammad ibn Isā al Tirmidhi, *Al Jāmi' al Ṣaḥīḥ* (Cairo: 'Isā al Bābi al Halabi, 1956), vol. 3, p. 666:1382.

⁵³ Suyuti, *Al Jāmi' al Saghīr* (Cairo: Abd al Hamid Ahmad Hanaft, n.d.), vol. 2, p. 167, on the authority of Tabarāni; the expression within parentheses has been added on the basis of another hadith quoted by Suyuti on the same page; see also al Abbādi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 96-107.

tivate it.”⁵⁴ Given these values, it should be possible to make productive investment take the place of consumption as a prestige symbol in a Muslim society such that the benefits that others can derive from savings are actualized. The levy of zakah on all net worth, including currency hoarding and gold and silver jewelry, should prove to be of great help in inducing savers to get into income-earning financial or real assets to be able to offset the impact of zakah on their savings.

However even these values may by themselves fail to promote productive investment. People do not commit funds for long-term productive investments unless there is a proper investment climate. Some of the factors which vitiate the investment climate are the absence of adequate social and physical infrastructure, an inequitable tax system, political uncertainties, continuous depreciation in the exchange rate of the country’s currency and an arsenal of unwarranted controls. A reference has already been made to the need for infrastructure construction and tax reform. The remaining three factors are briefly discussed below.

There is no immediate solution to political uncertainties which are the result of poverty, sociopolitical unrest, and absence of democratic processes. These have been further aggravated by shifting loyalties of the ruling elite to capitalism, socialism, and Islam in response to the conflicting demands of their own vested interest, international power politics and the people’s aspirations. This has generated confusion and contributed to an absence of firm direction in policies and strategies. Making a serious commitment to Islam and allowing democratic processes to play their full political role should help provide the needed direction and stability to policies.

The shari’ah clearly defines the rights and limitations of property holders and the legal enforcement of these should help remove the fears of investors about arbitrary seizures and nationalization. In his address delivered on the occasion of his Farewell Pilgrimage, the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, declared: “Your lives

⁵⁴ M. H. Haykal, *Al Fārūq Umar* (Cairo: Maktabah al Nahdah al Misriyyah, 1964), vol. 2, p. 229.

and your properties are as sacred as this day of the Hajj.”⁵⁵ Accordingly, the jurists have unanimously ruled against arbitrary confiscation and nationalization of property by the state. Abu Yusuf epitomized this ruling by saying: “The ruler has no right to expropriate anything except by a clear and established right.”⁵⁶ This clear verdict of the shari‘ah should become reflected in the legal framework of all Muslim countries. They should define clearly and stipulate legally all those sectors of the economy where only public enterprises may be permissible and sectors where private enterprise will have a free role to play. Such a classification should be further reinforced by a legal guaranty in favor of just compensation in case of reclassification. Public enterprises will anyway have to be kept at a minimum because of the prohibition against interest and the inability of the governments to raise sufficient financing for such enterprises through taxes or sale of shares. Once such guarantees have become integrated into the country’s constitution and legal framework and it is realized that their fountainhead is the shari‘ah, it would be difficult for any government to disregard them in the interest of its own domestic popularity and international standing.

The continuing depreciation of the currencies of most Muslim countries cannot be prevented without reducing claims on resources, particularly foreign exchange resources, through restructuring of private sector consumption and government spending in the manner already discussed. Instead, most Muslim governments rely on exchange controls (overvalued exchange rates with import licensing), high tariffs, and promotion of import-competing industries.

Exchange controls, as evidence has indicated, have been largely ineffective.⁵⁷ They lead to the creation of a dual market of official and black market exchange rates. The overvalued official rate encourages imports and discourages exports, thus worsening the allocation of resources and depressing the rate of economic growth. They

⁵⁵ Muslim, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 889:147; and Ibn Mājah, *Sunan Ibn Mājah* (Cairo: Isā al Bābi al Halabi, 1952), vol. 2, p. 1297:3931.

⁵⁶ Abu Yusuf, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-6.

⁵⁷ See Ramires-Rojas, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

contribute to socioeconomic injustice by subsidizing import license receivers at the expense of consumers and exporters; the consumers continue to pay for imports at the opportunity cost of foreign exchange while the exporters receive less for their output. They also promote corruption and inefficiency. The various bonus schemes adopted to promote exports in the absence of a realistic exchange rate only succeed in exacerbating injustice and corruption. The benefit of these schemes does not permeate to the actual producers; their resources do not consequently increase to enable them to acquire improved inputs and better technology. Their productivity hence continues to remain low.

Higher tariffs, unlike realistic exchange rates, constitute a single-edged weapon. If applied effectively, they can discourage imports, but do not encourage exports. However, when high tariffs are used in developing countries with weak customs administration, and without any attempt to change the social mood, there is under-invoicing, smuggling, and tariff evasion. This raises the relative profitability of highly taxed, but smuggled, luxury goods and distorts resource allocation against need satisfaction. Hence a more effective strategy would be to ban the import of goods falling in the third category of goods and services.

Promotion of import-competing industries is no doubt necessary to reduce the pressure on foreign exchange resources and to promote employment and growth. However, in the absence of a consistent development philosophy, the selection of import-competing industries is arbitrary with no relationship to the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah or the rational principles of resource allocation. Nevertheless, they receive maximum government patronage in the form of subsidized financing, high tariff protection, exemption from duties on the import of capital goods and raw materials, and tax holidays. Such industries are usually large-scale and get established in urban areas. Since most of them are capital intensive and use a more sophisticated technology, their contribution to employment is not as much as that of labor-intensive SMEs (small micro enterprises). The high tariffs imposed to protect them contribute not only to higher

prices for consumers but also, along with other privileges, to the unearned enrichment of those who receive licenses for such industries and resort to under-invoicing. More and more of the nation's resources accordingly move into such industries distorting resource allocation and enriching the urban and rural rich. In such highly protected industries, there is usually little competition.⁵⁸ Agriculture and SMEs, which should really be the candidates for protection because of their great potential for import-substitution, are neglected. They suffer from lack of government support, overvalued exchange rates, import subsidies and commodity aid. Since most units operating in these sectors are small, unorganized and inarticulate, they are unable to exert any political pressure. The result is the vicious circle of neglect and poverty of these sectors and their inability to finance investments in improved technology. This is undoubtedly in conflict with the objectives of the shari'ah.

Probably the greatest obstacle to investment in Muslim countries, like in other developing countries, is the bureaucratic red-tape. This springs from various types of unnecessary controls which lead to a waste of investor time and an unnecessary rise in costs. Unless most of these controls are dismantled, it would be difficult to improve the investment climate even if savings increase. The general spirit of Islamic teachings is the freedom of enterprise within the value-frame of Islam. Controls are an inevitable source of corruption and even the Islamization of morals may not be able to prevent the officials from succumbing to temptation. There is moreover no justification for controls on the local manufacture or import of need-fulfilling consumers' goods falling into category one (necessities) and the raw materials and capital goods needed for their manufacture.

The Islamic ban on interest will make it indispensable for Muslim countries to encourage and facilitate foreign investment. This should not raise any demurs because "equity investment is beneficial to developing countries and can be increased."⁵⁹ It makes

⁵⁸ See OECD, *The Costs of Restructuring Imports—The Automobile Industry*, (Paris: OECD, 1987).

⁵⁹ IBRD, *World Development Report, 1985*, p. 125.

available not only finance but also technology and management which can increase the productivity of capital. The readjustment of economic policies in the light of Islamic teachings, the assurance that contractual obligations will be fulfilled as required by Islam, the removal of exchange controls on all current account transactions within the range of the perspective plan, and the ease of profit remittances and capital repatriation by foreign investors should prove to be positive factors in attracting foreign investment in Muslim countries. According to the World Bank, “countries that have followed a more open development strategy have had fewer problems with direct investment.”⁶⁰ However, until such time as the Muslim countries are able to attract more foreign equity investment, they may have to tolerate interest-based borrowings to the extent necessary to finance productive, self-liquidating projects that contribute to need fulfillment and development.⁶¹

Need-Based Production

Restructuring the investment climate may only help increase the volume of investments. It will be necessary to adopt measures to ensure that this increase in investment gets diverted to the production of need-fulfilling and exportable goods and services and the capital goods and raw materials needed for this purpose. All privileges and subsidies, explicit or implicit, which provide an edge to the production and import of luxuries and status symbols must be withdrawn.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 129.

⁶¹ This opinion, held by many fuqahā’ is based on the Qur’anic verse related to certain specified items which have been prohibited but the use of which have been allowed in extremely dire circumstances. “He has forbidden carrion, blood, pork and that which has been slaughtered in the name of other than God. However, if one is forced by dire necessity without willful disobedience or transgression of the limit, no sin shall be on him. Certainly God is Forgiving and Kind” (2:173) (Qur’anic references are composed of two numbers—the first referring to the *surah* [chapter] and second to the *ayah* [verse].) There are a number of other verses of this same implication in the Qur’an (5:3, 6:145, 16:115, 6:119). By analogy, this principle may be applied to interest paid to foreign lenders with whom no alternative arrangement is possible, provided that it is resorted to only to the extent absolutely necessary.

Emphasis of government fiscal, monetary and commercial policies should be tilted in favor of need fulfillment and exports.

The general tendency to resort to price controls on necessities leads to long-run shortages in their supplies by reducing their profitability. This becomes a permanent source of injury to the poor. In contrast the long-term supply of luxuries rises, thus serving the interests of the well-to-do. Hence the shari'ah has not permitted price controls under normal circumstances when there is no national emergency (war or famine) or when businesses are not creating an artificial shortage through monopoly, collusion, or hoarding. The short-term harm that the removal of price controls on necessities will inflict on the poor should be undone through the adoption of a gradual approach and the use of transfer payments and other measures discussed in this paper.

The support to agriculture and rural development and to SMEs, will play an important role in encouraging need fulfillment and exports. The restructuring of the banking system along Islamic lines must no doubt be an essential element of the whole reform program.

A New Deal for the Unemployed and the Underemployed

One of the most constructive ways of realizing the objectives of the shari'ah is the efficient and productive use of manpower resources of Muslim countries in such a way that each individual is able to use his or her creative and artistic abilities to the fullest extent in the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah . This cannot be materialized if the prevailing high level of involuntary unemployment and under-employment continues. The main policy instrument available within the framework of conventional wisdom for reducing unemployment and under-employment is expansion of aggregate demand.

While the conventional policy of aggregate demand expansion is no doubt necessary, it runs into two snags. First, given the flagrant inequalities of income and wealth and the demonstration effect of western life-styles, the increased demand spills over to a substantial degree into imports of goods and services for conspicuous consumption. Consequently its full benefit does not go to the goal of expand-

ing employment and removing poverty. However, if this policy were to be pursued in a need-based perspective, the benefit would tend to permeate a greater proportion of the population. Second, given the need to reduce macroeconomic and external imbalances, it is not possible to expand aggregate domestic demand; rather, it is necessary to reduce it. This adds importance to the policies of import substitution and export promotion. But these policies do not make an optimum contribution to employment if pursued within the framework of large-scale, capital intensive, urban enterprises.

Since the poorer Muslim countries have a surplus of labor, scarcity of capital and foreign exchange, and lack the educational infrastructure for training in complex technology, it would be desirable for them to expand self-employment opportunities through the proliferation of SMEs. As Dr. Muhammad Yunus has rightly pointed out, "Wage employment is not a happy road to the reduction of poverty, and that self-employment has more potential for improving the asset base of an individual than wage employment has."⁶² It would, however, be unrealistic to expect self-employment to absorb the entire manpower, and hence wage-employment may also need to be promoted simultaneously, provided that, in accordance with the dictates of the shari'ah, laborers receive a 'just' wage, are treated respectfully and humanly like brothers, and are not reduced to the position of small cogs in a big machine, unable to give full expression to their creative and artistic potential.⁶³ The greater the possibility of such employment in SMEs, the greater may be the possibility of realizing these goals.

There is a growing realization now that "the large-scale (modern) industrialization strategies of the previous decade generally had failed to solve the problems of global underdevelopment and pover-

⁶² Muhammad Yunus, "The Poor as the Engine of Development," reproduced from *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1987, in *Economic Impact* 2 (1988), p. 31.

⁶³ See M. U. Chapra, *Objectives of the Islamic Economic Order*, op. cit., p. 14-17; and Hakim Mohammed Said, ed., *The Employer and the Employee—Islamic Concept* (Karachi: Dār al Fikr al Islāmi, Pakistan, 1972).

ty.”⁶⁴ Studies conducted in a number of countries by Michigan State University and host country scholars have clearly indicated the rich contribution that SMEs can make to employment and income. They create new jobs not only directly but also indirectly by expanding incomes, demand for goods and services, tools and raw materials, and exports. They are labor intensive and require less capital and less foreign exchange. They rely primarily on personal savings and retained earnings and need much less access to credit from governments and financial institutions compared with large-scale industries. They invent new products, revive lost skills and help economies move into new kinds of work. They can be more widely disbursed and thus help maintain the link between a person’s place of work and his home which large-scale industries and hectic urbanization have severed to the detriment of social health. Moreover, they are at least as efficient as large-scale industries.⁶⁵ A Michigan State University study has concluded that they consistently generate more output per unit of capital than do their large-scale counterparts.⁶⁶ Little, Scitovsky and Scott have concluded that “large scale modern industry is usually much less profitable than the small craft type industries, in addition to being more costly in terms of capital and creating less employment.”⁶⁷ In fact, some scholars doubt that large-scale industries can be suitable at all under conditions of labor surpluses and capital shortages that are typical of most developing countries.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Carl Liedholm and Donald Mead, “Small-Scale Enterprise: A Profile,” reproduced from “Small Scale Industries in Developing Countries: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications,” A Michigan State University Development Paper, in *Economic Impact*, 2 (1988), p. 12.

⁶⁵ An expression of this view appears in International Labor Organisation (ILO), *Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya* (Geneva: ILO, 1972).

⁶⁶ Report of the Select Committee on Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁶⁷ Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott, *Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 91.

⁶⁸ See Mariluz Cortes, Albert Berry and Ashfaq Ishaq, *Success in Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises* (Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 2.

SMEs are hence being widely viewed as “an effective way of fostering the private sector’s contribution to both the growth and equity objectives of developing countries.”⁶⁹

Even the OECD countries have realized the job-creating potential of small enterprise.⁷⁰ Over the last decade they have accounted for a disproportionate share of new jobs, and those industrial countries where they play an important role have had a greater success in achieving lower rates of unemployment. Hence, a number of these countries have introduced measures to promote them.⁷¹ “No longer are small firms seen as the ‘Cinderella’ of the business community, rather they are to be courted and encouraged by politicians of all colors.”⁷² In Italy, artisans often working in family businesses, are a main factor behind the success of Italian jewelry, gold, silver, leatherworking, embroidery, glasswork, furniture, pottery, shoemaking, and clothes manufacturing, to mention just a few sectors.⁷³ In Germany, where the family-owned concern has always played a major part in the economy, there is renewed awareness of the need to create a favorable climate for small enterprise.⁷⁴ Japan’s export success is largely due to the vigour of internal competition promoted by the producing firms through their subcontracting of a lot of work to

⁶⁹ Liedholm and Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁷⁰ A number of books have recently been published indicating the strengths of small businesses. See, for example, Graham Gudgin, *Industrial Location Processes and Employment Growth* (London: Gower, 1978); and David Birch, *The Job Generation Process* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., Program on Neighbourhood and Regional Change, 1979); Steven Solomon, *Small Business USA* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1986); David Storey, *et. al.*, *The Performance of Small Firms* (London: Croom Helm, 1987); David J. Storey and Steven G. Johnson, *Job Creation in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises* (Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities, 1987); and Paul Burns and Jim Dewhurst, *Small Business in Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1987).

⁷¹ OECD, *Employment Outlook* (Paris: OECD, 1986).

⁷² Burns & Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

⁷³ See Alan Friedman, “Italian Small Business. The Backbone of the Economy Explored,” *Financial Times*, 15 September 1987.

⁷⁴ See “Small Business,” *Financial Times*, 29 April 1987, Section III, p. 1.

small businesses on a competitive basis.⁷⁵ Small firms are very important in Japan even domestically. They account for 50 percent of Japanese industrial output and 75 percent of total Japanese employment.⁷⁶ Three-quarters of retail sales are still made in Japan through specialty retailers and small family-run stores which are protected by law.⁷⁷ This, along with the widespread use of a profit-sharing system, may be among the primary reasons for Japan having the lowest rate of unemployment among industrial countries.⁷⁸ Even in other developed countries where the small firms sector has traditionally been weak, high levels of unemployment have made governments very receptive to their promotion. There has hence been a wealth of public and private sector initiatives to boost the small entrepreneur.

The emphasis of policy in Muslim countries on decentralized production with a proliferation of capital-saving SMEs may perhaps be the most effective way of not only occupying gainfully a large part of the rural landless but also the under-occupied members (husband, wife, parents, and children) of rural families having a small landholding. This policy will serve as complementary to agricultural reforms discussed earlier and will support rural development by raising the incomes of rural population and enhancing their ability to purchase better seeds, fertilizers and technology, thus raising their agricultural output. It will also reduce the outflow of population to urban centers. This will help maintain family solidarity and be more conducive to moral uplift and crime reduction, which are among the important goals of Islam. While many Muslim countries are critical

⁷⁵ See "Worker-Friendly Programs," *Economist*, 27 September 1986, p. 20.

⁷⁶ Steven Solomon, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-284.

⁷⁷ See "Why Japanese Shoppers are Lost in a Maze," *Economist*, 31 January 1987, p. 64.

⁷⁸ For a discussion of the Japanese profit-sharing system see Martin L. Weitzman, *The Share Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). It is surprising that while profit-sharing as applied to labor, has attracted attention in the West, profit-sharing as applied to capital, has not attracted such attention. Is it because of cultural myopia or is it because Muslims have themselves not presented the case convincingly?

of the policies of their colonial masters “who systematically destroyed all the fibers and foundations” of their societies, they have done little after independence to revive the skills and crafts that were destroyed.⁷⁹ In fact, everything has been done to stifle SMEs and to patronize large-scale industries and businesses through a high protective wall, liberal import licenses, concessionary financing, subsidized inputs and tax holidays. This is not a judgement against large-scale industry, which will be indispensable in certain sectors of the economy and which should be encouraged and undertaken where necessary, provided that the overall socioeconomic benefits exceed the costs and a heavy dose of permanent protection is not needed.

But how to encourage the proliferation of SMEs all over the country? It requires a number of revolutionary changes in the socio-economic environment. First, there must be a change in lifestyles away from imported status symbols and in favor of simple domestically-produced products that satisfy needs and utilize labor more abundantly. Second, there must be a change in official attitudes and policies towards SMEs such that they are not dismissed as inefficient small and anachronistic leftovers of the past, but are rather encouraged and helped to realize fully their rich potential. Third, they must be enabled, through help in acquiring better inputs, appropriate technology, effective marketing techniques, and other extension services to compete in terms of both quality and price with the products of large scale industries and imports. Fourth, they must also be enabled to upgrade their skills through better training facilities; this will require a complete overhaul of educational institutions to remove the existing mismatch between the skills in demand and the education offered. Fifth, they must also be provided access to finance, the lack of which constitutes the most serious obstacle to their development. Finally, it may also be necessary to eliminate, if not reverse the direction of, the existing bias in favor of large scale industries which is one of the major sore points in the expansion of SMEs.

⁷⁹ Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), p. 149.

The objectives of import-substitution and export promotion may not be realized through the SMEs unless they are helped to acquire more efficient technology to enable them to compete effectively. It would however be preferable if such technology is simple, in which case it would have the following advantages. It would require a smaller capital outlay, thus absorbing the growing labor force with a smaller amount of capital. It would minimize the demand for high skills and be thus suitable for Muslim countries with their relatively lower standards of literacy and technical education. It would enable a greater use of locally available materials and reduce the claim on foreign exchange resources. It would be possible to develop and produce it locally, thus helping reduce the dependence on imported technology. It would also be possible to introduce it in small towns and rural areas, thus reducing regional income disparities and minimizing the concentration of population in a few large urban centers, which large-scale enterprise with its capital intensive and complex technology tends to create. It would thus be what Schumacher calls a “technology with a human face.”⁸⁰ Even such a simple and inexpensive technology has the potential of leading to a “fairly rapid increase in productivity in underdeveloped countries.”⁸¹ It could not only help raise incomes and standards of living but also help achieve redistribution.

Financial Restructuring

The objective of achieving a proliferation of SMEs in rural and urban areas to solve the major economic problems of unemployment and concentration of wealth would remain only a fond dream unless arrangements are made for their financing. Lack of financing constitutes the most serious drawback in the development of small farms and SMEs. The poor are poor not because of their unwillingness to work hard or lack of skill. They in fact work harder than the rich and

⁸⁰ Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful* (London: Blond & Briggs, 1973), p. 18.

⁸¹ See the report by the United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, 1951), p. 29.

have more skill than they can use. Their problem is that they do not have access to financial resources necessary for being self-employed, and wage employment either does not utilize their skills optimally or does not pay them adequately to fulfill even their needs, let alone savings for investment. Financing is a powerful political, social and economic weapon and plays a predominant role in determining the power base, social status and economic condition of a person in the modern world. Dr. Muhammad Yunus has aptly emphasized that financing for self-employment should “be recognized as a right that plays a critical role in attaining all other human rights.”⁸² Therefore, reform of the financial system should constitute one of the key elements of all socioeconomic and political reforms.

The Select Committee on Hunger found that “the provision of small amounts of credit to micro enterprises in the informal sector economy of developing countries can significantly raise the living standards of the poor, increase food security and bring about sustainable improvements in local economies.” The Committee also concluded that “making credit available to entry level micro entrepreneurs is one way to help end the cycle of poverty and hunger among urban and rural landless poor in developing countries.” However, as the Committee indicated, “formal financial institutions in these countries do not recognize the viability of income generating enterprises owned by the poor.”⁸³ Even the Morgan Guarantee Trust Company, the sixth largest bank in the United States, has admitted that the banking system in developing countries has failed to “finance either maturing smaller companies or venture capitalists,” and “though awash with funds, is not encouraged to deliver competitively priced funding to any but the largest, most cash rich companies.”⁸⁴

Since the deposits of commercial banks come from a wide cross-section of the population, it would be rational to consider them a national resource to be utilized for the wellbeing of all sectors of

⁸² Muhammad Yunus, “The Poor as the Engine of Growth”, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁸³ Report of the Select Committee on Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. v.

⁸⁴ Morgan Guarantee Trust Company of New York, *World Financial Markets*, January 1987, p. 7.

the population and not for further enrichment of the wealthy and the powerful.⁸⁵ This is not possible within the framework of the conventional system in which, as Lester Thurow has rightly observed, credit is granted mainly “to those firms with large internal savings, regardless of whether they are earning above average rates of return on their capital investment.” The result is that “the winners are, as in lottery, lucky rather than smart or meritocratic.”⁸⁶ The most telling lesson about the conventional banking system comes from Catherine Shaw, a researcher at the London School of Economics’ Business History Unit, who says, “The recruitment of business leaders from one social class or a narrow social strata is an obvious symptom. It suggests that society is failing to utilize its total reservoir of ability.”⁸⁷

The adoption of the Islamic financial system could be more conducive to the harnessing of this pool of ability and the bringing to fruition the rich contribution that SMEs can make to output, employment and income distribution. The sharing of risks along with rewards by the financial institutions will substantially reduce the precariousness of a small entrepreneur’s position—he will save himself from the backbreaking burden of interest in difficult times by his willingness to pay a higher rate of return in good times. The financial institution is well qualified to share the risk, and could do so without denting its financial strength if it builds loss-offsetting reserves in good times.

However, even if the financial system is Islamized, it would be necessary to remove two of the primary causes responsible for the failure or inability of commercial banks to finance small farms and SMEs. The first of these is the serious economic disadvantages under which this sector operates, and the second is the greater risk and

⁸⁵ The noncorporate sector in developing countries generally accounts for 60-70 percent of private sector domestic saving. It is the only sector whose saving exceeds its investment (V. V. Bhatt, “Improving the Financial Structure”, *Finance and Development* (June 1986), p. 20.

⁸⁶ Lester Thurow, *Zero-Sum Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 175.

⁸⁷ Quoted by Charles Leadbearer, “Rags to Riches—Fact or Fiction,” *Financial Times*, 30 December 1986, p. 5.

expense to which the commercial banks are exposed. The first drawback cannot be removed without eliminating the implicit bias in official policies in favor of large-scale urban enterprises and replacing it by a strong commitment to support small farmers and SMEs. The adoption and implementation of the program proposed earlier through appropriate government policies and budgetary support should help gradually divert more and more of commercial bank financing to small farmers and SMEs. The second drawback cannot be removed without reducing the risk and expense of commercial bank lending to such units.

The greater risk of financing SMEs leads to a tough and extensive collateral requirement which they are unable to satisfy. This jeopardizes their growth and expansion in spite of their greater potential for contribution to employment, output and income distribution. The financing goes mainly to the rich who are subjected to a lower collateral requirement and which they are able to satisfy without any difficulty because of their greater wealth. Mishan has rightly indicated, "Given that differences in wealth are substantial, it would be irrational for the lender to be willing to lend as much to the impecunious as to the richer members of society, or to lend the same amounts on the same terms to each."⁸⁸

It may be expected that, within the Islamic risk/reward sharing framework, banks may tend to be attracted to provide greater financing to smaller firms because of their well established greater profitability. Small firms bear a record of better performance in terms of growth in real per capita profits in industrial countries where small entrepreneurs have been encouraged.⁸⁹ Even in developing countries with their extremely difficult environment for SMEs, they have consistently generated, according to a Michigan State University study, more output per unit of capital and are generally more efficient than their large-scale counterparts. Accordingly, the economic profit of smaller firms is consistently larger than that of large firms.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ S. Mihshan, *Cost Benefit Analysis: An Introduction* (New York: Praeger, 1911), p. 205.

⁸⁹ See Alan Friedman, *op. cit.*

⁹⁰ Report of the Select Committee on Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. 4 and Chart 2 on p. 5.

The risk may be reduced by introducing a loan guarantee scheme underwritten partly by the government and partly by the commercial banks.⁹¹ In the case of Islamic banks, the guarantee scheme cannot ensure the repayment of loans with interest as is the case in the conventional system. The scheme would rather cover the 'moral' risk of financing and relieve the bank of the need for collateral from SMEs whose general credentials have been examined and certified by the guarantee scheme. A large number of SMEs would thus be able to get financing from banks without being able to offer the collateral required by the conventional banks. The bank will receive its money back from the guarantee scheme in case of moral failure of the business. In case of market failure and the resultant loss, the bank should share the consequences with the business in proportion to the financing provided by it. The scheme may also be made to include some other noncommercial risks desired to be covered for increasing the availability of funds to SMEs.

This should not create any apprehensions about the viability of the loan guarantee scheme due to heavy loan losses. As indicated above, the scheme will not bear the entire risk of loan losses. It will bear only the moral risk, the business risk being born by both the bank and the borrower. Hence, the scheme will not be as heavily burdened with losses as the conventional schemes are. Moreover, the experience of International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is that credit provided, to the most enterprising of the poor is quickly repaid by them from their higher earnings.⁹² The Report of the Select Committee on Hunger also indicates that the "micro enterprise projects have recorded significant and impressive loan repayment rates."⁹³ Testimony from the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh indicates a constant repayment rate of 99 percent since the bank's

⁹¹ Loan guarantee schemes exist in practically all industrial countries which, having realized the potential of small firms, have initiated a program to encourage them. For some relevant details about such schemes in a number of European countries, see Burns and Dawhurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200.

⁹² See *Economist*, 16 February 1985, p. 15.

⁹³ Report of the Select Committee on Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

inception.⁹⁴ Other SME credit programs have yielded similar results. Therefore, there is no need to be unduly apprehensive about loan losses from such financing.

The additional expense of commercial banks in evaluating and financing SMEs may have to be partly or wholly offset by the government in the interest of realization of the objectives of the shari'ah. Big business has been subsidized by governments for a long time through various ways, including concessionary financing, import licenses, overvalued currencies, and subsidized inputs. To offset this undue advantage received in the past, the governments should now turn the table in favor of small farmers and SMEs. Both the objectives of the shari'ah and the principles of public spending discussed earlier justify a reasonable allocation of government resources for this purpose. Nevertheless, a part of the increased cost should also be recovered from banks and SMEs, at least for the sake of promoting greater responsibility and efficiency. It may be expected that once the credentials of SMEs have been established and the systems has started operating, the costs would tend to go down.

The Islamization of banks and the financing of SMEs may also help bring into their fold the savings of a large proportion of the rural population not yet absorbed by the banking system because of their lack of trust in conventional interest-based banks and the apathy of banks towards them. This will help mobilize the idle savings in the economy and generate a higher noninflationary rate of growth. It may also help reduce the attractiveness of gold as a store of value and release savings for investment.

Perspective Planning

It will not be possible for Muslim countries to actualize the objectives of the shari'ah (*maqāsid al shari'ah*) within the constraint of their scarce resources unless all the ingredients of the Islamic strategy are enabled to play a full and complementary role. The state will have to play a crucial role if the total potential of these ingredients is

⁹⁴ See M. Yusuf, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

to be realized. This it may be able to do more effectively if a long-term perspective plan is prepared. Such a plan would enable the state to take a realistic account of all the available physical and human resources and to establish, in the light of this, a set of well-defined priorities. This will help provide a clear direction to government policies and expenditure programs and to initiate effective measures for setting in motion the required structural and institutional changes.

The plan should not be comprehensive, trying to achieve a balancing of all input and outputs and their allocation among micro-units of the economy. This is neither feasible nor necessary. If a move is made in this direction, it will not only make the economy less flexible but also kill individual initiative and enterprise, thus engulfing the economy in the same kinds of contradictions and insoluble problems that the socialist and dirigiste economies are facing. What is however necessary is to bring into operation the double layer of filter moral values as well as market prices—and the motivating system of the Islamic strategy to ensure the realization of both efficiency and equity in the use of scarce resources.

It needs to be borne in mind that motivation requires not only the inculcation of fundamental Islamic beliefs and values in the population, but also the enforcement of socioeconomic justice, as discussed earlier. Prices, wages and availability of finance must no doubt be normally determined by market realities, but in the existing situation, with wealth and power concentrated in a few hands, they reflect monopolistic or monopsonistic characteristics and are, therefore, not 'just'. They therefore tend to suffocate the drive, initiative, creativity and enterprise of a large proportion of the population. The plan must indicate the policies and institutional reforms necessary for removing the existing injustice.

The goals of the economy must be clearly defined in terms of their priority and the ways of realizing them must also be specified. The establishment of priorities within the framework of the shari'ah will help in analyzing the existing allocation of resources and in pinpointing the direction of change. It would also be necessary to articulate the Islamic consumption, savings and investment values, and

work ethics, and to devise educational programs that would help inculcate these values and ethics in the people. The plan will also have to classify goods and services into the three categories discussed earlier.

In the light of the above, the plan must indicate the structural changes that must be introduced in the economy to realize the objectives of the shari'ah without creating macroeconomic and external imbalances. The plan must also indicate the institutions that must be established or reformed to reduce substantially the inequalities of income and wealth that now exist and to bring about a broad-based ownership of businesses and income-earning assets. The reform of the banking system in the light of Islamic teachings must receive special attention of the planners. The plan should not concentrate on any single measure or rely unduly on controls; rather, it should use a range of policies and incentives for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah. It should, in short, reflect a perceptible change in the development philosophy and strategy. All policies—fiscal, monetary, incomes, import and production—should be formulated within the framework of this perspective plan.

The production, import, distribution and consumption of what fits into the perspective plan should be permitted freely through the operation of the price system without bureaucratic red tape or controls. Controls, including those on the use of foreign exchange for current transactions, should be employed only where, and as long as indispensable. A general policy of letting social and institutional reform take the place of controls will help remove iniquities in material rewards, harness people's own inner drive for development, and, not only help reduce corruption and attain greater efficiency, but also make innovation and adjustment to changing circumstances easier. However, what does not conform with the perspective plan should not be allowed—irrespective of how rich or resourceful a person is.

There should not be changes in policy from quarter to quarter or year to year because the resource perspective, needs and goals of a country do not change frequently. Frequent tinkering with policies generates uncertainties and enriches mainly those having 'insiders'

knowledge. But errors which have been made in the preparation of the perspective plan should be rectified with an open mind and without undue delay. Since the resource endowment of different Muslim countries may be different, the same perspective plan may not be suitable for all even though the objectives of the shari'ah may be essentially the same for all.

Conclusion

It may thus be concluded that economic development with socioeconomic justice, which Islam sanctifies, cannot be attained within the constraint of the resource endowment of Muslim countries unless there is a revolutionary change in priorities and a motivating mechanism to induce people to change their work, consumption, saving and investment behavior in keeping with these priorities. The secularist, value-neutral and this-worldly perspective of both capitalism and socialism, in which Muslim countries are now operating, cannot help in either establishing the right priorities or in motivating the people to restructure their claims on resources in accordance with these priorities. When the capitalist and socialist societies have failed to achieve their professed socioeconomic goals in spite of decades of rapid development and their vast resources, they cannot serve as models for Muslim countries with their scarcer resources.

What the Muslim countries need to do is to increase the allocation of resources for programs that would help actualize the objectives of the shari'ah. However, this will enlarge the claims on resources and aggravate the macroeconomic and external imbalances in other areas. The major reduction in claims on resources should come through cuts in public as well as private wasteful or unnecessary spending. This cannot be accomplished in a vacuum; it requires a filter mechanism to distinguish the 'essential' from the 'inessential' and the 'equitable' from the 'inequitable' and an effective motivating system that would induce the people, particularly the rich to forgo their consumption of the inessential to conserve resources for capital formation and general need fulfillment. Prices alone cannot provide

such a filter mechanism or motivation in a secularist society with substantial inequalities of wealth and power. They provide an edge to the wealthy and the powerful and need-fulfillment suffers.

Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom, reflected in the IMF corrective programs, assumes that liberalisation of the economy and the prevalence of market-determined prices (including devaluation of the currency) will solve the problems. They will not. Higher prices do not create any significant dent in the demand of the rich; they continue to buy what they want. There is nothing to motivate them to do otherwise; therefore, the poor get more squeezed. This accentuates socioeconomic injustice and leads to social unrest and political instability. Collectivisation does not help either, because it kills incentive and efficiency, does not leave any leeway for consumer choice even in the area of needs, and concentrates power and decision making in the hands of a few. Such a concentration of power would be dangerous.

Therefore, Islam has moved away from both systems to ensure the realization of efficiency as well as equity. While it has recognized the contribution that profit motive, private property and the decentralized decision-making process of a market economy can make to efficiency, it has introduced other important ingredients in its economic system to ensure the actualization of justice. Hence, given the macroeconomic and external imbalances along with substantial iniquities and sociopolitical tensions prevailing in Muslim countries, the only feasible alternative they are left with is to Islamize their economies. This will not only help reduce their imbalances but also make a perceptible contribution toward social harmony through actualization of the objectives of the shari'ah. The concept of accountability before God will serve as a strong motivating force for keeping self-interest within the limits of social welfare, and, along with the filter mechanism of values and realistic prices, bring about the quantity and quality of reduction in claims that the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah requires. Such a reduction in unnecessary claims on resources will help lower the prices of all need-related uses of resources which the sole reliance on the price system does

not. Thus, by giving a moral complexion to resource use in both public and private sectors, Islamization will humanize the market forces and improve and strengthen their role in the economy.

The elimination of a substantial part of total claims will release resources for investment, exports and need fulfillment. The establishment of a need-based production system, along with equitable material rewards, will create a favorable climate for greater efficiency, increased supply of need-satisfying goods and services, and lower prices. Land reform and the proliferation of SMEs along with a total restructuring of the conventional financial system in the light of Islamic teachings, should help expand self-employment opportunities, reduce poverty and lower the concentration of wealth and power. Need fulfillment and equitable distribution will tend to have the effect of harnessing the energies and creativity of a greater part of the population for accelerated development. The reduction in inflationary pressures and the containment of the continuing depreciation in exchange rates should also make a positive contribution to growth and wellbeing. Nevertheless, the interest of the poor should be attended to even further, not through a general subsidy, but rather through organized and intensified relief payments by the government and social organizations out of zakah, voluntary donations, and maximum possible budgetary appropriations.

The Muslim governments have unfortunately used Islam so far only as a slogan, failing to realize the positive contribution it can make towards the betterment of their societies and economies and to their own survival. Professor Khurshid Ahmad has rightly indicated that "there is no evidence to conclude that, generally speaking, the policy makers derived any inspiration worth the name from Islam and tried to translate its economic ideals into development policies."⁹⁵ Even with a change in attitudes and policies the task of

⁹⁵ K. Ahmad, "Economic Development in an Islamic Framework," in K. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 173. According to Dr. Amin, even the motive for rapid economic development is weak. He says, "Rather than showing a general desire for rapid economic development Arab governments show a surprising weak will to achieve it.... A much more powerful motive than economic development is the

adjustment and reconstruction is bound to be difficult and time consuming. The sooner the policy makers read the signs of the times, the better it will be for them and the Ummah. Islamization should not, however, be conceived as an antidote to all the problems of Muslim countries. Some of the problems created by centuries of social and moral degeneration misguided domestic policies and painful external shocks are bound to persist for a long time.

motive to remain in power.” (Galal A. Amin, *The Modernization of Poverty*, vol. VIII of the *Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980), p. 108.

Comments on “Economic Development in Muslim Countries: A Strategy for Development in the Light of Islamic Teachings”*

A. El Najjar

Chapra’s paper is a long one with an extensive list of references. The paper covers the following themes: The failure of ‘imported’ development strategies in Muslim countries; and, an Islamic development strategy covering—the affect of the human factor, reducing wealth ownership concentration, and restructuring the economy.

I support the author’s conclusion that Islam is not responsible for the prevailing underdevelopment in Muslim countries (writers prejudiced against Islamic claim that it is the cause) because Islam has not been actualized in them. As we know, Islam is a state and a religion, a faith and a system of jurisprudence. This world is tied to the Hereafter and interest in this world only is not the correct Muslim attitude. Allah says: “But seek the abode of the Hereafter in that which Allah hath given thee and neglect not thy portion of the world.” And He says:

Yet if the people of those communities had but believed and been conscious of Us, We would indeed have opened up for them blessings out of heaven and earth; but they gave the lie to the truth—and so we took them to task through what they had been doing.

Chapra considers the failure of development policies in Islamic countries as a natural result of ‘adopted’ development strategies, whether capitalist or socialist. Being imported, they simply do not suit the social and economic climate prevailing in Muslim countries. He then offers a scheme of development policies determined by the *maqāsid* (objectives) of the shari‘ah.

Though a discussion of development strategies requires detailed exposition, attributing past failures solely to the fact that they were imported needs reexamination. I believe that the shari‘ah makes it a duty on a Muslim to explore what is latent in the human soul. Man is

* Translated from Arabic by the editor.

free to adapt modern forms of organization, explore the creative potential of economics and other fields of knowledge and arts. There is no reason why one should not adopt science and technology. Islam urges its followers to use and adopt ideas that do not contradict its basic teachings. It is well-known that wisdom is the lost property of the Muslim: He recovers it wheresoever he finds it. This is the position of the various schools of interpretation and opinions in fiqh. Muslims may find themselves facing new problems where there is no ready solution. The solution to these problems requires ijthihad within the limits of available texts and sources of the shari'ah.

In his paper, Chapra stresses the concepts of equity and efficiency. He sees that Islam is occupied with these concepts. No doubt, modern economic systems are also occupied with such concepts. As is well-known, modern economics is the science of the efficient use of available economic resources. The problem, then, is finding the way to ensure efficiency and equity in an Islamic economic system.

The paper considers the core problem of modern economic theory to be scarcity of resources. In fact, scarcity is the product of human action, and nature should not be blamed. Natural resources are sufficient, but suffer from under-utilization or mis-utilization or both. This phenomenon creates the situation in which there is scarcity and hunger for the majority and abundance and over consumption for the minority. Unlike modern economics, Islam is not occupied only with the material aspects of the economic problem because the spiritual development of Muslims is of central importance. Spiritual development influences a Muslim's behavior, making him satisfied with whatever material goods he consumes, profoundly effecting the economic problem.

To actualize the objectives of the shari'ah in the light of available resources, Chapra considers it necessary to do the following: encourage the movement of the human factor to centers of development to ascertain its effective contribution in the development efforts; reduce wealth and income concentration using zakah and inheritance laws in the shari'ah; reconsider investment policies so that investment con-

tributes to needs fulfilment, creation of job opportunities, and increased exports. He also suggests the following:

- ♦ The creation of incentives through a just wage system that would satisfy and fulfill the needs of the workers, besides realizing the values in the shari‘ah.
- ♦ The development of individual abilities to improve on efficiency and equity by introducing a program of training and education for the labor force.

All these ideas intimated by the author are of a general nature. He does not give us a clue as to how they would be implemented in the prevailing political conditions in the Muslim countries. The nature of his suggestions, as admitted by the author, do not differ from what is being recommended by secular economic theories for ameliorating the conditions in developing countries.

The actualization of the objectives of the shari‘ah require that the shari‘ah be applied to all aspects of the Muslims’ lives. What the paper suggests is that an Islamic development strategy include changes in the behavior and in the system of values of an Muslim society. These changes cannot be achieved except through faith in God and the implementation of the rule of God on private citizens, the ruler, and the society as a whole.

Both Muslim individuals and Muslim rulers are responsible for actualization of Islamic values. Allah says in the Qur’an: “Allah will not change the fate of a people, until they change what is in themselves” (13:11).

The author’s call for the restructuring of economies in the Muslim countries is founded on his assumption that the standard of living in these countries is an imitation of Western standards. He points to corruption as an important obstacle to the efficient use of available resources. I support this conclusion and agree that Muslim countries will not efficiently use their resources as long as they are dependent upon the Western system, whether it be capitalist or socialist. The serious problem facing Muslim countries is how to escape dependency or at least moderate and temper its effects.

Muslim countries should adopt a plan of development that takes into account the values and traditions of the Islamic society.

The author takes issue with military expenditures and considers them to be constraints on development efforts, especially when there is no imminent threat of military conflict. An increase in military expenditures does help to assure the security of a government. However, real security comes from the internal strength of a society, its strong moral values, its social justice, and its equality of opportunities. Though we are in general agreement, I think that the threat of war is real and may be imposed on Muslim countries; therefore, governments find themselves obliged to increase military expenditures.

The first step in the Islamic strategy is to implement the following two statements from the Qur'an: "So let them worship the Lord of this house, who hath fed them against hunger, and hath made them safe from fear." And "Hence, make ready against them whatever force and war mounts you are able to muster." (8:60) With the development of modern industries, new techniques are being discovered that make it easier for the Muslims to feed and defend themselves.

Chapra believes that subsidies are not necessary and are misused. He prefers to use zakah to help the poor and the needy through social organization and social benevolence. He also discusses the tax systems in the Muslim countries, and shows the narrowness of the tax base, the high rates of taxes, and the extent of tax evasion.

The author enumerates the obstacles to investment, such as the absence of a suitable economic environment, political unrest, and the lack of democracy, etc. Although views may differ when such important matters are exposed, it should be noted that not only Muslim countries manifest these weaknesses. To start with, an Islamic strategy for development in Muslim countries is a strategy for Muslims who are happy to actualize the shari'ah. The question remains then, How do we adopt an Islamic strategy under the prevailing conditions in Islamic countries?

The author calls for the encouragement of foreign capital to be welcomed in Muslim countries and emphasizes the positive contri-

bution of foreign capital in transferring technology, know-how and badly needed administrative skills. However, he does not discuss the negative aspects of foreign capital. He recommends the dismantling of exchange-rate controls and facilitating capital repatriation and profits to the investing countries, without the effects of this on the recipient country. There is also a suggestion of using interest rates in borrowing if the foreign investment policy is not successful. The stress put on foreign sources of capital obliged the author to neglect the internal sources of finance and the mobilization of saving to supply the needed capital. One ought not forget that the reputation of foreign capital has been good in developing countries. Dependency on foreign capital and its ramifications is not discussed by the author.

Chapra examines the problems facing the agricultural sector in Muslim countries. The poor infrastructure—the lack of electricity, roads, etc.—the scarcity of financial support, and the poor education of the farmers, are only some of the problems. The absence of marketing techniques in small enterprises makes the problem even worst. The paper describes problems that are general to all Muslim countries, but in fact Muslim countries face different types of problems. Also, the more serious problem of food production is not examined. Food production is one aspect of the agricultural section that has a very high priority, whether on the national level or on the regional level. The paper does not prioritize items within the development strategy.

The author points to the financial system, highlighting the failure of commercial banks to supply the necessary finance to small enterprises and small farms. An Islamic banking system could solve the problem of small enterprises via the *muḍārabah* (partnership between one who has capital and one who has expertise) and *mushārah* (joint venture, partnership in which the participants contribute both capital and expertise) system.

The role of government is vital in the Islamic development strategy. Planning is done in government ministries—implementation of the plan, choice of priorities, and fixing targets is a government

responsibility. The government also manages the economy through budget, monetary, and fiscal policies.

Chapra analyzes in detail the nature of the plan for actualization of the objectives of the shari'ah. He analyzes an indicative plan that works through market prices.

The desires of man are numerous and it is expected that he strive to satisfy them. Human needs fulfilment leads to clarity of thought, security, stability, and allows for the development of spiritual values and moral standards. Therefore, Islam does not put any obstacle in the way of achieving material progress. Rather, Islam urges Muslims to work hard and strive to reach the highest possible standard of living. Islam asks the Muslim society to secure good living conditions for its members, while at the same time not forgetting that life has other important needs, spiritual and moral, which bring a balanced and peaceful life. A good Muslim has always one eye on earthly matters and one eye on heavenly matters. Knowledge raises him while ignorance pulls him back. Making efforts to perform good works in this world is rewarded in the Hereafter. Allah says in the Qur'an (20:123-126):

. . . But if there come unto you from Me a guidance, then whoso followeth My guidance, he will not go astray nor come to grief;

But he who turneth away from remembrance of Me, his will be a narrow life, and I shall bring him blind to the assembly on the day of resurrection.

He will say: "My Lord! Wherefore hast Thou gathered me (hither) blind when I was wont to see?"

He will say: "So (it must be). Our revelations came unto thee but thou didst forget them, In like manner thou are forgotten this day."

Stabilization and Growth in an Open Islamic Economy*

Abbas Mirakhor and Iqbal Zaidi

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Abstract

Islam proposes the replacement of an interest-based financial system with one which operates on the basis of risk and profit sharing. Using a general equilibrium model, the paper investigates some open-economy implications of adopting Islamic banking for economic growth and stabilization. It analyzes the long-run effects of Islamic banking on international capital flows and on the economy's capacity to adjust to disturbances. It concludes that monetary policy can be used effectively for stabilization purposes and that disturbances to asset positions are absorbed efficiently in an Islamic financial system.

Summary

A number of studies have shown that monetary policy can be used to stabilize an economy that adopts an Islamic financial system. Until now this conclusion has been based on a closed-economy model. This paper expands and extends the consideration of stabilization and growth questions to an open economy whose banking system operates on the basis of risk and profit sharing.

A simple general equilibrium model is developed to illustrate how and through what channels monetary policy alters rates of return on financial and real assets, thereby affecting investment, output, and the balance of payments. This exercise shows that although the authorities lose the ability to set directly financial rates of return, and monetary policy is constrained both by substitution possibilities among domestic assets and by offsetting international capital flows, the authorities can alter the rate of return on physical capital, thereby affecting investment and output.

The paper also investigates the long-run implications of adopting Islamic banking for international capital flows, and sheds some light on the capacity of an Islamic economy to adjust to certain macroeconomic disturbances. It concludes that, to the extent that borrowed external resources (through profit-and-risk-sharing models) are channelled into productive investments, such investments can be expected to generate a stream of returns at least sufficient to repay the foreign loans. Furthermore, an Islamic financial system has the capacity for better adjustment to macroeconomic disturbances that require the shifting of resources from the traded to the nontraded sector than does the conventional interest-based system.

I. Introduction

There has been a great deal of interest in recent years in the analysis of an Islamic economy. The purpose of this paper is to integrate and to expand upon the results of certain approaches which have been adopted to study the effects of stabilization policies in an Islamic economy. The possibility that monetary policy could be used to stabilize such an economy, characterized specifically by the strict prohibition against charging interest, has been demonstrated by Khan and Mirakhor (1987).¹ Employing a short-run macroeconomic model of a closed economy, they show that, in an Islamic economy, there is apparently no fundamental change in the way monetary policy affects economic variables. The authorities can achieve the same results through controlling the supply of profit-based bank lending as they can through varying the total money supply.² The present paper extends the analysis to an open economy. This endeavour, besides being of interest in itself, serves to clarify the relationship between the financial and real sectors in an open Islamic economy. More specifically, the analysis pinpoints the principal channels through which monetary policy alters rates of return on financial and real assets, thereby affecting investment spending, output, and the balance of payments.

The paper has the following plan. In the Section II, certain institutional and accounting features of an Islamic banking system are discussed. The intention is to demonstrate the similarities, as well as the differences between interest-based banking and Islamic banking. Section III discusses the general equilibrium approach to monetary theory and the 'q' theory of investment developed by Tobin and Brainard. The purpose is to systematically analyse, by way of intro-

¹ See also Mohsin Khan, "Principles of Monetary Theory and Policy in an Islamic Framework," paper presented at the International Institute of Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan, September 1987.

² In most of the highly-developed countries in fact such rates are set indirectly through central bank actions, e.g., open market operations, reserve requirement changes, variations in discount rates, etc.

duction, the implications of the general equilibrium model, both in explaining the effectiveness of monetary policy when financial intermediaries are uncontrolled, and in providing a foundation for the analysis of monetary policy in an open economy without interest. Section IV presents a simple general equilibrium model for an open Islamic economy. The model is designed to illustrate how changes in government holdings of bank equities affect the various rates of return, and how the possibility of substitution amongst assets affects the outcome of monetary policy. Section V concentrates on the relationship, in an Islamic economy, between total investment and saving on the one hand and the current account deficit on the other. The purpose of this section is to shed some light on the issues concerning the sustainable level of external borrowing and whether adoption of an Islamic banking system will tend to increase or reduce the current account deficit. Finally, Section VI contains some concluding remarks.

At the risk of oversimplifying the analysis contained in this paper the main results that emerge can be summarized as follows. Since Islamic banking essentially transforms banking from an interest-based system to one that relies on profit and loss sharing, it becomes an equity-based system and, in the process, the authorities lose the ability to set directly financial rates of return. Although monetary policy is constrained by both substitution possibilities among domestic assets and by offsetting international capital flows, the authorities can alter the rate of return on physical capital, thereby affecting investment and output. Furthermore, it will be argued that replacing an interest-based system with Islamic banking will not necessarily lead to a reduction in savings and investment. If both savings and investment should increase, then the effect on the current account position is ambiguous. But even if the current account deficit is increased because of a larger increase in investment, it can be shown that given that certain conditions are met, the ensuing growth of output would make it feasible ultimately to close the gap between domestic saving and investment. The Islamic financial system also

has advantages over the conventional interest-based system in terms of adjustment to certain types of macroeconomic disturbances.³

II. Islamic Financial System

In an Islamic financial system, banks perform the same essential functions as they do in the conventional banking system but are constrained to carry out their transactions in accordance with the rules of Islamic law, the shari'ah. They act as administrators of the economy's payment system and as financial intermediaries. The need for them in the Islamic system arises for the same reason as that in the conventional system, which is to satisfy simultaneously the portfolio preferences of two types of individuals or firms. On one side are the deficit financial units who wish to expand their holdings of real assets behind the limits of their net worth. On the other side are the surplus units, who wish to hold part of their net worth in liquid assets with small risk of default. The reasons a bank can accomplish these transformations are that it possesses administrative economy and expertise in negotiating, accounting, appraising, and collecting; it reduces risk by pooling of independent risks, with respect both to returns on assets and to deposit withdrawal; and government regulations and provisions are designed to assure their solvency and liquidity. Banks exploit the imperfections in the financial markets, including *inter alia*, imperfect divisibility of financial claims, and transaction costs of search in the acquisition and diversification of these claims by the surplus and deficit units. Just as their counterparts do in the conventional system, banks in the Islamic system can be expected to exhibit economies of scale in monitoring financial transactions. Because of these economies of scale and the banks specialized expertise, banks possess the ability to minimize the cost of transactions that convert current income optimal consumption and investment bundles. Banks alter yield relationships between surplus and deficit units, and provide lower costs to the deficit units and higher

³ See also Khan (1986) for similar conclusion derived from the analysis of a closed-economy model.

returns to the surplus units than would be possible with direct finance. As in interest-based banking, Islamic banking transforms the liabilities of firms into a variety of obligations to suit the tastes and circumstances of the surplus units. Their liabilities consist of shares, which serve as the medium of exchange; and their assets consist mainly of primary financial securities in the capital market.

In disallowing interest but permitting profits, the shari‘ah has developed two specific forms of business arrangements as means of earning profits without resorting to interest charges, namely, *muḍārabah* (commenda) and *mushārahah* (partnership).⁴ In the case of *muḍārabah*, one party provides the necessary financial capital and the other party provides the human capital that is needed for the economic activity to be undertaken. *Mushārahah* is a form of business arrangement in which a number of partners pool their financial capital to undertake a particular activity within an enterprise—either whole-firm or project-specific oriented. *Muḍārabah* is traditionally applied to commercial activities of short duration, whereas *mushārahah* is applicable to production or commercial activities of long duration.

The expectation is that in the Islamic system, projects would be selected for funding through partnerships primarily on the basis of their expected profitability. This factor, together with the predominance of equity markets and the absence of debt markets, has led Muslim scholars to conclude that, potentially, in an Islamic system, there would be a greater number and variety of investment projects that would be seeking financing—a more cautious, selective, and perhaps more efficient project selection by the savers and investors—and a greater involvement by the public investment and entrepreneurial activities, particularly as private equity markets develop, than in the conventional fixed-interest-based system. In the Islamic profit-sharing arrangement, while the profit is shared on the basis of a predetermined share parameter between the agent-entrepreneur and the financial-capital owner, the loss is only borne by the owners of

⁴ See Khan and Mirakhor (1987) for other forms of Islamic transactions.

the funds and not the entrepreneur. This affords human capital, which is representative of present work and effort, a status on par with financial capital, which is representative of monetized past labor and work. In this respect, the owner of financial capital risks the loss of his funds, whereas the agent-entrepreneur is recognized as risking his time, effort, and labor.

The efforts of Muslim scholars and economists in developing models of banking within the framework of Islamic requirements has led to a variety of proposals that can be categorized into two principal models. The first model, relying on the concept of profit-sharing, integrates the asset and liability sides of the financial sector on the basis of a principle called 'two-tier *mudārabah*'.⁵ This model envisages depositors entering into a contract with a banking firm to share the profits accruing to the bank. The bank, on its asset side, enters into another contract with an agent-entrepreneur, who is searching for investable funds and agrees to share his profit with the bank in accordance with a predetermined percentage that is stipulated in the contract. The bank's earnings from all its activities are pooled and then shared with its depositors and shareholders according to the terms of their contract. The profits earned by the depositors are a percentage of the total banking profits. According to this model, the banks are allowed to accept demand deposits that would not earn profits and instead may be subjected to a service charge. This model requires that demand deposits must be paid to the depositors on demand, and has no specific reserve requirement.

The second model divides the liability side of the bank balance sheet into two windows, one for demand deposits, which serve as transaction balances and the other for investment balances.⁶ The choice of which window to use is left to the depositors. This model stipulates a 100 percent reserve requirement for the demand deposits but no reserve requirement for investment balances. Proponents of this model argue that demand deposits are placed as *amānah* (safe-

⁵ Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987).

⁶ Khan (1986).

keeping) and must be backed by 100 percent reserve, because these balances belong to the depositors and do not carry with them the right for the bank to use them as the basis for lending and money creation through fractional reserves. Money deposited in investment accounts, on the other hand, is placed with the depositor's full knowledge that the deposit will be invested in riskbearing projects, therefore no guarantee is justified. In this model, too, the bank may charge a service fee for providing safekeeping services.

III. Monetary Policy, Investment And the Balance of Payments

The effectiveness of using monetary policy to influence macroeconomic conditions is a controversial and widely debated topic. On the one hand, some economists contend that if domestic labor and product markets respond slowly to shifts in the economic environment, giving rise to disequilibrium situations in which supply and demand are not always equal, there is scope for monetary policy to stabilize the economy. On the other hand, other economists argue that a counter cyclical monetary policy cannot be effective in influencing employment and output, based on models in which economic agents are rational and do not make systematic errors in anticipating the behavior of the monetary authorities. A key issue in this debate is whether prices are free to adjust rapidly so that markets clear continuously as economic participants respond to whatever changes in monetary policies they come to anticipate.

In addition to focusing on the effectiveness of monetary policy in the context of rational expectations, developments in monetary theory have also focused on the issue of international capital mobility and its implications for active monetary policy. The effectiveness of monetary policy depends crucially on whether money 'spills out' directly and rapidly through the capital account of the balance of payments, and on the strength of the effects on the current account from changes in both the relative price of traded and nontraded goods and aggregate domestic demand.

In the analysis of the open-economy aspects of monetary policy, exchange rates and the balance of payments are sometimes discussed as a separate compartment of monetary policy. 'International' financial policy is taken to be concerned with capital flows in the balance of payments, with official intervention in exchange markets, with holdings by the government of international reserve assets, and with the choice between a fixed- or flexible-exchange rate regime. 'Domestic' monetary policy is considered independently of international complications and is taken to be concerned with, for example, interest rate changes, open-market operations, and the supply of commercial bank reserve. However, as the monetary approach to the balance of payments has emphasized, there is no valid way to segregate the 'external' and 'domestic' aspects of national monetary policy for separate analysis.

The monetary approach to the balance of payments (MABP) uses the money-supply process and the money-demand function as the central theoretical relationships around which to organize the analysis of the balance of payments.⁷ In the framework of the monetary approach, the balance of payments position of a country is considered to be a reflection of decisions by the residents to accumulate or to run down their stocks of money balances. For a small country, in which income is exogenous, which has prices given from abroad, and which adheres to a fixed exchange rate, the money supply is endogenous and increases in the domestic supply of money beyond the level demanded will leak out in the balance of payments. In essence, MABP argues that international money flows are a consequence of stock disequilibria differences between desired and actual stocks of international money and, as such, are inherently transitory and self-correcting. A nonzero official settlements balance allows the money stock to change until the demand for and supply of money are equalized and when the money market is in equilibrium, the official settlements balance returns to zero.

⁷ Two useful anthologies of the monetary approach to the balance of payments are Frenkel and Johnson (1976) and the International Monetary Fund (1977).

Another important subject that has been emphasized in recent years in macroeconomic theory has been the variation in the pace of capital accumulation and the sensitivity of investment to rates of return in financial markets. Tobin (1969), Tobin and Brainard (1968, 1977), and others, have attributed much of this variation in investment to changes in the relative attraction for wealth-owners to hold physical capital, on the one hand, and money or obligations to pay money, on the other. In this approach, monetary assets are part of a list of assets and the commercial banking system is one sector, but not the only one, whose balance sheet behavior must be specified. The Tobin-Brainard model of the economy's capital account specifies the assets (and liabilities) that appear in portfolios and balance sheets, the factors that determine the demands and supplies of the various assets, and the conditions under which asset prices and rates of return clear these interrelated markets. Equilibrium in these models is an equilibrium of stock and balance sheets, that is, a situation in which both the private sector and the financial institutions are content with their portfolios of assets and liabilities, and the demand to hold each assets is equal to the stock supply. Proponents of this general equilibrium approach to monetary theory argue that the monetary operations of a central bank can bring about changes in the 'q' ratio—the ratio of the market value of firms to the replacement cost of their physical capital—and that this ratio is the principal link between the financial and real sectors of the economy.

A change in the quantity of money disturbs asset market equilibrium and sets off a chain of portfolio substitutions. Currency, deposits in banks and other financial intermediaries, equities, etc., are important substitutes for each other and other assets in the portfolios of investors. The central bank operates in the first instance on the rate of return of some financial instrument that it holds in its portfolio by buying or selling it in the market. The monetary operations are then transmitted to equity yields as portfolio substitutions are affected by the current levels of the rates of return and expectations of their future paths. Thus, changes in the stock of money alter 'q' and thereby alter private investment expenditures, real output, and prices. The

rate of investment is a positive function of 'q,' and an increase in the money stock increases 'q'. In a competitive economy with constant returns to scale, the equilibrium value of 'q' sustains capital replacement and expansion at the natural growth rate of the economy. If there are no adjustment costs, the firm will continue to increase or decrease the capital stock until 'q' is equal to unity. In the short-run, disturbances, expectations, and policy changes cause movements in 'q,' which in turn changes incentives for real investment.

Tobin and Brainard (1963) address the question whether the existence of uncontrolled financial intermediaries diminishes the effectiveness of monetary control. Their method is to set up models of general equilibrium in financial and capital markets and to trace, in these models, the effects of monetary controls when structural changes, such as abolishing ceilings on rates which commercial banks pay on deposits, occur. Tobin and Brainard note that introducing nonbank financial intermediaries, uncontrolled or controlled, into a system in which banks are under effective monetary control presents essentially the same issues as introducing commercial banks as an intermediary, controlled or uncontrolled, into a system in which the government's control is the supply of its own currency. Their analysis, therefore, focuses on the effects of financial intermediation by banks, the consequences of leaving their operations unregulated, and the effects of regulating them in various ways. In their model, a monetary action is considered expansionary if it lowers the rate of return on the ownership of real capital that the community requires to induce it to hold a given stock of capital, and deflationary if it raises that rate of return. In equilibrium, this rate of return equals the expected marginal productivity of the capital stock, which in turn depends on the size of the capital stock relative to expected levels of output. If a monetary action lowers the rate of return on capital at which owners of wealth are content to absorb the given stock of capital into their portfolios or balance sheets along with other assets and liabilities, then it becomes easier for the economy to accumulate capital.

The Tobin-Brainard analysis shows that the presence of an uncontrolled financial intermediary does not imply the ineffectiveness of monetary policy to alter the required rate of return on physical capital. Although a reduction in the supply of currency will raise the financial intermediary's rates, the substitution of the intermediary's liabilities for currency will not offset the monetary contraction completely so long as the intermediary's liabilities are an imperfect substitute for currency. Substitutions of this kind imply that a given change in the supply of currency and bank reserves would have more effect on the economy if such substitutions were prevented, but this does not imply a one-for-one offset to enforced reductions in the supply of controlled monetary assets.

Whether it is important that monetary controls be more effective in this sense is another question. . . . When a given remedial effect can be achieved either by a small dose of strong medicine or a large dose of weak medicine, it is not obvious that the small dose is preferable. Increasing the responsiveness of the system to instruments of control may also increase its sensitivity to random exogenous shocks. Furthermore, extension of controls over financial intermediaries and markets involves considerations beyond those of economic stabilization; it raises also questions of equity, allocative efficiency, and the scope of governmental authority.⁸

IV. A Model of Monetary Policy In an Open Islamic Economy

The key insights from the general equilibrium approach to monetary theory and the 'q' theory of investment, as they bear on the subject of Islamic banking, are that the principal way in which monetary policy affects aggregate demand is by changing the valuations of physical assets relative to their replacement costs, and that monetary policy can accomplish such changes even in the presence of uncontrolled financial intermediaries. The transformation of banking from an

⁸ Tobin and Brainard (1963).

interest-based system to one that relies on profit and loss sharing makes an Islamic banking system essentially an equity-based system. The authorities cannot set directly financial rates of return, so the financial system is more market oriented in an Islamic economy than in an economy with fixed-interest rates. In this respect, the Tobin-Brainard models, particularly the model for analyzing the effect of an uncontrolled financial intermediary on the effectiveness of monetary control, are relevant. In this section, we present a variant of the Tobin-Brainard model for the purpose of studying monetary policy in an open Islamic economy. As the model is for an open economy, monetary policy is constrained by substitution possibilities among domestic assets and by offsetting international capital flows. The model below bears a close resemblance to models developed by Branson (1976, 1979), Miller (1973), and Tobin and de Macedo (1980). The purpose is to develop the simplest possible fundamental model which yields the basic behavior of the general equilibrium approach to monetary theory in an open Islamic economy, particularly, the movements in the rate of return on physical capital and offsetting international capital flows following shifts in monetary policy.

The model consists of the following assumptions. There are three financial assets and one real asset, and the set of excess demand equations for these assets determines the rates on the assets, given the values of the various exogenous variables. Table 1 gives definitions of the symbols used. The domestic private sector allocates its wealth between currency, bank deposits, bank equities, and physical capital. The banking sector holds currency, bank equities, and loans. The foreign sector holds deposits in the domestic banking sector and also holds equity capital.

The model represented by equations (1) through (7) is presented in Table 2. The first four equations are the excess demand equations for bank equity, bank loans, physical capital, and currency, respectively. The assets-holders demand functions for the four imperfectly substitutable assets are functions of the rates of return that are relevant for the particular sector. It is assumed that the assets are all gross

Table 1
Symbols Used

Symbol	Definition
D	Bank's liabilities to domestic residents (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
D*	Bank's liabilities to foreign sector (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
H	Supply of bank equities (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
G	Government holdings of bank equities (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
K	Physical capital (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
C	Currency (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
c	Required reserve ratio for banks
ê	The rate of change of the exchange rate, where the exchange rate is expressed as the domestic currency price of a unit of foreign currency
rd	Rate on bank deposits
rl	Rate on bank loans
rh	Rate on bank equities
rk	Return on physical capital
rf	Return on foreign assets

substitutes in the portfolios of each sector, which implies that a rise in the rate on any asset will lead to substitution into that asset out of other assets in the portfolio. In other words, the partial derivative of the asset demand function with respect to the own rate is positive, while with respect to an alternative rate, negative or zero. Equation (5) describes the private sector's demand function for bank deposits, whereas equation (6) is the foreign sector's demand for domestic bank deposits. Equation (7) describes the relationship between the bank loan rate and the deposit rate.

Table 2
Islamic Financial System Model

Symbol Number	Equation
(1)	$b^h(rh,rl)(1-c)(D+D^*) + p^h(rh,rd,rk) + G-H=0$
(2)	$b^l(rh,rl)(1-c)(D + D^*)-p^l(rk,rl) = 0$
(3)	$p^k(rh,rd,rk,rl) + f^k(rk-rf-e)-K = 0; \quad f^k > 0$
(4)	$cb^d(rh,rd) + p^c(rh,rd,rk)-C = 0$
(5)	$D = p^d(rh,rd,rk)$
(6)	$D^* = f^d(rd-rf-ê); \quad f^d > 0$
(7)	$rd = r(rl); \quad r > 0$

Commercial banks offer investment deposits to the private sector, D , and to the foreign sector, D^* , which are not guaranteed by the banks and do not yield a predetermined rate of return. The banks are assumed to pay depositors a rate of return, rd , that is based on profits from their operations, as postulated in equation (7). These deposits are shared between the depositors and the banks in mutually agreed-upon proportions determined prior to the transaction, so that, should the banks incur losses, the rate of return to the depositor would be negative and the nominal value of the deposits would be reduced accordingly.⁹ Unlike the commercial banks in the interest-based banking system, commercial banks in the Islamic system cannot borrow from the central bank through the customary mechanism of rediscounting at a given official discount rate. It is assumed that banks can borrow from the central bank only on an equity-participation basis, and the central bank purchases equity in the banks when it wishes to expand reserves in the system, and vice-versa. Therefore, an additional source of funds for the commercial banks is the rate of equity shares to the central bank, and the public also participates in this market. As in the case of investment deposits, the rate of return on equity shares, rh , depends on the overall profit position of banks, so that in contrast to the official discount rate, it is not determined directly by the central bank.

On the lending side, banks engage in only risk-return sharing *muḍārabah* arrangements with the private sector. *Muḍārabah* financing in this case is assumed to subsume all other types of similar arrangements, such as *mushārah* financing. As in the case of investment deposits, the profits earned from the projects financed by the banks are shared between the bank and the entrepreneur on a pre-arranged basis specified in the contract between the two before the financing is provided. Banks are also required to hold a certain proportion, c , of their liabilities to the private and foreign sectors in the form of reserves with the central bank.

⁹ See Khan and Mirakhor (1987).

The foreign sector holds investment deposits in the banking system and physical capital. The foreign demand for investment deposits, f^d , is a function of the rate of return on investment deposits, rd , less foreign or world interest rate, rf , and the expected depreciation of the domestic currency, \hat{e} . The derivative of f^d , is positive.

The central bank's liabilities consist of reserves of commercial banks and currency held by the public. As mentioned earlier, the central bank holds equity shares of commercial banks, and the rate of return on these is market determined. The supply of reserves is changed by the central bank through variations in its stock of bank equity shares, dG , which in turn alters the cost of borrowing for the banks.

The four excess demand equations for the assets are constrained by the balance sheet, so they contain three independent equations determining rh , rl , and rk , for given values of the exogenous variables. Dropping equation (4) and substituting for D , D^* and rd , leaves three equations to determine the three endogenous rates of return. To derive a result for the direction of movement of one of the rates, we can take the total differentials of the three excess demand equations. Total differential of equations (1) through (3), after suitable substitution, yields equation (8), which determines drh , drl and drk as functions of changes in G , c , H , K , rf , and \hat{e} .

$$(8) \quad AdY + BdX = 0 \text{ or } AdY = -BdX$$

with

$$dy = \begin{bmatrix} drh \\ drs \\ drk \end{bmatrix} \quad dx = \begin{bmatrix} dg \\ dc \\ dh \\ dk \\ drf \\ d\hat{e} \end{bmatrix}$$

and the coefficient of the matrices A and $-B$ are given in the Appendix. The solution is

$$(9) \quad dY = -A^{-1}BdX.$$

The matrix A , with elements a_{ij} , is a matrix of partial derivatives of the excess demand functions with respect to the endogenous rates of

return, and B is defined analogously with respect to the exogenous variables. The assumption of gross substitutability ensures the following:

- (i) $a_{ii} > 0$ for all i ;
- (ii) $a_{ij} < 0$ for all i, j and $i \neq j$;
- (iii) $a_{ij} = 0$ for all j ; and
- (iv) $\det A > 0$.

The determinant of matrix is positive because condition (iii) implies that A has dominant diagonals by column, which is sufficient for the characteristic roots to have positive real parts. An important result for matrices of this kind is that all cofactors are nonnegative and the inverse of A is composed entirely of nonnegative elements.

Next, we discuss the effect of changes in central bank holdings of commercial bank equities, dG , on the endogenous rates of return. From equation (9) the entries for change in government holdings of bank equities on the endogenous rates of return are given in equations 10 through 12:

$$(10) \quad dr_h/dG = (1/|A|) [-(a_{22}a_{33}) + (a_{23}a_{32})];$$

$$(11) \quad dr_l/dG = (1/|A|) [-(a_{23}a_{31}) + (a_{21}a_{33})]; \text{ and}$$

$$(12) \quad dr_k/dG = (1/|A|) [-(a_{21}a_{32}) + (a_{22}a_{31})].$$

Given the assumptions on matrix A , all three endogenous rates decline in response to an increase in the central bank's holding of bank equities. Intuitively, the results can be explained by noting that the increase in the central bank's holding of bank equities adds immediately to the supply of funds banks have for lending purposes. As banks seek out more projects for *muḍārabah* financing, they accept projects with lower expected rates of return than previously. The lower earnings on *muḍārabah* financing will be reflected in lower returns on *muḍārabah* deposits. Given the decline in *muḍārabah* deposit rates, there is substitution into the market for physical capital, and the increased demand for capital lowers the required rate of return on capital. As discussed earlier in terms of the 'q' theory of investment, this monetary action is expansionary

because it lowers the required rate of return on capital and makes it easier for the economy to accumulate physical capital.

It needs to be mentioned, however, that because deposit rates are flexible and not controlled by the central bank in Islamic banking, there will be partial offsets to the monetary action. As returns on *mudārabah* deposits decline, the private sector will not only substitute into physical capital but also into currency, thereby dampening the expansion of bank intermediation. Furthermore, the foreign sector will reduce its holdings of domestic assets, both *mudārabah* deposits and physical capital, because their rates of return decline. These offsetting international capital flows will depend on the elasticities of the foreign asset demand functions with respect to the rates of return. Thus, the move to greater flexibility in the setting of deposit rates is likely to increase the extent to which capital flows offset monetary policy. But as long as the assets are imperfect substitutes, the offset is only partial. Although the greater flexibility in the rates of return increases the short-run international capital flows offset to monetary policy, this does not at all mean that the adoption of Islamic banking will lead to sustained medium- or long-term capital outflows. The model is presented for the purpose of analyzing short-run effects of monetary policy. To study the long-run implications of Islamic banking for international capital flows, one needs to look at the likely effects that interest-free banking would have on domestic saving and investment. This issue is discussed in the next section.

V. Saving, Investment, Growth And External Borrowing

The foregoing discussion has concentrated on the relationship between monetary policy and the rates of return in an Islamic economy, and how changes in the rates of return affect investment spending. This section focuses on the relationship between domestic saving and investment, on the one hand, and the current account deficit, on the other, in order to shed some light on the external debt servicing capacity issue for an Islamic economy. In the national income

accounts identity, gross national product (GNP) is measured both by expenditure on final product and by the way in which the income that is generated in production is used. As is shown in equation 13.

$$(13) \quad C + I_p + I_g + G + (X - M) = \text{GNP} = C + S + T + R_f.$$

The left-hand side of the identity indicates that expenditure on *GNP* is divided among private consumption C , gross private sector investment I_p , gross government investment I_g , government spending for consumption-type goods and services G , and net exports $X - M$. The right-hand side of the equation indicates that the income earned in production is used up in private consumption C , saving by consumers and businesses S , net tax payment T , and transfer payments to foreigners by private citizens R_f . Subtracting private consumption C from both sides of the identity and rearranging we have equation 14:

$$(14) \quad (M - X) + R_f = (I_p - S) + (I_g + G - T).$$

In other words, the current account deficit equals the sum of the excess of private sector investment over private sector saving and the budget deficit of government. This implies that the higher the current account deficit, the greater is the accumulation of capital, the smaller is the accumulation of private wealth, and the larger is the budget deficit. But a deficit in the current account means a transfer of resources to the country, in the sense that some of the goods and services brought into the country are not paid for by an equivalent claims on the country. In total, the current account deficit must be reflected by changes in the net asset position, irrespective of whether these take place through a reduction in foreign assets (including international reserves) or through borrowing. If a current account deficit results from increased investment, then the economy is trading one asset, the debt instrument, for another, the claim to physical capital. To the extent that borrowed resources have been channeled into productive investments, such investments could be expected—given prudent management of the economy and maintenance of the competitiveness of the external sector—to generate a stream of returns at least sufficient to repay the associated loans. If, on the other hand, the resources were used, directly or indirectly, to sustain con-

sumption, repayment of the indebtedness must be, at least to some extent, at the expense of future levels of consumption, a far more onerous prospect. It is, therefore, of considerable interest to know whether the adoption of an Islamic banking system would lead to increased investment or increased consumption, i.e., whether a stream of real resources is likely to be generated which will permit the eventual repayment of the foreign liabilities.

It could be argued that in an Islamic economic system, particularly with its emphasis upon work and moderation in consumption, saving would be enhanced. Nevertheless, concerns have been expressed that the adoption of an Islamic financial system may lead to a reduction of savings and retardation of financial intermediation and development. One argument suggests that since savings receive no reward (i.e., interest rate is zero) there is no incentive for individuals to save. Another argument asserts that savings will decrease because of increased uncertainty of future prospects in the Islamic system.

The first argument stems from a misunderstanding regarding Islam's prohibition against interest. Those advancing this argument consider the prohibition against interest to be tantamount to an imposition of a zero rate of return on investment and capital. This view reflects a confusion between rate of return and rate of interest. While the latter is forbidden in Islam, the former is not only permitted but is, in fact, encouraged. The second argument is based on the proposition that increased uncertainty in the rate of return affects savings adversely. Recently this issue has been subjected to rigorous theoretical analysis with conflicting results. The few studies that have considered this question within the context of Islamic framework have tended to neglect the risk return tradeoff aspects of the question.¹⁰ That is, the effects on savings of a fixed and certain rate of return are compared with effects on savings when only uncertainty is taken into account, and the obvious result is a reduction in savings in the latter case. If the expected value of return is kept constant while its vari-

¹⁰ See Haque and Mirakhor (1987).

ance is increased, i.e., when increased risk is not compensated by higher returns, savings will be adversely effected. This conclusion, however, is far from obvious when both risk and return are allowed to vary. The theoretical conclusion of an analysis in which risk and return variability have both been taken into account depends on assumptions regarding the form of the utility function and its risk properties; e.g., the degree and the extent of risk aversion, the presence and the degree to which the future is discounted, whether or not increased risk is compensated by higher return, and finally, the income and substitution effects of increased uncertainty.

Haque and Mirakhor (1987) have argued that the structural changes accompanying the adoption of an Islamic financial system may produce favorable effects on the rate of return on savings. The increased rate of return could compensate for the increased level of uncertainty that may result from the elimination of the risk-free asset, thereby leaving the overall level of savings unchanged or perhaps even leading to an increase in savings. They also note that the move to an Islamic banking system cannot be analyzed as an *a priori* increase in uncertainty in the environment in which the consumer is operating. Theoretically, any asset whose return is not *ex ante* fixed and tied to the amount of money invested can be admitted into the menu of assets available in an Islamic financial system. Given the availability of assets with a variety of risk characteristics, the saver can organize a diversified asset portfolio which can enable him to minimize risk in the Islamic financial system as in its counterpart.

In the companion paper to the one just mentioned, Haque and Mirakhor (1987) analyze investment behavior in an interest-free Islamic economy, and their analysis indicated that there is no strong theoretical reason to support the assertion that investment levels would decline if an Islamic profit-sharing system were adopted. Their analysis demonstrates that in the case of perfect certainty and full information, whether investment decisions are based on profit sharing or on a fixed rate of return has no real consequences for the economy. But when uncertainty is introduced, the level of investment may actually increase under certain conditions. Intuitively, the result

can be explained by noting that when a fixed-interest rate is replaced by profit sharing, both the owners of the firm and the lenders to the firm would be residual income earners and a fixed cost for capital would not be required as part of the firm's profit calculations. Therefore, the marginal product of capital could be taken up to the point where maximum profits would be obtained, as the firm does not face the constraint of meeting a fixed cost of capital.

The question of what will happen to the level of savings and investment following the adoption of Islamic banking will ultimately be an empirical one. However, some insights regarding the effect on the current account deficit can be obtained from examining the various possibilities with regards to the movements in savings and investment.

The propositions that follow from the above discussion are that savings and investment are unlikely to decline in an Islamic economy. If both savings and investments rise, then the effect on the current account deficit is ambiguous. Other things being equal, if the increase in saving is greater than the increase in investment, then the current account deficit will be lower. But even if the current account deficit is increased because of a larger increase in investment, the ensuing growth of output would make it feasible ultimately to close the gap between domestic saving and investment to repay the external loans. This statement needs to be qualified to allow that high saving and investment rates by themselves do not imply immunity against difficulties in external debt management. For example, a number of developing countries that apparently devoted the proceeds of external borrowing to investment have, nevertheless, encountered serious debt-servicing problems. The reasons for this are complex, and include both global economic developments—weakness of international trade, protectionist practices in industrial countries, high international interest rates—and policies in the developing countries, especially with regards to fiscal deficits, exchange rates and pricing policies, that lowered the efficiency of investment. While a full analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, two aspects of investment spending in a capital importing economy may be dis-

cussed, insofar as the discussion serves to show that disturbances to asset positions are absorbed more efficiently in an Islamic financial system and capital inflows are less likely to be affected by sudden and uniform shifts in the perception of the country's creditworthiness in Islamic banking than in the conventional form of international bank lending.

The first point we discuss is the well-known result that a high level of capital inflows into a country, which reflects not only a strong demand for external capital but also the absence of substantial credit rationing constraints on its supply, will lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The increased inflows cause an increase in domestic expenditures relative to output. The supply of traded goods required by the increased demand will be met by some combination of increased imports and decreased exports, with the resulting increase in the current account deficit equal to the capital inflow. However, the increased demand for nontraded goods can only be met from domestic supply, and if the supply of nontraded goods is unchanged, their relative price will rise. If one makes the small country assumption that the foreign currency price of traded goods is not affected by developments in the domestic economy, then the rise in the relative price of nontraded goods occurs through either a rise in the domestic currency price of nontraded goods or an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The rise in the relative price of nontraded goods results in the drawing of labor out of the traded goods sector because the real wage rate in terms of nontraded goods declines. However, the wage rate measured in terms of traded goods and the real wage rate (that is, in terms of all goods consumed) both rise because of the resource movement effect. This increase in the cost of labor has an adverse effect on external competitiveness. A sudden reduction in the level of capital inflows, either because borrowers are frozen out of the markets by the credit rationing phenomenon or because they cease borrowing voluntarily in the face of high interest rates in world financial markets, will require a fall in the real exchange rate to restore equilibrium and may involve substantial short-run adjustment costs, in terms of foregone output and under-

employed resources, if resources cannot be shifted back quickly to the traded goods sector.

These types of adjustment problems will be less severe in an Islamic financial system, both because the fluctuations in capital inflows are dampened and because the transfer of resources from the nontraded goods sector to the traded goods sector is facilitated by Islamic banking. Muslim scholars have little doubt that a financial system based on an Islamic framework of profit sharing would be more efficient in allocating resources and more stable as compared to a conventional interest-based system.¹¹ It is argued that allocational improvements would occur because investment alternatives are, to one another, based strictly on their productivity and rates of return, and better quality investment projects will be undertaken because the saver becomes an entrepreneur sharing in the profits earned. As payment commitments of firms and financial institutions are mostly dividends that will have to be paid only if profits are received, the decline in the profitability in the nontraded goods sector of the sort discussed above will be reflected quickly in the returns earned by investors on the nontraded goods sector, thereby encouraging the investors to switch their resources to firms or financial institutions that are active in the traded goods sector.

The second aspect of financial intermediation and investment spending in a capital importing country is the case where existing debt constrains the flow of new credits and domestic investment. The argument as presented in Dooley (1987) is that when a country experiences an exogenous reversal in its economic prospects, a wedge can become established between the contractual and market value of debt. The contractual value of debt can be defined as the present value of the stream of payments set out in the initial contract between the debtor and the creditor on the assumption that such payments will be made with certainty. The market valuation of that contract is the present value of the market's expectation of the stream of payments

¹¹ It must be pointed out that external borrowing in an Islamic economy will also have to be based on a profit-and-risk-sharing basis.

that will actually be made under the contract. Whereas the contractual value is generally above the market valuation to cover the possibility that the contractual obligations may not be carried out. Circumstances can arise where uncertainty among new investors as to whether or not they will be forced to share an expected loss on existing unprofitable investments through increased taxation, exchange rate depreciation, and other means that the government may employ, causes a sharp slowdown of new investment in the capital-importing country.

In this regard, an important difference between interest-based international bank lending and Islamic modes of financing is that, whereas in the former, interest payments are due irrespective of the uses to which original borrowing had been put, payments in the latter are closely linked to the returns on the underlying investment.^{12 13} Due to the prohibition against charging interest and the fact that banks will have to rely primarily on profit-sharing, Islamic banks will have to offer their asset portfolios of primary securities in the form of risky, open-ended, mutual-fund type packages for sale to the investor depositors, as opposed to the conventional bank practice of keeping title to the portfolios they originate. In the Islamic system, there will also be greater interdependence and closer relationship between investment deposit yields because banks can primarily accept investment deposits on the basis of profit sharing and can provide funds to the enterprises on the same basis. Due to the fact that the return to lia-

¹² See Khan (1986) and Mirakhor (1986).

¹³ There is a marked shift from nondebt-creating flows—official transfers and private direct investment—to debt-creating and interest-sensitive borrowing by developing countries in world capital markets. During the 1986's, the main form of international bank lending was short-term trade credit. During the 1970s, however, institutional developments in the domestic banking systems of the industrial countries lowered the risk on deposit liabilities of the money-center banks, which enabled the major banks to become the largest recipients of international loanable funds. Furthermore, financial innovations—notably the growth of syndicated loans and the increased use of cross-default clauses—reduced perceived levels of risk in lending to developing country borrowers, resulting in a significant rise in the volume of private bank lending.

bilities will be a direct function of the return to asset portfolios and also because assets are created in response to investment opportunities in the real sector, the return to financing is removed from the cost side and relegated to the profit side, thereby allowing the rate of return to financing to be determined by productivity in the real sector. It will be the real sector that determines the rate of return to the financial sector in the Islamic financial system, rather than the other way round. For these reasons, Islamic banking tends to reduce the vulnerability of the capital importing country to fluctuations in the level of capital inflows and sharp slowdown of new investment due to uncertainty among investors.

This can be further explained in terms of the 'q' theory of investment that was discussed in Section III. One way to look at 'q' is that it represents the comparison between the marginal efficiency of capital and the financial cost of capital. The marginal efficiency of capital is the internal rate of return on investment at its cost in the commodity markets, whereas the financial cost of capital is the rate at which investors discount future returns from investment. The reason new investment does not take place when a wedge becomes established between the contractual and market value of debt is not primarily because marginal productivity of capital is reduced but, more importantly, because investors discount future returns from new investment on the basis of a very high discount rate, which reflects their expectations that proceeds from their investments will be used to service the existing large external debt. The problem of high discount rates on new investments will not arise in the Islamic financial system because the liabilities of each economic unit are composed of equities, are fully amortized with an underlying future income flow, and no debt refinancing can take place. If there is any refinancing, it must be based on the sharing of future income expected from assets.

VI. Concluding Remarks

The aim of this paper has been to extend the analysis of monetary policy to the case of an open Islamic economy. A general equilibrium model for analyzing investment and external balance was pre-

sented. The model should not be taken too literally; rather, it should be regarded as an exploration of monetary policy in an Islamic economy when there are offsetting international capital flows. While the strong qualitative results that emerge from this paper hinge on the specific assumptions used, the basic conclusions are of general interest. Without denying the constraint imposed upon monetary policy by substitution possibilities among domestic and foreign assets, the paper argues that monetary policy can be used to affect output in an open Islamic economy. The rate of return on equity shares of commercial banks is market determined, but the supply of reserves is changed by the central bank through variations in its stock of bank equity shares, which in turn alters the cost of borrowing for the banks. While an increase in the supply of bank reserves will lower the deposit rates, the substitution of currency and foreign assets for domestic bank deposits will not offset the monetary expansion completely so long as the assets are imperfect substitutes.

Although the move to greater flexibility in the setting of deposit rates is likely to increase the extent to which international capital flows offset monetary policy, this does not imply that Islamic banking will lead to sustained medium- or long-term capital outflows. To study the long-run implications of Islamic banking for international capital flows, the paper discussed the effects that interest-free banking would have on domestic saving and investment. It was argued that savings and investment are likely to increase in an Islamic economy so that the effect on the current account position is ambiguous. However, to the extent that borrowed resources are channelled into productive investments, such investments could be expected to generate a stream of returns at least sufficient to repay the associated loans. Furthermore, the Islamic system has some advantages over the conventional interest-based system in terms of adjustment to certain types of macroeconomic disturbances because the liabilities of each economic unit are composed of equities and, therefore, fluctuations in international capital flows on domestic investment are dampened.

Appendix

Coefficient Matrices

$$b_{rh}^h(1-c)(D+D^*)+b^h(1-c)p_{rh}^d \quad b_{rl}^h(1-c)(D+D^*)+b^h(1-c)(p_{rd}^d+f^d)\dot{r}+r'+\dot{r}p_{rl}^h \quad b^h(1-c)p_{rk}^d+p_{rk}^h$$

$$A = b_{rh}^l(1-c)((D+D^*)+b^l(1-c)p_{rh}^d) \quad b_{rl}^l(1-c)(D+D^*)+b^l(1-c)(p_{rd}^d+f^d)\dot{r}-p_{rl}^l \quad b^l(1-c)p_{rk}^d+p_{rk}^l$$

$$p_{rh}^k \quad p_{rl}^k+p_{rd}^k \dot{r} \quad f_{rk}^k+p_{rk}^k$$

$$-1 \quad b^h(D+D^*) \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad b^h(1-c)f^d \quad b^h(1-c)f^d$$

$$-B = 0 \quad b^l(D+D^*) \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad b^l(1-c)f^d \quad b^l(1-c)f^d$$

$$0 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad f^k \quad f^k$$

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Comments on “Stabilization and Growth In an Open Islamic Economy”

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Stabilization and Growth in an Open Islamic Economy by A. Mirakhor and I. Zaidi focuses on the following major issues of concern to Islamic economics: savings and investment in a zero-interest economy, the role of monetary policy (known to economists as the management of the interest rate), open market operations, and the reserve ratio as it is used to stabilize the economy, real versus financial sectors, the rate of return on real assets versus the cost of fund acquisition, and last but not least, the inflow and outflow of capital to an Islamic economy. This paper should be looked at as a serious attempt by Muslim economists to position Islamic economics in the literature of economics, using the same tools and instruments which invite other economists to respond, positively or negatively, to their concepts and views. This dialogue is essential in gaining support and creating awareness among a wider spectrum of specialized scholars.

Mirakhor and Zaidi establish the following propositions:

1. In a zero-interest economy, savings and investment are unlikely to decline.
2. A financial system based upon a framework of profit sharing would be more efficient in resource allocation.
3. The agents of development in a ‘conventional’ economy are savers and investors. In an Islamic economy the same two agents exist but they usually act differently, in the sense that they are both entrepreneurs.

These three propositions are quoted from previous works by Iqbal and Mirakhor, Khan, Haque, and others. However, the model developed in this paper adds a fourth proposition, which is that a monetary policy can be used to affect output in an open Islamic economy.

One tends to agree with these four propositions based upon the logical presentation and the equilibrium model's development. The general equilibrium model rests on the assumption of imperfect but gross substitution among four assets, namely, currency, bank deposits, bank equities, and physical capital. This implies that the partial derivative of the asset demand function with respect to the own rate is positive, while with respect to an alternative rate, it is negative or zero. This assumption is essential to the model's validity. The three partial derivatives drh , drl , drk with respect to dG have to move in the same direction so as to institute the impact of monetary policy on output. Gross substitution ensures this one directional movement, and imperfect substitution dampens the expansion of bank intermediation.

At this stage, one should critically evaluate the substitutability assumption. Bank deposits, bank equities, and currency are all financial assets; they have the property of being substitutable though imperfectly. Infact, one may doubt whether physical and financial assets may be substituted. The rate of return on physical capital, i.e., the marginal efficiency of capital, is determined by long-term expectations of future returns. Returns on financial assets floated by the banking sector are determined by short-term expectations. In a nonzero interest economy the relationship between short-term and long-term interest rates is governed by three theories: the expectation theory, the liquidity preference theory, and the segmentation theory. These theories conclude that movements in the long-term interest rates are not necessarily related to movements in the short-term interest rates. By the same analogy, the assumption that short-term rates of return tend to affect long-term rates of return need to have further supportive evidence.

Another strong proposition of the paper is that although the greater flexibility in the rates of return increases the short-term international capital flows offset to monetary policy, the adoption of Islamic banking will lead to sustained medium or long-term capital

outflows. Our intuition is that in an equity economy and in the absence of fixed guaranteed returns, capital movements, both inflows and outflows, tend to be more or less sustainable depending upon foreign expectations of movements of equity returns.

Mirakhor and Zaidi's model is developed as a deterministic model. The Modern Portfolio Theory (Sharpe and *et al.*) explains rates of return on equity in a probabilistic form. The prominent Capital Asset Pricing Theory (CAMP) states that

$$E(R_j) = R_f + B (E(R_m) - R_f);$$

$$E(R_j) = \text{Expected rate of return on stock } j;$$

$$R_f = \text{Risk free rate of return, if } R_f = 0, \text{ model's conclusion is still valid;}$$

$$E(R_m) = \text{The expected rate of return on the market portfolio;}$$

$$B = \frac{\text{Cov}(R_j R_m)}{\text{Var } M} ;$$

$$= \text{Systematic risk.}$$

This implies that the 'expected returns' rather than 'returns' should be included in the model specification in an Islamic monetary system. Whether expected rates of return on equity can best be explained by CAMP or the most recently developed arbitrage theory need to be studied. The point that must be emphasized here is that probabilistic models should be used to explain rates of return in an Islamic economic system rather than in the conventional monetary policy deterministic models.

The last point in the Mirakhor and Zaidi model is the absence of risk analysis in the overall specification of the model—more specifically, the absence of a country risk factor in the D^* equation. This equation explains foreign demand for investment deposits as a function of the rate of return on investment deposits, less foreign or world interest rate and the expected depreciation of the domestic currency. No one would expect all Muslim economies to have a country risk factor equal to zero; in fact, a Muslim country, with its own distinctive economic and political conditions, may carry a positive country risk factor. In the case of running the D^* equation in a risk-analysis

system, country risk as an argument of this equation should be included.

Another point related to specifying the D^* equation is the inclusion of a world interest rate. Though this is relevant when comparing investment in non-Islamic economies to investment in Islamic economies, a more appropriate exogenous variable would be a weighted average expected rate of return in other Muslim countries. Foreign investment usually compares world opportunities both to Muslim economies' investment opportunities and to one Muslim economy's investment opportunities.

There are a few remaining points worth mentioning. The relationship between bank shareholders and bank depositors in the decision making process concerning the management of an Islamic bank and the fair and equitable distribution of bank profit, invites further analysis by Muslim bankers. The comparison of the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) to the financial cost of capital is artificial in an Islamic project evaluation context. In an interest-based economy the MEC is different from the cost of capital. But in a zero-interest economy the rate of discount for investment projects would be the MEC or the internal rate of return (IRR), depending upon whether it is determined ex-post or ex-ante.

Comments on “Stabilization and Growth In an Open Islamic Economy”

Hanaa Kheir-El-Din

Stabilization and Growth in an Open Islamic Economy is a well written and well thought out paper. It is very informative and in some places illuminating. It represents a serious and profound attempt to study both the short- and long-term stabilization and growth effects of a banking system that operates on the basis of risk and profit sharing in an open economy.

First, I would like to make a general comment that concerns the paper's overall approach. In the context of a Muslim forum where, presumably, we believe in Islam and its political, social and economic superiority, the search should not be to determine whether the Islamic system is more or less stable than the 'conventional' one, or whether the Islamic system is more or less conducive to growth or more or less capable of adjusting to microeconomic disturbances. Rather, the search should be concerned with finding economic tools—whether original or conventional—which, in accordance with the shari'ah, optimally achieve the objectives of the economy; and after determining these economic tools finding their economic properties and effects. The paper, not following this approach, instead, alters the 'conventional' relationships to fit the Islamic requirements and then compares the results in the two cases. As a result, the authors often sound apologetic and seem to imply that the conventional system is the ideal standard to be used to assess any other system.

The following are comments relating to details of the paper.

When comparing the Islamic system with the conventional one, it is alleged that in an Islamic system, there would be “a more cautious, selective and perhaps more efficient project selection by savers and investors” than in the conventional interest-based system. I do not see any justification to this conclusion so long as the convention-

al system offers, in addition to the fixed-interest yielding assets, the possibility of profit sharing through equity holding. On the contrary, one may argue that the coexistence of both kinds of assets in the conventional system makes the choice of profit-sharing projects more selective and more efficient.

When the authors describe the Islamic financial system, they mention two principal models of Islamic banking. The first one requires that “demand deposits must be paid to the depositors on demand and has no specific reserve requirement.” The second “stipulates a 100 percent reserve requirement for the demand deposits [and] . . . no reserve requirement for investment balances.” The first allegation is not clear and one wonders why, for safety and confidence purposes, demand deposits should not be subject to a specific reserve requirement in an Islamic banking framework, thus liberating a set proportion of these deposits to be used in financing further projects and enhancing the potential of the bank to earn profits. As for the latter allegation, it reminds one of the medieval goldsmiths’ practices of safe-keeping deposits. Given that the likelihood of withdrawing all demand deposits simultaneously is slim, it has no justification. This point of view has already been advanced by previous writers in the field. Thus, in both kinds of models it is not plausible in terms of their reserve requirements, to treat demand deposits in the Islamic banking framework differently from those in the conventional banking system.

We turn now to the general equilibrium model. It is developed to specify how rates of return on various financial and real assets are determined and is used to illustrate how monetary policy may, through altering these rates, affect investment, output and the balance of payments (see Section IV). Several remarks may be registered about the model offered in the paper.

First, the model is based on the main assumption that “there are three financial assets and one real asset, and the set of excess demand equations for these assets determines the rate on the assets, given the values of the various exogenous variables.” Formulated this way, the model disregards an essential feature of an Islamic

economy, namely, that the rate to the financial assets is determined by the rate of return on the real asset. To capture this feature, the model should include relationships to specify the factors that determine various returns on the financial assets as a function of the return on physical capital. Thus, rd , rl rh should somehow be directly related to rk .

Second, rl is defined as the rate on bank loans. What does this represent in an Islamic context? Is it the rate at which the commercial bank borrows from the central bank on an equity participation basis? If it is, then the term is misleading and should be replaced with a more accurate one. In general, the terms 'loans' and 'borrow' often used in this section and in the following section are misleading, as they imply the obligation of the receiver of the funds to repay at least the principal, regardless of the outcome of the ventures in which they were employed. However, this is not true in an Islamic system where repayment of the principal more or less depends on the outcome of the venture.

Third, equation (7) expresses the rate on bank deposits, rd , as a function of the rate of bank loans, rl , thus reflecting the influence of the conventional way of thinking on the authors. Instead, it seems that any of these rates should be tied to rk , the rate of return on physical capital.

Fourth, in coefficients matrix A shown in the Appendix, the first element, i.e., the coefficient of $d rh$ in the first equation, is missing a third term, namely, $+ p_{rh}$, which represents the effect of changes in rh on the demand by the domestic private sector on bank equity.

Fifth, the first remark mentioned above is further illustrated by the result that the central bank may affect the supply of reserves "through variations in its stock of bank equity shares dG , which in turn alters the cost of borrowing for the banks." This statement is confusing and does not seem to accord with the requirements of an Islamic system. Instead, the central bank, through affecting the supply of reserves and thus the funds available for financing real investments, should affect the rate of return on physical capital, which in

turn should affect the rates of return on other financial assets. There is here a question of causality that has to be settled.

Concerning the paper's use of G to refer to both government holding of bank equities (in equations 10 through 12) and to government spending for consumption-type goods and services (in equations 13 and 14), as is well-known, one should avoid using the same notation to refer to different variables.

In Section V, the paper begins to discuss the effect that comes from the prohibition of interest and the resulting increased uncertainty on both savings and investment. The argument concerning the effect of an interest free economy on investment is sound; however, the argument concerning its effect on saving is refutable and implies a confusion between the decision to save and to invest. The return on saving, according to current economic thinking, is not a major determinant of saving. As correctly mentioned in the paper, saving is a behavioral decision determined by the form of the utility function of the individual which, in Islam, emphasizes work and moderation in consumption, thus enhancing saving. However, the decision concerning the form in which these savings are held, is subject to another set of variables of which risk and relative return are essential components. In this context, the role of zakah is essential in discouraging hoarding and stimulating the search for investment financing, either directly through *mudārabah* or *mushārahah*, or indirectly through investment deposit.

Finally, Section V is concerned with investigating the capacity of the Islamic financial system to "repay its foreign loans" or "to service the existing large external debt." One should mention that the current account deficit, in an Islamic framework, would be financed either through a reduction of foreign assets or through direct foreign investment. The latter is available only for productive ventures. Financing nonproductive ventures (such as imports) or nonreturn-yielding investments (such as infrastructure) would be financed through grants, or through constraining external spending to the available domestic resources. Thus, talking about external debt or foreign loans seems to be in conflict with a basic condition of an Islamic system.

**Development and Islam:
Selected Bibliography**

Muhyiddin Aṭīyah

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
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
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Proceedings of the Fifth International Islamic Economics Seminar 1993

Edited by Ehsan Ahmed



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
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Proceedings of the Fourth International Islamic Economics Seminar

Edited by Ehsan Ahmad



Economic Growth and Human Resource Development in an Islamic Perspective

**Edited by
Ehsan Ahmad**



This book is a collection of eight selected papers read at the Fourth International Islamic Economics Seminar held at the World Bank during 1992. The workshop was sponsored by the Association of Muslim Social Scientists and the International Institute of Islamic Thought. The papers examine various aspects of modern economic life and how Islamic principles can be used to further the development of Muslim peoples.

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
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Contribution of Islamic Thought to Modern Economics

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(Cairo, 1988/1409)**

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Introduction

Misbah Oreibi

This book contains papers presented at the Conference on the Contribution of Islamic Thought to Modern Economics held in Cairo, Egypt, on 25-28 Muḥarram, 1409 A.H./ 6-9 September, 1988 A.C. sponsored by Salih Kamil Center for Islamic Commercial Research and Studies at al Azhar University and the International Institute of Islamic Thought.

Islamic economics is not entirely a new subject; it has been developed as an integral part of the wider subject of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and is as old as the Islamic way of life. *Fiqh al mu'āmalāt* branch of Islamic jurisprudence covered different aspects of economic activities such as market organization, sale contracts, financial dealings, types of company structures in production and consumer protection. Gradually, international trade became an important economic sector that required tariff estimation and collection, organized transport facilities and trained personnel.

The economic life of the early Muslim community grew in complexity with the expansion of Islam into most parts of the world and international trade played an important role in this expansion. In the process of Islamic expansion new peoples accepted Islam and new territories and countries became part of the caliphate (*khilāfah*). Muslims encountered new and complex methods of production, new technology, and a wider range of products and crops. The free exchange of goods and the free movement of people within the Muslim state enhanced the well-being of its citizens, increased its financial resources thereby allowing it to extend welfare services to all its citizens, irrespective of their belief, race, or background. Even when the unity of the caliphate was no longer sustainable, the free exchange of goods and capital and the free movement of people continued to be the rule rather than the exception.

Islamic scholars studied economic exchange in the light of the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah, and established basic principles for the protection of consumers, workers, merchants, and financiers. Ijtihad (opinion) was used to develop further al *mu'āmalāt* for smoother economic exchange whenever that was needed. For example, the *salām* sale contract (a contract allowing full payment in advance) was introduced to meet the special needs of agricultural producers.

However, the development of Islamic economics like all other intellectual activities came to a halt with the disintegration of the khilāfah and the decline of Islamic civilization. The rising powers of the European nation states, who occupied the Muslim lands, imposed their own social and economic systems. The newly imposed way of life was buttressed by secular education. Islamic education was confined to traditional *madāris* (religious schools), depriving the Muslim community of its most valuable and dynamic support to revitalize itself.

Islamic awakening needed a new economic doctrine, efficient and morally superior to the secular economic doctrines dominating the modern world. A few Muslim economists championed the reintroduction of Islamic economic doctrine. They held conferences, seminars and workshops. They published papers and books that attracted the attention of economists, students and learned circles in the Muslim world as well as in Western countries.

This conference is part of the intense on going efforts to reintroduce Islamic economics on more firm theoretical grounds. Parallel to this theoretical effort, some Muslim businessmen put into practice the concept of Islamic banking, creating interest-free banks. In spite of the difficulties engendered by the international financial system, and the rather negative attitude of governments in the Muslim world, Islamic banking proved to be successful. The venture of interest-free banking has confirmed moral principles as a base for successful financial intermediation. Demand for the services of interest-free banking has expanded in the last decade. Islamic banks are now handling over 80 billion US dollars.

Muslim economists who studied modern economics and mastered the tools of economic analysis, turned to researching Islamic

economics not only to prove the feasibility of an interest-free economic system, but also to prove its fundamental moral and spiritual superiority. At the center of the economic model, Islam replaces the selfish and greedy individual with the individual shaped by strong moral and spiritual values. A Muslim, as an economic agent, is not the classic economic man—an agent of greed and selfishness. Although, in a Muslim society, greedy and selfish individuals do exist, they are the exception rather than the norm.

The papers included in this volume are part of the ongoing effort to reintroduce Islamic economics using modern analytical tools. The first two papers are concerned with teaching Islamic economic programs. The first one by Iqbal and the second one by Khan discuss in detail the existing Islamic economic programs and introduce new ideas and concepts to improve on its teaching and research.

Iqbal compares different existing curricula for teaching Islamic economics in four well-known Islamic educational institutions. He carefully considers the objectives of teaching Islamic economics, highlighting the balance in the existing programs between the traditional shari'ah contents with those of modern economics. Detailed information on the existing programs is presented in an appendix, where comparison can easily be made.

Khan's paper covers extensive ground and points in the direction of further research. His handling of the microeconomics program for the undergraduate level is complete and profound. Microeconomics lies at the center of economic analysis. We are now considering the micro-foundations of macroeconomics. A well designed program of microeconomics is vital to any teaching program. Khan's methodology, prerequisites, coverage, and duration of Islamic economics courses, digs deeply into the epistemological foundations of Islamic economics, discussing the concept of ownership in Islam, the theory of demand, work and leisure, and intertemporal choices. In each of these basic topics, he explores new grounds and points to new directions for further research. He goes into detailed discussions of the theories of production, distribution, costs, and the firm in a comprehensive teaching program of Islamic economics that he suggests for undergraduates in an Islamic university.

The third paper, by Chapra, is centered around economic development strategy. He explores the differences between what he calls the imported development strategy and the Islamic development strategy. Imported strategies have been tried in Muslim countries and have failed to achieve serious economic progress, whether they were capitalist or socialist. The spectacular failures of the imported strategies were due to the fact that they were not in harmony with the system of values and the spiritual aspirations of Muslim societies. The value system of western development strategies is in conflict with the value reference of Islamic countries, so the institutional setup erected by the colonial powers in the Muslim countries represent a superstructure not related to the values and morality of Islam. Despite intensive government efforts and foreign aid, development efforts simply have been in vain.

As an alternative, Chapra develops an Islamic development strategy based on the *maqāṣid* (objectives) of the shari'ah. Equity and efficiency are the focus of the Islamic development strategy. While efficiency is at the core of the secular capitalist economic system that dominates the international arena, it has all but neglected equity. The socialist system, on the other hand, has stressed equity but has failed to realize it and at the same time has lost track of efficiency.

The Islamic development strategy embraces the two concepts of equity and efficiency as vital components. Economic policies are needed to achieve equity and efficiency in the Islamic development strategy as required by the shari'ah. Special attention should be directed to encourage small enterprises, financial intermediation, the human factor, and the reduction of wealth concentration. The role of government is emphasized and governments are urged to take the necessary steps to restructure the Muslim countries' economics to ascertain a positive outcome from the development strategy.

Chapra's paper is a serious contribution to development economics from an Islamic perspective, and will constitute an indispensable reading for the students of economic development.

The fourth paper, by Mirakhor and Zaidi, is critical to the development of Islamic economics. Economic policies and, in particular, monetary policies have been controversial. It has been said that in an

Islamic economic system there is no way to assure the success of economic policies, fiscal or monetary, in the absence of the rate of interest. The question is how to counter economic instability and promote growth where the interest rate is no longer at the disposal of the government and the central bank?

The inability of the government to set rate of return in the PLS system does not exclude the effectiveness of monetary policy in an open economy. This is the basic thrust of the analysis of the Mirakhor and Zaidi paper. They affirm using the supply of credit and money, in general, to successfully implement the required monetary policies to stabilize the economy and promote its growth. The model presents a valuable advance in the development of theoretical analysis in Islamic economics.

It is proved that a banking system free of interest, and using *muḍārabah* (partnership between one who has capital and one who has expertise) and *mushārahah* (joint venture, partnership in which the participants contribute both capital and expertise), can be the basis of a monetary policy that fixes the rate of return on capital and enhances saving and investment.

Included in this volume are extensive discussions and comments by economists whose interest in Islamic economics is well known, and who make valuable contributions to the debate.

Finally, there is an extensive bibliography of references and published materials on development in the Islamic perspective by Muḥyiddin Aṭīyah that makes this volume a necessary companion for students and researchers in the subject. We hope that this book will also be used by students and teachers in Islamic universities, and by students and teachers in secular centers of education as a reference to raise the awareness of the emergence of the new paradigm.

Rajab 1418 A.H./October 1917 A.C.
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Teaching Programs in Islamic Economics: A Comparative Study

Munawar Iqbal

Introduction

Islamic economics is a new discipline but it is gaining strength and maturity very quickly. Its development in the last few years has led to the establishment of teaching and training programs at a number of places in several countries. With increasing literature of high quality becoming available due to tremendous interest in the area, it is hoped that several new programs will appear in the near future. Therefore, it is a very crucial stage in its development. The seed has been sown but there are years of hard work ahead. This is the time for fertilizing and watering on the one hand and weeding and pruning on the other. While it is imperative to increase the present effort manifold, it is also important to keep a vigilant eye on the experiments under way in order to ensure that they achieve the objectives for which they were designed. It is in this spirit that the present comparative study of the major teaching programs in Islamic economics are being undertaken.

Initially, Islamic economics was introduced as one of the subjects in degree programs in the economics and shari'ah faculties in some universities. It was comprised of only one or two one-semester courses. The number of courses gradually increased. It was only in the early 1980s that complete degree programs in Islamic economics were introduced. At present, there are four accepted teaching programs—the partial program, the undergraduate program, the graduate program, and the training program (designed to meet the short-term needs of the Islamization process). In the following pages we will say a few words about each of them. But before doing so we present some broad objectives that the teaching programs should attempt to achieve. The existing programs shall be evaluated according to these.

Objectives of Teaching Programs in Islamic Economics

The major universities of most of the Muslim countries have inherited or borrowed their style of teaching economics from Western universities. Their approach is purely secular and the contents of their courses mundane. Such an approach is, of course, quite suitable to countries whose ground is materialism and secularism but is most contradictory to Islamic societies where all disciplines should have a profound imprint of Islam so as to provide Islamic vision. Before listing the objectives of teaching programs in Islamic economics, some general remarks about the existing education system may be useful. The major defects from which the education system in most of the Muslim countries suffer may be identified as follows:

- First, the education system has been bifurcated into so-called 'modern' and 'religious' education. The two are being imparted through entirely independent and completely different institutions with no interaction between them. In most of the Muslim world, religious education is given through *madāris* (literally, schools, but here meaning religious schools) while secular, modern education is imparted through colleges and universities.
- Second, religious education receives neither patronage nor recognition. Public funds controlled by the state support the public schools and universities while it is left to charitable institutions to support religious schools. Similarly, the graduates of *dīni madāris* (religious schools) receive no official recognition; almost all public jobs go to the graduates of colleges and universities. The graduates of *madāris* have to survive on very meager and irregular allowances in the informal sector. They have no status in the society and are often looked down upon by the so-called 'educated class'. The natural result has been that most of the talent flows into the secular system of education.
- Third, the quality of education has been pathetically low. The curricula and syllabi for the university education are out-

dated. The system of education and examination is such that the critical and creative abilities of the students are not promoted. The situation in the religious schools is even worse. The system of education and examination is very loose. Quite often it is very informal. Even curricula and syllabi are not standardized. They vary from one madrasah to another both in coverage and standard. There is hardly any place for the study of modern developments, new technology, or research.

The brief review of the problems given above provide useful insights into planning out a strategy for their solution. Any prescription for the treatment of the ailing system must include the following elements:

- So-called ‘modern’ education and the ‘religious’ education systems must be fused together.
- Education must be purpose-oriented. It should be considered as *‘ibādah* and must result in a better understanding of the Islamic faith. It should aim at character building and spiritual elevation along with an increase in knowledge.
- Quality of education must be improved so as to produce people who are not only qualified in modern science and technology but are also imbued with Islamic knowledge, character, and spirit. They should have all the necessary qualities that will enable them to reconstruct modern knowledge on the foundations of Islam and to suggest ways and means for putting it into practice.

In the light of these broad principles the teaching programs in Islamic economics should aim at the following:

- Knowledge of Arabic good enough to enable the students to have direct access to classical Islamic literature and original sources.
- Knowledge of the shari‘ah in general and Islamic economics in particular.
- Knowledge of traditional economics.
- Knowledge of ‘quantitative’ tools of analysis.
- Ability to critically evaluate economic theory.

- Professional awareness of the need for a new approach towards the science of economics.
- Motivation of the students to participate in the process of Islamization of knowledge.
- Preparation of the students for the job market in order to meet the requirements of Islamization efforts on the one hand and to provide a decent means of living for the graduates on the other.

Salient Features of Various Kinds of Teaching Programs in Islamic Economics

Partial Programs

Overall content

As mentioned in the introduction, there are four kinds of programs being offered. The partial program is the least ambitious of them. It involves only one or two courses in Islamic economics. The contents of these courses vary but they are usually very elementary. A typical course is “Economic Values and System of Islam” offered at Punjab University, Pakistan and includes the following topics:

1. **Meaning and scope of Islamic economics:** Economic system of Islam as a part of its overall philosophy of life; sources of Islamic economic concepts; Islamic economics and modern economics.
2. **Basic Values and Principles:** Concepts of equality *musāwāh* (equality), *ikhwah* (brotherhood), *‘adl* (justice), *taqwā* (fear of Allah), *ihsān* (benevolence), and *ta’awwun* (cooperation) as the basis of all economic policies; concepts of halal and haram and their application to economic activities; islamic code of business ethics.
3. **Islam and other economic systems:** The economic system—its meaning and functions; a comparative analysis of the broad economic features of Islam, capitalism, and socialism.

4. **Consumption:** Importance and principles of consumption in Islam; principles of moderation and its economic significance; behavior of the Muslim consumer.
5. **Production:** Islamic approach to production; areas of private and public ownership in Islam; ownership and cultivation of land; forms of business organizations—*mudārabah* (partnership between one who has capital and one who has expertise) and *mushārah* (joint venture, partnership in which the participants contribute both capital and expertise).
6. **Dignity of labor:** Importance, dignity and rights of labor in Islam; measures to improve labor-capital relationship.
7. **Product pricing:** Concept of just pricing in Islam; prohibition of exploitative prices—monopolistic, speculative, etc.; regulation and control of prices; behavior of firms under the influence of the Islamic spirit.
8. **Principles of distribution of national income and wealth:** Qur'anic emphasis on the circulation of wealth among all sections of the community; limits on rents and profits; Islamic approach to determination of wages; measures against accumulation of personal wealth—the institutions of *zakah* (poor-due; public welfare tax), *ṣadaqah* (charity), *khayrah* (good deed), and *awqāf* (endowments); distributional aspects of the Islamic law of inheritance; state's power for further measures; rights of specified sections of the community to receive pensions; death duties; the revolutionary concepts of *al 'afw* (waiver of punishment).
9. **Interest-Free Banking and Insurance:** Prohibition of interest and its economic and social significance; interest-free banking; introduction of interest-free investment and deposit accounts in Pakistan; insurance and Islam.
10. **Public finance, fiscal policy and budgeting:** Taxation in Islam; the institution of *bayt al mal* (public treasury); principles of public expenditure; the institution of *zakah*; *zakah* as an instrument of fiscal policy; the *Zakah* and '*Ushr* (one-tenth) Ordinance, 1980.

11. **International trade:** Islamic approach to trade among nations; new world economic order and Islam.
12. **Economic development and planning:** Islam's keen interest in economic development; encouragement of technology, inventions, and innovations; nature and importance of economic planning in Islam; goals for development policy in Islam.
13. **Role of the state:** Maintenance of law and order; security of life and property; social security; provision of basic necessities of life; social overhead capital; education and *tabligh* (spreading the message of Islam); economic development; social justice.
14. **Social justice in Islam:** Social justice in Islam; goals, strategies and instruments.
15. **Role of Muslim economists:** Muslim civilization and the development of world trade, commerce, agriculture, technology and transportation; contribution of Muslim economists to development of economics as a science.
16. **Islamization process in Pakistan:** The character and objectives of any Islamic economy; the choice of an appropriate policy package.

Two one-semester courses

It goes without saying that partial programs cannot help much in the objective of Islamization of knowledge. However, they have their own importance. They are a good precursor to full-fledged degree programs where introduction of the latter is not possible for one reason or another. They are like the first few drops of rain that herald a downpour. The contents of these courses can, however, be improved. Assuming only two one-semester courses to be offered, we suggest the following sequence: Economic Doctrines of Islam and Introduction to Islamic Economic Theory.

In addition, every teacher should be asked to introduce Islamic elements into the conventional courses as far as possible. The suggested contents of the two courses are given below:

Economic Doctrines of Islam

1. What is Islamic economics and how does it differ from secular economics?
2. Islamic economic system: a comparative study; salient features of the Islamic economic system.
3. The Islamic principles guiding consumption and production.
4. Shari'ah guidelines for the theory of exchange.
5. The concept of ownership and its limits in an Islamic framework.
6. The redistribution mechanism in an Islamic economy.
7. The concept of *ribā* (interest), its interpretations and implications.
8. Alternative institutions to interest-based operations and their justification in the shari'ah.
9. Zakah and its economic role: The place of zakah in Islamic fiscal policy, its effects on consumption, saving and investment activity in the country.
10. Institutions of *'ushr*, *kharāj* (land tax), *jizya*, (head tax on free Nonmuslims under Islamic rule), etc. as sources of public revenue.
11. The economic role of state in an Islamic economy.
12. Muslim economic thinking: A survey of contemporary literature.

Introduction to Islamic economic theory

1. Consumer behavior in Islamic perspective and its effect on demand.
2. Behavior of firms in the Islamic framework and its effect on supply.
3. Market equilibrium.
4. Islamic view on market structures—perfect competition, monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition.
5. Factors of production and determination of return.
6. Distributive justice and need fulfillment.
7. Measurement of gross and net national product—some considerations from an Islamic perspective.

8. An introduction to macroeconomic modeling for an Islamic economy
9. Consumption—saving and investment functions in an Islamic economy.
10. Interest-free banking and monetary policy.
11. Public sector economics in an Islamic economy.
12. Project evaluation from an Islamic perspective.
13. Shari‘ah guidelines for international trade.
14. Concept of economic development in Islam.

Undergraduate Programs

Undergraduate programs are most important for the achievement of the desired objectives. However, designing a program that can accommodate the discipline’s many needs is not easy.

In order to prepare the student for his profession, he must be exposed to a large number of subjects, the latest analytical techniques and technology, as well as the relevant shari‘ah topics. The student must obtain a good understanding of both English and Arabic to gain access to both the rich heritage of the shari‘ah knowledge as well as to the ‘traditional’ economic literature that is in English. The design of the degree program is constrained because one of its objectives is to merge *madrasah* (religious school) education with college education, and the different backgrounds from which graduates of these two streams come. One has to come up with a mixture of courses that produce graduates prepared to meet the challenge of promoting the discipline of Islamic economics while meeting job market requirements. In addition, the problem of preparing bilingual graduates has to be solved.

Given the time constraint, fitting in all the requirements is a very difficult task. Each institution is coping with these requirements in a different way, all of them involve compromise. In this section, we review the programs of four major institutions engaged in undergraduate teaching. They are the International Institute of Islamic Economics at the International Islamic University, Islamabad,

Table 1
Structure of Undergraduate Programs
A Comparative Statement

	IIIE Islamabad	IIU Malaysia	Imam Muhammad Univ. Riyāḍ	Imam Sadiq University Tehran
1. Duration of the Program	4 Yrs.	4Yrs.	4 Yrs.	5 Yrs.
2. Medium of Instruction	English/Arabic	English/Arabic	Arabic	Persian
3. Credit Hours Required	216	134	153	200
i. Shari'ah Subjects (%)	39 (18.05)	28 (20.90)	64 (41.85)	69 (34.50)
ii. Economics (%)	84 (38.88)	63 (47.01)	43 (28.10)	45 (22.50)
iii. Complementary (%)	24 (11.11)	27 (20.14)	21 (13.72)	8 (4.00)
iv. Language (%)	69 (31.94)	16 (11.95)	25 (16.33)	78 (39.00)
4. Number of One Semester Courses	56	48	59	82
5. Average Number of Courses Per Semester	7	6	7.4	8.2
6. Average Hours of Instruction Per Week	27	17	19	20

Pakistan (IIIE); the Faculty of Economics at the International Islamic University in Malaysia (IIU); the Department of Economics, the Faculty of the shari'ah at Imam Muhammad University, Riyāḍ, Saudi Arabia; and the Department of Economics at Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran. A summary of the undergraduate program structure in Islamic economics at these institutions is given in Table 1. The detailed curricula of these programs are given in Appendix A.

Except for Imam Sadiq University, all programs require four years, after completing the higher secondary school level. Program IIIE appears to be the most intensive, in the sense that it requires completion of 216 credit hours. *Hifz* (memorization of Qur'an) requirements and some noncredit courses are in addition to these. Hours of classroom instruction required per week is 27. The most extensive program is the one at Imam Sadiq University in Tehran. It extends over five years and requires 82 one-semester courses. The program at the Faculty of Economics (IIU) in Malaysia is more traditional, in the sense that it follows the work load common in most

Western universities (120 to 135 credit hours). The average number of courses to be taken per semester ranges from 6 to 8.2 in the four institutions under review.

From a study of the composition of these programs and of their course contents, two distinct models emerge. The program of Imam Sadiq University and Imam Muhammad University place much more importance on shari'ah subjects as compared to the programs of IIE Islamabad and IJU Malaysia. The relative weight of shari'ah subjects is almost double in the former two programs as compared to the latter two. The case of economic subjects is exactly reverse. The result is that the graduates produced by the first model will lack sufficient background in economics while the graduates produced by the second model will be weak in their shari'ah background. Finding the right balance between the two is the most important issue in teaching Islamic economics.

Within the second model, the relative share of economics and related subjects which include statistics, mathematics, quantitative methods, etc., is higher in the case of IJU Malaysia (67 percent as compared to 50 percent) but in absolute terms the IIE Islamabad program has a larger component of economics and complementary subjects (108 credit hours as compared to 90 credit hours). Therefore, one can safely conclude that, in terms of economics, the program of IIE is the strongest. It also devotes a lot of time to languages, 69 credit hours, which again are the highest in the four year period. The problem with the IIE program is that it has a very high work load which may not be sustainable in the long run. Secondly, the shari'ah component of the program is rather weak. While the graduates of IIE can be compared to the graduates of any reputable university in terms of their background in economics, their shari'ah background remains much lower than the professed objective of producing scholars who can serve as the vanguards of efforts to Islamize knowledge. Another objective that the IIE program has not been able to achieve is the merger of the college and *madrasah* streams of entering students. The reason is that, from the start, the program is very technical, and

Table 2
Proposed Structure for a B.A. Degree
Program in Islamic Economics

Subjects	Credit Hours Required			
	Core	Major in Economics	Major In Fiqh	Double Major
Shari'ah Subjects	24	24+12=36	24+24=48	24+24=48
Economics	36	36+24=60	36+12=48	36+24=60
Complementary Subjects	15	15	15	15
Languages (Arabic and English)	21	21	21	21
Optional Subjects	—	15	15	18
Total:	96	96+54=150	96+54=150	96+69=165

the *madrasah* students, who usually have a weak technical background, find it difficult.

A feature common to all the programs is the lack of options available to the students. The program at the International Islamic University in Malaysia (IIU) does provide some options but they are only within the area of economics and business. At an undergraduate level so much concentration is perhaps undesirable. Furthermore, within the discipline itself, if some diversification can be provided, it will suit the varying aptitudes of the students better.

In the light of this discussion we are of the view that some improvements are required in the present undergraduate programs. We offer the following suggestions for improvement:

- The work load should not exceed 150 credit hours in total, nor 20 credit hours in one semester.
- A more judicious balance between economics and shari'ah subjects should be maintained. In this regard, it should be remembered that since the degree to be given is in economics, it should not be dominated by shari'ah subjects. However, the shari'ah component should be strong enough to produce the kind of blend that Islamic economics aims at.
- It is desirable to cater to varying aptitudes of students by introducing the system of majors. Initially two majors, i.e., a major in economics and a major in fiqh can be introduced. More majors can be added later.

Table 3
Curriculum for Proposed Structure of a B.A. Degree Program in Islamic Economics

Core Subjects (To be taken by all)	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Major in Economics	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Major in Fiqh	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Double Major	Credit Hours
Shari'ah Subjects							
'Uliam al Qur'an I	3	Islamic Studies I	3	'Uliam al Qur'an	3	'Uliam al Qur'an III	3
'Uliam al Qur'an II	3	Islamic Studies II	3	'Uliam al Qur'an	3	'Uliam al Qur'an IV	3
'Uliam al Hadith I	3	Fiqh for Economics I	3	'Uliam al Hadith III	3	'Uliam al Hadith III	3
'Uliam al Hadith II	3	Fiqh for Economics II	3	'Uliam al Hadith IV	3	'Uliam al Hadith IV	3
'Usul al Fiqh I	3			'Usul al Fiqh III	3	'Usul al Fiqh III	3
'Usul al Fiqh II	3			'Usul al Fiqh IV	3	'Usul al Fiqh IV	3
Fiqh al Mu'āmalāt I	3			Fiqh for Economics I	3	Fiqh for Economics I	3
Fiqh al Mu'āmalāt II	3			Fiqh for Economics II	3	Fiqh for Economics II	3
Economics							
Microeconomics I	3	Microeconomics III	4			Microeconomics III	4
Macroeconomics I	3	Macroeconomics III	4			Macroeconomics III	4
		Economics of Welfare and Distribution	4			Economics of Welfare and Distribution	4
Microeconomics II	3	Monetary Economics	4	Monetary Economics	4	Monetary Economics	4
Macroeconomics II	3	Economics of the Corporate Sector	4	Economics of the Corporate Sector	4	Economics of the Corporate Sector	4
Money and Banking	3	Public Sector Economics	4	Public Sector Economics	4	Public Sector Economics	4
Public Finance	3						
International Economics	3						
Economic Development and Planning	3						
History of Economic Thought	3						

Table 3 (Continued)
Curriculum for Proposed Structure of a B.A. Degree Program in Islamic Economics

Core Subjects (To be taken by all)	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Major in Economics	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Major in Fiqh	Credit Hours	Additional Subjects for A Double Major	Credit Hours
Economics							
Comparative Economic Systems	3						
Contemporary Islamic Economics	3						
Economic Survey of Muslim Countries	3						
Complementary Subjects							
Statistics I	3	Statistics I	3	Statistics I	3	Statistics I	3
Statistics II	3	Statistics II	3	Statistics II	3	Statistics II	3
Basic Mathematics	3	Basic Mathematics	3	Basic Mathematics	3	Basic Mathematics	3
Mathematics for Economists	3	Mathematics for Economists	3	Mathematics for Economists	3	Mathematics for Economists	3
Introduction to Computers	3	Introduction to Computers	3	Introduction to Computers	3	Introduction to Computers	3
Optional Subjects							
Five/Six Courses Selected as Follows:							
1. Economics Majors Must Select at Least Two from List 1.		List 1 - Econometrics - Advance Mathematics - Project Evaluation - Computer Programming - Labor Economics - Resource Economics - Economics of Agriculture - Industrial Economics - Principles of Accounting - Principles of Auditing - Principles of Marketing - Principles of Business Management		List 2 - Aqeedah I, II - Tafsir I, II, III - Hadith I, II, III - Fiqh I, II - Maqasid al Shari'ah - Islamic Law		List 3 - Islamic History I - Islamic History II - Political Science I - Political Science II - Sociology I - Sociology II - Foreign Language I, II, III	
2. Fiqh Majors Must Select at Least Two from List 2.							
3. Double Majors Must Select at Least Two from Both List 1 and List 2.							
4. The Rest of the Courses May Be Selected from any of the Lists.							

- Some optional subjects from other disciplines, such as Islamic history, sociology, philosophy, political science, law, business management, accounting, etc., may be allowed. This will help broaden the outlook of graduates.

New Proposed Structure of Undergraduate Programs in Islamic Economics

In the light of the above remarks, we have attempted to design a slightly modified program for undergraduate teaching in Islamic economics. The structure of a four year program leading to a bachelors degree in economics is given in Table 2, while the suggested curriculum is given in Table 3.

In many countries there are local course requirements determined by the government. We suggest that these be accommodated within the 150 hours. However, in exceptional cases the work load may be marginally increased.

The time reserved for languages (i.e., 21 hours) should be divided between English and Arabic for each student depending upon his level in these two languages. For example, students coming from the college stream would take more Arabic while students coming from the *madrassa* stream would take more English.

Three separate lists of optional subjects have been suggested. Out of the five or six optional courses economics majors must take at least two courses from the first list. Similarly, students with a fiqh major must take at least two courses from the second list. Students with a double major should take two courses from each of these lists. The rest of the optional courses may be taken from any of the three lists. Note that these lists are only indicative. More courses can be added to each list. Each department may also choose only a few of these to be offered if facilities do not exist to offer all.

Graduate Programs

Graduate programs in Islamic economics have been started at the International Islamic University in Islamabad (IIIE) and the Faculty

of the shari‘ah at both Umm al Qura University in Mekkah and Imam Muhammad University in Riyāḍ. All of these programs are new and it may be a little premature to evaluate them. We will only offer a few remarks.

The same two tendencies that we find at the undergraduate level are observed at the graduate level. The shari‘ah dominates the programs of Imam Muhammad University and Umm al Qura University and economics dominates the program of IIIE.

Most of the material available in the Islamic economics literature can be covered at the undergraduate level. Therefore, presently, there is not enough graduate level material. With the passage of time more material will surely become available for the graduate level. For this reason, there are people who have reservations about starting graduate programs at this time. However, there are others who believe that today’s graduate programs will lead to good quality papers, dissertations, research, as well as producing teachers for undergraduate programs. The next few years will show the product of graduate programs and an evaluation can then be objectively made.

Training Programs

Training programs are meant to cater to the manpower requirements of the process of islamization. In the field of teaching itself, the most severe constraint has been the availability of qualified manpower. The present generation of economists have had little or no formal education in Islamic economics nor have they had its prerequisite subjects. In order to meet immediate requirements, some orientation programs are needed. Towards this end, IIIE, in 1984, conducted a two-week refresher course for Pakistani universities’ teachers of Islamic economics. The contents of this course are given in Appendix B. In 1988 another refresher course with international coverage was planned under the joint auspices of IIIE and the Islamic Research and Training Institute of the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah.

Table 4
List of Courses for a One-Year Diploma in
Economic Theory for Shari'ah Graduates

First Term

1. English Language I
2. English Language II
3. Basic Economic Concepts
4. Introduction to Economic Theory
5. Money and Banking
6. Public Finance

Second Term

1. Microeconomic Analysis
2. Macroeconomic Analysis
3. International Economics/International Economics Institutions
4. Development and Planning
5. Islamic Economics
6. Comparative Economic Systems

Summer

Summer will be required only for deficiency courses in language or other subjects, if any.

While these programs were a good beginning, two-weeks can hardly be considered sufficient time in which to provide teachers the required training. A cursory look at the course contents reveals that there is too much material to cover in two weeks. Only a broad brush treatment of the topics is possible. Because on-the-job training programs cannot be conducted for much longer periods, one has to settle for short training programs of two- to four-weeks duration and hope that the participants will be motivated to continue their study either through self-study or through follow-up courses.

We believe, however, that in order to meet immediate requirements additional efforts have to be made. We suggest the following two crash programs: a One-Year Diploma in Shari'ah/Islamic Economics for Graduates in Economics and a One-Year Diploma in Economics for Shari'ah Graduates. Tables 4 and 5 present the proposed structures of these programs.

The Diploma of Economics for Shari'ah Graduates will be very useful in assimilating *madrasah* students into the degree programs. They may be required to complete this diploma before entering the degree programs. This will also be useful for shari'ah experts who

Table 5
List of Courses for a One-Year Diploma in
Shari'ah for Economics Graduates

<p>First Term</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Arabic Language I 2. Arabic Language II 3. <i>Tafsir</i> 4. <i>Usul al Hadith</i> 5. <i>Usul al Fiqh</i> 6. History of Islamic Economic Thought <p>Second Term</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Maqāsid al Shari'ah</i> 2. <i>Fiqh al Mu'āmilāt</i> 3. <i>Fiqh for Economists I</i> 4. <i>Fiqh for Economists II</i> 5. <i>Introduction to Islamic Economic Theory</i> 6. <i>Readings in Contemporary Islamic Economics</i> <p>Summer</p> <p>Summer will be required only for deficiency courses in language or other subjects, if any.</p>
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are teaching fiqh courses to economists or who are involved in research on contemporary problems. These diploma programs will go a long way in bridging the communication gap that presently exists between economists and *fuqahā*. They can then work together to find Islamic solutions to contemporary economic problems.

Another purpose of training programs is to provide qualified manpower for Islamic banking. A beginning was made in this regard by the International Federation of Islamic Banking which established the International Institute of Islamic Banking and Economics in Cyprus. The IIIE started a diploma program in Islamic banking. Unfortunately, the Institute ran into financial problems and was closed down in 1984. The gap created by the cessation of this program has not yet been filled.

The International Islamic University in Islamabad (IIIE) started a Senior Officers Training Program (SOTP) in Islamic Economic Doctrines and their Practical Application in 1986. This is a four-week program meant for senior officers of economic ministries and bank executives. The contents of this program are given in Appendix C. So far, three such programs have been conducted. The course is running

very successfully and is creating a very good impact. Given sufficient resources, the Institute plans to offer this program internationally. Since this program is meant for senior officers the need for similar programs for middle-level management of Islamic banks is still present.

Conclusion

In this paper we have described the major teaching and training programs in Islamic economics, provided some comparative assessment, and, most importantly, identified some of the areas where improvements in the existing programs are needed. An attempt has also been made to identify areas where new programs are required to meet pressing needs. Some suggestions have been made only to initiate the discussion.

Appendix A

Table 1
Curriculum for the B.Sc. (Hons.)
Degree at IIIE Islamabad

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>First Year</i>			
Arabic (Reading) I	4.5	Arabic (Listening Practice)	4.5
Arabic (Grammar) I	4.5	Arabic (Grammar) II	4.5
Arabic (Conversation & Composition)	4.5	Arabic (Conversation & Composition) II	4.5
Islamic Studies (Arabic) I	4.5	Islamic Studies (Arabic) II	4.5
English (Reading) I	3	English (Reading) II	3
English (Grammar) I	3	English (Grammar) II	3
English (Composition) I	3	English (Composition) II	3
Total Credits	27	Total Credits	27
<i>Second Year</i>			
Arabic III	4.5	Arabic IV	4.5
English III	4.5	English IV	4.5
Introduction to Economic Theory I	4.5	Introduction to Economic Theory II	4.5
Mathematics for Economics I	4.5	Mathematics for Economics II	4.5
Usul al Fiqh I	3	Fiqh al Muamilat al Maliyya I	3
Pakistan Studies	3	Economic Doctrines of Islam	3
The Islamic Man	3	The Islamic System	3
Total Credits	27	Total Credits	27

Table 1 (continued)
Curriculum for the B.Sc. (Hons.)
Degree at IIIE Islamabad

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>Third Year</i>			
Microeconomics I	4.5	Microeconomics II	4.5
Macroeconomics I	4.5	Macroeconomics II	4.5
Monetary Theory	4.5	Public Finance	4.5
Introductory Statistics	4.5	Basic Econometrics	4.5
Usul al Fiqh II	3	Usul al Fiqh III	3
Fiqh al Muamilat al Maliyya II	3	Fiqh al Muamilat al Maliyya III	3
Arabic	3	Arabic	3
Total Credits	27	Total Credits	27
<i>Fourth Year</i>			
Advanced Microeconomics	4.5	Advanced Macroeconomics	4.5
Comparative Economic Systems	4.5	Economic Development	4.5
Readings in Islamic Economics	4.5	Economies of Muslim Countries*	3
International Trade and Finance	4.5	Current Issues in Islamic Economics	4.5
History of Economic Thought	3	Readings in Economic System of Islam	4.5
Research Methods for Social Scientists	3	Research Project**	3
Usul al Fiqh IV	3	Fiqh al Muamilat IV	3
Total Credits	27	Total Credits	27
* Alternatively: "The Pakistan Economy"			3
** Alternatively: "Project Evaluation"			3
Total credits in 4 years = 54 + 54 + 54 + 54 = 216			
Total subjects in 4 years = 14 + 14 + 14 + 14 = 56			

Table 2
Curriculum for the B.A. Degree in
Kulliyah of Economics
International Islamic University, Malaysia (IIU)

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>First Year</i>			
Economics I	3	Economics II	3
Quantitative Analysis I	4	Quantitative Analysis II	4
Introduction to Business Administration	3	Introduction to Accounting	3
Introduction to Islam & Its Aqidah	2	Introduction to al Qur'an	2
Elementary Qur'anic Language I	2	Elementary Qur'anic Language II	2
Elementary English Language I	2	Elementary English Language II	2
Total Credits	16	Total Credits	16
<i>Second Year</i>			
Microeconomics	4	Macroeconomics	4
Fiqh for Economists I	3	Fiqh for Economists II	3
Introduction to Computers & Information Processing	3	Introduction to Development and Planning	3
Introduction al Sunnah	2	Fiqh al Ibadat	2
Introduction to al Shari'ah	2	Intermediate Qur'anic Language II	2
Intermediate Qur'anic Language I	2	Intermediate English I	2
Intermediate English I	2		
Total Credits	18	Total Credits	16

Table 2 (continued)
Curriculum for the B.A. Degree in
Kulliyah of Economics
International Islamic University, Malaysia (IIU)

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>Third Year</i>			
Economic Analysis I	4	History of Islamic Economic Thought	3
Monetary Economics	3	Fiscal Economics	3
Economics of Welfare & Distribution	3	International Economics	3
Econometrics I	4	Economic Analysis II	3
Ethical Philosophy of Islam	2	Research Methodology	3
The Preaching of Islam	2	Islamic Civilization	2
Total Credits	18	Total Credits	17
<i>Four Year</i>			
History of Western Economic Thought	3	Regional Cooperation among Muslim Countries	3
Comparative Economic Systems	3	Project Evaluation	3
Project Paper	2	Project Paper	2
Two of the following elective course(s):		Two of the following elective course(s):	
Development Studies		Development Studies	
Economic Planning	3	Econometrics II	3
Development Finance	3	International Trade & Development	3
Comparative Development	3	Regional Economics	3
International Studies		International Studies	
International Economic Institutions	3	Econometrics II	3
Issues in International Economics	3	International Trade and Development	3
International Relations	3	International Finance	3
Modern & Contemporary History of Islam	2	Regional Economics	3
Islam and Society	2	Islamic Thought & Contemporary Issues	2
Total Credits	15/18	Total Credits	15/18
Total hours in 4 years = 32 + 34 + 35 + 35 = 136			

Table 3
Curriculum for the Undergraduate Program at
Imam Muhammad University, Ryād, Saudi Arabia

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>First Year</i>			
Al Qur'an al Karim	1	Al Qur'an al Karim	1
Tafseer and Ulum al Qur'an	6	Al Fiqh and al Siyasaḥ al Shariah	2
Al Tawheed	2	Mathematics for Economists	3
Islamic Studies	2	Basic Economics (Macro)	3
Basic Economics (Micro)	3	Accounting	2
Principles of Accounting	2	Principles of Business Administration	2
English Language	3	Arabic Language	4
		English Language	3
Total Credits	19	Total Credits	20
<i>Second Year</i>			
Al Qur'an al Karim	1	Al Qur'an al Karim	1
Al Fiqh and al Siyasaḥ al Shariah	4	Al Tafseer and al Ulum al Qur'an	6
Islamic Studies	2	Usul al Fiqh and Principles of Fiqh	4
Microeconomic Analysis	3	Islamic View of Public Revenue	3
Principles of Statistics	2		
Arabic Language	4	Statistics Analysis	2
English Language	3	English Language	3
Total Credits	19	Total Credits	19

Table 3 (continued)
Curriculum for the Undergraduate Program at
Imam Muhammad University, Ryād, Saudi Arabia

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>Third Year</i>			
Al Qur'an al Karim	1	Al Qur'an al Karim	1
Al Hadith	6	Al Fiqh and al Siyasaah al Shariah	4
Usul al Fiqh & Principles of Fiqh	4	Islamic Studies	2
Macroeconomic Analysis	3	Money and Banking	3
Economic History for Society	2	International Economics	3
Mercantile Law and Companies	2	History of Islamic Economic Thought	3
English Language	2	English Language	3
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	19
<i>Fourth Year</i>			
Al Qur'an al Karim	1	Al Qur'an al Karim	1
Al Hadith	3	Al Hadith	3
Al Fiqh and al Siyasaah al Shariah	2	Al Fiqh and al Siyasaah al Shariah	2
Islamic Studies	1	Islamic Studies	1
Econometrics	3	Theory of Distribution	3
Economic Development and Planning	3	Mathematical Economics	3
Project Evaluation	2	Islamic Economics (Seminar Course)	2
Islamic Economics (Theory)	3	Saudi Arabian Economy and the Economies of the Islamic World	3
Thesis	1		
Total Credits	19	Total Credits	18
Total hours in 4 years = 39 + 38 + 39 + 37 = 153 Total subjects in 4 years = 15 + 13 + 14 + 17 = 59			

Table 4
Curriculum for the B.A. Degree at
Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>First Year</i>			
Tajweed	1	Qur'an	1
Islamic History	1	Islamic History	1
Aqeeda	2	Aqeeda	2
Logic	2	Logic	2
Fiqh	2	Fiqh	2
Arabic Conversation	5	Arabic Grammar	5
Grammar (English or French)	2	Arabic Conversation	1
Conversation (English or French)	2	Grammar (English or French)	4
Physical Training	1	Conversation (English or French)	2
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	20
<i>Second Year</i>			
Tafseer	1	Tafseer	1
Islamic History	1	Islamic History	1
Aqeeda	2	Aqeeda	2
Logic	2	Fiqh	2
Fiqh	2	Arabic Grammar	5
Arabic Grammar	5	Arabic Conversation	1
Arabic Conversation	1	Grammar (English or French)	4
Grammar (English or French)	4	Conversation (English or French)	2
Conversation (English or French)	2	School of Philosophy	2
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	20

Table 4 (continued)
Curriculum for the B.A. Degree at
Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran

Semester I		Semester II	
Course Title	No. of Credits	Course Title	No. of Credits
<i>Third Year</i>			
Tafseer	2	Tafseer	2
Islamic History	1	Islamic History	1
Fiqh	4	Usul al Fiqh	3
Arabic Grammar	3	Fiqh	3
Arabic Conversation	1	Arabic Grammar	3
Grammar (English or French)	2	Arabic Conversation	1
Principles of Economics	4	Grammar (English or French)	2
Mathematics for Economists I	3	Mathematics for Economists II	3
		Macroeconomics	3
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	21
<i>Fourth Year</i>			
Usul al Fiqh	3	Usul al Fiqh	3
Fiqh	4	Fiqh	4
Arabic Conversation	1	Arabic Conversation	1
Maani wa Biyan	3	Maani wa Biyan	3
Grammar (English or French)	2	Grammar (English or French)	2
Microeconomics	3	History of Economic Thought	3
Statistics	4	Econometrics	4
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	20
<i>Fifth Year</i>			
Fiqh	4	Fiqh	4
Arabic Conversation	1	Arabic Conversation	1
Grammar (English or French)	2	Grammar (English or French)	2
Economic Planning	3	Economics of Iran	4
Growth and Development Economics	3	Socialist System of Economic Planning	2
Money and Banking	3	Economic Planning in Islamic Economies	3
Multinational Corporation	2	Research Report	3
International Economic Institutions	2		
Total Credits	20	Total Credits	19
<p>Total hours in 5 years = 40 + 40 + 41 + 40 + 39 = 200</p> <p>Total subjects in 5 years = 18 + 18 + 17 + 14 + 15 = 82</p>			

Appendix B

Contents of the Two Week Refresher Course For Teachers of Islamic Economics

The Nature of Islamic Economics

1. Zarqa, A. "Islamic Economics: An Approach to Human Welfare." In *SIE*: 3-18.
2. Hasanuzzaman, S. Muhammad. Definition of Islamic Economics. *JRIE* 1(2), Winter 1984: 51-53.
3. Khan, Muhammad Akram. Islamic Economics: Nature and Need. *JRIE* 1(2), Winter 1984: 55-61.
4. Kahf, M. "Islamic Economics and Its Methodology." *TIE*: Chapter 1: 1-11.
5. Ahmad, K. "Introduction." In *SIE*: xiii-xxiii.
6. Mawdudi, S.A.A. "Ma'ashi Qawaneen ki Tadween-e-Jadid aur Uskay Usul" (Guidelines for Reconstruction of Economics from an Islamic Perspective). In *MI*: Chapter Eleven, 417-436. (U).
7. Tasin, Muhammad. "Islami Iqtisadiyat sey Muta'allaq Chang Usuli Baten" (Some Fundamental Issues in Understanding Islamic Economics). *Fikr-0-Nazar*, 14(2), August 1976: 81-101; 14(3), September/October 1976: 209-220. (U)
8. Mannan, Mohammad A. Islamic Economics as a Social Science. *JRIE* 1(1), Summer 1983: 49-61.

Muslim Economic Thinking

1. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "Muslim Economic Thinking: A Survey of Contemporary Literature." In *SIE*: 119-315.
2. ——— "Recent Works on History of Economic Thought in Islam: A Survey." *ICRIE*, Research Series in English, Paper No. 12, 1982.
3. Boulakia, J.D.C. Ibn Khaldun: A Fourteenth Century Economist. *Journal of Political Economy* 79(5), September/October 1971: 1105-18.

4. Zaim, S. "Contemporary Turkish Literature on Islamic Economics." In *SIE*: 316-50.

Islamic Economic System/Economic System of Islam

1. Mawdudi, S.A.A. "Qur'an ki Ma'ashi Ta'limat" (Economic Teachings of the Qur'an). In *MI*: Chapter Two, 67-117. (U)
2. ——— "Islami Nizame Ma'ishat kay Usul aur Maqasid" (Principles and Objectives of Islamic Economic Order). In *MI*: Chapter Four, 141-163. (U)
3. ——— "Sarmayadari aur Islam ka Farq" (Different between Capitalism and Islam). In *MI*: Chapter Three, 119-139. (U)
4. Qazi, A.G.N. "Economic System of Islam." Speech delivered at National Defence College, Rawalpindi on 6th August 1983. Karachi. State Bank of Pakistan, 1983.
5. *IKIN*.
6. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. *Some Aspects of Islamic Economy*. Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1970.
7. ——— "Guarantee of a Minimum Level of Living in an Islamic State." Paper read at *21CIE*. (See also comments on this paper by S.N.H. Naqvi at the Conference.)
8. ——— *Islam ka Nazriyya-e-Milkiyyat* (Ownership in Islam). 2 Volumes. Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd, 1968. (U)
9. Chapra, Muhammad Umar. *The Economic System of Islam*. Karachi: University of Karachi, 1971.
10. ——— "The Islamic Welfare State and Its Role in the Economy." In *SIE*: 143-169.
11. ——— Review on Ethics and Economics: An Islamic Synthesis. *The Muslim World Book Review* 2(1), Autumn 1981: 21-26.
12. Naqvi, S.N.H. *Ethics and Economics: An Islamic Synthesis*. Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1979.
13. ——— *Individual Freedom, Social Welfare and Islamic Economic Order*. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1983.
14. Mirakhor, A. "Attempt to synthesize Islamic ethics and modern economics," *Crescent International*, 13(7), Ramadhan 16 - Shawwal 1, 1404 (June 16-30, 1984): 9,11.

15. Ishaque, K. Muhammad. "Private Property and Its Role in Islamic Social Order." In *ESI*: 19-54.
16. ——— "The Islamic Approach to Economic Activity and Development." In *MWFEO*: 74-100.
17. Sakr, Muhammad Ahmad. "The Role of State in the Economic System of Islam." In *INIEO*: 103-116.
18. Ibn Taymiya. *Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Hisba*. Translated by Mukhtar Holland, edited by K. Ahmad. Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1982.
19. Khan, Muhammad Akram. "Al-Hisba and the Islamic Economy." In Ibn Taymiya, *op. cit.*: 135-151.
20. Awan, A.A. *Equality, Efficiency and Property Ownership in the Islamic Economic System*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983.

Microeconomic Theory of an Islamic Economy

1. Seoharwi, Muhammad Hifz-ur-Rehman. "Inferadi Ma'ishat" (Microeconomics). In *IKIN*: 61-67. (U)
2. Kelani, Abdul Rahman. *Islam mein Zabita-e-Tijarat* (Islamic Code of Business Ethics). Edited by A. Zubeidi and Abdul Wakeel Alvie. Lahore: Maktaba-tus-Salam, n.d. (U)
3. Mannan, Muhammad A. "Scarcity, Choice and Opportunity Cost: Their Dimensions in Islamic Perspective." *ICRIE*, Research Series in English, Paper No. 10, 1982. 35p.
4. Reference Nos. 18 and 19 in III.

Consumer Theory

1. Ariff, Mohammad. "Towards Establishing the Micro Foundations of Islamic Economics. A Contribution to the Consumer Behaviour in an Islamic Society." Paper presented at the 12th Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, November 1983. 29pp.
2. Kahf, M. "The Theory of Consumption." In *TIE*: Chapter 11, 15-25.
3. ——— "A Contribution to the Theory of Consumer Behaviour in Islamic Economy." In *SIE*: 19-36.

Theory of Firm

1. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "Ends of Economic Enterprise." In *EEI*: Chapter One, 1-34.
2. ——— "Justice and Benevolence as the Bases of Entrepreneurial Behavior." In *EEI*: Chapter Two, 35-73.
3. ——— "Muslim Entrepreneur and the Economy." In *EEI*: 139-152.
4. Kahf, M. "The Theory of Production." In *TIE*: Chapter IV, 41-56.
4. Mannan, Muhammad A. "Islamic Perspectives on Market Prices and Allocation." *ICRIE*, Research Series in English, Paper No. 5, 1982. 31pp.
5. ——— "All Efficiency, Decision and Welfare Criteria in an Interest-Free Islamic Economy. A Comparative Policy Approach." In *MFEI*: 43-73.
6. Reference Nos. 18 and 19 III.

Basic Macroeconomic Themes in Islamic Economics

1. Kahf, M. "A Contribution to the Theory of Consumer Behaviour in an Islamic Society." In *SIE*: 19-36.
2. Khan, Muhammad Fahim. "Macro Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework." *JRIE* 1(2), Winter 1984: 1-24.

Investment

1. Kahf, M. "Saving and Investment Functions in a Two-Sector Islamic Economy." In *MFEI*: 107-123.
2. Zarqa, Muhammad A. "An Islamic Perspective on the Economics of Discounting in Project Evaluation." In *FPRAI*: 203-252.
3. Choudhry, M.A. "The Rate of Capitalization in Valuation Models in an Islamic Economy." In *FPRAI*: 287-313.
4. Naqvi, S.N.H. "Interest Rate and Intertemporal Allocative Efficiency in an Islamic Economy." In *MFEI*: 75-106

Money Banking and Monetary Policy in an Islamic Economy

1. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah, "Islamic Approach to Money, Banking and Monetary Policy." In *MFEI*: 25-42, or more recent version of the same in *IIBSP*. 15-50.
2. Ariff, Mohammad. "Introduction." In *MFEI*: 1-23.

3. Ahmad, Z. Iqbal, M. and Khan, Muhammad Fahim. "Introduction." In *MBI*: 1-25.

Nature of Money and Interest: The Western View and the Islamic Viewpoint

1. Saud, M.A. "Money, Interest and Qirad." In *SIE*: 59-84.
2. Ahmad, Z. "The Theory of Riba." *Islamic Studies* 17(4), Winter 1978: 171-85.
3. Shafi', Mufti Muhammad. *Mas'ala-e-Sud* (The Problem of Interest). Karachi: Dar al-Asha'at, 1979. (U)
4. Ahmad, M. "Semantics of Theory of Interest." *Islamic Studies* 6(2), June 1967: 171-96.

Alternatives to Interest in an Islamic Economy

1. Council of Islamic Ideology. "Report on the Elimination of Interest from the Economy." (Along with "Interim Report of the Panel of Economists and Bankers on the Elimination of Interest.) In *MBI*: 103-257.
2. Ali, M. "Mudarabah and Shirakat as a Basis of Interest-Free Economy." In *IFBP*: 127-41.
3. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah *Shirkat aur Mudabarat kay Shar'i Usul* (Principles of Shirakah and Mudarabah in Shariah). Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd, 1969. (U)
4. ——— "Business of the Bank." In *BWI*: Chapter 2, 19-38.
5. ——— "The Bank and the Owners of Capital." In *BWI*: Chapter 3, 39-52.
6. ——— "Banking in an Islamic Framework." In *IIBSP*: 51-65.
7. ——— "Rationale of Islamic Banking." In *IIBSP*: 67-96.
8. ——— "The Process of Credit Creation." In *BWI*: Chapter 5, 73-96.
9. ——— "Monetary Theory of Islamic Economics." In *IIBSP*: 125-131.
10. ——— "Some Clarification." In *BWI*: Chapter 9, 167-176.
11. ——— "Economics of Profit-Sharing." In *FPRAI*: 163-201. (See also *IIBSP*: 97-123).
12. ——— "Banking in an Islamic Framework." In *MWFEO*: 101-11.

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14. Chapra, Muhammad Umar, "Money and Banking in an Islamic Economy." In *MFEI*: 145-86.
15. Mohsin, Mohammad. "A Profile of Riba-Free Banking." In *MFEI*: 187-210.
16. Uzair, Muhammad. "Some Conceptual and Practical Aspects of Interest-Free Banking." In *SIE*: 37-57.
17. Bashir, B. Ahmad. "Successful Development of Islamic Banks." *JRIE* 1(2), Winter 1984: 63-71.

Central Banking and Monetary Policy in an Interest-Free Economy

1. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "The Central Bank." In *BWI*, Chapter 6, 97-124.
2. Uzair, Muhammad. "Central Banking Operations in an Interest-Free Banking System." In *MFEI*: 211-235.
3. Hashmi, S.A. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in an Islamic Economy." In *IFBP*: 109-126.
4. Al-Jarhi, M.A. "A Monetary and Financial Structure for an Interest-Free Economy: Institutions, Mechanism and Policy." In *MBI*: 69-101.
5. ——— "The Relative Efficiency of Interest-Free Monetary Economies: The Fiat Money Case." In *SIE*: 85-118.
6. Farooqui, A.H. "Financing of Foreign Trade in an Interest-Free Economy." In *IFBP*: 143-152.
7. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "Issues in Islamization of Banking." In *IIBSP*: 133-145.
8. Neinhaus, V. Profitability of Islamic PLS Banks Competing with Interest Banks: Problems and Prospects. *JRIE* 1(1), Summer 1983: 37-47. (See also Comments on this paper by Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi and Z. Ahmad in *JRIE* 1(1), Summer 1983: 63-8, and Fahim Khan in *JRIE* 1(2), Winter 1984: 73-78.
9. Reference Nos. 1 and 17 in VI.3.

Public Sector Economics in an Islamic Economy

1. Reference Nos. 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 in III.

Fiscal Policy in an Islamic Economy

1. Faridi, F.R. "A Theory of Fiscal Policy in an Islamic State." In *FPREI*: 27-58.
2. ——— "Theory of Fiscal Policy in an Islamic State." *JRIE* 1(1), Summer 1983: 17-35. (See also comments on this paper by Riad el-Shaikh and rejoinder by the author in *JRIE* 1(2) Winter 1984: 79-82.
3. Metwally, Muhammad M. "Fiscal Policy in an Islamic Economy." In *FPRAI*: 59-97.
4. Salama, A.A. "Fiscal Policy of an Islamic State." In *FPRAI*: 99-130.

Zakat and Ushr

1. Al-Qardawi, Y. *Fiqh al Zakah* (Fiqh of Zakah). 4 Volumes. Translated from Arabic by Sajid-ur-Rehman Siddiqi. Lahore: Al-Badr Publications, 1981 (Vols. 1 & 2) (Vols. 3 & 4). (U)
2. Badawi, Muhammad A. Zaki. "Zakat and Social Justice." In *MWFEO*: 112-122.
3. Suleman, R. Muhammad Umar. "Distributive Aspects of Zakah." In *ESI*: 321-339.
4. Faridi, F.R. "Zakat and Fiscal Policy." In *SIE*: 119-130.
5. Hashmi, S.A. "Zakat as an Instrument of Fiscal Policy." In *ESI*: 340-371.
6. Salama. A. Ahmad. "Fiscal Analysis of Zakah with Special Reference to Saudi Arabia's Experience in Zakah." In *MFEI*: 341-371.
7. Kadri, A.H. "The Role and Significance of Ushr in Agricultural Taxation Policy Policy in Muslim Economies." In *ESI*: 250-269.
8. Hasanuzzaman, S. Muhammad. "Issues Relating to Zakat and Ushr." Paper prepared for Work Group on Zakat and Ushr of *ZICIE*.

Public Revenue and Tax Policy

1. Seoharwi, Muhammad Hifz-ur-Rehman. "Bait ul-Mal" (The Exchequer). In *IKIN*: 108-13. (U)

2. Abu Yusuf, Imam. *Islam ka Nizam-e-Mahasil* (Public Revenue in Islam). Translated from Arabic by Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi. Karachi: Maktaba Chiragh-e-Rah, 1966. (U)
3. Kahf, M. "Taxation Policy in an Islamic Economy." In *FPRAI*: 131-161.
4. Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "Banking System and Public Finance." In *BWI*: Chapter 7, 127-154.

General Macroeconomic Models of an Islamic Economy

1. Kahf, M. "The Macro-Monetary Theory." In *TIE*: Chapter V, 59-93.
2. ——— "Economic Policy." In *TIE*: Chapter VI, 125-144.
3. Rushdi, A.A. "Effect of the Elimination of Riba on the Distribution of Income." Paper read at *ZICIE*. (See also comments on this paper by Z. Ahmad and M. Iqbal at the conference.)
4. Reference No. 10 in VI.3.

Economic Policy of an Islamic State—A Historical Perspective

1. Ahmad, M. "Distributive Justice and Fiscal and Monetary Economics in Islam." In *MFEI*: 311-340.
2. Hasanuzzaman, S. Muhammad. "The Objectives of Economic Policy in the Early Islamic Period." In *ESI*: 151-171.

Economic Development in an Islamic Framework

1. Ahmad, K. "Economic Development in an Islamic Framework." In *SIE*: 171-188.
2. ——— "Some Thoughts on a Strategy for Development under an Islamic Aegis." In *INIEO*: 127-143.
3. Al-Mahdi, S. "Development—The Islamic Approach." Extension lecture delivered at *ZICIE*.
4. Naqvi, S.N.H. "An Islamic Approach to Economic Development." In *INIEO*: 117-125.
5. Ragab, I.A. Islam and Development. *World Development* 8(7) 8, July/August 1980: 513-521.
6. Sutcliffe, C.R. "Is Islam an Obstacle to Development?" *The Journal of Developing Areas* 10(1), October 1975: 77-81.

7. Nazer, Muhammad. "The Goal and Strategy of Economic Development for the Muslim World." In *MWFEO*: 165-173.
8. Rashid, E. "Development Strategy for the Muslim World." In *MWFEO*: 194-8.
9. *IPS Task Force Development Strategy for the Sixth Plan 1983-88*. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1983.
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Distribution in an Islamic Economy

1. Mawdudi, S.A.A., "Milkiyyat-e-Zamin ka Mas'alah" (The Issue of Ownership of Land). In *MI*: Chapter Six, 187-226. (U)
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3. Qutb, S. *Islam mein A'dl-e-Ijtema'i* (Social Justice in Islam). Translated from Arabic by Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi. Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1969. (U)
4. Hasan, Z. "Distributional Equity in Islam." Paper read at *2ICIE*. (See also comments by Irfan Shafey and Saeed al-Martani on this paper at the conference.)
5. Shafi', Mufti Muhammad. *Islam ka Nizam-e-Taqsim-e-Daulat* (Distribution of Wealth in Islam). Karachi: Dar al-Asha'at, 1973. (English translation available under the title *Distribution of Wealth in Islam*. Karachi: Begum Aisha Bawany Wakf, 1975.) (U)
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7. Reference Nos. 7, 8, 12, and 15 in III.

Specific Factor Shares

1. Al-Faruqi, I.R. "Islam and Labour." In *INIEO*: 79-101.
2. Hasan, Z. "Theory of Profit. The Islamic Viewpoint." *JRIE* 1(1), Summer 1983: 1-16.

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2. Reference Nos. in IV 1, 2, and 3 in VI 3.

Islam and the New International Economic Order

1. Ahmad, K. "A Muslim Response." In J. Gremillion and W. Ryan (eds.) *World Faiths and the New World Order*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-Religion Peace Colloquium, 1978: 171-193.
2. *MWFEO*.

A Glossary of Abbreviations

<i>BWI</i>	Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. <i>Banking Without Interest</i> . Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1983. (Also Volker Neinhaus's Review in <i>J.R.I.E.</i> 1(2), Winter 1984: 84-93.)
<i>EET</i>	Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. <i>The Economic Enterprise in Islam</i> . Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd., 1979.
<i>ESI</i>	Economic System of Islam. (Proceedings of a seminar organized by The National Bank of Pakistan in April 1979.) Karachi: The National Bank of Pakistan, 1980.
<i>FPRAI</i>	Ahmad, Z., M. Iqbal, and Muhammad Fahim Khan (eds.). <i>Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam</i> . Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1983.
<i>ICRIE</i>	International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
<i>IFBP</i>	<i>Interest-Free Banking in Pakistan</i> . (Proceedings of the seminar on "Islamization of Banking" in 1980.) Karachi: The Institute of Bankers in Pakistan, n.d.
<i>IIBSP</i>	Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. <i>Issues in Islamic Banking, Selected Papers</i> . Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1983. (Also Muhammad A. Mannan's Review in <i>J.R.I.E.</i> 1(2), Summer 1983: 69-72.)
<i>IKIN</i>	Seoharwi, Muhammad Hafiz-ur-Rehman. <i>Islam ka Iqtisadi Nizam</i> (Economic System of Islam). Lahore: Adara-e-Islamiyat, 1981. (U)
<i>INIEO</i>	<i>Islam and a New International Economic Order: The Social Dimension</i> . (Proceedings of the symposium held, on the same theme,

- in Geneva, 7-10, January, 1980.) Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1980.
- JRIE* *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics.*
- MBI* Ahmad, Z., M. Iqbal, and Muhammad Fahim Khan (eds.). *Money and Banking in Islam.* Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1983.
- MFEI* Ariff, Mohammad (ed.). *Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam.*Jeddah: International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, 1982.
- MI* Mawdudi, S.A.A. *Ma'ashiyat-e-Islam* (Economics of Islam). Edited by K. Ahmad. Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1969. (U)
- MWFEO* *The Muslim World and the Future Economic Order.* (Proceedings of the conference held, on the same theme, in London during July 4-9, 1977). London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1979.
- SIE* Ahmad, K. (ed.). *Studies in Islamic Economics.* Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1980.
- TIE* Kahf, M. *The Islamic Economy: An Analytical Study of the Functioning of the Islamic Economic System.* Plainfield, Indiana: The Muslim Students' Association of the United States and Canada, n.d. (Also Muhammad Umer Chapra's Review in *J.R.I.E.* 1(2), Winter 1984: 83-5.)
- (U) The title is in Urdu.
- 2ICIE* The Second International Conference on Islamic Economics held during March 19-23, 1983 at the Islamic University, Islamabad.

Appendix C
List of Topics Covered in Senior Officers
Training Programme in Islamic Economic Doctrines
And Their Practical Application Conducted by the
International Institute of Islamic Economics at the
International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan (IIIE)

Sequence

No.	Topics	Remarks
1	Main Components of the Universal Islamic Message	
2	Islamic Approach Towards Life	
3	Ejaz ul Qur'an	
4	Introduction to Hadith Literature	
5	Economics of Qur'an	
6	The Concept of al Adl Wa al Ihsan	
7	Maqasid al Shariah	
8	Idiological Basis for Pakistan Movement	
9	Applicability of Islamic Shariah in the Context of Modern World Conditions	
10	Extension Lecture on "Concept of Credit & Its Application	Evening lecture "Modern World"
11	History of Islamic Economic Thought	
12	Contribution of Islam of World Civilization	
13	Economic System of Islam	
14	Islamic Economic System	
15	Islamic Viewpoint on Distribution of Income and Wealth	
16	Islam's Distribution System	
17	Concept of Ownership & Property Relationships in Islam	
18	The Prophet (PBUH) ka Mo'ashi Inqila'ab	
19	Land Tenure System and Land Reforms in an Islamic State	
20	Worker-Employer Relationships in Islam	
21	"Source of Islamic Law"	Evening Lecture
22	Social Justice in Islam	
23	Riba in the Light of Qur'an and Sunnah	
24	Economic Rationale of the Prohibition of Interest and Virtues of an Interest-Free Economy	
25	Seminar on "Business Practices in Islamic Shariah"	
26	Islamization of Commercial Banking in Pakistan	
27	Role of Ijtihad in Meeting the Challenges of Modern World	

- 28 Worker-Employer Relationships in Islam
- 29 Commercial Banking Based on Islamic Principles
- 30 Elimination of Interest from Government Transactions
(Including Islamic Viewpoint on Deficit Financing)
- 31 General Discussion
- 32 “The Present State of Islamic Finance Movement” Evening Lecture
- 33 Resource Allocation and Project Evaluation in an
Islamic Economy
- 34 Principles of Public Expenditure in an Islamic Economy
- 35 System of Zakah and Ushr in Operation in Pakistan:
A Description
- 36 Some Misgivings about Islamic Interest-Free Banking
- 37 Islam and Insurance
- 38 Central Banking and Monetary Policy in an Islamic
Economy
- 39 Recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology
on Economic Issues
- 40 Extension Lecture on “Islamisation of Commercial
Banking in Pakistan” Evening Lecture
- 41 Development Finance Institutions and Instruments in
an Islamic Economy
- 42 Taxation, PLS System and Islamization
- 43 Islamic Theory of Public Finance and Principles of
Taxation in an Islamic Economy
- 44 Role of Awqaf
- 45 “Islamization Process in Pakistan” Evening Lecture

Comments on “Teaching Programs in Islamic Economics: A Comparative Study”*

Abdul Rahman Yusri

In “Teaching Programs in Islamic Economics: A Comparative Study,” Iqbal introduces excellent ideas that demonstrate his knowledge of both Islamic economics and the problems of teaching it. He exposes the hiatus between secular social sciences and traditional education in Muslim societies by following the usual interpretation; that is, describing the rift within the educational system between ‘traditional’ education which is devoted to the religious sciences while ignoring the modern sciences, and secular education which is devoted to modern sciences, accepting it in blind faith, while showing no interest in the religious sciences. However, within the educational institutions there exists a more fundamental problem.

Many Muslim countries such as Egypt have introduced modern sciences into the curriculum of institutions of traditional education. For example, al-Azhar University restructured itself, mixing traditional shari‘ah education with the modern sciences. Even so, the gap between the two systems did not disappear, rather, it became even more pronounced. Iqbal indicates his awareness of the problem but does not express it as succinctly and clearly as he should. The gap between traditional and modern education in our societies is reflected in the hearts and minds of our teachers, educators, and intellectuals who believe that integration does injustice to one or the other educational system. A deep-seated belief among some religious leaders is that modern science contains the seeds of evil thought and that the introduction of modern sciences into traditional Islamic education will have a negative effect on the faith. Clearly, mixing the modern and the Islamic sciences alone will not solve the problem facing our schools and universities. Rather, the problem will only be solved when educators expand the traditional curriculum so that it absorbs new branches of knowledge, while at the same time, establishes a

* Translated from Arabic by the editor.

discriminating filter to sift out what is not in accord with Islam. Only when we have developed a methodology to ascertain whether a modern scientific development is in line with the values inherent in our shari'ah will the blind imitation of the West stop. The moment Muslim intellectuals attain this is the moment the imaginary hiatus between the two systems vanishes. Vital to teaching Islamic economics is the knowledge that the real gap to be bridged is the one between the knowledge based on true faith revealed to our Prophet, the Seal of the Prophets, blessings and peace be upon him, and the sciences that do not pay attention to such faith, and may even run counter to it.

The early steps taken by some Muslim educational institutions to establish specialized departments with full curricula for the teaching of Islamic economics encountered the question of balance between shari'ah and secular sciences. The problem was not only how much of each to give the students but also who among the faculties was qualified to teach these subjects. The professors of fiqh saw themselves as the most qualified to teach Islamic economics as well modern economics. On the other hand, the professors who studied economics in the West or in the Muslim countries whose universities followed Western standards and were unconvinced of the relevance of Islamic economics, understood the problem of teaching Islamic economics as no more than modifying the economic theory within ordinary secular economics courses to accord with Islamic ethics and values. What concerned most professors of economics was how to analyse problems and pass them through theoretical studies within a general framework of basic assumptions deduced from the shari'ah and the ethics of Islamic societies. Economics professors concentrated on learning the details of some rather general principles of the shari'ah or considered the shari'ah outside their field of competence. Evidence of this situation was revealed in conferences, seminars, and workshops conducted in many countries since 1971, and is reflected in the curricula of many Islamic universities.

Iqbal analyses the curricula of four leading Islamic Universities, highlighting the balance between the shari'ah and modern econom-

ics in each. He finds traditional shari'ah subjects are prominent and receive higher intensity in Muhammad bin Saud and al Imam Sadiq Universities; whereas he finds modern economics more dominant in the curriculum of the International Islamic University in Malaysia. Iqbal does not explain the reasons behind the curricula differences. I may safely say that the differences in the curricula lie in the fact that at those universities where the shari'ah specialists had the upper hand, the shari'ah subjects dominated the curriculum and vice-versa. At the International Islamic University in Islamabad he found a more balanced curriculum. And reflecting his wide experience at the University of Islamabad, we find that Iqbal, in his proposed curriculum, judiciously mixes shari'ah science and modern economics to produce a balanced curriculum at the undergraduate level.

With care, Iqbal addresses the question of what is the proper mixture of shari'ah and modern economics in the university curriculum. Certainly, the question is not easy to answer and may not be answered until Islamic economics is well established in Muslim countries. Professors of shari'ah, and *fuqahā* in particular, are not economists. This fact does not reduce in any way their prestige—Islamic scientific methodology was developed centuries before the Western system. The Islamic system respects specialization. Professors of modern economics in Muslim universities have to begin economic analysis within the Islamic perspective. Of course, this will need more than a general knowledge of shari'ah principles, it will take a deep and searching exploration of the shari'ah, Islamic economic history, and the contribution of Muslim scholars to economics.

But the problem is not merely deciding the proper mixture of shari'ah and modern economics courses, the problem is how to facilitate the amalgamation of shari'ah and modern economics. The amalgam will not occur unless the hearts and minds of the teachers of both shari'ah and modern economics change. Then and only then will we have a unified concept of Islamic economics and no longer need to divide our courses into shari'ah and otherwise.

Iqbal's work is excellent as is the program he presents as a B.A. degree in Islamic Economics. Those who have studied modern economics and then devoted their time and energy to research in the field of Islamic economics are in complete agreement with him. However, even though a large portion of Iqbal's proposed curriculum contains study of the shari'ah, his proposal will still not be acceptable to most shari'ah specialists.

The fundamental question is how to eliminate the existing gap in the hearts and minds of those who teach. I suspect that, for a long time, there are going to be graduates from our leading universities who have B.A. degrees in Islamic economics but who have different backgrounds. Some will be well-versed in shari'ah principles and codes with little training in economics while others will be well-trained in modern economics but possess very superficial knowledge of the shari'ah.

In Iqbal's examination of Islamic universities, he ignores developments in three leading Islamic universities—al Azhar in Egypt, Um al Qura in Saudi Arabia and Omdurman in Sudan. Neglecting to mention these universities is unfortunate for they are instructive examples. In particular, al-Azhar, which has ambitiously pursued the integration of modern sciences with traditional religious teachings has been a target of criticism from different quarters. Al Azhar is worth evaluating and should have been included in this paper. The other two universities have identical programs of teaching Islamic economics. In these programs, there is a clear attempt to integrate modern economics and the shari'ah. There seems to be no particular reason why these universities were not included in this paper.

From my own experience at Um al Qura University, I know that within two years it is possible to present a substantial portion of the shari'ah of economics to graduate students from secular universities. At the same time, it is also possible to present a substantial portion of modern economics to graduates of shari'ah institutions. Within this program, a student who has passed his preparatory studies is in a position to choose his Master or Ph.D. thesis under the supervision of two professors, one specializing in the shari'ah and the other in mod-

ern economics. The program has resulted in important research and the completion of many theses in different branches of Islamic economics.

Some of the students who finished their Ph.D.s became part of the teaching staff at the university and will have an important role in furthering research in Islamic economics. They are well prepared for the task. They went through a program of balanced education in both economics and shari'ah. Some may wonder how it is possible to develop postgraduate programs where there is no undergraduate teaching of the subject? We should not forget that Islamic economics is not a new science. Its roots extend into history and we are only reintroducing it in the modern context.

The last point which I would like to raise is the importance of offering complementary subjects to students of Islamic economics. The job market is not yet ready to offer employment opportunities to its graduates. In fact, society may demand skills and training not developed by its courses but by the complementary courses. The complementary subjects such as accounting, business administration, foreign language, and quantitative studies, though not part of the study of Islamic economics, will enhance the opportunities of its graduates. This is very important, especially in the beginning. Certainly, students will not specialize in this science if there are no jobs for them.

How to Teach Microeconomics in Islamic Perspective at Intermediate Undergraduate Level in an Undergraduate Program

Fahim Khan

General Discription of the Course

Course Level

Microeconomics has not yet reached a level where the Islamic perspective can be incorporated into microeconomic theory at the graduate or even at the undergraduate level. At this stage, efforts are required to organize an intermediate undergraduate microeconomics course with an Islamic perspective. The course will be taught in the third year of a four-year undergraduate economics program, following courses taught at the principles level in the first or second year. This paper provides guidelines for such a course.

Prerequisites

The course follows the principles level courses—a course on the principles of ‘conventional’ economics, an introductory course on Islamic economic doctrines, and a course explaining the fundamentals of fiqh al mu‘āmalāt (the jurisprudence of economic and financial matters). A list of main topics covered in these prerequisite courses can be found in Appendix A. It is assumed that the student has been exposed to elementary mathematical tools (algebra, graphs, geometry, and differential calculus, etc.).

Duration

The course is two semesters. Normally, a course of this level is taught in one semester; but because students are required to review the secular concepts from the Islamic point of view, they need to learn all of the standard material plus the relevant Islamic literature. The most time consuming aspect of this course is the elaboration and critical appraisal of the philosophical underpinnings of conventional microeconomic theory.

Coverage

The course's basic framework will follow the standard textbooks used at this level at any well-known North American or West European university. The contents of a typical textbook are detailed in Appendix D.¹ The course objective will be to cover all the standard material covered in the secular context and then return to the material viewing it from the point of view of Islam and, when possible, offering Islamic alternatives. An outline of the course along with suggested guidelines for teachers are given below.

General Approach and Methodology

In most Western universities, a course at this level is given a mathematical rather than philosophical treatment. However, this course requires full mathematical treatment along with a detailed discussion, as far as possible, of the philosophical underpinnings. It would be futile to examine the secular concepts from an Islamic point of view without first providing the secular philosophic basis. Usually at the this course level no term paper is required, but for the purpose of this course a paper is highly desirable. Students are required to write a term paper on a topic that reviews a concept of modern microeconomics from an Islamic point of view or integrates a 'conventional' concept with an Islamic concept.

In Muslim countries junior faculty members, who have little exposure to the research in Islamic Economics, will most likely be teaching this course because it is an undergraduate course and there is shortage of adequately qualified faculty. Though the junior faculty members may be perfectly qualified to teach the secular content of the course, because of the lack of teaching material in the field, they will always feel handicapped in providing their students an Islamic insight into the concepts discussed in the course. It will, therefore, be desirable to arrange lectures to be delivered by renowned scholars of Islamic economics in order to present a comparative analysis of philosophical underpinnings of various concepts of modern microeconomics.

¹ These contents have been taken from A. Koutsoyiannes, *Modern Microeconomics*, 2nd edition, Macmillian Publishers Ltd., n.d.

Outlines and Guidelines

Broadly speaking the course should cover the following areas:

1. Introduction to Microeconomics
2. Theory of Demand
3. Theory of Production
4. Theory of Costs
5. Theory of Profit Maximizing Firm (i.e., firm behaving with marginal cost pricing)
6. Theory of Firm under Alternate Pricing Systems (i.e., pricing systems other than marginal cost pricing)
7. Production Factors, Pricing Factors, and Markets Factors
8. Theory of Distribution
9. General Equilibrium and Welfare Theory

Guidelines for content discussions in these areas are given below. (A detailed outline of the above headings are given in Appendix A.)

First Semester

Introduction to Microeconomics

Microeconomics requires an introduction to the concepts of the economic problem, economic agents, and economic social institutions. A brief description of the contemporary methodology of social sciences in general and economics in particular is also required. Usually a discussion on methodology is not covered in this course, but since Islamic economics is yet to be developed as a scientific discipline, it is essential that students broadly know the methodology of economics at this stage too. After a discussion of these topics in the secular context, the teacher then should turn to the Islamic perspective on these topics. An economic problem should be discussed in detail in the light of an Islamic system of life. At this point, a renowned Islamic economist, or, if one is not available, a renowned 'ālim (religious scholar) should be invited to give his idea of 'the economic problem of man.' The teacher then may synthesize this lecture into

the modern economic jargon. Such a discussion should make a student conceptualize ‘maximizing behavior’ within the Islamic context. Optimization, with respect to the objective of economic activity and the objective of the economic activities of Islamic agents, should be elaborated in detail.

The significance of ‘wants’ which emerge from desires is another important point to be discussed in the context of formulating the economic problem of man from the Islamic perspective. Along with wants the concept of ‘needs’ may be discussed. At this point, it will be useful to refer to the literature relating to the objectives of the shari‘ah. In addition, the following topics need to be highlighted: the limits of laissez-laire in the context of the Islamic economy, the role of the State to intervene in the economic affairs of economic agents of the society, the State’s own economic role, the State’s role in modifying the individual’s economic behavior so that it falls in line with the objectives of the shari‘ah, and the State’s role in building up itself as an institution so that it supplements or complements the market institution in achieving the objectives of the shari‘ah. Along with this introduction to the economic problem from the Islamic perspective, the methodology of Islamic economics should be discussed. Here we may introduce the role of the third sector in the Islamic economy, the private sector, which looks after the public needs of the society.

The discussion of microeconomic methodology may start by describing the axioms that relate human behavior to the development of economic theory and then goes on to determining whether or not Islamic economics requires different axioms. Again, a reference to the objectives of the shari‘ah may be required in order to derive the basic axioms of Islamic economic behavior. In this respect, some reading material mentioned in Appendix E can be consulted. So far, two or three different approaches are available. The teacher should discuss all of them as a methodology for Islamic economics.

A discussion of the implications of a difference in the set of axioms for human behavior should also be discussed. For example, it can be argued that whereas axioms of secular behavior emphasize only efficiency (more is preferred to less), the axioms of Islamic

behavior imply not only efficiency but some other norms also (e.g., equity, desirability, etc.). Similarly, as the secular axioms of laissez-faire will promote the market as an economic institution to achieve efficiency, Islamic axioms will promote their own institutions to ensure their norms of equity, desirability, etc. These institutions may be public sector institutions or third sector institutions.

In a secular context, this introduction may not take more than a lecture but in the Islamic context, at least three lectures should be devoted to this section so that students get the necessary background to visualize and compare the Islamic approach to the concepts of micro-behavior that they will be studying in this course. (The readings for this section are shown in Appendix B.)

Concept of Ownership

After the introduction, conventional microeconomic theory begins with the consumption theory. However, when beginning microeconomics from an Islamic perspective, the starting point will be the concept of ownership and individual property rights. Secular economics is justified in ignoring the discussion of individual property rights on the assumption that individuals are operating in a laissez-faire framework. This assumption is not true when discussing Islamic microeconomics.

The manner in which property rights are defined has an extensive and intensive effect not only on the economic activities of a society but also on the institutions that will develop in the society. In fact, the system of property rights determines the parameters of microeconomic behavior.

A precise introduction to the Islamic system of property rights will help students understand the institutional structure regulated in an Islamic society. He will be able to review the following:

- How relevant the assumption of competitive markets are to an Islamic society.
- How far the competitive markets will be able to meet the economic needs of the society.

- What institutions of Islamic society that competitive markets fail to meet.

A proper definition of property rights also determines the divergence between private costs/benefits and social costs/benefits which will provide a basis for understanding the Islamic approach to welfare theory in microeconomics.

The property rights of individuals and state/society need to be defined separately. Individual property rights, also called private property rights, must be explained in relation to a market system. Simple examples from contemporary societies will serve to explain how inadequately defined private property rights lead to market failures. They do so because they create externalities which lead to a situation in which either the private cost of an action is not equal to the social cost of that action or the private benefit of an action is not equal to the social benefit of that action. Distinctive features of the Islamic system of private property rights are required to be highlighted not only to mention that such externalities are minimized but also to mention that these features are extremely important for the formulation of various aspects of microeconomic theory. (References have been provided in the reading list to explain the extent to which the principles of property rights have affected the formulation of microeconomic theory.) Criticism of traditional theory of production and exchange and the new analytical approaches form an important body of contemporary economic literature. A large part of this literature is growing upon the notion of property right structure. Our students, who will have to criticize traditional theory and discover alternate analytical approaches, will benefit from a discussion of the Islamic system of property rights at the beginning of a microeconomic theory course.

While teaching the topics of consumption, production, and firm behavior, the teacher is required, off and on, to explain that the nature of Islamic property rights affects the allocation and use of resources in specific and predictable ways. It has been argued in economic literature that a change in the general system of property relations must affect the way people behave and hence, through this effected behav-

ior, property rights assignments affect the allocation of resources, composition of output, distribution of income, etc.

No in-depth analysis of property rights and their relationship to microeconomic theory is required at this stage. The objective is simply to make the students understand that Islam gives a different system of property rights with its distinctive features having implications on the microeconomic behavior of human beings.

Theory of Demand

In this section, the first topic discusses the theory of consumer behavior. After explaining the secular basis of consumer behavior (covering the concepts of utility, marginal utility, and indifference curve analysis), the question becomes is this a valid basis (or the only basis) from which to describe consumer behavior? One approach may be to derive the basis of Islamic consumer behavior from the objectives of the shari'ah. The objectives of the shari'ah should determine the objectives of Islamic consumer behavior. *Maṣlahah* (considerations of public interest) in the consumption of a good, for example, may be an alternative concept corresponding to the secular concept of utility. According to Shatibi, *maṣlahah* can be at three levels: *darriyah* (necessity), *hajjiyah* (complementary), and *tahsinuyah* (amelioratory). There will be a lexicographic ordering in the goods at different levels of *maṣlahah*. Indifference curve analysis, therefore, will not be valid. (Reference has been provided in the reading list to indicate how lexicographic ordering may be analyzed in this respect.) Only those goods which have the same level of *maṣlahah* can be amenable to indifference curve analysis. Such an approach leads to a distinction between wants (based on the utility concept) and needs (based on the *maṣlahah* concept). The question then becomes in what respect is the consumer behavior analysis based on the need concept substantially different from the analysis based on the utility or want concept? It is in this context that discussion should arise about economic institutions (not present in the secular framework) that moti-

vate or force the consumer to fulfill his needs (according to *maṣlahah*) rather than seek maximization of worldly utility (desires).

At this stage, it is necessary to distinguish between the two types of spending performed by the Islamic consumer.

- Type I is to meet his and his family's worldly needs (the fulfillment of which not only yields utility but also a reward in the Hereafter).
- Type II is for the sake of a reward in the Hereafter alone with no explicit motive of meeting worldly needs.

This discussion should start from the explanation of *āyāt* (verses) 2:260 to 2:280 in the Qur'an. It will be useful to invite a scholar in *fiqh* to explain these verses in detail with reference to the consumption behavior of the Prophet (Peace be upon him) and his Companions. Following the scholar's discourse, the teacher should reformulate the same concepts in economic jargon. Comparing the two types of spending we may say that, whereas type I spending may be yielding what is recognized as utility, type II spending yields something different from utility. Let us call it extra-utility (*thawāb* or reward in the Hereafter). Whereas utility is something that refers to the man-material relationship, extra-utility is something that refers to the man-Allah relationship. An optimum allocation between the baskets, therefore, takes place on the basis of several parameters (including the degree to which an individual is committed to behave as a true Islamic person). In fact, type I spending involves utility as well as extra-utility because to spend on one's own genuine needs (i.e., needs having *maṣlahah*) also brings a reward in the Hereafter; whereas type II spending involves only extra-utility. The Qur'an in *āyah* 2:177 "and giveth away his wealth out of love for Him" clearly indicates that type II spending involves only extra-utility. It may be discussed what relationship utility and extra-utility may have in type I spending. For example, it may be argued that marginal extra-utility and marginal-utility are positively related. When the hungry person eats his first portion of food, he gets highest utility and also gets highest extra-utility because he knows that saving his life is a religious obligation. Eating the next portion of food gives him lower utility as

well as lower extra-utility and so on. Since it is difficult to talk about a marginal reward in the Hereafter, particularly in reference to type II spending, one may therefore like to talk in terms of total utility and extra-utility. One may argue that the two are negatively related in type I spending. The higher one spends on one's own needs, though the total utility may increase, the extra-utility may decline. On the other hand, the extra-utility involved in type II spending is a monotonically increasing function of spending.

By maximizing extra-utility while trying to fulfill his needs, the consumer can arrive at an optimum allocation of resources between the two types of spending. There are two types of choices involved: the choices between type I spending and type II spending and the choices within each type of spending. We have to make an attempt to describe rules for each of them. It is not necessary that we should try to explain these rules with the help of indifference curve analysis. We may take the example of a typical Islamic consumer and, making various assumptions about his Islamic orientation, arrive at certain rules governing his choices either in terms of utility or *maṣlahah* or *thawāb*. Also, it is essential to explain the normative spending behavior of an Islamic consumer. Classroom discussion would serve to explain the term *isrāf* (intemperance) in the economic jargon of utility or *maṣlahah* and its role in arriving at a decision rule for the two types of choices. Also, it may be useful to attempt an explanation of *al 'afw* (one's resources that are beyond one's needs). It is here that students may be required to write an assignment on the decision rules of an Islamic consumer for the choices it faces. Hypothetical numerical examples may be given to ask the students to determine how a consumer will allocate his income or how this allocation will be different from the allocation if he behaves other than as an Islamic consumer.

Within the topic Theory of Demand, the standard textbooks cover the following as an application of the theory of consumer behavior: Work-Leisure choice and Intertemporal Choice. These two aspects of choice need elaboration from the Islamic perspective using the same method of analysis used above for consumer behavior.

Work-Leisure Choice

It may be pointed out that leisure is not the only alternative to work. There is another alternative use of time, it is the use of time for the Hereafter. It may, therefore, not be merely a work-leisure choice in the Islamic perspective. We may call it a time-allocation problem (corresponding to the income-allocation problem.² Someone may spend his time in three ways: first, earning income to have a command over other resources to meet his worldly needs; second, leisurely resting or recreating (which too is a worldly need); third, doing something that fulfills no worldly need but which will benefit him in the Hereafter.

How one allocates his time between the three types of uses is part of the discussion on consumer behavior. Parallel with the discussion of income-allocation we may put time-allocation into two types.

- Type I is spending time to meet worldly needs. This includes time allocated to work earning an income as well as resting the mind and body (again, meeting genuinely worldly needs implies a reward in the Hereafter too).
- Type II is spending time earning a reward for the Hereafter only (with no explicit objective to meet any worldly need). This includes time allocated to various *'ibādah* (acts of worship), the propagation of Islam, etc.

Similar to the income-allocation problem, the consumer is now confronted with two choices of expenditure: How much time to allocate to type I and type II spending. After it has been decided how much time to allocate to type I spending, the choice is to decide how much time to allocate to work and how much to leisure within this type I spending. The choice may be discussed with the student first in the utility-based approach using the indifference curve analysis and pointing out its limitation in analyzing such behavior. Then these choices may be discussed in the need-based framework too. Though there are no tools available for analyzing the need-based behavior

² Just as the consumer must decide on how much income to spend on which commodity, so the consumer must face the problem of time allocation, i.e., how much time to spend on what.

such as the indifference curves, still it is hoped that a continuous effort by teachers to explain the need-based approach will ultimately result in the development of our own tools of analysis.

Intertemporal Choices

Intertemporal choices require an in-depth analysis from the Islamic point of view. If the students are not clear about the Islamic position on this aspect of choice, they may later become confused on the issues relating to factor rewards, and income distribution between factors of production.

First, a full exposition should be given to intertemporal choice in the secular framework by explaining, in detail, the concept of time preference and how an equilibrium discount rate is arrived at with the help of indifference curve analysis between present consumption and future consumption. That the philosophical underpinning of such an analysis is important should also be highlighted and reviewed. After an excursion on the secular conceptual plane, a turn should be made towards the Islamic plane. The basic question to discuss is: Does Islam recognize time preference as a legitimate aspect of the economic behavior of human beings or will Muslims have a positive time preference if they behave according to Islamic norms of behavior?

Answering the question may begin by raising the above questions, first, in the secular context. Do people really have a positive time preference? If so, what are the factors that determine the rate of time preference? Do these factors remain valid in the Islamic context? Literature is now available to discuss this question in detail. (References have been provided in Appendix B.) One conclusion may seem to be quite obvious, that is, the rate of time preference in Islamic behavior may be much higher than in secular behavior. This may be because of several factors, e.g., the belief that the Almighty, and not the human being, can take the responsibility of future consumption and the social insurance system will take care of the emergencies. But this should not lead to the conclusion (as some writers have done) that savings in an Islamic economy will be lower or only

negligible due to the higher rate of time preference. The question of savings should be discussed from two angles. First, the motives and factors that generate savings are required to be discussed. Several motives and factors behind savings will turn out to be independent of the rate of time preference. The high rate of time preference may come in the way of savings only when investment and, hence, return on savings is the only motive for savings. Second, savings in an Islamic framework will be required to be invested, otherwise, it will be depleted by zakah. Thus, the savings in an Islamic economy are compelled to be in a productive form and, therefore, the consumer may even raise higher productive savings.³ All such discussion should be confined in the context of intertemporal choice to present and future consumption.

Next, in the context of intertemporal choice within the Islamic framework the question is whether the time has legitimate value in intertemporal transactions and whether this value is allowed to be cashed in the market. In other words, if I believe that I discount future consumption at the rate of 10 percent per annum, does this mean that I am entitled to charge a person who borrows my present resources to pay me a surcharge at the rate of 10 percent to compensate my time preference. There is some controversy about this, therefore, a review of the literature is essential to provide the students with food for thought whenever the issues of discounting, interest rate, deferred sales/payments are discussed. (References to the relevant literature have been provided in Appendix B.)

Now is an appropriate time to discuss a peculiar aspect of consumer behavior in the Islamic framework. In the secular framework, income-allocation in the intertemporal framework makes the consumer a saver who earns interest on savings to maximize his present and future consumption. Similarly, the time allocation between income and leisure makes him a laborer who decides to spend part of his time as labor for wages. But the analysis of consumer behavior in

³ It may be pointed out that a lot of savings in several developing countries are in unproductive assets like gold, jewelry, and other durable consumer items. Such savings are independent of time preference (as time preference in these countries should be high) and are independent of rate of return on savings.

the Islamic framework may lead us to explain how an entrepreneur or a firm is generated as a result of a consumer's work-leisure choice or as a result of his intertemporal choice.

Analysis of intertemporal income-allocation in the Islamic perspective reveals that if a person chooses to save, then he at the same time decides to be an investor too. In the presence of zakah and the absence of interest, he cannot decide simply to save unless he knows how to pay zakah. In other words, he will simultaneously decide in what form he will keep his savings so that he can pay zakah out of the income of such savings. Similarly, time-allocation analysis will simply reveal that a person decides how much time to spend working. But then there is another choice involved, and that is whether to work for a wage or initiate his own work in order to earn an income (in which case he will decide to bear entrepreneurial risk too).

In other words, analysis of how a consumer includes a choice between various risk bearing alternatives is available to him. This aspect may be made an important and integral part of the consumer theory in the Islamic perspective. It is this choice that will help us in understanding the supply of entrepreneurial factors of production⁴ (as opposed to secular consumer theory which helps us understand only the supply of labor and savings—savings being considered as supply of capital on the assumption that all savings are invested).

Next comes market demand analysis. The standard techniques and tools of market analysis may be taught to the students from any conventional textbook. The derivation of market demand resulting from the individual consumer's decisions and a discussion of the factors affecting market demand should be done both under utility-based analysis as well as need-based analysis. The differences in market demand under the two approaches should be discussed. Under the need-based (*maṣlāḥah*-based) analysis, necessities are required to be fulfilled first, then complementarities, and then amelioratories. In a society where institutions exist to motivate or compel its individuals to follow such a hierarchy in needs in the initial stages of develop-

⁴ The concept of entrepreneurial factors of production will be further introduced in detail under the topic of factors of production.

ment, market demand should reflect mostly the fulfillment of necessities. Complementarities and amelioratories may get added at an accelerated rate as society develops. For example, consider market demand of a good say, wheat. The slope of market demand of wheat will depend on, among other factors, the level of development in the country (i.e., per capita income) and the extent of income distributions. If the per capita income is low and income-distribution is more or less egalitarian, the market demand will be almost flat since most of the people will simply be using wheat to meet their necessities. (This may not be so if the economy is not following a hierarchy among necessities, complementaries and ameliorates in its consumption). As the country develops, the slope of the market demand will become steeper and steeper because into wheat's demand will enter the complementary and amelioratory. This result may hold irrespective of the distribution of income in the economy. On the other hand, in a secular economy, the more unequal the distribution of income, the steeper the demand for wheat because some people will be using wheat as complementary and some as amelioratory and the demand of such people will obviously be more price elastic. There is no institutional compulsion in the society not to go for amelioratory consumption of wheat when other people are deprived of even its essential consumption.

It may be instructive to analyze the recent developments in the theory of market demand such as linear expenditure which can have relevance for an analysis in the Islamic perspective. Linear expenditure systems refer to models which deal with groups of commodities rather than individual commodities like food, clothing, consumer durables, services, etc.

It is assumed that the consumer buys some minimum quantity from each group irrespective of prices. In the Islamic framework, we can say that the consumer, first, will have to meet essential needs (for the basic protection of life, property, religion, reason, and posterity), irrespective of prices. Then LES (linear expenditure systems) assures that the income left after the expenditure on these essentials is allocated among various groups on the basis of prices. Here we may

introduce that the income left after meeting the essentials will be first allocated to complementaries because the amelioratories cannot be purchased before fulfilling complementary needs. A constant price elasticity say b may be assumed for these complementaries (as LES assumes for all consumption beyond the minimum requirement). Then we may assume that the income left after spending on essentials and complementaries will be allocated to amelioratories. (This will be a step forward beyond what is discussed in LES). Again a constant price elasticity say b^* may be assumed for these amelioratories with the restriction that $b^* > b$. This is because, by definition, price elasticities of amelioratories are required to be higher than the price elasticities of complementarities. Several arguments can be developed to support such an hypothesis. (A similar division can be done for type II spending where some spending is absolutely essential—such as *zakah/‘ushr* [one-tenth] and *al nafaqāt al wājibah* [required living expenditures]—and some spending may be complementary, and the remaining may be amelioratory.) LES, in fact, is potentially very helpful for econometric estimation of market demand functions in a contemporary Muslim society, which if implemented can help them to strengthen an Islamic theory of consumer behavior. Such an analysis may even help define *isrāf* and understanding the factors behind it. This subject, in fact, has the potential to become the subject of a Ph.D. thesis in Islamic economics.

The theory of consumer behavior is at the core of microeconomics. The introduction and the discussion of the theory of demand should comprise more than two-thirds of the first semester. The remaining one-third should be devoted to the theory of production, the theory of cost, and the theory of profit maximizing firm.

Theory of Production

The conventional textbook treatment of the theory of production simply requires an explanation of technical relationships and concepts such as: law of returns to scale, technological progress, marginal conditions for equilibrium level of output, derivation of cost function

from production function, production possibility curves, etc. These concepts have to be taught in the same detail as any modern text provides on this topic. But before entering into these technical concepts and relationships, the students must be led to ask, Why produce? This is a question usually not discussed in modern textbooks while discussing the theory of production. The modern textbook usually addresses itself to the questions, What to produce? and How much to produce? But the question Why produce? is not raised at all. In the secular framework, the reason is obvious: since consumers have to consume to derive utility, consumption can be met only through production. Maximization of utility requires maximum production. The question Why produce? therefore, does not require discussion. The question Why produce? only becomes relevant when discussing the theory of production in the Islamic perspective because then the discussion requires us to distinguish the secular motives for production from the Islamic ones.

If we agree to divide consumption into two distinct types of spending, one to meet worldly needs and another to meet the needs of the Hereafter only, then production has to be made for both types of spending. An explanation of motives behind production will help to understand various goods of a firm, which will be discussed under the heading Theory of Firm.

While discussing a production function in the secular context, it must be clarified that $Q = F(K, L)$ simply refers to the fact that production depends on certain factors. In addition, it must be clarified that the Islamic framework provides a different approach towards factors of production than the secular framework. At this stage it may simply be mentioned that this production function takes into account only those factors of production which have a definite schedule of marginal productivity and hence are entitled to a reward equal to their marginal productivity. This production function assumes away risk and uncertainty. This assumption may go well with the secular analytical framework, but for an analysis in the Islamic perspective, this assumption may hide some important aspects of economic analysis. It may be mentioned with reference to a later discussion on factors of

production that the factors of production may opt for sharing the outcomes of an activity rather than claiming a fixed reward on the basis of marginal productivity. The above production function cannot adequately take into account this fact, because in the Islamic framework, the factors of production not only may contribute some definite service to the production process but may also contribute some indefinite service, such as bearing the risk of loss.

It is neither possible nor necessary at this course level to provide an alternative form of production function. The objective should simply be to put into the minds of the students that $Q = F(K, L)$ is not a mathematical formula like $(a+b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2$. The above type of production function emerges from a certain set of assumptions which may or may not be true, depending on the nature of the productive organization or the nature of the firm (to be discussed in the next chapter) and on the framework available for these organizations to operate in.

Similarly, while discussing the derivation of cost function from production function, the students should be reminded that this cost function is relevant only in the context of fixed-reward-receiving-factors of production. The cost function will be derived differently if we include profit-and-loss-sharing factors of production in the production function.

Theory of Costs

Theory of Costs is more or less a technical topic, in the sense that it simply explains the logical relationship between the cost of production and the level of output. However, after discussing in detail the conventional analysis of cost-output relationships, once again the issue of uncertain-reward-bearing factors of production should be brought under discussion. The economics of profit-and-loss-sharing-based employment of factors of production should be discussed as opposed to the economics of fixed-reward-based employment of factors of production. In this context, the economic rationale of profit-and-loss sharing, particularly with respect to financial investment,

should be elaborated, highlighting the significance of keeping the sharing of losses strictly in proportion to the invested capital. In other words, we should discuss questions such as Why in *muḍārabah*, and *mushārahkah* contracts, profits are allowed to be shared in any proportion but sharing of losses have no other option but to be in the ration of capital? and How would this arrangement affect the cost of production vis-à-vis the conventional arrangements?

While discussing the topic of costs, particularly nonpecuniary costs, the attention should be drawn to the fact that a Muslim may consider several things a cost which a non-Muslim may not. Similarly, there may be several elements which require treatment as cost in the conventional framework, but in the Islamic framework may not be considered as cost. For example, payment of a higher wage or some noncash benefits to low income labor out of benevolence and for the cause of Allah, cannot be treated as a cost because this element of wages cannot enter into the firm's decision making process of equilibrium level of production. Such examples of quasi-cost are likely to be numerous in an Islamic economy. Even today, in Muslim economies it has been observed that a lot of employment of labor takes place merely out of the spirit of benevolence and not on the basis of marginal productivity of labor. If marginal productivity of labor were the criterion, employment levels would be much less (e.g., in Pakistan the unemployment rate is only around three percent, whereas the marginal productivity is much less than the prevailing wage rate). Instead of arguing that the marginal productivity theory is not relevant in Islamic economics, it should be argued that the employer is not treating some part of the labor cost as economic cost. The students may be given an assignment to list the Islamic costs that are not treated as costs in the conventional framework, and the conventional costs that are not treated as costs in the Islamic framework.

The rest of the discussion under the title of Cost Theory should be the same as in any conventional textbook.

Theory of Firm

Theory of Firm should first answer the question, How is a firm created? More fundamentally, the question should be asked, How is an entrepreneur generated?

As a result of the allocation of time (as discussed earlier under the topic consumption theory) labor supply will be generated. How much of this labor will choose wage-paid jobs and how much of it will choose to be entrepreneurs (and hence a firm) to organize productive activity? Similarly, the consumer choice between present and future consumption results in savings. Under the Islamic framework, these savings have to be invested so that they are not deleted by zakah. Part of the savings will be converted into rentable assets and part will be put into an investment activity. This generates entrepreneurship. Firm, therefore, should be shown as emerging out of consumers and hence, firms should be argued as having the same motivation as consumers. This scenario will also help the students to think of alternative goals of the firm. The fact that conventional economic theory treats the firm as an abstract entity is something that may not fit into the economic system of Islam. A scholar of fiqh may be invited to explain the nature of the firm and its liability (as opposed to the limited liability of modern joint stock companies).

The question of how the firm is generated should start by reviewing various forms of economic enterprises or business organizations in Islam and their operation principles, particularly, with respect to the sharing of the outcome. Then compare the economic enterprises of *mudārabah* and *mushārah* with the economic enterprises in Western societies. This discussion should not confine itself to the industrial sector. The forms of economic enterprise in agriculture, such as *muzārah* (temporary sharecropping contract) and *musāqāh* (sharecropping contract over the leasing of a plantation, limited to a one-crop period), etc., also should be discussed.

Detailed discussions of the following should be presented: various forms of market structures within which economic enterprise can possibly operate, along with a review of the Islamic position on dif-

ferent types of market structures; joint stock companies as a form of firm; and the question of limited liability in the light of the shari'ah. A lecture by a scholar of fiqh on the subjects of business ethics, the conditions for operation in the market (rules relating to trade), etc., is also desirable. This presentation should then be rediscussed by the teacher to explain what market structures are promoted by Islam and what contemporary market structures are not desirable in Islam.

Goals of economic enterprise is the next topic that should be discussed. Profit maximization is one legitimate goal but there can be many other goals. Even conventional economics recognizes several goals other than profit maximization. A review of all the goals is necessary, along with the Islamic positions on each one of them. This should be followed by a discussion of the possible goals that can be enumerated in view of the Islamic motivations for production discussed under the theory of production. With reference to motives, firms may be divided into various categories, e.g., profit-motivated individual firms, society-regulated firms, nonprofit-motivated individual firms, state enterprises, trust enterprises, social-cum-profit-motivated firms, etc.

After discussing the goals and the types of firms, the remaining discussion about the theory of firm should be confined to discussing firm equilibrium under profit maximization. Firm behavior under alternative goals should be left for discussion in the second semester. The behavior of a profit maximizing firm under various market structures (other than competitive markets) prevailing in contemporary economies should also be discussed as given in a conventional textbook. However, Islamic positions on these market structures should also come under discussion. For example, while discussing the price-discriminating behavior of a firm relevant shari'ah regulations should come under discussion, including the Islamic conditions under which a firm may discriminate in charging prices for its products. Similar discussions are required while discussing the behavior of monopolist or oligopolist firms or of a firm under monopolistic competition.

Second Semester

Theory of Firm under Alternate Pricing System

The profit maximizing firm is one type of firm. All firms may not behave in a way that requires marginal cost pricing conditions. This has been recognized by conventional theory as well as through empirical analysis of the behavior of firms in contemporary economies. Criticism of neoclassical theories should be discussed using the conventional textbooks and then followed by the Islamic basis for rejecting the marginal price conditions for those types of firm that may not be motivated to maximize their profits.

Several alternative firm pricing systems are discussed in a conventional textbook (e.g., in Appendix D, see chapters 11 through 18). These alternative pricing systems should be reviewed from the point of view of Islamic norms of market behavior. In fact, students should be asked to write a critique of each pricing system from the Islamic point of view. The teacher may suggest possible dimensions in which they can review these systems from the Islamic point of view, but the students themselves should apply their own knowledge of *fiqh al mu'āmalāt* (particularly that relating to production, exchange, pricing, marketing, etc.) to analyze, criticize or promote these systems. They may ask the teachers of *fiqh al mu'āmalāt* to guide them to relevant literature in preparing the reviews. The student reviews should be saved and placed in the library for the next class to consult before they write their own reviews.

The conventional textbook on microeconomics provides a discussion on more than a dozen theories of firm behavior (see Appendix D, chapters 11 through 18). It is possible to select one of these theories and make it represent the Islamic behavior of a firm by making some marginal modifications. As an assignment, ask the students to explain which theories most closely represent Islamic behavior and how those theories can be made more Islamic.

Another useful exercise is to ask the students to classify firms according to their nature and objectives, identifying which theories in

the textbook most closely describe a firm found in an Islamic economy and, when they have been identified, how they can be modified to more closely represent an Islamic firm.

Give particular attention to behavioral theories for the study of private sector firm behavior discussed in conventional textbooks because theory of firm, from an Islamic perspective, means nothing else but the identification of a peculiar behavior of firm. Theory of private sector firms simply require an alternate behavioral theory of firm.

Managerial theories may be especially helpful for explaining the behavior of public enterprise or 'trust' firms, while average cost pricing theories may be helpful for building up Islamic theories of socially motivated firms.

Linear programming, which is simply a mathematical tool, is an important topic in microeconomics. It may be taught in the same way as discussed in a conventional textbook (see the details under chapters 19 and 20 shown in Appendix D).

Factors of Production, Factor Markets And Factor Pricing

After a thorough exposure to the contents of a conventional textbook on the topics of factors of production, factor markets and factor pricing, the following should be brought under discussion: The limitations of existing definitions and classifications of factors of production in capturing the features of the Islamic approach towards the factors of production.

It must be emphasized that theory of distribution heavily depends on how various factors of production are rewarded for their contribution to the output. The emphasis, therefore, should be to work out the peculiarities of the Islamic approach to the rewards of factors of production. Four points require particular discussion.

First, it should be explained why interest has been prohibited or, in other words, why under certain circumstances capital cannot get a

fixed reward and can only earn profit by bearing the risk of loss. In this connection, a brief exposure to the fiqh literature covering the following topics should be provided:

- The principles of *Ijār* (renting) in Islam. What can and cannot be rented? What are the conditions of a rent contract? Who is liable for what under a rent contract?
- The principles of earning profit. What makes a profit legitimate? The principle of *al ghurum bi al ghurum* (benefit through loss) and its implications for defining the concept of profit. How profit is different from rent? Under what condition mark-up on sales becomes a legitimate profit and under what conditions it does not?

These topics, in fact, may first be discussed by a scholar in fiqh and later on reformulated into the language of modern economics by the teacher.

Second, the concept of time-value discounting requires elaborate discussion. For example, why interest (as time value of money) is not allowed but the prices in a *al bay' al mu'ajjal* (delayed business transaction) and a *bay' al salām* (completed business transaction) are allowed to have price differentiation on the basis of time. What justifies time-value discounting and under what conditions is it not allowed? Again, a scholar of fiqh may be asked to give Islamic positions after which the teacher may present the same material in modern economic terminology.

Third, human labor as a factor of production requires discussion from the Islamic point of view, particularly because it has a human dimension and Islam pays special attention to this dimension. For example, the rent of an asset that is in excess supply may be allowed to go down to any limit (theoretically, it may become zero or even negative, at least up to the amount of the rate of zakah). But the rent of labor (i.e., wages) cannot be allowed to fall below a certain minimum required for sustenance. If wages cannot be allowed to fall to zero or negative how then is the minimum wage to be determined in a labor surplus economy? A scholar in fiqh may discuss the issue

from the point of view of Islam, and the feasibility of the same in the context of firm behavior may also be discussed in the class.

Fourth, conventional economic theory does not implicitly discuss determination of the reward of an entrepreneur. Conventional economics discusses the reward of all factors of production other than the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is kept out of the discussion because of the following reasons:

- Uncertainty is assumed away in the conventional framework, therefore, profit is nothing but an interest, a wage or a rent and hence there is no need to consider separately a theory of reward for the entrepreneur.
- Entrepreneur or firm can be assumed to be some an abstract entity and hence a residual (after payment of all wages and rents) is the reward of the firm and since it is an abstract entity, the implication of negative or positive reward may not have much significance.

An Islamic analysis requires a distinct treatment on the follow grounds:

- Factors of production cannot be assumed to have been employed only on the basis of fixed rent or wage. At least one factor of production, i.e., money-capital, is not allowed to earn rent. It can only earn profit by bearing a risk. The Islamic economic analysis, therefore, will have to treat this factor separately and distinctly and the theory of marginal productivity cannot be allowed. Once money-capital is treated distinctly because it cannot get fixed rent, then the possibility of other factors being employed on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis should also be considered. In situations of an excess supply of labor or capital, these factors of production would like to look for an entrepreneurial job rather a low wage or rent. How various factors decide to get an entrepreneurial job and on what factors their entrepreneurial rewards depend, therefore, should be an explicit part of the economic analysis.
- Entrepreneur of firm cannot be considered, in the Islamic framework, an abstract business entity. It has to be a specific

resource (human or nonhuman) which can be held liable for bearing the losses. It means that an entrepreneur or a firm will either be a human resource or it will be a physical resource. How the resources decide to become entrepreneurial resources, what will determine their reward, what are the implications of risk of bearing losses on their supply and demand, what will be the effect of their actual loss on their supply and demand, etc. are the questions to be discussed.

In other words an economic analysis of factors of production may implicitly recognize the presence of two types of factors of production: entrepreneurial and fixed-reward receiving. The implications of the socio-economic institutional framework of an Islamic economy on supply and demand of both types of factors of production requires detailed discussion. For example, the institution of social insurance (based on *zakah* and *ṣadaqah*) may increase the supply of small entrepreneurs. (The *zakah* and *ṣadaqah* may take care of their survival in case they incur loss.)

The discussion of the Islamic approach to the factors of production should be followed or preceded by a full discussion of the contents of a conventional textbook that deals with supply and demand of factors of production and factors of pricing in perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive markets.

The conventional textbooks also discuss income distribution in terms of factor shares. Distribution theory in Islamic economics requires discussion as a separate topic and not as an off-shoot of the rewards of factors of production which is determined by the firm under profit-maximizing behavior. At this stage, however, it must be pointed out that even for the functional income distribution between factors of production, a distinctive approach will have to be adopted to take into adequate account the share of entrepreneurial factors of production in the total output. One additional parameter that will be of interest in an Islamic economy, in the context of functional distribution (or factor share of income), is the ratio in which profits in the economy are distributed among human and physical resources within the entrepreneurial factors of production employed in the econo-

my on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis. It may be pointed out that the profit-sharing ratio between human and physical resources (joining hands on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis) is free to be determined by market forces. This ratio, therefore, depends on several factors, notably:

- Supply and demand of the physical resources on a rent basis;
- Supply and demand of human resources on a wage basis;
- Supply and demand of entrepreneurial resources on profit-and-loss-sharing basis; and
- Risk of loss in productive activities in the economy.

Theory of Distribution

Normally, the theory of distribution is taught only as part of factor pricing. Definition of factor shares is introduced as a measure of functional distribution. While teaching microeconomics in Islamic economics, the theory of distribution should be taught as a distinct topic, not merely as a supplemental topic of factor pricing. Islam emphasizes distribution and it should be clearly defined as an economic activity of society in the same way as the production activity is.

The main emphasis of discussion under this topic should be that within the Islamic framework, distribution is part of microeconomic behavior. This behavior has implications for personal income and wealth distribution, as well as functional income distribution. In fact, it is this personal distribution of income and wealth resulting from microeconomic behavior that makes microeconomic theory within the Islamic perspective a distinct economic theory. The conventional microeconomic theory has no room for the discussion of personal income and wealth distribution.

From the fact that Islam provides economic motivation to induce the distribution of wealth in society it is obvious that distribution of personal income and wealth in an Islamic economy is not just a coercive transfer of resources but is very much a part of economic behavior. Verse 30:39 from the Qur'an reveals the following:

That which you give in usury in order that it may increase on (other) people's property has no increase with Allah; but that which you give in charity, seeking Allah's countenance, has increase manifold.

Transfer of one's income or wealth to the less privileged in society has been promised to bring gains, which includes gains in the Hereafter.

Keeping in view the consumer behavior analysis discussed earlier, it can be seen that the distribution of personal income and wealth in the Islamic perspective is nothing but a part of the consumer's total spending that is done for the sake of a reward in the Hereafter. The first stage of choice, discussed earlier, i.e., is determining how to allocate income between type I and type II spending and is a micro-decision of how much of one's income will be distributed. This dimension is absent from conventional economic theory. No doubt charitable behavior can be seen in non-Islamic economies as well, but this is ignored in conventional economic theory, perhaps on two grounds. First, because type II spending is not considered as an economic choice since it is considered a noneconomic activity that is done for no reward or economic gain but for some psychological satisfaction. Second, because, for an average person, the expenditure on type II spending is generally very low, rather insignificant, and therefore not considered an important aspect to be studied prominently in the theory of consumer behavior.

Type II spending from the Islamic perspective is not only an important aspect of consumer behavior but also involves explicit gains and, hence, is required to be discussed as part of microeconomic theory. Type II spending should be treated as a decision to distribute income. The factors that will determine the level of type II spending should be discussed in detail in the class. The parameters of consumer behavior that will determine the level of type II spending and the parameters of the economy that will make it an effective instrument of personal income and wealth distribution in society should be sorted out through class discussion.

Functional distribution of income should be brought under discussion in detail now along the lines already discussed. Factors of

production, their supply, and their pricing mechanism should be used to explain the functional distribution of income.

General Equilibrium

Most of the discussion in the area of general equilibrium, for the time being, will have to be done in the conventional framework. As a passing remark, however, the following can be mentioned.

Using the Arrow-Debreu type economy, it can be discussed to what extent existence and stability conditions will be affected if interest does not exist in the economy as price of capital. This, in other words, means specifying a pricing mechanism of converting a commodity in one period of time to the same commodity in another period of time. As far as we can assume the following:

- There is no uncertainty.
- Real commodities are exchanged only through money as a medium of exchange.
- No commodity (including money) will be exchanged for exactly the same commodity.

It should not be difficult to argue that the absence of interest does not affect the existence, stability, and other conditions of general equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu type economy. It can also be argued that even the uncertainty assumption can be taken out without affecting the Arrow-Debreu type economy. Risk can be considered as a commodity having a price called profit and the rest of the analysis should remain unaffected. What is important is to assume that there is no price for 'time'. Pricing of time arises when a commodity in one period of time is to be exchanged for a similar commodity in another period of time.

It may, however, be emphasized that the Arrow-Debreu type economy is incapable of describing an Islamic economy. This is because in the Islamic framework, the market is not the only institution of exchange. Nonmarket institutions of exchange are quite substantial in an Islamic economy and hence cannot be ignored. What is important about these nonmarket institutions is that they reinforce the

system and help it work more 'efficiently' by providing solutions to what in conventional economies is referred to as 'market failures'.

The institution of the market cannot achieve all objectives of the Islamic economic system. It achieves only what is called 'efficiency'. There are a whole set of objectives of an Islamic economy that do not fall into the conventional concept of efficiency. But there are several Islamic institutions that take care of the market failures to achieve various objectives of the economy other than efficiency. For example, type II spending in consumer behavior and production for non-worldly motives achieves an important objective of the Islamic economy, (*viz.* distribution), which cannot be achieved by the market.

Hence, in the discussion of general equilibrium, various such economic institutions other than the market, which achieve specific objectives of an Islamic economy, need highlighting with various examples. This should clearly bring into focus the fact that not only is the Arrow-Debreu type economy unable to describe an Islamic economy but also that the study of general equilibrium in an Islamic economy requires an entirely different framework yet to be developed.

Another important point to be discussed in the class in the context of general equilibrium is that even a competitive market economy as described by Arrow-Debreu may fail to achieve market efficiency in several circumstances and a nonmarket institution may achieve efficiency even in the exchange of such commodities which are considered marketable. In this case, an example may be given even from contemporary market economies. A good example is the market of blood donations. In the United States, blood is donated under the framework of a competitive market and it has been realized that the market is not achieving 'efficient' results. In several European countries, on the other hand, blood donation is a voluntary institution and there the need of blood donation is being fulfilled more efficiently. The point is that ethical- and moral-based institutions may achieve, in several instances, better results than market institutions. Islam provides a strong ethical and moral base for the development of nonmarket institutions. The strength of many of

these institutions lies in the fact that they promise a reward in the Hereafter, and hence, the human instinct to maximize gains is satisfied. The ethical- and moral-based institutions are required to be as important a part of general equilibrium analysis as the market.

Welfare Economics

Welfare economics is concerned with the evaluation of alternative economic situations from the point of view of the society's well-being.

Defining a criterion with which alternative economic situations can be evaluated from the point of view of social well-being or welfare is important in the theory of economic welfare. Conventional textbooks provide a summary of various criteria put forward by the economists at different points of time. These criteria should be discussed, particularly with reference to their relevance for an Islamic economy.

The recent approach that requires formulation of a social welfare function should be discussed in detail, along with the related efforts of contemporary Islamic economists. It may be pointed out that problems in the evaluation of different situations from the welfare point of view arise because interpersonal comparison of utility is not possible in the conventional framework. On the other hand, if we deal with the concept of need (instead of utility), based on the concept as defined, for example, by Shatibi, we find ourselves far ahead of the conventional economists in evaluating different situations from the welfare point of view. This is because an interpersonal comparison of need, based on *maṣlahah*, which is objectively defined, is more feasible than the interpersonal comparison of utility, which has no objective basis for the purpose of definition. For example, if there is gross inequality in society, one group being very rich and another being very poor, in the conventional framework, the state intervention to redistribute income in the economy cannot be definitely regarded to have increased social welfare.

On the other hand let us see the Islamic economic scenario. In a situation where there exists a rich group that is believed to be fulfilling all its essentials, complementarities, and amelioratories and still have resources to waste (doing *isrāf*) while there is another group so poor that it does not even have the essentials to protect its life and property, then, if an Islamic state redistributes income so that the poor group at least fulfills all its essential needs while the rich group is deprived of fulfilling some of its amelioratory needs, the welfare (*maṣlahah*) of the society will be considered to have increased.

Another problem that arises in interpersonal comparisons of utility in the context of social welfare is the conflict in individual and social welfare in a non-Islamic society. If a person derives utility from narcotics, then, in order to improve society's welfare, the welfare of the individual will have to be curtailed by prohibiting him from using narcotics. Such conflicts are minimized if we analyze social welfare by comparing needs (rather than utility). Since in an Islamic framework the basis of need is *maṣlahah*, and the *maṣlahah* of an individual is the *maṣlahah* of society, and the *maṣlahah* of society is the *maṣlahah* of the individual, hence, it is unlikely that the economic welfare of society may conflict with the welfare of the individual in terms of individual and social needs. Prohibiting an individual from drinking alcohol will unambiguously increase the welfare of the individual as well as society.

The Arrows Impossibility Theorem may also be discussed with reference to an economy where need (based on *maṣlahah*) and utility are the guiding factors for consumption and production activities. The discussion of welfare also requires a discussion of the relationships of property rights with social welfare. The conventional literature addresses these issues. Some key issues should be selected from the literature in order to discuss them from the Islamic perspective.

This discussion should then be followed by the remaining contents of a conventional textbook under the heading of welfare economics (see the contents of Chapter 23 and Appendix D).

Appendix A

Proposed Outline of the Microeconomics Course to be Taught in Islamic Perspective at Intermediate Level in An Undergraduate Program in Economics

1. Introduction

- a. Economic problem of man: secular point of view and Islamic point of view.
- b. Economic agents and institutions: role of the state, in the context of microeconomic behavior, in the secular framework; and comparison with the Islamic framework.
- c. Economic institutions: classification of market; Islamic perspective on market structures.
- d. Methodology for the study of microeconomic behavior: the role of axioms in developing a social science; and the amenability of Islamic economics to be described with the help of the Islamic axioms for human behavior.

2. Concept of Ownership and Property Rights

- a. Concept of ownership and property rights
 - i. What does property rights mean?
 - ii. Types of property rights.
- b. Main elements of the system of property rights in Islam.
- c. Main features of the system of private property rights in Islam.
- d. Types of private property rights in Islam.
- e. Courses and means of acquiring private property rights.
- f. Limitations on the use of private property rights in Islam.
- g. Rights of others in private property rights.
- h. Brief comparison of Islamic system of property rights with the capitalistic and socialistic system of property rights.

3. Theory of Demand

- a. Theory of consumer behavior
 - i. Cardinal utility theory.
 - ii. Indifference curve analysis.

- iii. Distinction between want and need (derived from the distinction between utility and *maşlahah*).
 - iv. Need as a basis for the analysis of consumer behavior as opposed to utility as a basis for the analysis.
 - v. Revealed preference hypothesis and its relevance for the analysis of consumer behavior in the Islamic perspective.
 - vi. Consumer's surplus under the utility-based approach and under the need-based approach.
- b. Some extensions of the consumer theory
- i. Application of indifference curve analysis in income-leisure choice and in intertemporal choice.
 - ii. Consumer's time-allocation in the Islamic framework and income-leisure choice as part of the time-allocation problem.
 - iii. Intertemporal choice in the secular framework and in the Islamic framework.
 - iv. Savings behavior in the secular framework and in the Islamic perspective.
 - v. Risk bearing element in consumer behavior with special emphasis on the generation of supply of entrepreneurs/investors as a result of the decision making of a consumer in the context of his choices.
- c. Market demand
- i. Derivation of market demand.
 - ii. Determinants of demand.
 - iii. Elasticities of demand.
 - iv. Market demand, total revenue and marginal revenue.
 - v. Demand for the product of a firm.
- d. Linear expenditure systems and their relevance in explaining market demand in an Islamic economy

4. Theory of Production

- a. Motivation for production in an Islamic economy compared with a non-Islamic economy.

- b. Production function for a single production and its relevance for an Islamic economy.
- c. Laws of production (laws of returns to scale and law of variable proportion).
- d. Technological progress and the production.
- e. Equilibrium of the firm: choice of optimal expansion path.
- f. Derivation of cost function from production function and its relevance in the Islamic framework.
- g. Production function for a multiproduct firm.

5. Theory of Cost

- a. The traditional theory of cost.
 - i. Short-run cost.
 - ii. Long-run cost: the 'envelope curve'.
- b. Modern theory of cost.
 - i. Short-run cost.
 - ii. Long-run cost: the 'L-shaped' scale curve.
- c. Short-run and long-run engineering cost curves.
- d. The analysis of economies of scales.
 - i. Real economies.
 - ii. Pecuniary economies.
- e. Empirical evidence on the shape of cost curves.
 - i. Statistical cost studies.
 - ii. Engineering cost studies.
- f. Review of theory of costs under the institutional framework of an Islamic economy.
- g. Cost implications of the employment of profit-and-loss-sharing-based factors of production.
- h. Types of cost in the conventional framework compared with those in the Islamic framework.

6. Theory of Profit Maximizing Firm under Marginal Cost Pricing

- a. How a firm is generated.
- b. Forms of business organization in the Islamic framework compared with that in the secular framework.

- c. Goals of a firm in the secular framework compared with goals in the Islamic framework.
- d. Business ethics in Islam.
- e. Principles of production and trade in Islam (with special reference to the injunctions relating to trade practices).
- f. Identification of the firm of market structures promoted by Islam and contemporary firms of market structures disliked by Islam.
- g. All those topics as discussed in conventional textbook (see contents of chapter 5 to 10 in appendix D).

7. Theory of Firm under Alternate Pricing Mechanism

- a. Criticism of the neoclassical theory of the firm—conventional textbook arguments along with additional arguments from the Islamic point of view.
- b. Alternate theories.
 - i. Average cost pricing theory.
 - ii. Limit pricing theories.
 - iii. Managerial theories.
 - Baumol's theory.
 - Marris' theory.
 - Williamson's model.
 - Behavioral theory.
- c. Review of the theories from the Islamic point of view and identification of theory or theories capable of representing the Islamic behavior of firm (with or without some modifications).
- d. Linear programming.

8. Factors of Production, Factor Markets and Factor Prices

- a. Factors of production in the conventional framework.
- b. Islamic approach to factors of production.
 - i. Rational for the prohibition of fixed-rent on money capital in the overall framework of the principles of renting in Islam.
 - ii. Concept of profit and principles of earning profit in the Islamic framework.

- iii. Concept of human labor—entrepreneurial labor and fixed-wage receiving labor.
- iv. Entrepreneur/firm in the Islamic framework.
- c. Need to distinguish between entrepreneurial factors of production and rent-receiving factors of production.
- d. Factor pricing of the rent-receiving factor of production in the conventional framework (in competitive and imperfectly competitive markets).
- e. Relevance of conventional factor pricing in the Islamic framework.
- f. Supply, demand, and pricing in factor markets in the Islamic framework.
- g. Elasticity of factor substitution and the shares of factors of production (within rent-receiving factor—only in the conventional framework).
- h. Factors of determining the profit-sharing ratio between entrepreneurial human resources and entrepreneurial physical resources.
- i. Technological progress and income distribution in the conventional framework.
- j. Rents and quasi rents—Islamic positions.
- k. Nonhomogeneous factors and wage differentials along with the Islamic perspective on wage differential.
- l. Euler's product exhaustion theorem and its review in the presence of entrepreneurial factors of production.
- m. Clark-Wicksted-Walras "product-exhaustion theorem" and the implications of introducing entrepreneurial factors of production in the theorem.

9. Theory of Distribution

- a. Dimensions of distribution in an Islamic economy.
 - i. Personal and functional.
 - ii. Income and wealth.
 - iii. Distribution and redistribution.
- b. Personal income distribution as a part of microeconomic behavior.

- c. Distinctive features of functional distribution of income in an Islamic economy.
 - i. Features based on the nature of factors of production.
 - ii. Features based on attitudes towards labor.

10. General Equilibrium

- a. Contents of a conventional standard text on various aspects of general equilibrium (e.g., see contents of chapter 22 as shown in appendix D).
- b. Relevance of existence, uniqueness, and stability condition of Arrow-Debreu type economy from an Islamic economy.
- c. Islamic economy as an economy beyond the competitive market economy—the role of nonmarket institutions in achieving economic objectives of the society.

11. Welfare Economics

- a. Criteria of evaluation of social welfare as put forward by conventional economists from time to time.
- b. Social welfare function as discussed in conventional textbooks and their critical evaluation from the point of view of their relevance for an Islamic economy.
- c. Interpersonal comparison of *maṣlaḥat al 'ibād* as compared to interpersonal comparison of utility.
- d. Possible arguments of a social welfare function for an Islamic economy and other contents covered in a conventional textbook under this topic (e.g., see the contents of chapter 23 in appendix D).

Appendix B

Proposed Reading List* for the Course

Suggested in Appendix A

1. Introduction

- Somuelson, P.A, and W.D. Nordhaus. *Economics*. 12th ed. New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1985, pp. 24-26.
- Al Shatibi. *Al Muwafiq*. Cairo: Maktabah Muhammad Ali El-Azhar. N.d. vol. 2, pp. 126-134.
- Naqvi, S.N.H. *Ethics and Economics; An Islamic Synthesis*. Leicester; The Islamic Foundation, 1981 pp. 37-40.
- Iqbal, M. *Ethico Economic System of Islam*. Research Paper Series Center for Research in Islamic Economics. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: King Abdulaziz University, n.d. pp. 1-37.
- Faridi, F.R. "A Theory of Fiscal Policy in an Islamic State." In *Fiscal Policy and Research Allocation in Islam*, ed. Z. Ahmad, M. Iqbal, and M.F. Khan. Islamabad, Pakistan: Institute of Policy Studies, n.d.
- Mannan, M.A. "Islamic Economics as a Social Science." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 49-62.
- Ariff, Muhammad. "Towards a Definition of Islamic Economics: Some Scientific Considerations." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 2, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 87-103.
- Mannan, M.A. *Making of Islamic Economic Society*, chps. 1-4. N.p., n.d.
- Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1979, pp. 3-12.
- Blaugh, M. *Methodology of Economics*. Cambridge: CUP, 1980, pp. 55-250.
- Kahf, M. *The Islamic Economy*. Muslim Students Association of U.S. and Canada. pp. 1-11.

* This reading list is suggested for the teachers but not for the students. From this list teachers may develop a reading list for their students.

Khan, Shah Rukh Raf. "Islamic Economics: A Note on Methodology." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 2, no. 2: 83-85.

2. Concept of Ownership and Property Rights

Siddiqi, M.N. *Islam Ka Nazriyyah-e-Milkiyyat* (Ownership in Islam). 2 vols. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1968.

Khan, M. Fahim. "System of Ownership and Private Property Rights in Islam." (Mimeographed) IIIE Islamic economics program, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Al Maamiry, Ahmed H. *Economics in Islam*. Delhi, India: Lancer Books, 1987, pp. 48-103.

Furubotn, E.G., and S. Pejovich. "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature." In *The Making of Islamic Economic Society*, by M.A. Mannan. N.p., n.d. chps. 5-8.

Demetz, H. "Towards a Theory of Property Rights." *American Economic Review* 57 (May 1967): 374-73.

Mustafa, Ahmed H., and Askari, Hossein, G. "Economic Implications of Land Ownership and Land Cultivation in Islam." In *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfillment in an Islamic Economy*, ed. Munawar Iqbal. Islamabad, Pakistan: International Institute of Islamic Economies, n.d.

3. Theory of Demand

Koutsoyiannis, *Modern Microeconomics*, 2nd Ed. London: Macmillan. 1979 pp. 13-66.

Zarqa. "Islamic Economics: An Approach to Human Welfare" in *Studies in Islamic Economics*, edited by Ahmad. Islamic Foundation Leicertes, pp. 3-9.

Khan, M.F., and N.M. Ghifari. "Objectives of Shari'ah and Some Implications for Consumer Theory." Mimeographed, International Institute of Islamic Economics, Islamabad.

Khan, M. Fahim. "Macro Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 1, no. 2: 1-24.

- Tag el-Din, S.I. "Macro-Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework Comment." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 1 (Summer, 1984): 57-61.
- Mahdi, S. Iqbal. "Macro-Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework Comment." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 2, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 73-77.
- Hasan, Zubair. "Macro-Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework Comment." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 2, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 79-81.
- Kahf, M. "Saving and Investment Functions in Two-Sector Islamic Economy." In *Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam*, Edited by M. Ariff. Jeddah: Centre for Research in Islamic Economics King Abdulaziz University Jeddah, n.d.
- Zarqa, A. "An Islamic Perspective on the Economics of Discounting in Project Evaluation." In *Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam* Institute of Policy Studies. N.p, 1983, pp. 203-251.
- Khan, M. Fahim. "Time Value Discounting in Islam." Mimeographed, International Institute of Islamic Economics Islamabad, n.d.
- Masri, Rafiq. *Al Riba Wa al Hasam al Zamani Fi al Iqtisad al Islami*. N.p., n.d.
- Ariff, M. "Towards Establishing the Micro Foundations of Islamic Economics: A Contribution to the Consumer Behaviour in an Islamic Society." Paper presented at 12th Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, November 1983.
- Stone, R. "Linear Expenditure System." *Economic Journal* (1954).
- Fishburn, P.C. "Lexicographic Orders, Utilities and Decision Rules." *Management Science* (July 1974).
- 4. Theory of Production and Costs**
- Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*, Ch. 3 and 4.
- Kahf, Monzer. *The Islamic Economy*, Ch. 3.
- Siddiqi, M. Nejatullah. *Economic Enterprize in Islam*.
- Siddiqi, M. Nejatullah. "Economies of Profit Sharing." In *Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam*, edited by Z. Ahmad, et al. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1983.

5. Theory of Firm

- Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. Chap. 5-18 (chapters 5 to 10 to be covered in the first semester and chapters 11 to 18 to be covered in the second semester).
- Siddiqi, M. Nejatullah. *Economic Enterprize in Islam*. Chap. 1, 2 and 3.
- Kahf, Monzer. *The Islamic Economy*. Chapter 4.
- Mannan, M.A. *The Making of Islamic Economic Society*. Chap. 10 and 11.
- Metwally, M.M. "A Behavioral Model of Islamic Firm." Research Paper Series (English) No. 5 of Centre for Research in Islamic Economics King Abdulaziz University Jeddah.
- Islabi, Abdul Azim. "Ibn Taimeyah's Concept of Market Mechanism." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economies* 2, no. 2 (Winter 1985): 55-66.
- Muharji, Badal. *Theory of Firm in an Interest Free Economy*. Jeddah: Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University.
- Boulding, K. "The Present Position of the Theory of Firm." In K.E. Boulding and W.A. Spvy (eds), *Linear Programming and Theory of Firm*. New York: Macmillan, 1960, pp. 1-17.
- Coarse, R. "The Nature of the Firm." *Economica* 4 (November 1937): 386-405.
- Goper, W. "Theory of Firm: Some Suggestions for Revision." *American Economic Review* 39 (December 1949): 204-22.

6. Factor Pricing

- Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. Chapter 21.
- Khan, M. Fahim. "Factor of Production and Factor Markets in Islamic Framework." Mimeograph, Centre for Research in Islamic Economics King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah.
- Masud, M. "Islamic Land Tenure System." Discussion Paper, International Institute of Islamic Economics, Islamabad.
- Tabakoglu, A. "Labour and Capital Concepts in Islamic Economics." In M. Fahim Khan (ed.), *Distribution in Macroeconomic*

Framework. Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Economics, n.d. (Under Print).

Hassan, Zubair. "Theory of Profit: The Islamic View Point." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 1, no. 1: 1-16.

Chishti, Salim. "Theory of Profit: The Islamic View Point-Comment." *Journal of Research in Islamic Economics* 2, no. 1(Summer 1984): 49-51.

7. Distribution Theory

Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. Chap. 21, pp. 468-484.

Iqbal, Munawar (ed.). "Distributive Justice and Need Fulfillment in an Islamic Economy." In *Islam International Institute of Islamic Economics*. Islamabad, pp. 1-24.

Zarqa, Ana. "Islamic Distributive Schemes." In Munawar Iqbal (ed.), *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfillment in an Islamic Economy*. Islamabad: IIIE, pp. 159-218.

8. General Equilibrium and Welfare Theory

Koutsoyiannis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. Chap. 22.

Khan, M. Ali. "General Equilibrium and Capital Pricing in Islamic Framework." International Institute of Islamic Economics, Islamabad. (Under Print)

Arrow, K., and G. Debreau. "Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy." *Econometrica* 22 (July 1954): 265-90.

Arrow, K. "An Extension of the Basic Theorem of Classical Welfare Economics." In J. Neyman ed., *Proceedings of the Second Barkley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability*. Barkely, 1951, pp. 507-532.

Bator, F. "The Anatomy of Market Failure." *Quarterly Journal Economics* 8 (August 8, 1972): 351-379.

9. Welfare Economics

Konlsoyinnis, A. *Modern Microeconomics*. Chap. 23.

Zarqa, Anas. "Islamic Economics: An Approach to Human Welfare." In Khurshid Ahmad, ed., *Studies in Islamic Economics*. Islamabad: Institute of Policy, 1980.

Course, R. "The Probelm Social Cost." *Journal of Law and Economics* 3 (October 1960): 1-14.

Appendix C

Sample of Student Assignments on Required Topics to Be Discussed in the Islamic Perspective

1. What is the economic problem of man in the Islamic perspective and how does it differ from that in the secular perspective.
2. Critically examine the axioms underlying the Conventional Consumer Theory. Does the explanation of consumer behavior in the Islamic perspective require a different set of axioms? If so, what are the axioms and how do they differ from the secular axioms?
3. Distinguish between 'need' of *maṣlahah* and 'want' as implied in the concept of utility. Compare their relative merits and demerits for their application of the analysis of consumer behavior in the Islamic perspective.
4. Explain the 'need' of savings as opposed to the 'need' for investment in the Islamic perspective.
5. Explain the concept of *isrāf*, first using the concept of utility in the conventional sense, and then using the concept of *maṣlahah* as explained by Shatibi.
6. Explain how an Islamic consumer will decide what is the '*afw*' (surplus) that he is required to spend in the cause of Allah. Use the concept of need (for consumption and savings/investment) to explain this concept. What parameters will determine the size of the '*afw*' for a typical consumer.
7. List such possible costs of a firm in conventional framework that may not be considered as cost in the Islamic framework and vice-versa.
8. Implication of Islamic principles of *ijārah* for the classification of factors of production.
9. Islamic principles of profit and their implications for supply and demand of entrepreneurs.

10. Give a classification of firms according to its objectives and the nature of ownership of its resources and its liabilities keeping in view the Islamic norms of business organization.
11. From chapters 11 through 18, of Kousoyiannis, find out which theory of pricing of a firm can be regarded as closest to the Islamic approach. Suggest modifications that can bring it closer to the Islamic approach. If you think none of these theories can be regarded as anywhere near the Islamic approach, then suggest your own theory.
12. What aspects of an Islamic economy will fail to be reflected if the conventional definition of factors of production is used to explain the Theory of Production or the Theory of Costs. Suggest an alternative classification of factors of production for an Islamic economy.
13. Discuss the nature of personal income distribution and wealth distribution in an Islamic economy and how it is related to micro-economic behavior in the Islamic economy.
14. Give an Islamic criterion for evaluating situations from the point of view of the economic welfare of society. How does this criterion differ from the criteria given by Islamic economists from time to time?

Appendix D
Contents of a Typical Book on Microeconomics*
of Intermediate Undergraduate Level
Part One: The Basic Tools of Analysis

1. Introduction

- a. Economic Models
- b. Classification of Markets
- c. The Concept of an 'Industry'
 - i. The Importance of the Concept of an Industry
 - ii. Criteria for the Classification of Firms into Industry

2. Theory of Demand

- a. Theory of Consumer Behavior
 - i. The Cardinal Utility Theory
 - ii. The Indifference Curves Theory
 - iii. The Revealed Preference Hypothesis
 - iv. The Consumers' Surplus
 - v. Some Applications of Indifference Curves Analysis
- b. The Market Demand
 - i. Derivation of the Market Demand
 - ii. Determinants of Demand
 - iii. Elasticities of Demand
 - iv. Market Demand, Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue
- c. Recent Developments in the Theory of Market Demand
 - i. The Pragmatic Approach to Demand Analysis
 - ii. Linear Expenditure Systems
- d. The Demand for the Product of a Firm

3. Theory of Production

- a. The Production Function for a Single Product
- b. Laws of Production
 - i. Laws of Returns to Scale
 - ii. The Law of Variable Proportions

* This table of contents has been taken from A. Koutsoyiannis, *Modern Microeconomics*, Macmillan Publishers, 1985.

- c. Technological Progress and the Production Function
- d. Equilibrium of the Firm: Choice of Optimal Combination of Factors of Production
 - i. Single Decision of the Firm
 - ii. Choice of Optimal Expansion Path
- e. Derivation of Cost Functions from Production Functions
 - i. Graphical Derivation of Cost Curves from the Production Function
 - ii. Formal Derivation of Cost Curves from a Production Function
- f. The Production Function of a Multiproduct Firm
 - i. The Production Possibility Curve of the Firm
 - ii. The Isorevenue Curve of the Multiproduct Firm
 - iii. Equilibrium of the Multiproduct Firm

4. Theory of Costs

- a. General Notes
- b. The Traditional Theory of Cost
 - i. Short-Run Costs
 - ii. Long-Run Costs: The 'Envelope Curve'
- c. Modern Theory of Costs
 - i. Short-Run Costs
 - ii. Long-Run Costs: The 'L-Shaped' Scale Curve
- d. Engineering Costs Curves
 - i. Short-Run Engineering Costs
 - ii. Long-Run Engineering Costs
- e. The Analysis of Economies of Scale
 - i. Real Economies of Scale
 - ii. Pecuniary Economies of Scale
- f. Empirical Evidence on the Shape of Costs
 - i. Statistical Cost Studies
 - ii. Studies Based on Questionnaires
 - iii. Engineering Cost Studies
 - iv. Statistical Production Functions
 - v. The 'Survivor Technique'
- g. The Relevance of the Shape of Costs in Decision-Making

Part Two: Theory of the Firm

Section A: Perfect Competition, Monopoly, Monopolistic Competition

5. Perfect Competition

- a. Assumptions
- b. Short-Run Equilibrium
 - i. Equilibrium of the Firm in the Short Run
 - ii. The Supply Curve of the Firm and the Industry
 - iii. Short-Run Equilibrium of the Industry
- c. Long-Run Equilibrium
 - i. Equilibrium of the Firm in the Long Run
 - ii. Equilibrium of the Industry in the Long Run
 - iii. Optimal Resource Allocation
- d. Dynamic Changes and Industry Equilibrium
 - i. Shift in the Market Demand
 - ii. Predictions of the Perfect Competition Model when Costs Change
 - iii. Effects of Imposition of a Tax

6. Monopoly

- a. Definition
- b. Demand and Revenue
- c. Costs
- d. Equilibrium
 - i. Short-Run Equilibrium
 - ii. Long-Run Equilibrium
- e. Predictions in Dynamic Changes
 - i. Shift in the Market Demand
 - ii. An Increase in the Costs of the Monopolists
 - iii. Imposition of a Tax
- f. Comparison of Pure Competition and Monopoly
- g. The Multiplant Firm
- h. Bilateral Monopoly

7. Price Discrimination

- a. Assumptions

- b. The Model
- c. Effects of Price Discrimination
- d. Price Discrimination and Elasticity of Demand
- e. Price Discrimination and the Existence of the Industry
- f. Government-Regulated Monopoly

8. Monopolistic Competition

- a. Assumptions
- b. Costs
- c. Product Differentiation and the Demand Curve
- d. The Concepts of the 'Industry' and the 'Group'
- e. Equilibrium of the Firm
- f. Critique
- g. Comparison with Pure Competition

Section B: Classical Oligopoly

9. Noncollusive Oligopoly

- a. Cournot's Duopoly Model
- b. Bertrand's Duopoly Model
- c. Chamberlin's Oligopoly Model
- d. The 'Kinked-Demand' Model
- e. Stackelberg's Duopoly Model

10. Collusive Oligopoly

- a. Cartels
 - i. Cartels Aiming at Joint Profit Maximization
 - ii. Market-Sharing Cartels
- b. Price Leadership
 - i. The Model of the Low-Cost Price Leader
 - ii. The Model of the Dominant-Firm Price Leader
 - iii. Critique of the Traditional Price Leadership Models
 - iv. Barometric Price Leadership
- c. The Basing-Point Price System
 - i. The Single Basing-Point System
 - ii. Multiple Basing-Point System

Section C: Average-Cost Pricing

11. A Critique of the Neoclassical Theory of the Firm: The Marginalist Controversy

- a. The Basic Assumptions of the Neoclassical Theory
- b. The Hall and Hitch Report and the 'Full-Cost' Pricing Principal
- c. Gordon's Attack on Marginalism
- d. In Defense of Marginalism

12. A Representative Model of Average-Cost Pricing

- a. Goals of the Firm
- b. Demand and Cost Schedules
- c. Price Determination: The 'Mark-Up' Rule
- d. Comparison with Pure Competition
- e. Predictions of Average-Cost Pricing Theory in Changing Market Conditions
- f. Critique of Average-Cost Pricing

Section D: Limit Pricing (Or Entry-Preventing Pricing)

13. Bain's Limit-Pricing Theory

- a. Bain's Model
- b. Barriers to New Competition
 - i. Bain's Concepts of 'Competition' and 'Entry'
 - ii. Barriers to Entry
- c. Summary of Bain's Empirical Findings
- d. Industry Equilibrium
- e. Some Comments

14. Recent Developments in the Theory of Limit Pricing

- a. The Model of Sylox-Labini
- b. The Model of Franco Modigliani
- c. The Model of Bhagwati
- d. The Model of Pashigian

Section E: Managerial Theories of the Firm

15. Baumol's Theory of Sales Revenue Maximization

- a. Rationalization of the Sales Maximization Hypothesis
- b. Interdependence and Oligopolistic Behavior
- c. Baumol's Stasis Models
- d. Baumol's Dynamic Model
- e. Empirical Evidence
- f. Some Comments

16. Marri's Model of the Managerial Enterprise

- a. Goals of the Firm
- b. Constraints
- c. The Model: Equilibrium of the Firm
- d. Maximum Rate of Growth and Profits
- e. Comparison with Baumol's Model
- f. Comparison with a Profit Maximizer
- g. Critique of Marri's Model

17. Williamson's Model of Managerial Discretion

- a. The Managerial Utility Function
- b. Basic Relationships and Definitions
- c. The Model
 - i. A Simplified Model of Managerial Discretion
 - ii. The General Model of Managerial Discretion
- d. Implications of the Model
- e. Comparative Static Properties
- f. Empirical Evidence

Section F: Behavior Theory of the Firm

18. The Behavioral Model of Cyert and March

- a. The Firm as a Coalition of Groups with Conflicting Goals
- b. The Process of Goal-Formation: The Concept of the 'Aspiration Level'
- c. Goals of the Firm: Satisfying Behavior
- d. Means for the Resolution of the Conflict
- e. The Process of Decision-Making

- f. Uncertainty and the Environment of the Firm
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 - The Supply of Labor in Perfectly Competitive Markets
 - Supply of Labor by an Individual
 - Market Supply of Labor
 - The Determination of the Factor Price in Perfect Markets
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 - The Market Demand for and Supply of Labor
 - Model B
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 - Model C—Bilateral Monopoly
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- b. Elasticity of Factor Substitution, Technological Progress and Income Distribution
 - i. Elasticity of Input Substitution and the Shares of Factors of Production
 - ii. Technological Progress and Income Distribution
- c. Some Additional Topics on Factor Pricing and Income Distribution
 - i. The Price of Fixed Factors: Rents and Quasi-Rents
 - ii. Nonhomogeneous Factors and Wage Differentials
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 - Euler’s Product Exhaustion Theorem
 - Clark-Wicksteed-Walras ‘Product Exhaustion’ Theorem

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Appendix E
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 - a. *Māl* (Property) and Its Kinds (Immovable, Movable, Valuable, and Unvaluable)
 - b. Ownership, Complete Ownership, and Benefits of Ownership
 27. Zakah: First Volume of *al Hidāyah* (p. 96-117)
 28. *Bay‘*: Third Volume of *al Hidāyah* (p. 21-86)
 29. *al Mushārakah*
 30. *al Muḍārabah*
 31. *al Muzārah*
 32. *al Musāqāh*
 33. *al Ijārah*
 34. *al Wadī‘ah*
 35. *al ‘Arīyah*
 36. *al Hibah*

Prescribed Texts

1. Samuelson, P.A., and W.D. Nordhaus. *Economics* 12th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1985.
2. Mannan, M.A. *Islamic Economics—Theory and Practice*. Lahore: Sh. Mohammad Ashraf & Sons, 1970.
3. Afzal-ur-Rehman. *Economic Doctrines of Islam* Vol. I, II and III. Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited, 1980.

4. Siddiqi, N. *Islam Ka Nazriyae Milkyyat* Vols. I and II. (Urdu). Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited, 1968.
5. Marhenani. *Al-Hedaya*.

Recommended Books

1. Wonnacott, and R. Wonnacott. *Economics* 2nd Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982.
2. Brue, S.L., and D.R. Wentworth. *Economic Sciences: Theory in Today's World* 2nd Ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980.
3. Shafie Mufie Muhammad. *Ma'ārif al Qur'an* 8 Volumes (Urdu *Tafsir*). Karachi: Idarah al Ma'aref, 1980.
4. No'mani, Muhammad Manzoor. *Ma'ārif al Hadith* Vols. 4 and 7 (Urdu). Karachi: Darul Asha'at.
5. Al Abadi, Abdussalam. *Nazriyah al Milkyyah*. Jordan, Amman: Maktabat al Aqsa.
6. Ibn Rushd. *Bidyat al Mujtahid*. Lahore.
7. Ibn Qudama. *Mughni*. Egypt.
8. Ibrahim, Ahmed. *Kitab al Mu'āmalāt al Māliyah*. Egypt.
9. Ramli. *Nihāyat al Muhtāj*.
10. Hamid, Hussain. *Al Madkhal al Fiqhi*. (Nazriyat al A'qd).
11. Assalusi, Ali Ahmad. *Mu'āmalāt al Banuk al Hadithah*.

Comments on “How to Teach Intermediate Microeconomics in Islamic Perspective at Intermediate Level in an Undergraduate Program”*

A.S. Dunia

I would like to start by congratulating Brother Khan for dealing successfully with such an important field. No doubt, initiating university-level research in Islamic economics will bear fruit. The present Islamic intellectual awakening will provide for us a path away from Western intellectual domination. Then our students will be able to pursue their studies, preparing the ground for generations of Islamic economists. If we can enrich economics departments in the Islamic universities by introducing Islamic economics programs, soon, we will witness a whole generation of Islamic economists from all over the Muslim world contributing profound research.

Realizing such ambitions is not easy. It is not possible to change the secular microeconomics curriculum into an Islamic one in method and content in a short time; but it is possible to change it step by step. Each subject needs to be systematically designed, taking into consideration all relevant elements, such as its importance, its fundamental relationship to the other subjects, as well as the means by which it will be infused with the Islamic character.

I think microeconomics represents the core of economics. So how to achieve such an important objective? Obviously, it cannot be achieved by the efforts of one researcher. It requires the combined efforts of many researchers. Whenever the subject is discussed the enormity of the task looms over the debate. The difficulties are many—a lack of funding, an absence of Islamic economics from the intellectual stage, etc. Presently, there is no serious scientific research being undertaken. Applied Islamic economics is nonexistent in the Muslim countries—they are dominated by secular economics. There are no specialists of Islamic economics.

* Translated from Arabic by the editor.

In the light of these facts, approaches to Islamization must be attempted. One approach is to teach the shari'ah as it relates to economic topics in parallel with secular economics. I contributed to this approach and was associated with it. At the time, it was a necessary beginning but now it is no longer sufficient. It did not produce the hoped-for Islamic economist; rather, it produced a person with two separate cultures, one from secular economics and the other from the shari'ah, without achieving the goal of an Islamic economist.

I believe it is necessary to rethink the problem in order to reach a more effective approach. Presently, the call for the Islamization of economics is urgent. Such a call gives the impression that what we need to do is examine secular economics from an Islamic point of view, eliminate what is not in accord with Islamic values, and then develop what accords, replacing those parts which were eliminated. This approach has many practical points. Already, we have a full-fledged economic science and it is a waste not to use the available literature, particularly when we know that wisdom is the lost property of the Muslim, he recovers it wheresoever he finds it."

There is another approach, and that is to rely totally on given Islamic principles and laws and what was developed by our scholars, then build on this heritage, completely overlooking the existing secular economic theory. Assuming that there has been no secular economics, we would have failed to develop the basis for new economic theory. This approach is quite intricate, but at the same time the outcome will be less influenced by the prevailing secular economics.

I think that the difference between these two approaches can be narrowed. I see no problem in benefiting from the existing secular economics. I even think that it is necessary to use the accumulated knowledge of secular economics, not only as a basis for developing Islamic economics, but also as an aid. The experience of teaching Islamic economics motivated some researchers to investigate the problems related to Islamic economics programs at Muslim Universities. The present paper is an important piece of work in that effort.

Now I would like to discuss the question of production. The author sees that Islam perceives the production function differently than the West. He adds that in secular economics the production function does not take into account the element of risk but that in Islamic economics, the elements of risk and uncertainty are present.

According to the author, in Islamic economics, factors of production do not earn fixed returns as they do in secular economics. I do not agree with that. The production function has only one setting. What differs is the cost line, that may take a different configuration from the 'well-known' cost line. The production function is similar in the two cases. We cannot, however, define the cost function in Islamic economics, because it is derived from the production function. In Western systems, one can derive the cost function because the factors of production receive fixed returns. In Islamic economics, this cannot be done because capital does not receive fixed returns. In fact, this problem deserves detailed treatment because there is no Islamic literature on the subject. Even in secular economics production theory is the weakest point in the science and the focus of much debate.

Khan is convinced that the theory of general equilibrium is not suitable for Islamic economics, where the market decides the allocation of resources. I think that market forces in Islamic economics will function well, because the definition of property rights in Islam will diminish the possible failure in the markets. In fact, they may function even better in Islamic economics.

Finally, I would like to applaud the successful efforts of Khan in this excellent contribution.

Comments on “How to Teach Intermediate Undergraduate Microeconomics with an Islamic Perspective”*

M. Adaniat

Commenting on a paper that covers such an important topic as teaching microeconomics in Islamic universities is not easy. The paper is short but covers a wide-range of topics offered in a full undergraduate program of microeconomics. Khan opens his discussion by introducing the nature of the economic problem and goes on to the following topics: property rights in Islam; the theories of demand, production, and cost; institutional set-up; intertemporal choice; and general equilibrium. Unfortunately, the paper covers these topics too quickly and leaves a lot to be desired. I believe each item deserves a much longer and more detailed treatment.

One topic in particular that struck my interest was the author’s theory of consumer behavior, taken from the work of Al Zarga. Khan’s discussion of consumer behavior tries to connect two consumer behavior axioms, the first one based on ‘need fulfillment,’ which he calls the Islamic way, and the other based on ‘utility maximization’. He treats them hastily within a framework in which expenditure is divided into two types: the needs fulfillment for this world (for himself and for his family), and the needs fulfillment for the Hereafter or extra-utility (*thawab*). He emphasizes that this type of expenditure gives the consumer both ordinary utility and extra-utility at the same time. The consumer will choose the optimum distribution of his expenditure in order to maximize his extra-utility, at the same time fulfilling his worldly needs. This is very clear in his statement that the choice of the consumer is based on the available information. Information, however, does not give a solution to the problem, it only points to a possible solution.

Dr. Khan discusses the question of resource allocation, without elaborating on the issue of budget constraint. But how can we discuss optimum allocation of resources without mentioning budget con-

* Translated from Arabic by the editor.

straint? In discussing consumer behavior one should distinguish between presumed behavior and actual behavior. The author bases his analysis on the presumed, rather than on the actual behavior of the consumer. He assumes that Muslims reach a point of devotion and faith in which they act more like angels than like human beings. We all know devotion is relative, and that there are strong Muslims and weak Muslims. Wrongfully, when discussing a Muslim's consumer behavior, we assume that he is faithful and devout. This has been the attitude of all writers on the subject. For example, Al Zarga has put worldly consumer goods on the horizontal line and *thawāb* on the vertical line in his efforts to reach an equilibrium point. Mathematically, it is impossible to reach a point of equilibrium. Khan assumes that all Muslim consumers are strong and faithful; however, we must take into account the weak ones as well.

Another problem with Khan's argument is the distinction he makes between two types of expenditures, one for utility and the other for extra-utility. The two types are considered consumer objectives, but I do not know of any mathematical model supporting such a proposition. The relevant question here is how the two expenditures are affected if the Muslim consumer considers both types and how would that be reflected in his utility function? I do not believe that there is any important effect. Consumer expenditures on goods and services satisfy immediate needs. The fulfillment of religious duties gives joy and relief and would be part and parcel of the utility function of the consumer. Therefore, it is easier to talk about one utility function and then compare the satisfaction of two consumers.

At this stage, I would like to take issue with the division of goods into necessities, complementaries, and amelioratories which was used by Al Zarga in his study of consumer behavior. Is it true that the division of goods into three types creates a Muslim consumer who is basically different from a non-Muslim consumer? I do not believe that this is the case. Man's priorities are based on personal as well as social considerations. Non-Muslim consumers differ from Muslim consumers because Muslims abide by God's prescribed criteria—this is a special consideration built into Islamic economics. Muslims use

God's given criteria to strike a balance between private and social interests; therefore, economic units in an Islamic economy do not conflict, in fact, they line up in harmony and move in an integrated and supportive fashion.

Though I appreciate their efforts, I do not think science departments and research centers should assign staff to design curricula and write textbooks, even if the effort leads to a difference in what is taught.

The paper suggests that a complete microeconomics curriculum cover the following topics: introduction to microeconomics, private property and property rights, theory of demand, theory of production, theory of costs, theory of the firm, factors of production, theory of distribution, and general equilibrium and welfare economics. In the introduction, the author suggests that the following economic problems be included in microeconomics: the role of government, the role of the third sector, types of markets and their structures, the place of values in social sciences, and the importance of substituting needs for desires. The paper then goes on to discuss the methodology of microeconomics for all these items, comparing them in the light of secular and Islamic economics. Though I agree with the author on what he includes in his study, I think all the items except for the topics of markets and property rights should not be treated as part of microeconomics. They should be included in a course on Islamic economic principles.

Khan raises a methodological problem but does not pursue its solution. Many times he suggests that the course lecturer should consider a topic from the point of view of secular economics and then examine it in the light of Islamic economics. The question is, following such procedures, are we teaching Islamic economics or are we teaching comparative economic systems?

Khan calls for fiqh specialists to contribute to the study of many aspects of Islamic economics. On this we do not differ, but he does not explain how the *fuqahā* are to make their contributions. Shall it be through teaching classes in fiqh or shall it be through directing the

students to write papers in microeconomics on each question related to fiqh? This question needs exploration.

In his exposè of the theory of demand, Khan raises many questions. I found some of them difficult to accept. For example, he points to consumer behavior in the light of the *maqāsid* (objectives) of the shari'ah as being based on interest (*maṣlahah*), rather than on utility, and that indifference curves may be used to express consumer preferences. Here, I raise a basic methodological point concerning the terminology being used in Islamic economics. Should we avoid the language and terminology used by secular economics? Should we use it widely? Or, should we use it selectively?

I believe we should develop our own terminology for Islamic economics and base our analysis on it. Whatever we find suitable and acceptable in secular economic terminology, and which does not contradict Islamic concepts, we should use. However, whenever we use terms that have already acquired meaning in secular economics a problem arises. Should we dispose with its distorted meaning or should we use it to convey Islamic meaning? For example, the word 'utility' in secular economics has connotations of pleasure and pain, but utility as an Islamic concept used in the Qur'an contains consumption as well as production connotations. Allah says, "(Many) benefits you from them and that you may satisfy by their means a need that is in your breasts . . ." (40:80). Moreover the root of the word utility (*manfa'ah*) with all its derivations is widely used in Islamic thought and the Sunnah of the Prophet. The linguists say that *manfa'ah* is synonymous with interest (*maṣlahah*). Do we need to avoid 'utility' and replace it with another term? Also the terms 'just wage' and 'just price' need further consideration.

I have another question about utility, Does an analysis based on (*maṣlahah*) differ from that based on utility? There are other questions that we may raise, such as, Is the principle of maximum satisfaction as an objective for consumer behavior acceptable from an Islamic perspective? Or, What are the differences between a Muslim utility function and that of a non-Muslim in the light of humility and self sacrifice? Or, To what extent is the Islamic concept of economic

nationality different from the secular concept? Or, What are the implications of making simplicity a part of buying and selling on the analysis of the consumer as well as the producer's behavior? The secular economic view that tastes and tendencies are given, needs to be recast in an Islamic perspective.

The author exposes many interesting points. Concerning the motives of the Muslim consumer, he distinguishes between two types of expenditures, one to fulfill basic needs in this world, and another to fulfill the needs of the Hereafter. He tries to reach an equilibrium point between these two types and an equilibrium within each type. Here, I would like here to point out the sensitivity of such ideas, and we should not insist on imposing quantitative analysis. On the other hand the position is quite clear and open in this realm. There is the basic satisfaction with its limits, anything above it is prohibited lavishness and anything below it is unacceptable miserliness. There are texts that could be construed as recommending standing within the limits of needs fulfillment. I would like to suggest that treating this question within the theory of consumer behavior may not be suitable from a methodological point of view. This question ought to be looked at from within expenditure or distribution. The most interesting sequence of Islamic economic subjects is the following: principles, consumption, production, distribution and exchange, etc., instead of the usual secular division of economies into 'micro,' 'macro,' etc.

Khan raises the problem of seeing labor and leisure as opposites. He shows that, in an Islamic context, the alternative to work is not only leisure but the work for the Hereafter. Although the author raises the question of how to distribute time between these three alternatives, he does not provide an answer. I do agree with him on the importance of posing such questions. However, I do not think that these questions should be raised within the theory of consumer behavior, rather, they should be raised when dealing with factors of production or labor.

I would like to emphasise here that this sharp distinction made between work for the world and work for the Hereafter is not Islamic.

The Islamic attitude is that the work for this world and work for the Hereafter should be integrated together. It is the spirit of the objectives of the shari'ah. This remark applies as well to time preference. Although I approve of what he said about time preference, I do not agree that this is the right place for it.

I agree with Khan's analysis of market demand, and how it differs in an Islamic context, because it is based on needs and *maṣlahah* in its three types. However, I think that what he says lacks the right setting, particularly, since introducing sequential steps in the market requires clear shari'ah cooperation.

There is a question that I would like answered; i.e., Is it conceivable that during a given period we would find in the market place only the goods and services that fulfill just the basic needs of the Muslims? If the answer is yes, On what evidence is this based? How can this be true when we know that amelioratives as well as luxuries were available in the markets in the early period of Islam, in spite of the fact that there were those who could not meet their basic needs.

I agree with the author's treatment of the theory of production. I would like to stress the importance of the elimination of interest rates and its effect on firm equilibrium and size. Also, I would like to point out the firm's sources of finance and, in particular, the share in the profit of the capital owner.

I agree with the author in his treatment of costs, and in the way he highlights the differences between the concept of costs in Islamic economics and those in secular economics. It needs further detailed analysis. The implications of this distinction are far reaching; for example, some expenditures are undertaken by the firm for social needs or for paying workers wages higher than their marginal product. Are these costs to be considered part of the costs of production? And how do these costs affect the equilibrium of the firm?

I also agree with what Brother Khan included under the theory of the firm, in particular, the objectives of the firm and the Islamic attitude toward profit maximization. However, the subject requires further serious research. I would like to ask, with respect to value and

price and the factors that determine them, Are they the same thing? and Are they different from an Islamic perspective? There is also the need to study market structure in an Islamic economy, and Islamic attitudes vis-a-vis their structures.

I do not agree with Brother Khan's suggestion concerning the factors of production. The same applies to his theory of distribution. I believe that it should be treated separately, rather than the way he adopted. As far as welfare theory is concerned, my direct remark is that the author bases his analysis on an ideal situation, thereby reaching the ideal conclusion that there is no conflict between the needs and interests of individuals and those of society. It may not be wise to neglect the actual situation in our analysis of this particular question and others as well. If we take an actual rather than an ideal situation, a conflict will arise. We may encounter this conflict in ideal situations as well, even though Islam, with the depth of its moral principles introduced the solution, the potential for a conflict of interest exists and should not be overlooked.

Finally, I would like to affirm the importance of using Islamic terminology and of not being influenced by the secular economic system when determining the sequence and content of the subject. I noticed that Brother Khan was influenced by the methodology of secular economics, as witnessed by his list of references in English. To finish, I would like to thank and congratulate Dr. Khan on this excellent work, I am certain that his contribution will take us closer to our objectives, namely the Islamization of economics.

Economic Development in Muslim Countries: A Strategy for Development in the Light of Islamic Teachings*

M. Umar Chapra**

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The Questions

All Muslim countries fall within the category of developing countries, even though some of them are relatively rich. Most of these countries, particularly the poorer ones, are, like other developing countries, beset with a number of extremely difficult macroeconomic imbalances, which are reflected in high rates of unemployment and inflation, excessive balance of payment deficits, continued exchange rate depreciation, and heavy debt burdens. They are also experiencing extreme inequalities of income and wealth. The basic needs of a considerable portion of the population remain unsatisfied; the rich and the upper middle classes live in great affluence, corroding the social fabric and causing sociopolitical instability.

The Islamic revival, which is gaining momentum in almost all Muslim countries, forces us to pose two basic questions. The first is What is the quality of development that Islam stands for? And the second is What can Islamic teachings provide to aid in the development of this quality within each country's existing resource constraints such that their macroeconomic imbalances are reduced?

The quality of development is automatically defined by the objectives of the shari'ah (*maqāsid al shari'ah*). They imply that, while economic growth is essential, it is not sufficient for attaining real human wellbeing (*falāh*); it must be accompanied by a rise in mental peace and a decline in crime and social tensions. This is not possible without spiritual health at the core of human consciousness, and justice and fair play at all levels of human interaction. Accordingly, the shari'ah accords a high priority to spiritual uplift, brotherhood, and socioeconomic justice. But these will remain an unrealized dream unless the scarce resources at the disposal of Muslim countries are utilized for the wellbeing of all its people

through the removal of poverty and the reduction of economic inequalities.¹ Since Islam discourages begging and makes it a personal obligation on every physically and mentally fit person to support himself and his family, the goal of 'need fulfillment' needs to be realized through the development of individual ability and the expansion of both self-employment and employment opportunities.

Because there is no significant controversy among Muslims about the objectives of the shari'ah, this paper will be concerned mainly with formulating a strategy to realize the kind of development that Islam stands for. To lay the discussion groundwork, the paper

¹ The fulfillment of basic needs is now quite widely accepted as a strategy for development (See Paul Streeten's "A Basic Needs Approach to Economic Development" in Kenneth P. Jameson and Charles K. Wilber, eds., *Directions in Economic Development*, [Notre Dame, IN: W. Notre Dame University Press, 1973]; and Frances Stewart, *Basic Needs in Developing Countries* [Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1985].) A number of other authors have also written over the last-decade on the concept of basic needs and its implications for development.

The stress on need fulfillment in Islam should, however, not be construed as an afterthought arising out of the recent Western discussion of the subject. It has received an important place in the fiqh and other Islamic literature throughout Muslim history. The jurists have unanimously held the view that it is the collective duty (*farḍ kifāyah*) of the Muslim society to take care of the basic needs of the poor. (See, for example, Abu Muhammad 'Ali Ibn Hazm, *Al Muhallā*, Beirut: Al Maktab al Tijāri, n.d., vol. 6, p. 156:725.) In fact, according to Shatibi, this is the *raison d'être*, of society itself (abu Ishāq al-Shatibi, *Al Muwāfiqāt fi Usul al Shari'ah*, ed., Abdallah Daraz, Cairo: Al Maktabah al Tijāriyyah al Kubrā, n.d., vol. 2, p. 177). All modern writers, including Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Mustafā al Sabā'i, Abu Zaharah, Bāqir al Sadr, M. al Mubarak, and al Qardāwi, unanimously agree on this point. (See for a brief introduction, M.N. Siddiqi, "Guarantee of a Minimum Level of Living in Islamic State", in Munawwar Iqbal, *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy* (Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Economics, 1986), pp. 249-301; 'Abd al Salām al Abbādi, *Al Milkiyyah fi al Shari'ah al Islāmiyyah* (Amman, Jordan: Maktabah al Aqsā, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 81-95; Ibrahim Ahmad Ibrahim, *Nizām al Nafaqāt fi al Shari'ah al Islāmiyyah* (Cairo: Al Matba'ah al Salafiyyah, 1349 A. H.); and M. Anas Zarqa, "Nahwa Nazariyyah Islāmiyyah Mi'yāriyyah li al-Tawzi'," a paper presented to the Second Islamic Economics Conference at the International Institute of Islamic Economics in Islamabad).

starts with a brief discussion of capitalist and socialist strategies and exposes the fact that continued pursuance of these strategies will either frustrate the efforts of Muslim countries to realize the objectives of the shari'ah or lead to an accentuation of their macroeconomic and external imbalances. The paper then discusses the main ingredients of a strategy in the light of Islamic teachings—a strategy that will enable the poorer Muslim countries to accelerate economic development, giving it the meaning and color that Islam visualizes, and reduce the severity of their macroeconomic imbalances.

Failure of the Borrowed Strategies

If resources were unlimited there would be no difficulty in realizing the objectives of the shari'ah. However, the bitter fact is that resources are limited. This makes it necessary that the claims on these resources be reduced and that they be allocated and distributed in such an efficient and equitable manner that an optimum rate of economic growth is attained (efficiency) and the objectives of the shari'ah are realized (equity) without generating macroeconomic imbalances. It is not possible to accomplish these goals in a vacuum and, therefore, it is necessary to have an underlying philosophy consistent with the goals.

Every economic system has such an underlying philosophy even though, like the foundation of a building, it is not visible. This philosophy helps the system develop its own strategy, consisting of: (a) a filter mechanism to enable individuals to discriminate and choose among the unlimited uses of resources in such a way that the aggregate claims do not exceed supply and socioeconomic goals of the society are realized; (b) a motivating mechanism to induce individuals to contribute their best in conformity with the dictates of such a filter mechanism irrespective of whether this serves their own interest or the interest of society; and (c) a transfer mechanism to bring about resource allocation and distribution that is in harmony with social goals. Unless the underlying philosophy of the system is con-

sistent with its professed goals, a proper strategy cannot be developed and the goals will not be realized.

Muslim countries have tried to pursue development strategies conceived within the secularist and 'this-worldly' perspective of either capitalism or socialism. However, their problems have become aggravated and they have moved farther and farther away from the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah. The fundamental reason is that the strategies they have adopted have been borrowed from societies whose professed goals may be the same as those of Islam but whose underlying philosophy and strategy are in conflict with the realization of these goals.

Capitalism regards self-interest as the primary motivation behind individual initiative and enterprise. It thus assigns primary value to everything that serves self-interest, such as maximum individual freedom, unlimited rights to accumulate private property, market determined prices, and profit maximization. Freedom is also conceived within the framework of unhindered opportunity to pursue this self-interest. The willingness of the sovereign consumers to pay the price in accordance with their individual preferences will interact with the cost schedules of passive suppliers and determine not only the production of that configuration of goods and services which is socially most preferred but also the incomes earned by different factors of production in return for their contribution to output and revenue. The serving of self-interest by everyone in a free and competitive market environment will thus serve the social interest by leading to a most efficient and equitable allocation and distribution. Prices will serve as the filter mechanism in determining necessary from unnecessary and equitable from inequitable. Trying to do this in any other way requires value judgements which are an anathema. Capitalism thus sidesteps the crucial issues of ethics and socio-economic justice by asserting that market forces will be sufficient to keep self-interest within the bounds of social wellbeing. Government intervention is accordingly considered undesirable except when it is necessary to ensure the prevalence of orderly markets.

A number of assumptions are implicitly made in the above reasoning. However, usually they are not spelled out clearly in the literature. First, it is assumed that everything that needs to be done in social interest is also in self-interest, with no possibility of conflict between the two. This is a false assumption; for example, a substantial reduction in luxury consumption of the rich is in the interest of increased savings and investment and of general need-fulfillment, but may not necessarily be in the immediate interest of the rich. Similarly, eliminating the pollution in a country's rivers is in social interest but need not necessarily satisfy the immediate, this-worldly self-interest of an individual because it raises costs and reduces profits; thus, market forces would tend to benefit those who avoid such costs.

Second, it is assumed that background conditions that are necessary to bring about a harmony between self-interest and social well-being in a secularist environment are fulfilled. Two of the most important of these are: perfect competition (many buyers, many sellers, no barriers to entry, and perfect knowledge) and equal distribution of wealth, talents, education, and power. However, none of these two tacitly assumed conditions is fulfilled in any of the market economies around the world. Samuel Brittan has rightly observed that "No real world market is likely to be even approximately satisfactory in all the background conditions."² Hence, while market forces may be able to raise efficiency, they cannot, by themselves, be expected to bring about equity. Rather, they will enable the rich and the powerful to tilt the allocation of resources in their favor. Accordingly, as Samuelson has rightly indicated, market forces will only lead to "starving couples; to malnourished children who grow up to produce malnourished children; to perpetuation of Lorenz curves of great inequality of incomes and wealth for generations or forever."³

² Samuel Brittan, *Two Cheers for Self-Interest* (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, for the Wincott Foundation, 1985), p. 17.

³ Paul Samuelson, *Economics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980, 11th ed.), p. 591.

Third, it is assumed that even in a secularist system committed to utilitarianism, the preferences of utility maximizing sovereign consumers would reflect social priorities. This is also not true. Without the restraint that commitment to moral values promotes in the use of resources, votes cast in the market place cannot reflect social priorities. Why would the rich abstain from diverting scarce resources from need fulfillment to the satisfaction of their preferences, whatever they be.

Given the prevailing inequalities of income and wealth and the lack of commitment to agreed social values, the price system could not but effectively contribute to social Darwinism in resource allocation and distribution. The situation is worsened by value-free advertising to promote the sales of status symbols and the relatively easy access of the rich to the enormous financial resources of the banking system through credit. The result is that in secularist market economies, the rich are able, by the sheer weight of their purchasing power, to get scarce national resources diverted to the production or import of luxuries and false symbols of prestige which do not fall within the category of needs. Thus, as indicated by Tawney, a “part of the goods which are annually produced, and which are called wealth is, strictly speaking, waste because it consists of articles which, though reckoned as part of the income of the nation, either should not have been produced until other articles had been produced in sufficient abundance or should not have been produced at all.”⁴ Nevertheless, every competitive equilibrium is declared to be a Pareto optimum, irrespective of whether the configuration of goods and services produced and the income distribution brought about is in conflict with the professed goals of society.

Therefore, the only policy alternatives left for removing poverty and satisfying needs within the capitalist framework are accelerated growth and government ‘welfare’ spending. However, two decades of unprecedented growth have failed to remove poverty and fulfill needs even in the world’s richest countries. In fact, as Adelman and

⁴ R.H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society* (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1948), p. 12.

Morris have convincingly shown on the basis of a cross-section of data, "development is accompanied by an absolute as well as a relative decline in the average income of the poor."⁵ Moreover, growth has now faltered and there seems to be no hope of faster growth in the near future without rekindling inflation or accentuating external imbalances. Welfare spending, undertaken within the framework of value neutrality, has also helped the rich more than the poor because of their larger purchases and their greater access to facilities.⁶ Thus, while the single-minded pursuit of growth and welfare spending led to an avalanche of claims satisfied through deficit financing, credit expansion, and external borrowing, it did not help accomplish the desired goals; rather, it led to macroeconomic imbalances which have acquired cancerous proportions in some countries. Within the constraints of neoclassical orthodoxy, being championed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the cure lies in a greater resort to the market mechanism. This implies a package of liberalization policies including removal of price controls and subsidies, real exchange rate depreciation, and a general reduction in all forms of market intervention. While these are no doubt essential, their use within the secularist framework of value neutrality not only slows down growth but actually squeezes the poor unduly, leading to riots and socio-political instability.

Socialism, which is equally if not more secularist in its outlook towards life, has an implicit distrust in the ability of human beings to act in the interest of society. Hence, there arises the need to curb freedom and eliminate private property as well as the profit motive through state ownership of all means of production and central planning to promote efficiency and equity in resource use. The removal of profit as a direct reward for individual effort, however, erodes initiative and efficiency, both of which are indispensable for growth. Centralized decision making also makes the transfer of resources

⁵ Adelman and C.T. Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1973), p. 189.

⁶ See Richard Titmus, *Commitment of Welfare* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 2nd ed., 1976), p. 196.

slow and cumbersome and makes the whole economic machinery inefficient.⁷ Thus, the emergence of perestroika in almost all socialist countries—a move to reintroduce private profit, realistic prices, and some other elements of the market system for greater efficiency in resource allocation.

Nevertheless, the basic question that remains is, If individual human beings cannot be trusted to manage their private businesses within the overall constraint of social wellbeing, how can they manage the whole nation's means of production for this purpose? Will not the government officials come out of the same people who cannot be trusted? If so, what is the guarantee that they will not exploit the tremendous power exercised by them through the placing of all means of production at their command. Moreover, even the central planning officials need a philosophy of life and a filter mechanism of values to manage the means of production for actualizing socio-economic justice. Who will provide these values? If they themselves try to develop all values and rules, even the fundamentals, wouldn't there be arbitrariness in their decisions and a conflict of interest, particularly in a system which has dialectics (the counterpart of social Darwinism) as an essential part of its world view? Who will check them and correct them if necessary?

The logical flaws in the reasoning of both capitalism and socialism are also borne out by facts. The experience of capitalist countries indicates that even the richest and most advanced ones have not been able to remove poverty in spite of decades of development and their enormous wealth. In fact, inequalities of income and wealth have risen and unemployment has become a chronic, long-term problem. Some of these countries are also facing chronic macroeconomic and external imbalances that they are finding hard to remove. The record of the socialist countries is no different in either fulfilling needs or in reducing socio-economic inequalities, in spite of their enormous resources. Their economies have stagnated due to lack of motivation among workers as well as executives, and the inability of the system

⁷ For the experience with socialism in some Muslim countries see, Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque, *Socialism in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

to respond to changing realities. The external debt of some of these countries has also risen steeply like that of a number of developing countries. The adoption of market solutions, which perestroika envisages, within the framework of the diehard secularism of these societies is bound to get them engulfed in the problems of inflation, unemployment, and other macroeconomic imbalances that capitalist societies are themselves experiencing.

Thus, both systems have failed to realize their professed goals. This is because their fundamental philosophy of life and the strategy derived from it are not in harmony with their professed goals. The goals are humanitarian but the strategies are conflict-oriented, based on social Darwinism or dialectics rather than on the concepts of brotherhood, trust, and accountability before the Supreme Being. Within the frame of reference of their world view and strategy they are unable to introduce the radical structural changes that are needed to realize professed goals without accentuating macroeconomic imbalances. Systems which have themselves failed to realize their goals cannot serve as examples for Muslim countries. Hence, Muslim countries must turn inward and see whether Islam can provide an allocation and distribution strategy that is different from those of both capitalism and socialism, while at the same time is in conformity with the objectives of the shari'ah.

The Islamic Strategy

Realization of the objectives of the shari'ah requires resources and, in view of the already existing heavy pressure on resources, it is not possible to muster resources for this purpose without reducing the flow for other purposes or, to use the proper economic terminology, reallocation. In the absence of reallocation there is bound to be an excessive resort to deficit financing, credit expansion and external debt. These exacerbate inflationary pressures, balance of payments deficits, currency depreciation, and debt-servicing burdens.

The kind of resource reallocation needed for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah cannot be brought about merely by the operation

of market forces or central planning. It is necessary to have a socially agreed upon filter mechanism of values, which only a moral system can provide. Islam is no doubt such a moral system with values that no sincere Muslim would be willing to challenge. However, values, even if they are accepted by everyone, may be ineffective unless they are acted upon. This requires a strong motivating mechanism, particularly when there is a conflict between self-interest and social interest. Islam provides such a mechanism through a set of inter-linked beliefs. The human being is the vicegerent (*khalifah*) of the One Almighty God, the Creator of this universe and everything in it. As God's *khalifah*, he is accountable to Him for how he uses the resources provided. He is duty-bound to look after his wellbeing and dignity in this world. But this world is not the end of his life. There is a life after death and his self-interest lies in safeguarding his interest in this world as well as in the Hereafter. Islam thus gives self-interest a spiritual, long-term direction by extending the span of self-interest beyond the confines of this life. His wellbeing in the Hereafter is ensured only by behaving in a way that does not hurt the interests of others in this world. This is because he is not the only *khalifah* of God, there are millions of others like him who are his equals and brothers and whose needs must be satisfied through a fair share in God-given resources.

Thus the contribution that self-interest and the desire for profit can make towards individual initiative, drive, efficiency and entrepreneurship are recognized by Islam. However, the evils of greed and the unscrupulous disregard for the rights and needs of others that the secularist, this-worldly perspective of both capitalism and socialism can promote are overcome through the internal self-regulating mechanism of Islam, with its unrelenting emphasis on belief in God, accountability before Him, moral values, brotherhood and socioeconomic justice. This accountability serves as a strong motivating force in preventing individuals from pursuing self-interest beyond the limits of social health and wellbeing. Competition and market forces are essential for playing a complementary role but are not adequate to ensure the interest and wellbeing of all because self-interest can tend

to be blind and find different ways of restraining competition and thwarting the operation of market forces, particularly when wealth and power are unequally distributed.

However, even in a morally charged environment, values may be violated and accountability before God ignored, individuals may tend to be oblivious to the problems of scarcity and to social priorities in resource allocation. They may simply be unaware of the urgent and unsatisfied needs of others and, if they are well-to-do, they may unconsciously divert scarce resources to the satisfaction of their relatively less urgent wants. Therefore, a certain degree of economic restructuring is indispensable if the objectives of the shari'ah are to be realized by Muslim countries without exceeding the limits of their resources and engulfing themselves in perplexing macroeconomic imbalances. The restructuring must address itself to the following:

- a. Transforming the human factor in development to enable it to play an active and constructive role;
- b. Reducing the existing concentration in ownership of means of production;
- c. Eliminating or minimizing all wasteful and unnecessary consumption at the private as well as the public level to release resources for actualizing social goals;
- d. Reorganizing investment to enable the production system to fulfill the demands of a need-based economy, increase opportunities for self-employment and employment, and expand the export surplus; and
- e. Reforming the financial system in the light of Islamic teachings to enable it to play a complementary and enabling role in the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah.

Such restructuring is not possible without the government playing a positive, active economic role. Totalitarianism, as envisaged by socialism, does not permit such a role. Islam, on the other hand, takes a complementary role, not through excessive controls, unnecessary violation of individual freedom, and abolition of property rights, but rather through the creation of a healthy environment and development of proper enabling institutions. Islam's four dimensional

approach (i.e., providing a filter mechanism of values, motivating the individual, socio-economic restructuring, and positive role of the government) should prove to be more effective in ensuring the well-being of all within society than the single dimensional capitalist or socialist approach of putting the whole burden on the shoulders of either self-interest and market forces or collectivization and central planning.

In general, the governments of poorer Muslim countries have been inwardly (though perhaps not outwardly) secularist, in step with their colonial heritage and the 'conventional' wisdom. They have not formulated a consistent development philosophy to realize the objectives of the shari'ah. Hence, their policies have lacked a firm direction and have oscillated on the waves of socialism and free enterprise, controls and decontrols that have been in vogue in development literature over the last four decades.⁸ This lack of firm direction, combined with fluctuations and inconsistencies in policies, has generated uncertainties and caused immense harm to the developmental process. Whatever development has been attained has been at a high cost in terms of macroeconomic imbalances, increased inequalities of incomes and wealth, and social tensions.

While formulating policies for Muslim countries within the framework of such an integrated approach, it is not necessary to find a precedent for all of these in early Islamic history. Although the shari'ah has prescribed the essential elements of a basic strategy, it has not spelled out detailed policy measures. These have to be developed. It may be possible to emulate the experience of other countries with respect to specific policies. However, while doing so, it is necessary to ensure that the policy measures being considered for adoption fulfill two criteria—that they make a positive contribution towards the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah without creating a conflict with the shari'ah, and that they do not lead to an

⁸ For some relevant details on the changing moods in development literature, see, Gerald M. Meier, ed., *Pioneers in Developments* (published for the World Bank by the Oxford University Press, 1987), in particular the "Introduction" by Meier himself. See also, Gustav Ranis and Poul Schult, eds., *The State of Development Economics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).

excessive increase in claims on resources. The second criterion should not be fulfilled within the framework of Pareto optimality. A strategy that talks of increasing resources for a specific purpose without effectively reducing its availability for other purposes, cannot but lead to frustrations and imbalances. Hence, value neutrality must be set aside. Policies must be passed through the filter mechanism of Islamic values. This will also help in the public acceptance of these policies, particularly policies which do not satisfy the criterion of Pareto optimality.

In general, the policy measures suggested below may be familiar to those well-versed in development literature. No originality is claimed for most of these. What is important is the integrated approach within the framework of the Islamic world view and strategy to realize the objectives of the shari'ah without putting excessive pressure on the limited resources available.

The Human Factor: Motivation and Ability

Allocating resources efficiently and equitably, and removing imbalances requires a number of essential qualities in the people themselves, qualities that enable them to serve their individual self-interest and qualities that ensure social wellbeing. They must be willing and able to render their best by working hard and efficiently with integrity, conscientiousness, and discipline and must also be willing to sacrifice their personal comfort to overcome obstacles in the path of development. They must also change their consumption, savings, and investment behavior so that it is in conformity with what is needed for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah. This requires proper motivation and ability.

Motivation

Unless individuals are properly motivated, no system can realize either efficiency in resource use or equity in distribution. The present-day Muslim socioeconomic environment has become so inherently unjust that it is unable to motivate people to render their best,

either in their own interest or in the interest of society. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt policies that will help ensure both.

To make people work in their self-interest, they need to have an assurance that their self-interest is served by their hard work, creativity and contribution to output. There must, in other words, be socioeconomic justice—a quid pro quo relationship between the quantity and quality of output and reward.

If individuals, irrespective of whether they are employees, savers, investors or exporters, do not share equitably in the fruits of their contribution to output through a reciprocal reward, they become apathetic and their initiative and efficiency suffer considerably. In most Muslim countries material rewards are inequitable due to biases and lack of realism in official policies. Wealth and power is concentrated in the hands of the few in both rural and urban areas. Biases and lack of realism have distorted key prices which have unconsciously lowered the incomes of tenant farmers, small microenterprises (SMEs), and workers, reducing their demand for needs and creating a misallocation of resources against need fulfillment. The concentration of wealth and power, also due partly to official policies and partly to the exploitative economic system that has prevailed for centuries, has restricted competition, generated widespread collusion and created a climate conducive to the misery of the masses. This has reduced the willingness and ability of the individuals in the Muslim countries to do their best.

The bias against agriculture and SMEs in government policies has retarded the development of human, physical, and financial infrastructure in rural areas, thus not only reducing the rewards for the efforts of tenant farmers and workers in rural areas but also lowering their ability to invest in better seeds, fertilizers and equipment in SMEs to supplement their incomes from agriculture. This has led to an influx of labor in urban areas, thereby depressing wages and living conditions there. The bias in favor of urban development and large-scale businesses and industries, has also raised, along with heavy tariff protection, concessionary financing and subsidized inputs, along with profit rates among favored urban SMEs, further

increasing the concentration of wealth and power. While high tax evasion prevents the governments from reaping the benefit of their urban bias, urban congestion results in low wages and salaries and prevents urban employees from getting rewarded appropriately for their contribution to urban prosperity. However, while it is necessary to remove the bias of official policies against agriculture and SMEs, it is also necessary to remove other policy biases that reduce the real income of workers, savers, investors and exporters, particularly of those who are poor.

Minimum real wages in an Islamic society, not necessarily legally stipulated, should be such that a laborer is able to fulfill all his and his family's essential needs in a humane manner.⁹ In sharp contrast to this, wages in most Muslim countries are so low that, in spite of nearly 10-14 hours of hard work, a laborer is unable to fulfill his and his family's basic needs. This is due to the exploitation that results from inappropriate official policies, concentration of wealth and power, poverty, and lack of training facilities for workers and their children. Unless this pathetic situation is remedied it may not be possible to motivate workers to work conscientiously and efficiently.

The prescription of minimum wages may not, nevertheless, be the immediate solution. It would be difficult to enforce and, if enforced, may tend to exacerbate the prevailing high level of unemployment. Rather, it is better to resort to an entirely different package of policies—policies that raise the ability of workers to earn more through training and finance and also that restructure the entire economy in favor of need fulfillment and a more equitable distribution of incomes and wealth. Profit sharing and the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) should also be made as widespread as possible.

Every firm should be required to establish a profit-sharing scheme for the employees. A certain agreed proportion of the firm's net profit should be distributed among the employees as profit-sharing bonuses and as a means to provide training facilities and improve working conditions, as well as to grant medical benefits, educational

⁹ For discussion, see M. U. Chapra, *Objectives of the Islamic Economic Order* (Leicester, U.K., The Islamic Foundation, 1979), pp. 14-16.

allowances to children, housing facilities, and food subsidies. Linking the increase in income and benefits of employees beyond a certain basic level to their firm's profitability and combining this with a more humanitarian treatment should have a number of benefits, including: (a) boosting employees' morale, thus leading to increased efficiency and productivity; (b) improving labor/management relations and promoting solidarity and the sense of worker participation that should be the characteristic of an Islamic society; (c) keeping the employees' earnings flexible and responsive to the health of the national economy and the performance of their firms—employees sharing in their firm's prosperity when profits are good but not burdening it when profits are low or the firm is suffering losses; (d) reducing tax evasion (provided that the tax system is reformed), because the employees, in their own self-interest, would keep an eye on the firm's actual profits with respect to which they are currently indifferent; and (e) maintaining the competitiveness of the economy and the firms, thus improving the general climate for investment and the macroeconomic performance of the economy.

The introduction of ESOP could also go a long way in benefiting workers and reducing concentration of wealth and power. It will enable workers to become equity owners, thus increasing their stake in the firm's success. It will raise savings, discourage the unproductive alternative of gold hoarding and help raise their social status in the company and society. When ESOP has been adopted even in some capitalist countries like France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, there is no reason why it should not receive enthusiastic support in Muslim countries.¹⁰

The low return on deposits paid by conventional banks because of administrative fiat hurt mainly the small savers; big businesses get a higher return and are, besides, alleged to keep most of their savings abroad to evade taxes, to protect themselves from the depreciation of their currency, and to get a higher international market-related return. However, for domestic investment, they borrow from local

¹⁰ See, J. W. Middendorf II, "Employee Share Ownership: An ESOPs Moral for the Third World" *Financial Times*, 25 March 1987, p. 25.

banks and government financial organizations at lower prime- or concessionary-rates. This is not a plea in favor of higher interest rates, but rather a strong case in favor of equity financing in conformity with the shari'ah because of its more positive role in rendering greater justice to both savers and investors and in bringing about greater allocative efficiency, economic stability, and growth.¹¹

Similarly, unrealistic exchange rates and unnecessary price controls hurt producers and exporters, while high protective tariffs hurt consumers. The claim that these measures are adopted in the interest of the common man and the country's development is usually a lie. They are not, rather, they serve the vested interest of the rich and powerful who have grown continually richer at the expense of the masses who have become more and more impoverished.

All measures that enrich a minority of the population at the expense of the majority cannot be defended in the light of the shari'ah. Nevertheless, since such practices have been in existence for a long time, it may not be advisable to remove them abruptly without taking measures to safeguard the interests of the poor. These measures may take the form of an increase in their incomes or relief payments, or an expansion in the supply of need-fulfilling goods and services, or a rise in income-earning opportunities. Among the needs that should be given priority are education and training, nutrition, the water supply, housing, sanitation, medical facilities, and public transportation.

Although a quid pro quo relationship between work and reward is necessary for hard and efficient work, it is not necessarily sufficient for inducing integrity and conscientiousness. It is also not adequate to motivate people to change their consumption, savings and investment behavior to be in conformity with the objectives of the shari'ah. Secularism, which has tacitly been the philosophy of most of the power elite in the Muslim world, regardless of whether their leaning is towards socialism or capitalism, has neither the filter mechanism necessary to serve social goals, nor the charisma to

¹¹ For a discussion of this, see M. U. Chapra, *Towards a Just Monetary System* (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1985), pp. 107-125.

inspire people and to motivate them to make the sacrifices required. Islam however carries a great potential for creating the desired qualities in people and for making them identify the social interest with their personal interest. Islam not only demands these characteristics in its followers, it also commands the necessary charisma and motivation to inspire and change them.¹² However, due to several centuries of degeneration and foreign domination, Muslims have lost touch with the inner core of their faith. Muslim countries could accelerate development substantially by improving the quality of the human factor through a reform program based on Islamic values. If they do not undertake such a reform, the erosion in morals will continue and contribute to a further degeneration in the quality of people, accompanied by its adverse impact on development and sociopolitical stability.

Ability

While socioeconomic justice and moral consciousness are both necessary to motivate people they are not enough for realizing efficiency and equity. Two persons may be equally motivated, yet they may be unable to contribute equally to the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah. The difference lies in ability, which is not only inborn but also acquired, partly through education and training and partly through access to finance. Hence, expansion of educational and training facilities, and the poor's access to finance are indispensable.

The invaluable contribution that appropriate education and training can make towards improvement in the quality of human beings, greater socioeconomic justice and faster growth is now universally recognized. Education opens the door to opportunity and has been rightly considered to be the great equalizer of the human condition. Nevertheless, Muslim governments have been grossly guilty of

¹² For a more detailed discussion of the moral characteristics required in Muslims see, Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, *The Islamic Movement: the Dynamics of Values, Power and Change*, tr. and ed. by K. Murad (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1984), in particular pp. 93-132. See also, Marwan Ibrahim al Kaysi, *Morals and Manners in Islam: a Guide to Islamic Adab* (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), see particularly the "Introduction," pp. 13-53.

neglecting this important sector in their resource allocation policies. Even literacy, which is the first step on the path of education, has not become universal in Muslim countries. Such a neglect cannot continue for long without ruining the fabric of Muslim society.

The primary stress of education has to be on creating a 'good' Muslim. He must be educated about the qualities of a true Muslim and strongly motivated to create those qualities in himself. But this is not sufficient. It is also necessary to teach him the skills in demand and the most efficient production, management, and marketing techniques available.

The secular educational system in Muslim countries has failed to make its students better human beings and it has also failed to make them more productive. While qualified young men are unable to get admission into vocational training institutes and engineering and medical colleges due to a shortage of facilities, the universities, following loyally the blueprint set by their colonial masters, have been producing generations of secularized liberal arts majors for clerical and civil service jobs, which have now become more than fully saturated. There is thus a steep rise in the number of 'educated unemployed' in urban areas, in spite of a scarcity of trained manpower in several sectors of the economy. While the rich are easily able to get technical education for their children at home and abroad, the poor, who need it more acutely to raise their income and status, are unable to do so. This tends to widen the gulf between the rich and the poor, and to condemn the poor to a position of permanent misery. It is an obvious proof that the educational systems are not responding to the objectives of the shari'ah nor to the changing economic and political realities within Muslim countries.

Hence, there is need for a revolutionary change in educational curricula in order to impart Islamic values and the needed technical skills. It is also necessary to establish a widespread network of institutions such that even a poor man's child in rural areas or urban slums is able to have access to technical education and training facilities. This is an important way of removing one of the primary sources of

iniquity and poverty and providing everyone a chance to push ahead on the basis of his innate ability and the training he has acquired.

The inability of the poor to have access to finance is undoubtedly the most crucial drawback in bringing about a broad-based ownership of businesses and industries and thereby realizing the egalitarian objectives of Islam. Unless effective measures are taken to remove this drawback, a better and widespread educational system will only help raise efficiency and incomes but be ineffective in reducing substantially the inequalities of wealth, thus making meaningless the talk of creating an egalitarian Islamic society. Fortunately, Islam has a clear advantage over both capitalism and socialism through a financial system which is built into its value system and which provides biting power to its objective of socioeconomic justice. This will be discussed later.

Reducing Concentration of Ownership

The most serious obstacle to the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah is the existing concentration in ownership of means of production in Muslim countries, as it is in all market economy countries. Unless this situation is corrected through special measures adopted in the light of the shari'ah, it may not be possible to make perceptible progress in realizing the egalitarian goals of Islam. The Islamic strategy in this case is in sharp contrast with that of socialism, which has reduced human beings to a permanent state of wage slavery through collectivisation of all means of production and centralization of decision making. Proliferation of ownership and decentralization of decision making, conform to the dignity and freedom that are associated with the concept of *khalifah*. This proliferation must be brought about in both the rural and urban areas, as well as in agriculture, industry, and commerce.

Land Reforms and Rural Development

In most Muslim countries, a large proportion of the population is dependent on agriculture for income, employment, and general well-being. However, a constellation of historical and political forces has

led to a socioeconomic structure that is inherently unjust and perpetrates exploitation and misery of the rural population. Nevertheless, this sector has failed to receive the priority it deserves in official policies in order to remove the prevailing iniquities and inefficiencies. Unless measures are adopted to make the agricultural sector more efficient and equitable, the poorer Muslim countries will find it difficult to remove poverty and inequalities or to accelerate development.

A small number of absentee landlords controls large tracts of land in rural areas and a substantial part of the farming population is either landless or has an uneconomic holding. This sets the stage for exploitation by both the landlord and the money lender and serves as one of the major sources of persistent economic and political inequalities. The poverty of tenant farmers and rural laborers prevents them from adopting better farming techniques, thus freezing them into a state of permanent poverty and depravity. It also kills the incentive of the rural population to put in their best and creates in them the characteristics of indolence, dishonesty, and apathy. It also drives the rural population to urban areas in search of work. There, they face unhealthy living conditions and remoteness from their loved ones. Social control declines and, combined with low wages and other frustrations, contributes to crime and social unrest.

Realizing the objectives of the shari'ah is not possible without making land reform the corner stone of all economic policies. However, land reform revolves around the issues of size of land holdings and terms of tenancy. Unless these are settled in conformity with the demands of socioeconomic justice, it will be difficult to make significant headway.

If land had been acquired through fair means and cultivated either by the owner himself or leased to tenant farmers on 'just' terms, and if the Islamic system of inheritance had also been faithfully applied, landholding would not have become concentrated in the hands of a few families. However, since land has been acquired for centuries through unfair means and the Islamic law of inheritance has been disregarded, landholding has become inequitably distributed, subjecting most of the rural population to lives of virtual slav-

ery, poverty and misery. Given this highly unjust situation, it is important to set a ceiling on the maximum size of landholding and to distribute the surplus equitably among landless peasants.

The shari'ah does not visualize the setting of such limits on private wealth in normal circumstances.¹³ Nevertheless, the shari'ah does authorize the state to take all measures that are necessary for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah, provided that they are not specifically prohibited by the shari'ah.¹⁴ Since land ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few families, the existing exploitation, poverty, and inefficient use of land and labor will continue, and the goal of realizing an equitable distribution of wealth will remain permanently frustrated as long as the combined monopolistic and monopsomatic power of landlords is not broken by imposing certain reasonable limits on the maximum size of land held by one family. Even the enormity of the present rural population relative to the limited size of total available land necessitates the adoption of such a measure. Accordingly, a number of renowned scholars have argued in favor of such limits.¹⁵ Since the shari'ah requires the payment of 'just' compensation to 'rightful' owners, the land needs not be given away to the peasants free. Rather, it should be given at a fair price, the entire value being realized by the government gradually over a number of years out of the peasants' earnings, and used partly to

¹³ See Abbādi *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 400.

¹⁴ Ali al Khafif, *Al Milkīyah fi al Shari'ah al Islāmiyyah*, vol. 1, p. 93.

¹⁵ See Muhammad Qutub, *Al Insān Bayna al Māddiyyah wa al Islām*, (Cairo: Isā al Bābi al Halabi, 4th ed., 1965), pp. 160-168 and 200-201; see also Mustafā al Sabā'ī, *Ishtirākīyat al Islām* (Damascus; Mu'assasat al Maṭbu'āt al 'Arabīyah, 2nd ed., 1960), p. 62; and Abbādi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 398-420. There are many others who have expressed similar opinions, for example, Ali al Khafif, Mahmud Abu Sa'ud, Muhammad Yusuf Musa, Wahbah al Zuhayli, Abd al Hamid Mitwalli, Muhammed Anis Ibrahim. Even Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, who, in his early writings, held the opinion that no 'arbitrary' limits can be imposed on land ownership, recanted later and stated that, in the light of the existing unfair distribution of land, the Islamic state should impose certain desired limits as a temporary measure to remove the inequities. See, Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Mas'alah Milkīyat al Zamin* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 3rd ed., 1969), p. 111.

compensate the 'rightful' (and only the 'rightful') owners and partly to meet some of the costs of rural development.

In addition to reducing the size of landholdings, it is important to reform the terms of tenancy. While the objective of establishing justice between the landlord and the tenant remains undisputed by the *fuqahā* of all schools of Muslim jurisprudence, the nature of land tenancy has been one of the most controversial issues in fiqh literature.¹⁶ Some jurists (a small minority) permit neither sharecropping nor fixed-rent tenancy and require that a landowner himself should cultivate whatever land he can and grant the use of the balance to someone who can do so.¹⁷ There are others (a greater minority) who allow share-cropping but prohibit fixed-rent tenancy.¹⁸ Their contention is that although initially the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be on him, discouraged both sharecropping and fixed-rent tenancy, he later allowed sharecropping. This became a widespread practice among the Prophet's companions and their successors. A predominant majority of the jurists, however, allows both sharecropping and fixed-rent tenancy, this being consistent with the permissibility of both *muḍārabah* (partnership between one who has capital and one who has expertise) and leasing in the shari'ah. Their rationale is that the poverty of most Muslims in the early Madinese period had led the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be on him, to discourage both sharecropping and fixed-rent tenancy. However, later on when the economic condition of Muslims improved, he allowed both, and not just sharecropping as is argued

¹⁶ For a cogent summary see, Yusuf al-Qardawi, *Al Halāl wa al Harām fi al Islām* (Cairo: Dār al I'tisām, 8th ed., 1974), pp. 290-301; Abbādi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 113-138; and M. Anas Zarqā "Al Siyāsah al Iqtisādiyyah aw al-Takhtit fi Iqtisād Islāmi," unpublished paper, pp. 36-39.

¹⁷ For a discussion in favor of this point of view see, Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, "The Theory of the Economics of Islam" in *Contemporary Aspects of Economic Thinking in Islam* (Bloomington, Indiana: The Muslim Students Association of U.S.A. and Canada, 1976), pp. 9-12.

¹⁸ For a strong defense of this viewpoint see, Ibn Hazm, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, pp. 210-214; see also al Qardāwi, *op. cit.*, p. 295-299.

by the second group.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyyah and a number of other jurists consider fixed-rent tenancy to be *makrūh* (undesirable).²⁰ According to them sharecropping is preferable because it is closer to justice; it requires both the landowner and the tenant to share in the reward as well as the risk of farming, in contrast with fixed-rent tenancy, which assures the landlord a fixed return even though the tenant may or may not be able to have any output. Hence, a number of jurists argue that since fixed-rent tenancy is undesirable, though not prohibited, it is within the competence of an Islamic state to prohibit it, at least temporarily, or to regulate it sufficiently, if it is considered necessary for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah and serving the interests of the people.²¹

Since the tenants and landless farmers are weak and powerless and are likely to remain so for some time in spite of the enforcement of a limit on the size of landholding, fixed-rent leasing of land may continue to be a source of injustice and poverty when the output continues to be uncertain. Hence, it would be desirable for Muslim governments to make sharecropping the general basis of land lease and to strive for a just sharing of the output between the landlord and the tenant. This should continue at least until the power base in rural areas has become sufficiently broadened and the exploitative edge of landholding families has been substantially curtailed.

The importance of land reforms for creating the egalitarian and democratic climate that Islam visualizes cannot be overstated. The creation of a rural sector of small, independent proprietary farmers would help provide a great boost to farmer incentives, thus raising agricultural output and accelerating development. Combined with the proliferation of SMEs (small micro enterprises), it would help reduce the migration of farm population to urban areas and the associated urban congestion, crime and violence. The reduction of

¹⁹ For a strong case in its favor, see Abu Yusuf Kitāb al Kharāj, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-91 and Ibn Taymiyyah, *Al Ḥisbah fī al Islām*, ed., Abd al Aziz Rabāh (Damascus: Maktabah Dār al Bayan, 1967), pp. 28-31; see also Mawdudi, *op. cit.*

²⁰ Ibn Taymiyyah, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

²¹ Abbādi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 128 and M. Anas Zarqā, p. 39.

inequalities of income and wealth would tend to strengthen democratic processes in these countries.

Given the flagrant iniquities that now exist, land reform is not an option which the governments may or may not consider seriously. If a meaningful land reform is not implemented, it will come ultimately through a violent revolution. Historical experience shows that when such revolutions take place, all ethical values get trampled. Landlords may, in this case, lose not only their lands through expropriation but also their lives. Therefore, it would be in their best interest to strive voluntarily for a just land reform.

Land reforms, though indispensable for reducing concentration of wealth, will not by themselves take the Muslim countries very far in realizing the objectives of the shari'ah unless there is a simultaneous effort to remove some of the other disadvantages from which the entire agricultural sector is suffering. The most serious disadvantage is the absence of an efficient infrastructure (roads, schools, electricity, and health facilities) due to neglect of the agricultural sector in government budgetary appropriations. Unlike the rich industrial countries, which encourage farmers through various incentives, including protection from imports, most developing countries discriminate against their farming sectors.²² They try to offset the inflationary impact of government budgetary deficits through overvalued exchange rates and low administered food prices. Such policies have turned the terms of trade against agriculture and SMEs, lowered agricultural output, increased dependence on imports, reduced exports, and depressed rural incomes. The depressed rural incomes, combined with the inequitable land tenure system, does not leave an adequate surplus to enable tenant farmers to undertake the necessary investments in agriculture and SMEs. This accentuates rural unemployment and underemployment. Thus, there is a vicious circle of poverty, paucity of investments, lower output, and unemployment. The pressure of population in urban areas has also consequently risen, leading to a decline in urban wages and the creation of slums. Hence, the hub of the problem in rural areas, as the authors of *Poverty and*

²² IBRD, *World Development Report, 1986*, pp. 85-109.

Hunger have indicated, is income distribution rather than agricultural technique.²³

Another serious disadvantage faced by the agricultural sector is the lack of availability of financing to small farmers and microenterprises. "Constant indebtedness to traders, informal money lenders, loan sharks, or relatives perpetuates the poverty of poor people."²⁴ The result is that small farmers do not have the financing to purchase better quality agricultural inputs and to operate microenterprises to raise their incomes and to keep themselves fully occupied. Hence, an equitable distribution of landholdings would by itself not lead very far unless suitable arrangements are also made to provide adequate financing, not only for agriculture but also for small enterprises in rural areas.²⁵ This should naturally be done within the framework of the alternative to the interest-based financial system provided by Islam.²⁶ However, it may not be possible unless the governments and

²³ IBRD, *Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing Countries*, 1986; see also "Can Better Farming Feed the World", *Economist*, 5 July 1986, p. 73.

²⁴ *Banking for the Poor: Alleviating Poverty through Credit Assistance to the Poorest Micro-entrepreneurs in Developing Countries*, Report of the Select Committee on Hunger, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1986), p. 1.

²⁵ In Japan, three out of four farming households now get most of their income from outside agriculture. See "When the Salt of the Earth Loses its Savour," *Economist* 20 February 1988, pp. 43-44.

²⁶ The alternative arrangement, in which cooperative societies, commercial banks and government sponsored financial institutions will have to play an important role, must avoid interest and be based on risk/reward sharing (*muḍārabah* or *mushārah*), *murābahah* (cost-plus financing), leasing, or *bay' al salam*. (*Bay' al salam* refers to a sale where full payment is made in advance against an obligation to deliver the specified fungible goods at an agreed future date. This is not the same as a speculative forward sale because a full, not a marginal payment is required. Under this arrangement the farmer may be able to secure the needed financing by making an advance sale of only a part of his expected output. This will not get him into delivery problems if output falls due to unforeseen circumstances. For details on *bay' al salam* see Abd al Rahman al Jaziri, *Kitāb al Fiqh 'alā al Madhāhib al Arba'ah* (Cairo: Al Maktabah al Tijāriyyah al Kubrā, 1938), vol. 3, pp. 3-20 and vol. 2 pp. 302-318.

commercial banks, who have subsidized large urban enterprises for decades through concessionary or prime-rate financing, now tilt the balance in favor of agriculture. How this may be done will be discussed later.

Land reforms supported by other measures to liberate the peasants from the iniquities and inefficiencies they are suffering from, should not only help expand considerably the productivity of the agricultural sector but also dim the attraction of the bright city lights, thus helping reverse the shift of population from rural to urban areas. Nevertheless, it would be necessary to bring about a change in the attitudes and work habits in rural areas. This may be attained faster if Islam is used as a mechanism for social change and motivation. The mosque plays an important role in rural life and its proper use could open up an effective way of inculcating the desired characteristics in the rural population.

Proliferation of Small and Micro Enterprises

The counterpart of rural land reforms in the industrial and business sectors is the proliferation of efficient SMEs in rural as well as urban areas. This would complement land reforms in reducing the prevailing concentration of wealth and power in Muslim countries. It also has other advantages which occupy a place of high priority in the Islamic value frame.

It will enable man, the *khalifah* of God, to have an independent means of livelihood, thus rendering to him greater dignity and self respect, not possible in the state of wage slavery. In the capitalist world small businessmen, farmers and artists have increasingly lost their independence and bargaining power. In the United States, the proportion of population dependent on wages and salaries has risen steeply over the last two centuries from 20 percent in 1780 to 84 percent in 1970. Accordingly, the proportion of those who are self-employed or those who work as managers and officers has declined from 80 percent to 16 percent over this period.²⁷

²⁷ Michael Reich, "The Evolution of the U.S. Labour Force," *The Capitalist System* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1972); Edward S. Greenberg,

Large businesses dominate the economic and political scene in the capitalist world and the trend is decidedly in favor of even bigger businesses and farms. Competition, which was the predominant form of market relations in the 19th century in the capitalist world, has ceased to occupy that position.²⁸ Socialism sought to solve this problem through collectivisation, which increased wage slavery and alienation, while at the same time eliminating competition, worker incentive, and efficiency. Hence, the change of emphasis in Muslim countries in favor of a proliferation of SMEs should help create a healthier climate for competition and also be more conducive to the realization of greater efficiency and equity.

Wider Ownership and Control of Corporations

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that small business units, although preferable, may not be feasible for all types of economic activity. Hence, large business units cannot be avoided. Preferably, their form should be that of a corporation because of its ability to proliferate ownership. However, the corporation as it exists in the West is a primary cause of wealth and power concentration.²⁹ Even though it constitutes the dominant sector of the economy, it does not reflect the political democracy of the West in its decision-making. The corporation operates as an autocratic institution; the holding of controlling stock by a few families makes it possible for a few people to have control over all policies.³⁰ They exercise an immense power to make

Serving the Few: Corporate Capitalism and the Bias of Government Policy (New York: John Wiley, 1974), p. 244.

²⁸ See Paul A. Baran & Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* (New York: Modern Reader Paperback, 1966), p. 6.

²⁹ See C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 117.

³⁰ One percent of all tax filers in 1960 owned 48 percent of all stock held by individuals (Reagan, "What 17 million shareholders share," p. 102 cited by Greenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 45). "In the 150 Companies on the current Fortune 500 list, controlling ownership rests in the hands of an individual or of the members of a family," (Robert Sheehan, "Proprietors in the World of Big Business," *Fortune*, 15 June 1967, p. 179).

basic product, price, and investment decisions that affect the entire nation and, in fact, the world.³¹

The Western corporation does not, therefore, provide a model for Muslim countries. It must be reformed drastically to reduce the concentration of power. The abolition of interest and the introduction of equity financing in place of borrowing will help remove the inverted pyramid of corporate power. The requirement to raise financing through the issue of shares rather than borrowing will enable broad-based ownership of corporate shares and set the stage for wider distribution of power. Since this may still not solve the problem of wealth and power concentration because most shareholders do not participate in board meetings, other reforms will also be needed to reduce the sweeping powers of directors.

Activation of Zakah and Inheritance Systems

The above measures for reducing inequalities of income and wealth would be more successful if they were further strengthened by the activation of Islamic zakah and inheritance systems. Unfortunately, even though the implementation of both these systems is an essential part of a Muslim's obligations, and indispensable for the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah, they have remained dormant for ages.

Islam requires every Muslim having resources in excess of a certain basic amount to pay zakah as a given proportion of his or her net worth or agricultural output, mainly for the benefit of the very poor and destitute. What could be a stronger rationale for making the needed sacrifice to meet one's social obligations than the belief that all resources are a trust from God and must be used for the wellbeing of all human beings who belong to the one human family of the One God, before whom account has to be given about how resources are utilized. This system of social self-reliance should, along with other measures discussed in this paper, enable the Muslim society to meet the needs of all without putting the entire burden on the public exchequer as socialism and the welfare state have unwittingly done.

³¹ See Gabriel Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America: An Analysis of Social Class and Income Distribution* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 68 and 127.

Since it is the obligation of a Muslim to earn his livelihood, it has been considered desirable by the *fuqahā* to give priority in zakah disbursements to the objective of enabling the poor to stand on their own feet. Zakah should become a permanent income supplement of only those who cannot be enabled to earn enough through their own effort. This requirement, implemented in a socioeconomic environment which encourages SMEs, should make a valuable contribution toward the reduction of inequalities.

The distribution of a deceased person's estate in accordance with Islamic injunctions should also help reduce the skewness in wealth distribution. If necessary, the enforcement of inheritance laws should be in such a way that it does not lead to a rise in unnecessary consumption but, rather, to an increase in investment and a proliferation in the ownership of means of production.

Restructuring the Financial System

The interest-based financial system, which Muslim countries have borrowed from the capitalist countries, is one of the primary sources of the concentration of wealth and power.³² Therefore, the Muslim countries may find it difficult to bring about a reduction in inequalities and a proliferation of SMEs unless the entire financial system is restructured in the light of Islamic teachings. This subject is discussed later.

Economic Restructuring

Actualization of the objectives of the shari'ah without accentuating macroeconomic imbalances requires resources and, given the scarcity of resources, it may not be possible to allocate additional resources for this purpose without reducing their use elsewhere. Such a reallocation of resources is not feasible without a total restructuring of the economy in accordance with the Islamic world view and strategy. Such a restructuring would inevitably cover all aspects of the economy, including private consumption, government finances, capital for-

³² M. U. Chapra, *Towards a Just Monetary System* (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation), pp. 110 and 140.

mation and production. Some of the relevant aspects of these are discussed below.

Restructuring Consumer Preferences

Since an accelerated rise in capital formation is indispensable for realizing the objectives of the shari‘ah, it is necessary to increase savings by squeezing consumption. This objective poses a dilemma. The unequivocal Islamic emphasis on brotherhood and social equality requires that a reduction in consumption be brought about in such a way that the standard of need satisfaction of the poor is not only not worsened but in fact improved. It is not possible to resolve this dilemma without making a revolutionary change in the prevailing life-styles, particularly of the rich, knowing fully well that the inability of society to fulfill needs is not necessarily the result of an absolute lack of resources but rather of the failure to achieve a consumption pattern which is in conformity with its resources and ideals. If the needs of all are to be met within the constraint of scarce resources and if this is also to be accompanied by a rise in capital formation, then an offsetting reduction has to be made by holding consumption within the range of what the society can afford. Consumption cannot then be allowed to become the sole end of an individual’s life as it has become under capitalism.

For decades, Muslim countries have been following a consumption pattern that has been copied from the Western consumer culture which measures a person’s worth by the extravagance of his living and the frequency of his purchases. Accordingly, expensive lifestyles, which even some of the rich industrial countries can hardly afford, have become a prestige symbol in the poorer Muslim countries. The bandwagon effect of this, along with a number of unIslamic customs and ceremonies, extending from childbirth to marriage and death, have led to an unrealistic consumption pattern which is unwarranted in the light of their values as well as their resources. The victims of this competition are forced to live beyond their means. Aggregate consumption has accordingly risen, savings have lagged behind, and capital formation based on domestic savings remains inadequate. Moreover, since most luxury goods and services carrying

a snob appeal are of foreign origin, the pressure on foreign exchange resources has risen steeply. The resources gap has had to be filled by external borrowings, contributing to a higher debt servicing burden and further squeezing of resources.

The crux of the problem is how to distinguish 'necessary' from 'unnecessary' claims on resources and how to induce everyone to abstain from making 'unnecessary' claims? It is necessary to have a filter mechanism and a motivating system. The price system operating in a secular, value-free economy cannot provide either an effective filter mechanism or a complete motivating system.

Though prices are important for regulating consumer demand and generating efficiency in the use of resources, they are inadequate to realize equity, particularly if the background conditions are not satisfied. Reliance on prices alone enables the rich to buy what they want of the luxuries and status symbols, no matter how high their prices. If one family has them others consider them indispensable. Those who cannot afford them try to acquire them through suppression of need satisfaction, corruption, evading tariffs and taxes, and smuggling. In developing countries with their inefficient and corrupt tax administration, it is possible to avoid or evade high tariffs and taxes by means of under-invoicing, bribing and smuggling; however, the higher prices resulting from such tariffs and taxes yield higher profit margins and promote not only larger imports (through official and unofficial channels) but also greater domestic production of such goods. This leads to an unintentional diversion of resources into status symbols and unwittingly squeezes their availability for need satisfaction, thus making their prices higher.

This does not imply that higher taxes and tariffs should not be imposed. It does, however, mean that the effort to check unnecessary consumption merely by means of higher prices cannot be effective. It must also be reinforced by changing the preference scale of consumers by means of another layer of filter based on socially agreed values. If this is done, a substantial chunk of aggregate demand is eliminated even before it gets expressed in the market. A new equilibrium between aggregate supply and aggregate claims on resources

is then established at a lower level of general prices. This should help need fulfillment and improve the living conditions of the poor.

In central planning, the absence of a filter mechanism as well as consumer 'sovereignty' makes resource allocation subject to the whims and vested interests of the politburo members and other power elite. Moreover, the absence of realistic market determined prices removes even the secular motivation for 'efficiency' in the use of resources. However, if realistic prices and consumer 'sovereignty' are bracketed with central planning, as is now intended to be done in many socialist countries, then the absence of a filter mechanism, along with arbitrary decision making and vested interest of the high-salaried power elite, would lead to a resource allocation and price structure that are little different from capitalism.

Hence, as long as the Muslim countries continue to use the capitalist and socialist strategies, they will not be able, like the capitalist and socialist countries themselves, to prevent the use of scarce resources for inessential purposes. They will thus fail to realize the objectives of the shari'ah in spite of their increasing wealth. What the Muslim countries need to do is to distinguish the 'necessary' from the 'unnecessary' by dividing all goods and services into three categories: those that fulfill a need or reduce a hardship and thus make a real difference in human wellbeing; those that make no difference in a person's wellbeing and, being needed mainly for their snob appeal could be classified as luxuries and status symbols; and those that lie within the borders of the two and, there being a difference of opinion about their 'need', a clear-cut decision is not possible and a leeway is considered desirable.

The filter mechanism necessary for such a classification is available within the Islamic value system. There is substantial discussion in the fiqh literature about necessities (*durūriyāt*), conveniences (*hājīyāt*) and refinements (*taḥsinīyāt*). All of these, as defined by the *fuqahā* (jurists), simply fall within the range of what is understood to represent needs (necessities and comforts) in modern economics and do not include luxuries or status symbols. Anything that goes beyond needs has been treated by the *fuqahā* as prodigality and self-indul-

gence and is strongly disapproved of.³³ The Islamic consumption norms could thus be of great assistance in defining ‘unnecessary’ claims on resources.

It is important to bear in mind that since Islam is not an ascetic religion, the classification of goods and services into the three categories given above, need not remain constant through time and place. Since Islam allows a person to satisfy all his needs and to partake of those comforts that increase his efficiency and wellbeing, and since the classification of goods and services into the three categories takes into account the development of technology and the shared increase in the standard of living, the definition of need is bound to undergo a change over time. In fact, most Muslim countries are richer today and can afford a higher standard of need fulfillment than previous Muslim societies. What is, however, indispensable is the satisfaction of all basic needs of all human beings in a Muslim society in conformity with their position as *khulafā* (vicegerents of God) and members of His family. This goal cannot be realized unless the differences in consumption levels which have been allowed in conformity with the status and income of individuals do not go beyond what the economy’s resources can bear. They should not reflect snobbery or lead to wide social gaps that could only weaken the bonds of Islamic brotherhood. The objective should not be to create a monotonous uniformity and drabness in Muslim society. Simplicity in life-styles can be attained along side creativity and diversity. The criteria for classifying a need into one of the three categories should be based upon norms defined by Islam (i.e., the impact of its consumption on brotherhood and social equality) as well as upon availability of resources.

³³ For the definition of these terms within the perspective of fiqh, see Shatibi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 8-12; and Anas Zargā, “Islamic Economics: An Approach to Human Welfare”, in K. Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Economics* (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1980), pp. 13-15. Ahmad al Najjar and Anas Zargā have in fact argued that in the light of Islamic teachings nothing that a man uses (as a consumer or as a producer) is morally free, even if it is economically free. (See Ahmad al Najjar, *Al Madkhal ilā al Nazarīyah al Iqtisādīyah fī al Islām*, Beirut: Dar al Fikr, 1973, pp. 32 ff; and Anas Zargā, *op. cit.*, p. 13).

'Liberalization' may hence be construed only within the framework of these three categories. Production, import and distribution of all goods and services falling within the first category should be liberalized. Market forces should be allowed to play their full role. The government should do all it can to ensure healthy competition and free interaction between a large number of buyers and sellers. The government should also provide all necessary incentives and facilities to increase the supply of goods and services falling within this category. Any indirect taxes that are considered necessary to impose on these goods and services should be modest and graduated inversely to their necessity. The consumption of goods falling within the third category should be discouraged through moral suasion, import restrictions, and relatively higher tariffs and taxes.

However, it would be necessary not to liberalize the use of resources for the second category of goods and services. The price system, as argued earlier, cannot by itself motivate people to use resources in a way that reflects social priorities. It is necessary to change consumer preferences through moral reform. If people understand their social obligations and their accountability before God, and realize that use of the economy's scarce resources by them for inessential purposes will deprive others of need fulfillment, they will tend to change their behavior voluntarily. However, moral exhortation may be ineffective when conspicuous consumption has become common and accepted over a long period of time. It is necessary to change the social mood. Individuals cannot change the direction of the tide and are constrained to conform. Hence, for greater effectiveness in creating the needed social environment, it would be desirable to campaign for simple living accompanied, at least initially, by an officially imposed ban on the third category of goods and services, including luxury imports, ostentatious ceremonies, unrealistic dowries and the display of status symbols. The elimination of 'unnecessary' claims on resources brought about in this manner, would release resources for greater supply of needs, thus keeping their prices at a humane level without the use of force or controls. It will also help prevent the continued depreciation of the currency

which is the obvious consequence of liberalization within a value-free framework as propagated by the IMF and the World Bank.

Efforts to reduce corruption are bound to fail unless the governments first strike at one of the major roots of corruption—ostentatious life-styles that now prevail in Muslim countries. Such life-styles almost force people to resort to unfair means of earning. Acquisitiveness and corruption may decline substantially once they realize that their effort to acquire greater prestige through conspicuous consumption only blemishes their reputation and raises questions about the source of their financing.

Responsible Government Spending

No doubt changing consumer preferences in favor of simple living will reduce private sector pressure on resources and raise the savings needed for investment and development. However it will not be enough. Governments in Muslim countries, as in other developing countries, are as blameworthy as, if not more than, the private sector for the excessive claims on resources. They have almost lost control over their public finances. The result is that, in spite of high rates of both direct and indirect taxes, they have had to resort to unhealthy levels of budgetary deficits. These deficits have been financed by monetary expansion and excessive levels of domestic and external borrowing. The high levels of inflation and the debt-servicing burden which have been generated will continue to plague them for a long time.³⁴

In spite of their excessive spending, governments have neither laid down the minimum infrastructure necessary for a balanced and accelerated development nor adequately supplied the services indispensable for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah. Rural infrastructure and agricultural extension services, on which the wellbeing of a preponderant proportion of the population depends, have been neglected. Education, which should constitute the foundation stone of an Islamic society, has also received inadequate attention. Health expenditure has been concentrated mainly in the major cities, in large

³⁴ See IMF, *Survey*, 6 April 1987, pp. 98-99.

capital intensive hospitals and on curative medicine. Yet the majority of the population lives in the countryside, needs a network of simple clinics and paramedical personnel, control of epidemic diseases, and, above all, the provision of clean water supplies, sanitary services and eradication of malnutrition.³⁵ Housing for the poor has received hardly any public sector attention and slum areas without public utilities and sanitation have mushroomed. Development of an efficient public transport system has been grossly neglected causing great hardship to the poor who have no transport facilities of their own. At the same time considerable lip service is paid to Islam and its imperative of socioeconomic justice. This sorry state of affairs is bound to perpetuate slower growth and economic inequalities, thus accentuating social tensions and unrest. It is therefore necessary for Muslim governments to restructure their spending so that they are able not only to reduce their overall spending levels but also reallocate spending to concentrate more on projects that will help accelerate development and realization of the objectives of the shari'ah.

The absence of a serious effort on the part of governments to utilize their limited resources more efficiently has a number of reasons. First, there is a lack of realization that the resources at their disposal are a trust from God. This failing, along with the expensive life style of government officials, has contributed to corruption. Only a moral reform of the society along with a restructuring of people's life-styles can remove this shortcoming. Second, the absence of an indigenous development philosophy, prepared in conformity with the country's own resources and values, has led to the absence of well-established priorities. Without the establishment of such priorities it is impossible to set up agreed criteria for judging the 'essential' from the 'inessential' and the 'productive' from the 'wasteful' use of resources. Unless a long-term commitment is made to an Islamic development philosophy, it may not be possible to remove the existing confusion and conflict in policies. Third, the price system has not been used and resources, particularly foreign exchange resources, are

³⁵ See Thomas, McKeown, *The Role of Medicine: Dream, Mirage or Nemesis?* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979,; and Alastair Gray, "Health and Society: Reflections on Policy," *IDS Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 3-9.

acquired or sold by governments and public enterprises at less than their opportunity costs. This contributes to inefficient use of resources. Fourth, the absence of an elected parliament and a free press deprive the public of a forum for criticism of government policies. This problem cannot be cured without establishing democratic processes.

Commitment to Islamic values and the objectives of the shari'ah should help on all four counts. The objectives of the shari'ah will in particular help reduce the existing arbitrariness in government spending decisions by providing the criteria for establishing priorities. The objectives of the shari'ah could be further reinforced by adhering to the following six broad principles adapted from the legal maxims developed over the centuries by Muslim jurists to provide a rational and consistent basis for Islamic jurisprudence.³⁶

1. The principal criterion for all expenditure allocations should be the wellbeing of the people (Article 58).
2. The removal of hardship and injury must take precedence over the provision of comfort (Articles 17, 19, 20, 30, 31, and 32).
3. The larger interest of the majority should take precedence over the narrower interest of a minority (Article 28).
4. A private sacrifice or loss may be inflicted to save a public sacrifice or loss and a greater sacrifice or loss may be averted by imposing a smaller sacrifice or loss (Articles 26, 27, and 28).
5. Whoever receives the benefit must bear the cost (Articles 87 and 88).

³⁶ *Majallah al Ahkām al 'Adliyyah*, briefly known as the *Majallah*, states 100 maxims of jurisprudence (*al Qawā'id al fiqhīyyah*) in its preamble. An English translation of the *Majallah* by C.R. Tyser, *et. al.*, and entitled *The Mejelle* was published in 1967 by the All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Nabha Road, Lahore. Although the *Majallah* is a Hanafi compendium codified during the Ottoman period, the maxims of jurisprudence are almost universally used by jurists of all schools of Muslim jurisprudence. See also Mustafa A. al-Zarqā, *Al Fiqh al Islāmi fi Thawbihi al Jadid* (Damascus: Matābi' Bā' Alif Bā' Al Adib, 1967), vol. 2, pp. 945-1060. The numbers given within brackets after each principle refer to the articles of the *Majallah* from which the principle has been derived.)

6. Something without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is also obligatory.³⁷

These maxims have an important bearing on taxation and government spending in Muslim countries. To clarify some of their implications for government expenditure programs, it may be helpful to consider a few examples.

Since general wellbeing has to be an essential objective of all public spending in accordance with maxim 1, then maxim 6 would require that all physical and social infrastructure projects which help realize this objective through accelerated economic growth, job creation and need fulfillment should be given priority over those that do not make such a contribution. Even among the indispensable infrastructure projects, maxim 2 would demand the giving of preference to projects that would help remove the hardship and suffering caused, for example, by malnutrition, illiteracy, homelessness, epidemics, lack of medical facilities, clean water supply, and sewage disposal. Similarly, the development of an efficient public transport system should acquire priority in accordance with maxim 3 because its absence causes hardship to a majority of the urban population, adversely affecting efficiency and development, and leading to an excessive import of cars and gasoline. While these cars provide extra comfort to a small portion of the suburban population, a reduction in their imports and diversion of the savings to import of public transport vehicles could be justified on the basis of maxim 4. Such a measure would not only reduce the pressure on foreign exchange resources but would also provide comfortable transport services to the majority with less congestion and pollution.

If priority is to be given to serve the interest of the majority in accordance with maxim 3, then the secondary importance given to rural development programs has no foundation. Since the majority of the population lives in rural areas and the mass uprooting of manpower from their families and society causes socioeconomic problems, the development of these areas to raise agricultural productiv-

³⁷ See al Shatibi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 394; see also Mustafā al Zarqā, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 784 and 1088.

ity, expand self-employment and employment opportunities, and fulfill their needs must take precedence. This will also automatically improve urban life by reducing the population congestion.

If inequalities of income and wealth are to be reduced, it becomes indispensable, in accordance with maxim 6, to raise the ability of the poor to earn more through greater and more convenient access to better educational and training facilities and to finance. This demands the giving of priority in government spending programs to the establishment of educational and vocational training institutions in rural areas so that everyone who qualifies has an equal access to them. It is also necessary to restructure the financial system to make financing available to a broad spectrum of entrepreneurs in rural as well as urban areas to raise self-employment opportunities and to increase the supply of need-satisfying goods and services.

Given the unhealthy fiscal deficits, the objectives of the shari'ah cannot be realized without a reallocation of government spending. Hence, a decision has to be taken about areas where spending must be reduced. Without such a reallocation, either the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah will have to be compromised or else spending will exceed the limits of available resources and lead to macro-economic and external imbalances. Where can spending be reduced? It is important to identify some of the major areas where savings can be realized.

The first and the most obvious way to achieve substantial savings is to minimize corruption, inefficiency and waste, which are seriously eroding the governments' ability to utilize their scarce resources efficiently. According to the Chairman of the Pakistan National Assembly's Public Accounts Committee, "the major part of the development budget is misappropriated." Instances cited by him include: defective buildings collapsing a few years after construction, roads washed away by a single rainstorm, imported railway machinery becoming scrap without being used, imports being sold elsewhere before reaching Pakistan, and big loans extended by national-

ized banks to influential people being written off.³⁸ However, the effort to reduce corruption may have a greater chance of success if it is also accompanied by moral reform, transformation of life-styles and structural changes in the economy.

A second area where substantial savings can be made is subsidies. Even though the welfare of the poor has to be one of the primary considerations of an Islamic state, a number of subsidies provided by Muslim governments (either directly or through public enterprises, and either transparent or opaque) cannot be convincingly supported. Subsidies are usually defended on equity or economic considerations. However, on both these counts they do not stand up to the test of the objectives of the shari'ah or the maxims of public spending stated above.

If equity is the goal, the subsidy must redistribute income toward the truly needy. It does not. A lower price that does not cover the costs in accordance with maxim 5 tends to benefit the rich more than the poor because of their larger consumption and easier access.³⁹ This is not defensible in a system committed to socioeconomic justice. If value judgements are not an anathema, there is no justification for a lower price or subsidy for the rich or those who can afford to pay. Only those who are unable to pay a realistic price should be helped. Since price discrimination is administratively difficult and since it is desirable to make everyone pay the realistic price, the best way to help the poor is through substantially increased scholarships, relief payments and income supplements paid out of appropriations made for this purpose by the government or social service organizations, zakah funds, and other voluntary or compulsory donations. In this way the government may be able to provide more intensive relief to the needy by using only a proportion of the total amount spent on a general subsidy. The income supplement would give the poor the chance to determine their own priorities and the realistic price would

³⁸ "Most of Pak Funds for Development Misused": Ali Shah Details PAK Findings," Summary of a report published on the authority of Reuters by the *Saudi Gazette*, 21 June 1987, p. 7.

³⁹ In Morocco, only 16 percent of the subsidy on subsidized foods reached the lowest income group in 1984. See "World Bank Presents its Six-Point Approach to Subsidies in Developing Countries," *BIS Review*, 8 April 1987, p. 5.

help minimize the wasteful use of goods or services brought about by a general subsidy.

If efficiency is the goal, subsidy must strengthen incentives for the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah and allocate resources more effectively. It does not. Agricultural subsidy has mainly helped the big farmers "who have obtained a disproportionate share of it and have used it to amass land and other assets."⁴⁰ The subsidy paid to large-scale urban industries on the basis of infant industry argument rarely encourages them to cross the threshold of infancy. However, if the subsidy is used to enable small farmers and SMEs to adopt better technology and inputs, and to stand on their own feet, it could be justified on the basis of the objectives of the shari'ah. But the rural and urban poor "tend to be dispersed, unorganized and politically inarticulate" compared with the urban and rural elite.⁴¹ Hence they rarely get producers' subsidies of the kind obtained by large-scale industries and influential landlords. The poor nevertheless end up bearing the tax burden of subsidies because the tax systems in these countries are usually regressive.

A third important area of saving could be the gradual lifting of patronage provided to public sector enterprises. "By and large the performance of state-owned businesses in the developing world has been disappointing."⁴² They have typically failed to provide the spur to industrialization and faster growth that governments had hoped for; not only have the financial returns often been unimpressive but the social returns have been poor. This is because they have operated without competition and governments have often placed little emphasis on efficiency and have rarely been prepared to use the sanction of liquidation. Low profitability limits their ability to self-finance their investments. Consequently, they have often been a cause of large budgetary deficits and external debt. In a sample of 27 developing countries from 1976 to 1979, the net budgetary payments

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6; see also IBRD, *World Development Report, 1986*, pp. 90-104.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁴² "Privatisation in the Third World," *Financial Times*, 3 September 1987.

to nonfinancial state owned companies were more than 3 percent of the GDP.⁴³

A fourth area where large savings can be made is defense. According to the World Bank, "evidence increasingly points to high military spending as contributing to fiscal and debt crises, complicating stabilization and adjustment, and negatively affecting economic growth and development."⁴⁴ Within the framework of the objectives of the shari'ah and the principles discussed above, the claim of national defense for the lion's share in budgetary appropriations loses its rationale in the absence of a serious threat of external aggression.⁴⁵ It is often forgotten that defense spending imposes not only monetary cost but also other costs, including reduced wellbeing of the poor, leading to social unrest and political instability. Only a few Muslim countries are seriously threatened; most of the others usually make undue fuss about defense on the basis of unrealistic assumptions. Moreover, it is always possible to have better defense with smaller spending if efficiency is ensured in the use of resources, if corruption, which is more rampant in defense than elsewhere, is removed, and if a conciliatory policy is adopted and unnecessary conflicts with neighboring countries are avoided.

⁴³ IBRD, *World Development Report, 1983*, p. 74. The net deficit of a sample of Niger's state-owned enterprises accounted for about 4 per cent of the country's GDP in 1982 (*ibid.*, p. 67). Turkish public enterprises averaged net losses equivalent to 3.9 percent of GDP during 1977-9 (*ibid.*, p. 74). One study has found that countries in which state-owned enterprises accounted for higher shares of gross domestic investment generally had lower rates of economic growth. (See IBRD, *World Development Report, 1987*, pp. 66-67).

⁴⁴ IBRD, *World Development Report, 1988*, p. 106.

⁴⁵ Although the average defense expenditure of industrial and developing countries was 14.35 percent and 14.02 percent, respectively, of total government expenditure in 1983, the expenditure of some Muslim countries was: Pakistan, 34.82 percent; Indonesia, 20.04 percent; Malaysia, 15.05 percent (1981); Egypt, 16.59 percent; Oman, 48.51 percent; and Yemen Arab Republic, 30.68 percent. See IMF, *International Financial Statistics, Supplement on Government Finance, 1986*, pp. 30-31.

Since the existence of poverty and extreme inequalities and the absence of adequate educational institutions, hospitals, and public utilities, particularly in rural areas, is subjecting a majority of the population to hardship and economic backwardness, there seems to be little moral or economic justification for spending huge sums on defense hardware. The absence of a real threat prevents the governments from demanding from themselves and the rich the financial and economic sacrifices that defense requires. Countervailing adjustments are accordingly not made in life styles and government spending, and the needed sacrifice is hence quietly passed on to the urban and rural poor through the low priority given to satisfaction of their needs on the basis of the usual plea of 'lack' of resources.

High defense spending does not even provide the security which the governments claim it does. The 'real' source of security for the poorer Muslim countries lies in internal strength attained through moral reform, economic development and socioeconomic justice. No amount of defense spending can provide security against internal disintegration which is gaining momentum in many Muslim countries. It seems that sometimes even the very objective of defense build up, ensuring national and territorial integrity, is jeopardized by 'excessive' defense spending. This is because, as Paul Kennedy has rightly argued, a strong economic base is more vital to a nation, in the long run, than military superiority; and nations which stretch themselves militarily beyond what their economies will sustain are looking for a fall.⁴⁶

Therefore, one of the most important goals of government policy in Muslim countries should be to minimize defense spending through policies of conciliation and peaceful coexistence with a view to release resources for satisfying the needs of the majority. If the Muslim countries concerned take the initiative, there is bound to be public pressure for reduced defense spending even in the neighboring countries from which the Muslim countries feel the psychologi-

⁴⁶ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict, 1500-2000* (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. xvi and 536-540.

cal threat. Every one will then be better off. The nonavailability of borrowed funds due to the Islamic ban on interest should help compel Muslim governments to resort to conciliatory and peaceful coexistence policies. They also need to derive inspiration from the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, who signed a truce agreement with the Makkans on extremely unfavorable terms to get a period of peace and tranquility.

While spending needs to be reduced and reallocated the tax system, which is as guilty of fiscal mismanagement as expenditure policies, also needs to be reformed in the interest of greater equity and higher revenue. Muslim countries, like other developing countries, are not so much over-taxed as they are badly taxed. The tax base is narrow and so the tax rates are high. Tax base, tax rates and corruption are parts of a vicious circle. The narrower the tax base, the higher the rate must be to achieve a given amount of revenue. The higher the tax rate, the greater the incentive for corruption. This vicious circle leads not only to economic distortions but also to a greater reliance on indirect taxes. It is well known that "tax evasion by the well-to-do is colossal, and they are anyhow relatively very few, while the poor are many. Taxation becomes forced to rely on regressive indirect taxes."⁴⁷ The reform of the entire tax system and the collecting machinery are hence indispensable.

Muslim countries have no alternative to expenditure and tax reform; increased reliance on borrowing and foreign aid is not feasible. Borrowing does not bear a great promise because the debt servicing burden of both domestic and foreign debts of these countries has already risen to an intolerably high level. Foreign aid, although indispensable under the existing imbalances and welcome to the extent to which it helps in the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah, has its own limitations. It has gone down in real terms and, excepting for a small proportion of grants, most of it comes as

⁴⁷ Gunnar Myrdal, National Bank of Pakistan, *Quarterly Economic Journal*, January-March 1979, p. 29.

loans.⁴⁸ Even though most of these loans are at concessionary rates, they have nevertheless to be repaid with interest. The tragedy is that most foreign aid is not used ultimately to increase the rate of capital accumulation and growth; it is used to increase private consumption or recurrent public expenditure, including military expenditure.⁴⁹ In the interest of maintaining their geopolitical independence, it would be desirable for Muslim countries to seek as little aid as possible and to use effectively whatever aid they get for the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah. The Prophet's hadith saying that "The hand that is above is better than the hand that is below,"⁵⁰ should be applicable to nations even more than it is to individuals. While there may be a justification for aid that is used for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah, there is hardly any justification for aid that is used for supporting private conspicuous consumption, recurring public expenditure, and military build up in the absence of a real threat.

The Islamic injunction against interest should prove to be of great help in realizing greater efficiency in public sector spending. Since interest-based borrowing may be permissible only in emergencies or extremely difficult circumstances, governments will have to finance

⁴⁸ Total net financial flows to developing countries fell by about 15 percent in volume terms in 1986. For details see, OECD, *Financing and External Debt of Developing Countries—1986 Survey* (Paris: OECD, 1987). Except for a small proportion of grants, most of this aid is in the form of loans. See "Financial Resources for Developing countries: 1986 and Recent Trends," OECD, *Press Release*, 19 June 1987, Table 2, p. 8.

⁴⁹ Mohammad Anisur Rahman, "The Welfare Economics of Foreign Aid," *Pakistan Development Review*, Summer 1967, pp. 141-159; See also, "Foreign Capital and Domestic Savings: A Test of Haavelmo's Hypothesis with Cross Country Data," *Rev. Economic Statistics*, February 1968, pp. 137-138; Thomas E. Weiscopef, "The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic Savings in Underdeveloped Countries," *Journal of International Economics*, February 1972, pp. 25-38; Keith Griffin, *International Inequality and National Poverty* (London: Macmillan, 1978), and "Doubts about Aid," unpublished paper, Magdalen College, Oxford University, June 1984.

⁵⁰ Bukhari, *Al Jāmi' al Ṣaḥīḥ* (Cairo: Muhammad Ali Subayh, n.d.), vol. 2, p. 133; Abu Abd al Rahman bin Shu'ayb al Nasā'i, *Sunan al Nasā'i al Mujtaja* (Cairo: Mustafā al Bābi al Halabi, 1964), vol. 5, pp. 45-46.

their budgetary spending through mainly taxation, leasing and equity finance. All current and unproductive outlays will need to be financed out of tax revenues. Since there is a limit to the extent to which tax revenues may be raised, governments will not be able to overstretch themselves. They will be forced to keep their wasteful and unnecessary current expenditures under control and to apply cost recovery methods in the pricing of goods and services supplied by them.

Since borrowing does not obviate, but rather only postpones, the ultimate need for sacrifice, the ban on interest should prove to be a blessing by removing the long-term heavy debt-servicing burden it normally leads to. The constraint it will impose on government spending in the short-run may tend to be more than offset by the healthy discipline it will impose on the governments, the sustained, steadier growth it will generate in the economy, the greater cooperation it will bring about between the governments and the private sector, and the much smaller debt-servicing burden it will create in both the domestic and external sectors of the economy. To avoid an excessive squeeze in the initial stage, the governments may apply the prohibition gradually and not in one stroke. An unscrupulous government may try to find the easy way out by borrowing excessively from the central bank. This would hurt the Islamic imperative of making money a reliable measure of value through price stability. Accordingly, it would be unrealistic for a Muslim government to talk of Islamization without making a serious effort to reduce its budgetary deficits.

Restructuring the Investment Climate

Implementation of Islamic consumption norms should help increase savings. But, savings may not necessarily get diverted to capital formation. and even if they do, just a rise in capital formation is not the apex of achievement. What is needed is capital formation that would lead to need fulfillment, export expansion and a rapid rise in self-employment and employment opportunities. Therefore, it is not enough to cut consumption; it is also necessary to foster a suitable investment climate.

In the present-day Muslim societies, a substantial part of even the existing low level of savings goes into unproductive channels like hoarding (gold, precious stones, and jewelry) and capital flight. Capital flight has become a serious problem for most developing countries. During the 11 years to 1985, about \$150 to \$200 billion of the total capital outflow of \$250 billion from capital importing countries represented capital flight.⁵¹ Capital flight of this magnitude depresses domestic investment and makes sustained growth more difficult to achieve. If the same policies continue, it will be difficult to prevent capital flight and to raise domestic investment, thus frustrating the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah.

Productive investment of one's savings so as to contribute to need fulfillment and increased self-employment or employment is the social obligation of all Muslims who are capable of saving in keeping with the already-quoted maxim: "Something without which an obligation cannot be discharged is also obligatory." It becomes even more obligatory because the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, himself glorified productive effort and investment by saying: "Any Muslim who plants a tree or cultivates a field such that a bird or a human being or an animal eats from it, this deed will be counted as an act of charity."⁵² The Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, also discouraged disinvestment by saying: "He who sells a house [without need], but does not invest the proceeds in something similar, God will not bless the proceeds."⁵³ The Caliph Umar, may God be pleased with him, used to say: "He who has wealth, let him improve (develop) it and he who has land, let him cul-

⁵¹ See Stephen Fidler, "Third World's Missing Millions," *Financial Times*, 7 September 1987. See also C. L. Ramirez Rojas "Monetary Substitution in Developing Countries," *Finance and Development*, June 1986, pp. 35-38.

⁵² Bukhāri, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 128; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* (Cairo: 'Isā al Bābi al Hālabi, 1955), vol. 3, p. 1189:12; Muhammad ibn Isā al Tirmidhi, *Al Jāmi' al Ṣaḥīḥ* (Cairo: 'Isā al Bābi al Halabi, 1956), vol. 3, p. 666:1382.

⁵³ Suyuti, *Al Jāmi' al Saghīr* (Cairo: Abd al Hamid Ahmad Hanaft, n.d.), vol. 2, p. 167, on the authority of Tabarāni; the expression within parentheses has been added on the basis of another hadith quoted by Suyuti on the same page; see also al Abbādi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 96-107.

tivate it.”⁵⁴ Given these values, it should be possible to make productive investment take the place of consumption as a prestige symbol in a Muslim society such that the benefits that others can derive from savings are actualized. The levy of zakah on all net worth, including currency hoarding and gold and silver jewelry, should prove to be of great help in inducing savers to get into income-earning financial or real assets to be able to offset the impact of zakah on their savings.

However even these values may by themselves fail to promote productive investment. People do not commit funds for long-term productive investments unless there is a proper investment climate. Some of the factors which vitiate the investment climate are the absence of adequate social and physical infrastructure, an inequitable tax system, political uncertainties, continuous depreciation in the exchange rate of the country’s currency and an arsenal of unwarranted controls. A reference has already been made to the need for infrastructure construction and tax reform. The remaining three factors are briefly discussed below.

There is no immediate solution to political uncertainties which are the result of poverty, sociopolitical unrest, and absence of democratic processes. These have been further aggravated by shifting loyalties of the ruling elite to capitalism, socialism, and Islam in response to the conflicting demands of their own vested interest, international power politics and the people’s aspirations. This has generated confusion and contributed to an absence of firm direction in policies and strategies. Making a serious commitment to Islam and allowing democratic processes to play their full political role should help provide the needed direction and stability to policies.

The shari’ah clearly defines the rights and limitations of property holders and the legal enforcement of these should help remove the fears of investors about arbitrary seizures and nationalization. In his address delivered on the occasion of his Farewell Pilgrimage, the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, declared: “Your lives

⁵⁴ M. H. Haykal, *Al Fārūq Umar* (Cairo: Maktabah al Nahdah al Misriyyah, 1964), vol. 2, p. 229.

and your properties are as sacred as this day of the Hajj.”⁵⁵ Accordingly, the jurists have unanimously ruled against arbitrary confiscation and nationalization of property by the state. Abu Yusuf epitomized this ruling by saying: “The ruler has no right to expropriate anything except by a clear and established right.”⁵⁶ This clear verdict of the shari‘ah should become reflected in the legal framework of all Muslim countries. They should define clearly and stipulate legally all those sectors of the economy where only public enterprises may be permissible and sectors where private enterprise will have a free role to play. Such a classification should be further reinforced by a legal guaranty in favor of just compensation in case of reclassification. Public enterprises will anyway have to be kept at a minimum because of the prohibition against interest and the inability of the governments to raise sufficient financing for such enterprises through taxes or sale of shares. Once such guarantees have become integrated into the country’s constitution and legal framework and it is realized that their fountainhead is the shari‘ah, it would be difficult for any government to disregard them in the interest of its own domestic popularity and international standing.

The continuing depreciation of the currencies of most Muslim countries cannot be prevented without reducing claims on resources, particularly foreign exchange resources, through restructuring of private sector consumption and government spending in the manner already discussed. Instead, most Muslim governments rely on exchange controls (overvalued exchange rates with import licensing), high tariffs, and promotion of import-competing industries.

Exchange controls, as evidence has indicated, have been largely ineffective.⁵⁷ They lead to the creation of a dual market of official and black market exchange rates. The overvalued official rate encourages imports and discourages exports, thus worsening the allocation of resources and depressing the rate of economic growth. They

⁵⁵ Muslim, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 889:147; and Ibn Mājah, *Sunan Ibn Mājah* (Cairo: Isā al Bābi al Halabi, 1952), vol. 2, p. 1297:3931.

⁵⁶ Abu Yusuf, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-6.

⁵⁷ See Ramires-Rojas, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

contribute to socioeconomic injustice by subsidizing import license receivers at the expense of consumers and exporters; the consumers continue to pay for imports at the opportunity cost of foreign exchange while the exporters receive less for their output. They also promote corruption and inefficiency. The various bonus schemes adopted to promote exports in the absence of a realistic exchange rate only succeed in exacerbating injustice and corruption. The benefit of these schemes does not permeate to the actual producers; their resources do not consequently increase to enable them to acquire improved inputs and better technology. Their productivity hence continues to remain low.

Higher tariffs, unlike realistic exchange rates, constitute a single-edged weapon. If applied effectively, they can discourage imports, but do not encourage exports. However, when high tariffs are used in developing countries with weak customs administration, and without any attempt to change the social mood, there is under-invoicing, smuggling, and tariff evasion. This raises the relative profitability of highly taxed, but smuggled, luxury goods and distorts resource allocation against need satisfaction. Hence a more effective strategy would be to ban the import of goods falling in the third category of goods and services.

Promotion of import-competing industries is no doubt necessary to reduce the pressure on foreign exchange resources and to promote employment and growth. However, in the absence of a consistent development philosophy, the selection of import-competing industries is arbitrary with no relationship to the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah or the rational principles of resource allocation. Nevertheless, they receive maximum government patronage in the form of subsidized financing, high tariff protection, exemption from duties on the import of capital goods and raw materials, and tax holidays. Such industries are usually large-scale and get established in urban areas. Since most of them are capital intensive and use a more sophisticated technology, their contribution to employment is not as much as that of labor-intensive SMEs (small micro enterprises). The high tariffs imposed to protect them contribute not only to higher

prices for consumers but also, along with other privileges, to the unearned enrichment of those who receive licenses for such industries and resort to under-invoicing. More and more of the nation's resources accordingly move into such industries distorting resource allocation and enriching the urban and rural rich. In such highly protected industries, there is usually little competition.⁵⁸ Agriculture and SMEs, which should really be the candidates for protection because of their great potential for import-substitution, are neglected. They suffer from lack of government support, overvalued exchange rates, import subsidies and commodity aid. Since most units operating in these sectors are small, unorganized and inarticulate, they are unable to exert any political pressure. The result is the vicious circle of neglect and poverty of these sectors and their inability to finance investments in improved technology. This is undoubtedly in conflict with the objectives of the shari'ah.

Probably the greatest obstacle to investment in Muslim countries, like in other developing countries, is the bureaucratic red-tape. This springs from various types of unnecessary controls which lead to a waste of investor time and an unnecessary rise in costs. Unless most of these controls are dismantled, it would be difficult to improve the investment climate even if savings increase. The general spirit of Islamic teachings is the freedom of enterprise within the value-frame of Islam. Controls are an inevitable source of corruption and even the Islamization of morals may not be able to prevent the officials from succumbing to temptation. There is moreover no justification for controls on the local manufacture or import of need-fulfilling consumers' goods falling into category one (necessities) and the raw materials and capital goods needed for their manufacture.

The Islamic ban on interest will make it indispensable for Muslim countries to encourage and facilitate foreign investment. This should not raise any demurs because "equity investment is beneficial to developing countries and can be increased."⁵⁹ It makes

⁵⁸ See OECD, *The Costs of Restructuring Imports—The Automobile Industry*, (Paris: OECD, 1987).

⁵⁹ IBRD, *World Development Report, 1985*, p. 125.

available not only finance but also technology and management which can increase the productivity of capital. The readjustment of economic policies in the light of Islamic teachings, the assurance that contractual obligations will be fulfilled as required by Islam, the removal of exchange controls on all current account transactions within the range of the perspective plan, and the ease of profit remittances and capital repatriation by foreign investors should prove to be positive factors in attracting foreign investment in Muslim countries. According to the World Bank, “countries that have followed a more open development strategy have had fewer problems with direct investment.”⁶⁰ However, until such time as the Muslim countries are able to attract more foreign equity investment, they may have to tolerate interest-based borrowings to the extent necessary to finance productive, self-liquidating projects that contribute to need fulfillment and development.⁶¹

Need-Based Production

Restructuring the investment climate may only help increase the volume of investments. It will be necessary to adopt measures to ensure that this increase in investment gets diverted to the production of need-fulfilling and exportable goods and services and the capital goods and raw materials needed for this purpose. All privileges and subsidies, explicit or implicit, which provide an edge to the production and import of luxuries and status symbols must be withdrawn.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 129.

⁶¹ This opinion, held by many fuqahā’ is based on the Qur’anic verse related to certain specified items which have been prohibited but the use of which have been allowed in extremely dire circumstances. “He has forbidden carrion, blood, pork and that which has been slaughtered in the name of other than God. However, if one is forced by dire necessity without willful disobedience or transgression of the limit, no sin shall be on him. Certainly God is Forgiving and Kind” (2:173) (Qur’anic references are composed of two numbers—the first referring to the *surah* [chapter] and second to the *ayah* [verse].) There are a number of other verses of this same implication in the Qur’an (5:3, 6:145, 16:115, 6:119). By analogy, this principle may be applied to interest paid to foreign lenders with whom no alternative arrangement is possible, provided that it is resorted to only to the extent absolutely necessary.

Emphasis of government fiscal, monetary and commercial policies should be tilted in favor of need fulfillment and exports.

The general tendency to resort to price controls on necessities leads to long-run shortages in their supplies by reducing their profitability. This becomes a permanent source of injury to the poor. In contrast the long-term supply of luxuries rises, thus serving the interests of the well-to-do. Hence the shari'ah has not permitted price controls under normal circumstances when there is no national emergency (war or famine) or when businesses are not creating an artificial shortage through monopoly, collusion, or hoarding. The short-term harm that the removal of price controls on necessities will inflict on the poor should be undone through the adoption of a gradual approach and the use of transfer payments and other measures discussed in this paper.

The support to agriculture and rural development and to SMEs, will play an important role in encouraging need fulfillment and exports. The restructuring of the banking system along Islamic lines must no doubt be an essential element of the whole reform program.

A New Deal for the Unemployed and the Underemployed

One of the most constructive ways of realizing the objectives of the shari'ah is the efficient and productive use of manpower resources of Muslim countries in such a way that each individual is able to use his or her creative and artistic abilities to the fullest extent in the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah . This cannot be materialized if the prevailing high level of involuntary unemployment and under-employment continues. The main policy instrument available within the framework of conventional wisdom for reducing unemployment and under-employment is expansion of aggregate demand.

While the conventional policy of aggregate demand expansion is no doubt necessary, it runs into two snags. First, given the flagrant inequalities of income and wealth and the demonstration effect of western life-styles, the increased demand spills over to a substantial degree into imports of goods and services for conspicuous consumption. Consequently its full benefit does not go to the goal of expand-

ing employment and removing poverty. However, if this policy were to be pursued in a need-based perspective, the benefit would tend to permeate a greater proportion of the population. Second, given the need to reduce macroeconomic and external imbalances, it is not possible to expand aggregate domestic demand; rather, it is necessary to reduce it. This adds importance to the policies of import substitution and export promotion. But these policies do not make an optimum contribution to employment if pursued within the framework of large-scale, capital intensive, urban enterprises.

Since the poorer Muslim countries have a surplus of labor, scarcity of capital and foreign exchange, and lack the educational infrastructure for training in complex technology, it would be desirable for them to expand self-employment opportunities through the proliferation of SMEs. As Dr. Muhammad Yunus has rightly pointed out, "Wage employment is not a happy road to the reduction of poverty, and that self-employment has more potential for improving the asset base of an individual than wage employment has."⁶² It would, however, be unrealistic to expect self-employment to absorb the entire manpower, and hence wage-employment may also need to be promoted simultaneously, provided that, in accordance with the dictates of the shari'ah, laborers receive a 'just' wage, are treated respectfully and humanly like brothers, and are not reduced to the position of small cogs in a big machine, unable to give full expression to their creative and artistic potential.⁶³ The greater the possibility of such employment in SMEs, the greater may be the possibility of realizing these goals.

There is a growing realization now that "the large-scale (modern) industrialization strategies of the previous decade generally had failed to solve the problems of global underdevelopment and pover-

⁶² Muhammad Yunus, "The Poor as the Engine of Development," reproduced from *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1987, in *Economic Impact* 2 (1988), p. 31.

⁶³ See M. U. Chapra, *Objectives of the Islamic Economic Order*, op. cit., p. 14-17; and Hakim Mohammed Said, ed., *The Employer and the Employee—Islamic Concept* (Karachi: Dār al Fikr al Islāmi, Pakistan, 1972).

ty.”⁶⁴ Studies conducted in a number of countries by Michigan State University and host country scholars have clearly indicated the rich contribution that SMEs can make to employment and income. They create new jobs not only directly but also indirectly by expanding incomes, demand for goods and services, tools and raw materials, and exports. They are labor intensive and require less capital and less foreign exchange. They rely primarily on personal savings and retained earnings and need much less access to credit from governments and financial institutions compared with large-scale industries. They invent new products, revive lost skills and help economies move into new kinds of work. They can be more widely disbursed and thus help maintain the link between a person’s place of work and his home which large-scale industries and hectic urbanization have severed to the detriment of social health. Moreover, they are at least as efficient as large-scale industries.⁶⁵ A Michigan State University study has concluded that they consistently generate more output per unit of capital than do their large-scale counterparts.⁶⁶ Little, Scitovsky and Scott have concluded that “large scale modern industry is usually much less profitable than the small craft type industries, in addition to being more costly in terms of capital and creating less employment.”⁶⁷ In fact, some scholars doubt that large-scale industries can be suitable at all under conditions of labor surpluses and capital shortages that are typical of most developing countries.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Carl Liedholm and Donald Mead, “Small-Scale Enterprise: A Profile,” reproduced from “Small Scale Industries in Developing Countries: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications,” A Michigan State University Development Paper, in *Economic Impact*, 2 (1988), p. 12.

⁶⁵ An expression of this view appears in International Labor Organisation (ILO), *Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya* (Geneva: ILO, 1972).

⁶⁶ Report of the Select Committee on Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁶⁷ Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott, *Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 91.

⁶⁸ See Mariluz Cortes, Albert Berry and Ashfaq Ishaq, *Success in Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises* (Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 2.

SMEs are hence being widely viewed as “an effective way of fostering the private sector’s contribution to both the growth and equity objectives of developing countries.”⁶⁹

Even the OECD countries have realized the job-creating potential of small enterprise.⁷⁰ Over the last decade they have accounted for a disproportionate share of new jobs, and those industrial countries where they play an important role have had a greater success in achieving lower rates of unemployment. Hence, a number of these countries have introduced measures to promote them.⁷¹ “No longer are small firms seen as the ‘Cinderella’ of the business community, rather they are to be courted and encouraged by politicians of all colors.”⁷² In Italy, artisans often working in family businesses, are a main factor behind the success of Italian jewelry, gold, silver, leatherworking, embroidery, glasswork, furniture, pottery, shoemaking, and clothes manufacturing, to mention just a few sectors.⁷³ In Germany, where the family-owned concern has always played a major part in the economy, there is renewed awareness of the need to create a favorable climate for small enterprise.⁷⁴ Japan’s export success is largely due to the vigour of internal competition promoted by the producing firms through their subcontracting of a lot of work to

⁶⁹ Liedholm and Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁷⁰ A number of books have recently been published indicating the strengths of small businesses. See, for example, Graham Gudgin, *Industrial Location Processes and Employment Growth* (London: Gower, 1978); and David Birch, *The Job Generation Process* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., Program on Neighbourhood and Regional Change, 1979); Steven Solomon, *Small Business USA* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1986); David Storey, *et. al.*, *The Performance of Small Firms* (London: Croom Helm, 1987); David J. Storey and Steven G. Johnson, *Job Creation in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises* (Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities, 1987); and Paul Burns and Jim Dewhurst, *Small Business in Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1987).

⁷¹ OECD, *Employment Outlook* (Paris: OECD, 1986).

⁷² Burns & Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

⁷³ See Alan Friedman, “Italian Small Business. The Backbone of the Economy Explored,” *Financial Times*, 15 September 1987.

⁷⁴ See “Small Business,” *Financial Times*, 29 April 1987, Section III, p. 1.

small businesses on a competitive basis.⁷⁵ Small firms are very important in Japan even domestically. They account for 50 percent of Japanese industrial output and 75 percent of total Japanese employment.⁷⁶ Three-quarters of retail sales are still made in Japan through specialty retailers and small family-run stores which are protected by law.⁷⁷ This, along with the widespread use of a profit-sharing system, may be among the primary reasons for Japan having the lowest rate of unemployment among industrial countries.⁷⁸ Even in other developed countries where the small firms sector has traditionally been weak, high levels of unemployment have made governments very receptive to their promotion. There has hence been a wealth of public and private sector initiatives to boost the small entrepreneur.

The emphasis of policy in Muslim countries on decentralized production with a proliferation of capital-saving SMEs may perhaps be the most effective way of not only occupying gainfully a large part of the rural landless but also the under-occupied members (husband, wife, parents, and children) of rural families having a small landholding. This policy will serve as complementary to agricultural reforms discussed earlier and will support rural development by raising the incomes of rural population and enhancing their ability to purchase better seeds, fertilizers and technology, thus raising their agricultural output. It will also reduce the outflow of population to urban centers. This will help maintain family solidarity and be more conducive to moral uplift and crime reduction, which are among the important goals of Islam. While many Muslim countries are critical

⁷⁵ See "Worker-Friendly Programs," *Economist*, 27 September 1986, p. 20.

⁷⁶ Steven Solomon, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-284.

⁷⁷ See "Why Japanese Shoppers are Lost in a Maze," *Economist*, 31 January 1987, p. 64.

⁷⁸ For a discussion of the Japanese profit-sharing system see Martin L. Weitzman, *The Share Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). It is surprising that while profit-sharing as applied to labor, has attracted attention in the West, profit-sharing as applied to capital, has not attracted such attention. Is it because of cultural myopia or is it because Muslims have themselves not presented the case convincingly?

of the policies of their colonial masters “who systematically destroyed all the fibers and foundations” of their societies, they have done little after independence to revive the skills and crafts that were destroyed.⁷⁹ In fact, everything has been done to stifle SMEs and to patronize large-scale industries and businesses through a high protective wall, liberal import licenses, concessionary financing, subsidized inputs and tax holidays. This is not a judgement against large-scale industry, which will be indispensable in certain sectors of the economy and which should be encouraged and undertaken where necessary, provided that the overall socioeconomic benefits exceed the costs and a heavy dose of permanent protection is not needed.

But how to encourage the proliferation of SMEs all over the country? It requires a number of revolutionary changes in the socio-economic environment. First, there must be a change in lifestyles away from imported status symbols and in favor of simple domestically-produced products that satisfy needs and utilize labor more abundantly. Second, there must be a change in official attitudes and policies towards SMEs such that they are not dismissed as inefficient small and anachronistic leftovers of the past, but are rather encouraged and helped to realize fully their rich potential. Third, they must be enabled, through help in acquiring better inputs, appropriate technology, effective marketing techniques, and other extension services to compete in terms of both quality and price with the products of large scale industries and imports. Fourth, they must also be enabled to upgrade their skills through better training facilities; this will require a complete overhaul of educational institutions to remove the existing mismatch between the skills in demand and the education offered. Fifth, they must also be provided access to finance, the lack of which constitutes the most serious obstacle to their development. Finally, it may also be necessary to eliminate, if not reverse the direction of, the existing bias in favor of large scale industries which is one of the major sore points in the expansion of SMEs.

⁷⁹ Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), p. 149.

The objectives of import-substitution and export promotion may not be realized through the SMEs unless they are helped to acquire more efficient technology to enable them to compete effectively. It would however be preferable if such technology is simple, in which case it would have the following advantages. It would require a smaller capital outlay, thus absorbing the growing labor force with a smaller amount of capital. It would minimize the demand for high skills and be thus suitable for Muslim countries with their relatively lower standards of literacy and technical education. It would enable a greater use of locally available materials and reduce the claim on foreign exchange resources. It would be possible to develop and produce it locally, thus helping reduce the dependence on imported technology. It would also be possible to introduce it in small towns and rural areas, thus reducing regional income disparities and minimizing the concentration of population in a few large urban centers, which large-scale enterprise with its capital intensive and complex technology tends to create. It would thus be what Schumacher calls a “technology with a human face.”⁸⁰ Even such a simple and inexpensive technology has the potential of leading to a “fairly rapid increase in productivity in underdeveloped countries.”⁸¹ It could not only help raise incomes and standards of living but also help achieve redistribution.

Financial Restructuring

The objective of achieving a proliferation of SMEs in rural and urban areas to solve the major economic problems of unemployment and concentration of wealth would remain only a fond dream unless arrangements are made for their financing. Lack of financing constitutes the most serious drawback in the development of small farms and SMEs. The poor are poor not because of their unwillingness to work hard or lack of skill. They in fact work harder than the rich and

⁸⁰ Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful* (London: Blond & Briggs, 1973), p. 18.

⁸¹ See the report by the United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, 1951), p. 29.

have more skill than they can use. Their problem is that they do not have access to financial resources necessary for being self-employed, and wage employment either does not utilize their skills optimally or does not pay them adequately to fulfill even their needs, let alone savings for investment. Financing is a powerful political, social and economic weapon and plays a predominant role in determining the power base, social status and economic condition of a person in the modern world. Dr. Muhammad Yunus has aptly emphasized that financing for self-employment should “be recognized as a right that plays a critical role in attaining all other human rights.”⁸² Therefore, reform of the financial system should constitute one of the key elements of all socioeconomic and political reforms.

The Select Committee on Hunger found that “the provision of small amounts of credit to micro enterprises in the informal sector economy of developing countries can significantly raise the living standards of the poor, increase food security and bring about sustainable improvements in local economies.” The Committee also concluded that “making credit available to entry level micro entrepreneurs is one way to help end the cycle of poverty and hunger among urban and rural landless poor in developing countries.” However, as the Committee indicated, “formal financial institutions in these countries do not recognize the viability of income generating enterprises owned by the poor.”⁸³ Even the Morgan Guarantee Trust Company, the sixth largest bank in the United States, has admitted that the banking system in developing countries has failed to “finance either maturing smaller companies or venture capitalists,” and “though awash with funds, is not encouraged to deliver competitively priced funding to any but the largest, most cash rich companies.”⁸⁴

Since the deposits of commercial banks come from a wide cross-section of the population, it would be rational to consider them a national resource to be utilized for the wellbeing of all sectors of

⁸² Muhammad Yunus, “The Poor as the Engine of Growth”, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁸³ Report of the Select Committee on Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. v.

⁸⁴ Morgan Guarantee Trust Company of New York, *World Financial Markets*, January 1987, p. 7.

the population and not for further enrichment of the wealthy and the powerful.⁸⁵ This is not possible within the framework of the conventional system in which, as Lester Thurow has rightly observed, credit is granted mainly “to those firms with large internal savings, regardless of whether they are earning above average rates of return on their capital investment.” The result is that “the winners are, as in lottery, lucky rather than smart or meritocratic.”⁸⁶ The most telling lesson about the conventional banking system comes from Catherine Shaw, a researcher at the London School of Economics’ Business History Unit, who says, “The recruitment of business leaders from one social class or a narrow social strata is an obvious symptom. It suggests that society is failing to utilize its total reservoir of ability.”⁸⁷

The adoption of the Islamic financial system could be more conducive to the harnessing of this pool of ability and the bringing to fruition the rich contribution that SMEs can make to output, employment and income distribution. The sharing of risks along with rewards by the financial institutions will substantially reduce the precariousness of a small entrepreneur’s position—he will save himself from the backbreaking burden of interest in difficult times by his willingness to pay a higher rate of return in good times. The financial institution is well qualified to share the risk, and could do so without denting its financial strength if it builds loss-offsetting reserves in good times.

However, even if the financial system is Islamized, it would be necessary to remove two of the primary causes responsible for the failure or inability of commercial banks to finance small farms and SMEs. The first of these is the serious economic disadvantages under which this sector operates, and the second is the greater risk and

⁸⁵ The noncorporate sector in developing countries generally accounts for 60-70 percent of private sector domestic saving. It is the only sector whose saving exceeds its investment (V. V. Bhatt, “Improving the Financial Structure”, *Finance and Development* (June 1986), p. 20.

⁸⁶ Lester Thurow, *Zero-Sum Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 175.

⁸⁷ Quoted by Charles Leadbearer, “Rags to Riches—Fact or Fiction,” *Financial Times*, 30 December 1986, p. 5.

expense to which the commercial banks are exposed. The first drawback cannot be removed without eliminating the implicit bias in official policies in favor of large-scale urban enterprises and replacing it by a strong commitment to support small farmers and SMEs. The adoption and implementation of the program proposed earlier through appropriate government policies and budgetary support should help gradually divert more and more of commercial bank financing to small farmers and SMEs. The second drawback cannot be removed without reducing the risk and expense of commercial bank lending to such units.

The greater risk of financing SMEs leads to a tough and extensive collateral requirement which they are unable to satisfy. This jeopardizes their growth and expansion in spite of their greater potential for contribution to employment, output and income distribution. The financing goes mainly to the rich who are subjected to a lower collateral requirement and which they are able to satisfy without any difficulty because of their greater wealth. Mishan has rightly indicated, "Given that differences in wealth are substantial, it would be irrational for the lender to be willing to lend as much to the impecunious as to the richer members of society, or to lend the same amounts on the same terms to each."⁸⁸

It may be expected that, within the Islamic risk/reward sharing framework, banks may tend to be attracted to provide greater financing to smaller firms because of their well established greater profitability. Small firms bear a record of better performance in terms of growth in real per capita profits in industrial countries where small entrepreneurs have been encouraged.⁸⁹ Even in developing countries with their extremely difficult environment for SMEs, they have consistently generated, according to a Michigan State University study, more output per unit of capital and are generally more efficient than their large-scale counterparts. Accordingly, the economic profit of smaller firms is consistently larger than that of large firms.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ S. Mihshan, *Cost Benefit Analysis: An Introduction* (New York: Praeger, 1911), p. 205.

⁸⁹ See Alan Friedman, *op. cit.*

⁹⁰ Report of the Select Committee on Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. 4 and Chart 2 on p. 5.

The risk may be reduced by introducing a loan guarantee scheme underwritten partly by the government and partly by the commercial banks.⁹¹ In the case of Islamic banks, the guarantee scheme cannot ensure the repayment of loans with interest as is the case in the conventional system. The scheme would rather cover the 'moral' risk of financing and relieve the bank of the need for collateral from SMEs whose general credentials have been examined and certified by the guarantee scheme. A large number of SMEs would thus be able to get financing from banks without being able to offer the collateral required by the conventional banks. The bank will receive its money back from the guarantee scheme in case of moral failure of the business. In case of market failure and the resultant loss, the bank should share the consequences with the business in proportion to the financing provided by it. The scheme may also be made to include some other noncommercial risks desired to be covered for increasing the availability of funds to SMEs.

This should not create any apprehensions about the viability of the loan guarantee scheme due to heavy loan losses. As indicated above, the scheme will not bear the entire risk of loan losses. It will bear only the moral risk, the business risk being born by both the bank and the borrower. Hence, the scheme will not be as heavily burdened with losses as the conventional schemes are. Moreover, the experience of International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is that credit provided, to the most enterprising of the poor is quickly repaid by them from their higher earnings.⁹² The Report of the Select Committee on Hunger also indicates that the "micro enterprise projects have recorded significant and impressive loan repayment rates."⁹³ Testimony from the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh indicates a constant repayment rate of 99 percent since the bank's

⁹¹ Loan guarantee schemes exist in practically all industrial countries which, having realized the potential of small firms, have initiated a program to encourage them. For some relevant details about such schemes in a number of European countries, see Burns and Dawhurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200.

⁹² See *Economist*, 16 February 1985, p. 15.

⁹³ Report of the Select Committee on Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

inception.⁹⁴ Other SME credit programs have yielded similar results. Therefore, there is no need to be unduly apprehensive about loan losses from such financing.

The additional expense of commercial banks in evaluating and financing SMEs may have to be partly or wholly offset by the government in the interest of realization of the objectives of the shari'ah. Big business has been subsidized by governments for a long time through various ways, including concessionary financing, import licenses, overvalued currencies, and subsidized inputs. To offset this undue advantage received in the past, the governments should now turn the table in favor of small farmers and SMEs. Both the objectives of the shari'ah and the principles of public spending discussed earlier justify a reasonable allocation of government resources for this purpose. Nevertheless, a part of the increased cost should also be recovered from banks and SMEs, at least for the sake of promoting greater responsibility and efficiency. It may be expected that once the credentials of SMEs have been established and the systems has started operating, the costs would tend to go down.

The Islamization of banks and the financing of SMEs may also help bring into their fold the savings of a large proportion of the rural population not yet absorbed by the banking system because of their lack of trust in conventional interest-based banks and the apathy of banks towards them. This will help mobilize the idle savings in the economy and generate a higher noninflationary rate of growth. It may also help reduce the attractiveness of gold as a store of value and release savings for investment.

Perspective Planning

It will not be possible for Muslim countries to actualize the objectives of the shari'ah (*maqāsid al shari'ah*) within the constraint of their scarce resources unless all the ingredients of the Islamic strategy are enabled to play a full and complementary role. The state will have to play a crucial role if the total potential of these ingredients is

⁹⁴ See M. Yusuf, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

to be realized. This it may be able to do more effectively if a long-term perspective plan is prepared. Such a plan would enable the state to take a realistic account of all the available physical and human resources and to establish, in the light of this, a set of well-defined priorities. This will help provide a clear direction to government policies and expenditure programs and to initiate effective measures for setting in motion the required structural and institutional changes.

The plan should not be comprehensive, trying to achieve a balancing of all input and outputs and their allocation among micro-units of the economy. This is neither feasible nor necessary. If a move is made in this direction, it will not only make the economy less flexible but also kill individual initiative and enterprise, thus engulfing the economy in the same kinds of contradictions and insoluble problems that the socialist and dirigiste economies are facing. What is however necessary is to bring into operation the double layer of filter moral values as well as market prices—and the motivating system of the Islamic strategy to ensure the realization of both efficiency and equity in the use of scarce resources.

It needs to be borne in mind that motivation requires not only the inculcation of fundamental Islamic beliefs and values in the population, but also the enforcement of socioeconomic justice, as discussed earlier. Prices, wages and availability of finance must no doubt be normally determined by market realities, but in the existing situation, with wealth and power concentrated in a few hands, they reflect monopolistic or monopsonistic characteristics and are, therefore, not 'just'. They therefore tend to suffocate the drive, initiative, creativity and enterprise of a large proportion of the population. The plan must indicate the policies and institutional reforms necessary for removing the existing injustice.

The goals of the economy must be clearly defined in terms of their priority and the ways of realizing them must also be specified. The establishment of priorities within the framework of the shari'ah will help in analyzing the existing allocation of resources and in pinpointing the direction of change. It would also be necessary to articulate the Islamic consumption, savings and investment values, and

work ethics, and to devise educational programs that would help inculcate these values and ethics in the people. The plan will also have to classify goods and services into the three categories discussed earlier.

In the light of the above, the plan must indicate the structural changes that must be introduced in the economy to realize the objectives of the shari'ah without creating macroeconomic and external imbalances. The plan must also indicate the institutions that must be established or reformed to reduce substantially the inequalities of income and wealth that now exist and to bring about a broad-based ownership of businesses and income-earning assets. The reform of the banking system in the light of Islamic teachings must receive special attention of the planners. The plan should not concentrate on any single measure or rely unduly on controls; rather, it should use a range of policies and incentives for realizing the objectives of the shari'ah. It should, in short, reflect a perceptible change in the development philosophy and strategy. All policies—fiscal, monetary, incomes, import and production—should be formulated within the framework of this perspective plan.

The production, import, distribution and consumption of what fits into the perspective plan should be permitted freely through the operation of the price system without bureaucratic red tape or controls. Controls, including those on the use of foreign exchange for current transactions, should be employed only where, and as long as indispensable. A general policy of letting social and institutional reform take the place of controls will help remove iniquities in material rewards, harness people's own inner drive for development, and, not only help reduce corruption and attain greater efficiency, but also make innovation and adjustment to changing circumstances easier. However, what does not conform with the perspective plan should not be allowed—irrespective of how rich or resourceful a person is.

There should not be changes in policy from quarter to quarter or year to year because the resource perspective, needs and goals of a country do not change frequently. Frequent tinkering with policies generates uncertainties and enriches mainly those having 'insiders'

knowledge. But errors which have been made in the preparation of the perspective plan should be rectified with an open mind and without undue delay. Since the resource endowment of different Muslim countries may be different, the same perspective plan may not be suitable for all even though the objectives of the shari'ah may be essentially the same for all.

Conclusion

It may thus be concluded that economic development with socioeconomic justice, which Islam sanctifies, cannot be attained within the constraint of the resource endowment of Muslim countries unless there is a revolutionary change in priorities and a motivating mechanism to induce people to change their work, consumption, saving and investment behavior in keeping with these priorities. The secularist, value-neutral and this-worldly perspective of both capitalism and socialism, in which Muslim countries are now operating, cannot help in either establishing the right priorities or in motivating the people to restructure their claims on resources in accordance with these priorities. When the capitalist and socialist societies have failed to achieve their professed socioeconomic goals in spite of decades of rapid development and their vast resources, they cannot serve as models for Muslim countries with their scarcer resources.

What the Muslim countries need to do is to increase the allocation of resources for programs that would help actualize the objectives of the shari'ah. However, this will enlarge the claims on resources and aggravate the macroeconomic and external imbalances in other areas. The major reduction in claims on resources should come through cuts in public as well as private wasteful or unnecessary spending. This cannot be accomplished in a vacuum; it requires a filter mechanism to distinguish the 'essential' from the 'inessential' and the 'equitable' from the 'inequitable' and an effective motivating system that would induce the people, particularly the rich to forgo their consumption of the inessential to conserve resources for capital formation and general need fulfillment. Prices alone cannot provide

such a filter mechanism or motivation in a secularist society with substantial inequalities of wealth and power. They provide an edge to the wealthy and the powerful and need-fulfillment suffers.

Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom, reflected in the IMF corrective programs, assumes that liberalisation of the economy and the prevalence of market-determined prices (including devaluation of the currency) will solve the problems. They will not. Higher prices do not create any significant dent in the demand of the rich; they continue to buy what they want. There is nothing to motivate them to do otherwise; therefore, the poor get more squeezed. This accentuates socioeconomic injustice and leads to social unrest and political instability. Collectivisation does not help either, because it kills incentive and efficiency, does not leave any leeway for consumer choice even in the area of needs, and concentrates power and decision making in the hands of a few. Such a concentration of power would be dangerous.

Therefore, Islam has moved away from both systems to ensure the realization of efficiency as well as equity. While it has recognized the contribution that profit motive, private property and the decentralized decision-making process of a market economy can make to efficiency, it has introduced other important ingredients in its economic system to ensure the actualization of justice. Hence, given the macroeconomic and external imbalances along with substantial iniquities and sociopolitical tensions prevailing in Muslim countries, the only feasible alternative they are left with is to Islamize their economies. This will not only help reduce their imbalances but also make a perceptible contribution toward social harmony through actualization of the objectives of the shari'ah. The concept of accountability before God will serve as a strong motivating force for keeping self-interest within the limits of social welfare, and, along with the filter mechanism of values and realistic prices, bring about the quantity and quality of reduction in claims that the realization of the objectives of the shari'ah requires. Such a reduction in unnecessary claims on resources will help lower the prices of all need-related uses of resources which the sole reliance on the price system does

not. Thus, by giving a moral complexion to resource use in both public and private sectors, Islamization will humanize the market forces and improve and strengthen their role in the economy.

The elimination of a substantial part of total claims will release resources for investment, exports and need fulfillment. The establishment of a need-based production system, along with equitable material rewards, will create a favorable climate for greater efficiency, increased supply of need-satisfying goods and services, and lower prices. Land reform and the proliferation of SMEs along with a total restructuring of the conventional financial system in the light of Islamic teachings, should help expand self-employment opportunities, reduce poverty and lower the concentration of wealth and power. Need fulfillment and equitable distribution will tend to have the effect of harnessing the energies and creativity of a greater part of the population for accelerated development. The reduction in inflationary pressures and the containment of the continuing depreciation in exchange rates should also make a positive contribution to growth and wellbeing. Nevertheless, the interest of the poor should be attended to even further, not through a general subsidy, but rather through organized and intensified relief payments by the government and social organizations out of zakah, voluntary donations, and maximum possible budgetary appropriations.

The Muslim governments have unfortunately used Islam so far only as a slogan, failing to realize the positive contribution it can make towards the betterment of their societies and economies and to their own survival. Professor Khurshid Ahmad has rightly indicated that “there is no evidence to conclude that, generally speaking, the policy makers derived any inspiration worth the name from Islam and tried to translate its economic ideals into development policies.”⁹⁵ Even with a change in attitudes and policies the task of

⁹⁵ K. Ahmad, “Economic Development in an Islamic Framework,” in K. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 173. According to Dr. Amin, even the motive for rapid economic development is weak. He says, “Rather than showing a general desire for rapid economic development Arab governments show a surprising weak will to achieve it.... A much more powerful motive than economic development is the

adjustment and reconstruction is bound to be difficult and time consuming. The sooner the policy makers read the signs of the times, the better it will be for them and the Ummah. Islamization should not, however, be conceived as an antidote to all the problems of Muslim countries. Some of the problems created by centuries of social and moral degeneration misguided domestic policies and painful external shocks are bound to persist for a long time.

motive to remain in power.” (Galal A. Amin, *The Modernization of Poverty*, vol. VIII of the *Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980), p. 108.

Comments on “Economic Development in Muslim Countries: A Strategy for Development in the Light of Islamic Teachings”*

A. El Najjar

Chapra’s paper is a long one with an extensive list of references. The paper covers the following themes: The failure of ‘imported’ development strategies in Muslim countries; and, an Islamic development strategy covering—the affect of the human factor, reducing wealth ownership concentration, and restructuring the economy.

I support the author’s conclusion that Islam is not responsible for the prevailing underdevelopment in Muslim countries (writers prejudiced against Islamic claim that it is the cause) because Islam has not been actualized in them. As we know, Islam is a state and a religion, a faith and a system of jurisprudence. This world is tied to the Hereafter and interest in this world only is not the correct Muslim attitude. Allah says: “But seek the abode of the Hereafter in that which Allah hath given thee and neglect not thy portion of the world.” And He says:

Yet if the people of those communities had but believed and been conscious of Us, We would indeed have opened up for them blessings out of heaven and earth; but they gave the lie to the truth—and so we took them to task through what they had been doing.

Chapra considers the failure of development policies in Islamic countries as a natural result of ‘adopted’ development strategies, whether capitalist or socialist. Being imported, they simply do not suit the social and economic climate prevailing in Muslim countries. He then offers a scheme of development policies determined by the *maqāsid* (objectives) of the shari‘ah.

Though a discussion of development strategies requires detailed exposition, attributing past failures solely to the fact that they were imported needs reexamination. I believe that the shari‘ah makes it a duty on a Muslim to explore what is latent in the human soul. Man is

* Translated from Arabic by the editor.

free to adapt modern forms of organization, explore the creative potential of economics and other fields of knowledge and arts. There is no reason why one should not adopt science and technology. Islam urges its followers to use and adopt ideas that do not contradict its basic teachings. It is well-known that wisdom is the lost property of the Muslim: He recovers it wheresoever he finds it. This is the position of the various schools of interpretation and opinions in fiqh. Muslims may find themselves facing new problems where there is no ready solution. The solution to these problems requires ijthihad within the limits of available texts and sources of the shari'ah.

In his paper, Chapra stresses the concepts of equity and efficiency. He sees that Islam is occupied with these concepts. No doubt, modern economic systems are also occupied with such concepts. As is well-known, modern economics is the science of the efficient use of available economic resources. The problem, then, is finding the way to ensure efficiency and equity in an Islamic economic system.

The paper considers the core problem of modern economic theory to be scarcity of resources. In fact, scarcity is the product of human action, and nature should not be blamed. Natural resources are sufficient, but suffer from under-utilization or mis-utilization or both. This phenomenon creates the situation in which there is scarcity and hunger for the majority and abundance and over consumption for the minority. Unlike modern economics, Islam is not occupied only with the material aspects of the economic problem because the spiritual development of Muslims is of central importance. Spiritual development influences a Muslim's behavior, making him satisfied with whatever material goods he consumes, profoundly effecting the economic problem.

To actualize the objectives of the shari'ah in the light of available resources, Chapra considers it necessary to do the following: encourage the movement of the human factor to centers of development to ascertain its effective contribution in the development efforts; reduce wealth and income concentration using zakah and inheritance laws in the shari'ah; reconsider investment policies so that investment con-

tributes to needs fulfilment, creation of job opportunities, and increased exports. He also suggests the following:

- ♦ The creation of incentives through a just wage system that would satisfy and fulfill the needs of the workers, besides realizing the values in the shari‘ah.
- ♦ The development of individual abilities to improve on efficiency and equity by introducing a program of training and education for the labor force.

All these ideas intimated by the author are of a general nature. He does not give us a clue as to how they would be implemented in the prevailing political conditions in the Muslim countries. The nature of his suggestions, as admitted by the author, do not differ from what is being recommended by secular economic theories for ameliorating the conditions in developing countries.

The actualization of the objectives of the shari‘ah require that the shari‘ah be applied to all aspects of the Muslims’ lives. What the paper suggests is that an Islamic development strategy include changes in the behavior and in the system of values of an Muslim society. These changes cannot be achieved except through faith in God and the implementation of the rule of God on private citizens, the ruler, and the society as a whole.

Both Muslim individuals and Muslim rulers are responsible for actualization of Islamic values. Allah says in the Qur’an: “Allah will not change the fate of a people, until they change what is in themselves” (13:11).

The author’s call for the restructuring of economies in the Muslim countries is founded on his assumption that the standard of living in these countries is an imitation of Western standards. He points to corruption as an important obstacle to the efficient use of available resources. I support this conclusion and agree that Muslim countries will not efficiently use their resources as long as they are dependent upon the Western system, whether it be capitalist or socialist. The serious problem facing Muslim countries is how to escape dependency or at least moderate and temper its effects.

Muslim countries should adopt a plan of development that takes into account the values and traditions of the Islamic society.

The author takes issue with military expenditures and considers them to be constraints on development efforts, especially when there is no imminent threat of military conflict. An increase in military expenditures does help to assure the security of a government. However, real security comes from the internal strength of a society, its strong moral values, its social justice, and its equality of opportunities. Though we are in general agreement, I think that the threat of war is real and may be imposed on Muslim countries; therefore, governments find themselves obliged to increase military expenditures.

The first step in the Islamic strategy is to implement the following two statements from the Qur'an: "So let them worship the Lord of this house, who hath fed them against hunger, and hath made them safe from fear." And "Hence, make ready against them whatever force and war mounts you are able to muster." (8:60) With the development of modern industries, new techniques are being discovered that make it easier for the Muslims to feed and defend themselves.

Chapra believes that subsidies are not necessary and are misused. He prefers to use zakah to help the poor and the needy through social organization and social benevolence. He also discusses the tax systems in the Muslim countries, and shows the narrowness of the tax base, the high rates of taxes, and the extent of tax evasion.

The author enumerates the obstacles to investment, such as the absence of a suitable economic environment, political unrest, and the lack of democracy, etc. Although views may differ when such important matters are exposed, it should be noted that not only Muslim countries manifest these weaknesses. To start with, an Islamic strategy for development in Muslim countries is a strategy for Muslims who are happy to actualize the shari'ah. The question remains then, How do we adopt an Islamic strategy under the prevailing conditions in Islamic countries?

The author calls for the encouragement of foreign capital to be welcomed in Muslim countries and emphasizes the positive contri-

bution of foreign capital in transferring technology, know-how and badly needed administrative skills. However, he does not discuss the negative aspects of foreign capital. He recommends the dismantling of exchange-rate controls and facilitating capital repatriation and profits to the investing countries, without the effects of this on the recipient country. There is also a suggestion of using interest rates in borrowing if the foreign investment policy is not successful. The stress put on foreign sources of capital obliged the author to neglect the internal sources of finance and the mobilization of saving to supply the needed capital. One ought not forget that the reputation of foreign capital has been good in developing countries. Dependency on foreign capital and its ramifications is not discussed by the author.

Chapra examines the problems facing the agricultural sector in Muslim countries. The poor infrastructure—the lack of electricity, roads, etc.—the scarcity of financial support, and the poor education of the farmers, are only some of the problems. The absence of marketing techniques in small enterprises makes the problem even worst. The paper describes problems that are general to all Muslim countries, but in fact Muslim countries face different types of problems. Also, the more serious problem of food production is not examined. Food production is one aspect of the agricultural section that has a very high priority, whether on the national level or on the regional level. The paper does not prioritize items within the development strategy.

The author points to the financial system, highlighting the failure of commercial banks to supply the necessary finance to small enterprises and small farms. An Islamic banking system could solve the problem of small enterprises via the *muḍārabah* (partnership between one who has capital and one who has expertise) and *mushārah* (joint venture, partnership in which the participants contribute both capital and expertise) system.

The role of government is vital in the Islamic development strategy. Planning is done in government ministries—implementation of the plan, choice of priorities, and fixing targets is a government

responsibility. The government also manages the economy through budget, monetary, and fiscal policies.

Chapra analyzes in detail the nature of the plan for actualization of the objectives of the shari'ah. He analyzes an indicative plan that works through market prices.

The desires of man are numerous and it is expected that he strive to satisfy them. Human needs fulfilment leads to clarity of thought, security, stability, and allows for the development of spiritual values and moral standards. Therefore, Islam does not put any obstacle in the way of achieving material progress. Rather, Islam urges Muslims to work hard and strive to reach the highest possible standard of living. Islam asks the Muslim society to secure good living conditions for its members, while at the same time not forgetting that life has other important needs, spiritual and moral, which bring a balanced and peaceful life. A good Muslim has always one eye on earthly matters and one eye on heavenly matters. Knowledge raises him while ignorance pulls him back. Making efforts to perform good works in this world is rewarded in the Hereafter. Allah says in the Qur'an (20:123-126):

. . . But if there come unto you from Me a guidance, then whoso followeth My guidance, he will not go astray nor come to grief;

But he who turneth away from remembrance of Me, his will be a narrow life, and I shall bring him blind to the assembly on the day of resurrection.

He will say: "My Lord! Wherefore hast Thou gathered me (hither) blind when I was wont to see?"

He will say: "So (it must be). Our revelations came unto thee but thou didst forget them, In like manner thou are forgotten this day."

Stabilization and Growth in an Open Islamic Economy*

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Abstract

Islam proposes the replacement of an interest-based financial system with one which operates on the basis of risk and profit sharing. Using a general equilibrium model, the paper investigates some open-economy implications of adopting Islamic banking for economic growth and stabilization. It analyzes the long-run effects of Islamic banking on international capital flows and on the economy's capacity to adjust to disturbances. It concludes that monetary policy can be used effectively for stabilization purposes and that disturbances to asset positions are absorbed efficiently in an Islamic financial system.

Summary

A number of studies have shown that monetary policy can be used to stabilize an economy that adopts an Islamic financial system. Until now this conclusion has been based on a closed-economy model. This paper expands and extends the consideration of stabilization and growth questions to an open economy whose banking system operates on the basis of risk and profit sharing.

A simple general equilibrium model is developed to illustrate how and through what channels monetary policy alters rates of return on financial and real assets, thereby affecting investment, output, and the balance of payments. This exercise shows that although the authorities lose the ability to set directly financial rates of return, and monetary policy is constrained both by substitution possibilities among domestic assets and by offsetting international capital flows, the authorities can alter the rate of return on physical capital, thereby affecting investment and output.

The paper also investigates the long-run implications of adopting Islamic banking for international capital flows, and sheds some light on the capacity of an Islamic economy to adjust to certain macroeconomic disturbances. It concludes that, to the extent that borrowed external resources (through profit-and-risk-sharing models) are channelled into productive investments, such investments can be expected to generate a stream of returns at least sufficient to repay the foreign loans. Furthermore, an Islamic financial system has the capacity for better adjustment to macroeconomic disturbances that require the shifting of resources from the traded to the nontraded sector than does the conventional interest-based system.

I. Introduction

There has been a great deal of interest in recent years in the analysis of an Islamic economy. The purpose of this paper is to integrate and to expand upon the results of certain approaches which have been adopted to study the effects of stabilization policies in an Islamic economy. The possibility that monetary policy could be used to stabilize such an economy, characterized specifically by the strict prohibition against charging interest, has been demonstrated by Khan and Mirakhor (1987).¹ Employing a short-run macroeconomic model of a closed economy, they show that, in an Islamic economy, there is apparently no fundamental change in the way monetary policy affects economic variables. The authorities can achieve the same results through controlling the supply of profit-based bank lending as they can through varying the total money supply.² The present paper extends the analysis to an open economy. This endeavour, besides being of interest in itself, serves to clarify the relationship between the financial and real sectors in an open Islamic economy. More specifically, the analysis pinpoints the principal channels through which monetary policy alters rates of return on financial and real assets, thereby affecting investment spending, output, and the balance of payments.

The paper has the following plan. In the Section II, certain institutional and accounting features of an Islamic banking system are discussed. The intention is to demonstrate the similarities, as well as the differences between interest-based banking and Islamic banking. Section III discusses the general equilibrium approach to monetary theory and the 'q' theory of investment developed by Tobin and Brainard. The purpose is to systematically analyse, by way of intro-

¹ See also Mohsin Khan, "Principles of Monetary Theory and Policy in an Islamic Framework," paper presented at the International Institute of Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan, September 1987.

² In most of the highly-developed countries in fact such rates are set indirectly through central bank actions, e.g., open market operations, reserve requirement changes, variations in discount rates, etc.

duction, the implications of the general equilibrium model, both in explaining the effectiveness of monetary policy when financial intermediaries are uncontrolled, and in providing a foundation for the analysis of monetary policy in an open economy without interest. Section IV presents a simple general equilibrium model for an open Islamic economy. The model is designed to illustrate how changes in government holdings of bank equities affect the various rates of return, and how the possibility of substitution amongst assets affects the outcome of monetary policy. Section V concentrates on the relationship, in an Islamic economy, between total investment and saving on the one hand and the current account deficit on the other. The purpose of this section is to shed some light on the issues concerning the sustainable level of external borrowing and whether adoption of an Islamic banking system will tend to increase or reduce the current account deficit. Finally, Section VI contains some concluding remarks.

At the risk of oversimplifying the analysis contained in this paper the main results that emerge can be summarized as follows. Since Islamic banking essentially transforms banking from an interest-based system to one that relies on profit and loss sharing, it becomes an equity-based system and, in the process, the authorities lose the ability to set directly financial rates of return. Although monetary policy is constrained by both substitution possibilities among domestic assets and by offsetting international capital flows, the authorities can alter the rate of return on physical capital, thereby affecting investment and output. Furthermore, it will be argued that replacing an interest-based system with Islamic banking will not necessarily lead to a reduction in savings and investment. If both savings and investment should increase, then the effect on the current account position is ambiguous. But even if the current account deficit is increased because of a larger increase in investment, it can be shown that given that certain conditions are met, the ensuing growth of output would make it feasible ultimately to close the gap between domestic saving and investment. The Islamic financial system also

has advantages over the conventional interest-based system in terms of adjustment to certain types of macroeconomic disturbances.³

II. Islamic Financial System

In an Islamic financial system, banks perform the same essential functions as they do in the conventional banking system but are constrained to carry out their transactions in accordance with the rules of Islamic law, the shari'ah. They act as administrators of the economy's payment system and as financial intermediaries. The need for them in the Islamic system arises for the same reason as that in the conventional system, which is to satisfy simultaneously the portfolio preferences of two types of individuals or firms. On one side are the deficit financial units who wish to expand their holdings of real assets behind the limits of their net worth. On the other side are the surplus units, who wish to hold part of their net worth in liquid assets with small risk of default. The reasons a bank can accomplish these transformations are that it possesses administrative economy and expertise in negotiating, accounting, appraising, and collecting; it reduces risk by pooling of independent risks, with respect both to returns on assets and to deposit withdrawal; and government regulations and provisions are designed to assure their solvency and liquidity. Banks exploit the imperfections in the financial markets, including *inter alia*, imperfect divisibility of financial claims, and transaction costs of search in the acquisition and diversification of these claims by the surplus and deficit units. Just as their counterparts do in the conventional system, banks in the Islamic system can be expected to exhibit economies of scale in monitoring financial transactions. Because of these economies of scale and the banks specialized expertise, banks possess the ability to minimize the cost of transactions that convert current income optimal consumption and investment bundles. Banks alter yield relationships between surplus and deficit units, and provide lower costs to the deficit units and higher

³ See also Khan (1986) for similar conclusion derived from the analysis of a closed-economy model.

returns to the surplus units than would be possible with direct finance. As in interest-based banking, Islamic banking transforms the liabilities of firms into a variety of obligations to suit the tastes and circumstances of the surplus units. Their liabilities consist of shares, which serve as the medium of exchange; and their assets consist mainly of primary financial securities in the capital market.

In disallowing interest but permitting profits, the shari‘ah has developed two specific forms of business arrangements as means of earning profits without resorting to interest charges, namely, *muḍārabah* (commenda) and *mushārah* (partnership).⁴ In the case of *muḍārabah*, one party provides the necessary financial capital and the other party provides the human capital that is needed for the economic activity to be undertaken. *Mushārah* is a form of business arrangement in which a number of partners pool their financial capital to undertake a particular activity within an enterprise—either whole-firm or project-specific oriented. *Muḍārabah* is traditionally applied to commercial activities of short duration, whereas *mushārah* is applicable to production or commercial activities of long duration.

The expectation is that in the Islamic system, projects would be selected for funding through partnerships primarily on the basis of their expected profitability. This factor, together with the predominance of equity markets and the absence of debt markets, has led Muslim scholars to conclude that, potentially, in an Islamic system, there would be a greater number and variety of investment projects that would be seeking financing—a more cautious, selective, and perhaps more efficient project selection by the savers and investors—and a greater involvement by the public investment and entrepreneurial activities, particularly as private equity markets develop, than in the conventional fixed-interest-based system. In the Islamic profit-sharing arrangement, while the profit is shared on the basis of a predetermined share parameter between the agent-entrepreneur and the financial-capital owner, the loss is only borne by the owners of

⁴ See Khan and Mirakhor (1987) for other forms of Islamic transactions.

the funds and not the entrepreneur. This affords human capital, which is representative of present work and effort, a status on par with financial capital, which is representative of monetized past labor and work. In this respect, the owner of financial capital risks the loss of his funds, whereas the agent-entrepreneur is recognized as risking his time, effort, and labor.

The efforts of Muslim scholars and economists in developing models of banking within the framework of Islamic requirements has led to a variety of proposals that can be categorized into two principal models. The first model, relying on the concept of profit-sharing, integrates the asset and liability sides of the financial sector on the basis of a principle called 'two-tier *mudārabah*'.⁵ This model envisages depositors entering into a contract with a banking firm to share the profits accruing to the bank. The bank, on its asset side, enters into another contract with an agent-entrepreneur, who is searching for investable funds and agrees to share his profit with the bank in accordance with a predetermined percentage that is stipulated in the contract. The bank's earnings from all its activities are pooled and then shared with its depositors and shareholders according to the terms of their contract. The profits earned by the depositors are a percentage of the total banking profits. According to this model, the banks are allowed to accept demand deposits that would not earn profits and instead may be subjected to a service charge. This model requires that demand deposits must be paid to the depositors on demand, and has no specific reserve requirement.

The second model divides the liability side of the bank balance sheet into two windows, one for demand deposits, which serve as transaction balances and the other for investment balances.⁶ The choice of which window to use is left to the depositors. This model stipulates a 100 percent reserve requirement for the demand deposits but no reserve requirement for investment balances. Proponents of this model argue that demand deposits are placed as *amānah* (safe-

⁵ Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987).

⁶ Khan (1986).

keeping) and must be backed by 100 percent reserve, because these balances belong to the depositors and do not carry with them the right for the bank to use them as the basis for lending and money creation through fractional reserves. Money deposited in investment accounts, on the other hand, is placed with the depositor's full knowledge that the deposit will be invested in riskbearing projects, therefore no guarantee is justified. In this model, too, the bank may charge a service fee for providing safekeeping services.

III. Monetary Policy, Investment And the Balance of Payments

The effectiveness of using monetary policy to influence macroeconomic conditions is a controversial and widely debated topic. On the one hand, some economists contend that if domestic labor and product markets respond slowly to shifts in the economic environment, giving rise to disequilibrium situations in which supply and demand are not always equal, there is scope for monetary policy to stabilize the economy. On the other hand, other economists argue that a counter cyclical monetary policy cannot be effective in influencing employment and output, based on models in which economic agents are rational and do not make systematic errors in anticipating the behavior of the monetary authorities. A key issue in this debate is whether prices are free to adjust rapidly so that markets clear continuously as economic participants respond to whatever changes in monetary policies they come to anticipate.

In addition to focusing on the effectiveness of monetary policy in the context of rational expectations, developments in monetary theory have also focused on the issue of international capital mobility and its implications for active monetary policy. The effectiveness of monetary policy depends crucially on whether money 'spills out' directly and rapidly through the capital account of the balance of payments, and on the strength of the effects on the current account from changes in both the relative price of traded and nontraded goods and aggregate domestic demand.

In the analysis of the open-economy aspects of monetary policy, exchange rates and the balance of payments are sometimes discussed as a separate compartment of monetary policy. 'International' financial policy is taken to be concerned with capital flows in the balance of payments, with official intervention in exchange markets, with holdings by the government of international reserve assets, and with the choice between a fixed- or flexible-exchange rate regime. 'Domestic' monetary policy is considered independently of international complications and is taken to be concerned with, for example, interest rate changes, open-market operations, and the supply of commercial bank reserve. However, as the monetary approach to the balance of payments has emphasized, there is no valid way to segregate the 'external' and 'domestic' aspects of national monetary policy for separate analysis.

The monetary approach to the balance of payments (MABP) uses the money-supply process and the money-demand function as the central theoretical relationships around which to organize the analysis of the balance of payments.⁷ In the framework of the monetary approach, the balance of payments position of a country is considered to be a reflection of decisions by the residents to accumulate or to run down their stocks of money balances. For a small country, in which income is exogenous, which has prices given from abroad, and which adheres to a fixed exchange rate, the money supply is endogenous and increases in the domestic supply of money beyond the level demanded will leak out in the balance of payments. In essence, MABP argues that international money flows are a consequence of stock disequilibria differences between desired and actual stocks of international money and, as such, are inherently transitory and self-correcting. A nonzero official settlements balance allows the money stock to change until the demand for and supply of money are equalized and when the money market is in equilibrium, the official settlements balance returns to zero.

⁷ Two useful anthologies of the monetary approach to the balance of payments are Frenkel and Johnson (1976) and the International Monetary Fund (1977).

Another important subject that has been emphasized in recent years in macroeconomic theory has been the variation in the pace of capital accumulation and the sensitivity of investment to rates of return in financial markets. Tobin (1969), Tobin and Brainard (1968, 1977), and others, have attributed much of this variation in investment to changes in the relative attraction for wealth-owners to hold physical capital, on the one hand, and money or obligations to pay money, on the other. In this approach, monetary assets are part of a list of assets and the commercial banking system is one sector, but not the only one, whose balance sheet behavior must be specified. The Tobin-Brainard model of the economy's capital account specifies the assets (and liabilities) that appear in portfolios and balance sheets, the factors that determine the demands and supplies of the various assets, and the conditions under which asset prices and rates of return clear these interrelated markets. Equilibrium in these models is an equilibrium of stock and balance sheets, that is, a situation in which both the private sector and the financial institutions are content with their portfolios of assets and liabilities, and the demand to hold each assets is equal to the stock supply. Proponents of this general equilibrium approach to monetary theory argue that the monetary operations of a central bank can bring about changes in the 'q' ratio—the ratio of the market value of firms to the replacement cost of their physical capital—and that this ratio is the principal link between the financial and real sectors of the economy.

A change in the quantity of money disturbs asset market equilibrium and sets off a chain of portfolio substitutions. Currency, deposits in banks and other financial intermediaries, equities, etc., are important substitutes for each other and other assets in the portfolios of investors. The central bank operates in the first instance on the rate of return of some financial instrument that it holds in its portfolio by buying or selling it in the market. The monetary operations are then transmitted to equity yields as portfolio substitutions are affected by the current levels of the rates of return and expectations of their future paths. Thus, changes in the stock of money alter 'q' and thereby alter private investment expenditures, real output, and prices. The

rate of investment is a positive function of 'q,' and an increase in the money stock increases 'q'. In a competitive economy with constant returns to scale, the equilibrium value of 'q' sustains capital replacement and expansion at the natural growth rate of the economy. If there are no adjustment costs, the firm will continue to increase or decrease the capital stock until 'q' is equal to unity. In the short-run, disturbances, expectations, and policy changes cause movements in 'q,' which in turn changes incentives for real investment.

Tobin and Brainard (1963) address the question whether the existence of uncontrolled financial intermediaries diminishes the effectiveness of monetary control. Their method is to set up models of general equilibrium in financial and capital markets and to trace, in these models, the effects of monetary controls when structural changes, such as abolishing ceilings on rates which commercial banks pay on deposits, occur. Tobin and Brainard note that introducing nonbank financial intermediaries, uncontrolled or controlled, into a system in which banks are under effective monetary control presents essentially the same issues as introducing commercial banks as an intermediary, controlled or uncontrolled, into a system in which the government's control is the supply of its own currency. Their analysis, therefore, focuses on the effects of financial intermediation by banks, the consequences of leaving their operations unregulated, and the effects of regulating them in various ways. In their model, a monetary action is considered expansionary if it lowers the rate of return on the ownership of real capital that the community requires to induce it to hold a given stock of capital, and deflationary if it raises that rate of return. In equilibrium, this rate of return equals the expected marginal productivity of the capital stock, which in turn depends on the size of the capital stock relative to expected levels of output. If a monetary action lowers the rate of return on capital at which owners of wealth are content to absorb the given stock of capital into their portfolios or balance sheets along with other assets and liabilities, then it becomes easier for the economy to accumulate capital.

The Tobin-Brainard analysis shows that the presence of an uncontrolled financial intermediary does not imply the ineffectiveness of monetary policy to alter the required rate of return on physical capital. Although a reduction in the supply of currency will raise the financial intermediary's rates, the substitution of the intermediary's liabilities for currency will not offset the monetary contraction completely so long as the intermediary's liabilities are an imperfect substitute for currency. Substitutions of this kind imply that a given change in the supply of currency and bank reserves would have more effect on the economy if such substitutions were prevented, but this does not imply a one-for-one offset to enforced reductions in the supply of controlled monetary assets.

Whether it is important that monetary controls be more effective in this sense is another question. . . . When a given remedial effect can be achieved either by a small dose of strong medicine or a large dose of weak medicine, it is not obvious that the small dose is preferable. Increasing the responsiveness of the system to instruments of control may also increase its sensitivity to random exogenous shocks. Furthermore, extension of controls over financial intermediaries and markets involves considerations beyond those of economic stabilization; it raises also questions of equity, allocative efficiency, and the scope of governmental authority.⁸

IV. A Model of Monetary Policy In an Open Islamic Economy

The key insights from the general equilibrium approach to monetary theory and the 'q' theory of investment, as they bear on the subject of Islamic banking, are that the principal way in which monetary policy affects aggregate demand is by changing the valuations of physical assets relative to their replacement costs, and that monetary policy can accomplish such changes even in the presence of uncontrolled financial intermediaries. The transformation of banking from an

⁸ Tobin and Brainard (1963).

interest-based system to one that relies on profit and loss sharing makes an Islamic banking system essentially an equity-based system. The authorities cannot set directly financial rates of return, so the financial system is more market oriented in an Islamic economy than in an economy with fixed-interest rates. In this respect, the Tobin-Brainard models, particularly the model for analyzing the effect of an uncontrolled financial intermediary on the effectiveness of monetary control, are relevant. In this section, we present a variant of the Tobin-Brainard model for the purpose of studying monetary policy in an open Islamic economy. As the model is for an open economy, monetary policy is constrained by substitution possibilities among domestic assets and by offsetting international capital flows. The model below bears a close resemblance to models developed by Branson (1976, 1979), Miller (1973), and Tobin and de Macedo (1980). The purpose is to develop the simplest possible fundamental model which yields the basic behavior of the general equilibrium approach to monetary theory in an open Islamic economy, particularly, the movements in the rate of return on physical capital and offsetting international capital flows following shifts in monetary policy.

The model consists of the following assumptions. There are three financial assets and one real asset, and the set of excess demand equations for these assets determines the rates on the assets, given the values of the various exogenous variables. Table 1 gives definitions of the symbols used. The domestic private sector allocates its wealth between currency, bank deposits, bank equities, and physical capital. The banking sector holds currency, bank equities, and loans. The foreign sector holds deposits in the domestic banking sector and also holds equity capital.

The model represented by equations (1) through (7) is presented in Table 2. The first four equations are the excess demand equations for bank equity, bank loans, physical capital, and currency, respectively. The assets-holders demand functions for the four imperfectly substitutable assets are functions of the rates of return that are relevant for the particular sector. It is assumed that the assets are all gross

Table 1
Symbols Used

Symbol	Definition
D	Bank's liabilities to domestic residents (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
D*	Bank's liabilities to foreign sector (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
H	Supply of bank equities (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
G	Government holdings of bank equities (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
K	Physical capital (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
C	Currency (as a fraction of private sector wealth)
c	Required reserve ratio for banks
ê	The rate of change of the exchange rate, where the exchange rate is expressed as the domestic currency price of a unit of foreign currency
rd	Rate on bank deposits
rl	Rate on bank loans
rh	Rate on bank equities
rk	Return on physical capital
rf	Return on foreign assets

substitutes in the portfolios of each sector, which implies that a rise in the rate on any asset will lead to substitution into that asset out of other assets in the portfolio. In other words, the partial derivative of the asset demand function with respect to the own rate is positive, while with respect to an alternative rate, negative or zero. Equation (5) describes the private sector's demand function for bank deposits, whereas equation (6) is the foreign sector's demand for domestic bank deposits. Equation (7) describes the relationship between the bank loan rate and the deposit rate.

Table 2
Islamic Financial System Model

Symbol Number	Equation
(1)	$b^h(rh,rl)(1-c)(D+D^*) + p^h(rh,rd,rk) + G-H=0$
(2)	$b^l(rh,rl)(1-c)(D + D^*)-p^l(rk,rl) = 0$
(3)	$p^k(rh,rd,rk,rl) + f^k(rk-rf-e)-K = 0; \quad f^k > 0$
(4)	$cb^d(rh,rd) + p^c(rh,rd,rk)-C = 0$
(5)	$D = p^d(rh,rd,rk)$
(6)	$D^* = f^d(rd-rf-ê); \quad f^d > 0$
(7)	$rd = r(rl); \quad r > 0$

Commercial banks offer investment deposits to the private sector, D , and to the foreign sector, D^* , which are not guaranteed by the banks and do not yield a predetermined rate of return. The banks are assumed to pay depositors a rate of return, rd , that is based on profits from their operations, as postulated in equation (7). These deposits are shared between the depositors and the banks in mutually agreed-upon proportions determined prior to the transaction, so that, should the banks incur losses, the rate of return to the depositor would be negative and the nominal value of the deposits would be reduced accordingly.⁹ Unlike the commercial banks in the interest-based banking system, commercial banks in the Islamic system cannot borrow from the central bank through the customary mechanism of rediscounting at a given official discount rate. It is assumed that banks can borrow from the central bank only on an equity-participation basis, and the central bank purchases equity in the banks when it wishes to expand reserves in the system, and vice-versa. Therefore, an additional source of funds for the commercial banks is the rate of equity shares to the central bank, and the public also participates in this market. As in the case of investment deposits, the rate of return on equity shares, rh , depends on the overall profit position of banks, so that in contrast to the official discount rate, it is not determined directly by the central bank.

On the lending side, banks engage in only risk-return sharing *muḍārabah* arrangements with the private sector. *Muḍārabah* financing in this case is assumed to subsume all other types of similar arrangements, such as *mushārah* financing. As in the case of investment deposits, the profits earned from the projects financed by the banks are shared between the bank and the entrepreneur on a pre-arranged basis specified in the contract between the two before the financing is provided. Banks are also required to hold a certain proportion, c , of their liabilities to the private and foreign sectors in the form of reserves with the central bank.

⁹ See Khan and Mirakhor (1987).

The foreign sector holds investment deposits in the banking system and physical capital. The foreign demand for investment deposits, f^d , is a function of the rate of return on investment deposits, rd , less foreign or world interest rate, rf , and the expected depreciation of the domestic currency, \hat{e} . The derivative of f^d , is positive.

The central bank's liabilities consist of reserves of commercial banks and currency held by the public. As mentioned earlier, the central bank holds equity shares of commercial banks, and the rate of return on these is market determined. The supply of reserves is changed by the central bank through variations in its stock of bank equity shares, dG , which in turn alters the cost of borrowing for the banks.

The four excess demand equations for the assets are constrained by the balance sheet, so they contain three independent equations determining rh , rl , and rk , for given values of the exogenous variables. Dropping equation (4) and substituting for D , D^* and rd , leaves three equations to determine the three endogenous rates of return. To derive a result for the direction of movement of one of the rates, we can take the total differentials of the three excess demand equations. Total differential of equations (1) through (3), after suitable substitution, yields equation (8), which determines drh , drl and drk as functions of changes in G , c , H , K , rf , and \hat{e} .

$$(8) \quad AdY + BdX = 0 \text{ or } AdY = -BdX$$

with

$$dy = \begin{bmatrix} drh \\ drs \\ drk \end{bmatrix} \quad dx = \begin{bmatrix} dg \\ dc \\ dh \\ dk \\ drf \\ dé \end{bmatrix}$$

and the coefficient of the matrices A and $-B$ are given in the Appendix. The solution is

$$(9) \quad dY = -A^{-1}BdX.$$

The matrix A , with elements a_{ij} , is a matrix of partial derivatives of the excess demand functions with respect to the endogenous rates of

return, and B is defined analogously with respect to the exogenous variables. The assumption of gross substitutability ensures the following:

- (i) $a_{ii} > 0$ for all i ;
- (ii) $a_{ij} < 0$ for all i, j and $i \neq j$;
- (iii) $a_{ij} = 0$ for all j ; and
- (iv) $\det A > 0$.

The determinant of matrix is positive because condition (iii) implies that A has dominant diagonals by column, which is sufficient for the characteristic roots to have positive real parts. An important result for matrices of this kind is that all cofactors are nonnegative and the inverse of A is composed entirely of nonnegative elements.

Next, we discuss the effect of changes in central bank holdings of commercial bank equities, dG , on the endogenous rates of return. From equation (9) the entries for change in government holdings of bank equities on the endogenous rates of return are given in equations 10 through 12:

$$(10) \quad dr_h/dG = (1/|A|) [-(a_{22}a_{33}) + (a_{23}a_{32})];$$

$$(11) \quad dr_l/dG = (1/|A|) [-(a_{23}a_{31}) + (a_{21}a_{33})]; \text{ and}$$

$$(12) \quad dr_k/dG = (1/|A|) [(-a_{21}a_{32}) + (a_{22}a_{31})].$$

Given the assumptions on matrix A , all three endogenous rates decline in response to an increase in the central bank's holding of bank equities. Intuitively, the results can be explained by noting that the increase in the central bank's holding of bank equities adds immediately to the supply of funds banks have for lending purposes. As banks seek out more projects for *muḍārabah* financing, they accept projects with lower expected rates of return than previously. The lower earnings on *muḍārabah* financing will be reflected in lower returns on *muḍārabah* deposits. Given the decline in *muḍārabah* deposit rates, there is substitution into the market for physical capital, and the increased demand for capital lowers the required rate of return on capital. As discussed earlier in terms of the 'q' theory of investment, this monetary action is expansionary

because it lowers the required rate of return on capital and makes it easier for the economy to accumulate physical capital.

It needs to be mentioned, however, that because deposit rates are flexible and not controlled by the central bank in Islamic banking, there will be partial offsets to the monetary action. As returns on *mudārabah* deposits decline, the private sector will not only substitute into physical capital but also into currency, thereby dampening the expansion of bank intermediation. Furthermore, the foreign sector will reduce its holdings of domestic assets, both *mudārabah* deposits and physical capital, because their rates of return decline. These offsetting international capital flows will depend on the elasticities of the foreign asset demand functions with respect to the rates of return. Thus, the move to greater flexibility in the setting of deposit rates is likely to increase the extent to which capital flows offset monetary policy. But as long as the assets are imperfect substitutes, the offset is only partial. Although the greater flexibility in the rates of return increases the short-run international capital flows offset to monetary policy, this does not at all mean that the adoption of Islamic banking will lead to sustained medium- or long-term capital outflows. The model is presented for the purpose of analyzing short-run effects of monetary policy. To study the long-run implications of Islamic banking for international capital flows, one needs to look at the likely effects that interest-free banking would have on domestic saving and investment. This issue is discussed in the next section.

V. Saving, Investment, Growth And External Borrowing

The foregoing discussion has concentrated on the relationship between monetary policy and the rates of return in an Islamic economy, and how changes in the rates of return affect investment spending. This section focuses on the relationship between domestic saving and investment, on the one hand, and the current account deficit, on the other, in order to shed some light on the external debt servicing capacity issue for an Islamic economy. In the national income

accounts identity, gross national product (GNP) is measured both by expenditure on final product and by the way in which the income that is generated in production is used. As is shown in equation 13.

$$(13) \quad C + I_p + I_g + G + (X - M) = \text{GNP} = C + S + T + R_f.$$

The left-hand side of the identity indicates that expenditure on *GNP* is divided among private consumption C , gross private sector investment I_p , gross government investment I_g , government spending for consumption-type goods and services G , and net exports $X - M$. The right-hand side of the equation indicates that the income earned in production is used up in private consumption C , saving by consumers and businesses S , net tax payment T , and transfer payments to foreigners by private citizens R_f . Subtracting private consumption C from both sides of the identity and rearranging we have equation 14:

$$(14) \quad (M - X) + R_f = (I_p - S) + (I_g + G - T).$$

In other words, the current account deficit equals the sum of the excess of private sector investment over private sector saving and the budget deficit of government. This implies that the higher the current account deficit, the greater is the accumulation of capital, the smaller is the accumulation of private wealth, and the larger is the budget deficit. But a deficit in the current account means a transfer of resources to the country, in the sense that some of the goods and services brought into the country are not paid for by an equivalent claims on the country. In total, the current account deficit must be reflected by changes in the net asset position, irrespective of whether these take place through a reduction in foreign assets (including international reserves) or through borrowing. If a current account deficit results from increased investment, then the economy is trading one asset, the debt instrument, for another, the claim to physical capital. To the extent that borrowed resources have been channeled into productive investments, such investments could be expected—given prudent management of the economy and maintenance of the competitiveness of the external sector—to generate a stream of returns at least sufficient to repay the associated loans. If, on the other hand, the resources were used, directly or indirectly, to sustain con-

sumption, repayment of the indebtedness must be, at least to some extent, at the expense of future levels of consumption, a far more onerous prospect. It is, therefore, of considerable interest to know whether the adoption of an Islamic banking system would lead to increased investment or increased consumption, i.e., whether a stream of real resources is likely to be generated which will permit the eventual repayment of the foreign liabilities.

It could be argued that in an Islamic economic system, particularly with its emphasis upon work and moderation in consumption, saving would be enhanced. Nevertheless, concerns have been expressed that the adoption of an Islamic financial system may lead to a reduction of savings and retardation of financial intermediation and development. One argument suggests that since savings receive no reward (i.e., interest rate is zero) there is no incentive for individuals to save. Another argument asserts that savings will decrease because of increased uncertainty of future prospects in the Islamic system.

The first argument stems from a misunderstanding regarding Islam's prohibition against interest. Those advancing this argument consider the prohibition against interest to be tantamount to an imposition of a zero rate of return on investment and capital. This view reflects a confusion between rate of return and rate of interest. While the latter is forbidden in Islam, the former is not only permitted but is, in fact, encouraged. The second argument is based on the proposition that increased uncertainty in the rate of return affects savings adversely. Recently this issue has been subjected to rigorous theoretical analysis with conflicting results. The few studies that have considered this question within the context of Islamic framework have tended to neglect the risk return tradeoff aspects of the question.¹⁰ That is, the effects on savings of a fixed and certain rate of return are compared with effects on savings when only uncertainty is taken into account, and the obvious result is a reduction in savings in the latter case. If the expected value of return is kept constant while its vari-

¹⁰ See Haque and Mirakhor (1987).

ance is increased, i.e., when increased risk is not compensated by higher returns, savings will be adversely effected. This conclusion, however, is far from obvious when both risk and return are allowed to vary. The theoretical conclusion of an analysis in which risk and return variability have both been taken into account depends on assumptions regarding the form of the utility function and its risk properties; e.g., the degree and the extent of risk aversion, the presence and the degree to which the future is discounted, whether or not increased risk is compensated by higher return, and finally, the income and substitution effects of increased uncertainty.

Haque and Mirakhor (1987) have argued that the structural changes accompanying the adoption of an Islamic financial system may produce favorable effects on the rate of return on savings. The increased rate of return could compensate for the increased level of uncertainty that may result from the elimination of the risk-free asset, thereby leaving the overall level of savings unchanged or perhaps even leading to an increase in savings. They also note that the move to an Islamic banking system cannot be analyzed as an *a priori* increase in uncertainty in the environment in which the consumer is operating. Theoretically, any asset whose return is not *ex ante* fixed and tied to the amount of money invested can be admitted into the menu of assets available in an Islamic financial system. Given the availability of assets with a variety of risk characteristics, the saver can organize a diversified asset portfolio which can enable him to minimize risk in the Islamic financial system as in its counterpart.

In the companion paper to the one just mentioned, Haque and Mirakhor (1987) analyze investment behavior in an interest-free Islamic economy, and their analysis indicated that there is no strong theoretical reason to support the assertion that investment levels would decline if an Islamic profit-sharing system were adopted. Their analysis demonstrates that in the case of perfect certainty and full information, whether investment decisions are based on profit sharing or on a fixed rate of return has no real consequences for the economy. But when uncertainty is introduced, the level of investment may actually increase under certain conditions. Intuitively, the result

can be explained by noting that when a fixed-interest rate is replaced by profit sharing, both the owners of the firm and the lenders to the firm would be residual income earners and a fixed cost for capital would not be required as part of the firm's profit calculations. Therefore, the marginal product of capital could be taken up to the point where maximum profits would be obtained, as the firm does not face the constraint of meeting a fixed cost of capital.

The question of what will happen to the level of savings and investment following the adoption of Islamic banking will ultimately be an empirical one. However, some insights regarding the effect on the current account deficit can be obtained from examining the various possibilities with regards to the movements in savings and investment.

The propositions that follow from the above discussion are that savings and investment are unlikely to decline in an Islamic economy. If both savings and investments rise, then the effect on the current account deficit is ambiguous. Other things being equal, if the increase in saving is greater than the increase in investment, then the current account deficit will be lower. But even if the current account deficit is increased because of a larger increase in investment, the ensuing growth of output would make it feasible ultimately to close the gap between domestic saving and investment to repay the external loans. This statement needs to be qualified to allow that high saving and investment rates by themselves do not imply immunity against difficulties in external debt management. For example, a number of developing countries that apparently devoted the proceeds of external borrowing to investment have, nevertheless, encountered serious debt-servicing problems. The reasons for this are complex, and include both global economic developments—weakness of international trade, protectionist practices in industrial countries, high international interest rates—and policies in the developing countries, especially with regards to fiscal deficits, exchange rates and pricing policies, that lowered the efficiency of investment. While a full analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, two aspects of investment spending in a capital importing economy may be dis-

cussed, insofar as the discussion serves to show that disturbances to asset positions are absorbed more efficiently in an Islamic financial system and capital inflows are less likely to be affected by sudden and uniform shifts in the perception of the country's creditworthiness in Islamic banking than in the conventional form of international bank lending.

The first point we discuss is the well-known result that a high level of capital inflows into a country, which reflects not only a strong demand for external capital but also the absence of substantial credit rationing constraints on its supply, will lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The increased inflows cause an increase in domestic expenditures relative to output. The supply of traded goods required by the increased demand will be met by some combination of increased imports and decreased exports, with the resulting increase in the current account deficit equal to the capital inflow. However, the increased demand for nontraded goods can only be met from domestic supply, and if the supply of nontraded goods is unchanged, their relative price will rise. If one makes the small country assumption that the foreign currency price of traded goods is not affected by developments in the domestic economy, then the rise in the relative price of nontraded goods occurs through either a rise in the domestic currency price of nontraded goods or an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The rise in the relative price of nontraded goods results in the drawing of labor out of the traded goods sector because the real wage rate in terms of nontraded goods declines. However, the wage rate measured in terms of traded goods and the real wage rate (that is, in terms of all goods consumed) both rise because of the resource movement effect. This increase in the cost of labor has an adverse effect on external competitiveness. A sudden reduction in the level of capital inflows, either because borrowers are frozen out of the markets by the credit rationing phenomenon or because they cease borrowing voluntarily in the face of high interest rates in world financial markets, will require a fall in the real exchange rate to restore equilibrium and may involve substantial short-run adjustment costs, in terms of foregone output and under-

employed resources, if resources cannot be shifted back quickly to the traded goods sector.

These types of adjustment problems will be less severe in an Islamic financial system, both because the fluctuations in capital inflows are dampened and because the transfer of resources from the nontraded goods sector to the traded goods sector is facilitated by Islamic banking. Muslim scholars have little doubt that a financial system based on an Islamic framework of profit sharing would be more efficient in allocating resources and more stable as compared to a conventional interest-based system.¹¹ It is argued that allocational improvements would occur because investment alternatives are, to one another, based strictly on their productivity and rates of return, and better quality investment projects will be undertaken because the saver becomes an entrepreneur sharing in the profits earned. As payment commitments of firms and financial institutions are mostly dividends that will have to be paid only if profits are received, the decline in the profitability in the nontraded goods sector of the sort discussed above will be reflected quickly in the returns earned by investors on the nontraded goods sector, thereby encouraging the investors to switch their resources to firms or financial institutions that are active in the traded goods sector.

The second aspect of financial intermediation and investment spending in a capital importing country is the case where existing debt constrains the flow of new credits and domestic investment. The argument as presented in Dooley (1987) is that when a country experiences an exogenous reversal in its economic prospects, a wedge can become established between the contractual and market value of debt. The contractual value of debt can be defined as the present value of the stream of payments set out in the initial contract between the debtor and the creditor on the assumption that such payments will be made with certainty. The market valuation of that contract is the present value of the market's expectation of the stream of payments

¹¹ It must be pointed out that external borrowing in an Islamic economy will also have to be based on a profit-and-risk-sharing basis.

that will actually be made under the contract. Whereas the contractual value is generally above the market valuation to cover the possibility that the contractual obligations may not be carried out. Circumstances can arise where uncertainty among new investors as to whether or not they will be forced to share an expected loss on existing unprofitable investments through increased taxation, exchange rate depreciation, and other means that the government may employ, causes a sharp slowdown of new investment in the capital-importing country.

In this regard, an important difference between interest-based international bank lending and Islamic modes of financing is that, whereas in the former, interest payments are due irrespective of the uses to which original borrowing had been put, payments in the latter are closely linked to the returns on the underlying investment.^{12 13} Due to the prohibition against charging interest and the fact that banks will have to rely primarily on profit-sharing, Islamic banks will have to offer their asset portfolios of primary securities in the form of risky, open-ended, mutual-fund type packages for sale to the investor depositors, as opposed to the conventional bank practice of keeping title to the portfolios they originate. In the Islamic system, there will also be greater interdependence and closer relationship between investment deposit yields because banks can primarily accept investment deposits on the basis of profit sharing and can provide funds to the enterprises on the same basis. Due to the fact that the return to lia-

¹² See Khan (1986) and Mirakhor (1986).

¹³ There is a marked shift from nondebt-creating flows—official transfers and private direct investment—to debt-creating and interest-sensitive borrowing by developing countries in world capital markets. During the 1986's, the main form of international bank lending was short-term trade credit. During the 1970s, however, institutional developments in the domestic banking systems of the industrial countries lowered the risk on deposit liabilities of the money-center banks, which enabled the major banks to become the largest recipients of international loanable funds. Furthermore, financial innovations—notably the growth of syndicated loans and the increased use of cross-default clauses—reduced perceived levels of risk in lending to developing country borrowers, resulting in a significant rise in the volume of private bank lending.

bilities will be a direct function of the return to asset portfolios and also because assets are created in response to investment opportunities in the real sector, the return to financing is removed from the cost side and relegated to the profit side, thereby allowing the rate of return to financing to be determined by productivity in the real sector. It will be the real sector that determines the rate of return to the financial sector in the Islamic financial system, rather than the other way round. For these reasons, Islamic banking tends to reduce the vulnerability of the capital importing country to fluctuations in the level of capital inflows and sharp slowdown of new investment due to uncertainty among investors.

This can be further explained in terms of the 'q' theory of investment that was discussed in Section III. One way to look at 'q' is that it represents the comparison between the marginal efficiency of capital and the financial cost of capital. The marginal efficiency of capital is the internal rate of return on investment at its cost in the commodity markets, whereas the financial cost of capital is the rate at which investors discount future returns from investment. The reason new investment does not take place when a wedge becomes established between the contractual and market value of debt is not primarily because marginal productivity of capital is reduced but, more importantly, because investors discount future returns from new investment on the basis of a very high discount rate, which reflects their expectations that proceeds from their investments will be used to service the existing large external debt. The problem of high discount rates on new investments will not arise in the Islamic financial system because the liabilities of each economic unit are composed of equities, are fully amortized with an underlying future income flow, and no debt refinancing can take place. If there is any refinancing, it must be based on the sharing of future income expected from assets.

VI. Concluding Remarks

The aim of this paper has been to extend the analysis of monetary policy to the case of an open Islamic economy. A general equilibrium model for analyzing investment and external balance was pre-

sented. The model should not be taken too literally; rather, it should be regarded as an exploration of monetary policy in an Islamic economy when there are offsetting international capital flows. While the strong qualitative results that emerge from this paper hinge on the specific assumptions used, the basic conclusions are of general interest. Without denying the constraint imposed upon monetary policy by substitution possibilities among domestic and foreign assets, the paper argues that monetary policy can be used to affect output in an open Islamic economy. The rate of return on equity shares of commercial banks is market determined, but the supply of reserves is changed by the central bank through variations in its stock of bank equity shares, which in turn alters the cost of borrowing for the banks. While an increase in the supply of bank reserves will lower the deposit rates, the substitution of currency and foreign assets for domestic bank deposits will not offset the monetary expansion completely so long as the assets are imperfect substitutes.

Although the move to greater flexibility in the setting of deposit rates is likely to increase the extent to which international capital flows offset monetary policy, this does not imply that Islamic banking will lead to sustained medium- or long-term capital outflows. To study the long-run implications of Islamic banking for international capital flows, the paper discussed the effects that interest-free banking would have on domestic saving and investment. It was argued that savings and investment are likely to increase in an Islamic economy so that the effect on the current account position is ambiguous. However, to the extent that borrowed resources are channelled into productive investments, such investments could be expected to generate a stream of returns at least sufficient to repay the associated loans. Furthermore, the Islamic system has some advantages over the conventional interest-based system in terms of adjustment to certain types of macroeconomic disturbances because the liabilities of each economic unit are composed of equities and, therefore, fluctuations in international capital flows on domestic investment are dampened.

Appendix

Coefficient Matrices

$$b_{rh}^h(1-c)(D+D^*)+b^h(1-c)p_{rh}^d \quad b_{rl}^h(1-c)(D+D^*)+b^h(1-c)(p_{rd}^d+f^d)\dot{r}+r'+\dot{r}p_{rl}^h \quad b^h(1-c)p_{rk}^d+p_{rk}^h$$

$$A = b_{rh}^l(1-c)(D+D^*)+b^l(1-c)p_{rh}^d \quad b_{rl}^l(1-c)(D+D^*)+b^l(1-c)(p_{rd}^d+f^d)\dot{r}-p_{rl}^l \quad b^l(1-c)p_{rk}^d+p_{rk}^l$$

$$p_{rh}^k \quad p_{rl}^k+p_{rd}^k \dot{r} \quad f_{rk}^k+p_{rk}^k$$

$$-1 \quad b^h(D+D^*) \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad b^h(1-c)f^d \quad b^h(1-c)f^d$$

$$-B = 0 \quad b^l(D+D^*) \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad b^l(1-c)f^d \quad b^l(1-c)f^d$$

$$0 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad f^k \quad f^k$$

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Comments on “Stabilization and Growth In an Open Islamic Economy”

Medhat Hassanein

Stabilization and Growth in an Open Islamic Economy by A. Mirakhor and I. Zaidi focuses on the following major issues of concern to Islamic economics: savings and investment in a zero-interest economy, the role of monetary policy (known to economists as the management of the interest rate), open market operations, and the reserve ratio as it is used to stabilize the economy, real versus financial sectors, the rate of return on real assets versus the cost of fund acquisition, and last but not least, the inflow and outflow of capital to an Islamic economy. This paper should be looked at as a serious attempt by Muslim economists to position Islamic economics in the literature of economics, using the same tools and instruments which invite other economists to respond, positively or negatively, to their concepts and views. This dialogue is essential in gaining support and creating awareness among a wider spectrum of specialized scholars.

Mirakhor and Zaidi establish the following propositions:

1. In a zero-interest economy, savings and investment are unlikely to decline.
2. A financial system based upon a framework of profit sharing would be more efficient in resource allocation.
3. The agents of development in a ‘conventional’ economy are savers and investors. In an Islamic economy the same two agents exist but they usually act differently, in the sense that they are both entrepreneurs.

These three propositions are quoted from previous works by Iqbal and Mirakhor, Khan, Haque, and others. However, the model developed in this paper adds a fourth proposition, which is that a monetary policy can be used to affect output in an open Islamic economy.

One tends to agree with these four propositions based upon the logical presentation and the equilibrium model's development. The general equilibrium model rests on the assumption of imperfect but gross substitution among four assets, namely, currency, bank deposits, bank equities, and physical capital. This implies that the partial derivative of the asset demand function with respect to the own rate is positive, while with respect to an alternative rate, it is negative or zero. This assumption is essential to the model's validity. The three partial derivatives drh , drl , drk with respect to dG have to move in the same direction so as to institute the impact of monetary policy on output. Gross substitution ensures this one directional movement, and imperfect substitution dampens the expansion of bank intermediation.

At this stage, one should critically evaluate the substitutability assumption. Bank deposits, bank equities, and currency are all financial assets; they have the property of being substitutable though imperfectly. Infact, one may doubt whether physical and financial assets may be substituted. The rate of return on physical capital, i.e., the marginal efficiency of capital, is determined by long-term expectations of future returns. Returns on financial assets floated by the banking sector are determined by short-term expectations. In a nonzero interest economy the relationship between short-term and long-term interest rates is governed by three theories: the expectation theory, the liquidity preference theory, and the segmentation theory. These theories conclude that movements in the long-term interest rates are not necessarily related to movements in the short-term interest rates. By the same analogy, the assumption that short-term rates of return tend to affect long-term rates of return need to have further supportive evidence.

Another strong proposition of the paper is that although the greater flexibility in the rates of return increases the short-term international capital flows offset to monetary policy, the adoption of Islamic banking will lead to sustained medium or long-term capital

outflows. Our intuition is that in an equity economy and in the absence of fixed guaranteed returns, capital movements, both inflows and outflows, tend to be more or less sustainable depending upon foreign expectations of movements of equity returns.

Mirakhor and Zaidi's model is developed as a deterministic model. The Modern Portfolio Theory (Sharpe and *et al.*) explains rates of return on equity in a probabilistic form. The prominent Capital Asset Pricing Theory (CAMP) states that

$$E(R_j) = R_f + B (E(R_m) - R_f);$$

$$E(R_j) = \text{Expected rate of return on stock } j;$$

$$R_f = \text{Risk free rate of return, if } R_f = 0, \text{ model's conclusion is still valid;}$$

$$E(R_m) = \text{The expected rate of return on the market portfolio;}$$

$$B = \frac{\text{Cov}(R_j R_m)}{\text{Var } M} ;$$

$$= \text{Systematic risk.}$$

This implies that the 'expected returns' rather than 'returns' should be included in the model specification in an Islamic monetary system. Whether expected rates of return on equity can best be explained by CAMP or the most recently developed arbitrage theory need to be studied. The point that must be emphasized here is that probabilistic models should be used to explain rates of return in an Islamic economic system rather than in the conventional monetary policy deterministic models.

The last point in the Mirakhor and Zaidi model is the absence of risk analysis in the overall specification of the model—more specifically, the absence of a country risk factor in the D^* equation. This equation explains foreign demand for investment deposits as a function of the rate of return on investment deposits, less foreign or world interest rate and the expected depreciation of the domestic currency. No one would expect all Muslim economies to have a country risk factor equal to zero; in fact, a Muslim country, with its own distinctive economic and political conditions, may carry a positive country risk factor. In the case of running the D^* equation in a risk-analysis

system, country risk as an argument of this equation should be included.

Another point related to specifying the D^* equation is the inclusion of a world interest rate. Though this is relevant when comparing investment in non-Islamic economies to investment in Islamic economies, a more appropriate exogenous variable would be a weighted average expected rate of return in other Muslim countries. Foreign investment usually compares world opportunities both to Muslim economies' investment opportunities and to one Muslim economy's investment opportunities.

There are a few remaining points worth mentioning. The relationship between bank shareholders and bank depositors in the decision making process concerning the management of an Islamic bank and the fair and equitable distribution of bank profit, invites further analysis by Muslim bankers. The comparison of the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) to the financial cost of capital is artificial in an Islamic project evaluation context. In an interest-based economy the MEC is different from the cost of capital. But in a zero-interest economy the rate of discount for investment projects would be the MEC or the internal rate of return (IRR), depending upon whether it is determined ex-post or ex-ante.

Comments on “Stabilization and Growth In an Open Islamic Economy”

Hanaa Kheir-El-Din

Stabilization and Growth in an Open Islamic Economy is a well written and well thought out paper. It is very informative and in some places illuminating. It represents a serious and profound attempt to study both the short- and long-term stabilization and growth effects of a banking system that operates on the basis of risk and profit sharing in an open economy.

First, I would like to make a general comment that concerns the paper’s overall approach. In the context of a Muslim forum where, presumably, we believe in Islam and its political, social and economic superiority, the search should not be to determine whether the Islamic system is more or less stable than the ‘conventional’ one, or whether the Islamic system is more or less conducive to growth or more or less capable of adjusting to microeconomic disturbances. Rather, the search should be concerned with finding economic tools—whether original or conventional—which, in accordance with the shari‘ah, optimally achieve the objectives of the economy; and after determining these economic tools finding their economic properties and effects. The paper, not following this approach, instead, alters the ‘conventional’ relationships to fit the Islamic requirements and then compares the results in the two cases. As a result, the authors often sound apologetic and seem to imply that the conventional system is the ideal standard to be used to assess any other system.

The following are comments relating to details of the paper.

When comparing the Islamic system with the conventional one, it is alleged that in an Islamic system, there would be “a more cautious, selective and perhaps more efficient project selection by savers and investors” than in the conventional interest-based system. I do not see any justification to this conclusion so long as the convention-

al system offers, in addition to the fixed-interest yielding assets, the possibility of profit sharing through equity holding. On the contrary, one may argue that the coexistence of both kinds of assets in the conventional system makes the choice of profit-sharing projects more selective and more efficient.

When the authors describe the Islamic financial system, they mention two principal models of Islamic banking. The first one requires that “demand deposits must be paid to the depositors on demand and has no specific reserve requirement.” The second “stipulates a 100 percent reserve requirement for the demand deposits [and] . . . no reserve requirement for investment balances.” The first allegation is not clear and one wonders why, for safety and confidence purposes, demand deposits should not be subject to a specific reserve requirement in an Islamic banking framework, thus liberating a set proportion of these deposits to be used in financing further projects and enhancing the potential of the bank to earn profits. As for the latter allegation, it reminds one of the medieval goldsmiths’ practices of safe-keeping deposits. Given that the likelihood of withdrawing all demand deposits simultaneously is slim, it has no justification. This point of view has already been advanced by previous writers in the field. Thus, in both kinds of models it is not plausible in terms of their reserve requirements, to treat demand deposits in the Islamic banking framework differently from those in the conventional banking system.

We turn now to the general equilibrium model. It is developed to specify how rates of return on various financial and real assets are determined and is used to illustrate how monetary policy may, through altering these rates, affect investment, output and the balance of payments (see Section IV). Several remarks may be registered about the model offered in the paper.

First, the model is based on the main assumption that “there are three financial assets and one real asset, and the set of excess demand equations for these assets determines the rate on the assets, given the values of the various exogenous variables.” Formulated this way, the model disregards an essential feature of an Islamic

economy, namely, that the rate to the financial assets is determined by the rate of return on the real asset. To capture this feature, the model should include relationships to specify the factors that determine various returns on the financial assets as a function of the return on physical capital. Thus, rd , rl rh should somehow be directly related to rk .

Second, rl is defined as the rate on bank loans. What does this represent in an Islamic context? Is it the rate at which the commercial bank borrows from the central bank on an equity participation basis? If it is, then the term is misleading and should be replaced with a more accurate one. In general, the terms 'loans' and 'borrow' often used in this section and in the following section are misleading, as they imply the obligation of the receiver of the funds to repay at least the principal, regardless of the outcome of the ventures in which they were employed. However, this is not true in an Islamic system where repayment of the principal more or less depends on the outcome of the venture.

Third, equation (7) expresses the rate on bank deposits, rd , as a function of the rate of bank loans, rl , thus reflecting the influence of the conventional way of thinking on the authors. Instead, it seems that any of these rates should be tied to rk , the rate of return on physical capital.

Fourth, in coefficients matrix A shown in the Appendix, the first element, i.e., the coefficient of drh in the first equation, is missing a third term, namely, $+ p_{rh}$, which represents the effect of changes in rh on the demand by the domestic private sector on bank equity.

Fifth, the first remark mentioned above is further illustrated by the result that the central bank may affect the supply of reserves "through variations in its stock of bank equity shares dG , which in turn alters the cost of borrowing for the banks." This statement is confusing and does not seem to accord with the requirements of an Islamic system. Instead, the central bank, through affecting the supply of reserves and thus the funds available for financing real investments, should affect the rate of return on physical capital, which in

turn should affect the rates of return on other financial assets. There is here a question of causality that has to be settled.

Concerning the paper's use of G to refer to both government holding of bank equities (in equations 10 through 12) and to government spending for consumption-type goods and services (in equations 13 and 14), as is well-known, one should avoid using the same notation to refer to different variables.

In Section V, the paper begins to discuss the effect that comes from the prohibition of interest and the resulting increased uncertainty on both savings and investment. The argument concerning the effect of an interest free economy on investment is sound; however, the argument concerning its effect on saving is refutable and implies a confusion between the decision to save and to invest. The return on saving, according to current economic thinking, is not a major determinant of saving. As correctly mentioned in the paper, saving is a behavioral decision determined by the form of the utility function of the individual which, in Islam, emphasizes work and moderation in consumption, thus enhancing saving. However, the decision concerning the form in which these savings are held, is subject to another set of variables of which risk and relative return are essential components. In this context, the role of zakah is essential in discouraging hoarding and stimulating the search for investment financing, either directly through *mudārabah* or *mushārahah*, or indirectly through investment deposit.

Finally, Section V is concerned with investigating the capacity of the Islamic financial system to "repay its foreign loans" or "to service the existing large external debt." One should mention that the current account deficit, in an Islamic framework, would be financed either through a reduction of foreign assets or through direct foreign investment. The latter is available only for productive ventures. Financing nonproductive ventures (such as imports) or nonreturn-yielding investments (such as infrastructure) would be financed through grants, or through constraining external spending to the available domestic resources. Thus, talking about external debt or foreign loans seems to be in conflict with a basic condition of an Islamic system.

**Development and Islam:
Selected Bibliography**

Muhyiddin Aṭīyah

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